WORLD BANK Report No. 18322 INDIA - WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SECTOR REVIEW REPORT ON INTER-SECTORAL WATER ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT VOLUME II: DATA AND CASE STUDY ANNEX June 27, 1998 Rural Development Unit South Asia Region World Bank In Cooperation with Ministry of Water Resources Government of India India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II: DATA AND CASE STUDY ANNEX Annex 1. BOXES ON WATER AVAILABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION Box Al.l. River Basin Water Availability ............................................1..... Box Al.2. Water Availability in Selected Countries ..................................2 Box Al.3. Global Water Issues .......................................................... 3 Annex 2. BOXES ON WATER-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH ISSUES Box A2. 1. Water-related Environmental and Health Issues in India .4 Box A2.2. Impact of Domestic and Industrial Effluents in Bellandur (Kamataka) .6 Box A2.3. Coastal Zones in India: Environmental Problems and Management Possibilities .7 Box A2.4. State-Wise Groundwater Problem Areas from Industrial Pollution .9 Box A2.5. CPCB Classification of Fresh Water and Primary Quality Criteria .10 Box A2.6. ISI Drinking Water Standards .11 Box A2.7. Institutions and their Environmental and Water-related Programs .12 Box A2.8. Current Environmental and Water-related Programs in India .16 Box A2.9. Using Price Mechanisms for Pollution Control: The Case of the Dutch Water Boards .19 Box A2.1O. Incorporating Requirements of Aquatic Ecology in Water Resources Management: Indian and International Experience .21 Box A2. 11. A River Runs Through It: Delhi and the Yamuna River Basin .22 Annex 3. BOXES ON RIVER BASIN ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS Box A3. 1. The Inter-State Water Disputes Act for Establishing Tribunals: Existing Limitations .26 Box A3.2. The Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal Award .......................... 28 Box A3.3. River Basin Management: Indian Experience .29 Box A3.4. River Basin Organizations: International Experience and India's DVC Experience .31 Box A3.5. River Basin Management: Murray-Darling Basin Experience, Australia .34 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Box A3.6. Joint Management of Shared Aquifers Between the Israelis and Palestinians: Institutional Mechanisms ........................... 37 Box A3.7. Establishing Institutions for Water Allocation, Planning and Management at State Levels: Experience Under the WRCPs in Tamil Nadu and Orissa ........................................... 39 Box A3.8. Vaigai Basin Stakeholder Participation .................................. 41 Box A3.9. Institutional Linkages: Proposed Calcutta Environmental Management Strategy ........................................... 43 Annex 4. BOXES ON ECONOMICS AND PRICING Box A4.1. Indian Agricultural and Industrial GDP, 1986-1995 ............... 44 Box A4.2. Working Expenses and Interest on Capital Outlay in Irrigation Projects, 1974-1992 ........................................... 45 Box A4.3. Estimated Demand for Water in Mehsana, Gujarat ................ 46 Box A4.4. Differential Pollution Fees for Industry in Tamil Nadu .......... 47 Box A4.5 Water Pollution Fees for Industry in Andhra Pradesh ............ 48 Box A4.6. Calcutta's Water Supply and Surrogate Volumetric Water Pricing ......................................... 49 Box A4.7. Long-term Marginal Cost of Water Supply in South Africa ... 50 Box A4.8. How Domestic Sugar Policies Affect Water Use .................... 52 Box A4.9. Government of Karnataka's Agricultural Policy .................... 53 Box A4. 10. Market Failure and Rationale for Government Intervention in Water Resources Management ......................................... 54 Annex 5. BOXES ON WATER RIGHTS AND WATER MARKETS Box A5.1. Surface and Groundwater Rights: International Experience 55 Box A5.2 Protecting Existing Rights While Instituting a New Water Rights System: International Experience ............................... 56 Box A5.3. Pre-conditions for Efficient, Equitable and Environmentally Sustainable Water Markets ........................................... 57 Box A5.4. Opportunities for Establishing Water Rights and a Groundwater District: The Case of Chennai ........................................... 58 Box A5.5. Economic Scope and Institutional Constraints for Inter-Sectoral Water Allocation: The Case of Hyderabad ............................. 60 Box A5.6. Groundwater Transfers and Latent Water Markets in Periyar- Vaigai Basin, Tamil Nadu ........................................... 61 Box A5.7. California Drought Water Bank ........................................... 63 Box A5.8. Water Markets in Chile ........................................... 64 Annex 6. BOXES ON TECHNOLOGY Box A6. 1. Environmental Technology Options for Water Management. 65 Box A6.2. Integrated Wetland System for Wastewater Treatment and Reuse ........................................... 67 Box A6.3. Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) ......................... 68 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 7. BOXES ON BASIN MODELING AND PLANNING Box A7. 1. Institutional Responsibilities in Water-related Data Collection ........................................ 69 Box A7.2. Some Axioms for Good Basin Planning (Knowledge Driven- Knowledge Management) ........................................ 70 Box A7.3. Modeling for Stakeholder Participation: The THANNI Model for the Vaigai Basin ....................................... 71 Box A7.4. Inter-Sectoral Water Resources Planning and Management in a River Basin Context ................. ....................... 75 Annex 8. BRAINSTORMING SESSION ON IMPROVING INTER-SECTORAL WATER ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT List of Participants .................................................. 79 Annex 9. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON INTER- SECTORAL WATER ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT ............................................................ 80 Cover ........................................................... 81 Workshop Program ........................................................... 82 List of Participants ........................................................... 84 Recommendations from Workshop Sub-Groups Group 1: Policies, Strategies and Legislation ................ .................... 86 Group 2: Institutional Arrangements ................................................. 88 Group 3: Inter-Sectoral Perspectives, Allocation Principles and Mechanisms, and Economic and other Instruments ........... 90 Group 4: Technical, Environment and Public Awareness ......... ........ 92 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 1. Water Availability and Distribution Box A1.1 River Basin Water Availability Catchment Area Average Annual Replenishable Estimated 1991 Per Capita Available Per Capita Surface River Basin (million hectares) Surface Water Groundwater Population (millions) Surface Water and Groundwater Availability (BCM) Resources (BCM) (cubic meters) (cubic meters) Indus 32.13 73.31 26.55 41.90 1,749 2383.29 Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna 109.76 1110.62 206.07 392.04 18,061 3358.56 System (includes Ganga & Brahmaputra & Barak) Ganga 86.15 525.02 171 356.80 1,471 1950.73 Brahmaputra & Barak 23.61 585.60 35.07 35.24 16,589 17612.66 Godavari 31.28 110.54 40.6 53.98 2,048 2799.93 Krishna 25.89 78.12 26.4 60.78 1,285 1719.64 Cauvery 8.12 21.36 12.3 29.33 728 1147.63 Subemarekha 2.92 12.37 1.8 9.46 1,307 1497.89 Brahmani-Baitarni 5.18 28.48 4.05 9.77 2,915 3329.58 Mahanadi 14.16 66.88 16.5 26.60 2,513 3134.59 Pennar 5.52 6.32 4.93 9.70 651 1159.79 Mahi 3.48 11.02 10.48 1,052 1051.53 Sabarmati 2.17 3.81 10.58 360 360.11 Narmada 9.88 45.64 10.8 14.70 3,109 3839.46 Tapi 6.51 14.88 8.27 14.80 1,007 1564.19 West Flowing Rivers 28.9 a. Tapi to Tadri 5.59 87.41 25.80 3,383 3387.98 b. Tadri to Kanyakumari 5.62 113.53 32.60 3,480 3482.52 c. Kutch and Saurashtra incl. 32.19 15.10 22.10 683 683.26 Luni East Flowing Rivers 18.2 a. Mahanadi to Godavari 8.66 22.52 23.60 953 954.24 b. Pennar to Kanyakumari 10.01 16.46 45.20 366 364.16 Area of Inland Drainage in 6 7.10 Rajasthan . Minor Rivers draining into 3.63 31.00 2.10 14,623 Bangladesh and Myanmar Source: Indian Water Resources Society, 1997. 1 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 1. Water Availability and Distribution Box A1.2 Water Availability in Selected Countries Country Per Capita Water Availability (m3 per year) Africa * Algeria 528 * Egypt 923 * Kenya 1,069 * Libya 111 * Morocco 1,110 * South Africa 1,206 Asia * Singapore 211 Europe * Belgium 1,236 * United Kingdom 1,219 Middle East * Israel 382 * Jordan 314 * Kuwait 103 * Lebanon 1,854 * Oman 892 * Saudi Arabia 254 * United Arab Emirates 1,047 * Yemen, Rep. 359 South America * Peru 1,682 Source: World Resources Institute, 1997. (Adapted for India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 2 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 1. Water Availability and Distribution Box A1.3 Global Water Issues In India, freshwater demand will increase considerably in the coming decades, and a growing number of people will be affected by shortages. Because of high demand, more efficient use of water will not reduce the overall pressure on freshwater resources. In addition to freshwater demand, water availability is likely to change in the future. Global climate change, as indicated by increasing average global temperature and increasing carbon dioxide levels, probably will cause a wider variability in precipitation. According to projections with the Asian-Pacific AIM Model (Morita et al., 1995, in RIVM/UNEP, 1997), the widely expected doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations in the coming decades will cause half the world area to have higher water discharges, particularly in northern India, northern Russia and northern North America. By contrast, reductions in water discharges will likely be more prevalent in southern India, Africa, West Asia and China. There is strong evidence that glaciers in the Himalayas are melting and it is expected that within 50 years, most of the glaciers will have disappeared. This change in available snow-melt water, combined with the above predicted increases in rainfall pattern in northern India, will likely cause considerable changes in the annual runoff pattern of the Ganges. There might be less water available during a part of the dry season, affecting irrigated agriculture and food production. At the same time, runoff during the monsoon might strongly increase, causing flooding, loss of property and life, and loss of agricultural production. Better prediction models in the years to come will provide more insight into such possible eventualities. Source: R. Robelus Based on Bakkes and van Woerden, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 3 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.1 Water-related Environmental and Health Issues in India Environmental Sectors and Activities Contributing to Effect on Sectors and Other Water Users Problem Problem Reduced river flow * Irrigated Agriculture, Industry and * Ecology: change or loss of aquatic Domestic Water Users: excessive ecology; loss of river regenerative withdrawal of river water capability * Fishery: loss of fish and foreclosure of fishing activities * Tourism: foreclosure of recreational uses * Religion: loss of water for ceremonial use Organic pollution of * Industry: discharge of untreated * Water supply: contamination of water rivers industrial effluents for various uses * Domestic Sector: discharge of raw * Tourism: foreclosure of recreational sewage and inadequate disposal of uses domestic solid waste * Religion: inadequacy of water for ceremonial use Top-soil erosion and * Agriculture: land use techniques leading * Agriculture: soil and nutrient loss; river siltation to soil erosion loss of irrigation water storage * Forestry: deforestation * Energy (hydro-power): loss of storage capacity and power production * Flood control: reduced flood protection Toxic pollution of * Industry: inadequate disposal of * Domestic water supply: contamination surface and ground hazardous wastes and discharge of of drinking water water industrial effluents * Ecology: toxic effects on aquatic organisms and changes in aquatic community structure Nutrients: surface and * Agriculture: surface runoff or leaching of * Domestic water supply: excess nitrate groundwater nitrogen, phosphorus applied as in drinking water contamination and fertilizer, and animal wastes * Energy (hydro-power), irrigation and eutrophication of lakes * Sanitation: discharge of raw sewage; flood control: impairment of reservoirs and reservoirs infiltration from inadequate disposal of due to eutrophication domestic solid waste * Fishery: loss of fish * Ecology: disruption of food chain and propagation of unwanted species Waterbome diseases * Urban and Rural Sanitation: discharge of * Domestic water supply: unsafe raw sewage and inadequate disposal of drinking water domestic solid waste * Health: water-related illness * Education and Health: inadequate education in hygiene Water logging and soil * Irrigated Agriculture: over-use of water * Agriculture: loss of arable land salinity and inadequate drainage 4 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.1 (cont.) Water-related Environmental and Health Issues in India Environmental Sectors and Activities Contributing to Effect on Sectors and Other Water Users Problem Problem Loss of wetlands * Urban growth and industrial * Ecology: loss of biodiversity development in ecologically sensitive * Fisheries: destruction of coastal areas areas and loss of mangrove forests for fish * Agricultural expansion breeding * Water-related projects Groundwater depletion * Irrigated Agriculture: excessive * Domestic water supply: inadequate and contamination from withdrawal of groundwater quantity and quality of drinking water saline sea water * Domestic water supply: excessive * Agriculture: inadequate water quantity intrusion withdrawal of groundwater for irrigation Source: Medeiros and Dave, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 5 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.2 Impact of Domestic and Industrial Effluents in Bellandur (Karnataka) Bellandur cauliflower, greens and other vegetables were once famous in Bangalore. The people in Bellandur used to enjoy the 'tank festival' of a temple in the vast Bellandur tank. But all these have become part of one's memory, due to the inundation of the tank by sewage water and industrial effluents. The residents of Bellandur and their cattle have been afflicted by skin diseases after consuming contaminated water drawn from borewells and open wells. The milk from Bellandur cows has become tasteless and the cowdung watery, indicating serious health problems in the cattle. The once popular cattle show has also been discontinued. The centuries-old 950-acre tank, which used to supply drinking water to many villages, has been rendered useless. The tank had also been a major fish rearing center, but aquatic life came to an end 15 years ago with the contamination of water. Source: http://www.indiaserver.com/news/thehindu/THBO4.htmIl, 22 April 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 6 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.3 Coastal Zones in India: Environmental Problems and Management Possibilities Importance of Indian Coastal Zones: According to the UN by the year 2000 about 75 % of the human population of the world will live in a narrow strip, up to 60 km wide, along the shores of the continents. In Asia, 65% of the cities having a population of over 2,5 million inhabitants are located along the coasts. India is not unaware of this average: nearly one forth of its population lives within the same distance of the shoreline. In other words, coastal zone ecosystems are some of the most important life support systems of the country. The coastal zones of India are highly diverse: all the coastal types identified by the Ramsar Convention are present in the country, representing 50% of the total type of wetlands of the world. The most important shore types are shallow waters, beaches, salt flats, mudflats, cliffs and rocky shores, which represent more than 65% of the area of coastal zones. Mangroves, coral reefs and brackish lagoons cover most of the other 35%. These ecosystems are very productive with productivity values often approaching or exceeding the ones of many agricultural systems. Wood production in mangals, for example, is equal to or better than in some forests with values reaching 216 m3/ha/year. Coastal zones have also a high biodiversity value. GOI, aware of the ecological importance of many of these sites, established 7 National Parks in shore areas, representing 8,4% of India's total coastal area. More than 70% of this area was identified as good habitat for migratory species. Nearly 42% is important for the presence of rare species, and 24% registers endemic ones. In addition, 73% of the area has a high ecological value for maintaining biodiversity, in any of its types (genetic, species or ecosystems). But the distribution of these protected areas is not homogeneous, with an important under-representation of sites of high biodiversity value such as the Great Rann in Gujarat, Calimere-Vedaranayam in the SE coast and the Mahanadi delta and Salt Lakes in the NE coast, among others. Coastal environmental issues in India: The loss of total wetlands worldwide is estimated in 50% of those that once existed (Dugan, 1993). No precise information is available about the specific loss of coastal areas in India. However, it is well accepted that this degradation is primarily concentrated in the areas with higher biodiversity importance such as mangroves, coastal wetlands and coral reefs. Pollution and demographic growth pressures are the main causes of this degradation. It has been estimated that 20,000 million litres/day of domestic sewage reach the Indian coasts every day, discharged mostly in untreated conditions due to the lack of treatment facilities. Extractive activities such as fisheries, oil & salt production and mining are also generating irreversible impacts in the natural environments. In the Indian Sunderbans, for example, more than 100,000 ha of mangrove land have already been lost. In Gujarat, which concentrates 80% of the national salt production, soil salinization and increases in bromine concentration have also exterminated several has of mangrove forests. In Goa, iron-ore mining generates mineral deposits that acidifies soils and leads to iron oxide deposition in more than 18% of the total coastal land. Pollution by crude and refined oil is also another of the major threats affecting Indian coasts. Some areas of the tanker routes of the Bay of Bengal are more polluted than the Arabian Sea, with oil concentrations ranging from 0 to 69,75 mg/sqm as opposed to concentrations for 0 to 6 mg/sqm from the latter. In addition, in the Northern Ocean about 4800 tonnes of floating tar balls with a residence time of 30 to 60 days deposit every year. The rural potential of Indian coastal zones and coastal management possibilities: With the increase of Indian population and the consequent reduction of the per capita arable land, India's rich aquatic coastal resources become more important as potential reserves to sustain population. Up to now, coastal zones of India are hardly seen as areas of high rural production. India's aquaculture is one of the activities with good potential, but it is still in its early phase. Until now, it is mainly a land-based brackish water activity, with a scarce but promising sea-based mariculture. India's high potential for this activity relies on having one of the 7 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues richest shrimp biodiversities in the world, with more than 50 varieties. Since the Fifth Five Years Plan, GO0 has recognized this potential and started promoting several intensive aquaculture programs. But while this activity gets more support from Indian authorities, its haphazard growth makes it essential to base its policy framework in more environmentally sound principles. Such principles, for example, should select and delimit areas for priority use, outline forbidden coastal zones because of their biodiversity importance, ensure good environmental conditions for farmers, select and develop better genetic varieties, reduce environmental impacts on natural ecosystems and extend skills and ecologically sustainable technologies to producers. Another under-exploited activity in most of the Indian coastal areas is agroforestry. Sandy beaches and dunes are good habitats for casuarina, peanut, coconut, mango, cashewnut, maize and vegetable plantations. Agroforestry and tree plantations in coastal zones can also contribute to reduce the immense pressure originated by fodder and fuel-wood collection on mangrove areas. It is estimated that the area available for this activity is more than 100 times the present extension of mangals. Some Joint Forest Management initiatives involving coastal communities by agroforestry have already started in several areas along the western coast, allowing re-conversion of mudflats to mangrove forests and releasing the pressure on them by providing additional resources originated in agroforestry practices. But all of these initiatives are still in a pilot phase and much more still needs to be done to promote the sustainable management of Indian coastal resources and to protect its highly significant biodiversity. Source: E. Sennhauser (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 8 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.4 State-Wise Groundwater Problem Areas from Industrial Pollution STATE PROBLEM AREA CRITICAL PARAMETERS Andra Pradesh Visakapatnam,Patancheru-Bolaram heavy metals, fluoride, nitrate, bacteriological Bihar Dhanbad nitrate, TDS, conductivity Delhi (UT) Najafgarh Drain Basin Area heavy metals, bacteriological Kerala Greater Cochin heavy metals, acidity, pesticides, fluoride, iron, bacteriological Madhya Pradesh Korba, Ratlam-Nagda zinc, iron, fluoride, bacteriological Orissa Angul-Talcher heavy metals, fluoride, bacteriological Punjab Mandi Gobindgarh bacteriological Rajasthan Pali, Jodhpur water not even suitable for agricultural purposes Tamil Nadu North Arcot chromium (from tanneries) Tamil Nadu Manali - bacteriological, sodium, nitrate, fluoride Uttar Pradesh Singrauli chromium, iron, fluoride, bacteriological West Bengal Durgapur, Howrah bacteriological Source: CPCB, 1995b; MOEF, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 9 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.5 CPCB Classification of Fresh Water and Primary Quality Criteria Fresh Water Classification Designated Best Uses Drinking water source without conventional treatment but after A disinfection Outdoor bathing, swimming and B water contact sports Drinking water source with conventional treatment followed C by disinfection Propagation of wildlife and D fisheries Irrigation, industrial cooling and E controlled waste disposal Quality Criteria Classification A2 B3 C3 D E Dissolved Oxygen (mg/l) > 6 > 5 > 4 > 4 Biochemical Oxygen Demand -BOD (mg/l) < 2 < 3 < 3 Total coliform organism MPN/100 ml < 50 < 500 < 5000 pH 6.5-8.5 6.5-8.5 6.0-9.0 6.5-8.5 6.5-8.5 Free ammonia (as mgN/1) < 1.2 -- Conductivity g.mho/cm < 1000 < 2250 Sodium absorption ratio -- <26 Boron (mg/l) < 2 2 There should be no visible discharge of domestic and industrial waste into Class A waters. 3 B and C Class discharges are to be regulated/treated to ensure maintenance of the stream standards. Source: CPCB, 1995a. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 10 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.6 ISI Drinking Water Standardsa PARAMETER STANDARD (required/desirable limit or range) Turbidity, MTU 10.0 Dissolved solids, mg/I 500.0 pH 6.5 to 8.5 Colour, hazen units 10.0 Iron (as Fe), mg/I 0.3 Manganese, mg/l 0.1 Chlorides (as CI), mg/l 250.0 Nitrate (as N03), mg/l 45.0 Fluoride (as F), mg/I 0.6 to 1.2b Arsenic (as As), mg/l 0.05 Magnesium (as Mg), mg/I 30.0 Phenolic conpounds (as C6h5OH), mg/l 0.001 Pesticides Absent Residual free chlorine, mg/l 0.2 a The table includes only major parameters. Guidelines for bacteriological quality are not included. b Flouride levels above 1.5 mg/l (WHO guideline value) may cause fluorosis; low flouride levels are linked with dental caries. Source: India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998. 11 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.7 Institutions and their Environment and Water-related Programs Institution Tasks in Environment & Water Environment-Linked Programs & Projects Ministry of * Develop and implement conservation and protection * Environmental Action Program Environment and strategies, including pollution monitoring and (EAP) Forests environmental appraisal of development projects * National River Conservation Plan (MOEF) * Coordinate environmental management programs with other (NRCD -- implementing agency) ministries and agencies, volunteer organizations, * National Natural Resource professional bodies, and other groups Management System * Disseminate environmental information * Proper Management Practices of * Develop. national policy planning strategies Municipal Wastes (National * Support research on environmental problems Waste Management Council is * Develop environmental education programs to increase the implementing agency) national awareness of environmental protection issues and * Environmental Epidemiological the importance of natural resource preservation and citizen Study participation * Biosphere Reserve Programme * Review legislation and formulate additional legal measures * Man and Biosphere Programme when needed for environmental protection * National Lake Conservation Plan * Non-Formal Env. Education and Awareness Campaign) Central Pollution * Promote cleanliness of streams and wells in different areas * Monitoring of Indian National Control Board of the states by prevention, control and abatement of Aquatic Resources (MINARS) (CPCB) pollution * Global Environmental * Coordinate the activities of the State Boards and resolve Monitoring System (GEMS) disputes among them * River Basin Studies * Provide training and technical assistance to State Boards, * Coastal Ocean Monitoring and carry out and sponsor research relating to problems of Prediction System pollution * Action Plan for Pollution * Organize a mass awareness programme on the prevention, Control of Highly Polluting control and abatement of pollution Industries (in collaboration with * Collect, compile and publish statistical data relating to the SPCBs) water pollution and its mitigating measures; and * Zoning Atlas for Siting of disseminate information on water pollution and its Industries prevention and control * Training Programmes * Development of effluent standards and guidelines for * Awareness Programme prevention and control of pollution * Environmental Research * Lay down, modify or annul, in consultation with the state Programmes: governments concerned, the standards for streams and wells * Biological Monitoring and * Monitoring water quality (in collaboration with the SPCBs) Assessment of Pollution * Analytical Quality Control (for about 60 laboratories) * Development of Methodology for Toxicity Testing * Standardization of Methods for Analysis (laboratory) 12 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.7 (cont.) Institutions and their Environment and Water-related Programs Institution Tasks in Environment & Water Environment-Linked Programs & Projects Ministry of Water * Advising for prevention and control of floods * Environmental Monitoring Resources * Promoting the protection of irrigation command areas Committee (MOWR) * Monitor implementation of env. safeguards of water resources projects Central Water * Monitoring surface water quality * Water Quality Monitoring Commission * Coordination of the Environmental Monitoring Committee Programme (implemented by the (CWC) constituted by the MOWR CWC) * Environmental Monitoring Committee Central Ground * Advising and promoting ground water management and * Ground Water Quality Water Board protection Monitoring Programme (CGWB) * Monitoring ground water level and quality * Assessment of Ground Water * Carrying out selected surveys on ground water pollution Pollution * Development of protection zone maps Planning * Formulation of national investment policy and programmes * Eighth Five-Year Plan Commission and integration of environmental considerations into economic development * Drafting Five Year Plans for economic growth State Pollution * Set up emission standards for local industries based on the * Implementation of the 1974 Control Boards Minimum National Standards and the carrying capacity of Water Act (Prevention Pollution (SPCBs) sites Control) and the 1986 Env. * Issue consent orders allowing discharge of industrial Protection Act, as well as Env. pollutants to water Rules and Notifications under * Monitor compliance with discharge consents these Acts * Issue No Objection Certificates allowing industries to develop a site (depending on the industry an environmental assessment may still be required from the MOEF) * Publish statistics on pollution control for the State and disseminate information through lectures, seminars, etc. * Monitoring water quality and industrial effluents State Ground Water * Ground water development, management and protection * Groundwater quality monitoring Organizations * Establishment of standards, fixing norms of regulated (SGWO) exploitation, enforcement and co-ordination * Carrying out micro-level studies of ground water Ministry of * Conservation and regeneration of watersheds * Catchment area treatment Agriculture * Conservation and management of land and soil * Soil Conservation in river (MOA) catchments 13 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.7 (cont.) Institutions and their Environment and Water-related Programs Institution Tasks in Environment & Water Environment-Linked Programs & Projects Ministry of Rural * Promotion of safe drinking water in rural areas * State Sector Minimum Needs Areas and * Provision of grant assistance for water supply and sanitation Programme (Water Supply and Employment programmes Sanitation) (MORAE) * Social Forestry activities * Centrally Sponsored Rural Water Supply Programme * Centrally Sponsored Rural Sanitation Programme * Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission * Dovetailing funds of Jawahar Rojgar Yogana for Rural Sanitation Ministry of Urban * Formulation of policy guidelines on urban water supply and * State Sector Urban Water Supply Affairs and sanitation Programme Employment * Provision of technical assistance to State govts. or where * Urban sanitation: (MOUAE) needed * Environmental Improvement of * Acts as an intermediary in mobilizing external assistance in Urban Slums the water supply and sanitation sector and routing the * Centrally Sponsored Low Cost assistance through State Plans Sanitation Programme * Sponsorship of central schemes for low cost urban * Basic Urban services for the sanitation Poor, Sanitation * Facility/Night Shelter to Footpath Dwellers * MEGA City Scheme * State Sector Sewerage and Sewage Treatment * State Sector Urban solid Waste Management Ministry of Health * Promote safe drinking water and sanitation * National Water Supply and and Family Welfare * Assistance to the States in the implementation of water Sanitation Programme supply and sanitation schemes * Rural Health Services through Primary Health Care System * Health and Hygiene Education component of various National Diseases Control Programmes Ministry of Human * Education and Awareness * National Literacy Mission (adult Resources * Promote investigation and research in water pollution and education, including hygiene environment education) Ministry of * Protection of mining and oil extraction areas Petroleum * Prevention and control of pollution Ministry of Power * Prevention and control of pollution in thermal power (MOP) stations * Energy conservation * Formulation of nation-wide power policy 14 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.7 (cont.) Institutions and their Environment and Water-related Programs Institution Tasks in Environment & Water Environment-Linked Programs & Projects Central Electricity * Technical and economic clearance of hydro-power stations Authority * Assessment of hydro-power potential by basin (CEA) * Performance measurement of existing hydro-power stations and maintenance * Assessment of water requirements for thermal stations * Nation-wide hydro and thermal power planning Centre for * Develop and carry out nation-wide environmental education * Participation in the National Env. Environmental programmes and activities Education Programme in Education, Schools Ahmedabad * Program on the preparation of exhibition packages and publications * Various env. awareness campaigns Env. Education * Conduct programmes to spread awareness and interest * Training Programmes for NGOs Centre, Madras among the public, particularly among NGOs, teachers, and, teachers on Integrated youth and children, with the purpose of promoting Watershed Management, EIA, conservation of nature and natural resources and Design of Env. Education Projects NEERI. National * Conduct water related environmental research Environmental Engineering Research Institute Source: Medeiros and Dave, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 15 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.8 Current Environmental and Water-related Programs in India A description of the more important current environment, water and sanitation programs and associated institutions is presented below. India's Environment Action Program (EAP). The principal objective of EAP, coordinated by the MOEF, is improving the provision of environmental services. It provides the framework for major environmental programmes grouped into 7 priority areas. Of the 7 priority areas, five are water-linked: (i) industrial and related pollution and waste reduction/management, particularly hazardous wastes; (ii) afforestation, wasteland development, soil and moisture conservation, ensuring clean water sources; (iii) improving access to clean technologies; (iv) tackling urban environmental issues; and (v) alternative energy (pollution control in therrnal power stations). Surface and Ground Water Quality Monitoring. An inland and coastal water quality monitoring programme is being carried out by the Central and State Pollution Control Boards under two major data collection systems, in order to update the status of the existing water quality vis-a-vis the designated best use. Recently, the monitoring programme included surveys on ground water quality to identify critically polluted areas characterized by industrial activities. The monitoring network consists of 480 stations in inland waters (456 for surface and 24 for ground water sources). The SPCBs routinely collect and analyze the water samples and the data are forwarded to CPCB to process and publish the water quality bulletins and maps. In addition to the aforementioned programme, specific monitoring activities are carried out under the River Action Plans. Under the Ministry of Water Resources, two organizations are engaged in the monitoring of water quality: the , which carries out a national network of surface water quality monitoring in 267 stations, and the Central Ground Water Board (CGWB), carrying out the monitoring of groundwater quality in 16,000 wells/stations. Under the CGWB, groundwater pollution issues are tackled by a directorate with its office located in Lucknow. Drinking Water Quality Monitoring. Quality control of drinking water is usually the responsibility of the following agencies: State public health [engineering] departments (and/or the water supply and sewerage boards) routinely collect and analyze water samples. If the sample is found contamninated, the department recommends corrective measures to be taken by the concerned agency responsible for operation and maintenance of the water supply system (municipal corporation/municipality or gram panchayat in the urban and rural areas, respectively). Sarnples are taken at the source of water supply, at the tap waters and at the water pumps; Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission runs a national drinking water quality programme in rural areas; and surveys may be carried out on an ad hoc basis by metropolitan water and sanitation authorities, universities and other research organizations such as the All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health (AIIHPH). In collaboration with UNICEF, the AIIHPH has conducted several community based water quality surveillance activities in rural areas. Prevention and Control of Industrial Pollution. The SPCBs enforce the provisions of the Water Prevention and Control of Pollution Act. New and existing industries which discharge sewage/trade effluent are required to apply for a permit (consent) from the concerned SPCB in order to obtain a "No Objection Certificate". All industries generating effluent have to provide treatmnent plants and/or clean technology to satisfy the standards prescribed by the SPCB. 16 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Since a large number of small scale industries are often concentrated in clusters, the GOI has launched a programme designated Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs), based on the "polluter pays principle" by which the industries themselves have to accept full responsibility to set up, operate and maintain effluent treatment facilities. The SPCBs assist the units in mobilization of financial resources (25% subsidy by the central government), acquisition of land and in the technical scrutiny of the proposals of CETPs. In order to delineate suitable areas for industrial siting and for classification of different categories, a project for the preparation of a District-based Zoning Atlas for Siting Industries has been taken up by the CPCB in collaboration with the SPCBs and other agencies including the National Atlas & Thematic Mapping Organisation (NATMO) and the National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA). The methodology includes the identification of sensitive zones (unsuitable for industrial development) and other zones with surface and ground water pollution sensitivity, and the associated risks for industrial siting. Waste Minimization. The central government has recently conceived the idea of Waste Minimization Circles (WMCs) and entrusted the National Productivity Council with the task of establishing and running WMCs in the country. These circles would consist of an assembly of industrial representatives from the same sector who would work collectively on a regular basis to promote the idea of waste minimization in their respective units. It has been proposed to establish at least 10 WMCs in 1996. Management of Hazardous Wastes. In accordance with the rules enacted by the central government, all generators and receivers of hazardous wastes have to obtain the authorization of the SPCBs (for the purpose of collection, reception, treatment, transport, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes). At present, the units generating hazardous wastes are being identified and are in the process of applying for authorization. The SPCBs are starting to take steps for the safe disposal of hazardous wastes. National River Conservation Plan (NRCP). The National River Conservation Directorate (NRCD, under the MOEF) coordinates the implementation of the schemes under the Ganga, Yamuna and other rivers' Action Plans for the restoration of water quality. The main objective of the NRCP is to improve the water quality of the country's major rivers to desirable standards (designated best use). This programme was initiated in the Ganga river (1986) and later expanded to the Yamuna and Gomti rivers. In the case of the Ganga Action Plan, the programme has focused on the reduction of discharge of organic matter as a first step in the restoration of water quality. The second phase will emphasize interventions to reduce the microbial pollution of the rivers. In 1995, the CPCB identified critically polluted river stretches of 18 major rivers in 10 states covering 46 towns. Under the NRCP, the government plans to support pollution abatement works in the polluted stretches of these rivers. The total implementation period is expected to be 10 years. The programme also includes various water quality monitoring activities. In the present phase of the NRCP, costs are shared between the Center and participating State governments for capital works. The operation and maintenance costs are expected to be borne by the concerned State government. To date it appears as though the State governments are not assuming these responsibilities. Wetlands Conservation Programme (WCP) and National Lake Conservation Plan (NLCP). A National Committee on Wetlands, Mangroves and Coral Reefs was created to advise the government on appropriate policies and measures for the conservation and management of wetlands. To date, 22 wetlands have been identified as priorities for conservation and management under the WCP. Of the 22 wetlands, four fall within urban areas and require special treatment for pollution control which is dealt with under the NLCP and coordinated by the MOEF. NLCP proposes to augment the on-going WCP by undertaking large scale conservation activities in selected lakes. The program will concentrate initially on major urban lakes that are threatened by the discharge of municipal sewage. The same cost sharing criteria of the NRCP would be applied in the NLCP. 17 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Safe Rural Water Supply. Under the Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water Mission, special environmental and health problems are addressed through 5 Sub-Missions: (i) control of fluorosis, (ii) control of brackishness, (iii) eradication of guinea worm, (iv) removal of excess iron and (v) scientific source finding and conservation of water and recharging of aquifers. Low Cost Sanitation. Under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment this is a scheme to convert the country's existing dry latrines into low cost sanitary latrines. Source: Medeiros and Dave, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 18 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.9 Using Price Mechanisms for Pollution Control: The Case of the Dutch Water Boards Most of the Dutch Water Boards are hundreds of years old. Their traditional function was water management and flood control, mostly of the polders in the western part of the Netherlands (the large rivers are managed by the state). Under the Pollution of Surface Waters Act enacted in 1970, Dutch Water Boards also became responsible for water quality management (responsibilities delegated by the Provinces to the Water Boards). The Act provided for water pollution charges to be paid by polluting industries and individual households. This water pollution levy was and is still used to construct, operate and maintain the wastewater treatment plants which are owned by the Water Boards. In 1994, the revenue from these water pollution charges provided revenue of approximately U.S.$ 2.1 billion out of a total of about U.S.$ 3.7 billion spent on environmental management by public agencies (OECD, Environment Performance Review, 1995). The levy is based on the Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) waste load (chosen because it is relatively easy and fast to measure and is reliable) and on the total heavy metal waste load (based on composite effluent sampling). The computation is easy and straight-forward. Each Water Board calculates its levy rates by dividing its total annual costs for water quality management by the estimated volume "inhabitant equivalent" (IE) to be discharged. "IEs" are the units used for measuring the amount of oxygen- demanding discharges, such that one IE reflects the average amount discharged by one household member (in mg/l COD). Only large companies pay the levy according to the actual level of oxygen-demanding substances discharged into the wastewater treatment plant; families and small companies pay a standard amount, which lessens the incentives to control pollution. Additionally, a levy has to be paid for the amount of heavy metals discharged into the wastewater plant. This levy is considerably higher than the levy per IE (likely on the order of U.S.$ 100 per unit of heavy metals discharged). Discharges from the wastewater treatment plant have to comply with effluent standards for the specific water body, which differ by area and depend on the water quality management objectives for the specific water body. The levies are administered across the Netherlands by the Water Boards and rates vary widely. In 1992, the highest was about U.S.$ 60, while the lowest was about U.S.$ 21 per unit COD discharged. Studies have shown that the water effluent charges have been a powerful incentive in reducing the discharge of oxygen-consuming substances measured in terms of COD and heavy metal. These charges have been more effective than the regulatory approaches designed for this same purpose. For example, between 1975 and 1980, discharges of oxygen-consuming substances decreased by 27 percent and the heavy metal effluent load decreased by 50 percent (OECD, Applying Economic Instruments, 1994). The reality has been that companies have dramatically modified their discharges in response to the levies. Based on interviews with a number of companies, 74 percent said that the levies provided a strong incentive to reduce their effluent discharges. The costs to achieve the same environmental objective through the conventional "command and control" approach would have been many times higher -- likely on the order of six times -- than through the application of water pollution charges. The percentage of water effluent treated increased from 51 percent in 1980 to 74 percent in 1991. During that period, wastewater discharges from the manufacturing sector decreased by 80 percent. The height of the levy per JE unit has risen sharply over time to reflect changes in water resources management objectives (a 31 to 115 percent increase in real terms between 1975 and 1994). On average, the levy rates doubled from about U.S.$ 18 in 1980 to U.S.$ 36 in 1993. Over the years, many industries have found it cheaper to install their own wastewater treatment plant in order to reduce the water pollution levy they were obliged to pay: a rate increase of one percent yielded pollution reduction of 0.5 to one percent. The wastewater treatment plants owned by the Water Boards (around 500 total) treat the wastewater and discharge it into surface water according to certain effluent standards. This system has over time resulted in a considerable improvement in water quality in Dutch inland waters. Presently most industries treat their effluents so efficiently that total water charges collected have decreased substantially. This is one of the reasons why the levy was doubled. Fixed costs of sewage water treatment plants, therefore, have to be 19 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues distributed over an ever-decreasing number of LEs. The increase in levy rates provides an incentive for yet more companies to begin purifying their wastewater. And so the upward spiral continues. Paradoxically, the success of the pollution control measures has caused revenues for the Dutch Water Boards to shrink. The decline in revenues has been so dramatic that the Water Boards have run into difficulties operating and maintaining their water treatment plants. U.S.$ = 2 Dutch Guilder Source: R. Robelus (India WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 20 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.10 Incorporating Requirements of Aquatic Ecology in Water Resources Management: Indian and International Experience Historically, India has tended to overlook the impacts of water resources development on its fragile and unique eco-systems. This is largely due to lack of information and inadequate awareness of the potential environmental risks associated with development activities. There are numerous examples throughout India of the ecological degradation resulting from such an approach: * Estuarian migratory fish species have virtually disappeared in Krishna, Godavari, Cauvery and Hoogli (since the construction of the Farakka barrage). * Rare fresh water dolphins, endemic in the Gangetic basin, are on the verge of extinction. * The disruption of river hydrology from overdrawal or the construction of barrages and dams has had a severe negative impact on previously existing species of aquatic life. Fish have been forced to migrate to other parts of river systems or face extinction from lack of water of an adequate quality. Further, reduced flow has increased the exposure and vulnerability of fish to easy preying and over-catch by fishermen. * Many rivers are no longer able to receive and assimilate effluents because they have fallen below minimum levels of flow. Consequently, water quality is unacceptable for human consumption, as well as aquatic life. Notwithstanding rapidly increasing and competing water demands in other sectors (agriculture, domestic, industrial, navigation, etc.), these examples highlight the fact that India can no longer afford to overlook the significant water requirements of aquatic ecology. India may draw inspiration from the many countries which have successfully developed and managed their water resources while protecting the environment: USA Ohio River: As part of the Ohio Redevelopment (1954-1963), several low dams on the Ohio River were replaced with seven large dams to improve navigation and water availability. Further, fish ladders were constructed and waterways opened to allow migration of several fish species that were endangered. Several dams on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers were similarly modified. Colorado River: An agreement between the U.S.A. and Mexico was reached to manage water quality on the Colorado River after the construction of the Boulder dam caused increased salinity and reduced fish catch levels. Columbia River: Dams and Barrages have been provided with fish ladders and waterways in order to allow the migration of salmon and other species. St. Lawrence: Navigation locks were redesigned and managed to prevent the entry of stiny fish and other species which had harmed the indigenous species of the Great Lakes, specifically Erie and Ontario. Canada Frazer River: Dams and Barrages have been constructed with appropriate fish ladders and waterways for salmon and other migratory species. France Loire River: France maintains a national policy to preserve the Loire River in a natural state and has also held an international conference in Orleans on the Loire on "What Future for Large Rivers" to discuss issues related to the protection of aquatic ecology. Source: J.M. Dave (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 21 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues Box A2.11 A River Runs Through It: Delhi and the Yamuna River Basin The eleven million denizens of Delhi are both responsible for, and victims of, water quantity and quality problems in the S Yamuna river basin. The Yamuna river (figure A) has an annual flow of \ about 10 BCM that is highly skewed . S* seasonally as in the rest of the Ganges Delh basin, with three-quarters of the flow O,.w R. occurring in three monsoon months (figure B). The Upper Yamuna basin illustrates many of the problems in inter-sectoral water allocation, with half its land dedicated to agriculture , l A pA and its urban areas rapidly developing. . The water supply is stochastic and has _ ___ _ many quality problems upstream of Figure A: Delhi and the Yamuna Basin Area Schematic Delhi, primarily from non-point agricultural sources. Near Tajewala, upstream of Delhi, the Western and Eastern Yamuna Canals abstract much of the Yamuna water for irrigation in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh respectively, and Delhi water supply is at the receiving end of the drainage especially from the Western Yamuna Canal. The demands on the system are many (domestic, industrial, agricultural, washing, environment, navigation, flood management); the urban water needs of an increasingly populous (figure C) and affluent Delhi are rapidly increasing, exacerbating the stress on limited surface and groundwater resources from competing uses. About half the wastewater from Delhi flows untreated into the Yamuna, causing major public health problems. (It has been pointed out that the river is perhaps appropriately named after the sibling of the Hindu god of Death!). Yamuna River Flow 14,000,000 4500 'ai 2 211112,000003911 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~~~~~~10,000,0 2ie basi (220Mllo0irs e a)drw rmriya airbd(sa euto '000 2,DOO__ _ __ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ _ 6 0 00 - *' 4 ~~~~ ~ ~ d 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 19611971 1981 1991 2001 Figure B: Yamuna Flows at Tajewala Figure C: Population Growth in Delhi The water supply of Delhi comes from the surface and ground waters of the Yamuna river basin (2,200 Million Litres per Day) drawn primarily at Wazirabad (as a result of negotiations with Yamuna basin states), augmented by some water of the Ganges basin (500 MLD) from the Upper Ganga Canal through the Hindon cut and is used primarily for agriculture, domestic and industrial consumption. This results in a domestic water supply allocation of about 225 litres per capita per day, very privileged by Indian standards. However, the high physical losses (more than 20%) from an aging distribution system (parts of which are as much as 120 22 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues years old!), and high spatial and temporal variability in supply results in poor service, with most areas receiving low pressure water for less than 6 hrs/day. The over 30% of Delhi's population that live in slums and unauthorized colonies are particularly affected. In addition to physical losses, the financial losses are high, in terms of water theft (which, together with the physical losses, make the unaccounted for water in Delhi more than 30%) and non-billed and uncollected revenues (leading to about 60% of the water consumed being totally subsidized in effect). Water tariffs in Delhi are low in comparison with other Indian cities such as Bangalore, leading to the "vicious circle" of low tariffs, high subsides, poor cost recovery and poor service (also see India Water Resources Management sector report on "Urban Water Supply & Sanitation", World Bank, 1998). The willingness to pay is high in many areas, as the actual cost of the poor service is high although the charges may be low, as the citizens of Delhi invest money in borewells, pumps, sumps, tanks, boiling and filtering the water, buying bottled water or purchasing water from private vendors, and rescheduling their day's work to collect and store water depending on the vagaries of water availability. The water supply is not only vulnerable to cross-contamination from sewage during distribution, but is vulnerable to upstream non-point agricultural runoff, particularly from Haryana, where the high use of pesticides and fertilizers leave the Delhi water supply contaminated with DDT, Benzene HexaChloride, Aldrin, Dieldrin Heptachlor, endosulfans, Malathion, etc., many of which are persistent organochlorines whose use is banned in developed countries. The water treatment plants (2600 MLD capacity with frequent breakdowns) do not test for nor can remove these compounds without very expensive upgrades. In addition, upstream domestic and industrial discharges, especially from sugar mills, distilleries/breweries, etc. further pollute the water supply to Delhi. The groundwater is also contaminated with high levels of heavy metals, fluoride, nitrates, and organic loads. Groundwater levels, usually at depths of about 5m in the north-east parts of Delhi and 10- 30m in the south and south-west parts, are Y., generally falling, with drops in most parts of W Ya\ about 1-8 m in the last decade. (To Ho;\ Downstream of Delhi, the city turns from victim to antagonist. The city discharges 70% of the wastewater into the Yamuna (1900 YT EnunPCR1 MLD of wastewater from municipal sources and ( \ 320 MLD from many of the 125,000 industries O(a.U in Delhi) through 16 major drains (see figure D), with Najafgarh alone contributing 60% of the , vu wastewater volume and 45% of the BOD load. ya> R. Sewerage systems are inadequate in collection and the wastewater treatment plants, although KK.'Pa theoretically capable of treating over half the wastewater (at less than secondary-level treatment), are severely hampered by H.. operational problems including collection '4' problems, breakdowns and flooding, resulting in Ft. inadequately treated effluent discharge into the 'a Yamuna that, in the absence of any freshwater T\M _a minimum flows in non-monsoon months, is AUa Cana practically a sewer downstream of Delhi, Figure B: Drains around Delhi classified as unfit even for bathing and animal (adapted from Center for Science & Environment) consumption, with very low dissolved oxygen _ 23 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues levels (about 1-1.5 mg/I compared with 7-9 mg/I Fow CCOlCfl at Odhla upstream of Delhi), and high organic and inorganic loads (BOD loads are 200 tons/day with resulting D_f__'____________________X _ concentrations of 16-18 mg/1). Fecal coliform levels are extremely high (as shown in figure E). The CPCB estimates average annual values of about 1 OD 300,000 per 100 ml. at downstream Okhla and values as high as 24 million per 100 ml have been D reported - compared with even bathing standards of - - - - - - - i 500 per 100 ml. This indicates high untreated domestic sewage disposal and high potential for Figure C: Fecal Coliforms d/s of Delhi water-borne diseases. This also poses significant Source: Delhi White Paper, MoEF public health problems in water supply to downstream villages and towns, such as Agra, before the dilution effect of the Chambal tributary sets in. The Yamuna Action Plan, based on the Ganga Action Plan, focuses on the hardware installation for wastewater treatment, but has also had very limited success in cleaning up the river. Many steps are being taken to address a number of components of this problem, but there is much more that can be done. Water supply is expected to be augmented with planned reservoirs in Uttar Pradesh (Tehri) and Himachal Pradesh (Kishau, Renuka, Lakhwar, Giri), and inter-basin transfers from both the Ganges and the Indus systems. Proposals to harvest rainwater and use traditional and other depressions in the Delhi area for storage and exchanging agricultural water for treated wastewater are also being mooted. There is also major potential for recharging groundwater with the huge monsoon flows to increase sustainable yields and check the dropping water table. Water supply and sewerage infrastructure projects for Delhi are being considered for possible World Bank funding. The Upper Yamuna River Board has recently developed water- sharing agreements among the basin states that may go a long way to reduce the frequent negotiations to adjust ad-hoc allocations. However, the agreements need to take better account of the stochasticity of the water supply and the water quality concerns, including the provision of adequate dilution flows. Nevertheless, it is said that"the solution to pollution is not dilution" and there need to be significant checks on reducing the pollutant loading from point and non-point sources. This includes augmenting sewage treatment plant capacity for industrial and domestic effluent, provision of public latrines, crematoriums, etc. as well as more effective legislation and enforcement. The Supreme Court has been very active in closing/relocating polluting industries, mandating common effluent treatment plants, and stepping up enforcement, but "judicial activism" is no substitute for adequate planning and management and economic approaches. Upstream drain and canal flushing needs to be coordinated with water treatment facilities in Delhi. Solid and liquid water dumping into the Yamuna need to be carefully monitored and restricted. The water and sewerage agencies need to recover their capital and operating expenditures by restructuring tariffs and increasing management efficiency. The type and intensity of fertilizer and pesticide use in upstream agricultural areas should be evaluated in conjunction with best management practices for agricultural lands and catchment protection to reduce non-point source pollution. Conservation measures in all consumptive uses and recycling measures both in industry and domestic uses should be encouraged and the possibility of more effective use of treated wastewater in agriculture should be investigated. Although Delhi may appear to be an urban area, agriculture still accounts for a majority of its water use. Small changes in cropping and land-use patterns, agricultural water use intensities, and spatial and temporal use patterns in Delhi and in the Upper Yamuna basin in general, could help significantly alleviate urban water problems. Water resource considerations should be more fully integrated 24 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 2. Water-Related Environmental and Health Issues into the Delhi city master-planning process. There is a need for the use of modem, integrated decision support system tools for information management, and modeling and evaluation of options under various hydrological, policy and development scenarios. Research, stakeholder participation and coordinated information-based decision-making for optimal development of the region's water resources also need enhancing. It is often said that recognition of a problem is half the solution, and general public indifference and apathy to these complex and multi-faceted problems needs to be overcome. Enhancing public awareness and participation in decision- making, implementation, and enforcement is particularly essential, and reflects the notion that"if one is not part of the solution, one is part of the problem". Overall, fragmented responsibilities, overlapping jurisdictions, unclear accountability, enforcement problems, inter-state and inter-sectoral water sharing conflicts, poor information management, communication and dissemination, research and public involvement, and a lack of mainstreaming of water quality and other environmental and public health concerns, are still major problems in implementing any vision of a comprehensive basin-wide management of water resources. There are many tough questions that must be addressed relating to the relative importance of agriculture in the Delhi area given increasing urban demands and the huge amounts of water used in irrigation, the possibilities of innovative inter-sectoral allocation adjustments to higher-value uses, changes in land-use and cropping patterns, tariff increases, groundwater management legislation and environmental and in-stream use concerns. The problems of Delhi and the Yamuna are indicative of problems in river basins all over India, where rapidly increasing urban populations, especially in megacities, are competing with traditional irrigation uses. Agriculture still employs two-thirds of the population and the country does have major food security considerations. At the same time, urban areas, that already house about 220 million people and contribute more to India's GDP than agriculture, will soon be home to over half of India's population and their demands on scarce water resources would also be equally legitimate. All this needs a serious re-thinking of the country's water resource planning and management strategies to overcome traditional ad-hoc sectoral strategies and ensure more coordinated and integrated development in a river-basin framework within the political realities of administrative boundaries. Source: N. R. Harshadeep, World Bank (SASEN). Based on a number of sources, including the CPCB, Center for Science and the Environment, Delhi White Paper (MOEF) and other papers and reports. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 25 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.1 The Inter-State Water Disputes Act for Establishing Tribunals: Existing Limitations Background. Water, according to the Constitution of India, is as a general rule, a state matter. However, regulation and development of inter-state rivers and river valleys, to the extent to which such regulation and development is in the public interest, as declared by an Act of Parliament, is, under the Constitution, a central government matter. Based on Article 262 of the Constitution, the Parliament passed the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956. The Act defines a water dispute as any dispute between two or more states regarding: (i) the use, distribution or control of the waters of any inter-state river; or (ii) the interpretation of any agreement relating to the use, distribution or control of such waters or the implementation of such agreement; or (iii) the levy of any seigniorage or additional rate or fee by one state on another state because of the construction by the former of any works for the conservation, regulation or utilization of the waters of an inter-state river. When one state believes that a water dispute with another state has arisen, or is likely to arise, because its interests in an inter-state river have been, or are likely to be, prejudicially affected by reason of: (i) any executive action or legislation passed or proposed to be passed by the other state; or (ii) failure of the other state to exercise any of its powers, or to implement the terms of any agreement, relating to the use, distribution or control of such waters, such a state may request the central government to refer such a water dispute to a tribunal for adjudication. When the central government is satisfied that the water dispute cannot be settled by negotiations, it shall constitute a water disputes tribunal. The tribunal consists of a chairman and two members to be nominated by the Chief Justice from amongst the judges of the Supreme Court or one of the high Courts. The tribunal may appoint two or more persons as assessors, and shall have the same powers as those vested in a civil court, including the summoning and enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath, and requiring the production of any documents and materials. Moreover, the tribunal may require any state to carry out or permit the carrying out of any surveys and investigations as it may deem necessary for the adjudication. The decision of the tribunal may contain directions as to how the expenses of the tribunal would be paid. Differences on any point are to be decided according to the opinion of the majority members of the tribunal. The decision of the tribunal is final and binding on the parties to the dispute, and shall be forwarded to the central government for publication in the Gazette. Neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have or exercise jurisdiction in respect of any water dispute which may be referred to a tribunal. If the central government or any of the states believe that any part of the decision of the tribunal requires explanation, or that guidance is needed on any point not originally referred to the tribunal, then within three months of the decision, a request for such clarification or guidance may be referred again to the tribunal for further consideration. The tribunal may forward to the central government a further report giving such explanation or guidance. Once the central government is satisfied that no further reference to the tribunal in the subject water dispute is necessary, then the central government shall dissolve the tribunal. Observations. Although the promulgation of the Act for the establishment of a mechanism for resolving inter-state water disputes is by itself a major achievement, implementation of the Act has thus far raised a number of issues: (i) The Act deals only with procedural issues and does not provide any guidance to, or set any criteria for the tribunal on how to handle the substantive issue of water allocation among the riparian states. The different tribunals thus far constituted (the Krishna, Narmada, Godavari, Ravi and Beas, and Cauvery) have used their own criteria for allocation of water among the riparian states; and in some cases they were guided by the 26 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions factors enumerated in the International Law Association Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers. (ii) Although the title of the Act is "Inter-State Water Dispute Act," the different articles of the Act deal specifically with inter-state rivers, thus excluding groundwater from adjudication, even when groundwater is connected to such inter-state rivers. To underscore this point, most of the tribunals specifically exclude groundwater from these decisions too. (iii) The Act does not establish a time frame for the tribunal for reaching a decision. The Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal took about seven years to reach its decision, and the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal took about ten years. The negotiations preceding the establishment of the tribunal have also taken a relatively long time, ranging from three to ten years. (iv) Once the tribunal is dissolved, there is no authority with jurisdiction to provide clarifications or guidance on any subsequent controversies or issues related to the decision that may arise. (v) Decisions of the tribunals are subject to review after a certain period of time specified in the decision itself, ranging from 25 to 45 years. As that date approaches, the riparian states would start scrambling to establish claims to their shares through extensive water related works, as is happening in Karnataka, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh over the Krishna river. This would result in water grabbing which may not necessarily reflect the actual needs of some of the riparian states. (vi) The Act originally did not include any provisions regarding the establishment of an authority to implement the decision of the tribunal. This lacuna prompted an amendment to the Act in 1980 to authorize the establishment of such an authority when experience pointed towards the need for such body. Source: S. Salman (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank 1998). 27 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.2 The Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal Award The Krishna water dispute is a good illustration of how water tribunal awards could result in competitive, disjointed investments aimed at establishing claims to water when the awards come up for review. The Krishna river is the second largest river in Southern India, after the Godavari river. As a result of the promulgation of the States Organization Act, 1956, the riparian states to the Krishna river became Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. The dispute over the Krishna river pre-dates the emergence of those states. The Krishna-Godavari Commission that was set up in 1961 could not provide any recommendations regarding allocation of the Krishna water among the riparian states because of the absence of reliable data on the actual water use and needs of such riparian states. The absence of such data was partly due to the reorganization of those states a few years before the commission was established. The negotiations led by the central government could not provide an acceptable solution either. As a result, the central government constituted the Krishna Water Dispute Tribunal on April 10, 1969, and referred the dispute to this Tribunal, in accordance with the provisions of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956. The Tribunal issued its decision on May 27th, 1976, seven years after its constitution. However, arrival at that decision was facilitated by a number of agreements that the riparian states reached in the interim. The Tribunal defined the Krishna river to include the main stream of the Krishna river, all its tributaries and all other streams contributing water directly or indirectly to the Krishna river. The Tribunal determined that the 75% dependable flow of the Krishna river was 2060 thousand million cubic feet of water (TMC), and declared that this amount was available for distribution between the states of Maharashtra, Kamataka and Andhra Pradesh. Karnataka was awarded 560 TMC, Maharashtra 700 TMC, and Andhra Pradesh 800 TMC. The Tribunal declared that those states are free to make use of the underground water within their respective state territories in the Krishna river basin. In addition, the Final Order of the Tribunal superseded six agreements concluded between 1892 and 1946 between the predecessor states to the current riparian states. The Order of the Tribunal gave Andhra Pradesh the right to use in any water year (June 1 to May 31) any remaining water that may be flowing in the Krishna river, but this would not give Andhra Pradesh any prescriptive right or interest over such water. The Order states that failure by one state to use its share in one water year for whatever reason precludes that state from claiming that un-utilized water in any subsequent year. However, the Order goes on to state that such failure should not be taken to constitute forfeiture or abandonment by such state of its share of water in any subsequent water year, nor shall it constitute an increase to the share of any other state. The Order may be reviewed or revised by a competent authority any time after May 31, 2000. However, such review or revision shall not, as far as possible, disturb any utilization that may have been undertaken by any state within the limits of the allocation made to such state under the Order. This clause, establishing a date for review of the Order, in addition to the clause giving Andhra Pradesh the right to use any remaining water, formed the basis for the on-going scramble for the Krishna water by Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, and provided the perverse incentive for massive disjointed investments. The incentives confronting the states are to utilize as much water as possible before the set date for review of the Award, in order to establish favorable realities on the ground for the upcoming review. Source: S. Salman (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 28 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.3 River Basin Management: Indian Experience Various basin level planning and development institutions have been established in India after independence. The first such attempt was the establishment of the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The DVC is headed by a Chairman appointed by GOI. Two members of the Corporation are also appointed by GOl. The original mandate of the DVC included the construction and operation of irrigation facilities, water supply, drainage, hydro-electric and thermal power generation, flood control, navigation, afforestation, control of soil erosion, public health, agricultural, industrial, economic and general well-being in the Damodar Valley. The Damodar Valley Project envisaged by the planners, was a multi-purpose project comprising eight dams and one diversion barrage to provide flood regulation potential, generation of 200 MW of hydroelectric power and the provision of irrigation facilities for a command area of 308,000 hectares. The construction of the planned project did not materialize as the upper riparian state, Bihar, in consultation with GOI, decided to take up only four of the eight proposed dams in the first stage of development (due to cost considerations and in order to test efficacy of the dams in flood protection). At present, four dams are under the control of DVC and the diversion barrage is under the control and operation of West Bengal (the DVC having transferred to West Bengal this responsibility). Bihar has built one dam, after consulting and obtaining permission from the DVC, and is operating this independently, primarily for industrial water supply. Hence, the flood regulation planned in the original project has not fully materialised. The irrigation facilities are operated by the State ID of West Bengal. The DVC has a much diminished role in the management of the Damodar Valley (operating the dams for hydropower and irrigation but not being involved in the distribution network). This is largely due to DVC's inability to gamer full cooperation from Bihar because it did not fulfill its envisaged role to Bihar's satisfaction. The history of DVC clearly shows that unless the riparian States perceive a benefit and are thus willing to cooperate, a river-basin mechanism cannot be successfully implemented. Ganga Flood Control Board (GFCB) and Ganga Flood Control Commission (GFCC): The Ganga Flood Control Board was set up in 1972 by a GOI resolution, and the Ganga Flood Control Commission was set up as per Clause 5 of the resolution to undertake specific works in the Ganga Basin and for assisting the Ganga Flood Control Board. The Commission is headed by a Chairman and two full-time members from GOI and part-time members from the States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Central Water Commission (CWC), Central Water and Power Research Station (CWPRS), Ministry of Surface Transport, Railway Board and Chief Engineers of all co-basin States - Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan and National Capital Territory of Delhi. Problems arising from flood erosion and waterlogging in the States of Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Delhi are dealt with by the GFCC. The administrative cost of GFCC is borne by GOI. Implementation of schemes is the responsibility of the appropriate riparian State. The GFCC has prepared master plans for 23 river systems of Ganga Basin. The commission has also prepared feasibility studies for three flood management schemes such as the Buxar-Koelwar embankment scheme and Tamluk and Ghea Kunti basin drainage schemes. In addition, the Commission has undertaken performance evaluation studies for various flood management schemes. Brahmaputra Board: The Brahmaputra Board was set up in 1980 to prepare a master plan for flood control in the Brahmaputra Valley, taking into account the overall development and utilization of the water resources of the valley for irrigation, hydropower, navigation and other beneficial purposes. The Board is a corporate body with perpetual succession, is headed by a Chairman appointed by GOI, and has one member each from the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. In addition, members from GOI ministries dealing with agriculture, irrigation, finance, power and transport, members from the Central Water Commission, Central Electricity Authority, Geological Survey of India, and India Meteorological department are included in the Board. The main functions of the BB are: (i) preparation of plans for flood control and utilization of water resources for various uses; (ii) preparation of detailed designs 29 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions and cost estimates for proposed projects; and (iii) construction, maintenance and operation of multi-purpose projects with the approval of GOI. The BB has prepared Master Plan Part-I for the main stem of the Brahmaputra, Part-l1 for the Barak sub-basin, and Part-II for nine tributaries of the Brahmaputra and six rivers of the State of Tripura. Further works are in progress for the preparation of master plans and for surveys and investigations for the preparation of feasibility studies for a few multi-purpose projects and drainage schemes such as Pagladiya, Tipaimukh, Subansiri, Dihang, Lohit and Kulsi. The Board is also setting up the North Eastern Hydraulic and Allied Research Institute at Guwahati. Bhakra-Beas Management Board: The Bhakra-Beas Management Board (BBMB) was constituted through an executive order in accordance with Section 79 of the Punjab Reorganization Act 1966 to regulate the supply of the Sutlej, Ravi and Beas rivers to the States of Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The BBMB is responsible for distributing power from the Bhakra-Nangal and Beas projects to the States of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Union Territory of Chandigarh and Delhi when required. The Board is headed by a Chairman appointed by GOI with members from co-basin States, and including the Central Water Commission and the Central Groundwater Board. The BBMB is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the projects under its jurisdiction and to allocate water for irrigation based on inflows to the reservoirs according to a predetermined percentage share for each of the co-basin States. Power distribution is carried out by BBMB in consultation with beneficiary States. Upper Yamuna River Board: The Upper Yamuna River Board (UYRB) was constituted for allocating available flows among co-basin States within the overall framework of the Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) signed by the Chief Ministers of the co-basin States. The MOU takes into account irrigation and drinking water needs of all co-basin States. The Board is headed by the Member, Water Planning & Projects, Central Water Commission, and has members from the co-basin States of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and National Capital Territory of Delhi. The budget requirements of the Board are met by the co-basin States in equal share. The UYRB decisions can be submitted to the Upper Yamuna Review Committee headed by the Union Ministry of Water Resources with Chief Ministers of all co-basin States as members for review. The decision of the review committee is final and binding on all co-basin States. The functions of the Board include: (i) regulation and supply of water from all storages and barrages up to and including Okhla Barrage; (ii) maintenance of minimum flows; (iii) monitoring of return flow quantities from Delhi after allowing for consumptive use (municipal and industrial); and (iv) providing coordination for maintenance of water quality, conservation, etc. Other Organizations: Apart from the above, Betwa River Board is in charge of Rajghat dam across Betwa, Bansagar Control Board is in charge of Bansagar dam across Sone, and Mahi Control Board is in charge of Mahi Bajajsagar project across Mahi. The Narmada Control Authority is in charge of overseeing the implementation of the award of the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal for planning and management of the river-basin including storage apportionment, regulation and control of Narmada waters, and sharing of power benefits from Sardar Sarover Project. Source: Burchi and Singh, 1997 (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 30 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.4 River Basin Organizations: International Experience and India's DVC Experience River basins have so far played a limited role in the shaping of India's government water resources administration, both intra-state and inter-state. The Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) is the only inter- state statutory river basin institution in existence. At intra-state level, plans are reportedly afoot in Gujarat state to create a river basin organization for the Sabarmati River, on a pilot basis. In addition, special- purpose river boards are provided for by the River Boards Act, 1956 to address inter-state management issues. The Act provides for the establishment by the central government, on the advice of state governments or on its own motion, of River Boards. These boards are to advise the interested governments regarding the regulation and development of inter-state rivers and, in particular, to advise on the coordination of states activities with a view to resolving conflicts among them and to maximizing results in respect of measures for the conservation, control and utilization of the concerned river. To date, however, these provisions have never been utilized and no river board has ever been constituted under that Act. India's first attempt at basin level planning and development was the establishment of the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC). The DVC was created in 1948 by an act of the Indian Parliament as a joint undertaking, based on agreement between the central government and the states - then provinces - of Bihar and West Bengal which share the river and, together with the central government, provide funding for a number of flood control, hydropower and irrigation development projects. The Corporation is closely controlled by the central government, which appoints and removes its three directors and issues binding policy directions. Furthermore, the central government appoints the secretary - who is the Corporation's chief executive officer - and the financial adviser. Control by the states is exercised through examination of the budget, estimates, and annual report which DVC is required to submit to the central and state legislatures. The remit of the Corporation extends to the mainstream of the Damodar River and its tributaries. The Corporation is charged with development of irrigation, water supply, drainage and hydropower; flood control, navigation improvement, afforestation and soil erosion; and, in general, improvement of economic and social conditions. To carry out these tasks the Corporation can build and operate irrigation works, construct dams and regulate the generation, supply and transmission of power. The river basin has attracted considerable attention in many countries as a unit of special-purpose government administration. In some countries, such as notably France and Spain, but also, more recently, Italy and the Czech Republic, the entire Government water resources administration has been patterned along river basin lines. That is, the river basin - or groups of river basins - has been elected as the basis for delimiting the territorial scope of jurisdiction of units of special-purpose government, and for consolidating under these some or all of the functions of government in the management and development of water resources. Mexico also is moving fast in this direction. In Holland, institutions of equivalent scope are patterned instead along "water systems", which sometimes coincide with sub-basins. Elsewhere, river basin institutions have been created in specific areas of the country and in response to specific problems, such as in Germany. The mandate, scope of authority and legal status of these institutions vary considerably. The Spanish Confederaciones Hidrografcas are units of special-purpose government water administration with water resources planning, waterworks construction, water resources administration and law enforcement functions at the river basin level. They have corporate status under public law, and are subject to oversight by the Ministry of Public Works. The French Agences de 1'eau (drainage-based Water Agencies) are also units of special-purpose government water administration, with the status of public institutions operating under the aegis of the Environment Ministry. They have planning and funding authority with regard to water development and pollution control projects. The French system also consists of as many Comites de bassin (Basin Committees) as there are Agences de l1eau, consisting of users and local and central Government officials, with policy-making functions. The Czech River Basin Agencies have been converted in January 31 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions 1994 into public limited companies, with all the equity owned by the State. They function as units of special-purpose Government water administration, with authority to regulate water abstractions and wastewater disposal. The German river basin entities are associations - technically, bodies of self- government - under public law, with a variety of functions ranging from land drainage and provision of water supplies to the public, to wastewater treatment and management of water levels. The mandate of the Italian Autoritd di bacino (Basin Authorities), instead, is restricted to the formation of basin plans, and to overseeing their implementation. These Authorities do not have legal personality of their own. The Mexican Basin Councils have a comparable remit. However, they also serve as a forum to negotiate specific tasks and responsibilities for river basin plan execution and financing by Government and the water users. The Dutch Water Boards are functional public bodies, established by the Provinces, responsible for the management of water resources at the local level. In particular, they have flood control, land drainage and general water management tasks. Water users' participation in decision-making is central to most of the river basin institutions reviewed above. This is evidenced by the direct representation of users' interests in the membership structure of the organs of the institutions concerned. Italy's Basin Authorities are an exception, however, for membership in their internal organs is made up exclusively of nominated central and state Government officials. Financial independence from the National Treasuries is a feature and a goal of the basin entities - those, that is, which have an operational remit. The French Water Agencies and their programmes are funded from the proceeds of the collection of water charges levied by the Agencies on water users and on waste dischargers. The Czech River Basin Agencies cover their own administrative costs and the cost of the programmes they administer through the levying of water abstraction and wastewater disposal charges, which are paid into a National Environment Fund. The proceeds from the collection of water charges, from the sale of professional services and from the rental of property, in addition to appropriations from the national budget constitute the financial base of Spain's River Basin Agencies. The budget of Germany's river basin entities, which are in the nature of associations, is funded from the payments made by the associations' membership. Likewise, the financial base of the Dutch Water Boards comes from pollution fees and the direct payment of property taxes to the said Boards by eligible residents. In India's federal constitutional circumstances, the river basin approach to the management of inter-state rivers, however attractive, is made difficult by the provisions in the Constitution which have assigned the bulk of water management functions and responsibilities to the states, with carefully circumscribed powers vesting in the Union Government and Legislature with specific regard to inter-state rivers. As a result of the constitutional changes which have occurred since its creation in 1948, the Damodar Valley Corporation-type option could only be pursued nowadays through harmonized state legislation, or through unilateral Union legislation adopted under the carefully-circumscribed residuary authority vested in the Union Legislature in regard to the "regulation and development of inter-state rivers". However, it is doubtful if a Union initiative to create by statute a DVC-type institution would stand scrutiny by the Courts and survive the narrow test of the relevant constitutional provisions. This apparently formidable formal difficulty might be circumvented if a different kind of river basin institution than the DVC were pursued through a Union legislature initiative. If the remit of possible inter- state river basin institutions for India is to consist of the coordination and harmonization of states' water resources plans and programmes, useful inspiration can be drawn from Italy's Basin Authorities and from Mexico's Basin Councils. Both countries have a federal power structure in which the Centre plays a dominant role, like in India (refer also to the Australian Murray-Darling basin experience at Box A3.5, which also has had to contend with a strongly federated structure). Both kinds of river basin institutions were created as hosts to a structured basin planning process, in which the interests of different governmental stakeholders could be reconciled and coordinated. In addition, both kinds of institutions oversee the implementation of the plan, without engaging in actual implementation. However, whereas in the Italian model the users' interests have no direct representation in the internal structure of the river basin institutions, in the Mexican model they do - although such representation is marginal compared to the Government's. 32 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Since India's political and constitutional circumstances are not conducive to a full-scale re-designing of the map of the country's inter-state government water administration along river basin lines, it is surmised that: The purposes of coordination and harmonization of states' plans and prograrnmes affecting the water resources of inter-state rivers can best be achieved by a structured basin planning process, and the purposes of basin planning can best be served by a river basin institution. In addition to hosting the planning function, such an institution could oversee the implementation of the river basin plan, without engaging in actual implementation activities. The question of users' representation in the internal structure of the river basin institutions should be addressed taking into account the level of maturity of users' representative groupings. Where there is an established tradition of users' participation in decision-making, or where such can be created, as will typically be the case, direct representation of users' interests is strongly desirable. Source: Burchi and Singh, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 33 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.5 River Basin Management: Murray-Darling Basin Experience, Australia The Murray Darling Basin covers more than a million square kilometers -- virtually all of inland south-eastern Australia, and approximately one-seventh of the whole continent. It is the nation's most important agricultural region and is vital to the nation's economy. More than twenty major rivers flow through the basin comprising the states of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia. Attempts to coordinate the management and development of the Murray-Darling Basin's resources started as early as 1863 and there followed a period of prosperous river trade as steamers plied the Murray, Murrumbidgee and Darling Rivers. In the 1880's with the first large scale diversions from the Murray for irrigation, it became clear that cross- border measures for the management of water resources were needed. The new demands on water supplies provoked conflict between irrigation and navigation interests on the river. The most downstream state, South Australia, in particular, stood to lose as it relied heavily on the paddle-steamer trade, as well as depending on the Murray for its water supply. Under the River Murray Agreement signed in January 1917, the River Murray Commission was formed consisting of Commissioners from New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria and the Commonwealth. The Commission was responsible for the construction and operation of storages, weirs and locks for sharing, economic use and development of the basin's resources. For six decades the Commission's tasks concentrated primarily on water quantity. However, in the late 1960's the Commission conducted a detailed program of salinity investigations in the Murray valley. It became clear that the two upper states, New South Wales and Victoria, were contributing to salinity, pesticide and herbicide pollution problems, and the consequences of these were largely being "paid for" in the lower river state of South Australia through severely degraded water quality. A BROADER VIEW. In 1982 the Commission's role was broadened in recognition of the fact that water management should encompass issues of water quality. It was becoming obvious that successful management of the Basin's river systems directly related to end-use throughout the catchment. Further amendments to the Agreement in 1984 enhanced the environmental responsibilities of the Commission, reflecting increasing community concerns about salinity, the need for a whole-catchment approach to river management, and the recognition that natural resources issues in the Basin required coordinated action by all the Governments involved. This eventually resulted in the formation of the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council and Commission with a charter to plan and coordinate natural resources management programs throughout the whole Basin. The Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council was established in 1985 under the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement and consists of state and federal Ministers for land, water and environment. In 1991, Queensland, the most upstream state, agreed to join New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the Commonwealth in this agreement. The role of the Ministerial Council is to set policy and define broad directions for the management of natural resources in the basin. Its general objective as set out in its charter is to promote and coordinate effective planning and management for the equitable, efficient and sustainable use of land, water and environmental resources of the Murray-Darling Basin (refer to diagram on organizational structure, appended). Its specific goals are to maintain, and improve where possible, water quality for all beneficial uses, to control and prevent land degradation, to rehabilitate land resources where possible to ensure their sustainable utilization, and to conserve the natural environment of the basin while maintaining or improving sustainability of the valuable agricultural development in the basin. Under the agreement, the Council constituted a Community Advisory Committee comprised of representatives from regional and special interest groups from the basin to provide independent advice on the views of the basin's communities regarding natural resource management issues. Community involvement in natural resources management issues is a particularly strong feature of the way the basin is managed. 34 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMMISSION. is the executive arm of the Ministerial Council advising it on issues of environmental management throughout the Basin. It is an autonomous organization with equal responsibilities to each of the contributing Governments. It comprises two Commissioners from each of the Governments, normally the heads of departments concerning land, water and the environment. It is charged with equitably and efficiently managing and distributing the water resources of the River Murray, in accordance with the Agreement, to obtain the highest achievable quality and efficiency of use of such resources; and providing advice to the Council to achieve the sustainable long-term use of the water, land and environmental resources of the Basin. The Commission's effectiveness stems from it's ability to develop to a high degree, the cooperation and support of the participating governments. Rather than basing decisions on the needs of individual States, it bases them on the interests of the Basin as a whole. The major challenge of the Commission continues to be the development and implementation of coordinated action by Basin users to reverse resource degradation in the Basin. The Commission has been very effective in achieving this through working with State and Commonwealth government departments to co-ordinate, accelerate and standardize existing land, water and environmental management programs within the Basin. It also initiates on- ground actions with strong community involvement and ownership. Priority is given to issues which require joint government action or common action by two or more parties. The Commission is very successful in focusing on actions by individual States which could affect other parts of the Basin.. Environmental responsibilities of the Commission include action to preserve native fish and the riverine environment and coordinating the management of wetlands on the River Murray floodplain. The Commission is also involved in the coordination of vegetation management and carrying out groundwater and salinity modeling. The strong community involvement in natural resources management issues stems from highly developed and closely managed community educational programs about the natural resources of the Basin. Cap on Water Use Within the Basin More recently in 1996, the Ministerial Council took a decision, following an audit of water use in the basin, that in order to balance the needs between consumptive use and instream uses of water in the rivers of the Murray-Darling system, diversions must be capped and an immediate moratorium introduced on further increases in diversions, while the precise details of the Cap on future diversions and its implementation be worked out. There are two primary objectives driving the introduction of the cap. The first is to maintain and where appropriate, improve existing flow regimes in the waterways of the basin to protect and enhance the riverine environment, and secondly to achieve sustainable consumptive use by developing and managing the water resources of the basin to meet ecological, commercial and social needs. THE FUTURE. The Murray-Darling Basin Initiative is unique. The inter-government Ministerial Council has powers outside those of any of the individual governments which it comprises. Its achievements in cross-border environmental management to date are testament to an unprecedented degree of cooperation and commitment within political and bureaucratic circles and the community. This demonstrates the potential for successful cooperative, integrated land and water management. The Natural Resources Management Strategy has been greeted enthusiastically by landholders as it provides a practical mechanism for implementing the principles of sustainable development in the form of specific on-ground projects. It is becoming widely recognized that the ethic of sustainability is integral to successful land management, and that conservation values are an essential part of the wise use of natural resources. It will also continue to fulfill its crucial, traditional role of water resource assessment, planning and management within the basin. Source: G. Spencer, J. Briscoe and S. Rajagopal (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). Note: A diagram on the organizational structure of the Murray-Darling is appended. 35 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions MURRAY-DARLING BASIN MINISTERIAL COUNCIL Ministers holding land, water and environment portfolios from each participating government (C'wealth, NSW, SA, VIC,QLD) MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMMISSION 2 Commissioneres/ 2 Deputy commissioners representing each participating Government (senior executives from land, water and environment Agencies) & Independent President TECHNICAL SUPPORT/COUNCIL SECRETARIAT Community Advisory Committee (39 Staff) 25 regional representatives River Murray Natural Resource Administration Management Management and Finance SECRETARIAT (3 Staff) COORDINATING COMMITTEE Land and Water Environment Management I SPECIALIST INTERGOVERNMENT WORKING GROUPS Established as required INDEPENDENT CONSULTANTS PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Queensland Commonwealth New South Wales South Australia Victoria *Dept of Primary *Dept of Primary *Dept of Water *Dept of Primary *Dept of Industries Industries and Resources Industry Agriculture *Dept of Energy *Dept Conservation & *Dept of Environment *Dept Conservation Environment & *Dept of the Arts, Land Management & Land Management & Natural Heritage Sport, Environment *Environment *Engineering & Water Resources -Water Resources & Territories Protection Authority Supply Dept *Rural Water Commission *NSW Fisheries Corporation *NSW Agriculture COMMUNITY Source: G. Spencer, J. Briscoe and S. Rajagopal (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 36 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.6 Joint Management of Shared Aquifers Between the Israelis and Palestinians: Institutional Mechanisms The susceptibility of aquifers to pollution, salinization consequent to overpumping, uncertainty regarding their structure, complex surface-groundwater interaction and the potential of aquifers to serve as multi-year storage, emphasizes the need to manage groundwater aquifers under a comprehensive management framework. In the event of international aquifers the need for joint management is therefore inevitable, as in most situations it is unlikely that parties will be able to manage an aquifer in a sustainable manner operating on the aquifer independently. In the Palestinian-Israeli context the shared mountain aquifers (one in the north, one in the east flowing towards the Jordan River and one in the west flowing towards the Mediterranean) provide Israel with approximately 35 percent of its total annual consumption. The western shared aquifer, in addition to being Israel's major multi-year storage of high-quality water, provides virtually the total consumption of the Palestinians on the West Bank. This situation was recognized by the two parties in the interim agreement signed in September 1995, whereby a Joint Water Commission (JWC) was set up for co-ordination of management and protection of water resources/wastewater systems, resolution of disputes, and monitoring and exchange of information. To supervise and enforce the agreement, Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSET) were to be established. In addition, the agreement also included provisions for water purchases by one side from the other. Presently both parties have a central water management body, the Water Commissioner in Israel, and the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) in the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority. The JWC and JSETs have not yet become fully effective in their intended roles, but the process being used to build institutions is of interest. Towards a flexible sequential institution building approach, Feitelson and Haddad (1998a&b) have proposed a possible structure for such joint management of the aquifer. By showing that all joint management options are essentially dynamic, sequential processes, attention is focused on the need to initiate early confidence building measures for later integration with subsequent steps. The management of an aquifer in a sustainable manner requires that many actions be undertaken with regard to several issues. These include the monitoring of the aquifer (qualitative and quantitative), controlling and supervising activities in the recharge area, prioritizing and regulating withdrawals from the aquifer, research and investigations, promotion of programs and measures designated to protect the aquifer, and crisis management. Some of the relevant tasks are data collection and analysis, pollution control, assured wastewater treatment and re-use, risk management, and facilitation of water transfers. Each of these issue areas can be a basis for a joint water management structure. An evaluation of nineteen possible structures (e.g., monitoring of water resources/water extraction, crises management, wastewater issues, and enforcement of activity) showed four major thrusts that joint management institutions may take over time, i.e., aquifer protection, crisis management, economically based institutions and integrative-comprehensive structures. In the case of aquifer protection a proposal for a two-level institutional structure is advanced. In addition to a governing body, a number of specific units are proposed at a lower technical level to carry out professional tasks. The most important inducement to make joint management a potential win-win situation is the joint interest all parties have in maintaining the water quality of the aquifer and its storage capacity. Four or five stages can be identified in the sequence leading up to most resource protection structures. These include aspects such as qualitative and quantitative monitoring of the aquifer, wastewater issues, capacity to set standards, and research coordination. The institutional structure would involve decision makers and mediators at the top followed by the Aquifer Protection Commission (APC), to be composed of high ranking representatives of the main interests (water, health, environment) from the different parties. The APC would have the ultimate responsibility for protecting the aquifer. To help the APC in its work, several joint technical units would need to be set up. In addition, joint inspection teams may be desirable, to assure compliance with the agreed upon actions. A research coordination unit may be established for a long term continuous research program to improve and guide the protection efforts. Finally, a drilling licensing element is needed to prevent over- 37 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions pumping, and consequent salinization. The fourth level of the JWM structure includes field teams of both sides, and the different local and regional authorities and water utilities or units. For crisis management (spilling of toxic material, discovery of hazardous materials in drinking water coming from certain wells and natural events such as droughts), a joint monitoring and data sharing system, a decision making mechanism that can declare a crisis situation, enforcement and conflict-resolution mechanisms, and drought management should be set up, followed by feedback mechanisms to learn from each crisis and allow for adjustments. The central body in a JWM crisis management structure would be a Water Crisis Board, a body that would be assisted by several joint technical units. The economic structures envisioned would include structures intended to facilitate trading of water allocations and utilities, thus opening the way for private sector involvement in management of the aquifer and in fumding the programs. The first step towards an economic-based structure is the establishment of a joint monitoring system followed by trading and/or pricing mechanisms. The institutional structure of an economically based JWM system would include a board of directors (in the case of a utility) or an aquifer management commission that would set the trading rules and govern the structure. This body would be composed of top officials of both sides, representing water, environment, health and economic development interests, as well as (perhaps) some consumer or local authorities' representatives. The third element in these systems are the local authorities that supply the water to end users. Tlhe goal of an integrative structure is to cover all the aspects of aquifer management comprehensively, so as to assure the best result from an aquifer management perspective, and to assure its long range sustainability. Mechanisms for resolving disagreements, crises management, re-allocation mechanisms, financing instruments and a joint water project management capacity need to be built-up in this structure in stages. At a later stage, a comprehensive regulatory capacity and enforcement unit should be set up. The aquifer supervisory commission may eventually assume the role of a governing board for the JWM structure, and may take on the responsibility re-apportioning water if circumstances require. This approach allows decision makers to embark upon a cooperative route without committing themselves in advance to a fully integrative structure. This approach may, thus, provide the flexibility to include elements from other routes in response to changing circumstances, without compromising previous achievements. A question that may be posed in the context of this Water Resources Management review is whether the inclusion of a neutral third party (e.g., GOI in the case of aquifers shared between Indian states) might further facilitate progress towards coordinated management of the shared aquifers. In the case of the Israeli and Palestinian aquifers, actual achievements in improved water resources management between the two bilateral parties is still quite limited. Source: E.V. Jagannathan Based on Feitelson and Haddad, 1993a&b. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 38 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.7 Establishing Institutions for Water Allocation, Planning and Management at State Levels: Experience under the WRCPs in Tamil Nadu and Orissa Efficient allocation, planning and management of water resources in India depends on substantial changes and up-grading of institutional capabilities in water related departments at state levels. In India's federal structure, the state is the key administrative unit. Hence, it is at the state level where policy/institutional changes make greatest impact on the optimal utilization of scarce water resources. Under the World Bank assisted Water Resources Consolidation Projects (WRCPs) in Tamil Nadu and Orissa, under implementation since 1994 and 1995, state capacity upgrading in water resources management is being implemented in all functional areas, including in water allocation, planning and management discussed here. In these states, improved planning and management of water resources is being attempted on a holistic and multi-sectoral basis by the natural hydrological unit, the river basin, incorporating ground as well as surface water, and including environmental aspects in addition to quantity considerations. In the case of Orissa, the Orissa Irrigation Department (OID) has been the lead agency for irrigation development in the state. It was increasingly recognized that the OID, while it had considerable achievement in construction of civil works, had to shift its focus towards the challenges of complex water management. In 1996, as a part of the institutional reorganization under the WRCP, the Department of Water Resources (DOWR) was created. A reorganization was carried out to: (i) broaden the responsibility of DOWR to include basin planning; (ii) create a Water Resources Board (WRB) headed by the Chief Secretary to act as the State's highest authority for guiding and taking multi-sectoral decisions regarding water planning and allocation; (iii) create specialized line units for each key functional responsibility of DOWR; (iv) decentralize DOWR management along river basin lines including substantial transfer of decision making to regional basin managers; and (v) involve farmers in irrigation system operation and maintenance decisions and tum over responsibilities of O&M irrigation to farmers. The WRB ensures inter-departmental co-ordination of a wide spectrum of departments within the state that are involved in water planning, management and development. An Orissa Water Planning Organization (OWPO) has also been created headed by a Chief Engineer, to be the nodal unit responsible for all phases of multi-sectoral basin planning and the technical Secretariat of the WRB. A Hydrometry and Data Center has also been established. The work of OWPO is significantly underway and will result in preparation of multi-sectoral basin plans for all of the river basins in the state, followed by an integrated State Water Plan. OWPO is also sponsoring various workshops on water and environmental issues. In the case of Tamil Nadu, a Water Resources Control and Review Council (WRCRC), chaired by the Chief Minister, has been created to make decisions on water planning and allocation. A specialist Water Resources Organization (WRO) has been created through bifurcation of PWD, and the WRO has been reorganized around functional specialization and decentralized along river basin lines. The state's water management is now under four Basin Managers, supported by WRO's various technical units. The Institute of Water Studies (IWS) has had its mandate adjusted to serve as the state's water planning organization. IWS has been charged with preparation of basin plans and environmental plans,and an overall state water plan. IWS, through its technical committee, contains representation and expertise from all water using sectors. The IWS also serves as Secretariat of the WRCRC. A Ground and Surface Water Resources Data Center has also been created. Piloting is also underway for creation of intra-state RBOs involving stakeholders (refer Box A3.8), and includes development of an interactive basin model in the Tamil language as a decision support system (refer Box A7.3). The following organigrams highlight the inter-sectoral water resources management aspects that were built into the WRCP institutional reorganizations. The ongoing process now in both states is to build the technical capabilities of OWPO/IWS and basin manager's offices, and to complete the basin plans. In both states, the WRB/WRCRC still need to evolve as functionally dynamic multi sectoral entities Source: E.V.Jagannathan, K. Oblitas, and K. Eisenstadt (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998) 39 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.7 (continued) New Organizational Structures for Water Resources Management in Orissa and Tamil Nadu ORISSA: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF NEW DOWR & WRB 11 ^|- ^ DIRECTOR R & R E| N-R&R MONITORING. CHIEFCENG INEER CHIEF EN EER T SAIOE ME RECTCAANNG IWALMCIA PRC)GRAMME |BUDGET & |ACCO UNTS HUA RESOURCE PUB15 LICUPPE R INFORAATION ~. NG. DFIG AN MVA ON. IRN EAUTO PRORE. N RUESEAACCUCH . r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ TAMIL NADU: STRUCTURE OF NEW WRO & WRCRC BUDGET& ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~BDGTN ACCOUNTS_ ACCUNING M 1r_IC _ E N COOI CHIEF ENGINEER CHIEF ENGINEER F~~~~~~~~iii~FENGIEFNEENEE 11_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A - & A CDMIRTOSPOIONR | DDRECTOR 4 |IRMIGATION MANAGEMEENT TRAINING INSTITUTE -- | MONrrORING AND EVALUTO |PROGRAMMING| BUDGETING |ACCOUNTING 40 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.8 Vaigai Basin Stakeholder Participation Sustainable water resources planning, allocation and management in India not only requires an integrated view of the supply and demand aspects of water but also an interactive decision-making framework. This requires mutually-complementary initiatives for the establishment of formal institutions for stakeholder participation and the development of river basin analysis and modeling techniques. Stakeholders include any group or agency that is responsible for, can contribute towards, or is affected by water resources policies. On the demand side, this would include farmers, industrialists, domestic water users, in-stream water users, and those involved with hydropower generation and inland water transport, etc. who have to be consulted in an effective manner for a more efficient and equitable utilization of scarce water resources. The objective is to promote a consensus-building approach, through a mutually agreed give-and-take basis for optimal planning, allocation and management of basin water resources. The attempt is to progressively localize decision-making under a basin committee and to bring stakeholders and market mechanisms into the process of water allocation and management. Vaigai basin was chosen for pilot experimentation under the on-going World Bank assisted Tamil Nadu Water Resources Consolidation Project (WRCP). It is convenient for piloting because of its relatively discrete size, the fact that it is primarily an intra-state basin (with the exception of one reservoir), presence of multiple stakeholders, and inter-regional and inter-sectoral conflicts over scarce water supplies. Irrigation is highly developed with 67,000 ha under surface irrigation, and with 75% of agricultural area under paddy. The demand for drinking water supply, especially for the urban area of Madurai (population 1.2 million) is acute. Industrial requirements for water is expected to increase over five-fold by 2020. A large number of private wells extract groundwater without incentive for saving due to free supply of electricity to pumpsets resulting in declining groundwater table. Environmental problems include some effluent disposal from Madurai's municipal areas and industrial plants and saline water intrusion near the coast. The stakeholders in the basin include farmers, industries, domestic water consumers, livestock, washermen and various central, state and local governmental organizations and NGOs. They have to operate in a highly regulated environment with no formal water rights and fragmented and overlapping decision-making responsibilities. In Tamil Nadu, there were no Basin Committees to begin with, not even for discussion between concerned government departments. In two initially exclusive government meetings in May/June, 1996, arranged by the basin manager of WRO, GOTN, with participation by the representatives of various government agencies -- such as Collector, Madurai; Tamilnadu Water Supply and Sewerage Board (TWAD); Madurai Corporation; Pollution Control Board, Agriculture and Forest Department -- it was decided to initiate an inter-sectoral dialogue with the Vaigai stakeholders with a view to devise realistic plans to optimize the benefits from the basin. After these initial stakeholder meetings, the THANNI model (refer Box A7.3) structure was developed as a medium for a user-friendly dialogue with the stakeholders. The model has the capability to quantitatively reflect the possible interventions, both structural and non-structural, and their consequences so as to bring out immediately (i.e., during the discussion) the impact of the concern of various stakeholders and the trade-off possibilities. Subsequently, in the stakeholders' meetings held at Madurai on October 18, 1996, and on November 13, 1996, the model was presented. A large number of basin farmer representatives, NGOs, industry representatives, municipal corporation, pollution control board, washermen community, etc. were present as well as the relevant government representatives. The preliminary model was made operational based on the data collected from the Vaigai basin for all the related sectors. It was then presented in the stakeholders meeting held at Madurai on January 24, 1998. 41 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions This was the first interaction of the stakeholders on the model tailored specifically to the Vaigai basin. It evoked considerable debate on sub-sectoral issues, indicating the usefulness of such decision support systems to serve as a focal point for discussion. A Select Committee of Stakeholders consisting of leading stakeholders, NGOs and the representatives from the GOTN has been suggested for more focused interaction on improving the model so as to discuss model outputs for various identified scenarios in the next stakeholders' meeting. Attempts are ongoing to further improve the Tamil (local language) version of the model to enhance communication with and interpretation value for the various stakeholders. A gradual transfer from looking from compartmentalized sub-sector location-specific concerns of the stakeholders towards an understanding of the impact of a proposed activity/activities in a sub-sector on other sub-sectors of the river basin is discernible. Possibly, this will lead towards emergence of a basin plan acceptable to all after evaluating the relative trade-offs. There is still much to be done, but this is perceived to be the beginning of a new form of stakeholder interaction for collective decision-making. Source: E.V.Jagannathan and N. Harshadeep Based on work by the Inter-sectoral Water Allocation team (led by S. Rajagopal) of the India - WRM Sector Work Program (World Bank, 1998) and adapted from Oblitas, Rogers and Harshadeep, 1996. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 42 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 3. River Basin Organizations and Institutions Box A3.9 Institutional Linkages: Proposed Calcutta Environmental Management Strategy According to the draft Environmental Management Strategy for the Calcutta Metropolitan Area (Government of West Bengal, 1996), the interplay of state, the market and civil society institutions is at the centre of environmental management and of the Government of West Bengal's environmental policy (see table below). The environmental web illustrates conceptually the various types of institutions that exist, or could be established, with state, market or civil society functions over certain aspects of environmental management. To date, these three sectors' spheres of action have not worked collaboratively or with a common purpose. Encouraging co-operation and co-ordination will result in better policies and better implementation of those policies. A focal point of the Strengthening Institutions and Resources Strategy developed under Calcutta's Environmental Management Strategy, is to enable co-operation by reducing discord between these sectors. Environmental planning, development control, urban government and integrated water and waste management are processes to enable practical linkages to people. The Environmental Management Web Level Institution Type Political Administrative Regulation Executive Mediation State Cabinet Environment inter- Metropolitan "New Department departmental Planning Environment Committee on committee Committee Agency" Environment State Agencies Metropolitan State Pollution CMDA DLB/ILGUS as Planning Control Board CMWSA a clearing house Committee for urban env. information District District (Zonal) and District State Pollution Administration Planning Environmental Control Board Committee Cells Local Municipalities Chairman or District Local Env. Local Government Corporation Councillor Pollution Engineer / Environmental Control Units MoH / Forums (attached to palnning WBPCB) capacity Legal Envir.law Abatement association tribunals "Independent Ward Service contract Advocacy Recognised sector" Committees supervision NGO NGO abatement (NGO/CBO) Service O&M federations assistance Citizens Green political Greenwatch campaigns campaigns Private Sector Chamber of Trade associations Contractor Producer Commerce env. (self regulation or services responsibility units advisory) groups Source: Government of West Bengal, 1996. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 43 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.1 Indian Agricultural and Industrial GDP, 1986-1995 900 850 800 750 700 EL Agriculture co 650 I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~undustry 600 550 500~ 450 400- 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Yer1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Source: Adapted from World EBan k, 1997a. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 44 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.2 Working Expenses and Interest on Capital Outlay in Irrigation Projects, 1974-1992 Year Working Expenses Interest on Capital Outlay 1974-75 946 (1387) 1379 (2022) 1975-76 954 (1419) 1577(2347) 1976-77 1128 (1644) 1749 (2549) 1977-78 1272 (1764) 2155 (2989) 1978-79 1552 (2152) 2555 (3544) 1979-80 1405 (1661) 2923 (3546) 1980-81 2257(2257) 3015 (3015) 1981-82 2653 (2427) 4156 (3802) 1982-83 2377 (2121) 8727 (7785) 1983-84 2739 (2232) 5628 (4587) 1984-85 3340 (2540) 6357 (4834) 1985-86 4869 (3503) 6817 (4905) 1986-87 4896 (3347) 8673 (5928) 1987-88 14003 (8891) 1988-89 21280 (12584) 1989-90 22238 (12279) 1990-91 24184 (12421) 1991-92 27165 (11962) Rs. million, nominal and constant 1980-81 values Source: CWC, 1996. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 45 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.3 Estimated Demand for Water in Mehsana, Gujarat Dinar et. al. estimated a demand function for groundwater in Mehsana, Gujarat, based on data presented in Kumar (1996). The function takes the form Q = e 12.94 p 1.72 (R2=.499, t -3.45). The price coefficient in the demand function indicates that irrigators are sensitive to the price of water (as shown in the following figure), thereby influencing their allocation decisions. The groundwater prices are mostly on an hourly basis, though payment by season and number of irrigation events is also reported. While the observed hourly prices are in the lower range of Rs. 3-6 in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh, they are in the higher range of Rs. 25-45 {US$ = Rs. 12.97} in Gujarat where groundwater markets are more organised and competitive. The seasonal payment takes the forn of a 'water rent' and it varies from one-third in Tamil Nadu to 50-66 percent of buyers' crop output in Gujarat (Saleth, 1997). 500000 _ Observed Quantity _ Calculated Quantity 400000 Quantity 300000 (cubic m) 200000 100000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Price (Rs/cubic m) Source: Dinar and Saleth, 1997 (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 46 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.4 Differential Pollution Fees for Industry in Tamil Nadu A pollution tax was introduced by the Pollution Control Board of Tamil Nadu (TNPCB, 1996). Industries are classified as "Red", "Orange" or "Green" according to their pollution potential, and by their gross fixed assets, as a proxy for pollution amount within each class of industries. The following figure presents the fee structure for the different "colored" industries and for a variety of gross fixed assets values. 100000 80000 U M3.5 4.S 5.5-6.5 60000 -. *1110.0-50.0 Fees 0 100.0-200.0 40000 - * 500.0-1000.0 * 3000.0-4000.0 20000 0 E Ei11*>5000.0 O t < Gross Asset Red Industry Orange Industry Green Industry Category Source: Dinar and Saleth, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 47 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.5 Water Pollution Fees for Industry in Andhra Pradesh Water Consumption (m3/day) Pollution Fee (Rs/year) <10 260 10-50 390 500-1000 1040 10000-50000 3120 1000000-500000 6240 >500000 8320 Source: India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998. 48 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.6 Calcutta's Water Supply and Surrogate Volumetric Water Pricing Calcutta's population increased from 0.7 million at the beginning of the century to 4.4 million to date, and is expected to reach 6.9 million in ten years. Neighboring municipalities with a population of 1.2 million are expected to grow to about 2 million in the next decade. Water to these 5.6 million people (and 2 million more that commute daily for work) is supplied, at present, from mainly two sources by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC): 220 million gallons per day (MGD) per capita from the Hoogly River (222 gallons=lm3), and 25 MGD per capita from public ground water wells. Ground water quality is not satisfactory and the supply will terminate in the next century. Additional ground water from an unknown number of private tubewells is also pumped in the area. CMC does not face water scarcity, but rather it is concerned with the poor performance of the 60-150 years old conveyance system, which has a 35% unaccounted for water rate, high energy and other O&M cost. As a consequence, parts of the metropolitan area do not get the sufficient supply, which is calculated at 49 gallons per day per capita. Present annual electricity cost of supplying the 330 million m3 is 200 million Rs and other O&M costs are 300 million Rs. The variable cost of water supply by CMC is therefore 1.5 Rs/m3. Additional revenue is provided by a share of property tax. Of the 175,000 residential connections, only 25,000 are charged at present directly a flat rate per annum for water use. Collection of water charges are only 80 million Rs/year. Rates differentiate between the connection velocity (Ferule), and the type of customers. Residential connections with 25 mm ferule pay 780 Rs/year, connections of 20 mm ferule pay 480 Rs/year (Rates for 15 mm and 10 mm ferule sizes are 120 and 28 Rs/Year, respectively, and are not being collected.) The 10,000 commercial and industry connections pay 24,000 Rs/year. Short- and long-term plans for the next 10 years will increase the surface pumping and filtering capacity to 380 MGD and improve the efficiency of the conveyance system. This will only provide for the population growth needs, but not for additional water per capita. Investment is estimated at 3 billion Rs. The investment in the conveyance system is expected to result also in an annual saving of 100 million Rs in electricity and in an additional O&M saving of 100 million Rs. A new water tariff structure, which is being now established, incorporates 4 components that jointly will represent the volume of water that potentially can be used by the user. The tariff components are: the ferule, the pressure in the supply segment leading to the users intake, the distance of the user's intake from the supply junction, and the height of the user's intake compared to the supply junction. It is expected that the pseudo-volumetric tariff will provide incentives for users to request replacements of ferules (to a lower diameter) if they feel they use less water than potentially can be provided to them by their existing ferule. Charges for water are expected to triple compared to the 780 Rs/year being paid at present. Implementation of the new tariff is planned in two stages. First, a cost recovery rate of 80% is planned for several years, followed by a 100% cost recovery from thereafter. Source: Dinar and Saleth, 1997. Adapted from Calcutta Municipal Corporation, 1994; Government of West Bengal, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 49 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.7 Long-Term Marginal Cost of Water Supply in South Africa The Republic of South Africa's (RSA) water management policies focused, in the past, mainly on water supply. This implied the creation of complex water conveyance infrastructures that transferred water along and among basins, as well as provided water to several sub-sectors (e.g., irrigation, urban uses, power, mining, and others). The "New RSA" is facing major decisions in the water sector in light of recent economic, political, social, and demographic changes. Water use is expected to increase due to several reasons, including expansion of supply to communities that did not have access to adequate water services in the past, and increased consumption due to population growth and improved standard of living. This will bring consumption of water to a point where the existing water system will not be able to supply, if demand is not managed properly. The Vaal River Basin is one of the major water supply regions in the country. Its contributes about 60% of the nation's GDP and contains nearly 40% of RSA's urban population. The pattern of water consumption in the Vaal Basin, similar to that of RSA, is 24% urban, 16% industrial, and 44% agriculture. The total consumption of water in the Vaal Basin exceeds the available water of the basin, and is, therefore, amended by inter-basin transfers. To amend the increased need for water in the Vaal Basin, additional inter-basin (and international) water transfers have been initiated, with a substantial increase in the bulk supply cost. The figure below depicts the cost associated with developing new water resources for the Vaal Basin. Cost of Bulk Water Supply in the Vaal Basin: 160.0 - 140.0 LHWP lA&B , 120.0 E U 100.0. ' 80.0 60.0, 40.0 Tugela Vaal U 20.0 Vaal Dam Bloemhof 0.0 - 1F I 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 Cumulative Volume (Million cubic meters per year) The cost per unit of bulk water, as can be seen in the figure, is expected to reach the very high value of 1.60 Rand/m3 (I US$=3.5 Rand). With the completion of the two phases of Lesotho Highland Water Project Phase A and B (LHWP), the total supply of 3868 million m3 will still fall short of the expected need. Additional projects that have been evaluated recently, would result in the cost of additional 3000 million m3 to reach, in the margin, a value of 2.40 Rand/m3. To cope with the increasing gap of water availability over space and time, and the soaring cost of closing this gap, the government of the RSA is considering a change in its water pricing policy. It is acknowledged that the faster the demand grows in the Vaal Basin, the sooner these more expensive alternatives will need to be developed. The present pricing practice in RSA does not reflect the value of the investment nor does it 50 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing take into account the economic value of water. It basically uses an accounting principle of "writing down" the value of assets by the amounts paid off, therefore, in some projects, the cost of water reaches a very low unrealistic value. In addition, the pricing policy has not placed a cost/value on water itself. The current bulk water pricing formula comprises three parts: (i) an operating cost which includes full O&M allocated on an annual basis per m3; (ii) Capital cost based on historic depreciated average cost per m3; and (iii) a levy (for LHWP) for projected loan services, allocated over all urban and industrial consumers. The debate in RSA is over a water pricing policy that will enable it to: (i) fund investments for new water resources without mortgaging future generations; (ii) induce water conservation and pollution-reduction by sending appropriate economic signals; and (iii) be based on equitable considerations, taking into account sectors, income groups, and geographic areas. Moving away from the existing pricing system, several alternatives have been considered. Source: Dinar, 1994. (Adapted for India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 51 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.8 How Domestic Sugar Policies Affect Water Use Although grown on only 2 percent of India's agricultural land, sugarcane, and its by-products (sugar, molasses, gur, and khandsari, the last two being indigenous sweeteners) are an important sector of the economy, accounting for nearly 2 percent of the country's GDP. Being an extremely water intensive crop, sugarcane cultivation significantly affects water use in many parts of the country. A recent Bank study' that analyzed the sugarcane industry in the states of Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh where 60 percent of India's sugarcane is grown, found that government policies in the sugar sector have seriously distorted regional production and cropping patterns, and mis-allocated resources including irrigation water. Of the two states, Maharashtra is extremely water-short, but domestic sugar policies have contributed to a rapid increase in sugarcane cultivation in the state. Between 1968-1996 sugarcane production in Maharashtra grew at a trend rate of 4.4 percent per annum compared to a national average of 3.1 percent per annum. The rapid growth in Maharashtra has had an effect on water use in the state. By one estimate as much as 76 percent of irrigation water in Maharashtra is being used for sugarcane cultivation which occupies only 3 percent of the cultivated area in the state. Current policies distorting regional production patterns include licensing of sugar mills, government subsidies to cooperative mills, and a dual market for sugar. In addition, state advised minimum prices for sugarcane and large subsidies on fertilizer, power and water distort cropping patterns nationally, encouraging sugarcane relative to other crops. Licensing and Capital Subsidies. Licensing policies to establish new sugar mills or expand existing capacity have favored cooperative mills, and mills in Maharashtra in particular since the state encourages only cooperatives in the sugar sector. Apart from the licensing bias, cooperative mills also receive large capital subsidies from the state government, which are not available to the private milling sector that is dominant in Uttar Pradesh. These policies have led to a rapid growth in the number of sugar mills in Maharashtra, encouraged shifts to sugarcane cultivation, and skewed water use in the state. Dual Market System. Under the dual market system, 40 percent of sugar mills' output has to be sold to the government at below market prices (the "levy" system), but gur and khandsari producers are exempt. This policy provides a greater disincentive to sugar mills vis-A-vis gur and khandsari producers in Uttar Pradesh compared to Maharashtra. The presence of a large gur and khandsari sector (which is not subjected to a levy) increases the competition that mills in Uttar Pradesh face when buying sugarcane from farmers. Maharashtra mills do not face this competition for sugarcane supplies because there are a negligible number of gur and khandsari units in the state. Sugarcane Pricing. Unlike other important crops such as rice and wheat, the minimum support price announced by GOI for sugarcane is not the minimum price at which mills have to buy from farmers. States are free to announce significantly higher State Advised Prices (SAPs) which establish the actual minimum prices that mills must pay to growers. The process of determining SAPs is subject to considerable political intervention and prices are often set above competitive levels, contributing to a shift from other crops to sugarcane. Subsidies on fertilizer, power and water further accentuate the shift as, relative to other crops, sugarcane uses much more of these inputs, particularly in Maharashtra. '"India's Sugar Industry: Priorities and Reforms". (Forthcoming 1998). South Asia Rural Development Unit, The World Bank. Source: Deepak Ahluwalia, Benoit Blarel, and Dina Umali-Deininger (Adapted for India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 52 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.9 Government of Karnataka's Agricultural Policy In addition to inappropriate water pricing, water use and allocation in India has been negatively affected by the behavioral incentives generated by indirect pricing policies of water-related inputs and outputs. The water-related items in the 1995 agricultural policy of the Government of Karnataka (refer table "Karnataka's Agricultural Policy" can be used to demonstrate the mis-application of economic tools which has created an environment of conflicting incentives. For example, while some of the policy instruments (such as investment in water-efficient technologies) attempt to encourage conservation of scarce water, other policy instruments (such as subsidies for sugarcane production) eliminate the positive effect. The effect of crop pricing policy can be seen by considering Karnataka's agricultural policy. Although on the one hand incentives are provided for water-saving irrigation technologies, such as sprinkler and drip irrigation, on the other hand subsidies are provided for rice and sugarcane production which, by encouraging cultivation, could increase water usage. Farmers respond to crop prices by adjusting cropping patterns to market (or administrative procurement) signals, and, therefore, crop prices indirectly affect water use efficiency in agriculture. For example, in an attempt to explain the 1995/96 unexpected decline in foodgrain production in India (Raghavan, 1996), weather conditions have been blamed for a 4.4%, 2.1% and 8.1% decline in wheat, rice, and other pulses yields. However, about 600,000 hectares formerly under wheat production were switched to other crops in 1995/96, indicating that, "the price signals, as reflected by the lower procurement prices of grains, also played a major role in the changed cropping patterns " Source: Dinar and Saleth, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). Kamataka's Agricultural Policy: Water-Related Incentives and Subsidies in the Agricultural Sector Incentive/Subsidy Components Land use Waiver of conversion fee for converting agricultural land to industrial use. Concession to a maximum of 2 acres only. Relaxation from power cut. For 5 years for new units from the date of commercial production. Subsidy for bio-fertilizers. For cereal crops, 50% subsidy to farmers on "S" brands, not exceeding Rs. 15/ha. Subsidized pesticide distribution Distribution at 25% of cost. Herbicide use Assistance limited to Rs. 600/ha. Subsidy for rice production Assistance for rainfed rice production and Basmati rice production, limited to Rs. 600/ha. Subsidy for sprinklers Sprinkler sets to small and marginal farmers and farm area ut to 2 ha and a subsidy up to Rs. 10.000/set. Subsidy for drip irrigation equipment Subsidy on drip irrigation (minimum subsidy Rs. 14.200 and maximum subsidy Rs. 60,000). Sugarcane production Rs. 2,200/ha as seed subsidy and Rs. 500/ha as transoortation subsidy. Fertilizer concession price scheme to all farmers A concession of Rs. 340/ton for single super phosphate, and Rs. 435 to Rs. 999/ton for complex fertilizers. Source: Government of Kamataka, 1995. 53 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 4. Economics and Pricing Box A4.10 Market Failure and Rationale for Government Intervention in Water Resources Management * The mobility of water, in addition to oftentimes inadequate water-related information, make it difficult to establish well-defined (exclusive and enforceable) property rights which are necessary for a water market to function efficiently. Closely related to this, water use often involves externalities or third party effects. For example, the pollution or extraction of water upstream may reduce both the quality and quantity of water downstream. Similarly, over-exploitation of groundwater may not only reduce water levels but also lead to salt-water intrusion and contamination in other parts of the aquifer. Therefore, government intervention/regulation, including the use of economic tools, may be necessary to ensure that consumption of water does not decrease or subtract from another's potential use (i.e., subtractability). * Large capital outlays and long periods before payoff characterize many water projects/investments, making it difficult to attract private investors. Additionally, water projects/infrastructure often exhibit increasing returns to scale and are, therefore, prone to natural monopolies. Without government intervention there may be under-investment in water and monopoly pricing/over-pricing. However, as conditions change, such disincentives to private investment may diminish. For example, developments in tube well technology have reduced the economies of scale in tubewell irrigation and, therefore, one of the main constraints to private investment. * Many water investments produce joint or complementary products, such as recreation, power, flood control, and irrigation. Some water services, such as flood control, are also public good in nature. In other words, it is impossible or unfeasible to exclude potential users from benefiting from the service and the benefits generated by the service do not decrease, even as consumption of the service increases. Such goods will tend to be under-provided by the private sector and therefore public intervention is required to ensure appropriate levels. * The unique characteristic of water -- that it is essential for life -- in addition to environmental concerns warrant judicious use of government intervention to temper market outcomes which may be socially undesirable. Source: H. Qaddumi Adapted from World Bank, 1993b. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 54 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets Box A5.1 Surface and Groundwater Rights: International Experience Surface Water Rights: In India, the State's paramount rights were born out of Government-spearheaded and sponsored irrigation development and have served well their original purpose. However, they have not, so far, been carried as far as overhauling riparianism and replacing it with a Government-administered mechanism to allocate user-type rights in natural surface waters. As a result, until a new system emerges to replace riparianism, nothing prevents the courts from entertaining litigation among riparians who have the means to engage in court battles, and riparians of means may feel tempted to test in the courts instances where the Government exercises its paramount rights in connection with government-assisted irrigation projects. This legal limbo stands in contrast to trends world-wide. Common law riparianism has been done away with by virtually all the Eastern states of the United States of America, where it used to hold sway. It has been done away with altogether as recently as 1995 by Jamaica and in 1989 by the Australian state of Victoria, which has vested in the state a superior "right to the use, flow and control" of all waters in that state for the common good. It has been radically modified even in England and Wales, the very cradle of riparianism, in 1963. Its demise has been accepted as one of the lead principles which will govern the drafting of new water management legislation for South Africa. In all these countries, common law riparianism has been replaced by a statutory system of Government-administered permits for the abstraction and use of water. As a result, no one can claim a right to abstract and use water on the basis of ownership or possession of riparian land or - as in England and Wales - on that basis only. Groundwater Rights: Bold steps have been taken by many countries to live up to similar challenges concerning groundwater ownership that India faces - though such challenges are surely on a less dramatic scale than India's in quantitative terms. In the early 1980's the Legislatures of the American arid states of Arizona and New Mexico went as far as replacing the common law rule of absolute ownership of groundwater with a government-administered permit system of groundwater extraction. So did the Legislature of the Australian state of Victoria with the 1989 Water Act. In England and Wales, instead, government-administered licensing requirements have been superimposed on the enjoyment of riparian rights in groundwater under the 1963 Water Act. The same trend can be observed in countries belonging to the Civil Law tradition. The Spanish Legislature passed in 1985 legislation whereby all hitherto private groundwater resources became the public property of the State. Concern for the long-term sustainability of the nation's groundwater resources, in particular, prompted Italy's Parliament to pass in 1994 legislation vesting in the State all private water resources, including, in particular, groundwater. Legislation which effectively curtails such significant attributes of land ownership as the right to sink a well and to extract groundwater from beneath one's own land could be construed as a taking of constitutionally protected property rights and be challenged before the courts of law. The above-mentioned Arizona and the New Mexico statutes suffered such challenge and survived scrutiny by the courts intact, as did the Spanish Water Act's groundwater provisions. Source: Burchi and Singh, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 55 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets Box A5.2 Protecting Existing Rights While Instituting a New Water Rights System: International Experience In instituting a new water rights system, good-faith, unchallenged reliance on one's riparian/property rights need not be disturbed, nor should the law bring about unnecessary disruption of established water usages and use patterns. In England and Wales special provisions of a transitional nature were put in place, whereby riparian abstractions in progress at the time the new legislation came into force were guaranteed and protected through the instrument of a "licence of right". As a result, all riparian abstractors had to file for a licence within a one-year deadline from the coming into force of the new statute to have their rights confirmed, limited however to the amounts of water they could show they had actually been abstracting in the preceding five years. Similar provisions can be found in Jamaica's 1995 Water Resources Act. Additionally, in England and Wales groundwater extractions in progress at the time the new legislation came into force were treated and protected in the same manner as surface water abstractions. Under Spain's 1985 and Italy's 1994 legislation, dispossessed groundwater owners have been granted, on request, user rights, limited to the quantities of water actually extracted from existing wells. In Spain, such user rights are restricted in duration to 50 years from the time of the grant by Government. Another important feature of the licensing systems in effect in other countries is that licensing requirements are generally waived in respect of water abstractions, and groundwater extractions made to satisfy the immediate domestic and para-domestic requirements of the abstractor's household. Shallow wells and low- yielding wells also tend to be exempted from the scope of licensing requirements. The rationale is that recording and monitoring of these abstractions would be an impossible task, and an unnecessary one in view of the limited impact which "minor" abstractions and extractions are assumed to have on the relevant water systems. Source: Burchi and Singh, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 56 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets Box A5.3 Pre-Conditions for Efficient, Equitable and Environmentally Sustainable Water Markets Water markets can be an effective mechanism for improving water resource efficiency by facilitating the transfer of water to its highest-valued use. Additionally, by providing compensation for water sales, water markets induce water conservation, including the adoption of water-saving technologies. However, because of the special characteristics of water (refer Box A4.10), a number of preconditions are necessary to ensure that water markets are efficient, equitable and sustainable. * Institutional, and as needed, legislative, arrangements must be created to establish tradeable water rights that are separate from land. * Appropriate administrative arrangements must be established. In India, water rights and water markets might be more feasible on a group basis, such as for a WUA as a whole. The WUA could engage in water transactions as a group, with trading within the WUA based on informal or semi-informal arrangements between the WUA members. * A management unit which involves stakeholders must be established to monitor and regulate implementation of the trades. * Devices for volumetric measurement and flexible infrastructure must be in place which allow the sellers to transfer water to the buyers (e.g., for irrigation, adjustable gates and interconnecting canals). . A regulatory framework must be provided to protect the environment, health and third parties, all of which may be damaged by water trades due to the externalities associated with water use (e.g., minimum flow, downstream users). * Dispute resolution mechanisms must exist to deal with conflicts over water rights and third party interests. * Equity considerations must be taken into account in the design of water rights (e.g., by giving priority to certain uses) and in their initial distribution. * Impact on women and marginal groups (scheduled castes and tribes, landless, etc.) needs to be assessed carefully, and special organizational management and monitoring features introduced to ensure equal participation and full benefits. Source: H. Qaddumi Adapted from Biswas, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 57 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets Box A5.4 Opportunities for Establishing Water Rights and a Groundwater District: The Case of Chennai Future water quantity and quality requirements for Chennai (formerly Madras) are a pressing issue for water resource planners. The supply situation will improve dramatically over the next few years with the addition of 958 MCM/year of diverted Krishna River water. Even with the Krishna water augmentation, however, there is a substantial and ever-increasing gap between the demand for, and supply of, water. Additional surface water supplies will be very expensive and difficult to come by. The capacity for providing Chennai with a low-cost supply of high quality water to meet demand would need to rely upon the effective inter- sectoral re-allocation of irrigation water to urban and industrial uses. In terms of resource quality, the major issues involve avoiding groundwater overdraft, and subsequent saline intrusion, and the implementation of land use planning and industrial zoning to prevent industrial, non- degradable contamination of the various aquifers on which the city residents depend. Existing public awareness and concern about aquifer management in Chennai have greatly assisted Metrowater, the city's supplier, in innovatively addressing these issues through its effective use of the Madras Groundwater Act. Krishna water is a very beneficial resource for Chennai City -- a huge quantity of water of high reliability at relatively low cost (about Rs 2.0/cubic meter). This increase notwithstanding, Metrowater needs to be concerned about securing additional sources of water to satisfy demand projections. Given that regional surface waters are fully allocated, that groundwater is being mined in 30% of the region, that subsequent allocations from the Krishna River are unlikely, and that the cost of bringing additional water from outside the drainage basin is prohibitively high, the cost-effective option is the inter-sectoral re-allocation of irrigation water. Irrigation accounts for 87% of abstractions from both the nearby Araniar-Kusaithaliayar (A- K) aquifer, and the surface waters surrounding the city. Two options for the noted inter-sectoral allocation exist for Chennai; the use of irrigation water from Chembarambakkam Tank (a historic and currently functioning irrigation tank west of the city), and from the A-K aquifer. There are some precedents in India for the purchase of irrigation rights. In this region, an important precedent is that farmers' rights were bought out at the Redhill Reservoir in the 1960s. The Tank is a particularly attractive option for Metrowater, because it is designed to serve as the reservoir for the diverted Krishna water. Therefore, it provides a natural point for augmenting supply where no additional distribution expenses will be incurred. The Tank is a preferred low-cost option, but can only provide an additional 27 MCM/year of water. The sustainable yield of the A-K is not known with certainty, but an estimate from a major hydrogeological study of the aquifer by the UNDP places it in the range of 400-500 MCM/year. As in all other parts of the world, the value of water for irrigated foodcrops is a fraction of the value for urban and domestic purposes. Rough calculations suggest that the value of water in irrigation in Tamil Nadu is less than Rs 0.5/cubic meter. Even if Metrowater had to pay several times this amount, it could obtain additional water from the Tank and the A-K at a unit cost of around Rs 1.70 and Rs 2.0/cubic meter respectively, which is less than, or comparable to, the cost of Krishna water. In comparing these costs, it should be noted that residents and industries of Madras have long paid vendors between Rs 25 and Rs 45/cubic meter of water. The "quantity challenge" is, accordingly, to manage the voluntary transfer of a large portion of the A-K water from relatively low-value irrigation uses to the much higher-value domestic and industrial uses. Using a set of conservative assumptions and taking several factors into account (the value of irrigated agriculture, the fact that farmers would only sell or lease their water if they made a substantial profit, and the fact that a part of the water applied to fields returns to the aquifer), it is unlikely that Metrowater would have to pay more than Rs 2.0 for each additional cubic meter of water delivered to the city. The logic behind transferring A-K 58 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets water from irrigation to urban uses has long been recognised. A UN groundwater team previously raised the issue in 1988 and recommended in their final report that "consideration should be given to the feasibility of buying water from farmers." This suggestion was pilot tested in 1996 when Metrowater started purchasing small quantities of water (on a temporary basis) from farmers in the A-K aquifer, and injecting this water into their distribution system. In the view of Metrowater management, there are few impediments to simply purchasing customary water rights from farmers who are willing to sell. Currently, work is intended under the World Bank's Third Madras Urban Water Project. The project will upgrade the hydrogeological data for the A-K and specify mechanisms for organizing a formal water market. International experience with water markets in recent years, have provided major advances in both the understanding and practice of the use of "water markets" for voluntarily transferring water from low-value to high-value uses. In terms of understanding, in recent years it has become apparent that informal water markets are, in fact, ubiquitous, sophisticated and widespread. Of particular relevance is the fact that one of the largest, most complex and best-operated of these informal water markets is in India (in Gujarat). In terms of practice, formal, managed water markets have come into use in a number of countries (e.g., Chile, USA, Australia). These experiences show that markets offer a practical, tested alternative for the voluntary re- allocation of water. They also suggest that an approach to the sustainable and efficient management of the A- K aquifer would include: (i) the establishment of a tradable water rights system; (ii) land use planning and industrial zoning; and (iii) the establishment of a groundwater management district. Implementation would, however, need to be carefully designed and implemented. In particular, implementation would need to ensure monitoring and regulatory features to guard against overdraft, and management to ensure social equity and assured benefits for all participating farmers. Demand for water in Chennai will soon outpace supply. With few supplemental water resources available for exploitation, Chennai needs to begin looking at alternative measures to provide for its demands. The potential for voluntary inter-sectoral transfer of water to urban uses from irrigation provide a promising, low- cost alternative to other proposed options: intensive sewage recycling, bulk transfers from outside the region, or desalinization of sea water. Source: K. Eisenstadt and K. Oblitas Based on Briscoe, 1996. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 59 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets Box A5.5 Economic Scope and Institutional Constraints for Inter-Sectoral Water Allocation: The Case of Hyderabad As India is approaching fast its water supply limits, the economic value of water is increasing at a phenomenal rate. Since the value of water differs across uses, there is obvious scope for socially optimal inter-sectoral allocation. Unfortunately, serious institutional constraints -- ranging from the absence of transferable water entitlements for uses and users, to inefficient intra-sectoral policies including uneconomic water pricing -- remain as obstacles for realising the socially optimal inter-sectoral allocation. This can be demonstrated by considering the case of Hyderabad water supply system. Like most cities in India, Hyderabad has a number of technically feasible supply augmentation options. Among these options, some are within its present supply systems (intra-sectoral) and some are outside the supply systems (inter-sectoral). The table below gives the unit cost of alternative water supply options in Hyderabad (1996). No. Supply Augmentation Option Cost (Rs/cum) I Groundwater from own Wells (flats 0.55 2 Municipal Water Connections (flats) 1.23 to 1.53 3 Groundwater Diversion from Irrigation 2.95 4 Strengthening and Rehabilitation Scheme 3.06 5 Surface Water Diversion from Irrigation 3.50 6 Water Transfers from Godavari and Krishna Rivers 2.29 to 4.40 7 Average Municipal Water Charge 3.62 to 3.94 8 Actual Supply Cost of Water 5.58 9 Groundwater from own Wells (Individual House) 6.61 10 Water Supply through Metro Tankers 20.00 11 Water Supply through Private Tankers 31.25 to 62.50 The range of the unit costs (Rs. 0.55 to 62.50/cum) defines the feasible economic range for various forms of water transfers (i.e., inter-household within urban areas, inter-sectoral between irrigation and urban uses, and inter-basin or inter-regional between river basins and states). Since both the actual water charge paid by consumers (Rs. 3.62/cum under average pricing and Rs. 3.94/cum under marginal pricing) and the actual supply cost of metro water (Rs. 5.58/cum) are substantially higher than the cost of water diversion from irrigation (Rs. 2.95 to 3.50/cum), there can be a mutually beneficial inter-sectoral water exchange to be carried out either by private parties or by the metro water undertaking. Similarly, the vast unit cost differential between groundwater supply used by a group of households and the same by an individual household (options 1 and 9 in Table) indicates, in fact, the economic scope for joint supply arrangements as well as inter-household water sharing within a given locality. Unfortunately, the economic potential for both these intra and inter-sectoral water transfers could not be realized due to (a) legal and institutional constraints and (b) inefficient intra-sectoral price policies. Inter-sectoral water transfers--undertaken either on public account or through private initiatives--involve legal questions like water rights and organizational issues like the development of mechanisms for establishing inter-sectoral water allocation and resolving water conflicts. For irrigation water transfers undertaken by private parties, besides the above two macro issues, there are also micro problems like movement restriction beyond canal command and legalized opposition for groundwater sales to urban areas. More importantly, as long as water charges across sectors remain low and subsidized, inter-sectoral water transfers, though still possible, cannot be socially optimal. Therefore, the intra-sectoral policy question of setting prices right also forms a part of the institutional setting for inter-sectoral allocation. Source: Saleth and Dinar, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 60 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets Box A5.6 Groundwater Transfers and Latent Water Markets in Periyar-Vaigai Basin, Tamil Nadu Inter and intra-basin variations in the availability of groundwater as prompted by hydrogeological and topographical factors often obstruct the full utilization of available groundwater resources. Groundwater transfers could advance spatial equilibrium in groundwater demand and supply both within and across groundwater basins, change the cropping pattern, rejuvenate the local economic activity, and enhance the productivity and value of water. They can also create conditions for water markets especially during water scarce periods. Unlike the surface water transfers, however, groundwater transfers over long distance are extremely costly in view of pumping costs as well as those involved in constructing and maintaining underground cement pipelines. Nevertheless, these kinds of private groundwater transfers occur widely in many parts of India prompted by private economic gains often disproportionate to the economic costs. If we go by the social benefits in terms of improved employment, income, and productivity, these transfers are highly viable economic propositions. A very close field observations made in a village (Royappan Patti) located in the Cumbum Valley, Periyar- Vaigai Basin, Madurai district, Tamil Nadu revealed certain important aspects. This village, like most others in this valley, has three farming systems (the canal command with an exclusive focus on paddy, the groundwater areas centred on banana, coconut, and grapes, and the rainfed system) running parallel to the Periyar canal between the river and the foothills of the western ghats. While the intensive water use led to the wells in the groundwater region to have an average depth of about 30 m (some of them have also become dry), the well construction in the rainfed region is marred by well failure and excessive installation costs due to rocky substrates. Water scarcity in the groundwater region is the main factor for a large scale shift from banana to coconut and grapes during the past 10 years here. Excellent soil and economic opportunity from high value crops have prompted many private farmers to undertake ground water transfers both from the canal commands as well as from the foothills south of the village where an earthen-cum-masonry dam across the Shanmuga River with a storage capacity of 2.25 million m3 is currently under construction. (Although the water from this dam is planned to be moved 25 km north of the village by cement lined channel, the storage will recharge the groundwater aquifer in this region.) Today, there are 10 private groundwater transfer pipelines -- 4 from the wells in the private farms in the canal command and 6 from the wells located in the private farms on the Shannuga River banks. All these transfers involve a 12 HP pump of 30 m3/hour delivery capacity, running on an average 8 hours/day (depending upon power availability per day which is normally limited to 4 hours in the day and 4 hours in the night). Although power cost is currently zero (due to the economically and environmentally highly costly policy of free electricity for farming in Tamil Nadu), maintenance and investment costs are very high. Each of the water transfer pipes has an average length of 3 to 4 km, and costs between Rs. 50,000 and 200,000. Each of these transfer projects irrigates on an average 20 ha of land, either in isolation or in conjunction with local wells (which are very few with marginal water yield). Since most of the water transfers are used to irrigate the rainfed area close to the foothills, land productivity (and hence, water productivity) has increased tremendously mainly due to crop pattern changes and land use intensity. The lands used earlier for raising crops like groundnut, pulses, and coarse cereals under rainfed conditions are now under high value crops like banana, grapes, and coconut. As a result, income per ha has increased 10 to 20 times during the past few years. (While the income/ha from rainfed crops can hardly exceed Rs. 10,000/ha/year, the income/ha from grapes and coconut reaches 100,000 to 200,000/ha/year.) More importantly, the intensive year-round cultivation due to groundwater transfers has also increased employment, at least by three times, and reduced seasonality in farm employment. 61 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets These water transfers initiated by well-to-do large farmers using mostly their own capital (some farmers have also obtained bank loans) also benefit smaller farms in the vicinity through periodic water markets (i.e., during water scarce times) operating under two arrangements: one involves the sale of water at Rs. 20/hour and the other involves a long-term arrangement. Under the latter arrangement, the buyer has to deposit a refundable amount of Rs. 10,000/acre with the seller who, in turn, supplies water in lieu of interest payment (since the monthly interest in the village varies from 2 to 10 percent, water payment amounts to Rs. 2400 to 1200/acre/year. This higher amount is not a problem as the buyer also grows high value crops like banana.). Notably, since these water marketing activities occur essentially in scarce water periods, they remain latent in periods with better rainfall and water supply conditions. Source: Dinar and Saleth, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 62 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets Box A5.7 California Drought Water Bank A water bank is an institution that offers to buy and sell water, under some set of rules regarding prices and quantities, in a given service area. Water banks can mark up water prices to cover transaction costs and to compensate the area of origin. There are several examples of efficient and equitable transfer of water by water banks, of which the California drought water bank of 1991-92 is one. After five years of continuous drought, an emergency drought water bank (DWB) was established in California, following appropriate legislation (to allow for transfer of water rights). The aim of the DWB was to enable transfer of water from agriculture in northern California to urban, municipal, and agricultural sectors in southern California. The principles of the DWB were: * Voluntary transfers * Protection of fish and wildlife * Protection of ground water basins * Efficient use of water in receiving areas * Protection of present water right holders. In 1991, the purchase price by the DWB was set to $125/acre-foot (1 acre foot = 1235 m3) and the sale price by the DWB was set to $175/acre-foot. As a result, more than 300 transactions were recorded. The DWB bought 820,000 acre-feet, and sold 389,952 acre-feet, mainly to urban and industrial users (32%), and to agricultural users (16%). The difference (quantity not sold) was used for the environment (20% of the total) and for recharge (32% of the total); part was also lost in the system. The value of water purchased by DWB was $102,500,000 and the sale value was $68,241,600. Direct and indirect effects of the DWB in 1991-92 were analyzed by Howitt et al. (1992), and Archibald and Renwick (1997), and include increased income in receiving areas. Negative indirect effects were noted on soils, wetlands, and third party effects in the form of unemployment in the selling areas. Source: Dinar, Rosegrant and Meinzen-Dick, 1997. (Adapted for India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 63 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 5. Water Rights and Water Markets Box A5.8 Water Markets in Chile Chile's National Water Code of 1981 established a system of water rights that are transferable and independent of land use and ownership. Water rights are defined as permanent (from unexhausted sources) or contingent (from surplus water), and as consumptive or non-consumptive. Rights can be obtained by petition to the government or they can be established based on historical use; they can also, of course, be purchased from the owner. In practice, the second of these methods has been used the most to establish water rights, because the government's 1966 expropriation of all water rights has necessitated establishment or re-establishment of those rights since the National Water Code was passed. The most frequent transaction in Chile's water markets is the "renting" of water between neighboring farmers with different water requirements. This can also be termed a "spot market" in which the owner sells a portion of his or her water, usually over a brief period (perhaps even hours), sometimes without fulfilling formal, legal requirements. Although the volume of sales may not be metered, the buyer and seller have good information on the amount exchanged. Compensation may be in kind or in some other form of monetary or non-monetary benefit. The formal buying and selling of water-use rights in Chile requires legal sanction and registration. Although the law defines water use rights as a volume of flow per unit of time (24 liters/sec), in practice rights are a share of stream flows, since variability renders the volumetric/time specification impractical. Use rights are required for groundwater exploitation; these rights prohibit the user from other withdrawals within the area specified in the right. There is a system in place for challenging the granting of water rights and for resolving disputes related to them. Prices for water rights are left to the buyers and sellers. In a study covering over 700 shares of water in four river valleys in Chile, Hearne and Easter (1995) found that for both intra- and inter-sectoral transactions, "market transfer of water-use rights does produce substantial economic gains-from-trade," in the two valleys where transactions were numerous. In the Elqui Valley, for example, net gains from trade were calculated to be in the range of US$ 5.99 and US$ 1,642.00, with an average of US $826.00 per share of water traded, depending on the type of trading sectors. In the Limari valley the net gains-from-trade were calculated to be in the range of US$ 1.65 and US$ 2.85 with an average of US$ 2.40 per cubic meter. In the Limari Valley, one share equals, on the average, 4880 m3/year, so that the average gains from trade in the Limari Valley are US$ 11,700 per share. There were some instances of high financial but low economic gains to society from some inter-sectoral trading. Source: Dinar, Rosegrant and Meinzen-Dick, 1997. (Adapted for India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 64 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 6. Technology Box A6.1 Environmental Technology Options for Water Management Environmental Issue Technology Options Available Modification and loss of a Improvement of water allocation and efficient use of water to guarantee minimum aquatic ecology due to lack downstream flows. of minimum flow in rivers . Provision of suitable fish ladders. . Change of hydraulics of the river to provide fish and dolphins passage in low flow zones. Organic pollution * Areas with sewerage: (i) where land acquisition is feasible: integrated wetland system for from domestic sources wastewater treatment and reuse (using sewage in fisheries and agriculture - stabilization and fish ponds+irrigation); (ii) primary sewage treatment; and where feasible, secondary/ biological sewage treatment - activated sludge, oxidation ditches, anaerobic treatment, etc. * Areas without sewerage and/or infested with open defecation: (i) in urban areas, if funds are available and financial management is feasible, construct sewerage, interception and diversion) and implement aforementioned options; (ii) in urban or rural areas,conversion of dry latrines into low cost sanitary latrines; (iii) toilets for those who don't have any; (iv) septic tanks. . Sludge waters from urban and rural areas (domestic wastewater without excreta): recycling for agriculture; use in aquaculture. Industrial pollution * Common effluent treatment plants for clusters of industries with similar wastewater. * Clean technologies: water conservation, waste minimization; non-polluting technologies, segregation of lines; etc. . Increasing efforts for implementation of end-of-pipe treatments. . Hazardous waste treatment, minimization, recycling and safe disposal. a Prevention of pollution from inappropriate industrial occupation: zoning for siting of industries. Erosion and siltation of * Field practices to prevent erosion: tilling techniques (conservation tillage, contour rivers and reservoirs farming, delayed seed bed preparation, strip cropping); ground cover techniques (conservation cover, conservation cropping sequence, critical area planting). . Treatment practices to retain eroded sediments: hydraulic check dams; terraces, grassed waterways, flow diversions, filter strips, sediment basins, field borders; and stream ecology to control stream bank erosion. Pollution from agricultural * Nutrient management: implementation of formal management plans that result in reduced sources application rates of fertilizers. * Pesticide management: pesticide control programmes are attractive because reduced pesticide use results in reduced operation costs. They require adequate measures that provide the necessary technical information, educate the users, and provide appropriate regulatory control. Use of IPM. . Efficient use of water for irrigation (water conservation practices) to prevent groundwater contamination. 65 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 6. Technology Box A6.1 (cont.) Environmental Technology Options for Water Management Environmental Issue Technology Options Available Ground water * Physio-chemical treatment of extracted ground water. contamination with * In-situ treatment (only in cases where levels of contaminants in the aquifer are well naturally occurring trace known). minerals (As, F-, Fe, Boron, * Stop using the aquifer and try another sources of water supply. etc.) Salinity, alkalinity and * Improvement of irrigation efficiency (implement irrigation rehabilitation and waterlogging modernization programmes). * Watershed management. Environment related health * Drinking water: (i) community based water quality surveillance; (ii) development of a problems (waterborne sustainable system of proper maintenance and hygienic operation of tubewells; (iii) diseases) increase the provision of water supply and sanitation systems, as well as education on domestic hygiene (increased health benefits include not only provision of drinking water but depends on other factors like sanitation and domestic hygienic). * Use of pond water for bathing and washing: (i) increase the provision of water supply facilities (tubewells) and educate villagers to reduce the use of contaminated pond water (today villagers prefer to use pond water rather than walk a long distance for a safe and protected source); (ii) treatment of pond water with low cost technologies (slow sand filter, horizontal roughing filter, etc.); (iii) educational campaigns to make villagers aware of the necessity of sanitary protection of ponds and reducing their pollution. Biodiversity loss in * Implement the nine recommendations agreed at the first International Conference on wetlands Wetlands and Development (Kuala Lumpur Statement); * Continue with the preparation and implementation of management action plans for the conservation of the 22 wetlands that have been identified in the country for intensive conservation and management purposes. Source: Medeiros and Dave, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 66 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 6. Technology Box A6.2 Integrated Wetland System for Wastewater Treatment and Reuse Rural communities see domestic wastewater as a potential source of input for fisheries and/or irrigated agricultural production. In the State of West Bengal, a number of wastewater treatment and resource recovery projects are being implemented, based on lessons from the world's largest fisheries and agriculture production zone using city wastewater (the east Calcutta wetlands). A unified programme has been developed involving the local people, the village panchayat and the implementing authority (CMWSA) in wastewater conservation. In this approach, local village authorities (panchayats) are formally invited to share management responsibilities. They are made responsible for choosing an appropriate licensee who will be responsible for pisiculture production in admissible water areas. The licensee is expected to pay an annual fee to the sanitation authority responsible for project management. The traditional practice in Calcutta of using sewage in fisheries and agriculture was developed by the local fish producers and farmers over a century ago. The wetlands production options include pisiculture, agriculture, horticulture and animal husbandry. In the new projects implemented under the Ganga Action Plan, pond areas are designed using the same guidelines applied in the construction of stabilisation ponds (anaerobic, facultative and maturation). However, introducing culture fish in the admissible water areas improves system efficiency. Concerning the food quality, initial tests on the fish and vegetables indicate their adequacy for human consumption; however, further evaluation would be necessary particularly in zones where industrial effluents containing toxic wastes are mixed in the sewage. The effluent from the fish ponds is being used in the agricultural fields to grow paddy providing a satisfactory yield and has brought significantly increased livelihood for the local farmers. The cost and availability of land represent the limiting factors to this approach. However, expenditures are less than 3 million rupees per million litres of wastewater per day (including cost of land). In fact, choosing a wetland option will be easier for the cities with low-lying riparian coastal lands. The land in these areas is generally the cheapest and in most cases used to produce only one crop per year. It has been possible to engage the farmers in the wetland project for a continuous source of income that can even be more than the amount earned by them before the implementation of the project. Source: Ghosh, 1995 & 1996. (Adapted for India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 67 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 6. Technology Box A6.3 Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) Maharashtraa: The Government of Maharashtra has created an industrial park (Thane-Belapur) aiming to provide adequate infrastructure and to reduce potential hazardous effects on citizens in the urban area. The park, with a capacity of 3,000 industries, in 1996 had nearly 2,000 small and medium scale units. The park is managed by the industries, which initiated a project for constructing a Common Effluent Treatment Plant (CETP) to be run by an association of user industries. Some of the large scale industries in the park have their own treatment and disposal facilities. As of 1996, there were 1902 industries that joined the new CETP Association (CETPA). Of those industries, 1,543 are considered non-polluting (NP), 316 small scale polluting (SCP) and 43 medium scale polluting (MSP). The treatment plant has a capacity of 12,000 m3/day with the capability to expand. Industries are required to have "in-plant" treatment of their effluents in order to use the central treatment facility. The industries are monitored by CETPA, and for those industries that meet the standards they pay only 50% of the treatment O&M costs. The estimated investment cost of the plant is Rs 25.2 million of which Rs 3.5 million were contributed by the Central Government, Rs 3.5 million by the State Government and Rs 18.7 million by the members. CEPTA members contribute to the fixed investment fee according to the following criteria: NP industries pay 2,500 Rs, SCP 30,000 Rs and MSP pay 210,000 Rs. Effluent volume is not monitored but a general average of 75% of water supplied (being discharged as effluent) and the organic load (COD) are accepted as a basis for calculation to cover O&M cost. Average O&M cost of the plant is 10 Rs/m3. Treatment cost bill is expected to be collected with the water supply bill. Andhra Pradeshb: In Patancheru, Andhra Pradesh, there are 71 highly polluting chemical industries which have constructed 7500 m3/day capacity CETP at a cost of Rs.78.6 million. Their contribution of total cost was Rs.40 million, Central and State grants represented an additional Rs.8.9 million, and the rest was provided as a loan from financial institutions. Presently, the industries are paying charges of Rs.3.90/kg of COD (organic load) and Rs.2.30/m3 (hydraulic load). The plant receives 1,300-1,500 m3/day of highly concentrated effluent from member industries scattered in the area. The gross monthly income is about Rs.1.5 million while the corresponding O&M cost is around Rs.325,000/month. The resulting monthly "profit' of Rs.1.175 million per month will be used to upgrade the system because COD and dissolved solids in effluent are much higher than design-assumption resulting in very poor performance of the treatment process. The CETP project was cleared by the State Government in this design flaw. The initiative in this case was good but technical capacity seems to be needed in order to prevent other such projects. Tamil Naduc: Seven CETP (clusters of tanneries) are in full operation in Tamil Nadu. In 1995, forty CETP systems were proposed in the following sectors (most are under construction and some have already completed the works): 13 CETP for tanneries (531 beneficiaries industries; cost of project: Rs 406 million); 24 for textile & dyeing units (1847 beneficiaries; cost of project: Rs 646 million); one CETP for 93 hotels and lodges (cost of project: Rs 13 million); one CETP for sago industries (76 beneficiaries; cost of project: Rs 40 million); and one incinerator for hospital wastes (58 beneficiaries; cost of project: Rs 0.4 million). To prevent implementation problems due to poor project design, the SPCB requires the clearance of CETP projects by the lIT or Anna University. Presently, 32% of industries which contribute to more the 50% of the polluting loads into the rivers of the State have effluent treatment plants. Sources: a CETP Association (Thane-Belapur), Second Annual Report 95-96; b mission visit to Paancheru CETP (interview with Mr. Sivacgander, Plant Manager); c Tamil Nadu PCB: Annual Report 94-95 and data given by senior officers during mission visit to the Board. Source: Medeiros and Dave, 1997. (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 68 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 7. Basin Modeling and Planning Box A7.1 Institutional Responsibilities in Water-related Data Collection* ORGANIZATION FUNCTIONS Surface Ground Drinking Sanitation Drinking water quality water quality water quality water monitoring monitoring monitoring supply CPCB X X cWc x SPCB X X CGWB X MOUAE X X MORAE X X X MOEF (NRCD) X X Municipal / State X X X Water Supply and Sewerage Authorities Metropolitan X X X Development Authorities State Public Health X Departments (*) In the case of drinking water supply and sanitation, these examples demonstrate possible overlapping institutions and do not necessarily include all of them. Source: Medeiros and Dave, 1997. (India WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 69 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 7. Basin Modeling and Planning Box A7.2 Some Axioms for Good Basin Planning (Knowledge Driven --Knowledge Management) Without data and information about a river basin's resources, non-sustainable and inequitable development decisions are inevitable. Without quality simulation models and decision support sy_Jtems, less than optimal decisions will occur even if good data and information are available. Without well-trained and knowledgeable staff, poor decisiors will occur even if the information and technology is adequate. Without fully transparent data available to the public, decision- makers may make unsuitable decisions, unacceptable to the public. Without full involvement of stakeholders and the general public, decisions will not be owned by the public and implementation will have little chance of success. Source: S. Rajagopal (India - WRM Sector Review, World Bank, 1998). 70 India - Water Resources Management Sector Review Report on Inter-sectoral Water Allocation, Planning and Management Annex 7. Basin Modeling and Planning Box A7.3 MODELING FOR STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION: THE THANNI MODEL FOR THE VAIGAI BASIN The Vaigai river basin in Tamil Nadu (figure 1) is considered a very "water- short" basin, i.e., the current (and projected) supplies of surface and groundwater are ................. not deemed sufficient to meet ..... current (and projected) demands in the basin. The 7000 km2 basin is also the site of the first major inter-basin transfer project in India, with a tunnel, built as part of the Periyar-Vaigai project in 1895, diverting waters from the Periyar river in Kerala under a contentious 999-year agreement between Kerala and Figure 1 The Vaigai River Basin (indicating agricultural areas) Tamil Nadu. The western and north-western parts of the basin receive heavy rainfall during both the SE and NW monsoons, with an average rainfall of 850mm over the basin. The landuse (figure 2) is predominantly agricultural (consuming about 3800 MCM of F as W eti ad_ Ufb a atb uilt- ua 297l UnrIutivab le 800 .. : .:: g 1 i 0 .4% 4 J E3 ldUSStfial UnU9rig Ag.. 4E 600 i^_~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2:0 40
Группа Всемирного банка · Pre-2003 Economic or Sector Report
India - Water resources management sector review : report on inter-sectoral water allocation, planning, and management (Vol. 2 of 2) : Data and case study annex
Открыть оригинал документа
Полный текст размещён на сайте публикующей организации. lawenc.com индексирует метаданные и ведёт на официальный источник.
Полный текст
Основные сведения
Организация
Группа Всемирного банка
Тип документа
Pre-2003 Economic or Sector Report
Страна
Индия
Источник
Всемирный банк