Tunisia - Higher education : challenges and opportunities

Report No. 1 6522-TUN Republic of Tunisia Higher Education: Challenges and Opportunities May 8, 1997 H luman Development Group Middle East and North Africa Region Document of the World Bank  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency unit: Tunisian Dinar (TD) US$1 = TDI.04 TDI = US$0.96 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CNE Commission Nationale d'Evaluation National Evaluation Commission DEA Dipl6me d'Etudes Approfondies Diploma of Advanced Studies DESS Dipl6me d'Etudes Superieures Specialisees Diploma of Higher Specialized Studies DGRST Direction Generale de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Scientific and Technical Research Department EESR Etablissement d'enseignement superieur et de recherche Higher Education and Research Establishment EFEB Examen de fin d'etudes fondamentales Basic Education Completion Examination EPA Etablissement public a caractere administratif Administrative Public Establishment ISET Institut superieur des etudes technologiques Higher Technical Education Institute ISFM Institut superieur de formation des maltres Higher Teacher Training Institute MEN Ministere de I'Education Nationale Ministry of Education MENA Middle East and North Africa Region MES Ministere de l'Enseignement Superieur Ministry of Higher Education MFPE Ministere de la Formation Professionnelle et de I'Emploi Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment ONEF Observatoire National de l'Emploi et de la Formation National Employment and Training Laboratory SAGES Systeme d'analyse et de gestion de 1'enseignement superieur Higher Education Analysis and Management System SMIG Salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti Guaranteed Interoccupational minimum wage UE Union Europeenne European Union Vice President: Mr. Kemal Dervi, Director: Mr. Daniel Ritchie Sector Director: Mr. Jacques Baudouy Task Manager: Mr. Benoit Millot  - 11 - ABSTRACT 1. Higher education in Tunisia today is still a largely effective and well-performing system. However, with the doubling of enrollments expected over the next ten years, the system is going to encounter obstacles that could prevent it tomorrow from playing the role expected of it by a society and economy in rapid transformation. This report, which builds on a wealth of studies completed by Tunisian experts, identifies some of those obstacles and suggests a series of coordinated counter-measures. 2. The problems identified stem from four sets of circumstances: (i) low internal efficiency (despite a rigorous selection process in the previous cycles), linked to the not easily reversible channeling of students into compartmentalized fields of study; (ii) institutional organization and resource allocation methods that leave education establishments with little responsibility, do not foster openness to the external world, and are not conducive to private initiative; (iii) a teaching profession characterized by low statute-based workloads, inappropriate criteria for hiring and promotion, devaluation of professorial function, and lack of training in and evaluation of pedagogical skills; and (iv) a financing system funded almost entirely by the public sector, burdened by major but ineffective transfer payments, and likely to be incapable of covering the costs involved in expanding enrollment capacity to meet inevitable increases in demand. 3. Various means of rectifying these problems are available: (i) an adaptable modular style of academic organization that will eliminate the disadvantages of rigid channeling/assignment of students, make university-level career paths more flexible, and reduce the number of failures (particularly in the first cycles); (ii) greater decentralization of decision-making for universities, results-oriented resource allocation, greater autonomy in funding management, and a legal climate conducive to the opening of private establishments; (iii) separation of teaching and research, introduction of the possibility of exercising one or the other of these functions on a basis of specific time obligations (with opportunities to move between the two of them), and provision of educator training and evaluation services; and (iv) application of a range of measures for financing expansion of the system-recovery of social service and teaching service costs (in combination with targeting of transfer payments toward the most disadvantaged), more rational deployment of teaching personnel, and greater participation by the private sector.   - iii - TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ...... i Table of Contents ............ iii Executive Summary ............ vi I INTRODUCTION .I II ECONOMIC AND SECTORAL FRAMEWORK .I A Macroeconomic Setting .2 B Sectoral Setting .2 III CURRENT SITUATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION .5 A Enrollment .5 B Resources .8 C Financing .14 D Product .18 IV INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND INCENTIVES .21 A Routing of Students to Departments/Disciplines .21 B Curriculum Organization .22 C Distribution of Responsibilities .24 D The Teaching Function .27 E An Incipient Private Sector .33 F Research and Relations with the outside World .37 V PRECONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE EXPANSION .40 A Inescapable Pressure .40 B Mobilizing additional Resources .41 C Trimming Costs .44 Bibliography ....... 48 Annexes ....... 51 This report is based on the results of a mission that visited Tunisia in June 1996. The mission consisted of Benoit Millot (human resources economist, mission leader), Anne-Marie Leroy (public administration specialist), Francis Steier (education economist), Alenoush Saroyan (assessment specialist), Quentin Thompson (education planner), and Alain Shoenenberger (economist). The mission also benefited from contributions from Lauritz Holm-Nielsen (research specialist), Dung-Kim Pham (operations analyst), Pierre Weiss (sociologist) and Andre Legrand (law specialist), the comments of William Experton, Jamil Salmi and Christopher Shaw (peer reviewers), and discussions with Mourad Ezzine. The mission would like to express its profound thanks to the staff of the Ministry of Higher Education in Tunis, without whose assistance this report would not have been possible. Jacques Baudouy is the Manager of MNSHD and Daniel Ritchie the Director of MN 1.  - iv - Text tables 2.1 Selectivity in Public Primary and Secondary Education (1994/95) 3.1 Comparison of Private and Public Costs, by Education Level (1990) 3.2 Average, Minimum and Maximum Budget Transfers Via Higher Education Expenditures (1990/91) 3.3 Graduates Produced by Tunisian Universities (1995) 3.4 Civil Service: Annual Salary and Total Remuneration, by Corps and Grade (1995) 4.1 Matrix of Responsibilities in the Higher Education System 4.2 Teaching Staff Recruitment, by Grade (1995) 5.1 The Basic Scenario and its "Pessimistic Variant": Financing Deficits (1997-2006) 5.2 Alternative Scenarios: Financing Surpluses and Deficits (1997-2006) 5.3 Teaching Potential and Workload, by University Text graphs 3.1 Higher Education: Unit Cost/Enrollment Ratio (1972-1994) Text boxes 1. Enrollment Rates, by Level: International Comparisons 2. Public Education and Higher Education Expenditures: International Comparisons 3. Weekly Program Workloads in Higher Education: International Comparisons 4. Salary and Total Remuneration for Two Teaching Career Paths 5. Share of Private Financing in Higher Education in a Number of Asian Countries (ca. 1985) 6. Student Loan Repayment Default Rates: International Comparisons (1980-88) 7. Private Higher Education in Latin America 8. The Swiss National Research Fund (FNRS) Annexes 1. Structure of Education in Tunisia 2. Primary and Secondary Education: Basic Data 3. Higher Education Enrollment: Trend and Distribution 4. Repeating in Higher Education 5. GDP, State Budget, Education Budget and Higher Education Budget 6. Comparative Changes in Enrollment and Unit Cost in Higher Education 7. Unit Costs in Higher Education: International Comparisons 8. Higher Education Operating Budget: Distribution by Expenditure Categories 9. Higher Education Operating Budget: Distribution by Expenditure Category in Various OECD Countries 10. Data on Student/Teacher Rates in Higher Education 11. Annual Remuneration in the Tunisian Civil Service 12. Unemployment and Education Level 13. Teacher Recruitment Procedures in Higher Education 14. Distribution of Teachers, by Categories and Establishments (1995/96)  - v - 15. Distribution of Public and Private Expenditure by Type of Higher Education Establishment in Various OECD Countries 16. Foreign Students Enrolled in U.S. Universities, by Region of Origin and Discipline (1991-92) 17. Enrollment Projections, by Education Sector 18. Financing Scenarios (1997-2006) 19. Projection of Teacher Needs 20. Teaching Capacity, Workload and Deficit, by Establishment  I  - vi - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. Context 1. This study of the higher education sector in Tunisia not only forms part of preparatory work for the Ninth Plan, which has already resulted in a series of thorough reports by domestic agencies, but is also an important element in the dialogue between the Ministry of Higher Education and the World Bank. 2. The question motivating this study is whether higher education is ready to play the crucial role expected of it by the Tunisian economy in its quest for competitiveness and openness to the rest of the world. The higher education sector can be regarded in a generally positive light at the present juncture. However, its rapid expansion-both inevitable and welcome-can be expected to reveal dysfunctions which, though still manageable so far, will worsen and possibly paralyze the sector unless appropriate steps are taken. If the educational, institutional and financial situation remains unchanged, expansion of the sector will create multiple problems instead of valuable opportunities. II. Diagnostic Assessment of the Present Situation 3. Higher education in Tunisia has long been regarded as a well-organized and well-managed system that emphasizes quality, a fact this report readily acknowledges. The report also recognizes the merits of the recent reforms and the very real improvements resulting from them. If the critical appraisal that now follows dwells on the failings of the system, it does so in order to lay the foundations for measures designed to tackle these shortcomings and to safeguard the prospects of a favorable outcome. A. Production function of higher education 4. Flows. The schooling which leads to higher education is long and selective. Higher education is the final stage in a lengthy (13-year) education process which is characterized-in the name of quality-by a very high degree of selectivity. The effect of failures and rejections of potential students at the pre- university level is such that only one child in every 12 entering first year of primary school obtains his or her baccalaureat. Gross primary-school enrollment rates in excess of 100% drop to 43% in the secondary cycle and to 13% in higher education. This last figure is lower than in the group of comparable-income countries, especially the South Asian "models," and also lower than what is generally regarded as adequate for the era of global competition. Technical education is poorly developed, possibilities of transfer from one education stream to another are nonexistent, and all efforts are focused first on the hazardous passage to secondary education and after that on the unlikely event of admittance to higher education. Instead of certifying that knowledge has been acquired, the examination system merely regulates access to the following cycles. In particular, the baccalaureat, while it gives access to higher education, is not a diploma certifying completion of a course of studies. With very few exceptions, students who fail the examination cannot take advantage of their secondary schooling either to go on to higher education or to enter the job market. 5. Although strictly rationed in practice. higher education is entering an era of mass pressure. It has already gone through a major growth process which, by replicating the pattern of specializations seen in the secondary cycle, has mainly expanded the non-science streams. Despite all present obstacles, however, the simple fact of demographic pressure has increased the number of enrollments in higher education very significantly, doubling it over 10 years and pushing it to 120,000 in 1996 (with girls making up 44% of the total). In higher education, which is 97% public, and where virtually all those (and only those) who  - vii - successfully obtain their baccalaureat are to be found, the most crowded degree courses are the longer ones in general fields and in law and literature, a distribution different from that observed in countries against which Tunisia must compete. This emphasis is the result of an iterative channeling process that assigns students strictly in accordance with availability of places and is still too little influenced by the needs of the economy. Efforts are under way to achieve a more strategically balanced distribution in favor of short cycles, but the process is naturally a rather slow one and does not necessarily coincide with students' expectations. 6. The poor internal efficiency of higher education, particularly at the first-cycle stage. can be blamed on the centralized and not easily reversible channeling of students and on inadequate staffing. Selection does not end with the baccalaureat. The first cycle of higher education, for instance, is burdened with repeaters-in addition to the fact that it rejects many students. This double-edged internal inefficiency suggests that, despite its severity, the baccalaureat has proven unable to select those young people best suited to university studies. It also means that the channeling system-however objective, and despite the unlikely possibility of subsequent re-channeling--does not make the best of existing potential for success. Furthermore, such inefficiencies seem to point to weaknesses in academic monitoring practices in higher education. 7. Inputs. The drop in unit costs suggests that the student body may have increased in size to the detriment of quality of service. Tunisia invests more-proportionately-in the education sector (5.6% of GNP) than the majority of its neighbors, but less than they do in higher education (18% of sector expenditure). The country's choice appears to have been to build up the educational pyramid in stages, since the main budgetary effort in the sector was focused initially on basic education and has only recently been redirected to the post-primary levels. These levels are now under the pressure of a population growth rate that was high until a short time ago (1.8% between 1989 and 1995, but 3.1% between 1980 and 1985). In the meantime, unit costs have declined (to a current figure of approximately US$2,000 a year), although it is not easy to say whether this is attributable to economies of scale and/or a disquieting loss of quality. 8. Use of teaching personnel is less than optimal. Teacher/student ratios (averaging 1:17 across all establishments) vary greatly from one discipline to another. However, on average, they fall within the median range observed in comparable countries and are not out of line with the pedagogic demands of the different disciplines. On the other hand, statute-based teacher workloads are light, particularly at the higher levels, which means that classroom obligations cannot be covered without massive recourse to overtime. All the same, despite a decline in real terms, faculty salaries are by far the highest in the public sector, thanks to a system of bonuses paid automatically and at the maximum allowable levels, regardless of actual performance ratings or other factors they are supposed to reflect. 9. Transfers. Because targeting of the substantial funds appropriated for student aid is not sufficiently discriminating, these resources have little redistributive impact. Quality. pricing and administration of assistance in kind, as well as selection and monitoring of financial aid recipients. are less than optimal. The 42% of non-payroll resources the Ministry of Higher Education allocates for transfer expenditures does not appear to be achieving the expected goals of balanced distribution. In the case of assistance in kind, there is evidence of wastage and misapplication, whether such assistance is rationed (dormitory services) or not (cafeteria services). Financial aid, which is geared to parents' means, consists of scholarships or loans (the latter introduced in 1987/88); in both instances, the effects of poor targeting are apparent, partly because of the questionable accuracy of non-wage-earner tax returns. The scholarship allocation system (which benefits 37% of students) does not ensure that the neediest are selected, despite the low income threshold required for eligibility. The difficulties involved in keeping track of borrowers and loan repayments makes  - viii - loan administration arrangements costly and undermines the goal of ensuring conditions of equal access for all students. 10. User contributions. Both academic services and board and lodging services (the latter entirelv under government management. although a private lodging sector has recently emerged) are heavily subsidized. with onlv marginal contributions from students. Even with the recent increase in registration fees to TD 15 for first-cycle students, users will now be contributing less than 1% to the cost of their education. In the final analysis, a virtually free tuition system and largely ineffective assistance arrangements have combined to create a regressive pattern in which it is ultimately the highest-income population groups that benefit most from government efforts in favor of higher education. 11. Outputs. Lack of standardized information on the quality of education, and a scarcity of labor market data, prevent evaluation of the external efficiency of university-level training. Lack of adequate data makes it impossible to assess the experience and knowledge accumulated by the 13,000 students who graduate every year from Tunisia's higher education system, or to draw comparisons with graduates in other countries. Hence, any reliable pronouncement on the system's pedagogic performance or product quality is ruled out, although the high rate of success of Tunisian students pursuing third-cycle studies abroad is an encouraging sign. At the same time, the unreliable nature of available data on unemployment, on the methods graduates use to find employment, and on the duration of that employment is another obstacle to accurate appraisal of the external efficiency of higher education, and will remain so until the Employment Observatory, now being set up, is in operation. Fragmentary information does indicate, however, that graduates of the system are well thought of by private sector employers and less likely to be unemployed. The present data gaps coincide with a period when the state guaranteed automatic equivalency between level of qualifications and level of employment, now a thing of the past. As far as macroeconomic performance is concerned, the development of higher education will not by itself stimulate employment; employment creation is mostly determined by the regulatory environment and by economic growth, but by the same token skilled manpower has to be available in order for growth to accelerate. B. Educational and institutional factors 12. Organization of studies. Despite a series of refornms and an attempt to introduce a system of learning modules. higher education remains inflexible, hierarchical and compartmentalized. A number of legislative measures have been enacted to reform the organization of higher education study programs, including in particular the introduction of a module-based system designed to promote greater flexibility. However, implementation of these measures has led to a renewal, in fragmented form, of old program insularities. It has revived a closed system in which there is no switching between academic paths and no possibility of rerouting midway into a degree course, all of which exacerbates the consequences of mistakes made at the time of the initial channeling/assignment process. New degree courses may be introduced (or existing ones closed down) and curricula may be designed (or redesigned), but with minimal concern for changes in labor market trends or in the demand for particular qualifications or skills. However, the Ministry of Higher Education has recently launched a new initiative aimed at adapting courses and curricula to these trends. 13. Institutional framework. Creation of universities as intermediary bodies between their component faculties and schools and the central authorities has failed to settle the question of responsibilities within the higher education sector, which remains heavily centralized. The way resources are allocated to these faculties and schools (often referred to in this report as "establishments") is unrelated to performance but instead is the outcome of negotiations in which the central authorities have the last word. The decentralization process, which began with creation of the universities to provide an  - ix - intermediate echelon between the central ministry and the 89 higher education and research establishments (EESRs) henceforth to be grouped together in one or other of the six universities, has been only partially completed. The criteria by which responsibilities are to be assigned among the three echelons are somewhat vague; for the moment, the universities, although in principle they oversee the establishments, actually have only a subsidiary administrative role in the teaching, financial and personnel arenas. The Ministry of Higher Education is still the preeminent sector agent as regards the allocation of subsidies to the universities, which are negotiated directly. The autonomy of the establishments is in fact limited, in the sense that even when they successfully mobilize resources of their own to finance applied research they are subject to prior control checks and are unable to use these resources as they see fit, since such funds must be deployed according to distribution requirements set by law. 14. The preference given to research over teaching in the university faculty incentive system. in combination with a lack of educator training and systematic performance evaluation, has had adverse effects on the quality of instruction. Operating under a statute that differs from the regular civil service rules and regulations in certain respects, full-time teachers in the higher education sector have a dual function: to teach and to conduct research. In actual practice, their hiring, tenure and promotions depend mainly on their research activities and only marginally on their teaching and tutoring performance. However, the actual possibilities for research are limited, either for lack of resources (at all echelons), lack of incentive (in the case of senior faculty), or heavy involvement in teaching and tutoring activities (in the case of junior faculty). The results are: little prospect of promotion, a flattening of the career pyramid, a scarcity of level A teachers (at least in certain disciplines and in the provincial universities), and increasingly heavy recourse to contract teachers who do not always offer adequate guarantees of quality. The lack of pedagogical training for faculty, and of systematic evaluation of their performance, threatens the quality of instruction provided. 15. Relations with the outside world. Initiatives to organize activities focused on the surrounding world. especially research projects with partners in the production sector, are thwarted not only by the fact that the establishments lack control over their "own resources" but also by the reluctance of a still nervous private sector to participate. Research performance at the university level is undermined by the fact that scattered small teams work in isolation from one another, by the realities of the teaching profession, and by the excessive supervision to which the hardly independent establishments are subject. The end result is that the higher education sector receives few research commissions from local businesses, which still constitute only a small group, are often small-scale and perhaps traditional, and have not always realized the importance of research and development in achieving those advances which the Government advocates to bring the Tunisian economy up to speed with Europe and the rest of the world. Other types of exchanges between the sector and its surrounding environment-release of professionals by the private sector to provide specialized teaching, participation in university entities, student traineeships with business firms, etc.-are still not widespread. 16. Private sector. The historical context being what it is. the lack of any clear and incentive legal framework explains whv the private sector still plays only a limited role in higher education, despite evident signs of effective demand. The private higher education sector is still in its infancy and limited to certain fields of study, but it has been left to evolve in a legal void. This situation does not help to promote what would otherwise be its "natural" development, considering the number of potential students being rejected by the public tertiary system and the growing need for both educational and financial diversification. The success of Tunisia's main private university and the ease with which its graduates appear to find employment point to the existence of effective demand from households and expectations on the part of the labor market. However, the draft law now in preparation should provide the sector with the legal security essential to its development.  m. Recommendations for the Future 17. Tunisia is entering a phase of its history marked by increasingly radical and rapid changes. Its closer links with the European Union and efforts to become part of the global economy require expanded investment in developing both the potential and quality of its human capital. The pressure to become part of the international market not only leaves no other choice but also imposes a quest for greater competitiveness. In parallel fashion, higher education too is entering a transitional phase, which must be completed successfully. Tunisia is not alone in this: many countries have had to face-and in various regions of the world are still facing-the same economic exigencies and accompanying expansion of higher education. Fundamental national specifics aside, there are lessons to be drawn from these experiences, which tend to demonstrate that the key requirement in higher education at the present time is for a new approach. 18. With the appearance of larger cohorts of students, the problems identified will become much more acute: the institutional framework supporting higher education threatens to founder under the weight of mass demand and of financing mechanisms incapable of covering the cost of responding to this demand. These numerous and widely differing problems will require "two-tier treatment" geared to circumstances and to reactions to the treatment itself. A wide range of measures will be needed to ensure growth that is educationally sound and financially viable. This report presents a list of options which coincide, on a number of points, with the recommendations made by the Plan committees, and which, on others, correspond to actions already taken by the Government. These options are designed to reawaken the enthusiasm of players-students, faculty, administrators-for their roles in higher education, and are built around the principles of flexibility, diversification, accountability, and evaluation. 19. Decompartmentalize academic paths and reduce dropout rates-by allowing students to make changes during their university career, creating bridges between disciplines and authorizing course shifts. As a result, channeling/assignment would no longer be viewed as an unappealable sentence, and positive curriculum adjustments would be possible. In addition, the student failure rate would be reduced to a minimum, leading not only to a radical cut in the number of repeaters but also to official recognition of the academic achievements of students who drop out of higher education before completing their course of studies. Modules and credit systems are proven means of achieving such objectives-means that already exist in Tunisia, although they need to be reformulated and systematized. Changes of discipline and transfers between educational institutions will help lower repeater rates, although better supervision will also be needed if a system prone to produce failures is to be replaced by one that facilitates successes. At the same time, modernization and adaptation of study program content will be unavoidable, an issue on which expert task forces are currently working. 20. Increase institutional responsibility for allocating and administering resources. Expansion of the higher education system will make greater decentralization of decision-making inevitable. In the process, it will force the central sector authorities to reduce their involvement in university administration, to devote more attention to their incentive, promotional and arbitration functions, and to strengthen their programming capabilities. In addition, the division of tasks between universities and establishments should be reconfigured. This will undoubtedly involve reinforcing the role of the universities to ensure better overall sector functioning. The chief steps here would be to eliminate duplications of effort and parallel decision networks, to shorten spending approval processes, and to foster cooperation. The first area in which universities could be given greater responsibilities is student admissions and mobilization of public funds. A threefold approach is advocated: (i) the establishments would be authorized to adjust access to the different study programs to reflect demand; (ii) information would be assembled on each establishment's  - xl - performance in terms of intrinsic quality of instruction and success on the employment market; and (iii) funding allocation formulas would take account of both inputs and performance. Resource allocation formulas would provide a powerful tool for encouraging the establishments to take initiatives, for vesting system administrators with real responsibility, and in fact for regulating the system as a whole. However, it is critically important that these formulas be selected with care. 21. The establishments would be responsible for their own hiring policies (a situation that would not rule out adjustments and realignments). They would also make their own spending decisions, operating free of prior checks and controls in administering their resources in the form of public funds and the increased student contributions they would be receiving directly. The same principle would apply, and with all the more reason, in the case of resources they themselves generated, whether by leasing their facilities, providing teaching services for a range of clients, or earning fees on research contracts. They would also be more directly involved in the deployment and promotion of teaching personnel, even if the principle of national certification remained in force. Introduction of permanent arrangements for evaluating their performance would be an essential corollary, and would enhance the credibility of the sector. These measures would undoubtedly lead to greater diversification among the establishments, and even to their being ranked. Although a tacit ranking exists at present, it would become more transparent and thus sounder. Finally, their legal status could possibly be modified. 22. Encourage participation by the private sector to promote a broader choice of services. This would require the state to give up the de facto monopoly it continues to exercise in higher education. Demographic growth, the need to make choice a possibility, and the aspirations of the many potential students rejected by the public system will continue to fuel the demand for private sector services. There is no reason to thwart this demand, especially when the official sector itself looks likely to be overwhelmed by the same pressures. However, the domestic private sector will never have room and opportunity to develop until a more dispassionate approach can be adopted toward this issue. This will come about if the draft law now in preparation lays down clear rules and regulations governing legal status, financing arrangements, hiring practices, teaching obligations, and systems of equivalencies or accreditation. 23. Open up faculty career development opportunities; upgrade and evaluate the teaching function. In order to meet its considerable need for qualified teachers, the higher education sector must take action on several fronts simultaneously. It would be advisable, first of all, to dissociate teaching obligations from research obligations. This would allow recognition that research obligations are not essential in all cycles, or always feasible, or necessarily more admirable. For this to occur, teaching ability would have to be considered a career requirement and made the object of specific training (the fundamentals initially, followed by continuing courses). Several solutions are possible: the simplest would be to systematize the current recourse to secondary-school teachers [agreges] (who are highly qualified), particularly for the first cycle and for some second-cycle teaching work, while increasing the weight given to teaching activities in performance evaluation/promotion reviews (a policy originally introduced in 1995 in connection with the hiring of lecturers [maitres de confirences]. Another effective solution-with only minimum side effects-would be to offer a choice between two tracks in the same career path, either teacher or teacher-researcher, with clearly differentiated pedagogic obligations (instruction, but also hours for consultation, advice and tutoring). Choices could be exercised for limited periods, allowing alternation between the two areas. Steps could be taken to restore the original function of the bonus system by using it as a means of recognizing the value of teaching. One condition for success here would be the introduction of a transparent and objective evaluation procedure carried out through appropriately organized structures, an initiative that would involve a greater degree of decentralization in personnel management. At the same time, distance learning, making use of the newest communications technologies, should be systematically encouraged.  - xii - 24. Take advantage of expansion to experiment with new types of university institution. To improve the internal efficiency of higher education, it will be necessary to develop short cycles and reform first cycles, by improving staffing ratios, setting up "common core" programs in the major disciplines, and redefining course curricula and diplomas to provide graduates with qualifications relevant to the job market. Expert task forces are already studying these approaches. This report suggests going even farther, by gradually setting up specialized establishments to provide first-cycle instruction and absorb the new cohorts of students. The mission of these new establishments-of the "college," "pre-university institute" or "university-preparatory" type-would be to round out candidates' secondary schooling, give career guidance, prepare some of them for the job market and encourage others to pursue full-scale university studies in existing conventional establishments. 25. The institutional changes suggested above would make it possible to respond simultaneously to several of the structural challenges identified, and to mitigate the pressure expected to build up on the higher education sector, by: (i) improving internal effectiveness and moderating the rigid separations between degree courses. The colleges would provide a transition phase. By orienting and screening students for possible university studies, they would eliminate the causes of the present high repeater rates. Open to all holders of the baccalaureat, they would provide education of a modular type, with a particular focus on multipurpose courses, leading to award of a special diploma distinct from the certificate giving access to second-cycle studies. (ii) separating teaching and research. Relieved of the obligation to engage in research, teachers in the colleges would be in a position to devote themselves exclusively to their educational responsibilities, on the basis of which their performance would be evaluated and their remuneration set. Students would have the benefit of much closer monitoring, which should lead to a decline in the number of dropouts. Teachers working toward university degrees would devote more of their time to research, which would be concentrated in a smaller number of better-equipped centers. (iii) encouraging autonomy. These new establishments would provide an opportunity to test formulas for vesting them with greater independence and responsibility. Testing would focus on public resource allocation procedures and funding administration methods. 26. Unit operating costs per student in such colleges would be lower than in existing first-cycle establishments, since they would not need any research infrastructure, would use their teaching staff more effectively, and would reduce repeater rates. Their introduction would clearly pose many questions-for instance, on linkages between the two types of establishment, and arrangements for the transition period. However, the example set by the Higher Technical Education Institutes (ISETs) is clear evidence of the ability of the Tunisian higher education system to launch and manage new structures. 27. Ensure that expansion is financially viable. Given the projected increase in enrollments, the present financial structure of the higher education sector threatens to produce a deadlock before long. In theory, there are several ways such a situation could be avoided, all of which presuppose strong economic growth (6% per annum) and a proportional increase in government appropriations for higher education. An additional requirement is an improvement in sector internal efficiency, but this will take time. A necessary part of the process will be to utilize the potential represented by the present low statute-based workloads of  - xiii - faculty members, which offer the possibility of major savings. But it will be difficult to cut costs further (the unit figure has already been lowered substantially) without running the risk of a dangerous deterioration in quality, already being felt in some university departments. Alternative sources of financing will thus be necessary, particularly outside the public sector. However, even if the private sector grew at an annual rate of 15% it would not provide the means of eliminating the financial deficit. 28. In the final analysis, only user contributions can ensure the sustainability of the higher education sector. It would be logical to begin with meal and dormitory services, which are not directly associated with tuition, something the great majority of users have to finance themselves. However, this type of measure would still not close the gap, and student participation in covering education costs would inevitably follow. The student aid system would then obviously have to be expanded and retargeted, particularly its loan and scholarship provisions, although care would be needed to ensure that inability to pay did not result in exclusion from higher education. As a practical matter, a package of measures would have to be introduced to cover the deficit. 29. Selection, sequencing and application of the measures. The technical and financial feasibility of the options proposed here remain to be assessed, and such issues as how they are to be combined, what sequence they are to follow, and whether they are politically feasible still have to be resolved by the Tunisian authorities. Whatever final plan is decided on, it will need to be the subject of a promotion campaign, and its implementation should be carefully evaluated.  I. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Higher education in Tunisia is abundantly documented. Knowledge of the sector and understanding of the way it functions and of its problems is also well developed. This is probably explained by the status accorded to an institution that is the crown of the entire educational structure in a country where knowledge and culture have reigned as national values for centuries. It is no doubt also connected, more recently, with the developing awareness of the new role that higher education is called on to play in the future of the modem Tunisia and the process of "bringing it up to speed."' A third factor is the emergence of the difficulties being experienced by a sector undergoing rapid expansion, difficulties that could well thwart the ambitions reposed in it. 1.2 The priority status of higher education is recognized in the preparatory work on the Ninth Plan. For its part, the World Bank, whose partnership with Tunisia dates back more than 30 years, is currently engaged in a dialogue with the Government concerning higher education. The present report is a product of that dialogue. It does not aspire to be exhaustive and seeks primarily to complement the work done in Tunisia itself. The report accordingly begins with an overview of the current situation of higher education and seeks to shed special light on some of the problems that could well jeopardize its future. 1.3 In this way, the analysis that follows forms a natural component of extension of the Report of the Sectoral Commission on Higher Education (Commission Sectorielle Chargee de l'Enseignement Superieur), prepared for the purposes of the Ninth Plan under the responsibility of the Ministry of Higher Education (MES), and relies greatly on the observations and conclusions of that very comprehensive report (MES 1996a). The analysis could well serve as a platform for discussion concerning a new Bank project in support of higher education in Tunisia. A number of points are therefore left for more detailed, more operationally-oriented treatment later, which could take place as part of the process of the preparation of that project. 1.4 The report will examine the following topics: (a) the economic and sectoral environment; (b) the "production function" of higher education; (c) the institutional and economic setting; (d) the needed resources to cope with the inevitable expansion. II. ECONOMIC AND SECTORAL FRAMEWORK 2.1 Of the 21 strategic studies commissioned as part of preparation of the Ninth Plan, one (study no. 20, on education financing) deals widely with higher education while two others (no. I1, on Vocational Skills and Education and Training Arrangements, and no. 12, on Innovation, Technology and Research) cover that subsector in part. This reflects the central place occupied by higher education in the country's concerns. According to the Ministry of Industry, the agency responsible for implementing it, the process of bringing the country up to speed (Programme de Mise a Niveau) "comprises a series of actions, addressed to business and its environment, designed to enable the productive system to adjust to the requirements of the new international setting." Started in 1996, the program is aimed primarily at bringing Tunisia up to the level of the technological and competitiveness requirements of the European Union.  -2 - Having banked for a long time now on the build-up of human capital, and pursuing a deliberate policy of open growth and use of skilled labor, Tunisia must inevitably face up to the question of the future of its higher education in charting its medium-term development path. This is not to suggest that this higher education is currently beset by irreparable ills--the situation continues to be on the favorable side, and comparisons with neighboring countries are flattering. However, the circumstances that have presided over recent developments are undergoing profound change and failure to recognize this could well lead--at best- -to a stalemate. A. Macroeconomic Setting 2.2 The economic setting is broadly favorable, and Tunisia is frequently cited, within and outside the region, as an example of successful transition between a state-controlled economy and a market-oriented economy. Macroeconomic adjustment has been well handled (inflation has been brought under control, the budget deficit reduced and the debt burden trimmed); a start has been made on government divestiture; liberalization encompasses prices, trade, local and foreign investment and, to a less degree, the labor market and the banking and financial sectors; opening up to the European and world economies is proceeding apace, and GNP has grown steadily since the beginning of the 1990s (at between 2.6 and 8% a year). These advances have not been achieved at the cost of the social sectors, which on the contrary have also realized spectacular gains: first, average income has risen, while its dispersion has been narrowing, and the number of poor has been greatly reduced; second, the health and education coverage indicators have improved substantially. This progress on the twin economic and social fronts has been facilitated by a strong, clear and continuous political commitment. 2.3 Continuation of the efforts to promote an efficient economy alongside effective social services and equitable protection mechanisms will be indispensable for Tunisia to take up the new, already looming challenges. As change in the rest of the world is accelerating, the country is going to have to buckle down to a process of continuous adaptation. Bringing the country up to speed will be a long-haul process; narrowing the gap with the European Union will entail costs before it produces gains. Private initiative and investment remain weak and the incentives to get them moving inadequate. Decentralization has not yet run its course. The shrinking of civil service recruitment could well sharpen the labor market tensions, just when labor productivity and competitiveness need to improve. A bold human resources policy, particularly in higher education, will help to strengthen the economic gains posted and cement social cohesion. B. Sectoral Setting 2.4 In terms both of enrollment and of teaching content and quality, higher education is dependent on a long process which shapes primary and secondary education. In counterpart, secondary education depends on the universities to supply it with teachers. This situation calls for a rapid overview of basic and secondary education, especially since these subsectors are themselves undergoing change: an in-depth reform was launched in 1989, and its phased implementation is still ongoing. At the primary/secondary levels, the system is structured in accordance with a 9/4 sequence which makes it abnormally long (Annex 1). 2.5 Good enrollment performance. With net enrollment rates exceeding 96%, Tunisia is close to universal primary schooling and leads the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. The structure 2 The main problems affecting primary and secondary education, and the recommended solutions, are summarized in a strategy paper which is due to appear very soon (World Bank 1 996a).  of population growth is already having repercussions on the primary-age classes, whose enrollments are beginning to fall. In secondary education, with a gross registration rate of 52% (1994), Tunisia occupies a middle rank in the MENA reference group and in the emerging countries group (43% in Indonesia and 60% in Malaysia) but lags behind the more dynamic Southeast Asian countries (Annex 2), where the rates range from 70 to 98%. Concerning enrollment of girls, equality has been practically achieved in primary education and is well advanced at the secondary level, where girls lag only three percentage points behind the national average enrollment rate. The gender gap persists in adult illiteracy, with averages of 33% overall but 45% for women. While this gap undoubtedly has a generational aspect, it has nevertheless continued--and this is what makes it serious--to be sustained by dropouts from the present school system. Marked selectivity 2.6 Failure is in fact the main method of flow regulation in pre-university education. For 1994/95, repeater rates are of the order of 13-17% in basic and 21% in secondary education, with dropout rates of 5% and 12%, respectively. Applied from the first basic cycle, selection stiffens at transition to the second cycle (the 6th-7th year promotion rate is barely 60%) and continues through secondary school, culminating at the end of the latter with a high-school graduation (baccalaurwat) success rate of only 32% on average and 42% in the public sector (Solaux 1996). 2.7 Financial waste. defeat of pedagogic purposes and social exclusion are the counterparts of these losses, whose only justification (in part illusory) is maintenance of quality. Repeating (and dropping out) absorb human and financial resources and generate incremental costs that have to be funded at the cost of other investments. The large volume of repeaters helps to overload classrooms and clog the dynamics of the teaching process. Finally, school failure and rejection are often forerunners to social exclusion, especially in an environment in which the school is perceived as the main path to social mobility. The institution of the basic education completion examination (EFEB) in 1998 will not in itself suffice to remedy a phenomenon that seriously impairs the efficiency of the system if the other bottlenecks are not also alleviated. The causes of the losses--still poorly known--merit in-depth examination; such a study has just been started, with the Bank's cooperation. 2.8 The sharp selectivity in basic and secondarv education crystallizes around four stages: (i) the current 6th-7th transition, at the end of the first basic cycle; (ii) the EFEB , which from 1998 will mark the end both of the second basic cycle and of compulsory education and will govern the separation between the continued long general studies and short vocational education streams; (iii) the I Ith-12th transition, which at the end of the first secondary cycle (common stream) determines channeling into the various courses leading to the baccalaureat, and finally (iv) the baccalaureat itself, at the end of high school, opening the door directly to higher education (table 2.1).  -4 - Table 2.1 Selectivity in public primary and secondary education (1994/95) Level/Cycle Years Promotion Repeating Dropout (%) (%) (%) Basic school, 1st cycle Entering 1/2 85.2 13.8 1.0 Leaving 6/7 58.8 25.4 15.7 asic school, nd cycle Entering 7/8 77.4 16.2 6.4 Leaving 9/10 (*) 84.8 9.7 5.4 Secondary, I st cycle Entering 10/11 75.1 15.1 9.6 Leaving 11/12 64.2 19.7 16.1 Secondary, nd cycle Entering 12/13 78.7 13.5 7.8 Leaving 13/14 42.0 41.7 13.4 (Bac) Source: Based on data from the Ministry of Education. Notes: The figures in bold print refer to the four stages referred to in the previous paragraph. (*) The future EFEB will be located at this level. 2.9 Selection is tending to shift to increasingly higher levels of the school system; the new EFEB will gradually replace the 6th-7th bar, while the latter will cease to be watertight. This encouraging trend reflects the determination to combat premature exit from the system. Already, whereas the rate of admission from the 6th to the 7th year rose from 26 to 90% between 1979 and 1995, the baccalaureat success rate fell, from 52 to 32%. These phased selection devices relieve higher education of responsibility for regulating the overall level of student flows and require it solely to see to their internal routing. Opening the successive control gates that mark out the schooling path, even to a limited degree, will be reflected in increased pressure on the secondary education final cycles and, ultimately, on higher education (see chapter VI). 2.10 A total of 1,878,000 pupils were enrolled in primary education in 1995/96, of whom 418,000 (22%) for the second cycle. Of these, 188,000 pupils left, 52% of them without a diploma. In that year secondary education registered 308,000 pupils, producing 28,000 high-school graduates (bacheliers) at the same time as it lost 37,000 pupils by dropout. In private education, the picture varies according to education level: marginal in primary, where it accounts for only 0.6% of enrollment, it serves as a second chance channel for 10% of secondary education pupils. 2.11 Vocational training. Essentially under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment (MFPE), vocational training. which reaches only a small population (24,000 students), has an ambiguous role falling between recovery of persons excluded from  - 5 - general education and commitment to a true, complete course of training that imparts skills and leads to a diploma. Primarily in order to recover some of the 98,000 children excluded from primary and the 37,000 excluded from secondary school, vocational training tends rather to be used--tardily and imperfectly--to resolve school failure problems and is hardly capable of ensuring production of the operational and value-enhancing know-how that the economy needs. 2.12 On that point, a recent MFPE study (study no. I 1) finds that a majority of businesses undergoing reconstruction are experiencing difficulty in finding skilled labor. Yet instead of focusing essentially on resolving this difficulty, vocational training serves in large part as a refuge for persons rejected by the traditional school. This skewing of its function stems from an excessively fragmented view of the education system. It amounts to making one link in the system shoulder a responsibility that bears little relation to its natural function. More serious, it contaminates the latter by pinning on it the dismissive label of "training of last resort". Finally, vocational training does not allow those for whom it constitutes their sole stock of learning to go on later to higher-level studies: blocking as it does any educational future, it is not surprisingly viewed as a siding into which students can be shunted. 2.13 In the last analysis, the total interdependence between, on the one hand. all education levels (primary/secondary) and all education types (general/technical/vocational) and. on the other, higher education bears an important message: designing an education system capable of facing up to the economic and social challenges of the future demands a global approach. In the developed world, there are a large number of particularly dynamic countries (Australia, for example) where the barriers between types and levels of education are tending to become more and more blurred. In concrete terms, this means that in Tunisia, where supervisory authority in the education sector is divided among three ministries, those ministries need to cooperate extremely closely and to abandon their practice of "passing the buck" to each other. III. CURRENT SITUATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION A. Enrollment Flow levels, trends and distribution 3.1 In the last university year a total of 113,000 students were enrolled in Tunisia's public higher education system, comprising six universities (four of them in Tunis), the Higher Teacher Training Institutes (Instituts Superieurs de Formation des Maitres--ISFMs) and the Higher Technical Education Institutes (Instituts Supe'rieurs d'Enseignement Technologique--ISETs) and a number of schools and institutes. This enrollment figure includes both the students enrolled in the 67 establishments under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education (MES) and those (just under 7%) belonging to the 22 establishments administered by other ministries (under "joint responsibility" arrangements). In addition, some 3,000 students are enrolled in private establishments. To be able to assess the relative importance of these enrollment complements, we need to review their evolution, refer them to the pertinent age tranches and compare them with the figures for "comparable" countries; it will also be helpful to analyze their composition and finally to track the flows they generate. 3.2 Despite a sharp rise in enrollments. tuition fees continue to be relatively low. From a student population of barely 10,000 in 1970, higher education in Tunisia slowly began to gain strength, with an annual growth rate of 3% up to 1985/86, when it still attracted only 42,000 students. The ensuing period  - 6 - saw the creation of new universities, and enrollment soared, growing at an annual rate of 11% between 1986/87 and 1995/96 and hence doubling over the last six years, reflecting the improvement in the internal output of the education system and, more particularly, the sharp rise in the number of high school graduates (bacheliers) posted in the early 1980s. This evolution is reflected in the gross enrollment rates,3 which rose from 5% in 1980 to 11% in 1993 (Annex 3). As a result, Tunisia achieved parity with Algeria and Morocco (11% and 10%, respectively) but continued to lag behind the other MENA countries, the lower middle income countries (weighted average rate 24%), neighboring countries of southern Europe: Portugal (23%) and Spain (41%), and even Israel (35%). In light of this situation, combined with the thrust coming from secondary education, the observed trend can be expected not just to continue but to intensify (box 1). Although the overall enrollment rate for women is still relatively modest, they already account for 44% of the total student population, a fact that makes Tunisia a model for the region. EntroltmentROates by Levelt0 International Conparisons Comntr Primar SeCondary HIghe 1992 ~1992 1980: 1993 MulVS evItntriesia j :i; 117 43 5 i E II Algeria 99 60 6 1i Iran 109~~~~~lo 57 4-15 Jordan ~~~~~105 T-271 Morocco ~~~~~69 2&:8 6 ~ 10 Syria ~~~~107a) ~ 48(a - Indonesia 115 ~~~~3 8 41 10, Malysia 931 58 ~ 4 8 00SPhilippines0:A 1090 : 0 74: : 0 A 0280 it ;4 26 Thailand ~~~97 331 9 Portugal ~~~~120- 68 I I 23 :;Spaiiuf 0 0 : g 0 0 \ 0 31:07 i i ; : -- 0 0 :)0)0 241 40 lowler-middle-mome: i1300 ) :O:g::0 j;0;;i;0iji;g300i;:0l ountries ~ ~ ~ 10 ~~Jie3 Averag 9462 9 1 Source: World Bank, 1996b. (a) Source: World Bank, 1996c 3.3 The classical disciplines continue to be predominant. More than one student in two is enrolled in the arts, law and economics faculties. Only one fourth of enrollment is in the scientific and technical streams and 10% in medicine and biology, with the remaining 5% divided between agricultural sciences and teacher training. This indicates a skew against scientific and technical education which has repercussions on the channeling that takes place in the 1 Ith year, to which has to be added that effected in the first year of university. This imbalance is out of line with the efforts being made to bring the country up to speed and also with what is happening in the more advanced countries: in the EU countries, the proportion of first-cycle graduates accounted for by the scientific and technical disciplines The net rates are not very significant, owing to the dispersion of the students over the age curve.  -7 - is at least 32% (Austria) and rises to 60% and beyond (Belgium and Germany);4 a similar trend is noted in the new industrialized countries (Chile, Korea). In parallel, the figures show excessive growth in education courses of average duration (4 years) and long duration (5-7 years), in which 72% and 18%, respectively of the students are concentrated, to the detriment of the short vocational training streams (2- 3 years), with only 10% of the students (MEN/MES 1996). The combination of these two skews is symptomatic of a rigid, upward-looking education system geared to self-perpetuation. The reform initiated with inter alia creation of the ISETs, seeks to create this openness and its results are highly promising and greatly appreciated in higher education circles. Yet as the public authorities have come to realize, engineers/technicians and managers continue to represent a dangerously low minority of graduates, whereas these are two priority education categories in most of the countries pursuing aggressive economic policies. Internal efficiency 3.4 Repeaters and drop-outs represent a heavy burden. Annual university output was 13,000 graduates in 1994/95. This signifies an average success rate of 62%, around which there is a wide dispersion, ranging from a low of 35% (Tunis I, Arts) to highs of 95% (ISET) and 98% (ISFM). University education thus harbors 3,800 unsuccessful students each year. Above all, however, it puts up with a repeaters population which accounts for 31% of total enrollment in the large faculties and institutes (Annex 4). The streams with the highest enrollment also those with the heaviest losses: the main sources of dropouts are the law, economics and management and arts faculties; the arts faculties also account for the main contingents of repeaters (49% of enrollment at Tunis I, 47% at Sousse and 51% at Sfax). Overall, one student in two quits the circuit during the first cycle and only one in ten graduates on time. The skimming-off of the secondary. the severity of the baccalaureat examination and the first-year channeling of students hence do not suffice for this purpose: the system still rejects some chosen students and compels others to excessively prolong their stay at university, which they tend to tackle tardily. as a result of the long duration and low internal efficiency of pre-university education. 3.5 Despite the progress accomplished recently, a source of inefficiency remains that needs to be studied seriously and without delay. It is to the first cycle that attention needs to be given since it absorbs the growing flows of students certified by the baccalaureat and that suffers the overcrowding most detrimental to the efficiency of the teaching and the quality of the results. It is in this buffer cycle that, in the last analysis, there occurs, in an indirect and perverse manner, the selection of the students who will ultimately be called on to continue university education proper and be brought up to standard if need be. This cycle hence produces a large number of rejects who have not merely failed to obtain validation of their university education but also carry the stigma of failure. One avenue worth exploring would be to make the first cycle play this role offirst, preparatory year of university education directly and transparently and apply institutional, financial and pedagogic rules of the game (with specialist teachers) specific to it, thereby enabling it to perform the preparation and selection functions openly and efficiently, while validating the training received. This would allow the university to devote itself to its true role, including research, and cease to be parasitized by activities in which it does not excel and that absorb the energy of its teaching staff and a large part of its resources. In any case, the situation warrants at least that the first cycles receive special treatment through improvement of their teaching methods, adjustments to their staffing ratio and curricula, and revision of their diplomas, to ensure the production ofjob market entrants who are appropriately qualified rather than tainted byfailure. National Science Foundation, 1996.  -8 - B. Resources Public resources 3.6 Over the last twenty years Tunisia has devoted on average 5.3% of GNP to the education sector and around 1% to the higher education subsector. This refers solely to public resources included in the state budget. By way of indication, in 1992 higher education expenditure represented 0.9% of GNP in Spain and Portugal and 1.4% in Ireland (OECD 1995). In terms of public expenditure on education as a proportion of the state budget (including debt service), the ratios are 18% for the education sector as a whole and 3.8% for higher education alone (Strategic Study no. 20 and Jaoua 1995). Since no pertinent standard exists, the important thing is to determine the evolution of these resources and how and for what purposes they are utilized. That is the purpose of this section. 3.7 Within the sector. efforts have addressed first of all the pre-university levels. In 1992 Tunisia led the other MENA countries and the majority of the Asian countries in terms of share of GNP devoted to the education sector as a whole (5.6%, against 5.3% for Morocco and 4.1% for Egypt). In terms of share of public education expenditure in the total budget, Tunisia also ranks well in the MENA region, on a par with Morocco (nearly 18%) and well ahead of Egypt (10%). The value of these comparisons is of course reduced by the fact that the budget burden varies from country to country; in this sense Tunisia, with a total budget representing 33% of GNP, occupies a middle rank between Colombia (15%) and Egypt (43%), two extreme countries in this regard. To assess Tunisia's international ranking in the case of higher education, it is wiser to use the share allocated to higher education in the total education budget (box 2). In 1992 this share amounted to 36% in Egypt and 39% in Jordan but only 18.5% in Tunisia, which in this regard was closer to Iran (13%) and Morocco (16%). Here we have an indicator that, within an education sector that is globally well provided for, no priority is apparently accorded to higher education. Each country stands at a particular point in the development of its education system: in the case of Tunisia, the authorities have deliberately chosen to lay solid bases first at the primarv and then at the secondary levels. It is on these bases that expansion of university education can now go forward. The vital question is whether public resources will suffice to finance this expansion. i Public lucation and Hb igher EducationExpenbditues InternaonlC pais Tunisia Egyt ~Iordan orocico Maasa (a) inGNP. 5.6 4.1 4.4 :5.3 5.5' ifti the,stattebudget 17A6 10.3 14.4 17.9 - -h ithestatbudget ~3.3 3.7 5.7 :.2.9 - hi nthe: ucation budge 18, 36.0 39.3 16.2 Stute bdget aGDP hae (994 (b) G peradig 26.2 34.9: 27.1 24224 - Total ~~~~~~~~33.- 43.0 - 314264 So~urce: World bank, 1996b (a) Source: Mingat, 1995 (b) Source: World Bank, 1 996c  - 9 - 3.8 Evolution of resources. The trends over time (1972-94) indicate first of all that the share of resources allocated to the education sector as a whole in the state budget (operating and investment) and that of the resources accruing to higher education have been declining slowly and more or less in parallel since the early 1970s (Annex 5). Moreover, looking only at operating expenditures, the ratio of higher education to education sector expenditures has remained remarkably stable, around an average of 19.5%. for practically 25 years. In the case of investment expenditure this ratio shows much more irregular short- term movements, causing it to fluctuate between 27 and 47%, depending on the year, without any real trend being discernible. In both cases, the start of the decade marks an upward turn of the ratios: the share of higher education in the operating budget (excluding debt service) rose from 5.1 to 5.9% between 1988 and 1995. Moreover, it is apparent that, taking into account the increase in Tunisia's state budget burden as a percentage of GNP (a gain of ten points between 1972 and 1974), the volumes of resources available for the education sector and the higher education subsector have risen substantially, in both cases doubling in constant dinars between 1981 and 1994. We can hardly expect this increase to continue on a scale that would provide for expansion of the system (chapter V). 3.9 Public expenditure per student is already headed downward. For an accurate understanding of the significance of these figures, however, we need to examine them by reference to the clientele served. Our first finding is that the current education budget has been continuously and regularly losing ground to enrollment, the gap widening faster beginning with the period 1985-87, which marks the upturn of the enrollment curve (Annex 6). This dual movement produces a declining trend in public current expenditure per unit served, i.e. in public (or fiscal) unit cost, from about TD 2,500 to TD 1,400 (constant dinars) over the period 1987 to 1994 (graph 3.1). The data are inadequate to determine whether, however classical it may be, this decline in the average annual unit cost of schooling reflects a growth in the institution's efficiency or a deterioration in school physical and teaching conditions. Unit fiscal expenditure on higher education in Tunisia, at about US$2,000, slightly exceeds that of the other MENA region countries (Morocco US$ 1,000, Jordan US$1,500) but represents less than one third of the average expenditure of the OECD countries (average US$7,940, Spain US$3,370, Ireland US$7,270). In terms of per capita GNP (135%), the effort is comparable to that of countries like Thailand (178%) or Jordan (128% but on the other hand is far higher than that of the OECD countries (average 45%, Ireland 57%, Spain 29%). From another point of view, whereas it cost 9 times as much to educate a university student than a primary pupil in Tunisia (and 39 times as much in India), the ratio was 1:4 in Korea and 1:2 in Spain (Annex 7). The composition of expenditure undoubtedly plays a role in this; in particular, the relative size of transfer expenditures skews international comparisons of the ratios which, although useful for relativizing situations, do not suffice to answer the question.  - 10- Graph 3.1 Higher Education: Unit Cost/Enrollment Ratio (1972-1994) I6 e ,t _; Ci 0 000 ;=0 Hi EE \ 140 0 3 1000i;X I 00 200 0 1 0000 20000 0 0 4O 0 500 8DD / *a a 0 DDDDD El.11. .It 3.10 The cost per graduate is boosted by the low internal efficiency. Unit expenditure is only a partial and static indicator which does not take into account the system's efficiency in "producing" its graduates: we also need to how much the latter cost. In a system characterized by repeaters and dropouts, this cost does not come down simply to unit cost multiplied by theoretical number of years required to obtain a degree; it must also incorporate the incremental cost stemming from the education of students who needed to stay on in the system in order to obtain their degree and those who left it without graduating. By way of illustration, in the human sciences faculties the incremental cost per graduate due to these losses is 165%. To this purely financial additional cost attributable to the poor internal return there have of course to be added the qualitative losses, more difficult to quantify, attributable to the deterioration in working conditions, which has long been recognized (cf. Experton 1988). 3.11 Dispersion by department or discipline. Looking only at the subsidizing of unit operating costs, we note a marked dispersion between disciplines: the differential between Tunis II University (technical sciences and medicine), the best endowed university and the biggest user of equipment and material, and Tunis III (law, economics and management), the least well endowed, is 1:3.5. Looking at the entire operating budget (excluding joint-responsibility establishments) in 1996, we find a narrower differential (2.4) in public unit cost between the technical sciences (TD 3,530) and law and economics (TD 1,475). The large share represented by salary expenditures helps explains this relatively narrow range. 3.12 Composition of the expenditure. The breakdown of the current higher education budget by categories (Annex 8) gives an idea of the production function of higher education. It brings out two salient facts: (i) salary costs account for over half the higher education budget (54%, a relatively low figure, well below that found in the OECD countries--see Annex 9) and their budget share is rising, and (ii) of the non- salary portion of the budget, resources allocated to university services represent the largest item (54% of this category, i.e. 19% of the total budget). This leaves some 27% for academic, non-salary expenditures, within which subsidies allocated to and directly administered by the establishments account for 17% (Jaoua 1995). These data provide several leads: (i) the key role of transfer expenditures, (ii) the importance of salary expenditures, and (iii) the relatively minimal role of expenditures controlled directly by the establishments. The first of these leads has been amply explored in the Plan preparation studies (Ben Aiech 1995 and Abdessalem 1995). The other two merit more thorough study and are discussed in greater detail later in this report.  - I1 - Weight and determination of salary expenditure 3.13 The factors that serve to determine these salary expenditures, particularly those relating to teachers, are of two kinds: quantity, and price. While the way in which the two factors are combined is undoubtedly assessed primarily on a financial basis, the assessment ought in the final analysis to be based on pedagogic considerations and take account of input quality just as much as of the "final product." Unfortunately, few data are available from which to study this aspect of the question, either in order to compare student performance over time or to evaluate teacher performance (see later, IV-D). 3.14 A high but very variable and declining overall staffing ratio. Over the ten-year period 1985-95 teaching staff grew at a lower annual rate (6.3%) than student enrollment (10.5%). As a result, the teacher/student rate deteriorated steadily from the mid-1980s, when it reached its minimum (barely 1:12), and currently exceeds 1:17. There is a striking dispersion in teacher/student ratios between disciplines which reflects two phenomena associated on the one hand with differences in teaching methods and on the other with different student numbers: they range from generous ratios for the agricultural sciences (1:6) and the technical sciences (1:7), with their high teacher demand and low student numbers, to ratios for disciplines that are both less "labor-intensive" and have much larger student populations, such as law, economics and management (1:33). Comparison with the emerging countries of Southeast Asia in the 1980s shows that, on average, Tunisia is better placed in the area of public higher education than those countries were ten years ago (Annex 10). 3.15 Low statutory workloads. The relatively low staff complement in terms of numbers could have been expected to be offset by the combined effect of two factors: the quality of the teaching staff, and the intensity of their interaction with the students. The first factor is not favored by the systems of evaluation and promotion (see below, IV-D), while the second factor seems to be severely curtailed by the statutory workloads in effect. At the bottom of the scale, assistant lecturers, who are required to perform 13 hours of practical work a week (which can be reduced to 8 hours temporarily for thesis preparation), have little time to spare for student monitoring; at the other extreme, lecturers and professors are required to provide only 4- 1/2 course hours a week and have no particular incentive to take on tutorial activities. This distribution of services by hierarchical rank is not an optimum one and is overall weaker than the distribution observed in other countries (box 3). It could advantageously be replaced by an alternative system that would differentiate among teachers according to whether they actually conduct research, devote themselves exclusively to teaching or combine one of these two activities with administrative duties. It should at the very least be corrected by the combination of a more demanding workload in terms of teaching hours for lecturers [maitres de conference] and professors, an overhaul of the presently unbalanced system of promotion criteria, a lengthening of the career path, and more systematic recourse to qualified secondary school teachers where it is not essential to have teacher/researchers.  - 12 - We kly Program WorMloads in Higher Education:. I nternational Comparisons TUNISIA1. I. Assistants :13 hours of PWor 9 hours of SW] (with waiver possiblew-limited to 3 for completion of thesis, reducing the workload to 8 hours .of PW.or 5 hours of SW) 2. Assistantlecturers 12 hours of PW DO8 hours of SW 3. Lecturers and course Tprofessors 4.30 course hours UNITED STATES I. "Large universities &6.5-7 course hours 2. "Medium-sized universities 9-12 course hours 3. Community colleges I15 hours FRANCE 1. Professors and lecturers 4 hours of magistrate courses or 6 hours of SW or any combination of the two 2.Qualified secondary teachers in hghef 12 hours educatio SINGAPOREF 1. Researchmuniversities 9/10 hours ;2. Poflytechnial: colleges (taching only) 20000 tt2thours :t000;0;0 00 t 4 : 00 SWITZERLAND 1. Professors 6-84hours 2. Course leaders 8- 0 hours 3. Professionals 12-16 hours 4,]Assistants} 4 hours PW = Practical work ("travaux pratiques ") SW = Supervised work ("travaux diriges') 3.16 Teacher remuneration. Higher education teacher remuneration is the highest in the civil service. Bonuses account for the bulk of this remuneration:5 salary as such accounts for only one fourth of it at most. Average total annual remuneration thus ranges from TD 11,000 for an assistant to TD 18,500 for a professor, in both cases newly recruited. Estimating whether these are high amounts is a difficult (and sensitive) task owing to the lack of indisputable reference points: the private education sector is still too embryonic to serve as a basis for comparison,6 and the data required to construct a true control group in the sector are lacking. This makes it necessary to stay with the public sector (Annex 11). In the first place, Supplemental allowance, temporary supplemental allowance, teaching staff output bonus, staffing allowance, per-kilometer allowance. 6 As a general rule, in many countries, teachers are remunerated less well in the private sector than in the public sector.  - 13 - these remunerations have to be compared with the average of TD 1 1,100 received by a qualified secondary school teacher (who has a higher program workload). They also have to be compared with the salaries of Tunisian senior civil servants: TD 12,400 a year for a senior administrator (administrateur geinral) who has attained the rank and performs the duties of a ministry director general (against TD 22,300 for a professor at the grade ceiling); TD 7,800 on average for an administrator-advisor (administrateur- conseiller) recruited, like the assistants, with a degree testifying to six years of higher studies. The comparison ought in theory to be weighted by the number of hours actually worked; in that case teachers in grade A would be at an even clearer advantage in relation to their upper administration colleagues. 3.17 The salary profiles are not very finely drawn. either within grades or across the entire career spectrum. In terms of actual remuneration, including bonuses, however, the gaps widen. Because of this, the (hypothetical) career paths of a "go-getter" who is rapidly promoted to professor and attains the peak of his/her career at age 45 and that of a teacher who is in less of a hurry and less ambitious and does not rise beyond the grade of assistant lecturer do not differ spectacularly: over his/her entire professional life the first teacher will accumulate total discounted income about 14% greater than the second teacher (box 4). In these circumstances, when internal promotion prospects are blocked for assistants and assistant lecturers, it is only natural to seek supplemental income sources outside. 0 Box 4 Salary and Total Remuneration for two Teaching Career Paths 23000 . .: ... 21000. 21000 - d j'- i 16000- 1800C0 --.:-j-.; .,-s--.jj-- *-b 17020 - E1 000 -. . -.';.- , 1t00-....... e *W w -! . .... .. .. ...j.i. <, 10008 X- - j.... .. ..-......, ,,S, .000 . .0 .. 2 000* . ....00. Age 3.18 The salary (including allowances) of a higher-education teacher in Tunisia represents between 6.6 times (assistant) and 11.2 times (professor) per capita GNP. In order to arrive at orders of magnitude, we note that in Indonesia in the 1980s this ratio stood at 5.7 for the entire teaching corps, across all categories. Comparison of the same ratios for secondary-school teacher salaries produces a similar result: 4.1 in  -14- Tunisia (1995) and 3.2 in Indonesia, an average of 2.7 for Asia, and 2.5 in Portugal. To confirm the assumption that teachers tend to be better-off in Tunisia, we would need of course to take account of service obligations which, as we saw earlier, are on the light side by international standards. However, the question needs to be further refined by factoring in its time dimension. We then find that teachers' annual remuneration declined in real value between 1987 (index 100) and 1994 (index 91.5); this erosion of purchasing power is greater than the erosion suffered by teachers at the pre-university levels. In light of the observations noted earlier, one would be tempted to interpret this development as a realignment. 3.19 The fact that many university staff engage in other remunerated activities is probably explained more by an abundance of free time than by the amount of the salary, even if the two reasons are mutually reinforcing. One type of supplementary activity consists of teaching over and above the compulsory service hours but within the official university framework. A professor may receive overtime payment of TD 320/year for one course hour a week, TD 240 for one hour of supervised work and TD 160 for one hour of practical work (for an assistant, the rates are 15% lower). In brief, increasing his/her workload by I hour a week brings a professor a salary gain of 1.7%; doubling it gives him 9% of additional income. This low return, combined with the availability of free time, makes the numerous accounts of additional supplementary activities outside the university administrative framework extremely plausible. For the establishment. however, these supplemental hours constitute the oxygen without which the teaching system would be unable to function under the current statutory conditions (see chapter V, section B). C. Financing Financing sources 3.20 Accessible and practically free of cost to all who because they possess the baccalaureat are automatically eligible to enroll in it, public higher education is financed almost entirely out of public funds. Putting aside the indirect costs associated with loss of earnings, the share of direct costs borne by the families is less than 5% of the total cost of public higher education and represents about TD 100 a year. This is less than the contribution noted at the pre-university levels, as has been shown by study no. 20 (table 3.1): whereas a year of higher education costs the state nine times as much as a year of primary school, for the user the cost ratio is only 1:3. Table 3.1 Comparison of Private and Public Costs, by Education Level (1990) Private Cost Public Cost Social Cost Share of Private (TD) (TD) (TD) Cost (%) Primary 32 203 235 13.6 Secondary 75 485 560 13.4 Higher 100 2,049 2,149 4.7 Higher/Primary 3.1 10.1 9.1 0.4 Source: Based on MEN/MES, 1996--Report on first stage. Users' contribution 3.21 The level of tuition cost recovery is very low. Enrollment fees, the sole means of cost recovery from users, amount to TD 15/year for the first cycle (TD 20/year for the second and TD 61.5/year for the third cycle), i.e. barely 1% of schooling cost. While this case is not an exceptional one, there are also countries where cost recovery is substantial, which shows that there is wide room for maneuver (box 5).  - 15 - Minimal as they are, these amounts7 nevertheless reflect a recent increase: until 1995 the fee was TD 2.5 for all cycles. The increase applied is hence significant in relative terms. It reflects a policy decision and represents an initial test in a sensitive area, in which the free schooling concept is still almost unanimously shared. As we shall see later, more energetic action on this issue will be inescapable in the future (IV-B). Box 5 Share of Private Financing in Higher Education in a number of Asian Countries (ca. 1985) Share of Registration Fees in Overall Cost Recovery Rate Country Operating Cost ** Bangladesh 0.1 16.5 China 0.3 0.3 Korea 45.9 76.6 India 4.5 7.1 Indonesia 18.9 48.7 Malaysia 5.8 15.1 Nepal 10.4 31.8 Papua New Guinea 0.0 16.3 Philippines 15.3 85.8 Sri Lanka 3.4 20.5 Thailand 5.0 26.9 Average 10.0 n.d. Source: Tan and Mingat, 1992. Notes: * Solely in the public establishments. * * For the entire sector (public and private). 3.22 Students make only a modest contribution to the cost of hostel services. In addition, students pay a charge of TD 0.10 per meal (of which they take an average of 145 a year), equal to 6% of the total cost of the cafeteria service. For living accommodation, which is rationed in favor of first-cycle students, women and scholarship holders (i.e. 38% of the student population), they pay TD 60/year, equal to 12% of cost. Studies carried out for preparation of the Ninth Plan have revealed not only abuses and waste but also a mediocre quality stemming partially from the low prices charged and the high levels of subsidization. This situation undoubtedly offers substantial opportunities for rationalization, in terms of both efficiency and equity. Cafeteria and accommodation services lend themselves to priority measures to raise user contributions, since these are services not specific to higher education and not subsidizedfor the greater part of the population. Contracting some of these activities out to commercial cafeteria and housing entities and encouraging building owners to rent to students could also yield savings while lightening the state's responsibilities in functions in which it does not have any special comparative advantage. In practice, private residential complexes for university students are starting to take shape. No direct data exist on private expenditures associated with enrollment in higher education (supplies and books, transportation, etc.); having regard, however, to the estimates of total private expenditure, they are probably low. They include registration fees, library, examination, medical check-up, teaching activities and cultural and sports fees, all set by the 1995 decree, plus the costs of insurance and membership of the school accidents provident scheme.  - 16- Assistance 3.23 In addition to the non-discriminatory teaching and cafeteria service subsidies and the selective accommodation subsidy, the state also compensates students on a non-personal basis for transportation expenses (TD 44 per capita). Finally, the state provides selective direct assistance to certain students; since tuition is practically free of charge, this assistance in fact represents a public contribution to their opportunity costs. The assistance is channeled through two instruments: scholarships, and loans. Both scholarships and loans are administered by the National Social Services Office (Office National des Oeuvres--ONO) through two "windows," each with its specific clientele. The distinction between them is based on the annual income of the applicant's parents: for incomes below TD 1,450 students are eligible for a scholarship, while below TD 4,200 they are channeled to the loans system. 3.24 Scholarships. In practice, there are over 40,000 scholarship students (37% of the student population, a lower proportion than that in neighboring countries). Although the income ceiling for scholarship eligibility is below the guaranteed inter-occupational minimum wage (SMIG) (of the order of TD 1,550), the redistributive efficiency of the scholarships (the unit amount of which is TD 400/year) is difficult to confirm since eligibility is based on parents' income returns. Thus, the distribution of scholarships by father's socio-occupational category shows over-representation of the non-wage-earning categories, for which the returns most need to be treated with caution (Ben Aiech, 1995). While those who effectively have the lowest incomes are not necessarily found in these categories, only a more thorough study can furnish a true picture. For lack of such a study we must adhere to the hypothesis that under current fiscal conditions the scholarships targeting method used leaves a margin of error that undoubtedly penalizes salaried families. 3.25 Loans. The student loans system, instituted in 1987/88, currently reaches about 1,000 new students each year, i.e. less than 1% of the student population. These loans, for the same amount as scholarships and repayable over 10 years at a negative real interest rate (2.5%), are in great demand since only one application in ten is accepted.8 Since eligibility is again based on tax returns, appraisal of loan applications carries a priori the same risk of error as scholarships. The essential difficulty of the scheme, however, lies in recovery. Repayment of the loan, which is demandable from students who have found a permanent job, is monitored through the student's membership of a social security fund--automatic for wage-earners--and administered by the Ministry of Finance. Of the 800 first-generation borrowers, only 350 could be traced and have begun to pay off their debts. The low recovery rate is attributable to two separate factors: some students have not found a permanent job and are therefore excused from repaying the loan; others have a job but evade monitoring.9 The first situation is not a true case of repayment default and forms part of the risk borne by the government. In the second case, however, the student is in theory liable to the penalties provided for in the ordinary regulations governing public debts; however, since it is not possible to distinguish between the two cases, the penalties are not applied. It therefore seems that the necessary conditions for replacing scholarships by loans are not yet present. A number of measures will need to be taken for them to be met. Across the world, many experiments have been tried (over 50 are known) in the widest possible variety of economic settings. The results are often moderate, particularly as regards loan recovery (box 6). Lessons can nevertheless be drawn from these 8 The nominal money market rate was 8.8% in 1994 (World Bank, 1995a). The effective recovery rate is also affected by the administrative and program management costs and also the indirect subsidy involved in charging interest at below the market rate (cf. Albrecht & Ziderman 1993).  - 17 - experiments--including the failed ones--as the basis for improving the efficiency and the equity of the program (Woodhall 1983 and 1990; Johnstone 1986; Colclough 1996). Student Loan Repayment Default Rates International Comparisons (1980-88) (%) Jamaica 38.8 Sweden 1.0 Ontario, Canada 0.5 Colombia 12.0 Chile 40.0 USA 17.0 Denmark <10.0 Israel <2.0 Japan 2.3 Kenya 81.0 Hong Kong <1.0 Source: Albrecht & Ziderman, 1991. 3.26 In sum, the future of the assistance scheme can only be envisioned as part of an overall approach that integrates the policy of user-charging for the various services provided or financed by the state with the financing constraints. It is not a matter of a single scheme but of several schemes that have to be supported (as was the case in Chile; cf. Castafieda 1986). The main underlying principle of an assistance policy is to ensure that no student qualified to pursue a course of study is prevented from doing so by financial obstacles. From this point of view, the available courses of action would be based on combining (i) more significant cost recovery on the education side; (ii) adoption of a more elaborate, more diversified and more discriminatory charging policy for ancillary services not directly education to teaching, the range of which could advantageously be diversified and which could he contracted out to professionals; (iii) introduction of greater selectivity into the awarding of scholarships, with better targeting in favor of the most disadvantaged students; (iv) transfer of responsibility for managing the student loans scheme to banking institutions with a direct interest in recouping the funds they have put up, and (v) narrowing the gap between loan terms and market conditions and improvement of the loan recovery mechanisms. 3.27 Summary of redistribution efforts. A balance sheet of net transfers on behalf of higher education would serve to identify who are the true winners (and losers) of the financial flows channeled to it. Accurate estimation of the resulting redistribution will need to take account of education costs, differentiated by disciplines. It should similarly include not only the current benefits enjoyed by the users but also the future benefits accruing to them in the form of incremental income attributable to the education received. The exercise then takes on an intergenerational dimension which, owing to the inadequacy and unsuitability of the data available to deal with it, poses serious methodological problems and consequently risks (Nelson 1977; Bowman, Millot, Schiffelbein 1986; Lemelin, Millot, Perrot 1989). 3.28 On the other hand, using a shortcut, we can estimate the budget transfer differentials by reference to certain criteria that characterize households. This is what was done in one of the studies performed as part of preparation of the Ninth Plan (Oueslati 1995). This study, which is based on the 1990/91 household  - 18 - consumption survey, reveals first of all that, overall, students from low-income families (defined as those with incomes below the guaranteed inter-occupational minimum wage (SMIG) are in the great minority: 8% of the students came from such families, while 38% came from households with incomes five times higher than those of the SMIG families.'0 3.29 At the extremes. however, the fact of receiving an expensive education free of cost automatically results in positive transfers in favor of the better-off population groups. Thus, whether we look at geographic origin, residential milieu (urban/rural) or parents' social/income level, we systematically find that the better-off families and those living closest to the urban centers tend to benefit most from higher education and, conversely, that the most disadvantaged, least urbanized and geographically most remote families benefit least (table 3.2). These findings contrast with those for the pre-university levels, where transfers are clearly progressive and tend to mitigate the income distribution inequalities. Here we have a classic perverse effect of exclusively public financing, an effect which when factored in helps tip the scale in favor of cost recovery, combined with a soundly targeted assistance scheme. Table 3.2 Average, Minimum and Maximum Budget Transfers via Higher-Education Expenditures (1990/91) Average Minimum Transfer Maximum Transfer Category Transfer Amount Households receiving Amount Households receiving Amount (TD per cap.) the minimum transfer (TD per cap.) the maximum transfer (TD per cap.) Residence 16 Rural 6 Urban 23 milieu Geographic 16 Center-West 8 Tunis District 28 region Expenditure 16 < DT 250 4 > DT 1200 45 level Socio- 16 Unemployed 4 Upper cadres/ 57 occupational head liberal professions category Agric. workers 7 Retirees/other 40 inactive persons Source: Based on Oueslati 1995. D. Product 3.30 This deployment of human and financial resources has enabled the (public) sector to produce about 13,000 graduates a year. A good half of these are produced by the Tunis universities, almost two thirds of whose graduates have master's degrees. Proportionally, the provincial universities graduate more technicians and engineers than their Tunis counterparts (table 3.3). In terms of ratio of total enrollment to number of graduates, the provincial and Tunis universities are on a par, at about 10:1. The enrollment explosion and the improvement in registration rates will have a positive impact only provided that the In passing, the survey serves to establish that while children of senior professionals are undoubtedly over- represented in higher education (23% of total enrollment), their share is exceeded by children of households whose head is not economically active (25%), a manifestly heterogeneous and misleading category, which undoubtedly includes genuine retirees but also self-employed people of various kinds who are very much economically active.  - 19- graduates from the system bring incremental knowledge with them and hence that the quality of the education also tends to rise steadily. Unless potential employers perceive the new graduates as contributing a value added, as it were, the progress achieved in terms of access to higher education will be wiped out by increased unemployment and a frustration shared by students and employers, equally disenchanted. Table 3.3 Graduates Produced by Tunisian Universities (1995) Medical Technicians Master's Engineers Professions Total Tunis universities 1470 5410 530 330 7740 Center and South universities 1220 2170 390 510 4290 Teacher Training Institute 1250 1250 Total 3940 7580 920 840 13280 (a) Source: Based on MES 1995/96. Note: (a) Plus 180 specialist degrees awarded by Tunis I and II. 3.31 Tailoring to market needs. Data are lacking from which to assess the quantitative and a fortiori the qualitative match between these products and employers' requirements, and we are reduced at this stage to seeking disparate factors: in particular, recent data on unemployment by graduate level are not available. The problems involved in measuring unemployment moreover suggest that it might well be generally overestimated (Rama 1996). It is evident from the 1989 National Population and Employment Survey (ENPE) that 2% of unemployed persons had a higher education, compared with 4.7% of the employed population (INS 1991); this datum needs to be further refined since over the period 1984-89 the proportion of employed higher-education graduates rose much more slowly than that of unemployed graduates. Processing of the 1994 survey findings should reveal whether these trends are persisting. Meanwhile, the Employment Promotion Office (OPE) points to three trends over the period 1987-92: (i) a net fall in the proportion of skilled workers among job seekers, (ii) an (irregular) fall in the share of skilled workers in job placements, and (iii) an increase in skilled worker positions in employment supply (Annex 12). Assuming that the majority of workers classified as "skilled" are higher-education graduates, the superposition of these three trends suggests that there are simultaneous graduate deficits and surpluses, generating an unemployment that probably affects first-job seekers. Better labor market information is indispensable in order to throw light on these questions and enable the higher education (and vocational training) establishments to target their activities more accurately. The Employment Observatory to be set up at the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment should meet this need. 3.32 Education/salary relationship. The situation is no better with respect to data on salaries according to education level. This makes it impossible to estimate the output rate, which could furnish a static indication of the market valuation of the training." In the civil service, salaries are administered The most recent estimate is based on data that go back to 1980. At that time the private output rate in higher education was estimated at 27%, against 13% for secondary education, but was below the regional average, estimated at 39%. Using these date one can also infer a segmentation of the labor market, in  -20 - prices which remunerate graduates automatically. Using civil service salary grids we can collate the staff whose rank implies that they were recruited on the basis of a public higher education diploma (table 3.4): these senior staff generally begin their careers at a salary equivalent to about 2.5 times that of a civil servant at the bottom of the hierarchy. Within the category so defined, the maximum salary falls short of double the minimum salary. Finally, we note that the range is slightly wider for administrative than for technical staff. For the private sector, fragmentary data obtained from the 1990 annual enterprises survey point to a ratio between professionals (in principle, higher education graduates) and unskilled personnel of 3.5:1 in offshore business and 3.5 in the rest of the sector. The results of the 1995 Integrated Household Living Standards Survey will constitute an extremely valuable source of information from which to determine precisely the relationships between education investment level and the other social data. In particular, they should provide a basis from which to construct gain functions. Rapid availability of these results is therefore vitally important. Table 3.4 Civil Service: Annual Salary and Total Remuneration, by Corps and Grade (1995) Corps and Grade Salary Remuneration* (TD) (TD) 1. Administrative staff Minimum (temporary staff, grade D) 790 2766 Senior staff (a) 2208 7645 Maximum (administrateur general) 2999 9297 Library staff Minimum (library attendant) 790 2866 Senior staff (librarian, documents officer) 1888 5956 Maximum (chief librarian) 2140 7190 3. Technical staff Minimum (technician) 885 3733 Engineer (b) 1887 7966 Maximum (senior engineer) 2999 11715 4. Miscellaneous technical personnel Minimum (statistician) 885 3733 Architect (regular staff and principal) 1886 7990 Maximum 2622 10738 Source: Based on a series of decrees concerning civil service remuneration. * Remuneration = basic salary + various allowances. (a) Simple average of the emoluments of chief administrators, administrator-advisers, public services advisers and administrators. (b) Simple average of the emoluments of chief, principal, public works and assistant engineers. 3.33 Entry into the job market. There is no systematic follow-up of students through which to obtain an idea of job-market entry conditions together with the most efficient establishments. Fragmentary data presented in Strategic Study no. 11 (Ministry of Economic Development 1996) appear which the possession of a higher education degree would be of considerable importance (Abdennadher A., Karaa A., J.M. Plassard 1994)  - 21 - to indicate that market-entry is fastest and easiest for arts graduates, who rather rarely prolong their studies beyond the master's level, the great majority of whom find a stable job within 18 months after graduation, and who describe their job match to the education and training they have received as satisfactory. These positive findings are no doubt explained in part by the fact that most graduates from these disciplines adjust their aspirations more rapidly to actual employment availabilities and are recruited directly as teachers, an increasingly rare situation. The extremely long stays in university, and the lengthy period before they enter the job market (often over two and a half years) in the case of their human and basic sciences colleagues suggest that the transition from the university to the world of work is not an easy one for everybody. Here again, a system of regular monitoring of the students would be extremely valuable, not only for the students but also for the education establishments and the supervisory authorities. 3.34 It is even more difficult to assess the quality of the product from the available data (a characteristic that Tunisia shares with its neighbors; cf. Heyneman 1996). Interviews with employers reveal an overall positive evaluation of the engineers being graduated by the schools. The volume of export of graduates "made in Tunisia" is an interesting indicator but one about which we possess less in the way of quantifiable data than of anecdotal information: the anecdotes revolve around young Tunisians who went off to more developed countries after completing local university training and were offered good jobs in those countries despite the often high unemployment rates and immigration obstacles which have been multiplying over the past several years, especially in Europe. For its part, the Tunisian Technical Cooperation Agency (Agence Tunisienne de Cooperation Technique--ATCT) reports 260 bilateral cooperation staff in Europe and nearly 90 in the United States, and in its 20 years of existence has recruited more than 14,000 cooperation staff serving in 25 Gulf and African countries. Lastly, MES reports a very high degree of success on the part of Tunisian students who have gone abroad to complete their thesis, an indication of the continuing high quality of Tunisia's higher education system. IV. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND INCENTIVES 4.1 Development of the institutional environment of Tunisia's university sector is vital to enable the universities to experience dynamic development commensurate with the quantitative, financial and qualitative challenges that will appear during the next few years. Several components of that environment call for discussion: (i) channeling/assignment of students; (ii) curriculum organization; (iii) distribution of teaching, administrative and financial responsibilities, and (iv) the place of the private sector and opening up to the outside world. A. Routing of students to departments/disciplines 4.2 A routing system that is transparent and fair. but not easy to reverse and still lagging behind the needs of the economy. Routing of students to the various disciplines upon university entry is an important stage in the education program since entry is open to all high-school graduates (bacheliers)--and only to them. Channeling students to the various public education departments or disciplines and institutions is hence the only area for maneuvering available to the public authorities to regulate student inflows, since it cannot directly control their total volume. Because it does not apply overall rationing, the government exercises its preferences through internal rationing, differentiating among the various disciplines. The operation thus consists in matching the students' wishes and government priorities, which are reflected in the variation, from one year to the next, in the number of places offered in the different degree courses.  - 22 - Despite its rigidity, the system has succeeded in adjusting supply by limiting access to certain courses with no future and opening it up to those offering promising prospects for growth (English, for example). But the carryover of early channeling operations conducted in secondary school limits the room for maneuver at the higher education level. 4.3 The current discipline routing system is based on an algorithm that evaluates the aptitudes required to succeed in the discipline in light of the baccalauriat results. Students who, after several rounds, fail to get into one of the departments or disciplines of their choice and are enrolled in one that does not suit their wishes, can opt to sit a reassignment examination at the end of the year and, if they pass it, to start their course again (from scratch) in the coveted department or discipline. The fact that students lose a year by repeating in this way is a deterrent, and until recently few have opted to do it. Apart from this not very attractive possibility, there is no appeal. 4.4 Technically, the system appears to be running smoothly and, despite the recriminations heaped on it by rejected students, it is equitable in terms of principle and transparent in its application. Its weakness is not intrinsic, but rather stems (i) upstream, from the restriction of admission to bacheliers only,12 and, above all, (ii) downstream, from the rigidity of the university system, which channels students to disciplines once and for all. This rigidity, which is reflected in the monolithic nature of the curriculum and the lack of cross-over paths, makes it impossible to correct assignments which, though perhaps soundly based at the time they were decided on, have since turned out to be (or have been confirmed to be) mistaken. Finally, being totally centralized, the system takes all responsibility away from the universities and establishments, which passively submit to student routing and only take action downstream to correct mistakes.13 B. Curriculum Organization 4.5 A number of curriculum organization reforms have been implemented successively at the level of each university cycle. The first reform implemented was that of the general master's degree curriculum, which was restructured through the creation of modules (decree of November 22, 1992). This well- intentioned reform displayed its shortcomings as soon as it was implemented (1994/95): cutting the old annual programs into obligatory slices did not introduce the kind of chronological flexibility in which success is confirmed by a "negotiable" certificate based on a sequence only certain stages of which are compulsory. Moreover, because the modules are not dimensioned consistently, they do not allow inter- disciplinary flexibility: a year in science can yield three modules while ten can be earned in economics. The specialization of certain universities by disciplines (Tunis 1, 1, III) does not help to add flexibility to the system. The 3rd cycle curriculum has also been reorganized (decree of September 6, 1993), with the creation and/or reform of intermediate degrees (DEA and DESS) and of the doctorate, which was the culmination of the efforts of a decade and the scope of which was reduced. 4.6 A moreflexible approach is needed to ensure that student channeling at the start of the first cycle does not preclude any chance of reassignment later. The basic principle of this approach is twofold: (i) to give the students the opportunity to alter their course of study at several points along their university career, without incurring any penalty, and (ii) to allow universities an opportunity to adjust their syllabuses in light of the demands expressed. 12 In particular, entry is closed to technical training graduates. 13 In Portugal, a numerus clausus is applied, based on evaluation by the establishments. In Spain (where a numerus clausus is applied to 70% of disciplines), the number of places available in each institution is determined by the University Council.  - 23 - 4.7 First of all, the routing authorities could base their decisions on a set of indicators of labor-market mL~y by graduates, according to discipline or department (waiting time, nature of first job, relationship with the disciplines taught, salary, and so on) and arrange for the values of these indicators to be disseminated widely among the candidates; this wouldfacilitate better self-selection on the part of students and more refined adjustment both of assignments and of curricula. Regular publication of such information would undoubtedly lead to implicit classification of the disciplines and consequently of the institutions in which they are organized. Moreover, such an approach would eventually lead to differentiation of the institutions which would reflect any quality differences and at the same time any specialization based on local economic situations. Finally, it would probably involve modification of the present routing system, which on the supply side takes account only of intake capacities. Departments or disciplines not posting good scores on the indicators for several years in a row would undergo in-depth examination, and consideration should be given to redeploying them, following a search for a consensus with respect to them (if the market value of these departments or disciplines is low, does their cultural or social value justify retaining them?). It would make sense to activate the National Employment and Training Observatory (Observatoire National de l'Emploi et de la Formation--ONEF) and entrust it with the tasks of compiling, updating and disseminating the indicators. 4.8 Despite the very positive reforms referred to above, the current curricula and certification structure is still not very propitious to this approach, and the reforms need to be deepened to make the system more flexible and less compartmentalized. The MES is already engaged in debate on this subject, and has set up 21 expert committees (corresponding to the 21 maitrises currently offered). A more markedly modular organization would make it possible both to reduce losses (and hence enhance internal efficiency) and to react to changes emanating from the labor market (and enhance external efficiency). Without disrupting the system, a structure could reasonably be conceived in which modules of a standardized value can be accumulated in the first cycle, by making the effort to define a coherent compulsory core for each broad family of disciplines; this necessitates reformatting the modules to ensure both their compatibility with a common core and greater polyvalence. This arrangement could be expected not only to boost the system's efficiency but also to promote better quality (cf. for example the comments in the report by Ketele 1996). Such a reorganization of the first cycles would allow for a clearer distribution of roles, eliminate the confusions between research and teaching, and facilitate final screening for the purposes of the true university studies of the second cycle. Geared entirely to teaching, and certified by a specific diploma, these preparatory cycles could be grouped together into colleges with their own teaching bodies and 14 regulations 4.9 There is in point of fact no compelling reason to maintain a single system, mandatory for all establishments. Efforts could therefore be addressed to devising an organization that differs from one university to another. This would entail on the one hand decentralization of the work of redesigning the modules and programs, as well as the accreditation decisions, and on the other setting up a system of equivalencies (controlled at the central level) to ensure the essential permeability between faculties and between universities. Student mobility between universities would also have implications for resources management and would need to be reflected in an appropriate flexibility in this field and an increased role at the university level. 14 The creation of such institutes is envisaged by the commission that is currently discussing the future of the Tunis Science Departnent.  - 24 - C. Distribution of Responsibilities 4.10 The institutional structure. Responsibilities in the sector are shared among the MES (and other ministries, in the case of jointly supervised establishments) at the central level and among the Higher Education and Research Establishments (faculties and schools) (Etablissements d'Enseignement Superieur et de Recherche--EESRs) at the local level. The law of July 28, 1989 added the universities to the structure in order to alleviate the growing difficulty of maintaining communication between what had grown into a large number of establishments and the ministry. The graft has not yet fully taken, owing partly to the law's silence or ambiguity on certain points and partly to acquired habits. Coexistence of university presidents, appointed by decree, and department deans, elected by the teachers, is not a simple matter. Running counter to the direct relations between the deans and the ministry, yet lacking extensive responsibilities, the university presidents have difficulty in establishing their authority, which continues to be limited, in the financial and administrative as well as in the pedagogic areas. They are often perceived as an extra echelon unnecessarily inserted into the decision-making circuit rather than as university representatives whose existence is still relatively fragile. By the same token, the creation of the universities, which were supposed to pave the way for decentralization of the system, has not really achieved that objective; in particular, the three-tier system in place today has not succeeded in improving administrative management performance.l5 4.11 Under their statutes, universities and EESRs are administrative-type public establishments (etablissements publics a caractere administratif--EPAs) possessing juridical personality and financial autonomy. This having been said, the distribution of the respective responsibilities of the universities and of the establishments grouped together in them, as ratified by the July 1989 law and the December 1989 enabling decree, is not always clear. Moreover, the interviews with the university presidents themselves reveal a certain latitude in assessing their role and in interpreting the legal instruments. The same lack of unanimity with respect to this distribution is evident among the people at the establishment level. The distribution is indeed complex, many decisions requiring the involvement of at least two or three authorities (table 4.1). Some progress has, however, begun to be evident, thanks in particular to the adoption of a management information program which has introduced greater transparency (World Bank 1992).  - 25 - Table 4.1 Matrix of Responsibilities in the Higher Education System Ministry of Civil Service Ministry of M.E.S. University Establishment Finance Ministry Research Teaching -Admissions -Discipline organization -Establishments organization A P -Diplomas -Examinations organization -Student discipline Teaching Staff -Vacancies P -Recruitment, permanent staff -Recruitment, contract staff - -Remuneration -Promotion -Assignments and changes between P universities -Assignments and changes between P establishments -Discipline . P -Supplementary hours P Administrative Staff -Recruitment -Assignments and changes between P universities -Assignments and changes between - P establishments -Remuneration -Discipline P P Finances and Budget -Execution of estabs.budget P P -Execution of univs. budget C -Setting estabs. budget A P -Execution of estabs. budget C -Equipment maintenance Research -Program formulation - P -Program financing p P -Contracts C P -Patents -General contracts framework -Negotiation and signature C P Notes: Decision authority Approval authority A Proposal authority P Consultation C  - 26 - 4.12 The great majority of decisions continue to be the prerogative of the ministry. a minority of them appertain to the establishments, and the university administers the remainder while exercising partial supervision over the establishments. Lacking their own premises (in the case of Tunis) and with very limited budgets and personnel of their own, the universities play no part in pedagogic decisions. They do not express opinions on student admissions or channeling between departments and have no role in drawing up the curricula or designing the modules; they administer neither staff movements (except among their component establishments) nor--apart from overtime--staff remuneration. The result is that, teaching staff allocations and changes being decided on at the central level, they can disrupt the execution of a program and conflict with a university's plans for launching new modules.16 Teacher promotion prerogatives are totally outside the university presidents' jurisdiction, while the elected deans, for their part, hesitate to exercise their prerogatives (especially when penalties are involved). The awarding of scholarships is outside the jurisdiction of both the presidents and the deans, and is the prerogative of the University Social Services Office (OOU). 4.13 Resources allocation is a centralized process in which account is taken only of inputs. During the budget discussions the university presidents compile the proposals put forward by the establishment heads and then, after a first screening, discuss them with the MES, which presents the amended proposals to the Ministry of Finance. The supervision exercised by the MES strips the control university presidents are supposed to perform of its usefulness. If a university-managed student routing system were instituted, allocation of resources could also be perfonrned at that level, and the universities would in turn distribute the subsidies to the establishments. 4.14 The university is not involved in the management of salary expenditures, nor is it the approving authority for either equipment expenditures (title II) or operating expenditures. What is more, since transfers from title I to title II, and between chapters of a given title, are prohibited, no leeway remains to allocate funds during a given fiscal year in order to adjust to new situations. In these circumstances, one can hardly speak of operational autonomy. Similarly, a number of the people interviewed preferred to talk in terms of deconcentration rather than decentralization. Measures have recently been taken to introduce greater flexibility (authorization for carryover of unspent allocations, designation of secondary payment authorities, recourse to payment by check, etc.), but these do not confer any real autonomy upon the establishments. 4.15 There is very little incentive to raise internal resources. Equivalent to public resources, own resources deriving from outside contracts are in fact subject to the same constraints and controls as public resources, with all the delays that this implies, for example in obtaining expenditure authorizations. Moreover, those EESRs that manage to attract such outside resources by means of contracts are afraid of having their public financing cut. The same kind of mistrust aroused by excessive control leads teachers to accept totally private assignments that not only do not benefit the institution to which they belong but often cause them to reduce the time they devote to it even further. 4.16 In order to eliminate to these perverse results, rekindle interest in seeking externalfinancing and lighten the government's supervisory responsibilities, it would suffice to leave the institutions total latitude in using private funds obtained through the conclusion of contracts. In parallel, the amount of the funds earned by the institutions in this way should not affect the amount of the public subsidies allocated to them. 16 While the favorable opinion of the departure and arrival establishments is undoubtedly necessary, few establishment heads utilize this power to oppose a ministerial decision.  - 27 - 4.17 More generally, loosening the administrative constraints would not only allow the universities to attract a larger flow of financial resources but also generate productivity gains in public resources management and would probably be greeted positively by the staff, on both the teaching and the administrative sides, that operate the system. For that purpose, however, a suitable legal status is required that specifies a supervisory jurisdiction that is less stringent and geared less to a priori control. Legal formulas already in fact exist in Tunisia that allow public institutions more autonomy than the EPAs. An example is the Health Services Public Establishment (Etablissement Public de Sante--EPS), a formula already tried and tested in the case of hospitals, which also are providers of services addressed to a private clientele under public supervisory jurisdiction. The ISETs have the benefit of a less constricting statute, one that appears to give satisfaction both to their administrators and to the supervisory authority. At the extreme, there is also the case of the Industrial/Commercial Public Establishment (Etablissement Public a Caractere Industriel ou Commercial--EPIC) whose purposes, however, are far removed from those of the university. It would be of interest to undertake, as quickly as possible, an in-depth study of these formulas and their variants and to explore the possibilities of adapting them to the needs of the universities and their staff These needs concern the university's capacity first to control the channeling of new student intakes among the various EESRs and second to reallocate resources among EESRs in step with enrollment trends and the university's long-term objectives. 4.18 In the set-up suggested here, the university's supervisory jurisdiction over the EESRs would be substantially increased and would largely replace that now exercised by MES. The formula to be devised would of course center on increased decentralization of resources and decision-making authority and could be reflected in program-contracts concluded between MES and the universities. These contracts would prescribe each university 's objectives, specify performance indicators and lay down the principle of the universities' accountability. In brief, it would be a question of the phased introduction of a global resource allocation system, along with periodic evaluations of the beneficiary establishments. Experiences in other parts of the world are not lacking. those of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Chile and Pakistan deserve to be studied. 17 Changes of this kind do not take effect automatically: they would conflict with current attitudes and could arouse opposition. They would have to be subjected, alongside the essential technical expertise, to the broadest possible consultation. They would also, both prior to and during their implementation, have to be accompanied by training programs, especially in the management area, for university staffs, who are not ready to perform their new role. D. The teaching function 4.19 One of the great challenges of tomorrow's higher education relates to the people responsible for making it work, i.e. the teachers. As we have seen, they have played a crucial role in the current issue, 17 Autonomy of the establishments and output-based allocation of resources naturally go hand in hand. In the United Kingdom, where resources are allocated on this basis, the 130 universities are autonomous, are responsible for their financial, academic and administrative affairs and themselves decide on curricula, admissions and examinations. An interesting discussion of the various university financing mechanisms can be found in Albrecht & Ziderman 1 992b. In particular, the concept is discussed of "buffer institutions" more or less independent of the ministries and responsible for distributing the resources among universities. See also Sheehan 1996.  -28 - that of costs. Tomorrow, the issue to be faced is going to be that of teacher availability; beyond that it is on them that the quality of education is going to depend.'8 This issue therefore merits a close look. 1. Statutory provisions governing the teaching career Priority accorded to research activities in the teaching career 4.20 Full-time teachers fall under the general civil service rules and regulations, except as provided otherwise in their own special statute. This special statute governing teacher/researchers (decree of September 6, 1993) defines four grades: professor, lecturer [maitre de conferences] (which together form "level A"), assistant lecturer [maitre assistant] and assistant ("level B"). To these are added four other categories: professor emeritus, visiting teacher, associate teacher and contractual assistant. Their role is twofold: (i) to participate in the development of knowledge and ensure its transmission through student tutoring, counseling and guidance and also through the improvement of teaching methods, and (ii) to participate in scientific research and contribute to its development and the application of its results. The statutory definition of their functions thus places research and teaching activities on an equal footing. In practice, things are different, teaching being relegated to second place. 4.21 Recruitment and advancement. These are codified by a series of requirements and tests which give precedence to research and a subordinate place to teaching activities, at every career level (Annex 13). Access to the first echelon--that of assistant--is by open competition after six years of higher studies, supported by evidence of preparation of a thesis. Following a two-year probationary period, which includes no teacher training, confirmation takes place in theory on the basis of the state of progress of the thesis. Recruitment of assistant lecturers, and also access to the title of lecturer, are subject to a competition based on the candidate's research work. 4.22 Teaching is accorded only marginal weight as a factor in the hiring process or in an individual's career development. In practice,. only research activities really count. Apart from prescribing a number of hours, the rules governing teacher status do not lay down any quantified obligations in terms of time to be spent with students, in correcting examinations, or in performing services for the university: a teacher/researcher "owes" a small number of hours of teaching and may devote the whole of the remaining time to the activity basic to his/her evaluation, i.e. research. These incentives might hence be expected to lead the universities to devote themselves essentially to research. According to the evidence collected, however, this applies to only a minority of them. 4.23 There are several reasons for this situation: (a) The incentives system is actually very weak: (i) The career path is short. The seniority requirements for a promotion candidate allow a university teacher to reach the grade of professor at the end of ten years or so. Those that have attained professor grade are at the peak of their career. They no longer have any incentive, or are under any constraint, to continue to do research or to tutor and train young researchers; (ii) once they have achieved a regular appointment, assistants have only a moderate The issue of the place of teachers is being discussed more or less everywhere in the world (Higginson, 1996).  - 29 - incentive to complete their thesis.)9 The fact that assistants can achieve tenure without having completed their thesis hardly constitutes an incentive. This possibility, combined with a criterion that gives too much weight to subjective considerations (progress of the thesis), represents an anomaly. It should, however, be noted that the committees have recently stopped awarding tenure to assistants who do not submit a completed thesis. (b) The system of national recruitment and centralized assignment leaves little responsibility to the university and establishment authorities and thereby encourages a passive attitude to the taking of decisions, even when these affect their own functioning. Finally, the available physical resources, in terms of both premises and equipment, are usually inadequate. (c) Pressure of student numbers takes a heavy toll of the available time, especially at level B. The very smallness of the teaching service obligations explains why almost all teachers put in additional hours, sometimes going so far as to double their schedules: what is reasonable at level A, with a maximum workload of 9 hours, even below international standards, can become a very heavy load for level B staff if they do indeed pursue completion of their thesis. 4.24 In the final analysis. the priority accorded to research over teaching is not only detrimental toAhe quality of the research but is also to some extent illusory. The inadequacy of the resources, the administrative difficulties in managing them, the lack of critical mass and the absence of applied research outlets all combine to reduce the feasibility of doing true research, or in any event of doing it as systematically as the criteria applied by the current recruiting and promotion system would tend to suggest. A jammed-up promotion and recruitment system 4.25 As a result, career paths are often blocked, especially in the arts and humanities, and some assistants are on the point of completing their career path at that grade. The effects of absence of research; refusal by those that do perform research to apply for positions available in the provinces, far from their team; the malthusian attitude of certain juries, and finally the traditional clannishness all combine to paralyze recruitment and eventually jeopardize the maintenance of a good academic level. Analysis of the results of the 1995 recruitment competitions session confirms this finding and demonstrates the increasing weakness of the candidacies as one ascends through the hierarchy; this weakness cannot be explained merely by the relative youth of teachers aspiring to be assistant lecturers or by certain difficulties in arranging some of the examining juries (table 4.2). This comment refers of course primarily to those who began their thesis under the "old regime" of the state thesis, a monumental work the drafting of which could take over ten years or even, in some disciplines, extend over a teacher's entire career. The new thesis was only introduced in 1993 and, since the legislation granted the option to continue under the old regime, they are many people today still engaged in writing a state thesis.  - 30 - Table 4.2 Teaching Staff Recruitment, by Grade (1995) Grade Positions Candidates Aceted Assistants 229 572 168 Assistant Lecturers Internal competition 200 139 125 External competition 84 224 61 Lecturers 186 73 50 Professors 72 56 41 otal 771 1064 445 Source: Based on MES figures. 4.26 These figures show first that the Tunisian universities are going to have serious difficulty in coping with the growth in student numbers and in increasing the recruitment of teachers other than teacher- researchers and raising the number of assistants, and second that juries, having a very restricted range of choice, can exercise true selection only by refraining from filling the positions. On that point, moreover, for the same juries to be required simultaneously to evaluate individual qualifications and handle recruitment applications is an unhealthy situation. Eventually, under the pressure of numerical needs, quality is likely to deteriorate and replenishment of the teaching body to dry up. Tunisian universities are already resorting increasingly to non-research teachers to conduct the courses, a heterogeneous group that umbles together associate teachers,20 contractual assistants recruited under two-year, renewable contracts,) and, above all, secondary school teachers assigned to university establishments. 22 4.27 The career pyramid is becoming increasingly flatter. In 1995-96 30.5% of higher education teachers were not teacher-researchers: about one third were contractual teachers, and the rest secondary teachers. Professors and lecturers are greatly in the minority, rarely accounting for more than 15% of teaching staff; in some faculties at Kairouan and Sfax they represent less than 5%, and some disciplines in the provinces have no level A teacher (Annex 14). 4.28 Counting for little in recruitment and promotion, and benefiting neither from financial incentives nor evaluation, teaching is the most greatly neglected function from the quality standpoint. Initial pedagogic training remains to be organized. There is no continuing training system in place. The teachers can hence do no more than reproduce the teaching methods to which they were themselves exposed when they were students. Focusing the evaluation system on research has negative effects on teaching: for teachers to hold themselves at the disposal of the students for advice and counseling is perceived as a waste of time, especially considering that little in the way of premises is available for that purpose; teachers appointed to the provinces visit their faculties only for their courses and immediately return to Tunis, where most of the research teams are located. 4.29 Owing to the small number of program hours required of level A teachers, and the growing shortage of the latter, students are entrusted in the main to the least qualified teachers (assistants or contractual teachers). This situation no doubt helps to explain the high failure rates in the first cycle of 20 Qualified persons who have at least ten years of non-university professional activity and are able to demonstrate reputation and experience related to the discipline taught. 21 Among holders of a DEA, a secondary education teacher certificate or a diploma attesting to six years of 22 higher-level studies (these are in fact students who are being helped in this way to begin their thesis). These are the only ones who have received teacher training.  - 31 - higher education, which is when the students are most in need of tutoring and assistance. At the same time, the qualified secondary education teachers assigned to higher education are undoubtedly not used to the best effect, despite their unique and invaluable teaching experience. 2. Toward development of the teaching function 4.30 The improvement in internal efficiency in primary and secondary education is going to channel substantial student flows to the universities. The need to diversify and professionalize the training is already being partly recognized with the development of the ISETs and the phased setting-up of DESSs. Studies remain to be done on a personnel profile more closely tailored to the new situation. This necessitates redressing the balance of university activities in favor of teaching and reconsidering the dogma that every higher-education teacher is necessarily a teacher-researcher. The changes are particularly necessary and urgent in the first cycle, since at that level teaching requires much greater availability on the part of the teachers. Coping with enrollment growth 4.31 Doubling the number of higher education teachers in five years and tripling it in eight, which is what needs to be done according to the MES projections, is out of reach at the current pace of recruitment and promotion, even without considering the government's budget constraints. The Ninth Plan forecasts put the universities' needs at 600 additional teachers a year over the period (to which would have to be added 240 teachers for the ISETs and IPEls), with a further 530 over the Tenth Plan period. It is paradoxical to be facing this problem when teaching service obligations are low by reference to international standards. The first step to be taken would therefore be to raise the required minima and add to them "service" hours comprising participation in university life (councils, linkages with enterprises and so on) and assistance to students. It would be useful to prescribe the service obligations of all kinds for all grades more clearly and to quantify them.23 Removing career path blocks and maintaining quality 4.32 It is essential that parallel measures be taken to make the career of teacher more fluid and introduce alternative career paths. First of all, tenure should be granted only after obtaining of the doctorate, and a strict limit should be imposed on renewal of contracts during thesis preparation. Nor should it be granted until after appropriate pedagogic training (which remains to be put in place), which should be continued through refresher training over the teacher's entire career. 4.33 Making the teaching function more attractive. Secondly, the incentives to lecturers and above all professors to tutor and train young teacher-researchers should be increased& the required tutoring/supervision activity should be quantified, evaluated and perhaps even recognized by abolishing or 24 modulating bonuses; the career path should be lengthened by increasing the seniority requirements for application for a higher grade and possibly by instituting an additional grade for professors; lastly, teaching, as well as research, should be taken into account in the process of evaluating individuals for promotion to any grade. 23 For the purpose of fine-tuning to the needs of the faculties, the ministry could confine itself to setting ranges and allow the deans to negotiate the individual adjustments. 24 -They are currently practically automatic and have lost their incentive function.  - 32 - 4.34 Opening up career paths. Thirdly, action to diversify and professionalize teaching is indispensable. Moreover, the necessity to substantially raise the number of hours of teaching points up the need to tailor the rules to the realities of the situation, i.e. to create a category of higher education teachers of senior level but devoted entirely to teaching These teachers could be assigned in priority to the first cycle. 4.35 At this level, it is in fact not at all necessary to be a teacher-researcher, any more than it is in order to teach living languages in management courses or management in arts courses. It is moreover very unlikely that 14,000 teacher-researchers will all be high-level researchers and remain so throughout their entire career: for the teachers also, the change of scale entails qualitative changes. This diversification of the function of higher education teacher already exists in many foreign countries, where it reflects the diversification of the institutions: those devoted to the first cycles do not use researchers and place a heavy program workload on the teachers, as do many professionally-oriented second-cycle institutions. That is the general situation in, for example, North America and Asia, where teacher-researchers in the full meaning of the term are in fact in the minority. It is also partly the case in Tunisia, with ISET teachers and the use of secondary teachers; however, continuation of the current trends in the universities could well have serious adverse repercussions on teaching quality. 4.36 Several solutions merit consideration. They include. - either create a new teaching corps, recruited at the doctorate (completed thesis) level but with heavy teaching obligations limited only by the need to ensure their own continued training and to maintain contact with the research staff; - or extend the corps of teacher technologists to all disciplines, which would necessitate adjusting their statute to make it applicable to specialists in the non-technological disciplines; - increase the number and systematic utilization of qualified secondary-school teachers, who represent a high-level teaching corps that is particularly well suited to the first cycles; this would mean increasing the number of disciplines open to teachers seeking qualification [agr6gation]; - or again, and this is the mostflexible solution, allow teachers to choose between two career paths within the teacher-researchers corps. One path would be geared to teaching and would involve "heavy" service and student presence obligations. The other would have lighter program loads (though heavier than they are today) but would raise the quantitative and qualitative requirements for research activities. The choice, which would be setforth in a "contract"for a period of three to five years, would determine the nature of the evaluation over the course of the teacher's career. 4.37 This last solution would allow shuttling between the two statutes andfree up the career paths of those teachers who devote themselves to their students. It would also allow the institutions to tailor the activities of their departmental teaching staff to their specific needs and objectives. Logically, with developing needs the majority of teachers (particularly those responsible for the first cycles) would end up in the "teaching" track and a minority in more tightly structured research teams. Systematizing evaluation 4.38 Setting up a strict and transparent evaluation system is a precondition for the arrangements described above to succeedfully. It is also an essential step in order to put the university sector and its actors on the path to enhanced efficiency. Until very recently, no systematic arrangement existed in Tunisia  - 33 - for evaluating teaching performance. A National Evaluation Commission (Commission Nationale d'Evaluation--CNE) has only just been set up. One of the CNE's first initiatives was to conduct a survey of teachers to ascertain their activities during the academic year 1995/96. The survey was rejected by some of the target teachers, who feared lack of expertise on the part of those who will be responsible for utilizing its findings, penalization of teachers "overly committed" to teaching activities and, more generally, encroachment on academic freedom. The survey is nevertheless usable and will serve as a starting reference base. 4.39 Tunisia cannot tackle the new phase of university expansion without first ensuring that it will not take place at the cost of teaching quality. The only way to achieve this is to systematize the process of evaluation, not only of staff but also of programs and establishments, and bring it into general use. Teacher evaluation must, however, pursue clear objectives and be organized around specific and transparent criteria so that teachers know perfectly well what the evaluation process is all about and collaborate in it. It is important also that teachers know who is responsible for the evaluation and that they take part in the process themselves. The object of the evaluation may essentially be either (i) to furnish information for promotion decisions, or (ii) to facilitate pedagogic enrichment. In the first case it will tend to take the form of annual reports and it will be necessary to publicize the indicators used and the grid of activities evaluated, with their respective weightings, for both teaching and research. In the second case it will be based more on specifically-targeted interventions with the assistance of pedagogic experts. 4.40 A resource center specializing in pedagogic assistance could be an extremely useful evaluation tool--especially in evaluations of the second kind This center, like those located in North America and the Netherlands, would provide collective support (in the form of workshops) or individual support (consultation) for teachers who are new, in difficulty or simply wishing to improve their technique. It would include educational engineering experts, could serve as the base for launching pilot experiments and develop into an advisory assistance, initiative and research center for distance education and the new interactive media that are developing so rapidly. 4.41 More flexible and decentralized management of teaching staff. Universities should be given greater responsibility for managing their teaching staff so as to enable them to pursue a true institutional policy, reward the best performers and exert necessary pressure on the others. In particular, the universities ought to play a decisive role in selecting the teachers who are to work in them and, on the basis of aggregate staff quotas, decide on positions to be open to all candidates or promotions to be granted internally. Individual determination of service obligations through choice of one or the other track, discipline, teacher evaluation, evaluation of tutoring activities and participation in the life of the institution and the awarding and modulation of bonuses ought to be decided at the university level. E. An incipient private sector 4.42 Alongside the public higher education system there exists a private sector which in 1994/95 attracted only about 3,000 students, two thirds of whom attended the Universite Libre of Tunis while the others were dispersed among about ten small establishments. With less than 3% of total enrollment, the private sector is hence still at the embryonic stage, whereas it captures 10% of secondary pupils. There is an explanation for this modest place of private higher education. The tradition of private education at all levels--beginning with the Kouttabs for basic school--is a historic fact in Tunisia, associated with Islamic culture and religion. The main raison d'etre of this private education has always been connected with religion. At the higher education level, the Universite Ezzitouna--a prestigious 1,000-year-old establishment devoted, however, exclusively to Koranic studies--forms an integral part of the public  - 34 - university system. There was therefore no particular reason, as long as the state entirely met a demand that it controlled upstream, to promote the emergence of a non-denominational private education system. 4.43 The premises of demand exist. Currently, private higher education in Tunisia is limited to the data processing and management areas (81% of enrollment) and ventures into neither the basic disciplines of the public faculties nor the vocational disciplines of the secondary sector of the ISETs or the public schools. Bacheliers who opt directly for the private sector without first trying their luck in the public sector seem to be very few in number. The private sector tends in fact more to recruit students who have failed the baccalaureat, those who have passed it but are dissatisfied with their discipline assignments, and "cartouchards," i.e. students who have exhausted their right to repeat a class (World Bank 1995b). Here we find a classic source of pressure pushing students toward the private sector, i.e. rationing, in one form or another, by the public sector. In the case of Tunisia, the high failure rates in the public sector and the search for an alternative to public university programs, are a guaranteed source of private-sector demand. Another, no less classic factor boosting demand for private education is the low--or declining--quality in the public institutions. The available information does not suffice to show whether this is the case in Tunisia. However, it appears to be widely felt there, even among advocates of a larger private sector, that the sharp rise in private-sector demand is not explained by the deficiencies of the public higher education system. Moreover, the existence of an effective demand is evidenced by the fact that registration fees range from DT 1,300 to DT 2,000 a year, 100 times more than public university fees. 4.44 The lack of legal status does not encourage initiative to meet this demand. Private higher education is not governed by any official legal instrument whereas private primary and secondary and vocational education are regulated by precise legislation. This legal vacuum has for a number of years now afforded protagonists an opportunity to exchange contradictory interpretations concerning the right to set up private universities. Even though the law's silence on this matter no doubt permits certain defacto situations and has allowed the setting up of a few establishments, it promotes a climate of speculation and uncertainty that in the final analysis is unhealthy and is in any case likely to discourage initiative. An example of this climate is the heated controversy that broke out recently concerning ministerial directives aimed at restricting the right of public-sector teachers to work in private establishments: depending as they do 70% on part-time teachers coming from the public universities, the private establishments could probably not survive if this source were to dry up. The preparation and subsequent tabling of a draft law have done nothing to relieve the atmosphere. 2 Does this mean there is no future for a private university system in Tunisia? 4.45 To judge from what is happening elsewhere in the world, this is by no means the case. The last few years have witnessed a veritable explosion of private higher education in India, Romania, Chile, Jordan and the Dominican Republic. In the last country, the private sector's share in total registrations, barely 5% in 1991 (World Bank 1995c), had risen to 71% three years later. Over the same period the enrollment rate in higher education rose from 3 to 15%. In Latin America as a whole, the private sector receives, on average, 3 8% of students (box 7). And in the MENA region itself, it is probable that within five or ten years we shall no longer be able to state, as we could in 1988, that "in the Arab countries higher education is basically a function of government" (Za'Rour 1988). 25 The mechanism operates just as frequently at the secondary school level (E. James 1993). 26 The laws of July 29, 1989 and February 17, 1993, respectively. 27 The bill should finally be submitted and enacted into law in 1997.  -35 - Box 7 PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION IN LATIN AMERICA -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________ (1 9 9 4 ) Registration Total Private Sector Enrollment Student/Teacher Ratio Country Rate Enrollment (%) (000) (000) (%fo) Public Private Argentina 38.9 1054.1 213.9 20.3 1:6 n.d. Bolivia 22.8 154.0 13.0 8.4 1:25 1:7 Brazil 11A4 661.0 970.6 53.7 1:9 1:15 Chile 26.6 327.1 175.5 64.1 1:9 n.d. Colombia 17.6 561.2 360.0 - 1:10 1:10 Cuba 15.8 176.2 - 713 1:07 Dom. Rep. 15.1 112.8 80.4 25.2 1:10 1:32 Mexico 13.8 1304.1 329.0 35.9 1:70 1:5 Peru 28.3 643-2 2311 6.1 1:13 1:15 Uruguay 29.9 74.8 4.6 35.6 1:9 1:4 Venezuela 31.4 601.1 213.9 1:11 1:17 TotalfAverage* 20.7 7405.3 2820.2 38.1% 1:9 1:11 Source: Garcia Guadilla 1996. * The totals and averages are for all Latin American countries together, including those not shown in the table. 4.46 The example of other countries shows. on the one hand, that a great variety of formulas exists and. on the other hand, that purely private establishments (receiving no public funding) are relatively rare. The marginal place occupied by the private sector in Tunisia is not the stigma of a particular economic or education system or level. The countries where higher education remains a quasi-state monopoly include Sweden and Austria, for example, as well as Pakistan. The first two have enrollment rates of the order of 40%; conversely, in Pakistan the rate is 19%, i.e. not far below that of Portugal (23%), where the private sector commands 45% of enrollment. Above all, the example of Latin America clearly illustrates the sector's very marked heterogeneity in terms of teaching quality, status of the establishments, type of certification and financing method, especially considering that these are countries where the sector is expanding rapidly (Garcia Guadilla 1996). Regarding quality, in a given country a jumble of establishments can be found, ranging from bottom-of-the-scale establishments that use (and pay) professors at a discount and award degrees with low market value to selective schools that constitute elitist nuclei of excellence highly esteemed by the market. The method of financing also varies widely, from heavily subsidized establishments, as commonly found in western Europe (Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom--see Annex 15), to universities that are practically autonomous.28 Finally, creating private establishments serves a whole series of purposes, ranging from the purely educational to the essentially profit-seeking (Blomqvist and Jimenez 1989, and West 1995). As a result, 28 The use of education vouchers financed on a fiscal basis makes it possible to encourage private schools without limiting access to them to better-off students. See West 1996.  -36 - the private education issue can vary widely in its specifics and hence lends itself to discussion in terms more of combinations of specific features than of generalizations.29 4.47 It is in Tunisia itself, however, that we find the preconditions for the rapid development of private higher education. First, in light of the heavy pressure exerted by secondary-school leaver flows, it is doubtful that the state budget will be able to cope by itself with the growing enrollment numbers (see chapter V). This will call for an increased effort on the part of private operators. Next, as we have seen, the selectivity of public secondary and higher education fuels the demand for private education. Above all, however, the existence of a healthy private sector would be a diversifying factor that could inject a stimulating zeal for emulation into the sector, especially at a time when Tunisia is opening up to the international economy and the outside world and pursuing a general policy of bringing the country up to speed: the state has nothing to lose, and society everything to gain, from a sensible development of the private university. The only thing is, the issue has a strong ideological connotation, and in the eyes of many people education--even higher education--continues to be a function that belongs exclusively to government. There is reason to believe that this attitude--which has its historical roots--is today tending to yield ground. 4.48 The framework within which a private education sector could develop in this way needs to be carefully thought through and debated by the present andffuture actors in it. Its basic philosophy should be to promote and stimulate rather than to direct and control. Its role would be to furnish minimum assurances to both investors and consumers and thereby enable both groups to take decisions committing them over the long term, since it is over the long term that higher education is programmed and that it produces its effects. The following are the main issues it would need to address: (a) Status. Should private education be planned as a sector that legitimately pursues profit or one that is totally non-profit-seeking? The two formulas can co-exist, bearing in mind that they involve different rights and obligations, especially as regards financing. In any event, there would need to be total consistency with the investment and tax codes and the latter should, where appropriate, be partially revised to improve the incentives they offer; in addition, the accreditation procedures should be simple and transparent. (b) Financing. Should the aim be to make the establishments financially autonomous or to encourage a subsidized private sector? Here again, the choice could be left open, bearing in mind that the increased burden borne by the state would inevitably be accompanied by the imposition of a broader gamut of obligations on the establishments with respect either to teaching, to teachers or to diplomas. (c) Hiring. Should standard criteria be imposed on all the establishments? Pedagogically, that does not seem necessary. Financially, the state must be able to play its supervisory role and act to make sure the system does not falsify the democratic nature of the teaching. To that end it could adapt its revised scholarships system to offset the obstacle of private-sector registration fees for students who cannot afford them; in so doing, it would ensure respect by the sector as a whole for the principle of equity. In Greece, the place of private initiative in higher education has swung between extremes. Initially substantial and often the work of public benefactors, it was later ended in favor of a public monopoly and has since made a strong comeback in response to excess demand (Patrinos 1995). The variety of combinations of private and public financing is mirrored in the all the other social sectors. See Torres & Mathur 1996.  - 37 - (d) Curricula. Should the authorities adhere to the principle of a uniform curriculum or allow diversification? The rapidly growing demand for skills argues in favor of diversification. This diversification could be tested progressively, remembering that the state--in association with the representatives of the branch--would retain quality control and would seek to guarantee in this area, as in the others, professional standards of conduct. (e) Diplomas. Should the aim be to perpetuate a single national system and should all private establishments be bound by a national diplomas grid? Here again, in opting for flexibility, the authorities should allow the establishments latitude to choose between aiming for equivalence in diplomas (a form of maximum integration with the public sector) and simple recording of diplomas certifying success in diversified courses and ratified solely by the market. F. Research and Relations with the Outside World 4.49 Across the world, research is one of the major means by which universities maintain relations with the "outside world." It is also an instrument of growth. While no "model" exists in the matter, certain conditions have to be met (Parker 1992) if research is to effectively play a dynamic role. In Tunisia, these requirements are only partially met: the rigidities on the university side and a certain reserve on the part of this outside world--if by that we understand the private sector--prevent research from functioning as a true interface. 4.50 Dual jurisdiction. On the university side, research is developed and encouraged at MES by the Scientific and Technical Research Department (Direction Generale de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique--DGRST). In particular, the DGRST administers the international cooperation programs, distributes resources among the higher education establishments and evaluates the proposed programs. For its part, the State Secretariat for Scientific and Technological Research (Prime Minister's Office) defines priority programs and operates through calls for bids. In 1995, the Department counted a total of 390 teams with 3,000 researchers, of whom one half were enrolled for doctoral studies. 4.51 Contract receipts are subject to strict distribution rules. The decree of February 28, 1994 concerning "methods of utilization of resources received in the context of opening up the higher education and scientific research establishments to the exterior" prescribes that receipts obtained from outside contracts shall be utilized in accordance with the following distribution: 30% for remuneration of the participants, 30% for the institution (to upgrade working conditions) and 40% for execution of the terms of the agreement. Departure from this distribution is possible, except for the percentage assigned to improving working conditions in the institution. The establishments are hence a priori not free to set the resource allocation rules best suited to the project in question; problems of interpretation inevitably arise (for example, the distinction between upgrading of working conditions and remuneration of the participants). The administrative lead times in obtaining approval of expenditures out of these funds are still too long (at least two months). Another decree authorizes the institution to spend half the funds (instead of 30%) without prior control; however, this authority is not often used (paying officers prefer to play it safe regarding the legality of the expenditures, and deans are not always familiar with the procedures involved). 4.52 The will exists. Despite these administrative and financial obstacles, the Tunis Faculte des Sciences, for example, the country's oldest university institution, conducts numerous research projects in collaboration with other institutions in Tunisia and abroad. With 90 laboratories, it has produced a hundred or so state theses over the last two years. The share of research agreements entered into with medium-sized and large Tunisian businesses, most of them public enterprises, remains modest, however,  - 38 - in relation to total research financing (10%). In some disciplines, this share is much higher (30% in geology, explained by the existence of a mining sector). For its part, the Sfax National Engineering School (Ecole Nationale d'Ingenieurs de Sfax) affords a good example of the case of institutions integrated into their local economic fabric and trying, in spite of the difficulties, to develop a research policy of partnership with business (biological engineering, water technology, environment). 4.53 On the business side, the relatively small size of the private sector explains the continuing low demand; the studies and research projects financed on a contractual basis generally emanate from the enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises take little part in activities of this kind, except in very specific circumstances. The Research Secretariat grants assistance to private enterprises that do research and development (equipment and studies). The Investment Incentives Code (1994) provides for R&D investment "bonuses" amounting to 30% of total cost, with a ceiling of TD 25,000. This assistance is conditional on a minimum level of self-financing. 4.54 The Research Secretariat's program is in the start-up stage and accomplishments to date are still very few. The Investment Incentive Code does not include any specific measures to encourage collaboration between the public and private sectors. Scientific and technical professional-level staffing is poor and often inadequate in private enterprises. There is hence a dearth of qualified professionals to initiate and manage joint research projects, except perhaps in the (semi)public sector, where staffing appears to be satisfactory and there is some collaboration with the engineering schools. 4.55 In sum, the rigidity of the university system combines with the lack of interest on the part of private enterprise to limit interactions between the university and business worlds through the medium of research. the reasons imputable to the former reinforcing the lack of enthusiasm of the latter. and vice versa: (i) lack of decision-making and management autonomy, with respect both to regulation of the university curriculum and to the administrative and financial areas, reflected in, for example, lack of flexibility in resource allocation and in research projects organization and implementation; (ii) lack of motivation of a broad segment of the corps of researchers, who are able to exploit a rent situation thanks to their secure status and the absence of any evaluation of their activities; (iii) cautiousness of the still weak industrial world, dominated by small family enterprises, many of them set up by men of experience but with few academic qualifications and sometimes with a wary attitude toward the universities; (iv) the still limited scope for collaboration of the medium-sized enterprises, whose technological level is still not very far advanced, making it difficult for them to enter into complex relationships whose benefits are not obvious, and (v) frustrating experiences for representatives of the economy on the boards of university establishments, where their influence continues to be negligible. 4.56 The studies done by the Plan commissions30 identify the obstacles to and constraints on the development of research and its role as an instrument of interaction with the outside world. They also yield a series of recommendations which, concurrently with the "natural" development of the private sector, ought in theory to remove these obstacles and correct the skews noted. While these recommendations undoubtedly point in the right direction, they could be strengthened on a number of points, especially at the institutional level. In particular, the university and research establishments could be given greater autonomy by adopting more flexible financial management arrangements, such as (i) a posteriori budget control so as to avoid the need for frequent requests for prior expenditure authorizations; (ii) the technique of the financial ceiling attached to a services contract, whereby a set of 30 In particular those set forth in study no. 12 and by the "Scientific Research" subcommittee of the "Higher Education" sectoral commission.  - 39 - services is performed within the framework of an overall budget negotiated in light of the task assigned and predetermined objectives, and (iii) autonomous management of research and training projects. 4.57 Simplifying and liberalizing administrative and budgetary procedures and the state regulations governing research project management should help to bring the university and the enterprises in this field closer together. Upgrading the status of research necessarily involves, however, prior revision of the status of university teachers and researchers (see IV, D). 4.58 The private sector can make a substantial contribution to education. It would, however, be necessary to limit part-time and fixed-term teaching positions to very specialized instruction based on the teachers' experience in industry. The gap between remuneration levels and market rates should be narrowed ifpossible. As a general rule, it would be worthwhile to foster mobility between private sector and university, for example by providing opportunities for university teacher-researchers to work in a business for a specified period without having to give up their civil service gains. Empowering university boards could help motivate business heads and more broadly the representatives of society in general to play a more active role in training program formulation and research orientation. This upgrading is only feasible, however, provided the government confers some degree of management autonomy and effective decision-making authority on the establishments. 4.59 The development of an entity with true non-profit company status (foundation, association, etc.) could facilitate research partnership and financing (through donations and legacies, from foreign institutions, etc.). Consideration could then be given to setting up a National Scientific Research Fund to manage scientific research, first by financing training and general research projects, within the framework of a specified overall budget, and second by managing priority programs defined and financed by the government (for the example of Switzerland, see box 8). :x THE SWISS NATIONAL SCIENTIFC RESEARCH FUND (FNRS) Switzerland's Nattonal Scientific Resarch Fund (Funds National de la Recherche Scientifque--FNRS) was set up in 1952, as foundation under private law. The Fund promotes basic research, manages the national research programs and priority programs, awards fellowships, supports scientific publications, maintains international relationships and dissemninates scientific findings and information. It was endowed by the Swiss Confederation with SwF 325 million in 1995; research subsidies represent the greater part of the budget (75%). These figures represent 3,100 scientific researcher positions. The national research programs harness the potential of the university and private research centers to help resolve maJor problems selected by the federal govenmment (example of the 7th series. nanoscienees, diseases of the nenous system, migration flows, ransportation and environment, Swiss external policy). Two specific ptOgrarms, aceounting for about 9% of the annual budget, are devoted to improving teaching.and research. First, about 450 fe:llowships have been.awarded to starter researchers (bachelor'slmaster's degree) and more than 100 to advanced researchers (doctorate level) upon presentation of a personat research and training project. Second, just under 1% of the budget is devoted to personat. subsidies to provide the high schools with qualified relief staff.. The funds disttibuted by the FNRS represent about 3% of the sums devoted to R&D in Switzerland, and about 12% of the public funds. The purpose of the priority programs is to ensure and maintain a high level of research in certain key fields, having regard to the rapid pace of development in science, and also to promote the creation and development, in disciplines deemed to be of strategic importance, of skill centers within the higher education institutions. Parliament decides on the research topics and their overall budget (environment, biotechnologyi data processing and so on). Under the top-level authority of the Foundation's Board, which includes representatives of all the higher education, institutions, learned societies and economic and cultral institutions and also of the federal and cantonal authorities, the National Research Council and the commissions (whose members are volunteers) decide autonomously on allocation of the funds and subsidies. -Subee. Swiss National Scientific ResearchFnd. . .  - 40 - 4.60 Finally, the outside world, to which higher education must continue to draw as close as possible, to the point of erasing the boundary between them, also has an international dimension, one whose importance is constantly growing. In that regard, opening up its universities as much as possible to the world beyond its borders, through exchanges of professors and students,3' would be a step of cardinal importance for Tunisia--a historically penetrable country. At a time when the processes of economic take-off and bringing the country up to speed are boosting the supply of interesting and remunerative jobs in Tunisia and thereby reducing the "brain drain" risk, sending students to the large universities and schools and laboratories of more advanced countries probably offers a renewed advantage. Expensive as it is, the formula nevertheless yields long-term benefits, proven in practice by the Asian countries that have utilized it: South Korea alone had 25,000 students inscribed in the American universities in 1992 (Annex 16). In parallel, opening up positions for foreign teachers and researchers that offer good conditions for invited visitors can have a very positive impact on local scientific life; this can moreover be arranged under exchange agreements linking the filling of these positions with the sending of Tunisian students abroad. Finally, the Tunisian universities cannot stand aloof from the process of formidable change ushered in by the development of the new communication technologies which allow us to hook into interactive scientific networks at low cost.32 It would be advisable to set up a specialized unit (which could very conveniently be domiciled at the resource center the creation of which is suggested in para. 4.43) with specific responsibility to monitor developments in this field closely and examine how the requirements for connecting into these networks can be met as soon as possible and how certain areas of education can be repositioned in light of the possibilities offered by these networks. V. PRECONDITIONS FR SUSTAINABLE EPASION 5.1 The preceding two chapters, which took a static approach, drew attention to certain factors that currently impede the smooth functioning of higher education. This final chapter takes a more dynamic approach and guides the attention of planners to factors that could impair the positive development of the sector. To that end, it presents simulations of that development and discusses the preconditions for its financial sustainability. A. Inescapable Pressu 5.2 Natural population growth and education demographics, social challenges and economic choices, world competition and political resolve: the combined effect of all these factors is to make spectacular expansion of higher education in Tunisia in the near future inevitable. Unless the authorities first of all reconsider the principle of right of access to higher education by all high school graduates (bacheliers) and secondly considerably toughen selectivity at the secondary school level, student enrollment will rise by more than 7% a year, doubling within barely ten years and surpassing 200,000 by the turn of the millennium. Since they are unlikely to do either of these things, we can take these figures as solid predictions. 31 Cf. J. Delors' introduction to the recent UNESCO report (Delors 1996) and also UNESCO's guidelines document on changes and developments in higher education (UNESCO 1996). 32 A discussion on the relationships between new technologies, electronic networks and higher education can be found in Crawford, Eisemon & Holm-Nielsen 1995. A survey of the implications of these new technologies is presented in Hills 1994.  -41 - 5.3 This apparently inexorable development also happens to fit in well with the policy goals concerned with ensuring that Tunisia is well positioned to face up to the intensified international competition that will ensue with opening up to the EU. In terms of enrollment rates, the expected expansion will help to narrow the gap between Tunisia and the other LMICs, enabling it to move closer to the estimated minimum threshold of 25%33 and thereby build up the necessary human resources to equip it to take up the challenges of competition (World Bank 1995). The only truly flexible factor in the enrollment trend--the only one, that is, amenable to MES control--is cohort distribution by department or discipline; on that point, the projections prepared by MES staff reflect the government's intent to modify the current distribution to give greater weight to the technical and scientific disciplines (Annex 17). It should be borne in mind, however, that another source of flexibility exists, this time upstream, i.e. at the secondary level: any action affecting transition at this level would obviously generate very appreciable changes in higher education inflows (see chapter II). 5.4 Another prerequisite for this expansion to be handled to full advantage is that teachers, infrastructure and budgets must all be in place when it happens. It will call for a substantial increase in the financial and human resources provided to the system. The circumstances attending the provision of these resources are discussed in this chapter, which begins by simulating a number of resource augmentation scenarios and goes on to suggest ways of influencing the cost determinants.34 B. Mobilizing Additional Resources 5.5 Initially, all the proposed scenarios assume a constant ratio of higher education current (title I) expenditure to GDP. Since real annual GDP growth is assumed to be constant at 6% over the next ten years, government title I expenditure is also assumed to increase by 6% a year. Unit costs are also assumed to be constant; in the absence of efficiency gains, this obviously leaves no scope for improving quality. The simulations relate to three families of variables: first, enrollment levels; second, the expenditures devoted to them, and finally, the resources allocated to those expenditures. Capital expenditures are dealt with separately, on the basis of unit costs. There is no need, in the case of these expenditures, to draw up a resources/expenditure balance sheet since the receipts inflow to this budget (title II) is relatively unstable and in any event dependent partly on external contributions. We therefore estimate financing needs instead. Sensitivity analysis 5.6 Four series of simulations were performed in this way, corresponding to four distinct scenarios: a basic scenario (status quo as regards financing) and three families of scenarios based on three possible major lines of reform. Basic scenario. Tuition fees are those currently charged (TD 15, 20 and 61.5 a year for the first, second and third cycles, respectively). The charges for university meals and housing and the terms of utilization of university cafeterias (145 meals per student per year) and of access to housing (30% of enrollment) remain unchanged, as do the conditions of award of scholarships (maximum annual family income TD 1,450). A parallel threshold of 70% has been estimated for secondary education. The simulations were based on the spreadsheets used by MES in preparing the Ninth Plan (MES 1996).  - 42 - Scenarios Ia. Ib, Ic. Tuition fees are increased to cover respectively 10% (scenario la), 20% (scenario lb) and 30% (scenario Ic) of average recurrent unit cost. These increases would raise tuition fees to about TD 190, 380 and 570, respectively. The simulations assume a single adjustment, at the beginning of the period. Scenario 2. The meal price is raised from TD 0.100 to TD 0.850 (representing 50% of recurrent unit cost) and the charge for accommodation in university halls of residence from TD 60 to TD 120 a year (25% of current unit cost). Both adjustments take place all at once, at the beginning of the period. Scenario 3. Private higher education capacity is increased, replacing the public sector, more particularly in the economics/ management and the arts/human sciences disciplines, enrollment in which will grow by 15% a year under this scenario, beginning with the first year of the simulation period. Such an increase would mean increasing current enrollment in the private sector practically fourfold. 5.7 The results of the basic scenario simulations are summarized in table 5.1. Two points call for comment. First of all, if we adhere to the minimalist and conservative hypotheses of this scenario, the simulations indicate a continuous financing deficit throughout the period,35 rising from 7% in 1997 to 28% in 2002, then declining steadily to 20% in 2006. In absolute terms, it would peak at TD 80 million a year over the period 2002-04. The projections thus send a clear signal: if everything remained unchanged as regards cost recoverv and cost structure. a sustained budget effort -- an annual increase of 6% in the operating budget--would be insufficient to finance the expected expansion of enrollment. The required investment effort would be even greater: MES staff have calculated it at about TD 136 million a year over the Ninth Plan period. Table 5.1 The Basic Scenario and its "Pessimistic Variant": Financing Deficits (1997-2006) ____ ~~~~(%) Scenario 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Basic scenario - 6.9 - 12.1 - 18.2 - 23.0 - 27.2 - 28.1 - 27.1 - 25.2 - 22.9 - 20.3 Basic scenario, - 6.9 - 15.0 - 25.0 - 33.5 - 42.0 - 42.8 - 41.7 - 39.6 - 37.1 - 34.2 pessimistic variant 5.8 Turning to the second point, it has to be borne in mind that the basic scenario hypotheses are optimistic in several respects. At least three series of factors could potentially boost the financing deficit: (a) Enrollment: The new high school graduate (bachelier) enrollment figures are those projected by the Ministry of National Education (MEN). They are based on given secondary enrollment, repeater and dropout rates and finally baccalaureat success rates. If the authorities decided to boost new bachelier inflows by adjusting any of these variables (which is to be desired, in view of the weak secondary A deficit is defined as the shortfall between available resources and operating expenditure. The percentage deficit (or surplus) is calculated on resources.  - 43 - enrollment rates and Tunisia's economic ambitions), total bachelier enrollment would be raised and with it the financing deficit. (b) Expenditure: The basic scenario assumes the status quo in terms of quality, i.e. that no effort is made to enhance it, for example by improving teacher/student rates (analysis of the behavior of unit costs shows that they decline with increasing enrollment, a fact that can be explained either by economies of scale or by an effective decline in quality or, most likely, a combination of the two--see graph 3.1). (c) Resources: The pace of growth of the Tunisian economy may not be sustainable at 6% throughout the ten-year projection period; after all, the Tunisian economy is still partly vulnerable to climatic hazards: GDP growth averaged 4.5% over the period 1987-94 then slipped back to 3.3% in 1994 and 2.6% in 1995. In its projections for the period 1998-2003, the Country Assistance Strategy--(CAS) looks to average annual growth of 5.2%, with fluctuations within the range 3.5-6.2% (World Bank 1996d). By way of indication, based on a definitely pessimistic hypothesis, we note that a decline in annual GDP growth from 6 to 3% over 1998-2001 would have major repercussions on the financing deficits in the basic scenario, raising them from 12 to 15% in 1998, from 23 to 34% in 2000 and from 28 to 43% in 2002 (table 5.1). In this case the decisive variable turns out to be economic growth. 5.9 This leaves no alternative but to act by raising the students' contribution to the costs until now charged to the budget. This is done in simulations 1, 2 and 3 which, in one form or another, propose boosting internally-generated resources by raising tuition fees (scenarios la, lb and 1c) and university social services charges (scenario 2) and through a de facto increase in other resources via increased private enrollment (scenario 3).36 Table 5.2 suggests that, ceteris paribus, raising tuition fees clearly offers the greatest scope for bridging the financing deficit. followed by raising student services charges. Greater private-sector participation would have only a limited impact compared with the basic scenario, and the budgetary argument, though real, would not suffice by itself to justify increased private-sector participation in higher education. (The projections are detailed in Annex 18). Table 5.2 Alternative Scenarios: Financing Surpluses and Deficits (1997-2006) _ _ _ _ _ ~~ ~~~~(% ) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Scenario 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Basic Scenario la -1.8 - 6.4 - 11.7 - 15.9 - 19.4 -20.2 - 19.3 - 17.6 - 15.6 - 13.2 Scenario lb 3.9 - 4.6 - 8.2 -11.2 -11.8 - 11.0 - 9.5 - 7.7 - 5.7 Scenario lc 9.0 5.6 1.6 - 1.5 - 4.1 -4. - 3. - I. - 0.9 0.9 Scenario 2 4.4 -9.8 -13.9 - 17.4 -18.0 --17.0 -14.4 1-13.4 4 11.2 Scenario 3 4.2 - 9.2 - 15,0 - 19.6 1- 23.5 -24.1 -22.8 - 20.5 -17.8 -14.8 Source: Projections based on the MES model. Note The gray boxes mark a deficit-minimizing critical path. 36 From the point of view of government financing, this hypothesis is equivalent to a situation in which private sector students are enrolled in the public system and pay tuition fees equal to recurrent unit costs.  - 44 - 5.10 None of the measures described in the three scenarios would suffice by itself to meet the financing needs generated by expansion of the system. Even with a sharp increase (30%) in tuition fees,37 the current budget would remain in deficit (with the deficit possibly fluctuating within the range TD 10-15 million a year for four years) up to 2006. This necessitates applying a combination of these measures. Purely by way of illustration, we note that raising the tuition costs recovery rate to 30%, reassessing hostel and cafeteria charges and at the same time raising private enrollment by 15% a year would produce a financing surplus ranging between 5 and 16% throughout the period in question. 5.11 Without going that far, it should be noted that, just as the basic scenario was resolutely optimistic, so the scenarios depicted in table 5.2 are highly theoretical in that they simulate events (increases in fees and charges, increased private sector participation) occurring immediately and all together at the beginning of the period, just when the prevailing circumstances will require that they be phased in. Politicalfeasibility will continue to be the sole criterion in determining the appropriate combination of these measures and their implementation timing and in charting the critical path of necessary decisions for durable financing of expansion (see Haddad 1993 for a discussion of the prerequisites of success in implementing education reforms). The interdependence of the measures becomes particularly critical when we factor in the equity criterion. Thus, setting social services (room and board) charges at close to cost, justified in financing terms and in order to attract the private sector to invest in these services, would correlatively entail reassessing the scholarship amounts, which would in turn call for stronger selectivity in awarding them (see III.C above). C. Trimming Costs 5.12 The fragility of the basic scenario, together with the political difficulties inherent in speedy implementation of a meaningful cost recovery scheme as in the alternative scenarios, suggests the need to consider cost-cutting measures. Two kinds of measures are possible, i.e. measures designed to (i) reduce production factor costs, and (ii) enhance the internal yield of the system. 5.13 Reducing production factor costs. The expected expansion will necessitate an appreciable increase in human resources, especially teaching staff. However, recruitment sources are limited in relation to needs (nearly 1,000 new teachers a year, including nearly 900 for the MES, while maintaining the current teacher/student rates--see Annex 19). It would therefore be advisable to investigate whether raising the teachers' statutory number of hours a week would be an effective means of raising potential teaching capacity. Since the current teaching workload is so small, raising it obviously offers a natural source of savings. 5.14 In performing the calculations it is useful to distinguish clearly between two concepts: potential teaching capacity, and actual teaching workload. "Teaching capacity" is defined as the total annual number of statutory hours of teaching in a given establishment, which comes down to theoretical capacity to conduct courses using the "nornal" hours owed by the teachers. The establishment's "teaching workload" is equal to the total hours of teaching (supervised work (SW) equivalent) required to teach the subjects leading the students enrolled in the establishment's various disciplines to their degree; in other words, it is the true expression of need. It was possible to quantify these concepts precisely by applying the Higher Education Analysis and Management System (Systeme d'Analyse et de Gestion de 1 'Enseignement Superieur--SAGES) as part of the Higher Education Restructuring Project (World Bank 1992). For most Envisaged as a possibility by the Plan Commission. 38 Given the 26 weeks of courses per year, the potential teaching capacity is 26 times the product of "number of teachers per category multiplied by number of statutory hours expressed in equivalent SW hours".  - 45 - education disciplines, the teaching workload is of course higher than the potential workload.39 At present the teaching deficit is met by means of additional hours.40 5.15 For the country as whole. the teaching deficit represents a substantial proportion of teaching potential: 56%, which is equivalent, in terms of staff working under the current statutory conditions, to about 2,500 teachers.4' Table 5.3 summarizes teaching potentials, workloads and deficits, by university. While many faculties (Sciences in Tunis; Sciences at Sfax; Arts and Economic Sciences at Sfax; Arts at Sousse) have deficits of over 50%, the situation is even more critical in some schools, which have deficits exceeding 100% (the detailed results, by establishment, are given in Annex 20). Table 5.3 Teaching Potential and Workload, by University Establishment Teaching Potential Teaching Workload Teaching Deficit Deficit/ Potential (hours/year) (hours/year) (hours/year) (%) Tunis I University 135,993 189,615 72,477 53.3 Tunis II University 220,055 332,590 152,651 69.4 Tunis III University 172,265 215,733 96.683 56.1 Center University 175,799 199,798 66,334 37.7 South University 174,220 249,119 111,111 63.8 ISFM a/ 2,988 2,327 218 7.3 GRAND TOTAL 881,320 1,189,182 499,474 56.7 NM: In calculating the deficits only the understaffed disciplines are taken into account. a/ In this case, there is a surplus. 5.16 In these circumstances, increasing the teachers' statutory number of hours would enable MES to achieve two objectives, Initially, it would reduce the deficit and thereby help reduce new recruitment needs. In the following period (by means of certain remuneration adjustments), it would slow the growth of the total salary bill, compared to its growth without any increase in statutory hours. 5.17 To be able to fine-tune the first-phase simulation it would be necessary to do the calculations for each establishment. Let us consider, purely by way of indication, the national level. Assuming, for the current year, a uniform pro am workload increase of 30% for all teachers, the teaching deficit would be reduced by 264,400 hours. MES would then have several options. They include (i) simply curtailing the The only establishments without deficits are the faculties of pharmacy, medicine and surgery, ENIT and Polytechnique-Tunis, IPEST and INSAT, ENIS and ENIG, and three of the twelve ISFMs. 40 Additional hours are designated heures complmentaires when worked by a tenured teacher and heures suppl6mentaires in the case of a part-time teacher. 41 The sum of the deficits for all disciplines of a given establishment is its teaching deficit. This is the arithmetic sum of the true deficits; disciplines with a negative deficit ("teaching surplus"), i.e. overstaffed disciplines, are not taken into account. 42 The increase in potential teaching capacity (reduction of the deficit assuming that all teaching hours are interchangeable) for the year would be 0.3 x 881,320 = 264,400 hours.  - 46 - number of additional tenured/part-time staff hours by 264,400, and (ii) combining a reduction in the number of new teacher recruitments with a cut in the tenured/part-time additional hours budget. 5.18 The purely financial repercussions of such a decision on reducing the salary bill would depend on a number of politically sensitive hypotheses, notably agreements concluded with the unions. Despite its strong logical justification and its potentially important overall financial impact, the measure obviously needs to be studied meticulously since it reaches far beyond this financial context and would have profound repercussions on the profession. In particular, it should only be envisaged in measured combination with the suggested changes in the organization of the profession (see IV.D above). It could not be separated from the issues of "specialization" in teaching and research activities and in addition ought to be considered in conjunction with the question of reorganization of the first cycles. This is a perfect example of an area that will callfor compromises between the parties. 5.19 Improving the system's internal efficiency. As indicated in chapter III, the internal efficiency of higher education in Tunisia leaves something to be desired. In 1995/96, repeaters accounted for 31% of enrollment (Annex 4), a substantial waste of human and financial resources. This points to the need to cut the number of repeaters. Reducing their number by half, for example, would yield appreciable savings, amounting to about 15% of recurrent expenditures under the basic scenario and a substantial reduction in the financing deficit, which would peak in 2002 at 9% instead of the basic scenario's 28%.43 Here, therefore, we have another means of action. It could not, any more than the others, be implemented immediately. Creating first-cycle colleges would undoubtedly produce an improvement in output and thereby help reduce unit operating costs. Finally, there is no reason to think--pending a detailed preinvestment study--that the initial investment costs it would generate exceed those that would be necessitated in any event by the growth of student reception capacities if the structures remained unchanged. 5.20 The situation will rapidly become critical. However, MES has a battery of measures at its disposal through which to ensure the sustainability, in terms of both financial and human resources, of the expected enrollment expansion and at the same time enhance internal efficiency; provided these measures are taken, it will be possible to maintain quality and perhaps even to improve it. In addition to the measures suggested above, there are in fact other means of action that merit study. These include: (i) increasing the establishment's internal resources (through growth of continued training, renting of premises and equipment to associations and enterprises, and so on),4 and (ii) increasing the number of weeks in the university year. This last measure would offer two advantages. First, it would generate savings by raising potential teaching capacity (lengthening the year by five weeks would raise it by nearly 20%); second, it would result in improved utilization of premises. 5.21 Once the options have been clarified by means of technical analyses, the choice of the reforms and their combination packages, proportioning of the measures and timing of their implementation will, of course, be policy decisions. Points of attack and opportunities for action are not lacking, even though the A refined simulation would require knowledge of the following factors: conditions of improvement of internal efficiency, by discipline, establishment and cycle (for example, conversion of some first cycles into preparatory cycles, upgrading of the pedagogic quality of the teaching body--training, staffing ratios, etc.). It would also have to take into account the decrease in dropouts. Granting the establishments greater financial autonomy, together with a more effective incentives system that encourages contract-seeking, would obviously help boost their internal resources. These advantages would supplement those that could be expected to accrue in other areas (see IV.C above).  - 47 - constraints are great and the pressures immediate. Since this issue is all about the future of its young people and hence of the nation, Tunisia has powerful means at its disposal through which to convert tomorrow's challenges into opportunities. There are grounds for hope, since from the Tunisian viewpoint "it is more serious to sacrifice quality than to trim quantitative requirements" (Charfi 1996). The authorities' growing awareness of these challenges strengthens this hope.  - 48 - BIBLIOGRAPHY Abdennhader C., Karaa A., et Plassard J.M. 1994. Tester la dualite du marche du travail: l'exemple de la Tunisie. Revue d'Economie du Developpement, 1994/1 Abdessalem, T. Aout 1995. 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"The Quality of Education in the Middle East and North Africa. " Working Paper Series No.3. Technical Department Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa. Higginson, F. 1996. "Le r6le de 1 'enseignant et le changement mondial : document d'orientation." Secteur de l'education, UNESCO. Hills, G. 1994. "Universities of Tomorrow. " CEPES Papers on Higher Education. Institut National de la Statistique. 1989. "Enquete Nationale Population Emploi. " Republique Tunisienne. Ministere du Plan et du Developpement Regional. Institut National de la Statistique. 1994. "Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie. " Republique Tunisienne. Ministere du Plan et du Developpement Regional. Annee 1992 - 93. Volume No.36. James, E. 1993. "Why is there proportionately more enrollment in private schools in some countries?" Working Papers No.1069. Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development. Country Economics Department. The World Bank. Jaoua, A. 1995. "Etude Strategique No.20. 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"International Perspectives on Education: Some Ideas for Data Analysis." The World Bank. Education and Social Policy Department. Mingat, A. 1995. "Towards Improving our Understanding of the Strategy of High Performing Asian Economies in the Education Sector. " IREDU ; CNRS and University of Dijon. Ministere du Developpement Economique, Ministere de l'Education Nationale, Ministere de l'Enseignement Superieur, Ministere de la Formation Professionnelle et de l'Emploi. Republique Tunisienne. 1996. "Etude Strategique No. 11. Qualifications Professionnelles et Dispositifs d 'Education et de Formation. 2eme rapport d 'etape. Ministere de l'Education. Ministere de l'Enseignement Superieur. Republique Tunisienne. 1996. "Etude Strategique No.20. Le Financement de l 'Education. Rapport de deuxieme etape (version provisoire). " Ministere de l'Enseignement Superieur. 1996. Bureau des Etudes, de la Programmation et de la Planification. Republique Tunisienne. "Les Perspectives d'Evolution de l'Enseignement Superieur 1997-2007." Ministere de l'Enseignement Superieur. 1996. Bureau des Etudes, de la Planification et de la Programmation. Republique Tunisienne. 1995/1996. "L'Enseignement et la Formation Superieurs en Chiffres."  - 50 - Nelson, S. 1978. "The Equity of Public Subsidies for Higher Education: Some Thoughts on the Literature. " Paper No.5. The Brookings Institution. OECD. 1995. "Education at a Glance. OECD Indicators. " Centre for Educational Research and Innovation. Indicators of Education Systems. Oueslati, A. 1995. "Etude Strategique No.20. Le Financement de I 'Education. " Distribution des depenses des menages et de l'Etat en matiere d'Education et d'Enseignement Superieur. Ministere de I'Education. Ministere de I'Enseignement Sup6rieur. Republique Tunisienne. Parker, L. 1992. "Industry-University Collaboration in Developed and Developing Countries. " PHREE Background Paper Series. Document No.PHREE/92/64. Education and Employment Division. Population and Human Resources Department. The World Bank. Rama, M. 1996. "How Bad is Tunisian Unemployment ? Assessing Labor Market Efficiency in a Developing Country. " The World Bank. Sheehan, J. 1995. "New Mechanisms for Funding Higher Education. Recent Experience and Implementation Issues. " Department of Economics. University College. Dublin. Solaux, G. 1996. "Rapport sur le Secteur Educatif Tunisien. ". Tan, J.P., Mingat, A. 1992. "Education in Asia. A comparative Study of Cost and Financing. " World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies. UNESCO, 1995. "Changement et developpement dans 1 'enseignement supirieur . document d'orientation. " Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'education, la science et la culture. West, E. 1995. "Education with and without the State. " Working Paper HCOWP 61. Human Capital Development and Operations Policy. The World Bank. West, E. 1996. "Education Vouchers in Practice and Principle. A world Survey. " Working Papers HCDWP 64. Human Capital Development. The World Bank. Winkler, D. 1994 "La Educacion Superior en America Latina Cuestiones Sobre Eficiencia y Equidad." Documentos para discusi6n del Banco Mundial. Woodhall, M. 1983. "Student Loans as a Means of Financing Higher Education. Lessons from International Experience. " World Bank Staff Working Papers Nr.599. Woodhall, M. 1990. "Student Loans in Higher Education. Western Europe and the USA." Intemational Institute for Educational Planning. World Bank. 1993 "The East Asian Miracle. Economic Growth and Public Policy." . 1995. "Claiming the Future. Choosing Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa." . 1996a. "Memorandum and Recommendation of the President of the International Bankfor Reconstruction and Development to the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Republic of Tunisia. " Report No.1 5617-TUN. Country Operations I. Maghreb and Iran Department. Middle East and North Africa Region. . 1996b. "Vietnam. Education Financing Sector Study. " Human Resources Operations Division. Country Department 1, East Asia and Pacific Region. . 1996c. "Teaching to Succeed. Education in the Middle East and North Africa." . 1996d. "Republic of Tunisia Education and training Strategy Note. " Human Resources Group. Middle East and North Africa Region. Za'Rour, G. 1988. "Universities in Arab Countries. " Working Paper. Policy, Planning, and Research. Education and Employment. Population and Human Resources Department. The World Bank.  Annex I Page I of I STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION IN TUNISIA HIGHER EDUCATION Year FI_ l +H++ 1 13 1~~A!cAA~BA SC. A. Exper. 4e A. Math 4e A. Arts 4e A. EconlMan 4e A. Tech. F i E 3eA.Exper. 3eA. Math 3A A. Tmc m on2 c~~~~S.1 N D A R Y D 2nd Common Year |ll A T I st Common Year l- 9th Year 9 8th Year 8 2nd cycle B 7th Year 7 A I 6th Year 6 C 5th Year 5 E c Primary cycle 4th Year 4 A I 3rd Year 3 0 2nd Year 2 1st Year 1  Annex 2 Page 1 of 2 Primary and Secondary Education: Basic Data I. Primary Education A. Public Education -___________________________ _ | 1994/1995 1995/1996 Schools 4286 4349 Pupils 1472800 1460100 of which, girls 46.8% 47.1% Teachers 58280 59430 Pupil/teacher rate 25.2 24.6 Overall promotion rate a/ 79.0 78.4 Overall repeater rate a! 16.5% 17.27% Overall dropout rate a! 4.6% 4.4% a/ The data relate to the years 1993/94 and 1994/95 Distribution, by Study Year (1995/96) Total Enrollment Repeaters Ist year 239100 32900 2nd year 249000 36900 3rd year 256900 42400 4th year 246000 36900 5th year 239300 43300 6th year 242500 61700 Total 1472800 254000 Average Age by Study Year and Gender (1995/96) Boys Girls I st year 6.1 6.1 2nd year 7.3 7.3 3rd year 8.6 8.4 4th year 9.7 9.6 5th year 10.9 10.7 6th year 12.0 11.9 B. Private Education Schools: 35 Pupils: 8900 Teachers :455 Pupil/teacher rate: 19,6 Source: Ministry of Education Primary Education School year 1995/96  Annex 2 Page 2 of 2 II. Secondary Education A. Public Education _ _ _ __ 1994/1995 1995/1996 Establishments 712 760 Pupils 662000 725900 Of which, girls 48.3% 48.8% Teachers 27790 30170 Pupil/teacher rate 23.8 24.1 Overall promotion rate a/ 73.2 74.8 Overall repeater rate a/ 17.5 16.5 Overall dropout rate a/ 9.3 8.7 a/ The data relate to the years 1993/94 and 1994/95 Distribution, by Study Year (1995/96) Enrollment 1 st year 169600 2nd year 136900 3rd year 117000 4th year 109400 5th year 82900 6th year 54200 7th year 61200 Total 725900 Enrollment Distribution of Final Classes (7th year), by Disciplines (1995/96) Enrollment % Arts 22860 37.3 Mathematics 9540 15.6 Experim. Sciences 13800 22.6 Technology 6030 9.8 Economics and Management 8970 14.7 Total a7 61200 100.0 a! Plus 17.700 students of the technical vocational schools B. Private Education 1994/95 1995/96 Establishments 342 340 Pupils 71000 68500 Teachers (full-time) 1390 1260 Source: Ministry of Education Primary Education Statistics School year 1995/96  Annex 3 Page 1 of 1 Higher Education Enrollment: Trend and Distribution 1. Enrollment Trend (1961/62 - 1995/96) Year Enrollment Average Annual Growth Rate 1961/62 2310 -- 1970/71 10350 18.1 1980/81 30150 12.6 1985/86 41590 6.6 1990/91 66540 9.9 1995/96 112630 11.1 II. Enrollment Distribution, by Establishment (1995/96) Ezzitouna University 950 Tunis I University 20670 Tunis 11 University 22370 Tunis III University 24770 Center University 21970 South University 16880 ISET 2120 ISFM 2910 Total 112650 III. Enrollment Distribution, by Discipline (1995/96) Discipline Enrollment Share (%) Literature, arts, human and religious 36310 32.2 sciences Legal, economic and management 37540 33.3 sciences Basic sciences 14500 12.9 Technical sciences 5570 5.0 Medical and biological sciences 13900 12.3 Agricultural and agro-food sciences 1920 1.7 Teacher training 2910 2.6 Grand Total 112650 100.0 IV. Enrollment Distribution, by Cycle (1995/96) Cycle Enrollment Share (%) Ist cycle 67550 60.0 2nd cycle 34280 30.4 3rd year and + 3960 3.5 3rd cycle 6850 6.1 Total 112650 100.0 Source: Ministry of Higher Education 1996  Annex 4 Page 1 of 1 Repeating in Higher Education (1995/96) New Students Repeaters Total enrollment % enrollment % enrollment Ezzitouna University 470 57 350 43 820 Tunis I University 10570 54 8900 46 19460 of which: Faculty of Arts, Manouba (M) 4290 51 4060 49 8350 Journalism and Inform. Sciences 660 96 30 4 690 Institute (m) Tunis II University 14640 79 3970 21 18610 of which: Sciences Faculty, Tunis (M) 5170 67 2490 33 7660 National Engineering School (m) 880 93 60 7 940 Tunis III University 18750 76 6020 24 24770 of which: Faculty of Law (M) 4240 61 2700 39 6940 Business College (m) 1360 93 100 7 1460 Center University 13940 68 6550 32 20490 of which: Faculty of Arts, Sousse (M) 2190 53 1970 47 4160 Faculty of Medicine, Mounastir 640 89 80 11 720 (m) South University 9860 66 5080 34 14940 Of which: Faculty of Arts & Human 2000 49 2080 51 4080 Sciences, Sfax (M) National Engineering School, 720 90 80 10 800 Sfax (m) ISET 1760 89 210 11 1970 TOTAL 69990 31080 101070 Note: Date relating to establishments with over 500 students. For each university, the table shows the establishments with the highest repeater rate (M) and the lowest repeater rate (m). Source: Ministry of Higher Education 1996.  Annex 5 Page 1 of 1 GDP, State Budget, Education Budget and Higher Education Budget (1981-94) Year GDP State State Budget Education Education Higher Higher Higher (DT Budget (*) as share of Budget (all Budget as share Education Education Education millions) (DT GDP (%) levels) (*) of State Budget Budget Budget as Share Budget as Share million) (DT million) (%) (*) of Education of State Budget (DT million) Budget (%) (%) 1981 4162 1046 25.1 201 19.2 45 22.4 4.3 1984 6240 1700 27.2 352 20.7 71 20.2 4.2 1991 12172 3055 25.0 736 24.1 155 21.2 5.1 1992 13994 3285 23.5 814 24.8 170 20.9 5.2 1993 15246 3586 23.5 877 24.5 190 21.7 5.3 1994 16173 3910 24.2 980 25.1 221 22.6 5.7 Note: * The budgets are the sum of the operating and capital budgets. Source: Ministry of Higher Education 1996  Annex 6 Page 1 of 1 COMPARATIVE CHANGES IN ENROLLMENT AND UNIT COST IN HIGHER EDUCATION 900 (1972-1994) 800 + Enrollment 700 -0- Unit Cost 600 (0500 -400 300 200 100 N n I T (to co ( co 0 N cX IT t 0 1- co ) O0 - N Xa Nl- t- rN- N- N- N,- Nl- t- co c GO co co (0(0 ( co co co 0) 0) 0) 0) 0 o) a) ) a) cl) C) a) a) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) a) 0 0) ax a) 0) a 0) 0) a ) Years  Annex 7 Page 1 of 1 Unit Costs in Higher Education: International Comparisons Unit Costs as Unit Costs Ratio: Costs Unit Costs Share of Per Higher Education/ ($) Capita GDP (%) Primary Education Region MENA Region (1990) Tunisia 1926 135 9 Egypt 1515 230 12 Jordan 1514 128 9 Morocco 959 92 5 Asia Region (mid-1980s) Indonesia 497 106 7 Korea 2132 104 4 Malaysia 3540 190 14 Thailand 1267 178 3 Latin America (1981) Average 991 67 8 OECD (1992) United States (public) 11880 52 2 France (public) 6020 33 3 Netherlands 8720 53 3 Spain 3770 29 2 New Zealand 6080 43 3 Average 7940 45 2 Sources: MENA region: World Bank 1996c Asia: Tan and Mingat 1992 OECD: OECD 1995 Latin America: Winkler 1994  Annex 8 Page 1 of 1 Higher Education Operating Budget: Distribution by Expenditure Categories (1987 and 1994) Amount | Share Amount Share ______________________(DT 1000) (%) (DT 1000) (%) Salaries and remuneration 37998 51.2 89788 54.2 Equipment, administrative management and transportation expenses 1043 1.4 1200 0.7 Subsidizing of education establishments 13177 17.7 28194 17.0 Susiizn of unimvest *soca 5793 7.8 31860 19.2 services Governmnent activities in the social andllll cultural areas 16257 21.9 14702 8.9 Total for higher education 74268 100.0 165744 100.0 Source: Based on Jaoua 1995.  Annex 9 Page 1 of 1 Higher Education Operating Budget: Distribution by Expenditure Category in Various OECD Countries (1992) Remuneration of Remuneration of Other operating teachers other personnel expenses Belgium 57.6 0.3 42.0 France 72.6 27.4 Ireland 53.3 21.7 25.0 Italy 32.2 35.7 32.2 Portugal 72.1 27.9 Spain 80.6 19.4 Switzerland 58.2 25.0 16.8 OECD country average 45.4 21.8 30.8 Source: OECD 1995  Annex 10 Page 1 of 2 Data on Student/Teacher Ratios in Higher Education I Trend of student/teacher ratios in higher education in Tunisia (1970/95) 25 20 0 (U ~ 5 0 O N1 v CD co 0 N4 co co CO O N aw a aw ax 1) co ow a) cox co CD a Year l l 11 Student/Teacher Ratios in Higher Education in Tunisia, by Discipline (1995/96) Student Discipline Enrollment Student/Teacher Ratio Literature, arts, human and religious sciences 36300 25.4 Legal, economic and management sciences 37540 32.9 Basic sciences 14500 17.5 Technical sciences 5570 7.3 Medical and biological sciences 13900 8.4 Agricultural and agro-food sciences 1920 5.6 Teacher training 2910 9.1 Grand Total 112630 17.41 Source: Ministry of Higher Education.  Annex 10 Page 2 of 2 Ill. Student/Teacher Ratios in Public Higher Education: International Comparisons Country Year Student/Teacher Ratio MENA Tunisia 1985/86 12 1995/96 17 Morocco 1988/89 31 ASIA Japan 1970 27 1992 23 Korea 1980 28 1992 28 Indonesia 1992 15 Malaysia 1992 12 Philippines 1980 29 Thailand 1992 14 Viet Nam 1995 14 Average 1992 18 LATIN AMERICA Average 1994 9 Sources: MENA: Ministry of Higher Education Asia: Mingat 1995 and World Bank 1996b Latin America: Garcia Guadilla 1996  Annex 11 Page 1 of I Annual Remuneration in the Tunisian Civil Service (dinars) a/ Salary Total Remuneration Teaching Stff - Certificated professor 1970 11090 - Secondary teacher 1660 6700 - Technologist 2280 11770 - Assistant technologist 2040 10870 - Assistant 2040 10870 - Assistant lecturer 2280 12930 - Lecturer 2430 15520 - Professor, higher education 2720 18460 Technical Staff - Chief Architect 2620 10740 - Architect 1490 6900 - Statistician 1160 5120 Administrative Staff - Administrator-General 3000 9300 - Senior Administrator 2620 8280 - Administrator 1490 5570 - Administrative Assistant 1160 4650 Librmry Staff - Library curator 2140 7190 - Librarian 1890 5960 Source: Based on Decree no. 79-93 of January 11, 1979. Note: a/ Total remuneration comprises basic salary plus various bonuses, net of CNR contribution.  Annex 12 Page 1 of 1 Unemployment and Education Level I. Analysis of Unemployed Persons, by Education Level (1975-1989) (%) 1975 1984 1989 Illiterate 49,3 34,2 21,5 Primary 35,6 45,5 47,5 Secondary 13,8 19,2 29,1 Higher 0,3 0,7 1,5 Not stated 1,0 0,4 0,3 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 II. Skilled Workers: Job Demand, Supply and Placements (1987-92) (1987-1992) 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 A Skilled jobs demand 68215 73482 45554 27363 23960 24035 B Skilled workers placed 19243 19368 20915 16244 15023 17439 C Skilled job supply 24624 26981 29585 34332 29428 31047 B/A 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 C/A 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 C/B 1.3 1.4 1.4 2.1 2.0 1.8 Ill. First-time Job Seekers, by Gender and Education Level (1989) Men Women Total Illiterate 8,5 22,3 13,9 Primary 44,7 42,3 43,8 Secondary 44,7 33,5 40,3 Higher 2,1 1,9 2,0 Not stated -- -- -- Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 Source: INS: Statistical Yearbook, 1992-93, vol. 36  Annex 13 Page 1 of 3 TEACHER RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1. Assistants Assistants are recruited by competitive examination before a national jury. Candidates are required to hold a secondary education teaching certificate, an advanced studies degree or a diploma attesting to six years of higher education. They are also required to provide evidence that they are preparing a thesis and that it is sufficiently advanced for them to be able to defend it within a time limit of three years, which can be extended only twice, for one year. There is a separate national jury for each discipline. It comprises three professors, lecturers or assistant lecturers elected by the entire teaching body at these grades in the discipline concerned plus two other teachers of these same grades appointed by the minister, who may belong to foreign universities. The recruitment examination consists of a discussion relating to the work carried out by the candidate and the latter's discipline and the state of progress of the thesis. On the other hand, no prior pedagogic training is required (nor in fact is any organized training provided within the university). The pertinent regulations state only that the jury shall take into consideration, inter alia, the course work done; however, the wording leaves the impression that it is the disciplinary content of the course, much more than its pedagogic design, that will be decisive. An assistant first of all serves a two-year probationary period, at the end of which an evaluation is performed by two grade A teachers in the same discipline. The latter draw up a report and submit it to the establishment's scientific council, which renders an opinion with respect to confirmation in the grade. While the regulations provide that the two evaluators may carry out a "teaching inspection" of the classes the assistant teaches, the regulations indicate that timely completion of the thesis is the decisive factor (in fact, the state of the work, indicating that completion can be expected by the prescribed deadline), and in practice teaching inspection never takes place save perhaps in very exceptional cases. Assistants are required to perform 13 hours of practical work (PW) or 9 hours of supervised work (SW) a week. In principle, they are not required to do course work; if they do, one course hour is equated to 1 hr 50 mins of SW or 2 hr 45 mins of PW. However, to allow candidates to present the thesis within the time limit, the teaching program can be reduced to 8 hours of PW or 5 hours of SW, for a maximum of three years, by decision taken by the president of the university in light of the opinion of the scientific council of the candidate's establishment and the report of the thesis director. The assistant grade comprises seven echelons. 2. Assistant Lecturers (maltres-assistants) Assistant lecturers are also recruited by means of a national jury specialized by discipline. Their duties are to assist the professors and lecturers in organizing teaching programs  Annex 13 Page 2 of 3 and examinations and monitoring the work of the assistants. Candidates are required to hold a doctorate (or one of the old diplomas: state doctorate and 3rd-cycle doctorate). The jury comprises five professors or lecturers from the discipline in question, three elected and two appointed. The examination consists of a 20-minute presentation and a 1-hour public discussion session relating to the work of the candidate and the latter's discipline. The jury also takes into consideration the projects, studies, course work, etc. done by the candidate. In the case of tenured assistants who have presented their doctorate, the recruitment jury consists of a promotion commission which decides in light of two reports, drawn up by two of its members. Assistant lecturers are required to perform teaching service comprising 12 hours of PW and 8 hours of SW a week; course work carries the same equivalencies as for assistants. Their tenure is confirmed following one year of probation. The assistant lecturer grade comprises six echelons. 3. Lecturers (maitres de confirence) Candidates for the grade of lecturer are required to hold, in addition to the doctorate, the university habilitation certificate, itself issued by the establishment authorized to do so by the minister. Candidates may also hold a Tunisian or foreign state doctorate or a foreign doctorate and foreign habilitation, provided they possess teaching and research experience. To obtain habilitation, an assistant lecturer (a candidate for habilitation must possess this grade), is required to present documentation including a set of publications and a detailed summary report on research activities conducted; where appropriate, the candidate may also present a second report on teaching and monitoring activities. Authorization to appear before a habilitation jury is granted by the dean with the agreement of the Doctorate and Habilitation Theses Commission and in light of two favorable reports drawn up by two professors or lecturers designated by the this commission. The jury comprises five members, including at least three professors, designated by the president of the university upon proposal by the dean. The jury may include members belonging to a foreign university. The two rapporteurs form part of the jury. The examination consists of a presentation to and a discussion with the jury, which assesses the candidate's ability to design, direct, lead and coordinate research activities. Having obtained the certificate of habilitation, assistant lecturers are required to present themselves at the lecturers recruitment competition armed with documentation setting forth they works they have conducted, together with a detailed report on their teaching and monitoring activities and, where appropriate, their participation in the life of the institution. The national jury for the discipline concerned, consists of five professors, three elected and two appointed.  Annex 13 Page 3 of 3 The examination comprises: - a discussion, lasting a maximum of two hours, on the work performed and the discipline in question, - and/or a one-hour discussion on the work performed and the discipline plus a half-hour lesson, following eight hours of preparation, relating to a specialized subject of the discipline chosen by the candidate. Assistant lecturers with at least three years standing may choose either option; others must undergo the second option. The jury takes into account both tests and the value of the work done, the courses conducted and the teaching, scientific, monitoring, etc. activities performed by the candidate. Lecturers serve a one-year probationary period before being confirmed in the grade and are required to perform 4 hr 30 minutes of course work per week. If they perform PW or SW, one hour of PW is assimilated to 30 minutes of course work, and one hour of SW to 45 minutes of course work. The lecturer grade comprises four echelons. 4. Professors (professeurs) Candidature for the grade of professor is open to lecturers with at least four years of seniority in that grade. They are required to present a detailed report describing their teaching, scientific and monitoring activities and their participation on the life of the institution. Recruitment is the responsibility of a national consultative commission for each discipline, composed of five professors, three elected and two appointed, who may belong to a foreign university. The grade of professor comprises four echelons. There is no probationary period. The special statute prescribes a common definition of the functions of professors and lecturers: preparing programs, supervising assistant lecturers and assistants, coordinating the teaching and research teams, monitoring the work of the students, and responsibility for examinations. The weekly service requirements are the same as for lecturers.  Annex 14 Page 1 of I Distribution of Teachers, by Categories and Establishments (1995/96) Contract Statutory Staff Other Grand Staff Staff Total (1) Category Category (2) Total (3) A B Ezzitouna University 4 12 39 3 54 58 Tunis I University 85 95 452 210 757 842 Tunis II University 155 278 915 805 1,998 2,153 Tunis III University 97 78 468 110 656 753 Center University 143 100 486 453 1,039 1,182 South University 131 79 495 264 838 969 ISFM 0 0 0 319 319 319 ISET 84 4 88 27 119 203 Total 699 646 2943 2291 5780 6479 Source: Ministry of Higher Education. (1) Including foreigners (41% oftotal contractual staff). (2) Including teaching-hospital categories. (3) MES and jointly supervised establishments.  Annex 15 Page 1 of 1 Distribution of Public and Private Expenditure by Type of Higher Education Establishment in Various OECD Countries (1992) Public Subsidized private Non-subsidized Total establishments establishments private establishments Belgium 38.2 61.8 100.0 Denmark 100.0 100.0 France 90.5 6.7 2.7 100.0 Ireland 99.0 1.0 100.0 Netherlands 56.2 43.8 100.0 Spain 92.2 7.8 100.0 Great Britain 22.2 77.8 100.0 Japan 40.4 59.6 100.0 Canada 99.5 0.5 100.0 OECD Average 78.9 21.1 100.0 Source: OECD, 1995  Annex 16 Page 1 of 1 Foreign Students Enrolled in U.S. Universities, by Region of Origin and Discipline (1991-92) Science and Management Others Total Technology (000) (000) (000) (000) Asia 127 49 70 246 Europe 21 12 21 54 Latin America 18 9 16 43 Middle East 18 5 8 31 Africa 11 4 7 22 Source: National Science Foundation 1996  Annex 17 Page 1 of 1 Enrollment Projections, by Education Sector (1996-2006) Sector 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 Literature, Arts, 40511 41745 43230 45158 47158 49399 51131 52572 54065 55642 57306 Human and Social Sciences Legal, Economic 41478 46692 52331 58769 64783 70742 75192 78686 81959 85241 88611 and Management Sciences Of which ISET: 1102 1824 2389 2793 3124 3441 3650 3800 3923 4072 4240 Medical Sciences 10302 10621 10915 11275 11689 12114 12421 12839 12813 13007 13222 Basic Sciences 16306 18329 21010 24428 28079 31816 34928 37412 39602 41642 43516 Technical Sciences 13054 16323 20261 24746 29117 33567 38899 39598 41866 43949 45786 Of which ISET: 2899 4488 6120 7583 8934 10324 11332 12054 12590 13130 13691 Agricultural 2215 2462 2751 3069 3356 3670 3889 4065 4217 4386 4553 Sciences TOTAL 123866 136161 150499 167445 184182 201307 214459 224971 234522 243867 252993  Annea18 Financing Scenarios _ Page 1 of 6 BASE SCENARIO 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (1) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses 36.9 41.6 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146.0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing (2) 223.9 237.5 252.0 267.4 283.7 301.0 319.0 337.9 357.9 378.9 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Deficit/Financing Surplus (3)= (2)-(1 -15.4 -28.7 -45.8 -61.6 -77.1 -84.5 -86.4 -85.1 -82.0 -77.0 % Deficit/Surplus (4)=(3)/(2) -6.9% -12.1% -18.2% -23.0% -27.2% -28.1% -27.1% -25.2% -22.9% -20.3% SCENARIO la =____ With cost recovery (Share of tuition in teaching costs) 10% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (5) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses 36.9 41.6 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146.0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing (6) 235.0 250.2 266.6 283.9 302.1 320.8 339.9 359.8 380.7 402.6 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 14.0 15.9 18.0 20.1 22.3 24.0 25.3 26.5 27.6 28.6 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Net savings (7) = (6)-(2) 11 13 15 16 18 20 21 22 23 24 % Saving (8) -7)/12) 4.9% 5.3% 5.8% 6.2% 6.5% 6.6% 6.6% 6.5% 6.4% 6.3% Deficit/Financing Surplus (9)=(6)-(5) -4.3 -16.1 -31.2 -45.1 -58.7 -64.8 -65.5 -63.3 -59.2 -53.3 % Deficit/Surplus (110)= (9)/(6) -1.8% -6.4% -11.7% -15.9% -19.4% -20.2% -19.3% -17.6% -15.6% -13.2%  Annex 18 Financing Scenarios Page 2 of 6 BASE SCENARIO 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 ______ __ {_ (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (1) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses 36.9 41.6 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146,0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing (2) 223.9 237.5 252.0 267.4 283.7 301.0 319.0 337.9 357.9 378.9 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees ___ _ 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Deficit/Financing Surplus (3)=(2)-(1) -15.4 -28.7 -45.8 -61.6 -77.1 -84.5 -86.4 -85.1 -82.0 -77.0 % Deficit/Surplus (4)=(3)/(2) -6.9% -12.1 % -18.2% -23.0% -27.2% -28.1 % -27.1 % -25.2% -22.9% -20.3% SCENARIO 1b With cost recovery (Share of tuition in teaching costs) 20% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (5) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses 36.9 41.6 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146.0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing (6) 249.0 266.1 284.6 304.0 324.4 344.7 365.2 386.3 408.3 431.2 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 28.1 31.8 36.0 40.3 44.6 47.9 50.6 53.0 55.2 57.2 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Net savings (7) = (6)-(2) 25 29 33 37 41 44 46 48 50 52 % Saving (8)=(7)/(2) 11.2% 12.0% 12.9% 13.7% 14.3% 14.5% 14.5% 14.3% 14.1% 13.8% Deficit/Financing Surplus (9)=(6)-(5) 9.7 -0.2 -13.2 -25.0 -36.5 -40.8 -40.2 -36.8 -31.6 -24.6 % Deficit/Surplus (10)=(9)/(6) 3.9% -0.1% -4.6% -8.2% -11.2% -11.8% 11 0% -9.5% -7.7% -5.7%  Annex 18 Financing Scenarios Page 3 of 6 BASE SCENARIO 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (1) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 _ 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses 36.9 41.6 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146.0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing (2) 223.9 237.5 252.0 267.4 283.7 301.0 319.0 337.9 357.9 378.9 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Deficit/Financing Surplus (3)=(2)-(1) -15.4 -28.7 -45.8 -61.6 -77.1 -84.5 -86.4 -85.1 -82.0 -77.0 % Deficit/Surplus (4)=(3)/(2) -6.9% -12.1% -18.2% -23.0% -27.2% -28.1% -27.1% -25.2% -22.9% -20.3% SCENARIO 1 c With cost recovery (Share of tuition in teaching costs) 30% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (5) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses 36.9 41.6 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146.0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing (6) 263.0 281.9 302.6 324.2 346.7 368.7 390.5 412.8 435.8 459.8 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 42.1 47.6 54.0 60.4 66.8 71.9 75.9 79.4 82.7 85.8 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Net savings (7) = (6)-(2) 39 44 51 57 63 68 72 75 78 81 % Saving (8) = (7)/(2) 17.5% 18.7% 20.1% 21.2% 22.2% 22.5% 22.4% 22.1% 21.8% 21.4% Deficit/Financing Surplus (9)=(6)-(5) 23.8 15.7 4.8 -4.9 -14.2 -16.8 -14.9 -10.3 -4.0 4.0 % Deficit/Surplus (I0)=(9)/(6) 9.0% 5.6% 1.6% -1.5% -4.1%/o -4.6% -3.8% -2.5% -0.9% 0.9%  Annex 18 Financing Scenarios Page 4 of 6 BASE SCENARIO 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (1) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses 36.9 41.6 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146.0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing l2) 223.9 237.5 252.0 267.4 283.7 301.0 319.0 337.9 357.9 378.9 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Deficit/Financing Surplus (3)=(2)-(1) -15.4 -28.7 -45.8 -61.6 -77.1 -84.5 -86.4 -85.1 -82.0 -77.0 % Deficit/Surplus (4)=(3)/(2) -6.9% -12.1 % -18.2% -23.0% -27.2% -28.1 % -27.1% -25.2% -22.9% -20.3% SCENARIO 2 . With cost recovery _ _ Accommodation = DT120 meals - DTO.850 ___ 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (5) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses _ 36.9 41.6 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146.0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing (6) 239.9 255.0 271.3 288.9 307.4 326.8 346.5 366.7 387.9 410.1 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 Charges for meals/housing 23.3 25.5 28.0 30.9 33.8 36.8 39.1 41.0 42.7 44.3 Net savings (7)= 6)-12) 16.0 17.6 19.4 21.5 23.6 25.8 27.5 28.8 30.0 31.2 % Saving (8) = (7)/(2) 7.1 % 7.4% 7.7% 8.0% 8.3% 8.6% 8.6% 8.5% 8.4% 8.2% Deficit/Financing Surplus (9)=(6)-(5) 0.6 -11.2 -26.5 -40.1 -53.5 -58.7 -59.0 -56.3 -52.0 -45.8 % Deficit/Surplus (10) =9)/(6) 0.3% -4.4% -9.8% -13.9% -17.4% -18.0% -17.0%1 -15.4% -13.4% -11.2%  Annex 18 Financing scenarios Page 5 of 6 BASE SCENARIO 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 L___________________________________ .l(in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (1) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses 36.9 41.6 _ 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146.0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing (2) 223.9 237.5 252.0 267.4 283.7 301.0 319.0 337.9 357.9 378.9 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Deficit/Financing Surplus (31=(24-(1) -15.4 -28.7 -45.8 -61.6 -77.1 -84.5 -86.4 -85.1 -82.0 -77.0 % Deficit/Surplus (4)= (3)/(2) -6.9% -12.1% -18.2% -23.0% 27.2% -28.1% -27.1% -25.2% -22.9% -20.3% SCENARIO 3 With private sector participation _ __ _ _ (Law and Econ., Arts & Human Sciences __ _ 15% growthi froom 1995 onwards} 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .(in M D ) Recurrent Expenditure (5) 233.2 259.3 289.8 319.8 350.3 373.5 391.6 407.2 421.6 434.9 Financing (6) 223.9 237.5 252.0 267.4 283.7 301.0 319.0 337.9 357.9 378.9 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Net savings (7) = (1)-(5 6.0 7.0 __ 8.0 9.2 10.5 12.1 13.9 15.9 18.3 21.0 % Saving (8)=(7)/11(1) 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 2.9% 3.1% 3.4% 3.8% 4.1% 4.6% Deficit/Financing Surplus (9)=(6)-(5) -9.3 -21.8 -37.8 -52.4 -66.6 -72.5 -72.6 -69.2 -63.8 -56.0 % Deficit/Surplus (1 -4.2% -9.% -15.0% -1.6% -23.5% -24.1% -28 -.5% i 17. /. -14.8% %6 ~Deficit~/Surplus (1 0) = (9)/(6) 242 -92 1.% -96 2.% -41% -2.8% -2.% 1.8 148  Annex 18 Financing Scenarios Page 6 of 6 BASE SCENARIO 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (1) 239.3 266.2 297.8 329.0 360.8 385.5 405.5 423.1 439.9 455.8 Salaries 103.6 117.2 133.1 148.8 164.8 177.2 187.1 195.8 204.1 211.8 Teachers 79.4 89.9 102.3 114.4 126.8 136.3 143.9 150.7 157.1 163.1 ATOS 24.2 27.3 30.8 34.4 38.0 40.9 43.2 45.2 47.0 48.7 Operating expenses 36.9 41.6 47.0 52.5 58.0 62.3 65.9 68.9 71.7 74.3 Meals/housing, other 98.8 107.5 117.7 127.7 138.0 146.0 152.4 158.3 164.1 169.7 Financing (2) 223.9 237.5 252.0 267.4 283.7 301.0 319.0 337.9 357.9 378.9 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.9 Charges for meals/housing 7.3 7.9 8.6 9.4 10.2 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.7 13.1 Deficit/Financing Surplus (3) =(2)-(1) -15.4 -28.7 -45.8 -61.6 -77.1 -84.5 -86.4 -85.1 -82.0 -77.0 % Deficit/Surplus (4) = (3)/12) -6.9% -12.1% -18.2% -23.0% -27.2% -28.1% -27.1% -25.2% -22.9% -20.3% OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO (Tuition 30% - Increase in cost of meals and accommodation - private sector 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 participation) (in MD) Recurrent Expenditure (5) 233.2 259.3 289.8 319.8 350.3 373.5 391.6 407.2 421.6 434.9 Financing (6) 279.0 299.5 322.0 345.7 370.3 394.5 418.0 441.6 465.9 491.0 MES Budget Title 1 213.6 226.4 240.0 254.4 269.6 285.8 303.0 321.2 340.4 360.8 Tuition fees 42.1 47.6 54.0 60.4 66.8 71.9 75.9 79.4 82.7 85.8 Charges for meals/housing 23.3 25.5 28.0 30.9 33.8 36.8 39.1 41.0 42.7 44.3 Net savings (7) = [(6)-(2)]+ 111)-(5)] 61.2 69.0 78.0 87.4 97.1 105.6 112.8 119.6 126.3 133.1 % Saving 181 = [(6)-(2)/(2)]+ [U1)-(5)/(1)] 27.1% 28.7% 30.5% 32.0% 33.4% 34.2% 34.4% 34.4% 34.3% 34.2% Deficit/Financing Surplus (9)=(6)-(5) 45.8 40.2 32.2 25.8 20.0 21.0 26.4 34.4 44.2 56.1 % Deficit/Surplus (10)=(9)/(6) 16.4% 13.4% 10.0% 7.5% 5.4% 5.3% 6.3% 7.8% 9.5% 11.4%  Annex 19 Page 1 of 2 PROJECTION OF TEACHER NEEDS (1996-2006) I. Projection of Category A Teacher Needs Sector Institution 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Literature, Arts, Fac. 114 120 124 128 134 141 149 155 161 167 173 180 Human and Inst. 5 7 10 13 16 19 22 24 25 27 28 30 Social Sciences ISFM Total 119 127 134 141 150 160 171 179 186 194 201 210 Legal, Fac Law 43 45 47 48 51 53 56 58 60 63 65 68 Economic and Fac Econ. 46 54 61 69 80 91 103 113 121 128 136 143 Management Inst. 19 35 54 75 97 117 134 146 155 162 169 177 Sciences ISET 8 15 21 26 29 33 35 36 38 39 41 Total 108 142 177 213 253 290 326 352 372 391 409 429 Medical Fac 31 32 33 33 34 35 35 36 36 36 37 37 Sciences ESSTS Total 31 32 33 33 34 35 35 36 36 36 37 37 Basic Sciences Fac 211 226 244 267 297 330 363 390 412 431 449 466 Total 211 226 244 267 297 330 363 390 412 431 449 466 Technical ENI 61 63 62 72 87 104 122 139 157 169 176 182 Sciences IPEI 20 36 52 68 87 103 118 124 127 132 139 146 ISET 4 16 32 49 64 77 92 102 109 115 120 126 Others 10 16 23 32 42 54 66 76 85 93 101 107 Total 95 130 170 220 280 338 397 441 478 509 536 560 Agricultural Inst. Sciences Total TOTAL 564 657 757 876 1015 1 1152 1291 1398 1484 1561 1633 1701  Annex 19 Page 2 of 2 II. Projection of Category B Teacher Needs Sector Institution 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Literature, Arts, Fac. 974 1009 1031 1053 1090 1128 1173 1208 1239 1273 1309 1346 Human and Inst. 160 173 189 207 223 239 256 268 276 284 291 300 Social Sciences ISFM 319 254 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 Total 1453 1435 1452 1491 1544 1598 1660 1707 1747 1788 1832 1878 Legal, Fac Law 261 273 282 292 305 319 335 348 359 372 386 400 Economic and Fac Econ. 366 410 450 496 557 621 689 744 790 833 874 914 Management Inst. 378 470 574 694 822 932 1031 1100 1147 1189 1231 1275 Sciences ISET 43 86 129 164 188 208 288 240 249 257 266 276 Total 1048 1239 1436 1645 1872 2080 2283 2432 2546 2651 2756 2865 Medical Fac 152 158 163 166 169 172 175 178 180 182 183 185 Sciences ESSTS Total 152 158 163 166 169 172 175 178 180 182 183 185 Basic Sciences Fac 607 691 792 926 1097 1279 1466 1622 1746 1855 1957 2051 Total 607 691 792 926 1097 1279 1466 1622 1746 1855 1957 2051 Technical ENI 395 404 402 457 541 637 739 839 937 1005 1049 1078 Sciences IPEI 283 373 467 555 662 754 839 873 890 919 960 997 ISET 156 224 316 410 494 572 652 710 752 783 814 846 Others 185 218 259 308 368 432 500 559 610 656 698 735 Total 1019 1218 1444 1729 2085 2395 2730 2981 3189 3363 3521 3656 Agricultural Inst. Sciences Total TOTAL 1 4279 1 4740 1 5287 1 5957 1 6747 1 7525 1 8314 1 8920 1 9407 1 9839 l_10249 | 10635  Annex 20 Page 1 of 2 Teaching Capacity, Workload and Deficit, by Establishment (1996) (Hours per year) Establishment Teaching Teaching Deficiti Capacity Workload Deficit Capacity _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~~(% ) Tunis I University Faculty of Arts, Manouba 44040 67303 17368 39.4 Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, Tunis 49355 54844 17790 36.0 Living Languages Institute, Bourgiba 23187 32369 13198 56.9 Journalism and Information Sciences Institute 10425 16544 9312 89.3 Advanced Documentation Institute 4150 9459 6617 159.4 Advanced Leadership, Culture and Youth Institute 4836 9096 8192 169.4 Subtotal 135993 189615 72477 53.3 Tunis II University Faculty of Sciences, Tunis 77975 112381 44642 57.3 Nat. School of Archit. and Urban Planning, Tunis 18536 31861 17486 94.3 School of Fine Arts, Tunis 24513 30009 9914 40.4 ENSI 8220 14452 9620 117.0 ENIT Polytechnique School, Tunis College of Science and Technology, Tunis 34992 38002 12407 35.5 IPEI, Nabeul 20185 25810 7937 39.3 Faculty of Sciences, Bizerta 24535 42211 19174 78.1 IPEST X INSAT IPEI, Tunis (Mhosen Ayari) 5999 21832 18526 308.8 IPEI, Mateur 5100 16032 12945 253.8 Subtotal 220055 332590 152651 69.4 Tunis III University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Tunis 32571 34729 6733 20.7 Fac. of Economic and Management Sciences, Tunis 39374 42917 15213 38.6 Institute of Advanced Management Studies, Tunis 32729 43394 21126 64.5 Institute of Advanced Business Studies 20070 32945 19630 97.8 Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences 12215 12428 5500 45.0 Business College 17315 17050 6450 37.3 Institute of Advanced Accounting Studies 17991 32270 22031 122.5 Subtotal 172265 215733 96683 56.1 Only understaffed disciplines are taken into account.  Annex 20 Page 2 of 2 Establishment Teaching Teaching DeficiV Capacity Workload Deficit Capacity _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (% ) Center University Faculty of Medicine, Sousse Faculty of Law, Sousse 34862 27984 3844 11.0 Faculty of Arts, Sousse 30834 41859 18506 60.0 ENIM 18234 17039 4569 25.1 IPEI, Monastir 15748 23119 10951 69.5 Faculty of Sciences, Monastir 40781 53259 15940 39.1 Faculty of Medicine, Monastir Faculty of Dental Surgery, Monastir Faculty of Pharmacy, Monastir Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, Kairouan 27976 24125 4897 17.5 Advanced Institute of Management, Sousse 7364 12413 7627 103.6 Subtotal 175799 199798 66334 37.7 South University Faculty of Sciences, Sfax 27837 40928 14276 51.3 Faculty of Medicine, Sfax Faculty of Econ. and Management Sciences, Sfax 35641 60722 35209 98.8 ENIS 31008 28819 5970 19.3 ENIG IPEI, Sfax 13319 21205 10521 79.0 Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, Sfax 32315 44234 16496 51.0 Faculty of Law, Sfax 13909 16113 5153 37.0 IPEI, Gabes 11789 12067 3048 25.9 Business College, Sfax 5432 12412 9628 177.2 School of Fine Arts, Sfax 2970 12619 10810 364.0 Subtotal 174220 249119 111111 63.8 Advanced Teacher Training Institute (ISFM) ISFM, Tunis 460 258 26 5.7 ISFM, Mhosen Ayari ISFM, Korba 364 281 29 8.0 ISFM, Mateur ISFM, Jendouba 336 252 24 7.1 ISFM, KEF 238 202 18 7.6 ISFM, Sousse 306 252 20 6.5 ISFM, Sbeitla 280 231 5 1.8 ISFM, Kairouan 374 274 15 4.0 ISFM, Gafsa 294 274 45 15.3 ISFM, Sfax l ISFM, Gabes 336 303 36 10.7 Subtotal LS.F.M. 2988 2327 218 7295.9 Grand Total 881320 1189182 499474 56.7 Source: Ministry of Higher Education Only understaffed disciplines are taken into account.    Report No.: 18522 TUN Type: SR