Sri Lanka - Recent economic developments and policies for growth

Report No. 5628-CE Sri Lanka: Recent Economic Developments and Policies for Growth May 14,1985 South Asia Programs Department FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Document of the World Bank This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS a/ End-December Currency Unit 1983 US$1.00 Rs 25.00 Rs 1.00 US$ 0.04 1984 US$1.00 Rs 26.28 Rs 1.00 US$ 0.04 Average Annual Exchange Rates Foreign Exchange Entitlement Official Rate Certificate (FEEC) Rate bI 1969-71 US$1.00 = Rs 5.95 Rs 9.22 (55% FEEC) 1972 US$1.00 = Rs 6.00 Rs 9.30 (55% FEEC) 1973 US$1.00 - Rs 6.40 Rs 10.56 (65% FEEC) 1974 USS1.00 = Rs 6.65 Rs 10.97 (65% FEEC) 1975 US$1.00 = Rs 7.05 Rs 11.63 (65% FEEC) 1976 US$1.00 = Rs 8.46 Rs 13.96 (65% FEEC) 1977 (Jan. 1-Nov. 15) US$1.00 = Rs 7.89 Rs 13.02 (65% FEEC) 1977 (Nov. 16-Dec. 31) US$1.00 = Rs 15.76 - 1977 US$1.00 = Rs 9.15 - 1978 US$1.00 = Rs 15.61 - 1979 US$1.00 = Rs 15.57 - 1980 US$1.00 = Rs 16.53 - 1981 US$1.00 = Rs 19.25 - 1982 US$1.00 = Rs 20.81 - 1983 US$1.00 = Rs 23.53 - 1984 US$1.00 = Rs 25.44 - a/ The Sri Lanka rupee, which had been linked to the US dollar from November 6, 1971, was re-linked to the Pound Sterling from July 10, 1972, onward at a parity rate of US$1.00 = Rs 15.60. Parity rates with all other currencies were determined from time to time by the Central Bank. The rupee was delinked from Sterling on May 24, 1976, linked to a weighted basket of currencies. On November 15, 1977, the exchange rate was unified, depreciated, and allowed to float at an initial rate of US$1.00 = Rs 16.00. b/ This rate applied to all exports other than tea, rubber, and coconut, and all imports other than food, fertilizer, and drugs. FEECs were abolished on November 15, 1977. This report is based on the findings of an economic mission which visited Sri Lanka during January 1985. The mission comprised Messrs. Rene Vandendries (Chief of Mission), John Wilton, Hassan Fazel, and George Mergos (consultant), and Ms. Geri Wise (Research Assistant). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY GLOSSARY AND PRINCIPAL ACRONYMS BTT - Business Turnover Tax CPC - Ceylon Petroleum Corporation EPC - Effective Protection Coefficients GOBU - Government Owned Business Undertakings IPC - Industrial Policy Committee JEDB - Janatha Estates Development Board Naha - Northeast monsoon, October-February M&LT - Medium and Long Term MTIP - Medium Term Investment Program NAFNS - National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy NMB - National Milk Board PE - Public Enterprise PIP - Public Investment Program PTC - Presidential Tariff Commission SPC - State Plantations Corporation Yala - Southwest monsoon, May-September This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their offl duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authonzation. TITLE : SRI LANKA: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES FOR GROWTH COUNTRY : SRI LANKA REGION : SOUTH ASIA SECTOR : COUNTRY ECONOMIC REPORT TYPE CLASSIF YY LANGUAGES 5628-CE CEM Restricted 05 85 English PUBDATE : 8505 ABSTRACT : Despite continued political and social unrest and a lower than expected paddy harvest due to flooding, the Sri Lankan economy achieved a substantial 5% real GDP growth rate during 1984. Moreover, both the overall budget deficit and the deficit in the current account of the balance of payments were reduced significantly. A large part of these improvements, however, was the result of unusually high tea export prices. At the same time, long-term growth trends in several major sectors of the economy remained low. This underscores the continued vulnerability of the Sri Lankan economy to fluctuations in tea earnings and the need to develop new areas of growth if living standards are to continue to rise. Based on a review of the link between Government policy and past performance, the primary focus of the report is on those policy changes in the overall incentive framework which are needed for continued growth in the future. Emphasis is placed on sector-wide policies in agriculture and industry. The report then illustrates how implementation of these policies would lead to a development scenario which would generate highex rates of growth, while maintaining internal and external financial stability. The downside risks of not following appropriate economic policies and the resulting slowdown in growth and build-up of external debt is also illustrated in alternative scenarios. The report con-ludes by emphasizing the vital role of the aid community in the achievement of Sri Lanka's development objectives. SRI LANKA: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES FOR GROWTH Table of Contents Page No. I. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................................. 1 A. Introduction ............. ...................... 1 B. Macro-economic Developments 2...... 2 (a) Sources of Growth ................. ................. 2 (b) Investment and Savings .......................... 5 (c) Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Exchange Rate .... 8 C. The Balance of Payments . ....................... 8 D. Public Finance ....... ....................... 12 (a) Introduction ...................... 12 (b) 1984 Budget Outcome .. ...................... 15 (c) The 1985 Budget ................o............... 16 II. MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS AND POLICIES ................. 19 A. Introduction - Prospects and Policy Issues ............ 19 B. The Base Scenario ... ......... .......................... 20 C. Policies for Growth ....... .. ........................... 24 (1) Agricultural Policies ....................... . 24 Introductioi . . .... . .................... .......... 24 Recent Production Trends ............................... 25 Major Policy Developments in Agriculture Since 1977 .... 27 Future Prospects and Recent Government Initiatives 29 (a) Prospects and Issues ............................ 29 (b) Recent Government Initiatives ................... 31 The National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy ......................................... 31 Tree Crop Subsector ............................... 32 Livestock Industry .............................. 36 Conclusion ....3.............................. 37 (2) Industrial and Trade Policies ....... .......... 38 Introduction - The Emerging Constraints to Growth .... 38 Prospects and Issues ...o........................ 40 Recent Government Initiatives and Upcoming Policy Issues ...o.................... ........ 41 (a) Industrial Policy Committee .................... 41 (b) Tariff Reform ................ . ... . 42 (c) Public Manufacturing Enterprises .............. 43 (d) Export Policy .......l4...................... 46 Conclusion ........................................... 48 D. Downside Risks 4...... ............................... 48 -ii- Page No. III. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OUTLOOK AND AID REQUIREMENTS ......... 51 A. Balance of Payments Prospects and Borrowing Strategy ..... 51 Export Prospects ......................................... 51 Import Prospects ......................................... 54 Foreign Exchange Requirements ......................... 55 Borrowing Strategy: Official Sources of Funds ........... 56 Private Sources of Funds .................o............... 58 B. External Debt Management ................................ 58 STATISTICAL APPENDIX .............................................. 61 MAP LIST OF TABLES IN THE TEXT Table 1: Annual Real Growth Rates of GDP and Selected Sectors, 1978-84 .................................... 3 Table 2: Other Selected Economic Indicators, 1978-84 ........... 7 Table 3: Balance of Payments Data, 1978-84 ........ .............. 11 Table 4: Summary of Budgetary Operations, 1977-85 ................ 14 Table 5: Historical and Projected Economic Indicators, 1980-94 ... 23 Table 6: Value Added in Agriculture and Its Major Subsectors - Average Annual Growth Rates and Shares of GDP ......... 26 Table 7: Real Price Indices for Major Crops ..................... 27 Table 8: A Co-tparison of Tax Incidence on Tea Exports in Sri Lanka and Kenya ................................... 35 Table 9: Budget Support of Public Manufacturing Enterprises ...... 44 Table 10: Alternative Growth Scenarios, 1984-94 ................... 50 Table 11: Base Scenario Balance of Payments Projections, 1984-88 .. 52 Table 12: Export and Import Detail ............................... 53 Table 13: Cumulative Foreign Exchange Requirements and Sources of Financing, 1981-88 ......................... 56 Table 14: New Commitments of Official Assistance and Commercial Loans, 1981-88 ........................... 57 Table 15: Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt Outstanding at Year-End ............................... 59 Graph 1: Effective Exchange Rates, 1978-85 ....................... 46 Page 1 of 2 pages SRI LANKA - COUNTRY DATA AREA POPUIATION &I DENSITY 65.607 sq ka 15.6 million (mid-1984) 235 per sq km (1981) Rate of Growth: 1.7% (from 1971 to 1981) 763 per sq km of agricultural land (1979) POPULATION CRARACTERTSTICS (1983) hH !EALTH (1983) Crude Birth Rate (per '000): 26.2 Population per physician: 7,902 Crude Death Rate (per '000): 6.1 Population per Bospital Bed: 349 Infant Mortality (per '000 live births): 34.0 cJ INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1978) ' DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP Z of national income, highest quintile: 54 Z owned by top 10% of owners: - lowest quintile: 4 % owned by smallest 10% of owners: - ACCESS TO PIPED WATER (1981) ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY (1971) Z of population - urban: 47 Z of dwellings - total: 9 rural: 10 rural: 3 NUTRITION (1977) EDUCATION (1981) Calorie intake as % of requirements: 97 Adult literacy rate: 87% Per capita protein intake (grams per day): 43 Primary school enrollment: 98Z GNP PER CAPITA IN 1983: $330 A/ OUTPUT IN 1984 BY SECTOR ANNUAL RATE OF GROUTH (Z. constant prices) Value Added $ Million 3 1970-77 1977-84 1970-8f Agriculture 1.519 28.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 Industry S/ 1,347 24.8 2.1 5.3 3.9 Services 2.566 47.2 3.7 7.1 L i Total L/ 5.432 100.0 2.9 5.7 4A GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN 1984 US$ million _L GDP at Market Prices 6.012 100.0 Investment 1,567 26.1 Gross National Savings 1.347 22.4 Current Account Deficit 220 3.7 Exports of Goods and NFS 1,755 29.2 Imports of Goods and NFS 2,121 35.3 GOVERNMENT FINANCE Central Government (Re million) K of GDP at Market Prices 1984 1297 1983 1984 Current Receipts j/ 33,342 17.2 18.9 21.8 Current Expenditures h/ 27.795 18.3 18.6 18.2 Current Surplus 5.547 -1.1 0.3 3.6 Capital Expenditures jf 21.105 7.3 13.7 13.8 External Assistance 12.934 3.2 8.0 8.5 g Registrar General's Department. h/ Provisional. j 1981. Al World Bank Atlas estimate. s/ Manufacturing, mining, and construction. f GDP at factor cost. z/ Includes capital revenue. h/ Includes advance accounts. j/ Includes net lending. South Asia Programs Department May 14. 1985 Page 2 of 2 pages SRI TAMA - COUNTRY DATA MONET. CREDIT. AND PRICES 191M 1271 12Z 1979 19 1981 1982 1281 1984 (end of period) (Rs Million) Honey and Quasi Money 3.115 8.717 10,892 15.058 19.860 24,447 30,510 37.257 43,427 Bank Credit to Public Sector 2.856 4,659 4,226 6,267 13.095 17,277 21,828 21,918 18,703 Bank Credit to Private Sector .1,320 4,116 6.449 8,705 12,709 16,690 20,570 27,375 31,224 (Percentages or Index Numbers) Money and Quasi Money as Z of GDP 22.8 23.9 25.5 28.7 29.9 28.8 30.5 30.6 28.4 General Price Index (1970-100) 100.0 147.0 164.8 182.6 230.2 271.6 301.1 343.3 400.5 Annual Percentage Changes in: General Price Index +5.9 +1.2 +12.1 .10.8 +26.1 +18.0 +10.8 +14.0 +16.7 Bank Credit to Public Sector +10.4 +7.7 -9.3 +48.3 +109.0 +31.9 +26.3 +0.4 -14.7 Bank Credit to Private Sector +8.6 +40.5 +56.7 +35.0 46.0 +31.3 +23.2 +33.1 14.1 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MERCRANDISE EXPORTS (1984) 1982 1983 1984 S Million Z (US$ illion) Tea 620 42.0 Exports of Goods, NFS 1,305 1,360 1,755 Rubber 130 8.8 Imports of Goods, NFS 2.205 2,138 2.121 Coconut Products 60 4.1 Resource Cap (deficit - -) -900 -778 -366 All Other Commodities 665 46.1 Net Factor Income -98 -138 -131 TOTAL 1.475 100.0 Net Transfers & Remittances 264 274 277 Balance on Current Account -734 -642 -220 EXTERNAL DEBT ($ Million) A/ Direct Foreign Investment 63 37 36 Met HILT Loans 403 292 311 December December Disbursements 472 373 410 __1983 __194 Amortization 69 81 99 Capital Grants 162 171 154 Total Outstanding 3,678 3,736 Other Capital (net) 79 143 24 Change in Reserves (+ - increase) -27 +1 +305 Total Outstanding and Disbursed 2,214 2.420 Gross Reserves (end-year) 527 522 735 Net Reserves (end-year) -22 -21 284 Crude Oil and Petroleum Products DEBT SERVICE RATIO ]L C) 17.7 14.2 Imports 590 468 419 Exports 158 114 129 IBRD/IDA LENDING, March 31, 1985 CUSS Million) RATE OF EXCHANGE IBRD IDA EndLJ979 End 182 USS1.00 - Re 15.45 US$1.00 - Re 21.32 Outstanding and Disbursed 53.9 329.2 Rs 1.00 - USS 0.06 Re 1.00 - USS 0.05 Undisbursed 10.4 287.0 End 1980 End 1983 Outstanding, including US$1.00 - Re 18.00 USS1.00 - Rs 25.00 Undisbursed 64.3 616.2 Re 1.00 - USS 0.06 Re 1.00 - US$ 0.04 End 1981 End 1984 USS1.00 - Re 20.55 US$1.00 - Re 26.28 Rs 1.00 - US$ 0.05 Re 1.00 - USS 0.04 a/ Repayable in foreign currencies and vith a maturity over one year. bJ Ratio of debt service on public and publicly guaranteed MLT debt (including IF charges and repurchases) to exports of goods and services. South Asia Programs Department May 14, 1985 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS i. After almost ten years of low growth, Sri Lanka introduced a new development strategy during the late 1970s, and the economy made good economic progress in several ways; output, employment and investment recorded substan- tial increases. GDP grew at 5.7% per annum in real terms between 1977 and 1984. The rapid growth in paddy output was most impressive, with the result that rice imports declined from an average of 33% of total rice consumption during 1970-77 to only 12% during 1978-83. Today the country has virtually reached self-sufficiency in rice. The ambitious public investment program, dominated by the massive Mahaweli irrigation and power development, was equally noteworthy; it was designed to create new sources of long-term growth. In support of this program, the country secured unprecedented levels of exter- nal aid. ii. Some of the policies which made these achievements possible, however, also led to serious financial imbalances. For example, as the public invest- ment program gained momentum, it grew beyond the country's resource availabilities, thus contributing to unsustainable budgetary and balance of payments deficits and to undesirable levels of foreign commercial borrowing. More importantly, the imbalances in the budget and in the balance of payments were aggravated by an inadequate resource mobilization effort by the public sector and by the existence of an overall policy environment which was not conducive to growth in several major subsectors of the economy, and especially the export sector. Exchange rate policy was of primary importance. Following the unification and depreciation of the exchange rate in 1977, the Sri Lankan rupee has more or less ccntinuously appreciated in real terms, thereby moving relative incentives in favor of non-traded activities and against sectors such as agriculture and industry. Within agriculture, paddy production was the exception: it was not taxed directly; prices were allowed to rise to world market levels; inputs were subsidized; other government spending such as Mahaveli directly assisted paddy; and it received substantial research and extension assistance. Other agricultural subsectors performed relatively poorly. This was especially true of the tree crop sector, which was subject to high export taxes and continued weak management in the state plantations. Industrial growth was also low. Although import tariffs were used to provide higher protection to manufacturing, the growth opportunities created by this inward-looking policy were limited by the small size of the domestic market. Moreover, the tariff structure protected existing firms but discouraged the creation of new industries, while the performance of publicly owned manufac- turing enterprises, which still contribute about 40% of manufacturing value added, was particularly poor. Export growth based largely on tourism and garments was sporadic. Excluding export earnings from the latter two activities, the real growth rate of exports during 1979-84 was barely 2.1% per year. Export earnings have remained concentrated on a few products, with tea and rubber alone accounting for half of total merchandise export value in 1984. -ii- iii. Despite the considerable political and social unrest, real GDP grew at 5% in 1984, matching the 1983 growth rate. After several years of precarious financial conditions, 1984 saw a significant reduction in both the external and internal deficits. As a share of CDP, the overall budget deficit declined from 13.4% in 1983 to 10.2% in 1984, while the current account deficit in the balance of payments declined from 12.4% in 1983 to 3.7% in 1984. Net interna- tional reserves rose by $305 million. These achievements were partly the result of Government policy, including the adoption of restrictive credit policies towards the private sector, the introduction of new revenue raising measures and the containment of public spending. Yet the dominant factor in explaining these developments was tea; export earnings from tea rose by $267 million or the equivalent of 4.4% of GDP, while government revenue from tea export taxes rose by Rs 2,794 million, the equivalent of 1.8% of GDP. iv. The sudden decline in tea prices during early 1985 underscores the continued vulnerability of the Sri Lankan economy and hence the need to pursue policies which will stimulate growth in new activities. The two primary areas of growth in the recent past, viz., paddy and public investment supported by large concessionary foreign capital inflows, are expected to slow. As rice self-sufficiency is now being reached, this sector is likely to be a less important source of growth in the future. In addition, public investment is unlikely to -- and indeed should not - expand very rapidly, in part because concessionary aid inflows are expected to level off. Yet, if Sri Lanka is to absorb the yearly addition to the active labor force and raise welfare levels, it is vital to maintain output growth rates of the order of 5% per annum. The primary issue facing the country, therefore, is to design and implement policies which will generate growth in alternative activities, especially exports. In addition, if growth is to be attained within a sustainable finan- cial framework, issues of investment strategy and domestic resource mobi- lization will also need to be addressed. v. The Government is well aware of these problems and, as demonstrated by the 1985 budget, has continued the process of policy reform. The 1985 budget introduced three new policy initiatives related to trade taxes, namely import tariff reform, a change in export taxes on tree crops, and a proposal to establish stabilization funds for tea and rubber. The import tariff reform is the first step in a phased program to reduce the variance in effective protection and lower the average level of protection. The Government showed considerable resolve in pushing forward with this reform despite much internal opposition. The change in tree crop taxation, which accompanied the introduc- tion of the Medium Term Investment Program for the state plantations, resulted in an overall reduction in the tax burden on tree crops and thus helped restore producer incentives in the sector. A decision was also made to estab- lish stabilization funds for tea and rubber as a countercyclical measure designed to reduce macro-economic fluctuations in an economy dependent on primary commodity exports with wide price fluctuations. In addition to these budgetary actions, the Government's report on a National Agricultural, Food and Nutrition Strategy lays out a framework for important reforms in the support services which would greatly assist in creating conditions for -iii- broader-based agricultural growth. Also, to help develop a consistent industrial policy framework, the Government has formed a high level Industrial Policy Committee, and it has continued to press hard to initiate reform of the public enterprise sector. These are major steps in moving towards an incen- tive framework which will allocate and utilize resources more efficiently. More needs to be done, however, if the Government is to achieve its objective of a rate of economic growth of at least 5% per annum in the coming years. vi. Economic projections for Sri Lanka are more than normally uncertain because of the current social and political tensions in the country. The report's projections Assume that substantial progress will be made in resolv- ing the communal conflict. The analysis suggests that a 5% per annum rate of economic growth is feasible and the current comfortable international reserves' position provides a good background against which to introduce further policy reform. It is recognized, however, that the volatile domestic situation may make the type of policy shifts advocated here difficult to implement. This argues for patience, but it does not negate the importance of continuing the process of reform. vii. Recent growth rates in agriculture, when import substitution in rice was the major driving force, are unlikely to be repeated. Nevertheless, the rehabilitation of the tree crop sector together with a determined effort at agricultural diversification and continued but slower growth in paddy should lead to a fairly high rate of expansion of some 3.6% per year during the next five years. The annual real growth rate of industry, on the other hand, should accelerate from 3.5% during 1979-84 to 4.8% during the next five years based on several anticipated developments. Processing traditional exports, which constitutes about one quarter of value added in industry, should grow at 2 to 3% per annum, as opposed to stagnation in the past. Exports of manufactures, which make up some 15% of industrial value added, should increase at 10% per annum given adequate incentives. Other industrial output should expand at 4.5 to 5.0% per annum, on the expectation that public manufacturing enterprises will be rationalized and the demand for domestic manufactures will increase in response to rising real incomes and an appropriate exchange rate policy. viii. The diversification of growth in both the agricultural and industrial sectors will need to focus on export markets and efficient import substitution. This means, in turn, providing appropriate incentives -- the exchange rate and trade taxes cum subsidy policies; providing support services including research and extension; developing infrastructure, especially roads and rehabilitating existing ass3ts; and, pursuing institutional reforms, especially in respect of public enterprises and financial markets. It must be added that the success of this strategy depends crucially upon continued growth in, and unrestricted access to, world export markets. ix. It was mentioned earlier that the Government has initiated some sig- nificant reforms in agriculture designed to revitalize parts of the sector. If these initiatives are to yield maximum benefits, they need to be set within -iv- an overall strategy designed to encourage the most efficient use of land resources. The investment in Mahaweli is beginning to open up new areas of irrigated land and the country's level of rice imports is minimal. Sri Lavka is, therefore, well placed to diversify into other crops without sacrificing the Government's prime objective of rice self-sufficiency. The challenge will be to create a policy framework which encourages farmers to increase yields from existing crops and to move land out of paddy in some areas into alterna- tive crops. The latter development is more likely to occur where the return to producing alternative crops is high and the domestic policy biases in favor of paddy are reduced. This will take time because farmers often perceive paddy as an "insurance" crop, i.e., it does not have to be traded to provide nutrition, farmers are familiar with optimal cultivation practices, and Government policy is designed to support paddy. x. A program of reforms is required that reduces the risk and raises the relative return to the farmer of moving land into its most productive use. Such a program will include incentive, support service and institutional components. The first step should be to restore producer incentives by allow- ing international prices to have a greater influence on the relative returns to different crops with due regard to stabilization objectives. This would entail restructuring taxation and subsidy policies around a more neutral framework, which includes cost recovery on publicly provided inputs such as irrigation water or fertilizer. This would also necessarily imply broadening the tax base in agriculture in order to equalize the tax effects on different crops. Second, there is a need to renew efforts to channel more resources into the necessary support framework. Improved research and extension serv- ices for a wider variety of crops and the rehabilitation and maintenance of the infrastructure in rural areas appear to be high priorities. In addition, whenever the opportunity arises, institutional reform should be pressed forward, both to reduce direct Government involvement in production, marketing or distribution and to consolidate and rationalize the remaining administra- tive structure. xi. As indicated, the Government has also begun to tackle in earnest several important constraints affecting the industrial sector. These initia- tives must now be pursued further. The phased process of tariff reform should be continued and certain anomalies in the first stage corrected; these include the exceptions which were allowed as well as the increase in Business Turnover Taxes payable on imports which partially offset the reduction in import duties. Concrete action to reform the public enterprise sector should be initiated early since this process is likely to take time. Above all it is crucial for the Government to establish and maintain the exchange rate at a level which will keep Sri Lanka internationally competitive in a wide range of exporting and import substituting activities. Kii. In pursuit of the growth objective it is also crucial that financial stability be maintained. To that end, the ratio of investment to GDP will have to be reduced from the average of 29.4% during 1980-84 to around 26.0% during the next five years and the national savings rate will have to increase -v- from 16.4% of GDP during 1980-84 to close to 20.0%. The reduction in the investment rate and the increase in the national savings rate will depend to a large extent an budgetary policies. Private investment is projected to increase as a share of GDP from 12.0% in 1980-84 to close to 14.0% during 1985-89 in response to the growth policies discussed above. Public investment will therefore have to be reduced from more than 17.0% during 1980-84 to about 12.0% during 1985-89, a target which the Government itself has accepted. On the savings side, it is important to maintain private savings at the level achieved in recent years; this means following a more flexible interest rate policy which offers a positive real rate of interest so as to attract private saving. Budgetary savings have been negative in most recent years. This is projected to change as a result of a combination of expenditure cuts and revenue raising measures. Thus, budgetary savings are expected to average 3% of GDP during the coming years. Reducing current spending may be difficult; there is a clear need to raise public sector salaries and the Government has begun to provide increased allocations for much needed spending on operation and maintenance. While several categories of current spending are fixed obligations and cannot be cut, there remain within the Sri Lankan budget several items of expenditure in the areas of subsidies, transfers and advance account payments which can be cut without efficiency Loss. There is a clear need to review the desirability of continuing to subsidize producer inputs, of providing transfers and advance account payments to inefficient public cor- porations which cannot be expected to pay back, and there are many instances where increased reliance on user charges must be pursued. Nevertheless, even if the Government succeeds in controlling current spending, there will con- tinue to be a need to raise revenues and restructure the tax system in order to reach the savings target. The challenges to continued good budgetary management are illustrated by developments during early 1985. The unexpected decline in tea prices may make it difficult to reach the 1985 budget revenue targets. At the same time, the Government continues to be uader a great deal of pres3ure to admit new expenditures, partly due to the windfall accumulation of reserves during 1984. xiii. The attainment of the 5% growth objective also rests on some important assumptions regarding external factors. The accumulation of reserves which occurred in 1984 has established a base from which the immediate balance of payments outlook is healthy under most scenarios. Even with a successful export drive as assumed in this report, however, Sri Lanka will continue to require substantial amounts of foreign assistance over the medium term. In the past the large resource gaps arising from successive budget deficits and slow export growth were financed by rapidly growing remittances and especially by the increased use of foreign concessionary capital made available by donors. Remittances are unlikely to continue their past growth and conces- sionary capital has become much scarcer. The projections assume that remit- tances remain constant in real terms. Official grants are projected to decline even in current prices, while commitments of new concessionary loans remain constant in real terms at the current level of about $300 million. There is, however, projected to be some real increase in non-concessionary financing from official sources, so that total commitments from official -vi- sources, loans and grants, are projected to remain constant in real terms. In the coming years the Sri Lankan economy will be forced to adjust to much smaller resource gaps than in the past and to rely partly on commercial bor- rowing to fill those gaps. xiv. The balance of payments projections in this report depend, above all, on the restoration of international competitiveness; the significant real appreciation of the Sri Lankan rupee since 1977 must be reversed. In volume terms export growth is projected to exceed import growth, although this will not be the case in current prices during the next five years because of deteriorating terms of trade. The bulk of external finance needed during the next few years to cover the current account deficit, amortization, repayments to the IMF and the addition to reserves, would come from official sources on highly concessional. terms. New commitments from these sources, loans and grants, would have to rise from $460 million in 1984 to $600 million by 1988. It should be noted that this level of commitments implies no growth in real terms. Commitments of official assistance have declined substantially from the peak of $800 million in 1981. In the past two years they have averaged about $450 million a year, partly because both Government and donors made a conscious effort to limit the introduction of new projects in a public invest- ment program which had grown beyond the country's absorptive capacity. Current indications are that the aid donors are likely to make new commitments amounting to about $500 million during 1985. For 1986 we would also recommend to the donors a level of new aid commitments of the order of $500-550 million. This level of support is a vital component in the overall strategy of restruc- turing the Sri Lankan economy at the same time that foreign commercial borrow- ing is contained at a manageable level. Areas most urgently in need of sup- port include rehabilitation of existing irrigation schemes, completion of downstream work in Mahaweli, rehabilitation of the road network, power trans- mission and generation, and telecommunications. Financing of local expendi- tures in support of the Government's own efforts to raise public sector savings and reduce the overall budget deficit should also receive high priority. xv. Together with the strengthening of Sri Lanka's export sector the country would also gradually become creditworthy for increasing levels of commercial borrowing. The balance of payments projections in this report assume that new commitments of private loans rise from $130 million in 1985 to about $285 million by 1988. A substantial portion of this commercial borrowing would be related to cofinancing requirements for some large projects with good economic justification, such as the major upcoming power projects. xvi. With a concerted effort to build up exports, strong support from donors and prudence in che use of commercial debt, Sri Lanka's debt servicing burden will be manageable. The public debt service ratio implicit in the balance of payments projections in this report, including IMF charges and repurchases, rises to 18.8% in 1987 but then declines to 18.0% in 1988 and 15.1% in 1994. The most crucial element in balance of payments management is to ensure that the export growth targets are achieved. If the Government were -vii- to maintain a high rate of investment and GDP growth through increased reliance on foreign borrowing to compensate for the shortfall in export receipts, the external debt service ratio would quickly rise to unacceptable levels, soon restricting the country's access to voluntary foreign capital inflows. On the other hand, if the Government reacts to the weaker export performance by curbing investment and import growth and reducing the growth of output, incomes and employment, the rate of growth of total consumption would eventually be reduced severely to unacceptably low levels, jeopardizing much of the economic progress made during the past few years. xvii. In sum, attaining the growth targets postulated in this report in the context of internal and external financial stability, entails a policy agenda for the Government which includes: (1) an appropriate exchange rate policy and changes in trade taxes and subsidy policies to create a producer incentives' framework which is more neutral between different activities: this includes, among others, a further review of tree crop taxation, and continuation of the phased process of tariff reform; (2) increased emphasis on support services, including research and extension, for broad-based agricultural growth; (3) investment in infrastructure such as roads, rehabilitation and power; (4) concrete action towards public enterprise reform; (5) a public investment program not exceeding around 12% of GDP; and (6) an increase in public savings to around 3% of GDP through a combination of expenditure cuts and revenue increases. To complement the above, the donor community should consider: (1) maintaining total official commitments roughly constant in real terms in the future, and in the range of $500-550 million during the coming year; (2) giving priority to meeting needs related to rehabilitation of existing irrigation schemes, completion of downstream work in Mahaweli, rehabilitation of the road network, power transmission and distribution, and telecommunications; (3) continuing to finance local currency expenditures; and (4) continuing to provide technical assistance to the Government. Chapter I: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS A. Introduction 1. Sri Lanka recorded a substantial improvement in a number of macro- economic indicators in 1984 despite considerable political and social unrest. Real GDP grew at 5%, matching the 1983 growth rate. Given the disruption of economic activity from physical damage and reduced private investment, this represents a considerable achievement. In addition, there was a significant narrowing of both the external and internal deficits, due partly to a con- tinued improvement in Sri Lanka's terms of trade and partly to Government policy. The reduced current account deficit in the balance of payments was financed largely by concessionary foreign aid inflows. At the same time there was an unprecedented $300 million accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, largely as a result of increased earnings from tea exports. The increase in available resources enabled the Governmeknt to reduce its overall demand for domestic credit and its outstanding debt to the banking sector by a repayment of Rs 2.6 billion. These favorable developments were supported by tighter monetary policy, which, coupled with improved food supplies later in the year, led to a reduction in the inflation rate to 9% during the 12-month period ending December 1984. The one negative trend in the macro-economic indicators was the steady appreciation of the currency. The rupee moved from Rs 25.2 per U.S. dollar at the beginning of 1984 to Rs 26.2 by December 1984, implying a considerable appreciation against almost all other major currencies.1/ 2. A dominant factor in explaining the performahce of the economy in 1984 were the favorable developments in the tea sector. Continued high tea prices coupled with a 16% increase in output resulted in a marked increase in both export earnings and Government tax revenue. Other favorable factors were higher coconut prices, the continued growth in garment exports, the recovery of the manufacturing sector, and lower world inflation; unfavorable factors were the reduced paddy and coconut crops and the decline in tourism. 3. While the above indicators reflect a strong economic performance in 1984, there remain a number of structural weaknesses which the Government will need to continue to address if the recent favorable growth rate is to be sustained over the medium term. When one looks at the sectors of the economy that will have to provide growth in the future there is reason for some concern. The good performance of 1984 at the same time underscores the vul- nerability of the economy to fluctuations in earnings in the tea sector. Without the policies needed to stimulate the growth of new exports and effi- cient import substitution activities, economic performance will not only 1/ See Chapter II for a detailed discussion of movements in the real exchange rate. -2- remain unnecessarily dependent on a few exogenous factors but the potential for future economic growth will also be limited.1/ 4. The Government is well aware of this problem and, as demonstrated by the 1985 budget, has continued the process of policy reform. The remainder of this chapter describes recent Government policy initiatives in the context of a more detailed analysis of the sources of growth, monetary policy, the balance of payments outcome and budget performance. B. Macro-economic Developments (a) Sources of Growth 5. The recent growth performance of the leading sectors and subsectors is presented in Table 1. The past year represents something of a break with previous trends in a number of ways. First, tea production registered an impressive 16% growth in volume over the drought-induced level of 1983, reversing the previous declining trend. Producers responded quickly to the improved weather conditions, continued high world prices, and a renewed commitment by the Government to rehabilitate the stagnating tree crops sector. The price rise in late 1983 through 1984, plus a recent adjustment in the tax structure provided producers with the opportunity to earn substan- tial profits. 11 A discussion of medium-term trends under different policy scenarios is found in Chapter II. -3- Table 1: ANNUAL REAL GROWTH RATES OF CDP AND SELECTED SECTORS, 1978-84 (at constant 1970 factor prices) 1978 . 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1977-84 a! Agriculture 5.4 2.0 3.1 6.9 2.6 5.3 2.1 4.0 Paddy 12.7 1.4 11.9 3.6 -3.4 15.2 -3.5 4.5 Tea -4.3 3.5 -7.5 10.0 -10.7 -4.5 16.2 -0.7 Rubber 5.6 -0.9 -13.0 -6.7 0.6 12.3 3.7 -2.0 Coconut 15.4 6.4 -11.0 11.5 11.3 -8.3 -7.0 2.0 Manufacturing and Mining 10.0 4.8 1.6 5.0 4.6 2.2 9.2 4.6 Export Processing 2.1 4.4 -9.8 7.6 -5.3 -4.6 9.0 -0.6 Factory Industry 11.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 8.9 2.0 14.0 6.1 Small Industry 13.2 9.8 0.0 5.1 10.1 4.0 4.2 6.1 Construction 28.3 20.9 11.0 3.0 -2.0 1.0 -0.1 6.0 Services 7.6 7.8 8.0 6.4 7.0 6.6 5.8 7.1 GDP 8.2 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.7 a/ Annual real growth rate over 1977-84 period using least squares method of estimating trend growth rate. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. 6. Second, the favorable weather conditions for tea had the opposite effect on paddy. Heavy flooding in certain regions early in 1984 resulting in a poor Maha crop, which normally accounts for about two-thirds of total paddy output during the year. Although the 1984 Yala crop was a record, paddy output declined by 3.5% in volume in 1984 after several years of almost uninterrupted growth. It is anticipated, however, that the 1985 Maha crop will be good. The improved performance of the paddy sector has been the main component in supporting agricultural growth in recent years. During 1977-84, value added in paddy increased by more than 4.5% per year in real terms; rice imports declined from an average 33% of total rice consumption during 1970-77 to only 12% during 1978-83. Imports during 1984 amounted to only 40,000 NT, by far the lowest level in many years and equivalent to about 2% of total consumption. As a result of Government policies over the past few years, including investments in irrigation, strengthened support services for farmers and the freeing of prices, the paddy sector has been considerably strengthened and its vulnerability reduced. Without these improvements, the decline in paddy output last year would have been even more pronounced, and the need for imports much increased. -4- 7. Much of the gain in paddy production has resulted from producers' response to improved incentives. The Government has withdrawn from interven- tion in both the direct procurement of rice (allowing private traders to market the produce which has lowered transaction costs) and in fixing market prices. Domestic rice prices have been allowed to increase to parity with international prices which has resulted in an upward adjustment in the domes- tic selling price. The Government's role has been reduced to providing a floor price for domestic paddy and the use of stocks to stabilize the market in times of supply shortages. Given present consumption patterns, the country has virtually reached rice self-sufficiency. However, the Government intends to pursue the goal of self-sufficiency in cereals further through the substitution of rice for imported wheat by altering relative prices. It is not clear what the domestic resource costs of this policy are. Additional increments in rice output may become more costly to attain, and the benefits of increased rice production must be weighed against the economic advantage of using the land for alternative crops either for the local market or for exports. 8. Third, the manufacturing sector recorded an unusually high growth rate in 1984. Part of this was directly related to the increase in tea production as demonstrated by the 9.0% growth in the export processing subsector, and the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) operated at or near full capacity. The higher growth rate in 1984 also reflects a more general recovery from 1983 when output was constrained by continuous power shortages. The commissioning of some of the Mahaweli hydroelectric plants considerably eased the situation, resulting in increased industrial capacity utilization during 1984. One area of suscained real growth in the manufacturing sector was garment exports. Due to increased demand caused by the strong recovery of the U.S. economy plus entry into new product markets, garment manufac- turers were able to increase exports by 47% in nominal terms. 9. The growth performance of other sectors of the economy remained similar to past trends. The output of agricultural commodities (other than tea and paddy discussed above) continued to grow slowly, especially export crops. While specific assistance has been provided for particular crops, under the guidance of the Export Development Board,1/ a number of other factors related to the supporting infrastructure, extension services and other components of the incentive structure, particularly the exchange rate, negated these positive incentives. A renewed effort at creating the environ- ment needed to stimulate a more efficient and diversified use of agricultural resources is essential for future growth. The elements of such an effort are discussed in Chapter II. 1/ For example, some success has been attained under the Export Development Board sponsored Village Export Promotion Scheme. -5- 10. The same or similar shortcomings in incentives and infrastructure constrained growth in new manufacturing activities. As discussed in the following section, private sector investment actually experienced a sharp decline. Although the reluctance to enter new investments is, in part, a reaction to the increased uncertainty created by the continuation of ethnic violence, part is due to inadequate policy measures. For example, the viability of a number of relatively new export-oriented manufacturing enterprises appears to be threatened by the appreciation of the real exchange rate. 11. Both the service and construction sectors were also adversely affected by Sri Lanka's domestic problems. Tourism declined below the already low 1983 level, with an increase in cancellations occurring in November for the coming season. Construction activity has also slowed due to the completion of a number of large projects and the general increase in uncertainty fostering a "wait and see"~ attitude before making investment decisions. (b) Investment and Savings 12. Beginning in 1979, Sri Lanka allocated more than one-quarter of its annual output to gross domestic investment. As shown in Table 2, in 1980 it reached the comparatively high ratio of one-third of GDP. The Central Government, public corporations and the private sector all participated in the investment boom, dominated by the construction of the massive Mahaweli power and irrigation system. As the accelerated portion of the Mahaweli program approached completion, the investment ratio began to fall; the slow- down in investment is apparent beginning in 1983 and continuing in 1984 when the ratio dropped to 26% of GDP. In the absence of reliable disaggregated investment data, it is difficult to evaluate the source of declining invest- ment in the public sectors. However, the drop in private investment is disturbing since it represents a major source of growth in the economy and is expected to provide an even greater impulse to output growth in the future. Part of this decline probably reflects the uncertainty created by the ethnic violence which escalated in July 1983. Both domestic and foreign private investors have been cautious in making new commitments as they wait to see how the domestic situation develops. 13. The financing of the boom is clearly reflected in Table 2. Gross domestic savings as a share of GDP declined in the late 1970s and then stayed flat during the period of the rapid build-up of investment until 1983 and 1984. Thus remittances (reflected in net private transfers from abroad) from migrant workers, mostly in the Middle East, helped offset the decline in -6- domestic savings, but most of the resource requirements was financed by increased concessioiary and commercial foreign capital inflows.1/ 14. While the improved terms of trade for 1983 resulted in a moderately reduced need for foreign savings, the latter declined sharply in 1984 due to a significant increase in domestic savings. Private savings increased by close to 3% of GDP and, more significantly, public savings became strongly positive for the first time since 1977, also increasing by slightly more than 3% of CDP. In addition, national savings increased at a time when private remittances declined as a share of GDP due to the weakened demand for foreign labor in the Middle East market, following the fall in oil prices. Most of the increase in savings derives from higher tea prices, which has raised private incomes and public revenues. It would appear that individuals and Government view 1984 as something of a boom year during which savings should be increased to provide precautionary balances against future unexpected declines in income. 1/ The concessionary and commercial inflows are further discussed below in connection with the budget and the balance of payments. -7- Table 2: OTHER SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1978-84 (% of GDP at current prices) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Cross Domestic Investment 20.0 25.8 33.8 27.8 30.6 28.8 26.1 Central Government 6.0 7.7 9.8 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.6 Public Corporations a! 5.9 9.1 11.4 11.0 14.1 11.5 10.8 Private 8.1 9.1 12.6 11.6 11.6 12.2 9.7 Cross National Savings 15.5 14.7 14.0 14.1 15.3 16.4 22.4 Central Government b/ -1.4 0.2 -3.8 -1.7 -1.4 0.3 3.6 Private and Public Corporations 16.9 14.5 17.8 15.8 16.7 16.1 18.8 less - Net Private Transfers from Abroad 0.8 1.4 3.4 4.6 5.5 5.2 4.6 less - Net Factor Income from Abroad -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -2.2 -2.0 -2.6 -2.2 Gross Domestic Savings 15.3 13.8 11.2 11.7 11.8 13.8 20.0 Foreign Savings 4.5 11.1 19.8 13.7 15.3 12.4 3.7 Colombo Cost of Living (Z change, year to year) 12.1 10.8 26.1 18.0 10.8 14.0 16.7 Money Supply (Z change end-December to end-December) 25.0 38.2 31.9 23.2 24.6 21.7 16.8 a/ This estimate includes budgetary capital transfers plus extrabudgetary sources of finance. It should be noted that the Government defines public corporations to include a number of Government departments, in particular the Mahaweli Development Board and the National Housing Development Authority, which are not expected to finance investment independently of budget transfers. If only Mahaweli is excluded, investment by public corporations stays flat at approximately 6.5% of GDP. b/ Equals current savings of the Central Government. Sources: Central Bank of Ceylon and Ministry of Finance and Planning. -8- (c) Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Exchange Rate 15. The decline in private sector investment caused a weakened demand for credit. This also coincided with a reduction in net credit to the Government, due to the improved revenue derived from tea, and with several policy measures designed to tighten domestic credit expansion. In an attempt to slow the rate of growth of domestic liquidity, the authorities introduced quantitative credit restrictions to the private sector, resumed auctions of Central Bank securities and increased the marginal reserve requirements on bank liabilities. Although the expansion in money supply remained high (at 16.8% for the 12-month period ending December 1984), this does represent an improvement over 1983. 16. The decline in the growth of liquidity was an important reason for the decline in inflation. After a higher inflation rate in the early part of the year had pushed the average mid-year Colombo cost-of-living index up to 16.6%, inflation declined significantly towards the end of 1984 (to 9% from December to December) partly because of the increased domestic availability of important food crops. The combination of increased domestic savings, tight monetary policy and a lower inflation rate has reversed the previous upward pressure on interest rates, causing both deposit and lending rates to decline recently. If inflation and the public sector's demand for credit can be held in check, and leaving aside the climate of uncertainty noted above, a further reduction in interest rates could help provide an important boost to private sector investment. 17. Inflation is also being suppressed by the Government's exchange rate policy. The Sri Lankan rupee has been allowed to depreciate only slightly against the U.S. dollar in recent months, which, together with the strength of the latter, has meant a real appreciation against all other major currencies. While the objective of the Government's exchange rate policy understandably is to avoid domestic price increases in a few basic consumer items during a period of social and political tension, this policy has impor- tant negative implications for the longer-term growth of the economy. It retards the development of new growth activities, i.e., non-traditional exports and efficient import substitutes, and thereby delays the creation of additional employment and income earning opportunities. C. The Balance of Payments 18. The balance of payments outcome in 1984 was a dramatic reversal from previous years. This is shown in Table 3 below. Export receipts increased by some $400 million to $1.75 billion while imports remained constant at $2.1 billion. As a result, the current account deficit, which averaged 16.3% of GDP in 1980-82, dropped from 12.4% in 1983 to 3.7% in 1984. Net interna- tional reserves, which had declined since 1980 and stood at minus $21 million -9- by the end of 1983, rose by $305 million during 1984.1/ Sy the end of 1984, gross official reserves stood at about $600 million, the equivalent of 3.1 months of imports of goods and services. 19. Merchandise exports increased by 39% in nominal terms mainly owing to a strong performance of tea and garments exports. Tea export volume rose by 30% from a drought-induced low level of 158 million kgs in 1983, while tea export prices rose by 36Z.2/ The,increase in volume was at least in part a response to the higher prices, improved producer margins and a series of measures taken by the public corporations to provide management and worker incentives in the field. Garments exports increased by 47% in nominal terms, because of a strong effort by the industry to increase its output and exports of products in non-quota categories, primarily to the U.S. market. The strong export performance of tea and garments was somewhat dampened by the continued stagnation of most other merchandise exports. Moreover, the political uncertainty also contributed to a decline in earnings from tourism, while the recession in the Middle East resulted in stagnant workers' remittances. 20. On the import side, merchandise imports in 1984 remained at roughly the 1983 level in current dollars. A sizeable increase in the imports of intermediate goods was offset by reduced spending for imports of food, other consumer goods and petroleum. Apart from price declines such as petroleum, major factors contributing to the decline in imports include the substantial drop in rice imports, credit restrictions in the case of non-essential imports and the overall climate of uncertainty in Sri Lanka which depressed private investment activity and appar-itly contributed to a rundown of stocks. 21. The current account deficit declined to $220 million, equivalent to 3.7% of GDP. The increase in the level of export earnings was responsible for a decline in the public debt service ratio from 17.7% in 1983 to 14.2% in 1984. Without the rise in export prices the debt service ratio would have remained at close to 18% in 1984. A key favorable factor affecting the balance of payments has been the 33% improvement in the terms of trade since 1982, both because of rising export prices and declining import prices. The roughly $500 million decline in the current account deficit since 1982 is equivalent to this terms of trade improvement. 1/ Net international reserves are defined as gross foreign assets minus short-term liabilities of official entities (Central Bank and Government) and commercial banks, and the net IMF position. 2/ Export volumes increased by more than domestic production during 1984 due to the carry-over of stocks from 1983. -10- 22. The positive balance of payments developments in 1984, however, should not obscure basic long-term trends. The most important of these is the low volume growth of exports, and the concentration of earnings on a few products. For example, tea and rubber alone accounted for 51% of total merchandise export value in 1984. With regard to traditional products, and abstracting from fluctuations due to the weather, the export volumes of tea, rubber and coconuts have essentially stagnated since 1978 and, especially in the case of rubber and coconuts, declined when compared with the early 1970s. Even in the case of tea, the 1984 export level was only 6% above that achieved in 1978 and below that of 1970. These trends result from a neglect of necessary investments during a prolonged nationalization process in the early 1970s, followed by the creation of numerous and poorly coordinated ministries and serious managerial problems in the state plantations. In addition, the overall incentive framework provided low to negative margins for both public and private producers. In recent years, however, the Government has been actively pursuing policies designed to reverse the trends of the 1970s, culminating in the Medium Term Investment Program (MTIP) for the State Corporations (Chapter II). 23. The real growth of non-traditional exports is difficult to judge in the absence of reliable price deflators. However, in the case of other agricultural exports (i.e., apart from tea, rubber and coconuts), these have stagnated in nominal dollar terms since 1978 and in fact declined during the past couple of years. Starting from an almost insignificant base, exports of other manufactured goods, apart from garments, grew fairly rapidly in value until 1982; they have stagnated since then. The one success story among merchandise exports in recent years is garments. It results from a combina- tion of Sri Lanka being a new entrant in a quota-dominated export area and efficient domestic manufacturing based on imported inputs. Two other sources of foreign exchange earnings, tourism and workers' remittances, both starting from a low base, grew rapidly until 1982. Since then, earnings from both sources have leveled off. -11- Table 3: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DATA, 1978-84 (US$ million) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Exports (G+NFS) 950 1,135 1,297 1,346 1,305 1,360 1,755 (Merchandise fob) (846) (982) (1,065) (1,066) (1,014) (1,062) (1,475) Imports (C+NFS) 1,081 1,540 2,205 2,055 2,205 2,138 2,121 (Merchandise cif) (999) (1,450) (2,051) (1,877) (1,990) (1,918) (1,911) Net Factor Income -15 -15 -26 -97 -98 -138 -131 (M&LT Interest Payments) (-25) (-28) (-33) (-50) (-69) (-86) (-103) Net Current Transfers a/ 22 48 136 203 264 274 277 CURRENT ACCOUNT -124 -372 -798 -603 -734 -642 -220 Net Direct Investment 2 47 43 49 63 37 36 Of--*icial Grants 58 144 138 162 162 171 154 Bilateral and Multilateral Loans (net) 206 149 151 154 170 237 261 Disbursements (239) (181) (190) (186) (204) (280) (310) Amortization (33) (32) (39) (32) (34) (43) (49) Private Loans (net) b/ -29 9 84 182 233 55 50 Disbursements (2) (25) (96) (194) (268) (93) (100) Amortization (31) (16) (12) (12) (35) (38) (50) Other Capital c/ -19 71 162 23 79 143 24 Change in Net Reserves (- indicates increase) -94 -48 220 33 27 -1 -305 (as % of GDP) Current Account -4.5 -11.1 -19.8 -13.7 -15.3 -12.4 -3.7 Official Grants 2.1 4.3 3.4 3.7 3.4 3.3 2.6 Bilateral & Multilateral Loans (net) 7.5 4.4 3.8 3.5 3.5 4.6 4.3 Private Loans (net) -,.1 0.3 2.1 4.1 4.8 1.1 0.8 Memo Items: Public Debt Service ($ mn) Public M&LT Loans 89.0 76.5 84.2 93.4 137.5 166.9 202.0 IMF 40.1 49.1 58.6 89.6 74.0 82.3 55.0 Debt Service Ratio 13.3 10.7 10.6 13.3 15.7 17.7 14.2 Export Price Index 98.8 103.6 114.3 107.8 100.0 106.3 121.1 Import Price Index 74.1 88.8 106.6 106.8 100.0 93.6 90.8 Terms of Trade 133.3 116.7 107.2 100.9 100.0 113.6 133.4 a/ Mainly private remittances. b/ With Government guarantee. c/ Includes short-term capital, non-Government guaranteed M&LT capital, SDR allocations, and errors and omissions. Sources: Central Bank; and Bank staff estimates. -12- 24. The poor overall performance of exports reflects the absence of an incentive framework, encouraging efficient export or import substitution activities. Policies are now being put inzo place to revitalize the "traditional" export sector. In addition, the Export Development Board has instituted a number of export promotion measures designed to assist specific non-traditional exporters.1/ Yet, in terms of the major price components determining a country's competitiveness -- the exchange rate and the tariff structure -- policy has been biased in favor of production for the domestic market. In recognition of this problem, the Government, in its 1985 budget submission, has taken a major step to improve resource allocation iy commenc- ing a process of tariff reform. However, exchange rate policy has continued to allow the rupee to appreciate, thus encouraging imports, moving incentives towards non-traded activities and discouraging the development of non- traditional exports. 25. Between 1978 and 1982, responding to the liberalization policies and to increases in the level of investment expenditure, imports grew con- siderably faster than exporLs in volume terms, but they have declined mar- ginally since. Major elements in constraining import growth since 1982 have been the continued successful program of import substitution in rice and the restraint in investment spending. 26. Balance of payments developments in Sri Lanka during the past few years have also been influenced heavily by budgetary policy. Large budgetary deficits, starting in 1980, increased the demand for imports and necessitated undesirable levels of foreign commercial borrowing. More recently, the Government has taken firm action to reduce these deficits, yet financing them has resulted in a fairly rapid increase in the debt service ratio. In addition, movements in the international terms of trade clearly play a major role in bil.ance of payments developments in an economy such as Sri Lanka. While the terms of trade during 1983/84 are roughly at the level of 1978/79, the substantial deterioration in between, complicated macro-economic manage- ment and was partly responsible for the need to resort to high levels of foreign borrowing and the increased debt service burden. D. Public Finance (a) Introduction 27. In order to place public finance developments during 1984 as well as the 1985 budget into the proper perspective, it is worthwhile to review some longer-term trends in government finances as illustrated by Table 4. The overall picture shows total public expenditures increasing rapidly without a corresponding increase in revenues. The result is a budgetary deficit increasing from 5.8% of GDP in 1977 to a peak of 23.1% in 1980 and declining 1/ These are discussed in more detail in Chapter II. -13- thereafter to 10% in 1984. Until 1979 the higher expenditure levels were offset by increased domestic borrowing and significant additional inflows of concessionary aid and grants, even to the point that the Government could continue to add to reserves. However, in 1980 the resources needed to com- plete ongoing public investments began to exceed the inflow of concessionary foreign finance and the Government turned to commercial foreign loans and continued high levels of domestic borrowing to finance the resource gap. This resulted in increased debt service payments which, given Sri Lanka's poor export performance and declining terms of trade up to 1983, began to raise important questions concerning the overall creditworthiness of the economy. Ir addition, the large budgetary deficits resulted in increased rates of inflation and an appreciation of the currency. Having been provided with a renewed mandate in the national referendum/elections of 1982, the Government has succeeded in reducing budget deficits from a high 17.3% of GDP in that year to an estimated 10.2% in 1984. 28. Part of the explanation for the unsustainable deficits experienced in the early 1980s has been a persistently weak public revenue mobilization effort in relation to expenditure levels. In the face of declining world market prices and reduced domestic output of tree crops,1/ and thus reduced earnings from export duties, there was an inadequate effort to tap alterna- tive sources of revenue. Indeed, as shown in Table 4, the share of non- export tax receipts in CDP in 1982 was below that of 1978. The subsequent improved revenue effort in 1983 and 1984 (to 18.9% and 21.8% of GDP respectively) originated from three main sources: the marked increase in the world price of tea, the treatment of Central Bank profits as revenue; and a number of other short-term taxation measures related to specific developments, e.g., the rehabilitation levy following the July 1983 riots. 1/ The factors leading to a decline in tree crop output are discussed in Chapter II in the section dealing with agriculture. -14- Table : BUNM OF BUDGEARY OPERATIONS, 1977-85 jLf (in percent of GDP) Provisional Provisional Budget 12M1 12LS 1M 19 0 19.1 1982 . 1983 . 9a 195 Revenues 16-.7 26.1 23.0 IL.2 17.4 jjj L. ,2 ?! 20.5 Income Tax 0.8 0.9 , 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 Corporate Profit Tax 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.6 1.7 2.1 2.0 2.5 2.4 Export Taxes 3.3 11.3 9.1 5.8 4.5 2.6 2.8 4.2 3.2 Import Duties 1.5 3.4 4.3 4.4 3.2 2.7 3.3 3.4 2.9 Business Turnover Tax 1.8 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.3 4.0 5.1 5.4 6.1 Excise Tax 2.3 3.1 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 Other Taxes 3.4 1.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 Other Non-tax Revenue 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 2.4 2.3 Transfer of Central Bank Profits - - - - - - 1.2 1.1 0.8 - Current Expenditure 16.6 23.4 20.8 19. 17.3 18.4 17.7 16.6 16.8 ' Wages and Salaries 5.0 5.4 5.5 4.8 4.3 4.4 4.1 3.7 3.9 Goods and Services 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.1 3.6 Pensions 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 Transfers to Public Corporations 0.4 2.5 1.8 2.4 1.6 1.7 1.6 { ( Transfers and Subsidies to {4.6 (3.6 Households and Other 5.2 8.5 6.3 4.6 3.8 3.3 2.7 { ( Interest. Domestic 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.1 3.6 Interest, Foreign 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 Underexpenditure Provision - - - - - - - -0.4 -0.3 Advance Accounts 12 4-1 2. 4.6 1.8 - 0.9 1.6 0.1 Current Account Balance -0.1 -1.4 0.2 -3.8 -1.7 -1.4 0.3 2A L Capital Expenditure 5--l 12.3 14.0 1-3 13.8 1L.1 13.7 13.8 12.3 Overall Deficit - -13.7 -13.8 -23.1 -1. -17.3 -1 -10.2 -8.7 Foreign Finance (net) .. 2S_ 7.1 1- 8.1 1.1 8.0 8-5 7-0 Net borrowing ( 7.5 4.5 5.3 5.7 4.7 5.1 5.7 4.9 (Gross commercial) ( 2.9 (-) (-) (1.4) (2.0) (1.2) (1.1) (-) (0.3) Grants { 1.5 2.6 3.9 3.2 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.1 Domestic Finance (net) 2..2 4.7 6.7 13.9 6.6 9. 5 1.7 1.7 Banking System -2.0 0.4 1.2 10.6 4.5 3.7 0.4 -1.7 -0.6 Other 4.9 4.3 5.5 3.3 2.1 5.5 5.0 3.4 2.3 n/ Import duty rebates have been deducted from both revenues and current expenditures from 1981 onwards. The table is therefore not fully consistent with the Statistical Appendix tables. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. -15- (b) 1984 Budget Outcome 29. The estimated actual total revenue collection in 1984 exceeded budget estimates by over Rs 6.0 billion or 4% of CDP; it represents a significant improvement in performance. Part of this revenue gain is due to higher than expected inflation; over Rs 4.0 billion is derived from additional taxes on international trade, of which Rs 2.5 billion is solely due to higher than anticipated tea prices and volumes; and Rs 1.5 billion is the gain from additional import duties. While increased tariffs contributed to the revenue gain, a significant share came from an unexpected change in the composition of imports towards higher taxed commodities. 30. The other significant source of additional revenue was from non-tax sources. This amounted to approximately Rs 1.3 billion above the 1984 budget forecast, and originated essentially from a 50% after tax "profits dividend" extracted from all public corporations (inclusive of banks and manufacturing enterprises); and a large capital receipt from CPC. CPC was in a position to make this payment due to higher than expected profits resulting from favorable relative price movements.l/ 31. Current expenditures in 1984 were held close to budget estimates with additional expenditures being limited to transfers and subsidies and defense- related programs. Advance accounts expenditures, however, exceeded budget estimates by Rs 2.2 billion. These payments were made to a variety of public agencies or enterprises, including the Insurance Corporation (to settle claims arising from the July 1983 riots), the Fertilizer Manufacturing Corporation, the Cement Corporation, the Ceylon Transport Board and a few other public manufacturing enterprises; the monies were provided to cover unexpected operating losses or capital costs. Advance accounts expenditures have often exceeded budget estimates due primarily to the poor performance of a few public enterprises. If budget targets are to be met, this category of expenditure needs to be carefully estimated and controlled, perhaps with some penalty applied to those users of the funds that persistently are unable to make repayments.21 32. Capital expenditures exceeded budget estimates by Rs 4.6 billion, with foreign aid plus bookkeeping entries accounting for about Rs 2.7 billion. The remaining Rs 1.9 billion was accounted for by additional expen- ditures on Mahaweli (Rs 800 million), defense (Rs 824 million) plus a number 1/ Capital receipts are included in non-tax revenue because they are usually insignificant. The payment involved the total repayment of a loan advanced to CPC by the Treasury in 1979. 2/ This could take the form of denying future access to budgetary funds. However, in the case of loss-making public corporations, a remedy would necessitate more direct reform of the enterprises themselves. -16- of additional projects related to transport, highways, health and telecommunications. Much of the latter type of expenditure involved financ- ing the local costs of foreign-aided projects or important rehabilitation work due to the flood damage in early 1984. While such expenditures may have been necessary, the magnitude of the overexpenditure, especially with regard to Mahaweli, indicates continued weakness in budget planning. The World Bank's 1984 Country Economic Memorandum suggested that certain projects appeared to be underfunded and that a 15% underexpenditure provision on top of a 10% across-the-board cut looked unrealistic and would in many cases produce undesirable results.1/ The 1984 outcome bears out this argument and illustrates the difficulties of attaining expenditure reductions by relying on across-the-board measures rather than cuts in specific projects. 33. Although expenditures did exceed revenue gains, the increased inflow of concessionary aid and grants enabled the Government to finance the 1984 budget deficit without recourse to foreign commercial borrowing. In addition, the domestic borrowing from non-bank sources exceeded financing requirements thus allowing the Government, for the first time since 1977, to make a net repayment to the domestic banking system of Rs 2.6 billion. Overall, the 1984 budgetary policies were commendably prudent. (c) The 1985 Budget 34. The 1985 budget introduced a number of new policy measures repre- senting important steps in moving towards an incentive framework which will allocate and utilize resources more efficiently. There were three major policy initiatives related to trade taxes, namely import tariff reform, the change in export taxes on tree crops, and the proposal to establish stabi- lization funds for tea and rubber. As these steps have implications extend- ing beyond strictly budgetary concerns, they are discussed in detail in Chapter II dealing with agricultural and industrial policy. The following paragraphs are confined to issues of revenue mobilization and expenditure policy. 35. On the revenue side, the 1985 budget is a mixture of revenue raising and reducing measures which, on the bottom line, results in revenues declin- ing by a forecast 1.3% of CDP. The major revenue reductions result from the revised export taxes on tree crops,2/ reduced import duties due to the implementation of the Presidential Tariff Commission's (PTC) recommendations, selective reductions in the Business Turnover Tax (BTT) for domestic industries, and higher exemption limits plus wider tax bands for income, 1/ That is, a slowdown in the implementation of aided projects with the associated loss in benefits. 2/ Expected revenue loss due to taxation reform is Rs 390 million for tea, Rs 270 million for rubber and Rs 80 million for coconut. -17- wealth, and dividend tax. In addition, if the Government implements the Rs 3 per kg payment into the stabilization fund for tea, as announced in the budget, this would entail an approximately Rs 600 million loss in revenue which is presently not accounted for in the budget estimate. Payments into the stabilization fund represent a revenue loss for the budget because such funds are to be "sterilized" to prevent a corresponding increase in the domestic money supply. The revenue losses which follow from the change in the taxation structure for tree crops, the creation of a stabilization fund, and the reform of the tariff schedule are an unavoidable short-term outcome of improving the incentive framework. However, the Government does anticipate that the loss from the income tax change will be more than offset by better enforcement of the existing tax law. It is expected that the Government will provide the necessary staff and incentives to the tax collec- tion agency to achieve this target. It must be added that the decline in tea prices in early 1985 was not anticipated in estimating the 1985 budget revenues. This implies that the Government will have to either raise revenues from alternative sources or cut expenditures if increased borrowing is to be avoided. 36. Current expenditure is budgeted to increase marginally from 16.6% of GDP in 1984 to 16.8% in 1985. However, total expenditure is forecast to decline from 32.0% of GDP in 1984 to 29.2% in 1985, due to tighter control of advance accounts and a further reduction in capital expenditure. Although a reduction in current expenditures could be achieved by adjustments in the subsidies and transfers paid to households and public. corporations, other components such as interest payments, pensions and to some extent wages are fairly fixed. In addition, any further reduction in total transfers and subsidies (they have fallen from 11.0% of GDP in 1978 to 4.6% in 1984) needs to be selective if the poor are not to suffer unduly. Although the Government should be encouraged to further reduce the subsidization of both producer inputs and inefficient public corporations, which amount to 5.4% of budgeted current expenditures or almost 1.0% of GDP, the simultaneous reduc- tion in direct income transfers to the lowest income group could have severe repercussions on l;-;ng standards. 37. In an effort to redress the past neglect of O&M expenditure on exist- ing public capital assets, the 1985 budget introduced Project 101, which has been allocated the equivalent of 10% of planned capital expenditures in 1985 specifically to address this type of essential work. The largest allocations within Project 101 are Highways (26%), Railways (22%), Mahaveli (9.6%), Local Government, Housing and Construction (9.2%), and Lands and Land Development (6.1%). During this first year of operation the Government will have to carefully assess whether Project 101 has been allocated sufficient resources, whether priorities have been correctly established and whether the financial provision in the budget does actually result in the physical implementation of the needed maintenance and rehabilitation work. 38. A greater degree of uncertainty surrounds the advance accounts and capital expenditure forecasts. The 0.1% of GDP budgeted for advance accounts in 1985 appears to be overly optimistic; 0.2% of GDP was budgeted for advance accounts in 1984 whereas actual expenditure is estimated at 1.6% of GDP. The -18- pressure for increased advance account expenditure can be expected to come from certain public enterprises that consistently make unplanned claims on budgetary resources, and possibly from defense-related programs. Neither straightforward efficiency nor income distribution arguments support the continued financing of publicly owned manufacturing enterprises.l/ The Government has, however, expressed a commitment to avoid a repetition of last year's outcome where a number of claims for advance account financing were allowed late in the year. 39. The level of capital expenditure budgeted for 1985 also appears to represent an underestimation. First, the original 1985 budget estimated capital expenditures at Rs 1 billion below the Government's five-year public investment program (PIP). Indeed, the PIP (1985-89) indicates that the level of capital expenditures will continue to exceed the total non-expansionary finance available to the Government for 1986 and 1987. Second, the reliance on a 15% across-the-board cut in planned expenditures, rather than the rephasing of specific projects, continues to represent a weakness in capital budgeting which may result in overexpenditure. Although the argument has been made that line ministries will meet the expenditure targets by making selective cuts within their own ministries, this is unsatisfactory because: it leaves open the question of whether the allocation among ministries is appropriate; and some line ministries do not have the manpower capacity to undertake prioritized reductions in expenditure. The end result may be either a slower implementaticn of a number of projects which delays the benefit stream, or higher capital expenditures. In addition, the one iden- tified cut relates to Mahaweli which, based on past performance, is one of the line ministries most capable of implementing planned expenditures. 40. In sum, the 1985 budget introduced several important policy initia- tives designed to improve efficiency and economic growth over the medium term. This reaffirms the Government's commitment and ability to undertake needed economic reforms along with their attendant short-run costs even when confronted with a tense domestic situation. The Government deserves full credit for these actions. However, the budget is likely to come under severe pressure during the coming months. The sudden decline in tea prices during early 1985 may make it especially difficult to reach the revenue targets. At the same time, the Government will be under a great deal of pressure to admit new expenditures partly due to the "windfall" accumulation of reserves in 1984. Likely candidates are energy or defense-related projects. As our projections below indicate, it is crucial for favorable medium-term prospects that the foreign exchange reserves not be rapidly depleted due to additional public sector expenditures. Such an outcome would deprive the economy of the savings needed to finance expenditures throughout the rest of the decade so as to minimize subsequent dependence on foreign commercial borrowing. 1/ See paragraphs on public enterprises in Chapter II for a discussion of the issues involved. -19- Chapter II: MEDIUM-TERM CROWTH PROSPECTS AND POLICIES A. Introduction - Prospects and Policy Issues 41. It must be recognized from the outset that the social and political tensions in Sri Lanka could become the determining factor in the country's medium-term economic prospects and thus render any projections more than normally uncertain. It has been assumed, necessarily, that sufficient progress will be made toward resolving the communal conflict so that it will not become the dominating influence in future economic developments. The following discussion covers the primary economic development policy issues confronting Sri Lanka; presents a "base scenario" for sustained growth in conditions of external and internal financial stability during the next decade; reviews in some detail the type of policy reforms required to generate that growth; and provides some comments on the downside risks. It should be stressed that the Government is already well aware of the importance of the policy shifts needed and, as discussed in Chapter I, has been adjusting its policies accordingly. The purpose of the analysis in this chapter is to sketch some of the key elements of a future policy program. It is recognized that the volatile domestic situation may make the type of policy shifts advo- cated difficult to implement. While this argues for patience, it does not negate the importance of continuing to follow appropriate economic policies. A healthy economy in which output, employment and incomes are growing satis- factorily offers the best kind of environment for tackling the country's social and political problems. 42. As discussed in the preceding chapter, there were major improvements in a number of macro-economic indicators in Sri Lanka during 1984, partly as a result of the rise in tea prices and partly because of government policies. The current economic outlook for 1985 suggests continued growth and a further accumulation in international reserves. However, an examination of sectoral growth rates over the past few years and of the performance of export volumes reveals that a number of structural issues remain to be resolved if economic growth is to be sustained over the rest of this decade and into the 1990s. Past economic growth has been based primarily on paddy output growth and a sizeable public investment program supported by large concessionary foreign capital inflows. As rice self-sufficiency is now being reached, this sector is likely to be a less important source of economic growth in the future, unless the Government vigorously pursues a policy of substituting rice for imported wheat. Moreover, public investment is unlikely to - and indeed should not -- expand very rapidly, in part because concessionary aid inflows are expected to level off. Yet, if Sri Lanka is to absorb the yearly addition to the active labor force and raise welfare levels, it is vital to maintain growth rates of the order of 5% per annum. Our analysis suggests that 5% output growth along with internal and external financial stabiLity is feasible, provided that a number of major policy issues are addressed. The primary requisite is to design and implement policies which will generate new sources of growth, especially export growth. In support of the growth -20- objective, issues of investment strategy and domestic resource mobilization will also need to be tackled. 43. Attaining an acceptable rate of economic growth in Sri Lanka involves developing new areas of growth in agriculture, to offset the anticipated slowdown in paddy growth, and in manufacturing, so as to lead to a gradual acceleration in industrial output. The diversification in both sectors will need to focus on export markets. This means, in turn, providing appropriate incentives -- the exchange rate and trade taxes cum subsidy policy; providing support services including research and extension; developing infrastructure, especially roads and rehabilitating existing assets; and, pursuing institu- tional changes, especially in respect of public enterprise reform. It must be added that the degree to which this strategy will be successful depends upon continued growth in, and unrestricted access to, world export markets. 44. To maintain financial stability, the Government will have to continue its recent efforts to reduce the level of public investment from the unsus- tainable levels attained in the past. This report considers that an invest- ment ratio of about 26% of GDP (Table 5) would be consistent with other macro- economic objectives. This is to be achieved by a reduction in public sector capital spending with an increased focus on the highest priority activities, combined with a gradual increase in the relative role of private investment, especially in export production. The reduced level of total investment will have to be complemented by an increase in the national savings rate of approximately 4 percentage points of GDP, an increase which should be obtained primarily through higher public sector savings. 45. This brief report focusses on the first set of issues, viz., those dealing with policies designed to sustain a high overall rate of economic growth (Section C below). The issues of investment strategy and domestic resource mobilization are not dealt with in much detail; instead, some key parameters of these two subjects are presented within the framework of the base scenario (Section B).l/ We now turn to this scenario, which outlines the major macro-economic developments foreseen over the coming decade. B. The Base Scenario 46. The objective of the development scenario outlined below is to illustrate the conditions under which a rate of economic growth of about 5% per year can be sustained in Sri Lanka in the coming years, maintaining, at the same time, internal and external financial stability and an acceptable debt service ratio. The realization of the scenario described in Table 5 below rests on several important conditions. First, it is assumed that the Government continues to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, sterilizing some 1/ A separate report on Sri Lanka's public investment program and its financing is being planned. -21- proportion of these savings to reduce domestic inflationary pressure, and maintaining the imports coverage of gross official reserves at 3 months. Second, these short-term stabilization measures must be supported by the policy reforms discussed in Section C below, designed to stimulate production in areas where Sri Lanka can compete on world markets. Unless this second step is taken, the Government runs the risk of stabilizing the economy at a low rate of growth which would have serious consequences in terms of employ- ment and income earning opportunities. Third, to maintain financial stability the overall investment coefficient will have to be reduced from an average of 29.4% of GDP during 1980-84 to around 26.0% and the national savings rate will have to increase from 16.4% of GDP during 1980-84 to approximately 20.0%. 47. The reduction in the investment coefficient and the increase in the national savings rate will depend to a large extent on budgetary policies. Private investment is projected to increase as a share of GDP from 12.0% in 1980-84 to close to 14.0% during 1985-89 in response to the growth policies discussed below. Public investment will therefore have to be reduced from more than 17.0% during 1980-84 to about 12.0% during 1985-89, a target which the Governmer- ttself has accepted. On the savings side, it is important to maintain private savings at the level achieved in recent years; this means following a more flexible interest rate policy which offers a positive real rate of interest so as to attract private saving. Public savings, having been mostly negative in the past, are expected to reverse this trend and average about 3% of GDP in the coming years through a combination of expenditure cuts and revenue raising measures. 48. The budgetary analysis in Chapter I reviewed the Government's progress thus far in achieving sustainable public investment and savings levels and suggested further steps which need to be taken. One of the Government's objectives is to reduce the size and role of the public sector in the economy; its achievement depends on several factors. The Government's proposed reduc- tion in public sector capital spending to approximately 12% of GDP during 1985-89 and measures designed to ensure greater budgetary discipline, such as the removal of underexpenditure provisions in the capital budget, represent significant steps in the right direction. On the other hand, reducing current spending may be more difficult to achieve. There is a clear need to raise public sector salaries and the Government has begun to provide increased allocations for much needed spending on O&M. In order to generate the required level of savings on current account, revenues within the recurrent budget will have to be reallocated away from low return uses. While several categories of current spending are fixed obligations and cannot be cut, there remain within the Sri Lankan budget several items of expenditure in the areas of subsidies, transfers and advance account payments which can be cut without efficiency loss. There is a clear need to review the desirability of continu- ing to subsidize producer inputs, of providing transfers and advance account payments to inefficient public corporations which cannot be expected to pay back, and there are many instances where increased reliance on user charges -22- must be pursued. Nevertheless, even if the Government is successful in con- trolling current spending, there will continue to be a need to raise more revenues in order to reach the savings target. 49. For the medium term, a conservative estimate of total Government expenditure over the period 1985-88 indicates a level of between 29% and 27% of GDP; this compares with 34.7% of GDP during 1980-84. Given the projected inflow of concessionary foreign capital channeled through the budget of 5% of GDP and domestic non-bank borrowing of about 3% of GDP in 1985-88, the Government's implicit revenue target is between 19% and 21% of GDP, as com- pared with 18.8% during 1980-84. If revenues are to be maintained at this level, the elasticity of the present taxation system needs to be improved and the tax base needs to be widened. The increased coverage of taxes is espe- cially important if the Government is to continue to make further reforms in the overall incentive structure which will necessarily imply a reduction in taxes on those activities which currently shoulder a disproportionately high part of the tax burden. In addition, direct cost recovery mechanisms for services provided by public bodies, e.g., transport or irrigation, should be improved to further stimulate resource mobilization. The Government is aware of this problem. It has implemented a cost recovery program for the irriga- tion system and has requested technical assistance from the IMF for a review of the tax system. -23- Table 5: HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1980-94 (%) 1979-84 1984-89 1989-94 Annual Real Growth Rates GDP 5.2 5.0 5.5 Agriculture 4.1 3.6 3.8 Industry 3.5 4.8 5.7 Services 6.5 5.9 6.2 Exports of G+NFS 5.1 a/ 4.9 5.9 Imports of C+NFS 5.5 4.0 4.2 Avg. Avg. Avg. 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 As Z of GDP Investment 29.4 25.8 26.0 Private 12.0 13.8 15.0 Public b/ 17.4 12.0 11.0 Gross National Savings 16.4 19.5 20.9 Private 17.0 16.5 17.9 Public c/ -0.6 3.0 3.0 Foreign Savings 13.0 6.3 5.1 a/ Excluding exports of non-factor services (tourism) and garments, the real growth rate of exports for 1979-84 amounts to 2.1% per year. b/ Central Government capital expenditure. c/ Central Government current savings. Sources: Central Bank; and Bank staff estimates. 50. The attainment of the base scenario also rests on some important assumptions regarding external factors. The accumulation of reserves in 1984 has established a base from which the immediate balance of payments outlook is healthy under most scenarios. Even with the high export growth in the base scenario, however, Sri Lanka will continue to require substantial amounts of foreign assistance over the medium term. In the past the large resource gaps arising from successive budget deficits and slow export growth were financed by rapidly growing remittances and especially by the increased use of foreign concessionary capital made available by donors. Remittances are unlikely to continue their past growth and concessionary capital has become much scarcer. In this base scenario, remittances are assumed to remain constant in real terms. Official grants are projected to decline even in current prices, while commitments of new concessionary loans remain constant in real terms at the current level of about $300 million. There is, however, projected to be some -24- real increase in non-concessionary financing from official sources. Thus, on balance, commitments from official sources, loans and grants, are projected to remain constant in real terms. In the coming years the Sri Lankan economy will be forced to adjust to much smaller resource gaps than in the past and to rely partly on commercial borrowing to fill those gaps. Thus, the Government needs not only to introduce policies designed to stimulate export growth and efficient import substitution but also to define and implement a borrowing strategy which is consistent with resource requirements and sustainable in terms of its debt servicing implications. 51. The most important features of the base scenario are summarized in Table 5. GDP can be expected to grow initially at about 5% per annum and accelera-e to a more rapid rate during the 1990s. Real export growth would exceed import growth through both projection periods. However, in terms of current prices import growth will exceed export growth for the remainder of the 1980s because of the expected deteriorating terms of trade. 52. In terms of major sectoral growth rates, the agricultural sector cannot be expected to continue to grow at the rate of the recent past. Nevertheless, the gradual rehabilitation of the tree crop sector together with a determined effort at agricultural diversification should lead to a fairly high rate of expansion of 3.6% per year during 1984-89. The growth rate of industry, on the other hand, should accelerate to 4.8% per year during the next five years based on several developments, including an increase in processing of traditional exports as opposed to stagnation in the past, con- tinued growth in garments exports, and a substantial acceleration in exports of new manufactures. As discussed in detail in Chapter III, the outlook is for a stable balance of payments situation with the debt service ratio rising from 14.2% in 1984 to 18.8% in 1987 but then gradually declining to 18.0% in 1988 and 15.1% in 1994. The growth policies in the agricultural and industrial sectors required to realize this development path are discussed next. C. Policies for Growth (1) Agricultural Policies Introduction 53. About 75% of Sri Lazka's population resides in rural areas, with some 45% of the total active labor force directly employed in agriculture. As Table 7 shows, agriculture has declined as a percent of GDP in constant factor prices from 24.7% in 1977 to 21.3% in 1984. Agriculture continues, however, to make a significant contribution to both export earnings and Government revenue. Exports of agricultural goods accounted for approximately 64% of total merchandise exports in 1984 with the three traditional exports - tea, rubber and coconut - accounting for 43%, 9% and 4% of exports respectively. This represents a decline from the early and mid-1970s when agricultural exports accounted for over 90% of all merchandise export earnings. In -25- addition, direct export taxes on the same three traditional exports accounted for 22% of total Government tax revenue in 1984. Nevertheless, the sector's contribution to the economy could be raised. The country's natural resource base, climate and relatively low-wage and literate work force provide it with the potential to be an efficient producer of a wide variety of agricultural produce. 54. This section analyzes the issues and prospects in the agricultural sector. Initially a brief outline is provided of the performance of agricul- ture in aggregate and by major crops since 1977, followed by a discussion of the major internal policies which appear to have shaped past growth patterns. This is important because the link between Government policy and past perfor- mance provides invaluable lessons for the formulation of future policy. Subsequently recent Government initiatives are reviewed, and an assessment is made of how far these measures go in creating the type of policy framework needed to generate the rate of growth depicted in the base case scenario. Recent Production Trends 55. Given the importance of agriculture, the marked improvement in growth performance since the policy shift of 1977 is encouraging. Agriculture (excluding forestry and fishing) has grown at a real annual rate of close to 4.0% during the period 1978-84, as compared with 1.8% per year between 1970-77, largely because of a sustained increase in the production of paddy. The level of paddy production climbed to new highs in the early 1980s with setbacks in 1982 and 1984 due to unfavorable weather. The reasons for this improved performance relate to the well documented producer response to the removal of the myriad of Government controls on prices, distribution and marketing that existed prior to 1977. This was supported by a research and extension system which concentrated its resources on the development and dissemination of modern rice technology. The result has been that Sri Lanka is almost at the point of self-sufficiency in rice production, with _"aports playing the important role of providing competition to domestic producers and an alternative source of supply. -26- Table 6: VALUE ADDED IN AGRICULTURE AND ITS MAJOR SUBSECTORS - AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES AND SHARES OF GDP Average Annual Growth Rate (%) Share of GDP (Z) 1970-77 1978-84 1970 1977 1984 (constant 1970 factor cost prices) Agriculture a/ 1.8 3.7 25.7 24.7 21.3 Tea -0.7 -0.6 3.2 2.6 1.7 Rubber -0.2 -1.5 1.8 1.3 0.9 Coconut -4.1 0.8 4.1 2.6 2.0 Paddy -0.9 4.5 7.2 6.2 5.9 b/ Other 6.4 5.5 c/ 9.4 12.0 10.8 a/ Excluding forestry and fishing. b/ Paddy output in 1984 was below the trend level due to flooding - in 1983 paddy accounted for 6.4% of GDP. c/ 1978-83. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. 56. In contrast, the data in Table 6 show that, over time, the volume of traditional export crops has essentially stagnated or declined. One explana- tion has been the steady worsening of international prices which, when coupled with an appreciation of the real exchange rate, has squeezed domestic profitability. Indeed, as Table 7 illustrates, prices in real terms have declined for tea, rubber, and rice with fluctuating movements in the case of coconuts. What is of interest, however, is that since 1970 the international price of rice has declined substantially and yet this is the one crop where production within Sri Lanka expanded rapidly. It is clear that domestic policies have played a major role in shaping the impact that movements in international prices have had on different crops. -27- Table 7: REAL PRICE INDICES FOR MAJOR CROPS a/ (1981 = 100) Coconut Dessicated Year Tea Rubber Copra Oil Coconut Rice 1960 242 230 75 173 87 n.a. 1970 153 123 69 170 94 110 1972 146 77 47 110 62 74 1974 112 129 53 275 140 190 1976 102 100 89 88 63 97 1978 138 96 74 130 85 93 1980 108 110 89 153 119 84 1981 100 100 100 100 100 100 1982 97 77 77 85 65 81 1983 132 90 75 93 89 74 a/ Index of f.o.b. export prices, except rice which is world price, in real 1981 US$. Sources: Central Bank Bulletin and World Bank CEM, May 1984. 57. As production data other than those on the four major crops discussed above are not as comprehensive, it is difficult to interpret trends. However, available volume data on minor export crops indicate a slow rate of growth from a small base. Other domestic food crops, however, appear to have main- tained reasonable growth rates although marginally below the rate of growth achieved prior to 1977. Major Policy Developments in Agriculture Since 1977 58. It has already been noted that the policy measures adopted by the Government since 1977 stimulated sustained growth in paddy production. The reasons for the relatively poor performance of other agricultural subsectors are several. First, the 1977 reforms significantly shifted relative incen- tives and institutional structures in favor of some agricultural activities and against others. The beneficial incentive effects that the unification and devaluation of the exchange rate had on agriculture in 1977 were largely offset for traditional exports (tea, rubber and coconut) by the imposition of high export taxes.1/ Thus, the producers of traditional export crops did not gain from the overall increase in the price of tradeables which followed the 1/ The share of tree crops taxation in total Government revenue jumped from 12% in 1976 and 1BZ in 1977 to 42% in 1978 following an increase in international prices in addition to the devaluation. -28- devaluation. In addition, the tree crop sector had been through a protracted process of nationalization in the early 1970s which placed approximately 60% of tea, 30% of rubber and 10% of coconut land under the control of two large state corporations.l/ The uncertainty created during the nationalization process coupled witE the following period of disorganization and mismanagement within the newly created public estates resulted in a slowdown in those cul- tivation activities that are essential in maintaining yields. 59. Second, since 1978-79 there has been a shift in relative incentives away from traded goods in general and in particular against agriculture. The large capital inflows associated with the jump in public investment, espe- cially Mahaweli, increased the demand for non-traded goods causing domestic inflation to rise above international inflation, resulting in an appreciation of the real exchange rate.2/ In addition, continued budget deficits added to the inflationary pressure causing the effective exchange rate to appreciate further. As an appreciation of the exchange rate moves incentives in favor of non-traded activities, agriculture along with other traded goods became rela- tively less profitable. At the same time, the import tariffs that were used to partially offset the appreciation of the exchange rate generally offered higher protection to domestic manufactured goods.3/ Covernment policy to maintain low prices for essential foods other than rice translated into low tariff protection on agricultural products which, coupled with the exchange rate policy, disadvantaged domestic farmers. 60. Third, while traditional export crops were a major source of tax revenue, public expenditures were largely directed towards assisting other crops, especially paddy. As Mahaweli became dominant in the public investment program, an unusually large share of public resources was devoted to paddy and to raising hydroelectric capacity.4/ This investment pattern not only increased the resources which were directly employed in paddy production but it also resulted in other important investments, which would have supported more diversified growth, being starved of resources. In the attempt to con- trol budget deficits, other public expenditures such as the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing smaller-scale irrigation networks, rural roads and the operational expenses of research and extension departments were reduced. As 1/ Janatha Estates Development Board (JEDB) and State Plantations Corporation (SPC). 2/ See paragraphs 108 and 109 for a discussion of exchange rate movements. 3/ See Cuthbertson and Khan "Effective Protection to Manufacturing Industry in Sri Lanka," September 1981. 4/ Mahaweli-related capital expenditures accounted for 29%, 37%, 45%, 57%, and 52% of total capital expenditures for the years 1979 to 1983, respectively. -29- one example, the effectiveness of extension workers has been constrained considerably because of insufficient funds for fuel and travel allowances. The paddy bias of capital expenditures was further reinforced by subsidy policies. The most significant current expenditure earmarked directly for agriculture has been the fertilizer subsidy, with over 60% of the fertilizer issues used by paddy producers.1/ 61. These tax, subsidy and expenditure interventions in favor of paddy were reinforced by the focus of the research and extension service. R and E institutions and associated manpower skills developed within Sri Lanka have been traditionally centered on the four major crops. In the context of a favorable shift in incentives in favor of paddy, research support was avail- able to assist paddy farmers; as no such incentive shift occurred for the three traditional export crops, there was little demand for research and extension services. Other crops, on the other hand, continued to face the dual obstacles of lower incentives relative to paddy production and negligible research/extension support. Thus even if diversification away from paddy would have been profitable there was little development of necessary support services. 62. In addition to the above, there are wide variations in the administrative/institutional structures surrounding each crop. Last year's CEM 2/ and the recent World Bank Tree Crop Sector Report provide illustrations of complex administrative structures constraining performance. Due to the distribution of responsibilities for one crop or subsector across a number of different ministries, consistent policy formulation, coordinated planning and implementation are rendered more difficult than necessary. Once again paddy is to some extent an exception in that the direct intervention via public bodies has been significantly reduced since 1977. Other crops, however, and in particular tree crops, have had to operate in an environment where a number of the major input decisions are shaped by several public institutions. Even so, there are areas where the absence of a consistent set of policies and an adequate capacity for planning and implementation have hindered the perfor- mance of all crops, including paddy, e.g., water management and research. Future Prospects and Recent Government Initiatives (a) Prospects and Issues 63. In the base scenario discussed previously the agricultural sector is expected to grow at a slightly lower level than in the recent past, when import substitution in rice was the major driving force. Nevertheless, the - 1/ This ratio dropped in late 1983 and 1984 following the tea price rise. 2/ See pages 47-49 of "Sri Lanka: Recent Economic Developments, Prospects and Policies", World Bank, May 4, 1984. -30- projected growth rate of 3.6% during 1985-89 rising to 3.8% in the 1990s is high when compared to other countries and would represent a significant achievement in terms of raising rural income levels and increasing employment opportunities. Aside from the continued, but slower expansion of paddy, future agricultural growth is dependent on the rehabilitation of Sri Lanka's traditional tree crops and a much higher rate of growth in "other" domestic food and minor export crops. The development of an incentive framework which encourages farmers to make the most efficient use of land resources would lead to greater diversification and is vital for future growth. Tree crops can be expected to gradually attain a growth rate of 3% per annum given the invest- ment programs now being implemented and the associated policy/management reforms. The remainder of agriculture should grow at around 3.8%, with non- traditional agricultural exports accelerating to a 7% per annum growth rate, in response to completed and planned investments and the policy reforms dis- cussed below. 64. The policy agenda needed to attain this growth can be divided into two parts. First, for those assets directly owned by the Government, primarily the tree crop plantations, a direct program of action is required to rehabilitate the productive stock and institute worker/managerial incen- tives in an environment of financial discipline and accountability. As described in the following section, the Government has made a significant start in addressing this set of issues. Second, since by far the largest part of agricultural production is in the private sector a much broader program of policy reform is required to tackle the constraints to growth outlined above. The major policy issues to be addressed in such a program are: the reduction of policy-induced distortions in the inter and intra-sectoral incentive framework (exchange rate policy, tariff reform, tax/subsidy policies); the redirection of public capital expenditure towards supporting more diversified growth (public investment in infrastructure, rehabilitation of existing capi- tal assets); a more effective research and extension service covering a wider variety of crops; the rationalization and improved coordination of public institutions/ministries (e.g., water management agencies), and a thorough overhaul of the rural credit system.l/ Some progress has been made in addressing these broad, but nonetheless crucial, policy issues. We now turn to consider recent Government initiatives and areas where policy change should be pursued further. 1/ Rural credit is not discussed in this report because the Government is in the midst of introducing a number of reforms, the details of which were not available when this report was being prepared. -31- (b) Recent Government Initiatives The National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy 65. In response to the obstacles facing diversified agriculture as high- lighted above, the Government initiated a thorough sector-wide review of the constraints to agricultural development and suggested remedial policies. The resulting "National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy - A Change in Perspective" (NAFNS),l is a major breakthrough. The analysis highlights the problems touched on before as well as many others, and outlines the Government's first attempt to spell out an overall corrective strategy. The NAFNS document is the collaborative effort between the National Planning Division of the Ministry of Finance and Planning and several Government institutions responsible for agriculture. It has been an important learning experience for those involved and clearly illustrates the need for coordinated planning in those sectors where a number of government departments operate, often independently of one another. 66. Many of the recommendations put forward in the NAFNS report are sound and should be implemented. The report is particularly strong in identifying the type of reforms needed in the research, extension and water management service systems to support more diversified agricultural growth. For example, with respect to field crops other than paddy, the report notes that Government services have been centered around supporting rice production and recommends that "a multifaceted program consisting of technological development, better extension outreach and marketing facilities" be developed. These general ideas are backed up with specific reforms for particular support services. Thus, to address the lack of coordination and communication within the various research institutions the report recommends that a Council for Agricultural Research Policy be established "to advise Government on research priorities and the promotion of inter-institutional research projects". However, research is of most value when it is applied and at the moment, as the report notes, "the extension services are over-burdened in distributing and administering development subsidies at the expense of extension outreach." It is recommended that the administration of subsidies be separated from exten- sion services. This would not only free extension officers' time but would also sever the link between technical advice on good farming practices and the inspection of property by officials to determine access to Government subsidies. Indeed, as the report notes the whole rationale for subsidies should be reviewed if output price incentives are raised. 67. The report also clearly identifies the issues involved in irrigation investment and water management. It is argued that the fut- re strategy for irrigation investment should center on a shift in priorities away from the 1/ Published by the National Planning Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning, June 1984. -32- construction of new irrigation schemes towards the rehabilitation of existing schemes. This should be coupled with a greater emphasis on water management and recovery of operation/maintenance costs through fees. As the report states, "...Presently, there is minimal planning on watershed management, although large investments have been devoted to major watersheds to protect these investments and ensure rational utilization of land and water resources, there has to be coordinated watershed management." 68. The report is less clear, however, when discussing reforms related to the incentive structure. The policy advice given in different parts of the r!port is often conflicting probably to some extent because this is a firsc attempt at working towards a consensus on what the overall policy framework for agriculture should be. For example, while the report makes a general argument in favor of allowing international prices to determine resource allocation, there are also a large number of proposals for selective assistance to particular crops in particular regions, via special lines of credit, price supports, subsidies, etc. This approach suggests the adoption of selective promotion policies similar to those used in the past with mixed results. While targeted assistance to particular activities may be warranted in the short run, it is important to avoid levels of support which will lead to the misallocation of resources over the medium term, lowering productivity and growth. 69. An alternative approach would be to step back from measures designed to promote specific crops and focus policy change on correcting the more important inter and intra-sectoral distortions identified in the previous discussion. Given the limited capacity of Government to make such complex decisions as which crops to grow, when, where and how much, it would seem more appropriate to concentrate public resources on such areas as establishing a widely based and responsive research, extension and support framework. Broader policy reform should be designed to reduce both the economy-wide policy-induced distortions which disadvantage the production of traded goods, in particular agriculture, and the relative distortions between crops within agriculture. The sustained success in paddy (as well as the 16% increase in tea output in 1984) demonstrates that farmers do react quickly to market incentives if the necessary support framework is in place. 70. Aside from the NAFNS document, which remains a statement of objectives, the Government has already implemented a number of desirable policy reforms. It is worthwhile analyzing these initiatives in detail because they provide both a concrete example of what the Government has done as well as a general illustration of the outstanding issues which remain to be addressed to stimulate more rapid growth throughout the agricultural sector. Tree Crop Subsector 71. There have been three major reforms designed to revitalize the tree crops - the Medium-Term Investment Program (MTIP), Tax/Subsidy reform, and the proposed Stabilization Funds. The MTIP represents the culmination of the -33- first attempt by the two state-owned tree crops corporations (JEDB and SPC) to identify a coordinated investment strategy beyond their annual budgets. At the instigation of the Government and IDA, the MTIP was formulated by grouping the five-year investment proposals of the 530 estates into regional plans, amalgamating them into .corporate plans, and combining them further as a single investment program for the plantation segment of the tree crops subsector. The objective is to increase the production of tea, rubber and coconuts by improving the productivity of all publicly held estates, rehabilitating factories, providing field and nursery equipment, improving transportation and strengthening the management and financial control of the corporations. The MTIP represents a significant step by Government to redress past policies which basically extracted profits from tree crops without providing the resources/incentives for operators to maintain output or produc- tivity in the medium term. 72. As the MTIP is restricted to the two public corporations, the Government also implemented changes in the tree crop taxation and subsidy rates designed to improve producer incentives to all producers, including private estates and smallholders. With regard to tea, the fixed export tax was reduced by Rs 2 to Rs 7 per kg. The threshold net auction price for the ad valorem tax was raised from Rs 28 to Rs 32 per kg with the new tax rate set at a uniform rate of 50%, subject to the provision that the net auction price (after tax) is not reduced below Rs 38 per kg.1/ While the increase in the threshold price at which tax becomes payable partly reflects an appropriate adjustment for inflation, the reduced fixed tax and the exemption from ad valorem tax up to Rs 38 per kg should result in a real increase in producer margins. The existing export duty on rubber was reduced by about Rs 2.25 per kg with the introduction of a new sliding scale of duty. And for coconuts the tax threshold increased from Rs 13,100 to Rs 20,000 per metric ton of coconut oil with a 50% tax on the excess. In addition, no more permits will be issued as of January 1, 1985, for subsidies to the two state corporations (JEDB and SPC), to encourage them to replant, infill and upgrade processing machinery. These type of subsidies represented a second-best method for offsetting the high incidence of taxation and an overvalued exchange rate which reduced margins making output or quality improving investments unprofitable. As a result of the marked increase in the tea price during 1983/84 plus the finan- cial resources that will be provided via the MTIP, the Government no longer considered it necessary to subsidize inputs. The private sector, however, will continue to receive these subsidies partly because the MTIP is restricted to public corporations, and partly because it is still considered necessary, 1/ This replaced the previous tax rate of 50% between Rs 28 and Rs 55 per kg and 40% thereafter. -34- despite higher tea prices, to offset the negative effects of imperfect credit markets and the high incidence of taxation.1/ 73. While the overall reduction in the tax burden plus the removal of subsidies for state corporations are welcome initiatives which bring both input and output prices more into line with international prices, a further rationalization of the tax structure may be appropriate. There has in the past been a tendency to view the tax on tree crops as a steady and reliable source of Government revenue, at least in the sh3rt run, without due regard to producer incentives and the longer-run impact on the sector and the economy, including Government revenues. While the following paragraphs are confined to a discussion of explicit taxes, exchange rate policy clearly has equally important implications for producer incentives and Government revenues. 74. It is useful to distinguish two dimensions to producer decision- making.2/ First, there are activities that, by improving the quali'y of product, increase the price received. In the case of tea, there are many activities in tea processing aimed at improving the sale price at the auction. Since the ad valorem tax is geared to this auction price, the marginal tax rate on price is relevant. If the quality of a kilo of tea could be improved at a cost of one rupee to get an improvement in the producer price by two rupees (before tax), it would obviously be profitable to do so. Yet, if the marginal tax is equal to or about 50%, as is the case in Sri Lanka, the activity will not be profitable, regardless of the relationship between the cost of the production and the initial price. Second, there are a range of activities which increase output. At a given price, the tax rate is fixed and the marginal tax on incremental output equals the average tax rate. For example, at an f.o.b. price of around Rs 65 per kg the average tax incidence created by the current system in Sri Lanka is approximately 29%. Any output increasing investment with a benefit to cost ratio of 1.3 in a zero tax situa- tion would have a 0.92 benefit to cost ratio under the present system. A profitable activity becomes unprofitable. 75. The issue which remains to be reviewed is the balance between tree crop taxes as a primary source of revenues and the incentives provided to producers of crops in which Sri Lanka has a comparative advantage. Quite clearly, this must be decided upon as part of an overall review and revision of the taxation system and its adequacy to generate sufficient revenues. With regard to tea in particular, however, Sri Lanka's tax structure does appear to have a continued bias against producers. The 50% marginal tax rate in the Sri 1/ Both the explicit taxes plus the implicit tax of an overvalued exchange rate. 2/ In order to clearly illustrate the economic repercussions of the tax system, the examples here assume that other factors remain constant, such as the possibility of an impact on world prices. -35- Lankan case applies at any net auction price over $1.23 per kg.1/ Current price projections indicate that this price is below any average "normal trend" price. 76. An alternative tax system could be based around a progressive struc- ture of tax rates with lower levels of taxation when prices are at "normal" levels. This has the advantage of moderating price effects during periods of abnormally high prices without imposing a tax burden which severely erodes incentives. This type of tax system is illustrated in Table 8 which compares both the marginal and average tax rates in Sri Lanka with that of Kenya, one of Sri Lanka's main competitors. It is interesting to note that over the period 1970-79 Kenyan exports grew at an annual rate of 11.9%, in contrast to stagnation in Sri Lanka. Although other factors are probably of more impor- tance in explaining the performance difference, the tax structure in the Kenya case did allow price incentives to operate more freely than is the case for Sri Lanka.2/ Table 8: A COMPARISON OF TAX INCIDENCE ON TEA EXPORTS IN SRI LANKA AND KENYA a/ Sri Lanka Kenya F.O.B. Price Average Marginal Average Marginal US$/ Tax Rate b/ Tax Rate Tax Rate b/ Tax Rate 1.2 22.4 0 0 0 1.8 14.9 0 2.8 10 2.4 27.7 50 5.6 15 3.0 32.2 50 8.2 20 3.6 35.2 50 10.7 25 4.2 37.3 50 13.1 30 a/ Assumed end-1984 exchange rates: K Shs 15.5 = $1 SL Rs 26.0 = $1. b/ This is the total tax payment, including fixed taxes, expressed as a percent of the corresponding f.o.b. price. It should be noted that the fixed tax in Sri Lanka is approximately $0.28 per kg versus $0.01 per kg in Kenya. 1/ However, as explained earlier, the tax becomes effective only at prices above $1.46 per kg. 21 Sri Lanka's other major competitor, India, does not impose any sig- nificant export taxes. However, exporters are controlled to some degree by manipulating a minimum export price to restrict export quantities. -36- 77. An additional major initiative in the 1985 budget was the Government's declared intention to establish stabilization funds for tea and rubber. This would entail syphoning off part of the tax revenue collected when prices are above a "trend level" into a.fund which is not part of current revenue. The funds are thereby sterilized to reduce the itflationary impact that a rapid rise in export prices can have an the economy, and would only re-enter the economy when prices hit abnormally low levels via price support to producers. Thus, stabilization funds represent a countercyclical measure designed to reduce macro-economic fluctuations for an economy dependent on primary com- modities with wide price fluctuations. While the countercyclical objective is desirable, the policy also needs to be implemented with due regard to producer incentives. 78. Although the details of how the stabilization funds will work in Sri Lanka have not been finalized, the intention is (a) to make payments into the funds only in times of above normal trend prices, and (b) to establish such a fund by making withdrawa-s from revenues already generated by the existing tax system, i.e., there will be no incremental tax effect on prices received by producers. It should be noted, however, that whether there will be a stabi- lization effect depends upon whether the Government reduces its own expendi- ture by the amount of the revenue loss due to payments into the stabilization fund or manages to raise revenues from alternative sources. 79. A method by which to attain both the stabilization and tax/incentive objectives would be to move to a progressive marginal tax structure. Lower levels of taxation when prices are in the normal range could be combined with progressively higher marginal tax rates at above normal trend level prices with a commitment to pay some proportion of the revenue collected at the higher tax rates into a sterilized stabilization fund. Subject to the above- mentioned review of the overall tax system, this would satisfy the macro management objectives without sacrificing the output, employment and income gains that derive from having resources employed in areas of comparative advantage. The Government has asked the IMF for some background technical papers and has established a special working group to investigate the issues involved in operating a stabilization fund. Livestock Industy 80. The Government has also instituted several policy measures which lay the foundation for an efficient livestock industry. With respect to dairy, the past expansion of milk production has been limited due to Government intervention in the marketing, distribution and in particular, the pricing of milk products. Past policy objectives resulted in the incentives necessary to encourage domestic production being given secondary importance to the objec- tive of providing milk to consumers at low and subsidized prices. A World Bank dairy report indicated that, subject to the adjustment of incentives, and -37- the introduction-of certain key institutional changes, domestic dairy produc- tion is an efficient import substitution activity with potentially significant employment/income effects for the rural poor. 81. In response, the Government has allowed both the producer and consumer prices of milk to rise, thereby reducing the budgetary subsidy to both the National Milk Board (NMB), the main processor of domestic milk, and the Cooperative Wholesale Establishment, the agency responsible for most milk imports. The Government has also decided to move towards abolishing the NMB and replacing it with an institutional structure which will be privately owned, primarily by dairy farmers. A complete restructuring and modernization of the dairy industry is intended which involves the construction of new processing plants and chilling centers and te encouragement of private sector ownership. In addition, the efficiency of domestic production and the level of prices to consumers will be held in check by allowing the importation of dairy products at a nominal tariff rate of 25% or less. Given the current overvaluation of the exchange rate and the level of other import tariffs, this is an acceptable tariff rate. 82. While these steps will greatly enhance the productivity and growth of dairy products, a similar expansion in meat production requires further action. Retail price controls, the absence of suitable slaughter and market facilities and a ban on the slaughter of buffaloes and female cattle reduce the incentives for producers to slaughter excess stock. A removal of these restrictions is required not only to increase the production and quality of domestic meat products in the short run, but also to ensure that the genetic improvement programs are effective in raising the quality of herds over the medium term. These measures would also have to be supported by a more effec- tive disease control and veterinary services network. Conclusion 83. In sum, the Government has initiated several significant reforms designed to revitalize parts of the agriculture sector. The measures under- taken with respect to tree crops will lead to a revitalization of traditional exports, particularly from state-owned plantations. More needs to be done for private tree crop smallholders; some of the tax/incentive measures that should be considered have been indicated. The livestock subsector will receive a considerable boost from dairy if the current program of reform continues to be implemented. This should be supported by removing the constraints confronting meat producers. In addition, the NAFNS report lays out a framework for impor- tant reforms in the support service network which will greatly assist in creating the conditions for broader based agricultural growth. 84. Looking ahead, if these initiatives are to yield maximum benefits, they need to oe set within an overall strategy designed to encourage the most efficient use of land resources. The investment in Mahaweli is beginning to open up new areas of irrigated land and the country is, therefore, well placed to diversify into other crops without sacrificing the Government's prime -38- objective of rice self-sufficiency. The challenge will be to create a policy framework which encourages farmers to increase yields from existing crops and to move land out of paddy in some areas into alternative crops. The latter development is more likely to occur where the return to producing alternative crops is high and the domestic policy biases in favor of paddy are reduced. This will take time because farmers often perceive paddy as an "insurance" crop, i.e., it does not have to be traded to provide nutrition, farmers are familiar with optimal cultivation practices, and Government policy is designed to support paddy. However, if farmers' incomes are to continue to increase, it is important that the appropriate incentives are put in place to encourage them to diversify towards crops which yield a higher rate of return at world prices. The alternative will be continued expansion of rice output at increasing costs of production which, in the absence of export competitiveness, can only be supported by increased resort to domestic price supports and public subsidies. 85. A program of reforms is required, designed to reduce the risk and raise the relative ttturn to the farmer of moving land into its most profitable use. Such a program will include incentive, support service and institutional components. The first step should be to restore producer incen- tives by allowing international prices to have a greater influence on the relative returns to different crops with due regard to stabilization objectives. This would entail restructuring taxation and subsidy policies around a more neutral framework, which includes cost recovery on publicly provided inputs such as irrigation water or fertilizer. This would also necessarily imply broadrning the tax base in agriculture in order to equalize the tax effects on different crops. Second, there is a need to renew efforts to channel more resources into the necessary support framework. Improved research and extension services for a wider variety of crops and the rehabilitation and maintenance of the infrastructure in rural areas appear to be high priorities. In addition, whenever the opportunity arises, institu- tional reform should be pressed forward, bot"h to reduce direct Government involvement in production, marketing or distribution and to consolidate and rationalize the remaining administrative structure. (2) Industrial and Trade Policies Introduction - The Emerging Constraints to Growth 86. When the 1977 liberalization reform package was implemented it was envisaged that the industrial sector, in particular manufactured exports, would provide a major source of future economic growth and employment. Initially, the various manifacturing subsectors did indeed respond positively with both factory industry and small industry registering particularly. high growth rates (7.5% and 11.5% respectively for 1977-79). CapaLity utilization increased due to the removal of import restrictions, the incentive to enter the production of traded goods relative to non-traded activities strengthened due to the unification and devaluation of the exchange rate, and the general -39- investment climate improved in response to the overall policy shift towards a more open market-oriented economy. 87. However, because of the absence of further Government measures designed to build upon the 1977 reforms and negative external developments, this renewed growth was, with the exception of garments, short-lived. As pointed out in the section dealing with agriculture, the subsequent apprecia- tion of the real exchange rate after 1978 disadvantaged the producers of traded goods, including domestic manufactures. Although import tariffs were used to provide higher protection for manufacturing vis-a-vis other sectors, the growth opportunities created by this inward-looking policy were Limited due to the small size of the domestic market. Moreover, the tariff structure w&s designed to protect those domestic industries in operation at the time of the major tariff reform in 1977 -- new industries which may have developed in a less distorted policy environment were, by definition, excluded. Indeed, to the extent that any new industry utilized the outputs of existing highly protected domestic producers the profitability of entering new activities was further reduced. Furthermore, the rapid increase in public investment raised the relative return of construction vis-a-vis other sectors. As certain factors of production are mobile between sectors, the increased demand for construction work attracted domestic resources away from manufacturing. The dampening effect that these changes in relative incentives had on manufactur- ing growth were compounded by a number of non-policy related constraints such as a poor and subsequently neglected physical infrastructure which raised domestic manufacturing costs, an indigenous financial sector which was just beginning to develop, and certain exogenous factors such as the general world recession following the second oil price shock and a steady depreciation in Sri Lanka's terms of trade. As a result, over the period 1977-84, manufactur- ing declined as a proportion of GDP in constant 1970 factor prices from 14.7% to 13.8% and manufactured exports (excluding petroleum re-exports and garments) increased in current prices from $13 million to only $69 million.1/ 88. Within the manufacturing sector the performance of the publicly owned manufacturing enterprises (PEs) has been particularly poor. Although the number of PEs has not expanded since 1977, they still contribute approximately 40% of the manufacturing value added. Manufacturing PEs have found it dif- ficult to compete in a more open economy, at the same time as the Government has been reluctant to press forward with the necessary rationalization process. The end result has been one of PEs growing slowly within a policy environment which provides them with enough protection to avoid closure but 1/ In contrast, garment exports increased from $13 million to $296 million over this period. -40- not enough resources, autonomy or competition co stimulate structural change. 1/ Prospects and Issues 89. As discussed earlier, a sustainable medium-term scenario is dependent upon a significant increase in the rate of growth of manufactured exports and efficient import substitution activities. The annual real growth rate in manufacturing is projected to increase from the 3.5% rate achieved in the recent past to 4.8% over the period 1984-89 and then to a gradually higher level in the next decade.2/ A much improved rate of growth is expected from the processing industries linked to tree crops; they constitute about one quarter of value added in industry and should grow at 2 to 3% per annum, as opposed to stagnation in the past. Exports of manufactures, which make up some 15% of value added, should increase at 10% per annum: this applies to both garments, which are currently the bulk of manufactured exports and, in view of past performance, are expected to continue to expand, and to exports of other manufactures which, starting from a small base, should grow rapidly if given adequate incentives. The remainder of industrial production geared to the domestic market makes up about 60% of value added and comprises the output of public manufacturing enterprises as well as private production of mostly simple manufactures. It should expand at 4.5 to 5.0% per annum, or close to the rate of growth of GDP, given the fairly high marginal propensity to consume industrial products as real incomes increase, and assuming, of course, an appropriate incentives and especially exchange rate policy accom- panied by a gradual rationalization of public manufacturing enterprises. 90. The policy agenda needed to achieve thi3 growth is as follows. On the macro side, a more responsive exchange rate policy is essential, as is a continued reform of trade taxes. This needs to be supported by a further reduction in the budget deficit to restrain inflationary pressure and lower interest rates. At the sectoral level a broad program of measures is required to stimulate manufacturing without preference for particular activities. Such a program would include allocating a larger share of public resources for improving the basic infrastructure, undertaking administrative reforms aimed at reducing the bureaucratic impedimants that confront potential investors, and implementing measures designed to rationalize, and raise the productivity of, manufacturing PEs. If manufactured exports are to expand, policies have to be adopted which will enable the private sector to compete against producers in other countries. The manufacturing exports market is extremely 1/ This is discussed in a draft World Bank report entitled, "Selective Issues in Industrial and Trade Policies". 2/ The Government's own projections support this view although they anticipate much higher rates of growth for manufacturing as a whole -- in particular manufactured exports. -41- competitive and relatively small bureaucractic obstacles or unnecessary addi- tional costs can have a significant effect on export competitiveness. Although most of the growth is expected to originate in the private sector, the Government's role is to reformulate policy towards providing a consistent and outward-oriented set of policies which assist the traded goods sector, particularly exports. The Government is well aware that a more dynamic manufacturing sector needs to be developed and has recently undertaken several reforms which show its determination to confront difficult policy issues. Recent Government Initiatives and Upcoming Policy Issues 91. The following discussion is focused on recent Government initiatives in the industrial policy area, including: the formation of an industrial policy committee, tariff reform, rationalization of PEs and export promotion measures. It also suggests the next steps to be taken in these areas, if industrial growth is to accelerate. (a) Industrial Policy Committee 92. The absence of an overall industrial strategy has been a major factor underlying the poor performance of the manufacturing sector. As a result, the policy framework for manufacturing has been shaped by a number of groups with different interests and views. This has Led to the adoption of a large number of selective policies which in aggregate often conflict with one another drawing resources into inefficient activities, giving confusing sig- nals to potential investors, and generally slowing expansion. While such a situation is certainly not peculiar to Sri Lanka, the malaise of industry and trade policy has drawn particular attention because of the strong commitment and clarity of purpose demonstrated by the Government in undertaking the 1977 reforms. 93. In response, the Cabinet has recently approved the formation of an Industrial Policy Committee (IPC) which has representatives from the three ministries directly involved in industry,1/ the Export Development Board and the Business Development Council. The Secretary of Finance and Planning is chairman, and the Director of Planning in the same ministry is a member with the responsibility for coordinating the committee's findings. The objective is to repeat the successful outcome of an experiment in the agricultural sector, where a similar body was able to produce a consensus document outlin- ing the first steps of an overall strategy for agricultural policy and 1/ The Ministry of Industry and Scientific Affairs, the Ministry of Textiles and the Ministry of Rural Industries. -42- projects.l/ The task facing the IPC is a difficult and complex one. The development of a consensus strategy will necessarily involve some painful choices in terms of rationalizing and restructuring the industrial sector. (b) Tariff Reform 94. The recommendations made by the Presidential Tariff Commission (PTC) to Cabinet to undertake a fairly major reform of the import tariff structure were accepted, with the new tariff schedule being implemented via the 1985 budget. The objective of the tariff reform was to reduce the variance in effective protection coefficients (EPCs) to a narrower range, which, according to PTC calculations, would be achieved by establishing a nominal tariff struc- ture with a range of 5% to 75%. In this first phase of reducing both the range of EPCs and the overall level of protection, the PTC recommended raising tariffs on those products where protection was low and reducing those tariffs where protection was inordinately high. As the PTC stated, "this is on the basis that there is no rationale in protecting one product at a very high level and not give a comparable level of protection to another product in order to ensure a more efficient allocation of resources". The new tariff schedule largely achieves the objective set for this phase of tariff reform. 95. The PTC's approach to reforming the tariff structure appears to be very thorough and the implementation of their recommendations by Government is a significant positive step in moving towards a more neutral trade regime. The Government showed considerable resolve in pushing forward with this reform despite much internal opposition. Furthermore, there is active discussion on converting the PTC into a permanent body so as to retain the institutional capability of undertaking the next phase of tariff reform designed to further reduce trade tax-related distortions. 96. Nevertheless, this is a first step and there are a number of anomalies which should be highlighted and discussed. First, a general reduction in the overall tariff level should have been accompanied by an exchange rate depreciation, if we assume that the currency was not undervalued before the reform.2/ A reduction in import taxes effectively results in an appreciation of the real exchange rate confronting importers, thus reducing the costs of imported products on the local market. An adjustment of the exchange rate compensates for this effect, at the same time as providing a boost to all exporters and import-substitution producers. To the extent that the Business 1/ See "National Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Strategy - A Change in Perspective", National Planning Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning, June 1984. This is reviewed under the section dealing with agriculture. 2/ As is argued later, the data suggest that the exchange rate is overvalued. -43- Turnover Tax (BTT) changes discussed below marginally offset the tariff reform, then the necessity for an exchange rate adjustment is reduced. It is recommended that any further reform of the tariff structure which attempts to reduce the overall level of protection should simultaneously involve an estimation of the required exchange rate adjustment. 97. Second, some 35 products were omitted from PTC's listed recommenda- tions foLlowing objections by representatives from the Ministry of Industries and Scientific Affairs. As these omissions leave the level of protection provided to certain PEs at disproportio.ately high levels, the economic effects of continuing to leave these products outside the general tariff reform need to be reconsidered. 98. Third, the reduction in the tariff on imported machinery from 7-1/2% to 5% or 0% in the case of producers that export more than 50% of their output, departs from the methodology of moving towards an equalization of tariffs. The rationale is to assist private investors especially those engaged in export activities. However, this does create a bias in favor of capital as opposed to labor using production techniques and may represent a poor second best measure to offset the disincentive effects of an overvalued exchange rate. 99. Fourth, the basis for valuing imports for the levy of BTT was changed by adding a hypothetical 10% profit margin, thereby increasing BTT payments on imports. The rationale is that as local producers already pay BTT on a price that includes their profit margin, importers should be placed on the same footing. In this sense it equalizes the tax incidence between imports and locally produced goods. Nevertheless, the imposition of this additional tax on imports does reduce the extent to which the recent tariff reform suc- ceeded in lowering the overall level of protection. It should also be noted that the effect this tax has on relative rates of effective protection between goods will vary due to differences in domestic value added. How important this effect is can only be determined empirically; however, given that the hypothetical margin is 10%, it is probably not very significant. 100. To conclude, in addition to addressing these anomalies it is anticipated that the PTC will press ahead with the next phase of tariff reform. This will involve a further reduction in both the overall level and variance of effective protection. (c) Public Manufacturing Enterprises 101. The Government continues to be concerned about the poor performance of PEs for two basic reasons. Firstly, as pointed out earlier, many PEs draw real resources into low return activities and utilize those resources ineffi- ciently which acts as a brake on the performance of the manufacturing sector in aggregate; and secondly, PEs as a whole continue to make significant demands on budgetary resources. As Table 9 demonstrates, budgetary transfers to manufacturing PEs have increased since 1981, with most of the expansion taking place in current transfers and advance account payments and not capital transfers designed to restructure PEs and raise productivity. By way of illustrating the type of trade-offs involved, it is notable that the non- capital transfers in 1984 to manufacturing PEs slightly exceeded the total cost of the food stamp program in the same year. Even if one ignores the efficiency arguments one could question the welfare gains of continually subsidizing those employed in particular manufacturing plants as opposed to using those resources to increase the value of the food stamps offered to the poorest segment of Sri Lanka's population. Table 9: BUDGET SUPPORT OF PUBLIC MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES (Rs million) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 a/ Current Transfers 658 231 246 66 883 730 1,025 Capital Transfers 1,272 741 623 251 510 234 570 Advances - 183 -148 -12 22 455 615 Total 1,930 1,155 721 305 1,415 1,419 2,210 Total as % of GDP 4.5 2.2 1.1 0.4 1.4 1.2 1.5 a/ Estimates. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. 102. In response to this situation the Government is undertaking a number of initiatives. For example, the Ministry of Finance has begun to put con- siderable pressure on those line ministries that have responsibilities for manufacturing PEs to complete the valuation of PE assets, a request that has been ongoing for two years. The reluctance of PEs and line ministries to complete this task is believed to stem from the view that such a valuation is the first step in a process of privatization. The Government, however, has offered assurances that this is not necessarily the planned outcome. Whatever the future of PEs, it is argued that a valuation of assets is an essential first step in undertaking a reform of their financial structure. 103. The Government is also preparing a paper which should suggest some further reforms for manufacturing PEs. One component is a proposal to solve the legalistic uncertainty that Government Owned Business Undertakings (GOBUs) currently operate in by making them either private companies or fully-fledged PEs. GOBUs were private companies that were taken over by the State under the 1971 Business Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, because either they were in danger of liquidation or they followed what were perceived to be unfair trad- -45- ing practices. Since that time GOBUs have operated in a legal enviro..aent which approximated a sort of middle ground between the private sector and PEs. Subject to private sector interest, it would be preferable to allow GOBUs to return to their former private sector status. 104. Lastly, the Government is actively discussing the option of privatization, particularly in the case of telecommunications. Although there is considerable opposition to privatization, the Government feels that this may provide the only mechanism through which modern technology, increased productivity, and better consumer service can be achieved. 105. While these recent initiatives are encouraging, a more wide-ranging set of reforms is required. A World Bank draft industry report of November 1984 outlined a possible approach to the process of rationalizing manufactur- ing PEs, and the 1984 CEN provided a summary of these recommendations. The reform of PEs is a complex area where protectionist feelings run deep partly because of the desire to maintain employment and partly because of the belief that "industrialization" must be initiated by the public sector due to the immaturity of the private secto-. Hiwever, Lhe employment and training objec- tives could be attained at a much lower cost without the significant distor- tions created by PEs, whereas the latter argument lacks credibility when one observes how the private sector reacted in Sri Lanka when strong positive incentives were offered. 106. The creation of more jobs and a higher level of productivity will require a more outward-oriented industrial strategy which will in turn neces- sitate that manufacturing PEs are able to compete. Restructuring the many PEs will inevitably take time and will involve some painful short-run choices as the economy adjusts. While political and social realities may dictate the pace of reform, this must be moderated by an equal concern for the negative effects on medium-term growth if policies are not changed. 107. One approach would be to initiate a firm-by-firm objective assessment of the ability of manufacturing PEs to compete in a more open economy. The studies could start with those firms at either end of the efficiency spectrum with the intention to close down those plants unable now or in the future to cover variable costs and to privatize those that are competitive and are able to attract private capital. Such a series of firm level studies should be accompanied by a general reduction in both tariff protection and budget sub- sidies provided to PEs. However, for many PEs a transition period will be required to bring them to the point where private investors will find them attractive. PEs have operated under an enormous burden of ad hoc policy measures, the effects of which will take time to dissipate. This type of rationalization will require a commitment to undertake a time-phased plan of action for each PE, that clearly outlines the investment, institutional, and incentive measures that are required to raise productivity. -46- (d) Export Policy 108. Sri Lanka has a range of policy measures designed to assist exporters, particularly those involved in the export of manufactured or non-traditional products. Bodies such as the Export Development Board have been established to promote exports and to provide direct assistance to exporters in estab- lishing market links and in obtaining finance. However, the recent apprecia- tion of the exchange rate has largely dwarfed the positive incentive created by these measures. Thus, before considering specific export assistance policies, recent trends in the exchange rate will be discussed. Graph 1: EFFECTIVE EXCHANCE RATES, 1978-85 a/ (1978/79 = 100) 150 Real index using CPI 100 * ..-.. . --. Nominal index *. 50- - - - - - ----- 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 at An increase in the index indicates appreciation. Source: IMF staff calculations. 109. As Graph 1 illustrates, the Sri Lankan rupee has more or less con- tinuously appreciated in real terms since 1977. The real effective exchange rate is defined as the nominal effective exchange rate adjusted for movements in the price level of Sri Lanka relative to those of its major trading partners; it is equivalent to an index of relative prices expressed in a common currency. As defined, an increase in the real effective exchange rate indicates a loss in overall price competitiveness. Although different indices will generate different absolute numbers, almost any acceptable methodology -47- would indicate a significant appreciation of the Sri Lanka rupee in comparison with the currencies of its export competitors, its major import suppliers, or its export markets.1/ The result has been a steady decline in both the profitability of existing export businesses and those import-substitution activities unable to lobby for higher import tariffs, and an increase in the incentive to enter non-traded activities such as the distribution and trading of imported products. 110. Leaving the exchange rate issue aside there are a number of specific export promotion measures in effect in Sri Lanka. For example, exporters of non-traditional goods are eligible for a rebate of the import duty and BTT paid on inputs.2/ These rebates represent an acceptable mechanism by which to offset the disparate tax effect that local taxes (i.e., BTT and import tariffs) have on exporters. Although these rebates can be significant, there are problems in administering the system. For example, exporters complain that the process through which one claims a rebate is time consuming and it can take several months until payment is received. Aside from the costs involved in obtaining the rebate, the system also generates unintended incentives. The existence of high import tariffs and therefore substantial profit opportunities in the domestic market, create strong incentives for some producers to abuse the rebate system. A lower more neutral import tariff structure would reduce such incentives as well as making the rebate scheme easier to administer. It should also be noted that such a rebate scheme is not a substitute for an appropriate exchange rate policy. 111. There are also schemes for exporters to obtain preshipment finance, export credit guarantees, export insurance, export expansion grants, and subsidized credit. Some of these measures assist in reducing the bias against exporters but they are selective and sometimes difficult or costly to attain. For example, there is a credit limit on the amount of preshipment finance available tied to refinancing by the Central Bank. Each commercial bank allocates its share of the subsidized credit to the larger and better known customers, which places smaller or new firms at a disadvantage. Alternatively, the export insurance offered by the Sri Lanka Export Credit Insurance Corporation offers very little, if any, additional assistance to exporters. Its premium rates are said to be high, some potential customers question its readiness to meet its obligations, and it is conservative in accepting risky exports. Potential investors also frequently complain about the number of approvals required to start an export business and the time official bodies require to process their application. 1/ Except the U.S.A. 2/ Beginning February 1, 1985, a system of bonded minufacturing for garment exporters has been introduced. Therefore, the need for rebates to garment exporters will not arise. -48- 112. Although exporters, like any other group of entrepreneurs, are always likely to complain that incentives are insufficient and the Government should do more, the absence of growth in manufactured exports, other than garments, supports their case. The aforementioned export promotion measures do indeed assist some exporters, but they are inadequate to overcome the anti-export or anti-traded goods obstacles which other policy measures produce. The appreciation of the real exchange rate significantly reduces the response that one can expect following the adoption of relatively minor export promotion measures. Producers of tradeables already confront an inadequate infrastruc- ture (roads, railways, telephone) which raises costs relative to competitors. Such a situation can only be made worse if other policins such as the exchange rate, tariff structure or investment approval system are so designed that they in effect raise the costs and reduce the profitability of entering export activities relative to non-traded or heavily protected import-substitution activities. Conclusion 113. In sum, the Government has begun to tackle in earnest several impor- tant issues, the resolution of which is required to achieve an acceleration in industrial growth. The most important of these are the exchange rate, trade taxes, reform of PEs, development of basic infrastructure and administrative reform. To help develop a consistent industrial policy framework, the Government has formed a high level Industrial Policy Committee. The Government has also initiated the first phase of a thorough tariff reform and it has continued to press hard to initiate reform of the PE sector. These initiatives must now be pursued further. The phased process of tariff reform must be continued and certain anomalies in the first stage corrected. Concrete action to reform the public enterprise sector must be initiated early since this process is likely to take time. Above all it is crucial for the Government to establish and pursue an appropriate exchange rate policy which will keep Sri Lanka internationally competitive in a wide range of exporting and import substituting activities. D. Downside Risks 114. The base scenario developed in this report rests upon some fairly important changes in the current policy environment and, more in particular, the adoption of an export-led development strategy. In addition, controlling inflation and maintaining financial stability are assumed to be major objec- tives of the Government's monetary and fiscal policy. Should it prove, for whatever reason, impossible to implement the policy reforms discussed above, the growth of the Sri Lankan economy in the medium term is likely to slow down considerably resulting in stagnant income levels and increasing unemployment. 115. To illustrate, two possible alternatives to the base scenario are shown in Table 10. Both involve lower projected export growth assuming the policy environment is not conducive to the development and expansion of non- traditional exports and hence a sharply lower domestic savings performance. -49- In alternative I, the high rate of investment and GDP growth is maintained through increased reliance on foreign borrowing to compensate for the short- fall in export receipts. A higher level of production for domestic private consumption or a higher level of government consumption spending, supported by continued rapid growth in imports, would, at least temporarily, lead to higher total consumption growth than in the base scenario. However, in these condi- tions the external debt service ratio quickly rises to unacceptable levels, soon restricting the country's access to voluntary foreign capital inflows. A more probable outcome of a lower export growth performance is alternative II. In this case, it is assumed that the Government reacts to the weaker export performance by curbing investment and import growth and reducing the growth of output, incomes and employment. Foreign capital inflows would be such as to keep the debt service ratio within manageable limits but would be insufficient to offset the lower level of export receipts. Given the limits to import substitution in a small economy such as Sri Lanka, import restrictions would most probably have to be imposed. The rate of growth of total consumption would eventually be reduced severely. While this outcome does maintain finan- cial equilibrium, it would represent the failure of Government to achieve its prime objectives of increasing employment, incomes and the general living levels of the population. In addition, it should be noted that the debt service ratio would exceed that in the base scenario and would continue to grow, ultimately forcing an even lower rate of growth on the economy. -50- Table 10: ALTERNATIVE GROWTH SCENARIOS, 1984-94 No Further Policy Reform Base Scenario Alternative I Alternative II 1984-89 1989-94 1984-89 1989-94 1984-89 1989-94 Annual Real Growth Rates (Z) GDP 5.0 5.5 5.0 5.5 3.9 3.9 Consumption 4.5 4.8 5.3 5.6 4.3 3.6 Exports of G+NFS 4.9 5.9 2.4 3.2 2.4 3.2 Imports of G+NFS 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.2 2.7 2.8 1989 1994 1989 1994 1989 1994 As % of GDP Investment 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 24.0 24.0 Gross National Savings 20.2 21.3 16.4 12.0 16.8 15.3 Foreign Savings 5.8 4.7 9.6 14.0 7.2 8.7 Public Debt Service Ratio (%) 16.2 15.1 21.0 40.0 18.3 24.4 Source: Bank staff estimates. -51- Chapcer III: THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OUTLOOK AND AID REQUIREMENTS A. Balance of Payments Prospects and Borrowing Strategy 116. The balance of payments projectiuns implicit in the base scenario are presented in Table 11. The overall outlook is for a stable balance of pay- ments situation with the public debt service ratio 1/ kept within prudent limits. Export Prospects 117. Exports of goods and non-factor services in real terms are expected to grow at 4.9% per year during 1984-89 and at 5.9% per year during 1989-94. As explained above, these growth rates depend on the restoration of international competitiveness, i.e., the pursuit of a realistic exchange rate policy sup- ported by strengthened export promotion measures. In the case of traditional exports, the adoption of taxation/subsidy measures designed to increase producer margins significantly and, for the state plantations, the execution of the Medium-Term Investment Plan (MTIP) and associated management reforms should ensure the rehabilitation and recovery of this sector. However, because of the long-gestating nature of the investments, traditional export volumes are expected to grow at only about 1.4% per annum through 1989. Thereafter, the implementation of the MTIP is expected to result in a real growth rate of traditional exports of close to 3% per year. Nevertheless, the growth potential of traditional exports is limited and Sri Lanka must look towards an expansion in non-traditional exports if the Government's medium- term growth objectives are to be attained. The analysis in the base scenario suggests that, to this end, non-traditional exports will have to grow at around 9.5% per year in real terms over the coming years. 1/ Including IMF charges and repurchases. -52- Table 11: BASE SCENARIO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROJECTIONS, 1984-88 (US$ Millions) 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Exports (G+NFS) 1,755 1,634 1,905 2,162 2,454 Merchandise (fob) 1,475 1,340 1,573 1,774 2,002 Non-factor Services 280 294 332 388 452 Imports (G+NFS) 2,121 2,266 2,520 2,833 3,193 Merchandise (cif) 1,911 2,036 2,261 2,541 2,863 Non-factor Services 210 230 259 292 330 Resource Balance -366 -632 -615 -671 -739 Net Factor Income -131 -116 -122 -125 -137 (M&LT Interest Payments) (-103) (-111) (-122) (-128) (-147) Net Current Transfers a/ 277 291 313 338 365 CURRENT ACCOUNT -220 -457 -424 -458 -511 Net Direct Investment 36 40 50 60 65 Official Grants 154 141 145 150 154 Bilateral & Multilateral Loans (net) 261 338 300 302 318 Disbursements 310 400 372 376 399 Amortization 49 62 72 74 81 Private Loans (net) 50 29 16 96 132 Disbursements 100 101 108 228 285 Amortization 50 72 92 132 153 Short-Term & Capital, n.e.i. 24 0 0 0 0 Change in Reserves (- indicates increase) -305 -91 -87 -150 -158 Memo Items: Gross Official Reserves at Year End 600 655 683 765 858 Net Credit from IMF 9 -36 -59 -69 -64 Purchases 32 0 0 0 0 Repurchases 23 36 59 69 64 Debt Service Payments Public M&LT Loans 202 245 287 334 381 IMF 55 66 85 90 79 Public Debt Service Ratio b/ 14.2 18.1 18.6 18.8 18.0 a/ Private remittances. bl Ratio of debt service payments on public and publicly guaranteed medium and long-term debt, including IMF charges and repurchases, to exports of goods and services. Sources: Central Bank; and Bank staff estimates. -53- Table 12: EXPORT AND IMPORT DETAIL (in million US$ at current prices) Actual Projections 1980 1984 1985 1986 1988 1994 A. Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services Tea 373 620 404 498 580 954 Rubber 157 130 121 147 181. 336 Coconut products 46 60 86 94 105 166 Other agric. products 80 76 86 100 136 284 Petroleum products 189 129 129 129 154 270 Garments & textiles 110 296 348 412 581 1,307 Other manufactures 43 69 80 94 133 334 Gems 40 25 36 40 52 98 Other 27 70 50 59 80 181 Sub-total 1,065 1,475 1,340 1,573 2,002 3,930 Non-factor services 232 280 294 332 452 1,017 TOTAL 1,297 1,755 1,634 1,905 2,454 4,947 Memo Item: Total in constant 1984 prices 1,338 1,755 1,807 1,895 2,109 2,956 B. Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services Food 422 295 313 339 403 604 Other consumer goods 107 128 138 152 185 301 Petroleum 489 419 434 449 571 1,249 Intermediate goods 540 556 615 698 909 1,844 Capital goods 493 513 536 623 795 1,423 Sub-total 2,051 1,911 2,036 2,261 2,863 5,421 Non-factor services 154 210 230 259 330 584 TOTAL 2,205 2,121 2,266 2,520 3,193 6,005 Memo Item: Total in constant 1984 prices 1,877 2,121 2,180 2,284 2,472 3,150 Sources: Central Bank of CeyLon and Bank staff estimates. -54- 118. The country has considerable potential to increase output of non- traditional agricultural exports; with improvements in product quality and marketing efficiency, an export growth target of 8% per year in real terms should be attainable. While it is difficult to see the recent rapid growth in garment exports recurring in the future, especially given the operation of quota restrictions, a more moderate expansion of about 10% per year in real terms should be within reach, assuming that the costs of production in Sri Lanka remain competitive. The volume of other manufactured exports, starting from a low base, shoujd be able to expand at some 10% per year in real terms under the assumed conditions of an appropriate incentives framework (Chapter II). 119. By 1988 the combined export earnings of non-traditional agricultural products, garments and "other" manufactures, in current prices, should equal earnings from the three traditional exports (Table 12). This is a significant shift from 1980 when the latter made up 54% of merchandise export earnings versus only 22Z for the combined earnings of the former three product groups. The estimates in current prices have been derived using World Bank price projections for major commodities or commodity groups. For merchandise exports as a whole, prices are projected to increase by about 20% over the next five years. The export price of tea clearly is of major importance in these projections. In the light of recent market developments, f.o.b. prices for tea have beei projected to decline from $3.03/kg in 1984 to $2.08/kg in 1985 and to rise thereafter gradually to reach the 1984 level in current terms only by 1989. In real terms tea prices in 1989 would be 40% below the very high level in 1984. 120. The current political uncertainty has been highly detrimental to the tourism industry and earnings from tourism in 1985 are not expected to exceed those of 1984. However, given the restoration of a stable social and politi- cal environment, the tourism sector should gradually resume expansion reaching annual growth rates of 8% in real terms. The growth in private remittances which had been very rapid in recent years has begun to slow down; it is assumed in these projections that remittances will remain constant in real terms in the future. Import Prospects 121. The policy environment subsumed in the base scenario, especially the pursuit of a realistic exchange rate policy, and tariff reform, will also facilitate efficient import substitution. This, together with restraint in public sector spending, should help reduce the rate of growth in imports. Nevertheless, in a growing open economy imports can be expected to continue to expand fairly rapidly. Imports of goods and non-factor services in real terms are projected to grow at 4% per year during 1984-89 and at 4.2% per year during 1989-94. -55- 122. Food imports should increase very slowly. The country has by now become virtually self-sufficient in rice; sugar imports should decline as existing capacity is more fully utilized and as several new sugar projects come into operation; and, while wheat grain imports could expand quite rapidly, much will depend on the availability and price of rice. Growth in the imports of other consumer goods should also be moderated by appropriate exchange rate and credit policies. In addition, consumption of petroleum products and thus petroleum imports should grow slower than in the past as the new hydro schemes become fully operational. On the other hand, the demand for intermediate goods imports is anticipated to expand quite rapidly. Given Sri Lanka's natural resource base, any significant increase in economic growth and in exports of manufactures will necessarily entail a rapid expansion in imported intermediate inputs. Imports of capital goods could normally be expected to grow at the rate of growth of capital formation. However, as private investment is, on the whole, less import/capital-intensive than public investment, a reduction in the proportion of total investment accounted for by the public sector should also assist in moderating the total demand for imported capital goods. In current prices, the most notable changes in the composition of imports between the early 1980s and 1988 are a continuing decline in the relative importance of food imports Pnd an increase in the share of imports of intermediate goods. The estimates in current prices are also derived using World Bank price projections for major commodities. Merchandise import prices are projected to increase by about 35% over the next five years. This, together with the export price projections, results in a deterioration in Sri Lanka's terms of trade of about 11% over the next five years when compared with 1984. Foreign Exchange Requirements 123. The projections above imply that exports and private remittances would have to cover roughly 88% of import requirements of goods and non-factor services during 1985-88 compared with 80% during 1980-84 (see Table 13). There is a marked increase in amortization payments during 1985-88 compared with the previous period and there are substantial repayments to the IMF. In dollar terms, import requirements not covered by export earnings and private remittances during 1985-88 amount to $1,350 million. In addition, over the same period, interest payments and amortization on medium and long-term debt amount to $1,246 million, repayments to the IMF total $228 million, and the cumulative addit -n to gross reserves to maintain imports coverage at 3 months is $258 million. Total external capital requirements during 1985-88 thus amount to about $3 billion. -56- Table 13: CUMULATIVE FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS AND SOURCES OF FINANCING, 1981-88 a/ (in million US$) 1981-84 1985-88 Requirements Imports of goods and non-factor services 8,519 10,812 Net factor payments 464 500 (Interest paid on M&LT debt) (308) (508) Amortization on M&LT debt 293 738 Increase in gross reserves 403 258 Net repayments to IMF b/ -157 228 TOTAL 9,522 12,536 Sources of Financing Exports of goods and non-factor services 5,766 8,155 Private transfers and remittances 1,018 1,307 Net direct investment 185 215 Official grants 649 590 Bilateral loans, concessionary 610 845 Multilateral loans, concessiunary 340 602 Multilateral loans, non-concessionary 30 100 Loans from private sources 655 722 Suppliers' credits (32) (109) Financial institutions (623) (613) Other capital (net) c/ 269 - TOTAL 9,522 12,536 al 1981-84 Actual, 1985-88 Projections. b/ Purchases exceeded repurchases by $157 million during 1981-84. c/ Includes short-term capital, non-Government guaranteed M&LT capital, SDR allocations and errors and omissions. Sources: Central Bank of Ceylon, World Bank Debt Reporting System and Bank staff estimates. Borrowing Strategy: Official Sources of Funds 124. About 70% of the $3 billion of external finance needed during 1985-88 is expected to come from official sources on highly concessionary terms. Grants from official sources are projected at about $600 million and disburse- ments of loans from bilateral and multilateral sources at about $1,550 million. About 40% of these disbursements or $850 million would be available from the pipeline at the end of 1984. Therefore, new commitments from offi- -57- cial sources, loans and grants, would have to rise from $460 million in 1984 to $600 million by 1988. It should be noted that this Level of commitments implies no growth in real terms. 125. Commitments of official assistance have declined substantially from the peak of $800 million in 1981. In the past two years they have averaged about $450 million a year (Table 14), partly because both Government and donors made a conscious effort to limit the introduction of new projects in a public investment program which had grown beyond the country's absorptive capacity. Current indications are that the aid donors are likely to make new commitments amounting to about $500 million during 1985. For 1986 we would also recommend to the donors a level of new aid commitments in the range of $500-550 million. This level of support is a vital component in the overall strategy of restructuring the Sri Lankan economy at the same time as contain- ing foreign commercial borrowing at a manageable level. Areas most urgently in need of support include rehabilitation of existing irrigation schemes, completion of downstream work in Mahaweli, rehabilitation of the road network, power transmission and generation, and telecommunications. Financing of local expenditures in support of the Government's own efforts to raise public sector savings and reduce the overall budget deficit should also receive high priority. Table 14: NEW COMMITMENTS OF OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE AND COMMERCIAL LOANS, 1981-88 (in million US$) Actual Estimates 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Official grants 138 162 162 171 226 141 Bilateral loans, concessionary 259 402 166 155 181 165 Multilateral loans, concessionary 245 238 154 118 43 130 Multilateral loans, non-concessionary - - 43 - 12 60 Sub-total 642 802 525 444 462 496 Suppliers' credits 30 1 - - 61 30 Financial institutions 202 232 274 38 43 100 TOTAL 874 1,035 799 482 566 636 Sources: Central Bank of Ceylon, World Bank Debt Reporting System, and Bank staff estimates. -58- Private Sources of Funds 126. Of the roughly $3 billion in foreign exchange requirements during 1985-88 (para 123) some $935 million would still have to be met from private sources. About $215 million is expected in the form of private direct foreign investment, and the remaining $720 million would have to come in the form of loans from suppliers' credits and commercial bank loans. To support this level of disbursements, new commitments of private loans would need to rise from $130 million in 1985 to about $285 million by 1988. 127. A substantial portion of this commercial borrowing would be related to cofinancing requirements for some large projects with good economic justification, such as the major upcoming power projects. Additional cofinancing needs are likely to arise in the future, and it is important for Sri Lanka to monitor carefully its reliance on commercial borrowing for development. As with all borrowing, it is crucial that the funds be applied towards efficient undertakings, whether in export production, import substitu- tion or infrastructure designed to increase productivity throughout the economy. In addition, it must be stressed that even this limited level of commercial borrowing is only feasible if exports grow as projected. Of course, if additional concessionary assistance were to become available beyond levels projected, then the reliance on commercial assistance could be reduced. In any event the Government will have to make important choices in allocating the limited concessionary funds among sectors. Care should be taken not to use concessionary aid to provide 100% financing for those projects suitable for commercial cofinancing, as this would divert funds away from other impor- tant government programs in such sectors as transport, health or education. B. External Debt Management 128. In the base scenario, with a concerted effort to build up exports, strong support from donors, and prudence in the use of commercial debt, Sri Lanka's debt servicing burden is manageable. Implementation of the policies discussed earlier would result in the country becoming increasingly creditworthy. The public debt service ratio, including IMF charges and repurchases, rises to 18.8% in 1987 but then declines to 18.0% in 1988 and 15.1% in 1994. Currently, Sri Lanka's external public debt, including undis- bursed debt, amounts to about $3.7 billion or the equivalent of 62% of CDP: disbursed debt alone amounts to $2.4 billion or 40% of GDP (Table 15). The comparatively low debt service ratio results because more than three quarters of the country's public debt is on highly concessionary terms. Nevertheless, as a share of CDP, interest payments alone are expected to continue to amount to a relatively high 2% during the next few years. -59- Table 15: PUBLIC AND PUBLICLY GUARANTEED EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING AT YEAR-END (US$ Millions) Actual Actual Projected 1983 1984 1988 Bilateral loans Disbursed 1,084 1,158 1,839 Undisbursed 645 597 492 Tot;" 1,729 1,755 2,331 Multilateral loans Disbursed 539 637 1,214 Undisbursed 672 580 758 Total 1,211 1,217 1,972 Suppliers' credits Disbursed 38 27 40 Undisbursed - 55 121 Total 38 82 161 Commercial loans Disbursed 553 598 858 Undisbursed 147 86 123 Total 700 684 981 Total debt Disbursed 2,214 2,420 3,951 Undisbursed 1,464 1,318 1,494 Total 3,678 3,738 5,445 Memo Items: Selected Debt Burden Indicators (Z) Debt outstanding & disbursed/CDP 43.0 40.0 46.0 Debt service/exports of goods & services a/ 17.7 14.2 18.0 Interest/GDP RI 2.3 2.2 1.9 Interest/exports of goods & services b/ 8.5 7.4 6.3 a/ Debt service includes IMF charges and repurchases. bR Interest includes IMF charges. Sources: World Bank External Debt Reporting System and Bank staff estimates. -60- 129. As explained before the Sri Lankan economy remains highly vulnerable to world price changes in a few commodities, especially tea. For instance, if tea prices were to remain at the estimated average 1985 level in current prices during the next 3 years and the foreign exchange gap is met by addi- tional commercial borrowing, the debt service ratio would rise 3 percentage points above that in the base scenario. This vulnerability underscores the need to follow a countercyclical foreign reserves policy and maintain an average level of reserves at 3 months' imports coverage. The most crucial element in balance of payments management, however, is to ensure that the export growth targets are achieved. If they are not, borrowing from private and official sources on non-concessionary terms will have to be curtailed significantly. In that case, Sri Lanka would then find its import capacity reduced significantly resulting in a lower rate of growth in production and employment. 130. A program of adjustment along the lines set out 4- Chapter II is essential for sustained growth in the economy and for an mproved export performance. Success with the latter is crucial to the maintenance of a satisfactory external debt situation and improved creditworthiness. Only under these circumstances can a policy of assuming additional commercial debt be regarded as prudent. -61- STATISTICAL APPENDIX Standard Tables Table 1: Sri Lanka - National Accounts Summary (Millions of Rupees at Current Prices) Table 2: Sri Lanka - National Accounts Summary (Millions of US$ at Constant 1982 Prices) Table 3: Sri Lanka - Balance of Payments (Millions of US$ at Current Prices) Table No. 1.01 Population and Vital Statistics, 1963-84 1.02 Employment in the Public Sector, 1970-83 2.01 Gross Domestic Product: CompositiGi and Sectoral Deflators, 1970-84 2.02 Growth Rates of GDP and Its Components, 1970-84 2.03 National Product and Expenditure, 1970-84 2.04 Percentage of Total Income Received by Each Tenth of Income Receivers, 1963, 1973, 1978/79 and 1981/82 3.01 Balance of Payments, 1970-84 3.02 Composition of Exports, 1970-84 3.03 Industrial Exports, 1975-84 3.04 Composition of Imports, 1970-84 3.05 Selected Food Imports, by Source of Finance, 1970-84 3.06 Imports of Selected Consumer and Capital Goods, 1976-84 3.07 International Liquidity, 1970-84 3.08 Aid Commitments, 1970-84 3.09 Aid Disbursements, 1970-84 3.10 Aid Group Non-Project Assistance, 1965-84 3.11 Overall Aid Pipeline, 1983-85 4.01 External Public Debt Outstanding Including Undisbursed as of December 31, 1984 4.02 Service Payments, Commitments, Disbursements and Outstanding Amounts of External Public Debt as of December 31, 1984 5.01 Summary of Budgetary Operations, 1970/71-85 5.02 Budgetary Revenue, 1970/71-85 5.03 Current Expenditures, 1970/71-85 5.04 Government Budgetary Subsidies and Transfers, 1970/71-85 5.05 Capital Expenditure and Net Lending, 1970/71-85 5.06 Central Government Budget Debt Services, 1970/71-84 5.07 Government Enterprises, 1970/71-84 5.08 Current Transfers to Public Corporations, 1970/71-84 5.09 Capital Transfers to Public Corporations, 1970/71-84 -62 Table No. 6.01 Interest Rates of Major Credit and Savings Institutions, 1970-84 6.02 Monetary Survey, 1971-84 7.01 Volume of Agricultural Production, 1970-84 7.02 Paddy Cultivated Area and Production; Rice Availability, Procurement and Distribution, 1970-84 7.03 Cultivated Area and Production of Subsidiary Food Crops, 1972-84 7.04 Tree Crops Production Statistics, 1970-85 7.05 Tea Producer Margin, 1970-84 7.06 Tea in the Public Sector, 1983-84 7.07 Rubber in the Public Sector, 1983-84 7.08 Fertilizer Issues by Crops, 1970-84 8.01 Growth of Industrial Outpu:, 1976-84 8.02 Manufacturing Survey, 1982 and 1983 8.03 Performance of Major State Industrial Corporations, 1977-83 8.04 Annual Physical Capacity and Output of Major State Industries, 1976-84 8.05 Industrial Investments Approved and Contracted by Greater Colombo Economic Commission, 1979-84 8.06 Industrial Investment Approvals by Foreign and Local Investment Advisory Committees, 1980-84 9.01 Petroleum Imports, 1970-84 9.02 Imports of Crude Oil by Country of Origin, 1970-84 9.03 Petroleum Product Exports, 1970-84 9.04 Domestic Production of Petroleum Products, 1970-84 9.05 Local Sales Volume of Petroleum Products, 1970-84 9.06 Production, Trade, and Apparent Consumption of Energy Petroleum Products, 1970-84 9.07 Petroleum Product Price Changes, 1970-84 9.08 CEB Electricity Generation, 1970-84 9.09 CEB Electricity Sales, 1970-84 10.01 Minimum Wage Rate, 1968-84 10.02 Colombo Consumer Price Index Numbers, 1976-84 10.03 Wholesale Price Index, 1977-84 10.04 Cost Indices for Selected Building Materials and Different Construction Activities, 1972-84 10.05 Administered Prices of Basic Consumer Goods, 1977-84 11.01 Selected Social Indicators, 1946-84 11.02 Major Social Expenditures in Relation to Total Current Budgetary Expenditures and to GDP, 1969/70-84 11.03 Health Statistics, 1969/70-84 11.04 Education Statistics, 1970-84 11.05 Tourism: Arrivals by Regions, 1975-84 -63- Table 1: SRI LANKA - NATIONAL ACCOUNTS SUMMY (Millions of Rupees at Current Prices) j278 197 1980 1981 1982 193 1984 1. Gross Domestic Product 42,665 52,387 66,527 85,005 100,140 121,928 152,955 2. Resource Gap (H-K) 2,044 6,305 15,012 13,645 18,730 18,377 9,386 3. Imports (G+NFS) 16,872 23,976 36,457 39,550 45,890 50,376 53,979 4. Exports (G+NFS) 14,828 17,671 21,445 25,905 27,160 31,999 44,593 5. Total Expenditures 44,709 58,692 81,539 98,650 118,870 140,305 162,341 6. Consumption 36,155 45,165 59,074 75,040 88,262 105,159 122,491 7. General Government 4,043 4,798 5,685 6,310 8,210 9,607 n.a. 8. Private 32,112 40,367 53,389 68,730 80,052 95,552 n.a. 9. Investment 8,554 13,527 22,465 23,610 30,608 35,146 39,850 10. Fixed Investment 8,521 13,246 20,845 23,279 30,360 35,356 39,700 11. Changes in Stocks 33 281 1,620 331 248 -210 150 12. Domestic Saving 6,510 7,222 7,453 9,965 11,878 16,769 30,464 13. Net Factor Income -234 -234 -430 -1,713 -1,956 -3,200 -3,358 14. Current Transfers 343 747 2,249 3,907 5,494 6,447 7,046 15. National Saving 6,619 7,735 9,272 12,159 15,416 20,016 34,152 Average Exchange Rates: 16. Rupees per US$ 15.608 15.569 16.534 19.246 20.812 23.529 25.438 17. Rupees per SDR 19.541 20.115 21.527 22.693 22.982 25.152 26.194 Note: The exchange rates shown above are the official rates and were used in converting from US dollars to national currency terms, items 3, 4, 13 and 14. p* -64- Table 2: SRI LANKA - NATIONAL ACCOUNTS SUMMARY (Millions of US$ at Constant 1982 Prices) 1978 1198 11 M1 1982 1983 A2j 1. Gross Domestic Product 3,849 4,092 4,330 4,580 4,812 5,052 5,305 2. Terms of Trade Effect 318 184 81 10 0 174 483 3. Gross Domestic Income 4,167 4,276 4,411 4,590 4,812 5,226 5,788 4. Resource Gap (5-6) 176 456 851 664 900 688 191 5. Imports (G+NFS) 1,458 1,736 2,067 1,923 2,205 2,141 2,122 6. Capacity to Import 1,282 1,280 1,216 1,259 1,305 1,453 1,931 7. [Exports (G+NFS)] 964 1,096 1,135 1,249 1,305 1,279 1,448 8. Total Expenditures 4.343 4,732 5,262 5,254 5,712 5,914 5,979 9. Consumption 3,368 3,445 3,685 3,862 4,241 4 457 4,579 10. General Government 376 366 355 325 398 392 361 11. Private 2,992 3,079 3,330 3,537 3,843 4,065 4,236 12. Investment 975 1,287 1,577 1,392 1,471 1,457 1,382 13. Fixed Investment 970 1,260 1,462 1,372 1,459 1,466 1,377 14. Changes in Stocks 5 27 115 20 12 -9 5 15. Domestic Saving 481 647 645 718 571 595 708 16. Net Factor Income -15 -15 -23 -90 -94 -128 -109 17. Current Transfers 30 54 128 190 264 293 305 18. National Saving 496 686 750 818 741 760 904 Rupee Deflators (1982 - 100) 19. Gross Domestic Product 53.3 61.5 73.8 89.2 100.0 115.9 138.5 20. Imports (G+NFS) 55.6 66.4 84.7 98.8 100.0 105.8 111.0 21. Exports (G+NFS) 74.1 77.5 90.8 99.7 100.0 120.2 148.0 22. Total Expenditures 49.5 59.6 74.5 90.2 100.0 114.0 130.5 23. Government Consumption 51.6 63.0 77.0 93.4 100.0 113.4 128.0 24. Private Consumption 51.6 63.0 77.0 93.4 100.0 113.4 128.0 25. Fixed Investment 42.2 50.5 68.5 81.5 100.0 115.9 138.5 26. Changes in Stocks 42.2 50.5 68.5 81.5 100.0 112.3 144.2 27. Exchange Rate Index 133.3 133.7 125.9 108.1 100.0 88.5 81.8 -65- Table 3: SRI LANA - BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Millions of US$ at Current Prices) 12Z8. 12Z7 . 120 1281 1982 1983 1.8 1. EXPORTS (G+NFS) 950 1,135 1,297 1,346 1,305 1,360 1,755 2. Merchandise (fob) 846 982 1,065 1,066 1,014 1,062 1,475 3. Non-factor Services 104 153 232 280 291 298 280 4. IMPORTS (G+NFS) 1,081 1,540 2,205 2,055 2,205 2,138 2,121 5. Merchandise (cif) 999 1,450 2,051 1,877 1,990 1,918 1,911 6. Non-factor Services 82 90 154 178 215 220 210 7. RESOURCE BALANCE -131 -405 -908 -709 -900 -778 -366 8. Net Factor Income -15 -15 -26 -97 -98 -138 -131 9. Factor Receipts 20 40 47 33 40 43 59 10. Factor Payments 35 55 73 130 138 181 190 11. (M&LT Interest Paid) (25) (28) (33) (50) (69) (86) (103) 12. Net Current Transfers 22 48 136 203 264 274 277 13. Transfer Receipts 39 60 152 230 289 294 302 14. Transfer Payments 17 12 16 27 25 20 25 15. CURRENT BALANCE -124 -372 -798 -603 -734 -642 -220 MALT Capital Inflow 16. Net Direct Investment 2 47 43 49 63 37 36 17. Official Grant Aid 58 144 138 162 162 171 154 18. Net M&LT Loans (DRS) 178 138 236 336 403 292 311 19. Disbursements 242 187 286 380 472 373 410 20. Repayments 64 49 50 44 69 81 99 21. Other MLT (net) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22. Net Short-Term Capital -3 - 157 31 7 38 -26 23. Capital Flows NEI and errors and omissions -17 91 4 -8 72 105 50 24. Change in Net Reserves (- indicates increase) -94 -48 220 33 27 -1 -305 Memo Items: 25. Net Credit from IMF +20 +67 -4 +165 -6 -11 +9 26. Disbursements 48 105 39 229 43 38 32 27. Repayments 28 38 43 64 49 49 23 Note: Underlying data from Central Bank of Ceylon except for lines 18-20 which are from World Bank's Debt Reporting System, and lines 25-27 from the IMF. -66- Table 1.01: POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS, 1963-84 Net Annual Population Birth Death Migration Natural Year Mid-Year Rate Rate Rate Growth Rate ('000) ----(per '000)---- 1963 10,651 34.1 8.6 -1.0 2.55 1964 10,889 33.2 8.8 -1.0 2.44 1965 11,133 33.2 8.2 -0.5 2.50 1966 11,439 32.3 8.3 -0.5 2.40 1967 11,703 31.6 7.5 -0.6 2.41 1968 11,992 32.0 7.9 -0.7 2.41 1969 12,252 30.4 8.1 -0.9 2.23 1970 12,516 29.4 7.5 -0.8 2.19 1971 12,608 30.4 7.7 -2.7 2.27 1972 12,861 30.0 8.1 -3.2 2.19 1973 13,091 28.0 7.7 -3.8 2.03 1974 13,284 27.5 9.0 -4.0 1.85 1975 13,496 27.8 8.5 -2.3 1.93 1976 13,717 27.8 7.8 -3.8 2.00 1977 13,942 27.9 7.4 -3.7 2.05 1978 14,184 28.5 6.6 -2.8 2.19 1979 14,471 28.9 6.5 -3.0 2.24 1980 14,738 28.4 6.2 -4.6 2.22 1981 14,988 28.0 6.0 -3.4 2.20 1982 15,189 26.8 6.1 -6.0 2.07 1983 15,416 26.2 6.1 -6.8 2.01 1984 15,599 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. not available. Note: Figures for 1982-84 are provisional. Source: Registrar General's Department. табlе 1.02: IDIPLCTNEIR 1М те8 PODLIC BECrCR, 1970-63 v 391!? 1.4Z1 191� �9Z1 �Sl.zt � 9� i2TSt i4i1 �.91� �74 �� 1�1 �.�. 1��3 Солгеве с Iевеiеисiоыв AdвloiвtraCire, таеЬыiеаl аыд Ргоtеввiоыаl Officsrs ок вс.кк т.nt 9,229 1о,а91 11,7т9 1а,озо 1s,6a9 1ь,1зз 19,еьб 16,9о1 17,512 1в,збб 1в,ь39 1e.szs 1е,бц 16.76: 8ubosdtoata аерlо�.ев р! 9s,ь7а 1оз,оsо 11а,ооо 13о,ззб 1аа,lеь 15o,e9s 11в,зо9 1еs,в93 19з,9:: 2об,з19 то7,5э3 то9,ц: 21о,3о3 :1т.ео: Mieor Еврlотеа. �I aб,sбa бь,slо 9:,7т7 1от,з27 1о9,ы 7 11з,71а 1га,lэо бs,51ь 67,172 9ь,1ь1 9s,9oa 99.о71 9я,9зб 1оо,1п еерооl reacbaz• 9b,966 97,866 100,6Э6 106,674 107,479 1o9,8SS 111.097 119,OOi 126,а37 133,269 1dS,270 1ц,991 136,978 137,302 Cthaeв ��. 3 .�.+.iSSi �л,�.}�. �� ...�}...�lZ _�ЭЭ4 i�� �� .�QS� �� �� ��Z �Ё� тот�1. 317,е17 з26,ббз 3sо,ц2 зеб,о21 а12,26а ь2s,бб5 ьоб,зеl ат2,ба7 мб,овs а7о,lеа ь7б,абб аеl,ь7s aas,el: ьи.а7: 8евi-соvегиеыt Ioвtitutiooв J , Adвioiвtтative, тееЬыlсвl вnд Ркоfеввiооаl OEticsr• о! вевfЕ гвоk 6,315 12,зы 1ь,теб 15,збо 15,755 и,793 1а,бав 11,ьо: 12,239 13,oos 13,вз3 и,3оа и,бо5 и.бя: 8ubordiaac• бврlотввв DJ 31,311 ц,919 29,335 31,17б 3i,891 77,596 So,656 50,18ь бо,711 72,936 80,503 63,3С9 Q4,9S1 65,70] Мiыот Еврlорвев g,/ 122.660 65,152 111,828 120,Э42 155,669 169,930 455,699 516,606 546,672 621,760 627,656 631,SбЭ 63т,ба9 6Э4,039 , оtдегв �/ _4,,�RQ ? 2 � �.ZZ.� .�0�4.v� � .1��. �.$�� �3. � .�.4 3�4�4i,i �� �3.a44i � rCLL 170,т1! 175,Эб0 201,496 2о9,боб 247,оо1 ц 9,18ь 541,044 617,073 659,ь04 7ь9,оц 769,122 776,199 7lт,2]а 7�.717 е,/ Тде ирlотеев аке eleввtfted асеогд{оц to caeegorieв вnд вtвеив, аод iaelude tирок.гу and ев.иаl wrksrв. �/ Clasieal vorkeeв, �J 8иi-вtilled вод иывtillед vоеlсесв. �/ Croveh ot sployвent iы tбi• еаее{orr (puЫie eorporaeioeв, uдiverвieieв, тевевгеЬ Luвtitutiooв, ete.) rв■ аsаеевгаеед in еЬа pesiod Ь� tые oatioывliaation о[ agгiculeural lаыдв. . �J Ргiесiрвlв, tевсЬsтв аед ot6ee едиевtlоы воrkеев. Воитееs Ceneral bвnk of Ce�1on. т,л1о :.°е: свобб ооиытгс па0остг гааоегтtОв диа бпt0ыг ааплтсаа, wл0-ц (hrewe рисое реlевв7 1970 H7S .14-16 Н77 lf _ 1!7! -_ 1вb _1!ц 1lat 1!б] а/ 1!М е/ /в 2 ое /в i е[ Lв 7 ot Ч i et /в 7 et ы i at бв 3 et 4 S ае b i ее 4 i в! 4 i в[ !� fiPL !Уь feor 1�ь !г_OL �i feP[_ !ffiа fRL 1$а f�! К4 fi4L �s �_ l�г. fi� �а �L iь SL ое цгiеоlсигв j/ ],n: :е.] 7,n6 ]о.ь е,и! :l.о 1о.бм 7о.7 12,77: 7os 1],н2 нл 17.1s1 :z6 :1л» :r.7 :ь,lб• я.е 7o,us :7.1 7а,иб :,.0 М[eie{ 97 0.7 470 �.а 87! к.з S!7 7.7 Як 1.1 !17 1.! 1.2H к.0 1,51♦ 2.0 к,к]1 к.б к/1р! к.7 7,1за к.з wвntвee.eisб :.1l7 16.7 :,цб :о.1 s,ao :ол е,о:] у.1 а,оl4 ю.о l.4ы 1l.t 11,аа 17.7 u,w t6.: и,б01 14.7 u.7s7 77.7 t0.lи и.в ceueraecie. 1и s.e 1,ои й.о 1,164 ь.: 1,17] ].] 1,lcs й./ 7,да 6.s 7.7s2 es 7,ао1 бл 7,ls! /.б l,а07 /.7 и,1аб а.7 Чп[ив бл1! 4а.7 и.:б7 и.! 1:.аь Ч.s и.км ы.к 17.цб a:.s и.п1 as.б :7.ки в]л ц.lбк as.7 и,иб а7.] s7.7» и.о s.:70 и.: Oti1[tieв 101 0.6 lбй 0.6 171 0.6 194 0.6 к]! 0.6 ]f6 0.• 601 1.0 10а 1.0 1.ОН 1.! 1,4ка 1.7 1,i77 1.к trвeepore/согвл■iнеtеев 1.аа !.s :�Отя а.1 :,:еб е.1 :.7к] 7.! к.!!й 7.4 •.7иь !.s s.п7 6.s 7.707 !.2 /,sц !.к 7о.7а !.s 1к.7и /.! со�.есlп a.e,te.. :,s]] 1l.: •,l7s 1l.4 s,йsь 1l.s с,]з! и.о •r,ssб и.б +.us tl.о ео,еlа и.7 1�.нт 17.! 16.os! 17.i и,иб 17.s п,и� ta.s piunetel Чnlевв 1S2 1.2 776 l.7 4l! l.S 74к 1.6 ЧS !.l 1,2Ч 2.S 1.715 к.! к.К7 7.! ],1l2 7.S •,1кк ].7 l.р7 !.0 воае[ц fмlсвв 31! 7.0 б]! t.S 78 2.6 дк к.♦ !Н 7.t l,t!] к.б 1.aS7 2.7 l.76t к.к 7.2Sf ].5 ],S7S 7.к 7,R! 1./ риlllе вдr[slпrвeies s11 ]л »6 7.1 !46 ].♦ 1.и7 7.й 1,s16 7.7 1,ий ].] 1.l6s ].: :,]ю ].0 :.и: 7.1 а.а! 7.7 s.7u 7.• осые a.e.tee. 1.4s! ц.1 :.кгб е.! :,ио е.е :,se: z• 7.2s7 а.1 ],!и т,л :.:и а.• 7,а! а.! в,и/ !.в 2o,n7 !.2 ц.lа! а.7 сго.. Оо...еtв ргодиее 1],1ы 1ао.о кs,бll 1оо.о :6,0]к 100.е ]ь,ьы 1оо.о а,й» 1ао.о и,7д 1оо.о в=,:и 1оо.о »,]]7 1ао.о l:,7l6 1оо.о и:,1п 1оо.е 1]а.1и toe.0 � Fтiевв (Iapilele Deflaeerв) yelerleoee у 1оо.0 пь.: :аае иьб кп.1 кlО.к 760.0 и1.к йа./ ss6.4 Нк.s М[е[е: 100.0 117.! 111.! 15.4 1l6.7 l4S.к Iaк.f 21к.7 277.7 к11.! 701.• weraeeort.a гоо.о ::7л а]7.о �.о.а ]1a.s зsб.� ик.1 4sa.a •n.7 s7s.7 бк4.7 Ceaвenetlee (00.0 156.9 l6l.! 1а7.0 247.5 цl.2 SlO.a 677.1 76.7 !lt.б 7,ук,! б.ntевв 100.0 1H.6 I60.7 172.й tlй.7 276.5 кбк.S ]1SJ ]6L1 Ч7.4 47l.! Otilleleв 100.0 140.! l40.к 1И.1 1S1.7 к0l.S ta7.S 7aS.] 4а4.0 i!!.7 iM.7 тгвираее/Ce..wteвeteaв 1оо.о 17ал и0л и1.е 1ее.7 :>s.s :az! 7п.• й1о.• иа.7 s6:.t Савепlвl lmisn 1оо.0 и:.• 1!].: :о/.о 27о.7 кбs.7 кд.1 7s1.! ]7s.• os.7 stl.! ►iыuciвl lег7iси 100.0 121.7 110.] 1а7.7 265.1 3Sl.1 4i4.0 S!!.1 61f.4 iS6.7 7кк.! Wuвlea tвевlев■ 100.0 t00.0 155.5 177.к 1fй.к tN.6 365.• ]OS.a 777./ 762.0 710.7 NЪ1ie Адвlв[вtевеtее 100.0 10l.S 1t4.7 lйа.а 177.5 !д.! 20а.! 77f.7 361.к кl1.f 7Ч.0 Оtбге р.е,tи. 1оо.о и:.о 1ц.! 1n.o 147.2 16lл ю4.о иа.• a:.s з4s.к 4о0.� Оееи Оовепiе hoduet l00.0 177.7 1tl.0 к17.7 к]2.i кбl.1 71а.0 7д.2 йц.3 Ч7.7 771.f �/ рееriв{ои1. р/ Iaeladu loruery вед [ieЪieб. боиееег Свеед{ ава� о[ Су1ое. Table 2,02: GROWTH RATES OF GDP AND ITS COMPONENTS, 1974-64 aj (go Million at Constant 1970 Factor Prices) 12A 1977 Im 1979 1980 1981 1983 Agriculture 3,732 3,847 3,894 4,299 4,532 4,622 4,766 5,097 5,131 5,508 5,624 Mining 95 395 571 515 619 652 684 713 742 boo BOB Manufacturing 2,197 2,263 2,371 2,357 2,541 2,659 2,681 2,820 2,955 2,979 3.H9 Construction 744 649 685 619 794 960 1,066 1,034 1,013 1,023 1,023 Services 6,419 7,833 7,910 8,288 8,915 9,608 10,378 11.042 11.815 12,595 13.326 utilities 101 117 122 131 158 190 209 234 257 274 282 Transport/Communications 1,258 1,497 1,425 1,498 1,607 1,716 1,938 1,957 2,079 2,173 2,282 C arcial Services 2,533 2,886 2,928 2,999 3,267 3,551 3,949 4,034 4,275 4.502 4,835 Financial Services 152 276 246 295 318 350 402 462 517 628 697 Housing services 399 463 467 475 499 518 549 579 611 623 635 Public Administration 517 729 760 791 854 905 959 997 1,102 1,439 1,583 Other Services 1,459 1,865 1,962 2,099 2,212 2,378 2,372 2,779 2.974 2,965 2,995 Gross Domestic Product 13,187 14,987 15,431 16,078 17,401 18,501 19,575 20,706 21.756 22,644 23,986 Annual Growth Rate (2) Agriculture fj 3.8 -2.4 1.2 10.4 5.4 2.0 3.1 6.9 2.6 5.3 2.1 Mining 18.5 33.9 44.6 -9.8 20.2 5.3 4.9 4.2 4.1 7.8 1.0 all Manufacturing 5.7 4.6 4.8 -0.6 7.8 4.6 0.8 5.2 4.8 0.8 11.4 Construction 14.4 -8.8 5.5 -9.6 28.3 20.9 11.0 -3.0 -2.0 1.0 - services 2.8 4.8 1.0 4.7 7.6 7.8 8.0 6.4 7.0 6.6 5.3 Utilities 21.0 8.3 4.3 7.4 20.6 20.3 10.0 12.0 9.8 6.6 3.0 Transport/Communications 1.4 2.4 -4.8 5.1 7.3 6.9 7.1 6.5 6.2 4.5 5.0 Commercial Services 2.4 4.2 1.5 2.4 8.9 8.7 8.4 4.8 6.0 5.3 7.4 Financial Services 3.8 29.6 -10.9 19.9 7.8 10.1 14.9 14.9 11.9 21.4 11.0 Housing Services 3.6 1.8 0.9 1.7 5.1 3.8 6.0 5.5 5.5 2.0 2.0 Public Administration 3.0 6.0 4.3 4.1 8.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 10.5 30.6 10.0 Other Services 3.9 5.0 5.2 7.0 5.4 7.5 8.1 8.0 7.0 -0.3 1.0 Gross Domestic Product 4.3 2.8 3.0 4.2 8.2 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 #j For 1983 and 1984, components do not add to total because new constant price series for 1982-84 with base 1982 has been linked with old series which is in constant 1970 prices. Provisional. S1 Includes forestry and fishing. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. Table 2.03: NATIONAL PRODUCT AND EXPENDITURE, 1970-84 (Re Million at Current Prices) a970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1960 1981 IM M A/ I M k/ PRODUCT GDP at Factor Cost 13.187 25,691 28,032 34,684 40,479 49,782 62,246 79,337 92.398 112.173 138,181 Indirect Taxes less Subsidies 477 886 2,171 1,723 2,186 2,605 4,281 5.668 7,742 9,755 14,774 GDP at Market Prices 13,664 26.577 30,203 36,407 42.665 52,387 66,527 85,005 100,140 121,928 152.955 Net Factor Income from Abroad -220 -213 -282 -252 -237 -240 -432 -1,868 -2,034 -3.164 -3,359 GNP at Market Prices 13.444 26,364 29,921 36,155 42,428 52,147 66,095 83,137 98,106 118,764 149,596 EPENDITURE Consumption 11,505 24,422 26,012 29,816 36,148 45,169 59,084 75,061 88,289 105,147 122,099 Public 1,623 2,480 3,021 3,118 4,043 4.798 5,685 6,310 8,210 9,607 - Private 9,882 21,942 22,991 26,698 32,105 40,371 53,399 68,751 80,079 95,540 - Gross Fixed Capital Formation 2,359 3,699 4,595 5,035 8,521 13,246 20,845 23,279 30,360 35,356 39,700 Government 6 Public Enterprises c/ 570 1,095 1,631 1,542 3,077 3,809 4,709 4,126 5,125 5,742 6,678 Public Corporations g/ 451 426 588 861 2,056 2,620 7,553 8,360 ) Private 1,338 2,178 2,376 2,632 3,388 6.817 8,583 10,793 ) 25.235 29,614 33,022 Change in Stocks 230 441 301 224 33 281 1,620 331 248 -210 150 Exports of Goods 6 NFS 3,478 7,306 8,773 12,311 14,835 17,660 21,4!4 25,892 -27.148 32,016 44,632 Imports of Goods 6 NFS 3,908 9,291 9,478 10,979 16,872 23,969 36,456 39,558 45,905 50,381 53,626 Memorandum Itemas Gross National Savings J/ 1,930 1,974 4,003 6,539 6,622 7,732 9,272 11,994 15,311 20,017 34,568 1 External Current Account Balance 1/ -659 -2,166 -894 1,280 -1.932 -5,795 -13,193 -11,616 -15,297 -15,129 -5,282 6 (Percent of GDP at Current Market Price) CDP (at market prices) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 External Resources (net imports of GUFS) A/ 3.1 7.5 2.3 -3.7 4.8 12.0 22.5 16.1 18.7 15.1 5.9 Total Resources Available (- total uses) 103.1 107.5 102.3 96.3 104.8 112.0 122.5 116.1 116.7 115.1 105.9 Consumption 84.2 91.9 86.1 81.9 84.7 86.2 88.8 88.3 88.2 86.2 79.8 Public 11.9 9.3 10.0 8.6 9.5 9.2 8.5 7.4 8.2 7.9 - Private 72.3 82.6 76.1 73.3 75.2 77.0 80.3 60.9 80.0 78.4 - Gross Fixed Capital Formation 17.3 13.9 15.2 13.8 20.0 23.3 31.3 27.4 30.3 29.0 26.0 Goverment 6 Public Enterprises r/ 4.2 4.1 5.4 4.2 7.2 7.3 7.1 4.9 5.1 4.7 4.4 Public Corporations j/ 3.3 1.6 1.9 2.4 4.8 5.0 11.3 9.8 Private 9.8 8.2 7.9 7.2 7.9 13.0 12.9 12.7 ) 25.2 24.3 21.6 Change in Stocks 1.6 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.5 2.4 0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.1 Nemorandum Itema: Gross National savings s/ 14.1 7.4 13.2 17.9 15.6 14.8 13.9 14.1 15.3 16.4 22.6 External Current Account Balance 1/ -4.8 -8.1 -3.0 3.5 -4.5 -11.1 -19.8 -13.7 -15.3 -12.4 -3.5 M/ Provisional. h/ Estimates. ./ Includes Railways, Ports, Harbor, Varehouse, Posts and Telecommunications. Since 1979, the Ports, Rarbor, and Varehouse have become Public Corporations and are no longer included under Public Enterprises. A[ Autonomous state-owned enterprises. 1/ Equals Cross Fixed Capital Formation plus Change in Stocks plus External Current Account Balance. f External transactions during 1970-77 converted to rupee values using FEEC rates. I/ Net imports of goods and non-factor services. Sau.es: Central Bank of Ceylon. УвЫе 2.04: PE8CS1i'tACE ОУ ТО?AL IЯСОМ8 EECEIVED DY ЕАСН SE1iT8 Ot . 1исОнЕ ЕЕскlаа8в, 196Э, 197Э, 1э78/79, �1т 1981/е2 Daci еа Отbед Rura1 Евевеев А11 Iв1 j,�63 1973 В/ 1 8 81 2 Z },�7� 8J 197в/79 1981/82 ��Г j,� 81 1978/у9 1981/82 1� }�j�!/ �t � Вi8Ьев! 4У.78 29.90 40.60 44,75 34.2Э 27.27 37.56 39.25 24.В7 Э1.70 25.50 26.37 99.24 29.98 39.03 41.70 8есодд 15.64 15.42 15.07 14.24 16.51 15.44 15.42 14.86 13.Э1 1Э.51 14.58 14.60 16.01 15.91 15.27 14.82 ihird 10.77 12.17 10.74 10.32 12.35 12.72 11.4Э 10.89 11.21 11.11 11.82 11.5Э 11.46 12.65 11.2] 10.65 lоигtЪ 8.Э1 10.25 8.52 7.83 9.96 10.68 9.39 9.01 10.42 9.5З 10.41 10.12 8.98 10.56 9.12 8.56 1ilth 6.64 8.68 7.20 6.52 8.11 9.16 7./5 7.40 8.71 7.99 9.17 8.76 6.82 8.75 7.29 6.9Э 8istб 5.1Э 7.45 6.04 5.11 6.45 7.79 6.36 6.10 8.71 6.91 7.58 7.75 �.55 7.10 5.93 5.57 8evaдth 4.28 6.25 4.83 4.28 5.04 6.42 4.94 4.98 7.ЭЗ 6.16 7.31 6.71 4.51 5.70 4.77 4.61 Eigheh 3.16 4.75 З.бб Э.38 3.1Э 5.18 З.ЬЬ Э.80 6.86 5.58 5.90 5.92 ' З.SЬ 4.Э8 З.ЬО 3.46 NLctЬ 2.00 3.42 2.13 2.40 2.54 3.53 2.44 2.55 5.56 4.61 5.04 5.22 2.70 Э.17 2.56 2.49 LoveвC �.гi2 _L14 ...��.�. �1 ._1�.4� �s$L �9� �sL� r.�.г� � 2•69 3.04 1.17 1,� 1.20 1.21 J 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 � J Fот е vsriety of тееводе, 1973 dsta are aot directly еооратеЫе vith 1963. Nolе: ?оtвlв тау доt адд ир дие to тоиддiдg. 8оитео: CanCral 8ank of Свуlод, 8urvey of 8г; Lnka'в Содвиг:ит Pioaneeв, 196Э, 1973, 1978l79 вдд 1981/В2. � а ���� $дtn v i � ёiм ёi�в'�л �вв�s3w�R � .�..:тi��Ti � tl.а О��Ri дбвАв� r н4� йiм i.�iww � wв �л•��� ввwв��� л р�"± н'2•�а ��� о» в:� : ��i��в°в° в��Ф��Чв� rie�y�� в н R м w п м i л + а о • � • � _^ w�<„ п w в в = п� п w i в н S5 в�J��' "е' S` Е 7. Z � " � .^r.n"�Riaв в°nS в3Q � 8 � • е п к� �1r :.°�'в s .. � � у : g . g :g° � �� �к к F� ër �� �gя Рв � ь i � ё ё� � ё в: e п п i n i w Cf �Е Yw ^•~�И � � О w О С • • ■ • � о �е ���ёв� � в. . : а S. �. � � : О' • е � � • П И�1•+ � О 77 в . � �' $�Э � Ч и �уΡ �V �V уΡ {�►/ уΡb уΡуΡ�уΡ �� �\ в в �i11i V О � Ч W Р У�е Ч �г AON�- �Ф 10 � УУ 1 OYYV Ч EJ УЧОУТ.О � �J р п • О в М 7 1� `_ Ь `_ �! д � �В 7� й�и .�i �' :. � �L' йС.. �"+ айй.. � р �Ф vo � sУиёй ы'r �ysuвwx � S' уΡ уΡ N y 1в • О• � V У � � V 1 Ф Ч а.' ►д NON Ч �О Р � ФЧ � ФРнОь: {в ФРРУРРь �} � Рn нМ у• �Vв ` рΡ■ •� уΡУЧ е.у ►рΡв МуΡ V V �bj Ч МЧ {�уΡ� �■ � ОЧФ � � О 1 ? О М н р М4 Ун �qi �р �у Р�н�лЧЧ V r �I V ОРФ.�У � У М . •• � r� � п �уΡ СΡ � � уМr • ЧЧО �� О 1 Ч р 0 1 М ЧьФ�-' � � � РА 1�ТУ�О �О У'vPYV P�i r �УуΡ и Ч 1� • i � в� г�гi l�_ e � 1•1 в буΡ. � Уо V �.1 � У 1 �в O.Pi и � ь1РОн �! �! � д V 1 Ои V йа r аювРУчv � � � п 6 i О О М •Cr У ; ^ д Ч ФФО Iв� 'в' V 1 У М у � �Ф � РФИ �О. �ь/ � VM 1 aYrON � �O+VOO� � � � iz+ ' п g 3 �i�+ 1 $в � sь�� � b =а `w � й�Ч � .уайS.ле � I`ai � н��ёу�iаё � Sëëeëiй � Е� � Ф в•+W Ли1 �� Ч�-' Ч Ч^ ..1 РРУD Р' � � РУI�еV+УМ � NVвФ.Ов'У � � �` У'е ♦ 1� 11�Р Р Р V • У 11^^„ О Ч Ф i \ i � уΡc рΡ ♦ I�УΡ 1уΡ _рΡ� ��1wI� 1рΡрΡl уΡуΡ рΡ � Ч А� М �У �1.1 � У ~ О^ У в+ в1^ЧЧ � Р F+ VO 1 в!ФРО V �J ОУУО V О! � R ййд I.Ni � й � v�Ау � р^й'а �К � Ю �seoвova �в �°о=ёй.''�ov+ � � L 1 • Ч Ч N �ву b уРЧ Р4�'О• Ч Р н�р Он 1 ОЧ w'�OPNb д Ф~' i � N 1 Ф О А � '^ Р` 1�' � Ч н �е О О � к Р � �Lв � 4N.0 1�' Г^ О 1 О� Р^н � Ч^1ил� М � � �ig � УЧрьМiЧ � ЧФ�ЧЧУЧ � � * TAble 3.0;: COMPOSITION OF MONTI, 1970-84 1971 1972 1973 1976 1977 IM HU IM W1 1982 19" 0 million) Tea 188 193 194 197 204 274 248 410 411 367 373 335 305 353 620 Rubber 74 52 44 92 111 93 105 107 130 160 157 150 112 121 130 major Coconut Vroducts 40 47 44 22 59 55 36 62 53 46 53 48 60 61 Capra (4) (4) (9) (1) (-) (1) (1) (-) (1) (1) ... ) (3) (3) (3) (3) Coconut Oil (20) (23) (22) (4) (21) (27) (22) (4) (21) (33) (3) (10) (17) (18) (12) Desiccated Coconut 1a) "J) 1U) 1U) W) M) IW W W) in) LW in) LU) LW Sub-total 302 292 282 311 374 422 397 553 603 610 576 538 465 534 111 Other lxports ki 40 36 53 98 148 136 171 IS$ 245 369 488 555 566 533 641 of wbiebi Precious & Smi-procious stones (1) (1) (2) (22) (16) (26) (31) (34) (34) (31) (40) (33) (33) (40) (24) petroleum Products _.U) (4) JU) "2) LU) in) LO) JU) JU) (DA) AM) J= -UH) _UJA) _(= TOTAL UPOITS 342 328 335 409 522 558 568 741 848 979 1.064 1. 093 1.031 1.067 3,452 (Percent of Total IsPort Value) Tea 55.0 58.8 57.9 48.2 39.1 49.1 43.7 55.3 48.5 37.5 33.1 30.6 29.6 33.1 42.7 lubber 21.6 15.9 13.1 22.5 21.3 16.7 18.5 14.4 15.3 16.3 14.8 13.7 10.9 11.4 L 9 Majou Coconut Products 11.7 L4l LU _LA "jJ 9.9 7.7 4.9 7.3 _U JA _Jd 5.6 _L1 Sub-total 88.3 89.0 84.2 76.0 71.6 75.6 69.9 74.6 71.2 62.3 54.2 49.1 45.1 50.1 55.8 Other Isparta _UJ 11 0 15 8 24 0 28 4 24 4 2 TOTAL MONTI 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N= Tea (million hS) 203 207 190 206 175 213 200 186 193 111 INS 193 181 is$ 204 Rubber (million kS) 161 129 130 128 161 137 136 136 138 128 121 133 131 123 126 major Coconut Products (million ka) rJ 123 140 ISO 59 65 114 108 39 71 73 35 56 79 91 Capra (million kg) (16) (17) (44) (3) W (1) (1) (-) (1) (1) ... ) (2) (3) (4) (2) Coconut Oil (million ILI) (58) (70) (87) (IS) (22) (54) (61) (9) (30) (32) (3) (17) (34) (35) (12) Desiccated Coconut (million kg) (49) (53) (49) (38) (43) (59) (46) (30) (40) (40) (31) (37) (42) (42) (32) A/ Provisional. Otter exports include coconut by-products. spices, minor agricultural crops, precious and semi-precious stoats, manufactured goods, minerals, and petroleum re-ezports. S/ The approximate conversion ratios for outs into kilograms for major coconut products are as follows: 4.93 vato - I kg of copra; 13.33 outs - I kS of coconut oil; and 6.60'auto I k& of desiccated coconut. NoW but to rounding off, couponents my not add up to tattle. Data not necessarily consistent with exports data as compiled on payments basis (Table 3.01). Source: Adjusted Sri Lanka Customs data as reported by the Central Dealt of Ceylon. 0 Table 3,03; INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS, 1975-84 (0 million) 1925 1916 19.71 197l 19.79 im MEL 1982 1.93 At 19.M A/ Food, Beverages and Tobacco 5.64 11.17 11.93 16.42 23.60 18.98 22.88 30.20 22.97 25.71 of which: Fish and Fish Products (3.13) (8.88) (9.30) (14.89) (19.75) (14.95) (17.99) (20.79) (17.89) (23.62) Textiles and Wearing Apparel 3.49 8.24 12.70 30.66 71.18 110.45 157.05 168.27 201.36 296.21 of which: Garments (3.30) (8.12) (11.81) (30.39) (70.88) (109.38) (153.68) (165.49) (197.02) (G89.25) Essential Oil 0.96 1.24 1.29 1.63 - - - - - - Chemical Products 1.58 1.39 1.06 1.43 3.15 4.25 3.54 10.80 4.89 7.31 Petroleum Products 50.03 60.27 63.74 59.38 123.72 .88.86 175.39 157.62 113.99 129.25 of which: Naphtha (8.09) (12.47) (10.53) (9.72) (28.01) (38.71) (29.30) (20.70) (14.61) (17.21) Bunkers and Aviation Fuel (41.74) (43.77) (42.77) (41.62) (87.56) (119.79) (104.41) (102.03) (79.11) (96.38) Fuel Oil (0.20) (4.03) (10.44) (8.04) (8.15) (30.36) (41.64) (34.89) (20.27) (15.66) Leather, Rubber, Wood and Ceramics 3.10 3.73 1.67 4.49 8.42 15.00 14.83 22.03 21.69 27.83 Other 2.12 0.33 0.45 1.14 1.30 4.56 5.55 8.52 10.01 8.58 TOTAL MANUACTURING Ajf- f 92.64 115.1 31.37 342.10 379.24 397." 374.91 494. 4 Natural Graphite 1.76 1.89 2.20 3.80 4.79 4.82 4.56 2.87 2.59 3.58 Netallic Ores and Iron Pyrites 0.96 0.58 - 0.76 3.36 2.89 1.57 2.45 3.01 1.75 Ilenite 1.04 1.05 0.57 1.52 0.53 0.39 0.82 0.78 0.54 1.69 Precioub and Semi-preciour Stones 25.56 30.90 28.92 34.02 31.48 40.17 32.95 32.91 39.97 24.23 TOTAL HINING AND oUARRYING 12 &q IAI A2jU 2-LU 4.14 MAa ALU 32.69 TOTAL INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS 9624 120.79 124.53 155.25 271.53 3,90.78 420.3 A 438.72 423.03 527.1A j/ Provisional. Bource: Central Bank of Ceylon. т.ые з.о4: соиновlтком оР кl�овта, 1970-84 а/ са в111iод) �91Q ��Z�. I�T�. д�.L 11.Z.4 1�7? 1� 1 77 1 78 � 1� 1i81 1 8�2 1�8? J �� J соевтlин coona 217.5 191.6 178.2 д�.� 321.5 Зт6.0 zoa.7 308.6 358.8 5о1.т 61j 479.2 414.4 494•1 434•2 of rЪieb: lоод адд Deiдk 179.7 15а.в 1s2.e 19s.o 293.2 зs7.а 181.3 255.а 263.1 307.s э87.б 2s4.1 1п .1 :28.s 19s.a ai�. 5з.4 э2.9 26.в а2.2 1ов.3 15о.б 75.9 1о7.б аа.1 s7.2 5з.э :1.6 44.4 32.5 е.о F1our 43.7 з4.7 32.2 70.8 128.9 142.1 80.7 109.4 145.8 107.0 110.` 1.S Э.О 4.б 1.1 aefiдed ■ugar 28,б 50.0 41.3 50.2 28.6 35.2 7.6 21.4 32.9 60.1 122. .4б.9 46.6 84.4 52.5 Иi1k адд вilk product. 9.2 7.9 9.5 10.9 10.5 11.6 9.6 11.7 25.4 30.8 32. 25.1 24.7 41.6 24.5 РiвЪ 11.4 12.1 13.7 В.1 7.5 6.2 3.0 2.1 2.1 12.2 17.б 3.3 15.6 14.9 24.5 ie:tile• (ineludiдg aloching) 20.8 17.4 8.0 8.6 8.9 2.8 5.8 17.3 Э4.0 98.7 104.1 121.3 104.1 115.б 117.0 ОсЪег содеиве: сооае 12.1 1э.7 1о.5 1з.1 12.8 s.9 1о.ь z5.2 а9.в 7в.9 107.1 я3.8 121.7 1зз.о 101.б Nedleinal Е pherвaeeutieat ргодиесе 4.9 S.7 6.8 5.6 б.б 9.8 7.0 10.5 11.7 16.2 15.7 10.0 17.1 17.3 19.8 гвтеио�кеТк соодв ��,в ,g�g, 8� i2�.3 288.7 267.8 267.0 320.6 Зsа.ь 586.4 938.8 932.s 1.039.б 923.2 940.5 of rbicbs Nheat едд вевlin 3.8 5.9 7.3 9.5 17.6 19.] 17.1 17.7 8.7 19.0 Э4.8 9В.2 85.9 99.5 104.1 P.reili:.r 1з.б 9.9 1о.5 17.з зз.2 29.5 11.7 э1.s 16.1 4з,г 81.о б:.� 2б.9 2б.4 4з.э Реtтоlаив 9.9 а.а ь.з 46.1 1зб.1 12з,7 1э7.б 16о.а 1s4.1 251.2 489.4 44е.4 se9.7 468.5 419.9 Chaвicala, eleвente адд - еовроиnде 9.4 11.1 12.2 16.7 34.9 16.Э 10.6 16.Э 28.6 32.2 32.9 34.5 35.0 35.4 40.4 D�efog, tвming аг.� eoloriag в.с.гi.1. 1.7 1.9 2.3 1.9 з.з г. � э.1 а.5 т.7 ч.б 1г.з 12.о ц.е 9.4 ц.s Уервг and рвретbовтд 7.6 8.1 7,0 6.2 9.8 9.9 б.б 7.4 15.Э 25.6 27.6 Зб.1 32.4 29.2 25.0 киvавтl0�т соои8 �1.� 19�.Z 1� ]91� 6�3 9� 1�,.4 � ?3i�2 �9� 4 2 цl.�.� �� 1�� �� о! rblcbs • в S Еиi1д1д8 ваtегlвl■ 20.0 19.9 20.2 16.7 22.1 24.0 12.3 9.В 9.6 23.б Эб.9 27.3 26.б 50.0 28.6 �' Тгедвротс equipвeдt 21.1 12.8 17.В 14.8 13.У 16.4 20.7 27.Э б3.3 10з.7 146.5 115.5 265.7 162.6 119.2 Mae6iдerr and equipвeдt 4б,4 ]3.7 30.2 35.0 27.5 45.7 43.0 37.0 118.4 186.2 254.7 201.5 190.5 223.б 209.7 Ul1CI�89IlI6D IКРОУТ9 �,,,j ,j� � � � 8�¢ ¢�, Q�¢ �,�¢ � J�, ¢� 4,,$ �.� �4 iOi�I. I![PCliB 388.8 Э34.9 344.1 424.3 684.б j�,� 354.1 721.4 440.9 �,447.2 j,052.8 1.632.2 2 0. 15.4 1.93б.1 �� --------------------------------»_----------------- PdIICB1R ОР тОцL I1[PO1iS --------- . Кевогвnди. iсеав л, содеи.е: сооа. s5.9 s7.2 5t.e 52.а аб.9 5о.5 36.9 42.в зе.1 34.7 29.9 26.2 ю.s 2s.б 23.2 D. Iдterвediat• Соод• 19.5 19.5 24.3 ЗО.О 42.2 36.0 48.2 44.4 Э8.1 40.5 45.7 50.9 51.6 47.7 50.1 С. Inveпкдt Good• 27.6 21.1 21.2 15.6 10.0 11.4 13.7 11.4 21.9 24.2 24.2 22.6 27.6 ]6.5 ц.5 D. lоод лдд Drink 46,2 46.2 44.4 46.0 42.8 48.0 32.7 Э5.4 28.0 21.З 18.9 13.9 8.S 11.8 10.4 Е, Роод, lвтсiliквг вдд Рвtтоlвив 52.3 SO.S 49.3 ЬС.9 67.5 б8.б 59.7 62.0 46.1 41.6 4б.б 41.8 39.0 37.4 35.2 r. Iвporte other сь.д „ем 47.7 а9.5 5о.7 з9,1 э2.5 а1.а 4о.э эб.о sз.9 5а.4 s3.4 5а.2 ы.о б2.б 64.9 � De/!д Од СУ/сов/ дасе адд, сЪlreloLl, oot деееееегil7 eoneieteot vith Ьеlвдса О( р.твlдс/ двсе io таЫе З.О1. �J Psovieiodвl. 11оtв: Due to rouдdiag �ft, совродедС. ввr aot едд ир to totele. воитсеs �djueted 8ri Lenka Сиеtов. dets ее тероксед Ъу che Седсгаl Daдk of Cq1on. Table 3,051 SnICTID FOOD IMPORTS, ST SOONCI OF FINANCR, 1970-84 A/ VALUE ($ million) 1974 1973 1977 1975 Commercial PuVehaffiss 50.4 26.7 18.6 49.0 88.2 137.4 83.5 108.1 40.1 56.5 51.9 48.5 39.4 22eO 3.1 Aid-financed 8.2 3.8 4.1 - 29.9 - 1.1 4.6 - 0.1 - - - 4.5 It - Total 58.6 30.5 22.7 49.0 118.1 137.4 $4.9 112.7 40.1 56.6 51.9 48.5 39.4 26.5 5.1 Wheat Crain C own arcial Purchases 3.8 5.9 6,4 8.3 19.5 14.4 20.6 16.8 8.8 16.0 11.0 74.3 61.2 52.9 35.9 Aid-f imanced - - - - 1.8 6.2 - - - - 34.3 33.9 27.0 44.7S/ 63.9 Total 3.8 5.9 6.4 8.3 21.3 20.6 20.6 16.8 8.8 16.0 45.3 108.2 $8.2 27.6 99.8 Flour Commercial Patch&@@$ 19.7 20.0 13.5 56.6 129,0 98.0 57.7 56.9 78.5 72.0 103.7 - - 1.4 - Aid-financed 17.7 13.2 20.9 14.9 18.2 48.0 33.8 41.9 54.0 32.5 3.4 - - 3.6 Al 0.1 Total 37.4 33.2 34.4 71.5 147.2 146.0 91.5 98.8 132.5 104.8 107.1 - - 5.0 0.1 Suasr Cc mme rcial purchases 25.4 37.0 39.9 51.0 20.1 33.7 14.1 22.2 37.3 59.4 116.7 106.4 2.3 42.3 17.9 Aid-financed - 1.5 - - - 4.5 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.1 - - - 0.05 A/ - Total 75.4 38.5 39.9 51.0 20ol 38.2 15.0 22.8 37.6 59.5 116.7 106.4 2.3 42.35 17.9 nm On mms rcial Purchases 99.3 89.6 78.4 164.9 256.8 283.5 176.2 204.0 164.7 203.9 283.3 229.2 102.9 118.6 58.9 Aid-financed 25.9 18.5 25.0 14.9 49.9 58.7 35.8 47.1 54.3 33.0 37.7 33.9 27.0 52.9 64.0 Total 125.2 108.1 103.4 179.8 306.7 342.2 212.0 251.1 219.0 236.9 321.0 263.1 129.9 171.5 122.9 - ------ - ---- - - -- - - - - ----------------- - - - ----------- - - -------- - ---- VOLM ('000 tons) Ain Commercial Purchase@ 443 287 207 344 255 457 416 498 160 211 190 157 161 104 26 Aid-financed 91 52 59 - 77 - 3 28 - I - - - 20 Total 534 339 266 3" 332 457 419 526 160 212 190 157 161 124 26 Vh"t Grain Commercial ]Purchases 55 93 92 83 91 65 130 115 64 112 63 374 352 310 220 Aid-financed - - - - 9 28 - - - - 164 170 170 269 S/ 351 Total 55 93 92 93 100 93 130 115 84 112 227 544 522 579 5n 11UL Commercial Purchases 172 164 84 261 380 261 224 237 338 323 353 - - 5 - Aid-financed 205 159 243 110 68 201 157 279 268 143 a - - 17.4/ 11 Total 377 323 327 371 448 462 381 516 606 466 361 - - 22 11 19W Co mme rcial Purchases 7." 276 217 194 43 48 45 94 165 245 200 168 11 170.0 96 Aid-financed - 12 - - - 14 2 2 1 - - - - 0.2 j/ - Total 244 288 217 194 43 62 47 96 166 245 200 168 11 170.2 95 #j Based on information supplied to the Ministry of Finance and Planning by the sain food importing agencies and. therefore, not necessarily consistent with Table 3.04, which is based an Customs data. k/ Includes emergency relief assistance, 4,247 XT valued at UB$0.9 million. S1 Includes emergency food aid, 20,298 XT valued at UG$3.5 million. jL/ Includes emergency relief assistance, 250 HT valued at US$0.05 million. jf/ Includes emergency relief assistance. 200 HT valued at U840.05 million. Sovircei Ministry of Finance and Planning. Table 3.06; IMPORTS OF SELECTED CONSUMEP AND CAPITAL GOODS, 1976-84 116 1971 198 0 1 1981 1982 1 19 Transport Eauipment Motor Cars, etc. 2,297 2,576 7,149 10,248 6,214 5,029 4,539 16,548 16,132 Lorries, Van@ 275 1,200 3,003 4,671 10,714 6,420 10,907 11,545 9,073 Buees 141 410 747 2,804 2,836 2,278 2,845 3,109 2,842 Tractors (including agricultural) 305 1,251 8,134 3,555 4,822 1,981 2,104 3,469 3,682 Motorcycles, Auto-cycles and Cycles fitted with auxiliary motor 306 708 8,133 18,085 50,769 11,212 8,711 18,359 18,636 Cycles not motorized 91 612 12,351 33,206 289,863 48,007 45,494 23,636 10.526 Ships, Boats and Other Vessels 8 242 16 30 31,433 289 52 227 562 Machinery and Mechanical Appliances Steam and Other Vapor Generating Boilers 8 120 185 129 42 96 101 702 100 Air Conditioning and Refrigerator Equipment () Air Conditioning Machine - Complete Portable or Fixed Window Type and Other 1,097 431 2,157 3,579 6,454 3,716 3,682 6,926 '19,571 (ii) Refrigerators and Refrigerating Equipment Complete 16 cu. ft. capacity and Other 621 472 2,467 3,612 7,935 8,316 8,620 13,057 9,960 -------------------------(Values in $ Million) _j]-- Transport Eauivuent Railvay Locomotives, Wagons and Coaches 3.4 4.9 6.4 30.2 18.2 6.3 21.5 4.7 2.4 Motor Cars, etc. 1.0 6.4 62.6 43.5 32.6 16.9 14.1 16.2 14.5 Lorries, Van. 7.8 10.7 28.5 32.2 57.3 '43.1 34.8 43.7 43.6 Buses 2.2 3.0 9.3 21.3 30.8 18.0 24.7 26.1 20.3 Tractors 0.9 4.4 21.1 23.5 22.4 6.0 4.1 9.0 7.5 Liftih, Handling and Loading Equipment 1.0 1.5 4.3 10.8 n.a. 16.3 17.6 20.1 9.1 Motorcycles, Cycles, Carriages, etc. 0.9 1.2 .6.6 13.4 38.0 13.0 8.4 7.2 12.2 Machinerv and Mechanical Appliances Boilers and Engines, other than Internal Combustion Piston Engines 0.2 0.2 6.7 5.2 2.5 7.2 2.0 9.5 1.6 Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Equipment 2.0 1.0 3.4 6.3 9.4 7.7 8.3 11.8 5.4 Hand Tools and Implements 1.8 1.4 6.0 6.6 7.9 3.6 4.3 5.7 6.3 Excavating, Levelling.and Turfing Equipment 2.8 5.9 5.9 10.5 24.6 18.2 17.4 16.8 15.0 Agricultural snd Horticultural Machinery - Other 1.7 1.3 2.5 10.0 8.8 2.6 1.3 1.0 0.9 Communications Equipment 5.1 2.0 5.1 14.6 n.s. 14.7 11.4 16.4 21.6 Electrical Machinery and Equipment (including accessories) 9.0 8.2 21.9 31.2 n.S. 28.3 26.0 35.4 26.6 A/ The exchange rates used for 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984 were US$1.00 - Re 8.46, Rn 9.15, Re 15.61, Rs 15.57, Rs. 16.53, R. 19.24, Rs 20.81. Rs 23.53 and Re 25.44, respectively. n.a. - not available. Sources: Sri Lanka Customs and Ministry of Plan Implementation except 1980 data which are Bank staff estimates based on Customs data. Table 3.07: INTERNATIOKAL LIQUIDITY, 1970-84 (m million) End of Period 1211 1971 192 121 1974 1975 1.. 1=2 191 179. 1i 8 . III 19.11 1981 Gross Official Reserves j] 43 50 60 86 57 58 92 293 398 517 246 337 352 309 543 Net International Reserves -108 -69 -48 -11 -68 -124 -67 116 210 258 38 5 -22 -21 289 IMF Position Use of IMF Credit 79 78 81 89 125 146 156 206 242 309 269 404 377 347 335 of which: Compensatory Dravings 39 21 23 46 54 42 47 30 21 21 10 29 71 40 33 Oil Facility Dravings - - - - 42 76 90 93 87 63 37 12 1 - - Extended Facility - - - - - - - - - 105 140 303 287 269 264 Credit Tranche Dravings 29 42 40 21 6 4 - 59 107 97 68 60 18 - - Other - - - - - - - - - - - - - 32 33 Buffer 8tock - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 5 Trust Fund Loans Outstanding - - - - - - - - 53 93 122 111 106 98 113 A/ Excluding international reserves held by comercial banks. 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S.ь 7.[ 6.! 6.2 5.• 7.0 67.7 аЕС еное - - - - ' 1.1 • - - 7.1 S.2 0.6 6.9 4.1 2.S 1.6 б.) 6.7 - - 44.i 1DJ tлво - - - - - - - - - 15.0 - ' - - - - - - - - 15.0 01 Огеар 1/ Сгиt = _ �� ` �,.i �ьI .JsZ s6 �е� ._L.S 1Zь4 �Sa� _LE �а.! �LS .`_ _ � .� � �jaL тта , 42.: •т.а м.7 so.7 66.1 16.о ы.1 ::.2 ы.1 и9.о 1:6.1 us.: 1оо.1 :оs.ь я2.ь 1s4.7 1».1 1ы.s п:.7 19о.• :,1s2.o {/ l�еlидгв 01,0, 2.0, 7.1, S.2 вnд /.2 вllllou cleвstHed ве proJeet в1д iв LDIe 7.11 {а l9l0, l9ll, I912, 19t1 вид l9ad, гг■ рагiвгl7. }f [втlади 612.2 вlllioe elвni[ied и projвet ид ie ТвЫе 1.11. �/ Lotire ввоиеt е1в ni[(ед вв preJree вLд iв ТвЫв 1.11. �/ [веlидм 612.б вillieo (ОМ 26 в[111oa) иввд !от tвpost о[ lоеовоtlввв иодег 1l76 lева о[ DM ]1 ■(lliee, вед elвniHrd и projeee ■id iв ТвЫе 1.11. �/ [оеlидв the Ie11ov[е[ [гве bг г:) двы reliв[ вгвеtв ot 61.6, 1.1, l.б, 0.66, 1.29 вед l.24 вiцiоо ia 1979, 1960, 1161, 1962, 19Ф вед I9M, твqгееiвеlгi (ii) дтои{Ье н1(в[ {гвое et твn 6S0 dllioo (62.76 в(I1(ее) ie 1962; вод (!!!) вввг`вов7 гв1lв[ виiвевае• [евеt е[ Теа 600 ■!11[оо (62,5 ■illioe) ie 19�. j/ /[l S.S вill[еа wt о[ ttl 14 вill[оа Loao elвaL[Led и pro�ect дд le таЫе 1.П . j/ lерrмгоtв tЬв вив totвl о[ eoвodit2 еаврааееtв o017. j/ lвpost виррогt rЫгЬ b ЬвLе[ uei[lввд [ее рееJвеев еlви![iвд и ргоJвеt в!д !в ТвЫ е 1.)1. �/ lвревивев двае евеевl(вt(оа. 1/ ааеlадlе{ У1! вад Оа teeбeieвl ви[веваее еовitввоtв vЫеЬ вгг еlввв([!вд и ргоJвее aid. fiЪ1в ].10 рцв 2 е( � руа )птnеп ип cs) fsцaцs Ltlа 1.9�! 134� 134L 194.4 19,б3 1р19 1411 1312 1911 L91! 1ft.f 131� 13I1 1!Z! 1l14 13l.4 13l1 134t 1!!! 1!!! Свевдв Lлве - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - DlPMtII 1Авд - - - - - - ' - - - ' - ' - - - - - - - rнвс. м.. - в.о - s.s ss - ].s - ].:3 s.4 и s.a {/ s.я и s.p � s.s �/ ь.s4 {/ s.ee д 3.73 д.3.7s и- г.s v сгг:.о[ 1�.о ].о ].о ].о ].о :.3 тs - - г.о - - o.7s - o.7s o.7s - o.7s - о.73 o.7s гоа1. 1�.в э.о - 3.о - 3.о - s.o - s.o - - s.o � 3.о 3.о 3.о - 3.о - - - Iсв17 Iдво - - - 4.5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . .. Jвр{о Lове 3.S S.5 S.2S S.2S S.2S S.0 4.75 Q/ - 4.S 4.0 �.0 ].7 ].S ].0 2.15 2.75 2.75 2.75 - ].2S а RгсЪвгlводг Lово - - - - - - - - - - 1.3 2.S 2.5 2.5 2.S 2.5 2.5 - - - �' Dritвerlвod Lовп - - - • - - - - - - - - - - 2.S2S �/ - - - - - Оо{tвд [io{дов Lo.n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Овitвд lевеев Lово 2.S {/ ].S - - ].0 �/ - - - - ].0 �/ - - - э.0 д/ ].0 �/ э.0 - - - - lгL аео) :.s {/ 2.3 {/ 2.3 g/ ].о OJ ].о 0/ - :.о з.о 0/ ].о ].о 0/ ].о �/ ].о �/ - ].о �/ э.о �/ ].о �/ ].о �/ э.о �/ ].о �/ э.о �/ [DA lдво - - . . . . - - • 0. i 5 t/ - - - - - - - - - - {/ hpnuote wi{Ьtед ■игв{в о[ tba ietesut гвtЧ о[ tbe public вед ргiнtг еоврасгоЧ о[ lовог. {1/ {вtв о[ iatвeut durle{ {гвев рвеlод '. �.131. у/ цео о[ iobreп durle{ {нее регiод iв 1i. 4/ tвtв о[ iвtпи[ дигlд; {лсг рпiод (г t2. f/ !L �!0 [оод вцiивеев цвlеп lоев[ еиггвоеiев. j/ tгепiев еЬвг{г. t Table 3.18 #ge 3 91 4 page@ Guck PERIOD Country m m m m Canada Lcan 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 Deumiärk Loan 7.0 - 7.0 - 10.0 - - - Yrågeg Laga 0.5 0,3 2,0 - 1.75 kl :j5 l/ 3.23 3.23 &1 3.75 3.75 4,60 5,25 &1 5.25 &1 5.23 kl - 5.23 11 gruay Löse 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 8.0 - - 10.0 - - 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 låd la 1440 1.0 1.0 - 2.0 - 2.0 3.0 - - 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 Italy Lata - - 2.0 Japan 1,44D 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7,0 7.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.0 N*tberlczdw Lote - - - - - 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 avitaerland Lcan - - - 6,3 11 - United Zte~ Loan 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 7.0 7.0 8,0 united state& 144a 5.0 - - 10.0 - - 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 - Loan (FI, 480) 2,0 2.0 2.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 IDA L<m* - - - - 10.0 - - Repregente velghted &Vera&@ of the public and privata Oceponente of lom. med tootnott l/, påt# I of thlm table. т.ь31 �.1о Рце 4 о! 4 рврв L6PAYMIMi PLe10D А►тСУ CLlC6 Ptt10D [Уыгд f4цiils а�.lд i.i42 1344 3.44i. i244 i.i42 1.4L4. Jil1 i.4Zs^ i.@i�. i.4L4 1311 :.4.Z4 3i.LZ 3.4L4 3922 14l9. :%41 19l2 i%41 1lQS. Свмдв еоао 40.0 10.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40,0 40.0 40,0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 - - - ^ - Оеа..гь Loan - - - - le.o - 1е.о - - - - - - - - - - - - - re..e. ео.. - 4.о - е.о е.о - 1з.а и- 16.о v 1s.s 1J u.s е/ 14.s v 14.о е/ 1s.o v и.4 и 1s.o 1l 1s.o е/ и,о е/ - .... с.�..� ив. 1].о и.о 1е.о 1е.о 2:.о ::,о - - 7о.о - - 4о.о - 4о,о 4о.о - 4о.о - 4о.о .... Iodiв еово ].0 - 9.0 - - - 10.0 - 11,0 - - 12.5 14.5 12,5 11.5 - 13.5 - - - IN1r Loaa - - - 12.0 - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - пр.е 1�.о s.o s.o ь.о и.о и.о и.о 17.о - 1е.о 1е.о 1е.о :о.о 2о.0 1о.о 1о.о го.о :о.о :о.о - .... NеtЬвгlвадв и,. - - - - - - - - - - 1:,о я:.о ::.о ::.о ::.о :т.о s:.o - - - er[енлв.а 1�.. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - e.s а/ - - - - - Т о.tева сlоеа.. еово ::.о 1:.о ::.о ::.о ::.о 1е.о 1е.о - 1е.о 1е.о - - - - - - - - - - и.lсед ае.сее 1а,о :о.о :о.о - - зо.о - - - - зо.о - - - зо.о зо.о зо.о - - - - Loao (РЬ 4е0') ь/ 19.0 :/ 19.0 s/ 19.0 :/ 19.0 s,/ - ]0.0 з0.0 70.0 з0.0 з0.0 ]0.0 - 70,0 70.0 ]0.0 з0.0 з0.0 70.0 е.в. 1СА Laao - - - - - - - - - 70.0 - - - - - - - - - - А/ ЧРгвЧоtв wiеЬсвд аvвгцв о[ еье нрвуsвее рггiодг [ег риьliе ■од peiwtв сирепгои of lевев. а/ еи [ооеооее =/. рца 7 о[ сЪtв евЫе. S/ ОВ8100,000 Чеь дигiее еЬв [iue eьrtt Тввгв вад еьв lвlвпев ie 16 вqивl io ц вllвгоев. /еигев� 4[вговl lиоигsев Dврвгевеаt. Table 3,11: OVERALL AID PIPELINE, 1983-85 (us$ million) Mahaweli Non-Mahaweli (Accelerated) Relief Of which: Pgoiect Proiect Conaditl LOA AelistARSC JgW Non-Mahaweli 1983 Undisbureed Balance 12/31/62 890.6 506.5 132.4 36.8 - 1,566.3 1,059.8 Now Commitments 1983 198.0 67.6 37,0 52,0 12,0 366.6 299.0 Disbursements from Past Commitments 144.4 138.9 57.9 36.8 - 378.0 239.1 Disbursements from New Commitments 21.8 24.0 6.6 13.8 12,0 78.4 54.4 Total Disbursements 1983 166.2 162.9 64.7 50.6 12.0 456.4 293.5 Im Undisbursed Balance 12/31/83 922.4 411.2 104.7 38.2 - 1,476.5 1,065.3 Now Commitments 1984 135.3 191.3 78.4 69.3 - 474.3 263.0 Disbursements from Past Commitments 199.7 148.4 65.4 35.9 - 449.4 301.0 Disbursements from Nov Commitments 19.5 36.5 7.0 34.9 - 97.9 61.4 Total Disbursements 1984 219.2 184.9 72.4 70.8 - 547.3 362.4 Im Undiabursed Balance 12/31/84 835.3 IL/ 417.6 110.7 34.4 JL/ - 1,398.0 s-j 980.4 rj New Commitments 1985 408.2 142.6 36.9 41.4 - 629.1 486.5 Diebt-reements from Past Co itments 212.3 144.6 73.0 26.6 - 456.5 311.9 Disbursements from Now Commitments 38.4 29.7 21.2 41.4 - 130.7 101.0 Total Disbursements 1985 250.7 174.3 94.2 68.0 - 587.2 412.9 Ir 1986 Undisbursed Balance 12/31/85 992.8 385.9 53.4 7.8 il/ - 1,439.9 1,054.0 IL/ The following undisbursed balances were treated as lapsed on December 31, 1984: $ million IDA Tank Modernization Project 0.70 France Purchase of locomotives 0.21 FRO Gas turbines 0.17 FRO Embilipitiya paper mill expansion 0.32 Denmark Colombo Dockyard 0.10 USAID Rice research 0.065 USAID Paddy storage and processing 0.065 USSR Iron and steel Stage 17 0.42 India Urea Fertilizer Project 1.07 ADB Ures Project (supplementary loan) Dim Total 3.17 The US Pl, 480 Loan of US$25.0 million signed on December 12, 1983, was quantity-wise fully utilized by financing the import of complete quantity of wheat (150,000 MT) valued at $22.69 million. The excess loan amount of $2.31 million is therefore treated an lapsed. A total of $5.5 million was cancelled an per footnotes (a) and W above. Represents the undisbursed balance under the Canadian Food Aid Grant of C$30 million signed on June 29, 1984. Source: External Resources Department. -86- Table 4.01: EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1984 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS ('000 US$) DE BT 0 UT S TANDING : IN ARREAR S TYPE OF CREDITOR -----------------------------------:---------------------- CREDITOR COUNTRY DISBURSED :UNDISBURSED: TOTAL : PRINCIPAL : INTEREST SUPPLIERS CREDITS AUSTRIA 213 - 213 - - CZECHOSLOVAKIA 580 - 580 - - FRANCE 2.656 52 2.708 - - GERMAN DEM. REP. 5 12 17 - - HONG KONG 83 - 83 - - ITALY 50 - 50 - - JAPAN 2.839 54.553 57.392 - - ROMANIA 15.813 - 15.813 - - SWITZERLAND 296 - 296 - - UNITED KINGDOM 4.187 7 4.194 - UNITED STATES 294 - 294 - USSR 3 3 6 - YUGOSLAVIA 146 84 230 - TOTAL SUPPLIERS CREDITS 27.165 54.711 81.876 - FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARGENTINA 13.691 30.294 43.985 - AUSTRALIA 1.102 - 1.102 - - AUSTRIA 1.091 - 1.091 - - CANADA 5.728 - 5.728 - - FRANCE 18.366 6.368 24.734 - HONG KONG 10.619 - 10.619 - JAPAN 11.946 - 11.946 - KOREA. REP. OF 30.373 - 20.373 - SWEDEN 22.450 17.397 39.647 - SWITZERLAND 4.074 1.725 5.799 - UNITED KINGDOM 47.206 29.994 77.200 - UNITED STATES 119.292 - 119.292 - MULTIPLE LENDERS 311.869 - 311.869 - TOTAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 597.807 85.778 683.585 - MULTILATERAL LOANS ASIAN DEV. BANK 145.789 188.376 334.165 - IBRO 54.794- 22.901 77.695 - IDA 311.404 324.321 635.725 - 1MF TRUST FUND 83.022 - 83.022 - - INTL FUND ARG(IFAD) 12.952 35.219 48.171 - - OPEC SPECIAL FUND 29.859 9.064 38.923 - - TOTAL MULTILATERAL LOANS 637.820 579.881 1.217.701 - - BILATERAL LOANS CANADA 120.976 17.635 146.611 - CHINA 24,765 17.885 42.650 - DENMARK 6.468 57 6.525 - - FRANCE 24.602 23.100 47.702 - GERMAN DEM. REP. 268 17 285 - - GERMANY. FED.REP- OF 143.127 94.461 237.588 - HUNGARY 80 - 80 - INDIA 19.574 9.460 29.034 - - IRAO 4.571 - 4.571 - - JAPAN 268.649 106.084 374.733 - KUWAIT 17.867 42.239 60.106 - LIBYA 51 - 51 - NETHERLANDS 58.842 2.858 61.700 - SAUDI ARABIA 10.447 59.902 70.349 - SWITZERLAND 4.074 1.725 5.799 - - UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 9.465 2.194 11.659 - - UNITED STATES 430.288 162.137 592.425 - - USSR 5.407 57.651 63.058 - - TOTAL BILATERAL LOANS 1.157.521 597.405 1.754.926 - TOTAL EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 2.420.313 1.317.775 3.738.088 - NOTES: (1) ONLY DEBTS WITh AN ORIGINAL OR EXTENDED MATURITY OF OVER ONE YEAR ARE INCLUDED IN THIS TABLE. (2) DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDES PRINCIPAL IN ARREARS BUT EXCLUDES INTEREST IN ARREARS. (3) THE FOLLOWING UNCOMMITTED PARTS OF FRAME AGREEMENTS AND STANDBYS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS TABLE. BILAIERAL LOANS CHINA 20.025 GERMAN DEN. REP. 10.000 TOTAL 30.025 TOTAL UNCOMMITTED FRAME AGREEMENTS AND STANDBYS 30.025 Source: World Bank. Table 4.02: SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1984 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS ('000 US$) TOTAL YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT TRANSACTI 0 NS DURING PERI 0 0D OTHER CHANGES : BEGINNING OF PERIOD : : DISBURSED ! INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE: S E R V I C E P A Y M E NT S CANCEL- ADJUST- : ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS MENTS :-------------------:-----------: LATIONS : MENT * PRINCIPAL INTEREST TOTAL : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 1980 1,110,924 1,763,196 736,318 286,423 50,807 33,365 84,172 24.630 -6,824 1981 1,344,228 2,417.253 872.027 380,093 43,826 49,590 93.416 8,070 -135,435 1982 1,610,168 3,101,949 636,418 465,979 73,270 69.056 142,326 6.418 -108,238 193 1,953,909 3,550,441 310.229 387,074 74,707 92,170 166,877 925 -107,396 1984 2,214,032 3,677,642 340,156 410,223 98,925 102.622 201,547 2,805 -177,984 1985 2,420,313 3,738,084 * * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * * * * * * 1985 2,420,313 3,738,084 - 412,095 133,402 91.877 225.279 - 17 1986 2,699,017 3,604,699 - 349,510 161,464 93,046 254,510 - -4 1987 2,887,056 3,443.231 - 244,140 202,470 88.463 290,933 - - 1988 2.928,724 3,240,761 - 158,519 201,735 80,418 282,153 - -6 1989 2,885,499 3,039,020 - 83,563 183,850 70,791 254,641 - -1 1990 2,785,208 2,855,169 - 39.335 139,587 62,010 201,597 - -3 1991 2,684,954 2,715,579 - 19,156 114,652 57,454 172,106 - -1 1992 2,589,460 2,600,926 * 9.017 117,444 53,265 170,709 - -11 1993 2.481.021 2.483,471 - 2,172 115,165 49,606 164,771 - 4 1994 2,368,033 2,368,310 - 277 ii.909 46,568 165,477 - -6 1995 2,249,395 2,249.395 - - 103,791 43,208 146,999 - -5 1996 2,145,599 2,145,599 - - 102,087 40,202 142.289 - -7 1997 2,043,505 2,043,505 - - 96,701 37,240 133,941 - -2 1998 1,946,802 1,946,802 - - 96.799 34,609 131.408 - -7 1999 1,849,996 1,849,996 - - 96,961 31,987 128,948 - 8 2000 1.753,043 1,753,043 - - 96,700 29,372 126.072 - -13 2001 1.656.330 1,656,330 - - 95,095 26,883 121,978 - 8 2002 1,561,243 1.,61,243 - * 93,701 24,522 118,223 - -4 2003 1.467,538 1,467,538 - - 89,708 22,419 112,127 - -5 2004 1,77.825 1,377,825 - * 86,852 20,563 107,415 - - * THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE. Source: World Bank. твы. s.o1� еоюwт о► �и0сетАпт Огыипаеб, 197о/п-т а1 (бв Mi7l(ooi 1lLO/ц 1ц,1Lц L41,i Lp2y, 1рц Lp1,4 J.l1Z Ll2,4 ),ц.t I!!II 19ц 1!�!, 19е7 19ы 1•es 1иу•е бадре /еевiвlеыl j6iWj,u )гедвlаыl �д 7. �Чтглnе Е•ввnив :,776 7,97е а,бт �,:б� �,s16 s,оя7 б,о:1 1о,979 и,пб u,1s+ и,о77 16,�97 77,67о 7е,7ее 3,,:77 7s,ие :, Currne �aposдltur• :,ыб �,оо7 7,707 •,709 4,и1 �,1еа ь,077 я,9ы 10,еи 7:,7зо 1s,7s7 и,117 77,7а ц,�оо 7б,ess :9,67s 7, Ад..ие..гсеиое р.7..ве. 7е и7 ы 17 -бб я4 бб 1,7�: 1,о71 7,а0 7,666 -1,оы 1,ио �оо :,soo soo 1. Сиггеае /ucPlue (l-7-7) sье -::: n 67 -:а9 -677 -9е -77о -9: -:,616 -1,666 -7,sц -я7 7,7н 6.977 s,иб s. c.piee7 и.оwо 19 7е и и �9 ы 7� 1ч► 717 1а 1еб 1и 1s9 17о 67s :7о е. С•р[ев1 Rгргедlсnя год Мес Leadle6 7�7 еае t,1» 1,�1о 1,97е :,ы 1 7,097 7,766 7,7лr 17,es7 ц,7s7 1s,ees 16,1s7 16,ы 7 u,1os 77,7о7 7, сееь O.ttele t6-�-s7 1,о7: 1,ое7 1,оы 1,79е :,:1е 7,оц 7,1и s,вьз 7,:76 1s,767 и,я9 17,7а 16,777 16,иs 7s,s9� 77,о76 tlцeeN l�s roedб■ crse...d wue (r.e1 661 7s7 su би 1,::е 1,oos 1,070 7,ие э,77е б,иб 7,eos е,171 9,7�7 1о,ьs7 17,9д 7:,ом Dаввесе 7ke-we6ee e. erorl•б ueet -яе :и - 1и -19 sбe бео яе s7s 1os ж 7,4ея 1,96: _ 7:� _ Dевиеls etarkвe brroвtrц lгов • ееs-Авд воигеы (r.e7 697 м: 677 беб е:7 еб7 1,ое7 1,s9s 7,ца 7,09~ 1,Чб �,OSO 4,аы :,н1 s,too 7,9д brroвiвi lгов иоЫо� увеи (r.e� 94 ::ь -11ь -1s 1s� ы я -7и 17s ьы 7,1о7 з,ееs �,99о 1,tp { бп -7,боь <-7,о79 0ве ое Свв6 Чlвоеве l77 -11! 67 7! 7l -77 -497 S1 -7/ -77 -76 -716 -697 { - ( МввоnЧ,иt 7вегеЬид{ееее7 tвевiрев ■ад h7вовев lselodN 1et Соггваt Ивоеио (Liao 1) 117 176 70! 7.77 775 7Ы 911 - - - - - - - - - � Соггвее аsрвед[tигв (Lteв ?7 99 7� lI7 1IS 97 100 721 - - - � - - - - - СврΡ[ев1 Lрввдlсиге ид Rве Lводlаб (Lisв б) 41 S7 91 170 . 7�7 76� 7�� - - - - - - . - . �/ Wtor• 1911/77, tЬв 7leeel Тиг ru fеов ОеtоЬвг 1 to tгрtиЬп 70. tloeaeial 7гег 197!/77 согегед в 1S^вооt6 риlод tгов Oetober I, 1971, tбeou{Ь Dк ибег 7l, 1l77. Ае tгов 1977, еЬв ►lвевl Тввг еогнвроодв ео еЬв евlиди 7un ео tЫв вед tЬг follorloR taЫu, еЬв дви 1os 197!/77 Ьввв Ьввs рео-гвtвд ео в 17-вооtЬ рвеlод, Соlие totвle ы� аее вдд ир ввгеtl� дов to гоиедlе� е([, �qureвi Сиtгв7 Mok ot Ср1ое, ! м/е ! а( 2 рере т.ы. s.o:, /wспит !!vlиоl. 19�oil1-а и (/в мllиевl 1l14l11 1911l121/ 1l1.i J.lZi 1l1S. Wл 1!]1 191д J.41.! 1!!S! 1!ц 1!)1 е9и ии 1/lS we/п wlиe ' /гевlвiвиl Чеlввевв hевевiеиl jal,j�jV, 1. Тие. ое a.t fвwвв .вд !го[ice у}, у}� 1D.Q i!! 1L4 !![ !i1 1a141 L]S1 1а411 L414 Ll11 L7iL iS4Q !.l44 L:!! wepee.c. l.ее.е те. с sI // 1 9se 4о9 s1: ье3 sso пе 9г1 1,7ое 1,�s9 :,us :,us �,ыs �,ио e,us 1lовдогрогвев lеее.. т.. с > тАь wo це иа :ei 7es 7ее 71/ s7o ео/ n! Ks l,ово !,lг9 WJwtмot � ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' . 3. Тии os Trapect! ид prop.rt! Тгвавlегв �/ !.4 1Q 11 !3 !i д1 10! 1!!. 1�1 3l1 11I �22 1!2 LII 1!II i3�. 7. Твкее ае боаде еед /вnееве J�j 1.OaZ 1.731 1.е.] 1.; jf j�j�j 2.177 7.103 7.1а/ ]�1QQ �}}1 �а� L.�I J1LIII>1 L�.вl4l iLSL w,lе..е т„гае.вг т.е 7:ь 794 sц ьа нь п1 ьь: 1,o�s 1,19s 1,Чо :,а9 4,os1 ь,:а е,lц е,lо: lo,so: тг.а. ил геегеееtов г r� // 1 n91 с1оя1 u1s1 с19г1 сllи t:9u cs7o1 cseu (1,оои t1,su1 t1,a9u ti,rso> и,91l1 а,но1 x.wr.eeerlea t 1 г4е�1 и9s1 (s7u гsь91 usu cw1 сььsl u,os:1 с1,еlи с!s!г! и,777! u,t»1 и.l9о! и.и:! /еlеееlвв твие ев сеоа. у •s1 еи ые 1so е71 91а 1,�ог !,/3. 1,9о! 1 и/ : оп !!» 7,l7о 7»о /.оа а,ае ьl�иег �е1в. L исы с:ы 1 гц�1 сгlы с:оы fHO) tuu csssl аи i/и1 i�и1 iки см» t97o� (l,ою� t!,l7о� тое.еео ти с39е1 г717> г7+!> (я71 as9� as» сsяи (1se1 ceot; гl.оооl и,1:71 u.�1s1 и.Чи t1.no1 u.sw) сl.цо� tвв lвs, вд ввlоrев j/ (7!) (Ч) (]9) (!61) (166) (!)б) 1575) 1510) (!37) (10!) (!б) flSO) !97!) �l,07о) 17,l7i) (l,403) �двiвlпиtitв Иq ов Coeosue Ol1 I-) (-) (-) (-1 (-) (-) (i0) р!S) (971 (H) (�) (�) (�) (-) (-) /вlвеt(л Sва.в аа /вniц. )1/ 13 16 3! 71 71 7! И Н 30 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ыее.е. l..е �ь s7 s/ s9 ы ы ц �� ы е: 9s us ие tu t� !to w.с.евв 1 9гоlивiоввl Ысвев.в s/ г3в1 сlвl (at 17:1 с7и as1 (3и сl91 ио1 tи1 лr1 t191 ии с-1 с-1 с-1 j rгыеlе ыивег т.: е■л оеьег с:о1 (3�1 (3и ст г3и са1 с!ы (�л1 и» се�1 с1и t1lы сьоl t-1 с-! с-) Т 9. т.ее. r, l.регее iu sц ш ш �t ц4 � t.ias a.дzt д.�ts. г.цt д.ш, �.ш a.t�. �.цs Lш Соеtов: L�tlu oai 9е{вевые 9гедееев 7г ц 37 :ь 3е !s s9 7е 9s 1о9 so и: 7и .... ■л. ..е. tnpвre/ 1oo/aи1h, plrtu, rt.eиe ьвд lеИеее �о 7i 7о :о ьо 1s! 1!� :77 s�e �о1 �и es9 tи в... ■... в... иtвеге! геоаееее 1ь 3о � ь � � 9 1� ы !е �е ss i» в... .... .... СЬм1ев1 /геlееи п 71 3, ы s! 7о 39 е9 е9 ио us и! !!7 .л. ■.е. .... НрегваУiаа Мвеп(де / и 11 1е 1е 1е а ss и и ие ио ие вл. r.e. .л. s.eeue sa seвsile «ectelee 7� э+ ц 7е 7� so se s�1 !s! 71о �so �ts ы1 е.е. ■л. ..в. Че. ИвtаU .ед ееее Меtв1 Areielee 16 И 16 !7 8 77 7! 17! 1!1 • 331 7S7 701 3l1� д.в. в... в.в. Mвe4laeq, /�иlрвлt вм) hree 77 !S !1 !7 31 S1 61 !10 710 17{ 1!3 33! Ч! в.в. ■л. вл. тгвиреге t�elpвut 30 ц ц 10 76 i3 93 !/0 71i 77l 1Ч 791 S!1 в.в. ■... ■.в. оее.г 7о 39 !t 7t ь1 �s ьs 1ее яо �7о �н Ч9 еоо в... .... .л. Ьiеиве !еи аа 11� / Оце bрогев 1 1 1 1 1 S !1 !S 1 1 1 ... ... в... в... в... S. Твие ее Lарегев �,( j}j �jj }jQ �1Q �i1 i1Q !а1]1 Sa1!! i.�1! Li1S. i�,4l. L!}!. 1.iif L1l1 LIl1 ти у 1и 1ы 1Т1 1sь ие 1ы :w 3,�п lл9s t,9�o 1,и9 l,�и 1,l9о 1,sso 1,tи !.l�о lеllег J/ 1� и и: !ы ио 1я! !ы 1,оо1 1.!» 1,7� 1,�п »7 е! 91о t,oo9 мs Weoeec .ед Ceeoeet prodeete S7 ?1 77 163 6S S !1 цS 7]S !11 !11 19t ц1 1S7 ц1 714 oerer 7s п и se �� s1 ьs 1о9 n 1и и7 9s �е и3 1и 9� /. !пе /.te ггоеееее, t.e L il.4 ls4i !.R! 941< 9iIl 9)д 1..94.1 цдl .._....i .,�3 - - - rro. aeet�. /и+/.е 1/ 3о9 7�7 7!я и� е1! ие (:1 739 s/ "= - - _ � - - ►re■ /аааае У/ и1 1:� 3ое 37: s7 wo ( - - - - - - - - - - �. reut т.■ ане.ве l,:п :,sse 7,и: 7,91� �,1н �,sяо s,�ьо 1о,7е7 11,1ss 1l,so� u,19s 1s,�3o lо,�о1 а,ьое l9,s9� 7o,ns ь 1sОв !� Jl1Q/ц 1WL11 1/ 1l2i 1!]i llii 1l11 1!ц 1!1! 1!1! 1l14 1lJ1 1!!1 1fОв �евеевл М,1ав! Ziatla{W1 ►1t1в11ц l1711tL1W1 Li1в1i0a !. lrquej fвивв �il. ак ц! цn 1ц ш цi ш ш �М. ц3 !i► Лг а.в. w. в,а. агг.ве hr�lu вt ававивt htвqеИи L! 0! Ч !t !0 S) 1f )i tl 1 И1 it0 1 в.а. в.а. в.в. Ывв►в /вге Соьвiввiвв (1S) (e1) (1!) (f1) (70) (!1) !11) 1101 (7f) (�1 (!) l1) (!) ■.в. ■.в. ■•в• hu ! Sвlргq►в вqвгеиве t-7�) 1•7) (-eS) f77) f10) f11) 11) (SO) (!1) 1И) f1S!) (fАЧ (7)!) в.в. ■.в. в.в. �и..� ai) и�) ао) с�и пи с1и с-77) {л) сли аи) с-1и) с-и» wa) .л. .... ..в. hвtit• 1гw tвЧ рtвв д 1� И 77 - - � - - • • • • вл. в.в. в•в• hdib о! tlввкв �виввt АвtИlеИв �i 17 l0 11 � 1 1 )0 Ч И 17 ) в.в. в•в• в�в• htвгиl� ОИUвМв 4ве 1S 10е iN 177 111 е70 711 117 ц7 !11 311 �Ч Ч1 в.в. в.в. в.в. д в►lе►� )tеи Iи1в1в1 iв �оtв1 ее~1.аlе... си ti) с7) c1r са {1) iи с» си сее) ces) л►) te0) с-) t-t с-) ие1ви14еаг� 1е 1о 1 ! и и 1v и �о и и )► и !е ц и 1. а►вг М.-тв. апвве iамв ц,� ц� �] �ц ц� 1гвиЧв tги tвв-1Мввtеlв) 1в1и 0/ a 1!1 ,11 171 ,11 1Ч шf0 77 -!1 i0} � 3i3 i3i а� � � YrlвИtлtlN С►вгрв W hвв 0/ !7 Ц Ч !� S1 !1 Ч 11 101 10! 171 !17 ц0 ■.в. в.в. в•а• 11ив ви tвгиlи 10 17 И д 17 71 )7 11 S1 �) 1! И fS в.в. в.в. в.в. с.вегlмеtи. и иввlа и►.в 0/ �L _ц ,,,11. �l .ц ,ц „!4 у .у; .ц �1, ,,,�$ �}, в.в. J.в. .�вва )о. ТемНвr в! еиs*в1 lвUь lиtiu _ ,.._ _ _ ,У, ..._ ,_,,, ,� � � еsве t.тк i,1l9, L!!о U. Мв-евв hггае lлвwв (ОНвt0) � frr �fв ае ,��ц ввв ,,,jpy 5fв ut �jj ,JT4 .LOIi .Ll01 �aYS 1.i� .!�! и. т•e.t агг.ве ев.виг 7s1ь 7,11! 7,ю1 ►,ы�► ►,!и s,o1) l.оа lо,1н !!,!и и.1ы tsл)! и,►и и,lа я,:н se,7)1 7l,ц1 � )7. аl1и1 Ог,,...в у ___и _..�! �i1. -1! _..!! _К ___t! �н � .,..1A1 ._1У ..�ц .._ш ...1]А .,�s�. _..1i� )ь. твиl lевив 7.117 1,1s! 7,иs 1,» 7 1.7и s.u) ы o1s 1),и7 )7,о11 u,ui и,>s1 и,ие �,)и 17,и0 я,1о: и,аи �/ 11ивв ив tиеиев 0/ св тв1)в 3.01 Гвг tИевl �ввгв. �/ lувги вгв !м иев в/)аЧИ lвг в 1l�ове► рг е�. L/ hиЧвив иt вЧ11вИв. ммв ивiв 1.� с.впwlч 1.1s) .и 1е. tвдвl{у tM lгвllЧ в( �rrut lьrрl� вМ евl11�1►ев геtивв 1еи ввtе� Чг. М/Iдт rгdlte of Atnct Моворll qгоыУ )f77. ваеГ YI)tI е►в вОвв/OIr YU У1• 1дв�вв�fв! ef е1в �scUв Овlвгtвввt и t►в lевев 01ве111п1вг Свгргвtlвв. V 1�1гА вв Mi1 Чреи д lеевl и1в. U Мвi.1� Чдв И1lи tвв �tnвив tввl l.7.S). /у/ Ав1аt1 1l�wr 1Ииввв. 1Ч1вi{q е►в гпвwее fгвв арге laeiu вМп еУв !И/1ев1 Wвtr ОNIцвЧ, �1lе� вгв игигеN (вг 1Ч1t► nnlив (ег ввеаев ввгепв. )Nleвtu в�аwи ►гиtОме. IвдвАу f в рвпцв0 ►1 Onuвeat bnlp 1Че ввnlвИ0. � 1гlвr ев 1!1)1)1 гв!!ев впв ►qt 1в Чв вhвввв ииrвев. е�оввЧг, lnfee• fвг tгlг ргiвl вН в1и 1Чlиевl. ц.в... и.�. e.i,i ви 0.1, �/ lвrви• rввlв 1А вЧ Ол аеьиу 1.1.7.e. .У l.1.7.1. V lвгвw 4вfв 7 д ОА.1.7. �I :Rврв И/Ir 1 rU 1Z. в.а. • иt аввllАlв. ... Игв ейв Ч t •itlle.. �а� елива ио •! еврвц аигв) п.вв.гl. � �{j� l�O7i CI1l.t�t1R ti►в11D119lR{� 1l10111-65 {/ (u Ml1l1o■) 1�1PLZl 1li1L7I 1l,L1 1115 L�. 1l1д 1lI1 1Э1.L 1l11 11lО. 11LL 1l11 l}�] 1!М 1в1�вt Ы{�ie- ' }кmiвieul �jj4� }гввLвlвиl �и, 1. 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ОtУп (10.6) (2А.А) (21.l) (26.1) (-) (ц .0) (72.2) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) ■.в. в.в. е.в. ieed п..ге - - - - - - - - soe.o 1.ы 7.6 1.s2o.� ),as.o 1.а�.о 2,s1o.o 1,s».о 1,�» .о е.ге..е. ее..rв - - - - - - - - ».2 1ы .е 1ы.о и1.о :б).о 7и.о 7п.о а2.о Iвеоео eeeplsut - - - - - - - 127.0 217.0 1ц.0 - - ' ' ' ' Сиггие тuuhn te tu0lle Согриtlоа. 2г.о а7.б ие.1 )67.s 1>+.7 1:я.1 иб.� 1,ое1.� я2о.� 1.se:.) 1.�ео.� 2.и).t t.lse.7 1,�ц.о 2,�о�.а ..., s ot в►iehs . r Cyloe letreloи Corputtoe (-) (-f i-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (S2e.0) (Ч.О) (-) (-) (-) (-) i-) (-) (-) Свуlее Iпtqieoe Coreentloe (-) (-) (-) (l6.S) (-) (-) (-) (-) (7lS.0) (SSO.Ч (Ч).0) (211.1) (1l1,2) Ч 21.0) (1�000.0) U00.0) мt2t ео.гд с-> (-) снл) сбб.о) себ.о) tеь.о) г�r.1) си.и 1н.о) 1s7.o) си.7) и�л) t:1.» (2s.e) c2s.e) t2s.e) сооегоl тгиерге ео.гд t-) с-) с-) (-) с-) t-> с-) na.o) со.о) ин.!) (-) ац.о) (1:�.о) .... (sse.o) us�.e) оееог Гиы ia сегрег.е(е.е (ц.о) (я.б1 (ц .�) (и .о) (1е.7) (1).O (б).2) (1i6.!) 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CYпnat ггвоеlои ее Cytoe со..г.,..е е.O..� - - - - - - ц.0 е.о 1�.о ео.о 2):.2 lеел :е7.о :)�.о �о�.о .л. 2еЧЧа taldd[ te 11et(ео.1 е..сев. е..б - - - и.) 12.6 12.е 1:.6 )12.6 s1.e и)л 7ее.о ба.о soo.o soo.o soo,o 4rs.o т.�сеооt авьеtд2 - - - - - - - - - �7.о �о.о ы.о бs.o ео.о бо.о ю.о тое.2 6)s.s 2�е.4 ees.o 1.и�.о 1,зn.з 1.о�s.з 1,61е.е э.�е).б �.)и.2 �,�17.е �,en.2 i,:е:л 4,s:o.o ел. .... .л. s.в. • вее влll.Ыв. бsигевl� о.апвl Тгиеег�� вед Сеsегвl евц е( Св21еs. . к sвыв s.os, глгltц с7rеис)ruee uro мп ье�)ес, )я7сiп-еs �/ (1в вillloo) U1.4L.T1 1:.i�L.t2 l�Il I9Z1 i}1f LI1L i:iL �! 1�Z4 i:lQ 1L11 1�II 16�1 1•М . 1elS... е•д{et Чдре lsereвieue �� hевlвlеиl �� Ae6aiвLtloв nt е•вl Аввеев �jS, S]i jQj j(Q 1.06t 1.175 1.11] 7.17• 7.7ве LSg. ].Sl7 6..s7 S.6f7 7.е17 i.,7в !� cиtt Уа■tвi.ee■eioe :1 ь: s) ь7 ее о1 ю ае ьоо ь:ь s1я 1,ао п7 ■.в, .,в, .,в, fоеИ1 tвпiем 1о7 1ю и7 )и )s� 7а us ьи 1,lе1 1,ы� » 7 roo 1,и7 .л. .... .... tdвeaeloe (�7) N9) (7!) Чl1 (ц1 fl1]) (11ь) (ll71 f1S91 (ьSр (ь�1) !47!) tS07) е.в. ■.в. •.в. tввlеЬ !7и с7ы г7ы с3» !еь) и1и си) и74) c7en иоя сlьи п7и cn» .л. .... .... rаоеlц !1и !гы и:) с�е) (ви a7l са) сци cs7sl с77) !7:) Чs71 си) ■... .... .... ое►.г с1е) с7:) !1ь) (16) с)я) !г�) с77) (n) (67) (иь) (!1) (97) (еь! ал. а.в. ьв. tеоеовlе аг.iк.в 71о 7ь: иэ sц ns ),о7о 7ы 1,7о: :.оь7 :,7а� 1,>+: 7,7и �,717 .... .... .... цгlеоlеоrв 4 1ггliвtlea (17=) l177) (1ь0) (7!7) (707) (41)) (77i) (7ьо) IS671 ff10) (ц7) () 07ь) (l,St7) в.в. е.в. ■.в. н.ь.еие сц сы с�) с)�) гзи аы с:и а�) с7и си:) г))�� i)sы te:� ..б. .... .л. )4виhееигiц ь NЫц cs) tя) с1и ио) м) ги) с17) ая) fsu fst) !еи ии сиЧ ..в. .... r... тг.д. си) us) !» с7) с7) с:и с)о) с17ы !7и !)ь) !и !7)р) !ы) .... ..., .�в. Сев>.,вlевеiоев usu t=оЧ сг�п lтьь) tь7i) гцы аа) с7а) и,цо) us)3) и,а7к) п,а7s) u,so7) .... , ■... ■л. hрlевl Тгвовlеев �Q �,Q¢, �,уу, �Qj �Q¢ 1�Qj; � i.3ье 7.ь7е ь.цв }.317 jp�l 10.7So h►lie Сеерогиlоав 7е1 ие 3еь 77е 77о яы аьа :,сме 7,))к ь,оев 7,17ь )о,ьь1 )о,ь7к �:;� ц"�' ц',,�в, оеь.г зя ье ь) а 7ь ьо ья s7o 7:ь 1ье и7 1и 77е в,в, ,,,в, ��в. Ставв WodiW L S� � .:DS. L1 i4� I� �i}. �. А.�}ь IOi � L1L �1 1j: if: 1а'I� е! вlie► вqeiвltloe о! tfwaiet вмви е!, Свllоо Ttuввertlbirdbвrd (-) (-) (-) (ь1) (fs) fS ) !(-0 (lf') (3ь7) (ц!) f1i1) (!77) Ч77) ■.в. в.в. в.в. 7 ое ) !н7) ■.в. .л. ■л. ОиllвевеМ t.уевдltагв :/ ,� � _1 ,_..39. _„1II _.! ,_.! .�. _!1 �3!! _1i1 _!! _,ц д,у � � У 1'оевl С•рlевl �. вадlеиsв ваt ввt Lводiц у сиеи! 4е� Clвutlieвeioe j/ 100 ri7 1,1б1 1,t1S 1.917 1.676 !,1l4 S.ьfь 7,nf 11,fS7 U.77i 1ь,Оь0 15,1lS ■л. в.в. ■.в. lвеег 9в1п [вреадltигв lгавlв)овв - - - • - - - - - - - - - о,.. ..а. b.. Ч4г lееЧвев iв Dвpвite el WЧсовеес Сагриеlви �/ se :� -и -1ьs � s )о1 1s7 7и -s�: и 17s !ai .... .... .... c.pte.1 ир.вдиае. ь �.е 4.а1ве »: еье 1,us 1,ь)о )л7е :,ы 1 :,оя] s,ць 7,sь7 1:,а7 у)),7s7 )s,иs ц,)s7 и,47� :),)os :7,3ot �/ /н tootaetв �/ ее 7вЫ в 3.01 !ег tlвeвl �игв. ]/ �e�uieitioв е! fWдelвl виоЧ. ' s/ Us.ttee.e.d еове о! I{LСв ad еЬв двеиегвllевд Ьидьве. Рог 19ь0-l1 рвгiод, еЬе 1п■t1. вrв и lопоы: 19е: иек ии ии J,:,QQ �pJj �гаввд frer[вlеевt даагвввд ,�цjуц nвeueuliua wae.e ие ьь ь:о и ь7о ь:о bррlвивtвq Сврltвl iпввеиве heerr 7А - 7(М - S!0 7D Iеtв�гвtвд еигвl оанlориве lwцвв lSь 22l 7tS - �S1 �И Ове7вевitiвд - - lц 1 Ч7 1,lSO 9/ мвев веевевtеl7, еСврlевl 6ргвдlеиrее" Ь7 Сеееsвl Иа4 е! Cy1es ИПоlеlos 1еи lеве еqв7веаt neвlptв. fЬв Сгоtеаl Идk дои we оа ее. еве, •Кп иедtу.■ �/ Чlвм еа еве еЬацв L Snuury деровitв (i.e. Тгвп.lви а•t ot гiеЬдгвrвlв). j/ lвеlиди b 701 вillies ►вiее рв reprrвet е! ереевl Чвевав Ьр еЬв Соеевt Иоl. в... • .ее ... u.bt.. ��t Сееегвl Чвk о! Св7)ав. lible ,06. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET DEBT SERVICES. 1970/71-84 Ll (Is Million) 1970/71 1971/72 1973 JI& 1983 1994 Budget Zralidgas, ZILLULU P-Tisional Domestic rjbt Amortization 107 135 197 290 248 293 422 664 683 903 1,002 1,939 3,661 709 775 Interest 267 324 399 461 561 668 822 1,083 1,339 1,864 3,143 4,190 5,354 6,261 3,793 Foreign Debt Debts bold by Sinking fund Amortization 2 2 2 2 38 - - - - - - - - - - Interust 4 5 5 5 3 - - - - Foreign Governments and International Organisations Amortization 134 192 231 269 308 368 525 502 499 600 607 673 1,165 1,659 1,516 Interest 65 84 110 114 135 172 191 285 357 413 713 915 1,270 1,734 1,568 Total foreign Debt Amortization 136 194 233 271 346 368 525 502 499 600 607 673 1,165 1.69 11516 of which., FEEC Cost (46) (69) (89) (93) (125) (136) (91) (-) (-) (-) (-) H Interest 69 89 115 119 138 172 191 285 357 413 713 915 1,270 1,734 1,588 of which: PEZC Cost (24) (32) (44) (45) (52) (64) (55) jL/ See footnote A/ to Table 5.01 for fiscal years. jqurce: Central Back of Ceylon. т,l,аlе S.07к СОУ8lN1[ЕИТ ПNiIlRPRI868, 1970/71-64 j/ (Re Иillion) 1.4i4L.T1 1411/ii 191� 13ig. 191�. 14Z4. 3913 1.�ZR 1914 19�.Q 12�1 19�. 19J7 19b4 1udбet l ia lvav �pvtвlonal Е■cia.c•в Рговiвiоевl А. Rвvaaue I40 169 17В Т18 Тэ2 2э7 229 292 э79 4ТЭ 486 534 5д!i 69э 693 А. Reeurreat Pxpmdlture �/ 118 1Т7 1э8 19] Т16 2Тб Тб4 э00 39Т SO] 600 7эТ !61 1,07Т 1,101 of �hichк Ioterввt, Dividвnd, Naot рвiд со covernreot (2) (2) t!) (J) (4) (5) (б) (7) (е) (10) (12) (14) (160) (16) I16) Ot6ar Раувеосе to Covaroвeot (22) (2S) (Тб) (Т9) (эТ) (э4) (э5) (45) (S]) (54) (67) (92) (1э0) ()45) (14S) с. Сиггеис surplua (А - е) 2Т аТ ао :1 16 11 -зs -а -19 -ео -11х -199 � -28э -э79 -4ое D. Capital б:рвпдiсигв 47 26 47 SO l52 196 132 297 565 50S А62 780 767 4э3 364 Port. 9аrЬое. УвгвЬоивв yf 1 6. lteveoue S1 54 47 S3 64 59 80 7S 79 - 2.0 0.7 - - - й Р. llecurraot Екрепдiеихе bJ Тб Т5 ТЬ э1 э4 э5 79 45 44 - - - �- - - б. Currene 8ьтрlив (s - Р) 25 29 21 22 ЗО Т4 41 70 Э5 - Т.О 0.7 - - - 9. Сарiевl Lspenditure 17 19 12 В 9 10 11 1S 54 - - - - ' - Рове впд tвlaeoвwnieatiooв к. ае�еои. вs 105 11э 151 1sa 17в ТоТ 2ы э17 з9: 626 71з 67о 1,о74 1э,х77 J. teeuereдe Pвpeaditure 13/ 107 108 12В 128 144 l62 196 211 265 ]0э Э69 467 5S3 740 77э . R. Сиггвпt Вигрlие (I - J) -2Т -э -15 Т3 10 !б б Sl 52 89 Т59 Т4б 711 3э4 SS4 ь. Свр1и1 вкреоаtс�те 7 21 29 зо аь ss а9 ав :э5 а18 2ее з57 а77 as6 4sь �/ Оо в савЬ Ьавiе. Рог [iеевl уеагв, ■еа tootnoee в/ to Тв61е S.O1. �/ Dвеед оо СЬв reelвeeltied двtе ивед to che Саосевl eвnk Annual laporc. g/ Rерlвевд Ьу Вг! 4ok■ Poct AuCЬoritr ■ид Sri Lвnke Свгgо Сотрогвсiоп in 1979. 8оиеевк Седегаl �ваk ot Се�1од. Lpe. б.ове соиtы тlгмеггаб то roeыc соегомтtоиа, 1э7о/7t-ы �/ (и М1111ов) !р]_4Lц 1.4Z1L1.i 19]3 141i 1.р13. 19]!г. 14ц 13ц !31! lt44. 1"л1 !!!2 1яи 1ги вадре haвiвieul �^R( евв 1!гавiвiеиl dвr1e1e1f�tL� �fl�Lli�4.4 Gг1о� гвеебilие Сегроевеlоа - - sб,s - - - - 3ss.o 3so.e бп,о :ы.1 1:7.п 1,ооо.о еоо,о [Iвп Г�(lдув Dввdlopr•ае Ward 9.1 1i.!1 9,! 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U.6 23.7 Coeoaet Colehвtion werd - - - - - - - - 13.] :7.7 »л 6.1 3.о 47.! !�.] Увtвг lетоеrевв bвтд - - - - - - - 3.6 l0.6 •.! 4.4 3.0 2.3 ].! ].2 JвевtЬв lвtвtе Derelopoвet bвгд - - - - - - - 1.0 ' 176.7 39.6 177.0 75.4 115.0 115.0 т.. бввlt wleieб Dnвlep■гое ►eeбorie7 - - - - - - - - о.3 3.3 11.! 27.о 16.7 ]s.6 ]s д Уц вг lnp�1� i Огвlnвбв bвгд - - - - - - - - - - ц3.S ]16.] l66.7 1,е01.б 1,101.6 оеыrв j/ t.o 1.1 о.1 - 1.+ ].о п.1 б.б 6.s 4.6 s.s 2.3 2.1 2 л 2.t lLl6rLu 11�д 17.1 Z,4 L4 2А.5. 17.�t 14.i ]!.i 41,! 4l�4. 19.! 1LL Ь3,}. 1ге4 1l,II Су1ео t3вМве3и Corprвtiee воа ►свьвт7 мгьотв 11.о 17.6 7.6 9.о :e.s 17.9 16.9 эs.4 1s.9 9а.б :б.б 1:.7 ы.s 1].о 7е.о tцauheeer3u б М!в[и 11,,�j � 130.1 �j 3!!.1 s]s.e у41.2 1.114.) 1ll.Ь :1 iц,1 36].! 31о.1 3]7.! бт:.о �4 �вуlев Са.вве Сетртвеlо■ 7.о е.б - - s.3 :].! 1l.о 36.1 - - - - _ _ _ Са71ое Спааiев Сопртвсtоо - - 71.9 3.5 15.� 19.0 19.0 - - - - - - - _ Cy1es Мiввтвl бведа Ceepeвtioe - 1.3 ].! 0.] 1i.6 t1.6 26.! 2].7 - -].9 - - - _ _ Се71оо е17.ооа Согрт.с3ов а.! !.о 2о.1 s.: :.б 6.1 6.7 о.1 - - - - _ _ Cq1ae беввl Сотртвеiое 1.2 O.S S.S 1.] 7.7 S1.] А3.3 67.5 - 10.7 7.f - ]!.! 3.7 2.7 tиЧтs hpn Ni11e Согрогвt3оо 17.6 е.7 :l.1 ]7.] и1.1 76л ы.7 ».7 - 40.1 4.6 - -• �7.0 �7.о l.cieu2 и11t w.re 7.s и.4 1ь.б 1.! 1л 3.о �.7 - 13.е 13.s 3о.3 и.7 !.о s.o 3.о Маtlьввl iвat3le Сокротвеlее 27.1 16.7 9.0 ].9 ]0.1 51.6 ]3.7 1.2 10.] -2.0 ]!.S �5.3 45.1 бт3 ыив бwиг сатргвеlов - - - 7.1 ]1.] 1о.о - - ь.s б.о 16.ё 7s.� 1:2.3 •33.о as.o бе.с. 1ert11iur 14noLпtnrin6 Согр. - - - - :.7 и3.б 3�6.6 i,o61.1 - и7.s еб.3 ]оо.о - - - lевев Са Cosporвelos 15.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - бевее т3.ьвт Corpoeeeloa 7.] - 1:.: 3.6 1.7 .1.] о.ь -1.6 - о.1 - - - - - ltвее Dлвlеривt б Coeвtrveeioв Согр. - - - - 0.6 •S.S - 6.0 - , - - - - - - Cy1es tпrolew Согргвtlое - - - - - бо.о - 6.2 - 1о.7 - - _ _ _ Oi2 ви rпе Согртвеiе■ - - - - 1.о •.1 - - - 2s.1 s1.7 1ол ц.3 3s.o 1s.o бtвtв tвttl7luт Сегрнtlое - - - - - - - - ц.0 !.] ]].! 61.3 б.] 33.0 23.0 цЫет Мвеоtвеtогlц Cosprвeioa - - - ].2 Sd S.4 •.S 1.6 - - - - - бtвев ртiвtiц Согрлеlоо - - - - - - - - - - ' - - 51.6 51.6 ае.н !,/ 1о.] 11.о ♦.] о.7 ].s •.s ].! б.е 1е.1 3s.6 пs - о.3 s.3 3s S 4316г il.,1 !Lд 112.1 102,! Il.9�2 11.4.�� ZILt i�.вl. l41�1 s/ L4�L� 1.lц.! 1.!l,Zь1 1.l.il.! 2.lii..l, ].!1l.й � се,1е. �rрте.е3ивеiр lовта - - - - э.3 11.о - - - - ].б 1о.о 1:.о ><.о 26.о еуlов еlееегlаlе7 мвгд - - 2s.6 до.о to.0 1s.o 6.s 4:.1 �2.1 иб.7 и3.3 317л ио.о 1tк.s 1а.3 Cqleв бЬ1ррlц Corputioa - - 12.1 1S.S - - - - 153.6 300.0 200.0 co�to■ тгеввроте lе.тд 17.7 - - - 13.о 1.о 7s.o 173.ё - 6.2 1.] - бо0.о 2вдевts3вl Опвlер.ввt bвгд 7.3 !.1 13.3 - - - - - - 21.2 10.0 И0.7 1.4 1.1 1 А 7.ва иtе� co..iвetoa - - - :.s - s:.o s7.s 17.s - 1в.о :7s.o 16е.1 13о.о 1и.о 11s.o ь3�евеоеt On.tepиae мвта - - o.s 1.о ы.2 ]б.] ,11.3 - е.о 1s.6 3о.б 1s 6.7 !.о !.о tадд7 Mвetotlц еюатд - 7.3 11.0 6.3 22.2 2.0 1.1 16.1 - 17�.6 l7.6 16.5 2.7 - - ЧвигтЬ б leiutiLlе 2ueitatв l.1 10.1 27.1 l1.9 - O.l - - 2.0 - - . . - - lевев LЬ(вввriц Согрие(оа - - O.S 10.0 - - - - - - - - - - - 03в3еlои3 оnеlории Cooee3U - - - - U.7 10.1 - - - . . _ _ Cq1ea /rовдтиеiц Сетргвеiое :.б о.е ].] 1.о 31.1 3.е 3.о 1.о б.о - _ - 2,s _ _ Cq1oa bевlв Corprвtioв - - - O.S ]].] !.9 - - - 3.3 3.9 - - - Су1ое Coeowe 3оеhот[е7 - - - - 2l.7 31.2 - - 0.1 - 6.S l7.6 21.0 13l.i 137.5 Отиеп Со1авlе lве.е.iе ео�iввiов - - - - - - - 1.1 1и.б 1о.о 33.е бо.о бо.о бо.о бо.о �3sprtв �stiorlt7 of 1тi 4eka - - - - - - - - - 16.i ]1.! 66.i - - ]06.0 tвeieul tеовiц Dв�вlер�вве �oee,eeie7 • - - - - - - - - 976.0 1,070.0 701.6 571.0 SS3.0 SS2.0 Celeab е(вt. lвеlвввеiее 6 Dеввlориое wвгд - _ - - - - - - ббл ws.o ]б.] 1е.е 1м 6.3 6.3 от►вв Оеввlери■е �оеЬотlе7 - - - - - - - - :ь.1 бо.о :оо.о - и.о sl.s 2l.3 ит w.w - - - - - . - - ]оо.о - O.s ]о0.о lоо.о 1,ооо.о 1,ооо.о /ei Lйв lert loebтlel ' - - - - . - - - - - 16.1 2.! 223.1 212.6 �вiи toeolв Corpueieв - - - - - - - - - - 1l.1 - - 150.0 0.0.l.0. - - - - - - - - - - - 11].0 2/.S l00.0 100.0 tspet lеввlерввt bвгд - - - - - - ' - - - - - 300.0 253.0 53.0 ОеЬпв 1/ �а3 11s! Jlа0 10,1 10,а1 iLd _]1а1 _21.! -11,! �1 _7l,1 �ё .�i.1 --.-_S�.d ��. rotu. :и.ь це.1 ]и.3 ]7е.3 77о.о яы.3 ебl.3 2,о7о.0 ],1и.б б,о^.е.: 7,171.1 1о,б3:л 1о.ц1.7 11,]оl.1 1:,11].о �/ ПмЧ ввв 3ootmtв �/ to 7выв S.O1 (ог 3lвевl 7ввл. j/ btitlu ьЫеЬ ЧаlвЧ 1ив tбво !в 10 вЧllов вввs7 7иг ie е!е рвгlод еоrпед. j/ Сwllвtв lгввбlово we вввilвые. �tг Сдоtгвl Чтk ot Cq1oa. т.ы . б.т, Iмгпит мпб 0► имое Сет1т дх0 елvгесе lепемкомб, 1l7аы !! ргг вееив ве го/ ot рвгiод) 1911! i9ЭS 1.414 1411 191.Q 1913 1�.�.Q 1.l41 1:� I.44i 1.L44 Оа�вгаввае iггвгие7 elter �/ ♦.73 3.00 3.00 9.00 9.00 l.00 13.00 17.00 17.50 !l.00 1ь.00 Соnегвl !ве► lвео j/ 6,50 6.50 6.30 10.00 10.00 10.00 1t.00 1ь.00 17.00 1l.00 1f.00 DQOSII' 6A76D Севвгеlвl eвeks . i7 МооtЬв pi:ed Огроа{tв 4.50-1.75 1.00-7.50 7.00-1.30 1д.00-13.00 14.00-13.00 t�.00-15.00 t0.00 70.00-7l.00 15.00-t7.00 16.00-75.00 1ь.00-77.00 8ovie{г Dгрев[tв 4.50 S.SO 7.50 7.t0 7.l0 5.00-l.OD 10.00-14.00 l0.00-16.о0 10.00•1d.S0 10.00-15.00 10.00-15.00 {вв(цв Ieвeieueieeв Maeiooвl евв(а{в еваk ' е..iве. O.po.ie. 7.so-ь.0о {/ 7.то 7.1о е.ьо е.ьо е,ьо 1г.оо 17.оо 17.оо 1:.оо 1:.оо 1к иоееЬг гlкгд Огрогlи ь.sо {/ 7.so 7ло 1s.oo 1s.oo 1s.oo :о.оо :о.оо ко.оо :о.оо 1е.ао 10-Тевг еввiо{в Crrti[ieвter 5.00 !l.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 71.00 !l.00 !l.00 й е�1тиС ипе Севвесlвl евеtв еееигед 6.50-17.00 6.Sa-17.00 6.S0-1d.00 10.00-lO.OD 10.00-70.00 10.00-t0,00 11.00-77.00 11.00-70.00 11.00-70,00 11.00-70.00 1l.00-70.00 Qoueund e.sal:.ao l.so-u.oo l.so-u.oo lе.оo-:о.оо n.oo-:о.оо и,оо-:l.о0 1я.оо-7о.оо !l.оо-ц.а0 и,ао-ц.оо и.оо.зо,оо и.баээ.оо lрва-Lл Сгвдlt Iuвlitutlaeв ее.е. могебц. е.оь �/ s.oalo.so s.oo-1г.оо 3.оo-l:.оо 3,оо-1г.оо s.oo-1:.оо s,oa•1е.оо s.oo-:О.о0 1г,оо-:ь.оо 1г.оакt.оо 1:.оo-гь.оо 1к.оо•пь.оо дбгlеиlепгвt аа1 lедивег(а1 ' Csellt Сагрогвеiоае j/ 9.00-1l.00 9.00-1t.00 9.00-lt.00 17.00-lS.00 11.00-14.ОС �/ д/ Q/ д/ 4/ д/ Dвгвlорисе рlsвагв Согрогвtlоег 9.30•10.30 9.30-1l.30 9.50-1l.SO l.SO-17.00 l.SO-l7.00 10,50•16.00 10.50-17.00 17.00-17.D0 1г.00-17.00 11.00-16.00 11.00�11.00 иае(еnвt eariee о.рпмее 11.оо б.оо-l.оо б.оо-l.а0 б.оo-l.оо аоо•l.оо а.оаl.оо б.оo-l.оа б.оo-l.оо б,оo-l.оо б.оо-l.оо б.оа-l.ао r6etooat е■eiee. l.е6 1о.оо-1г.оо {/ 1о,оо•и.оо l.оо-и.оо l.оo-и.оо l,оо-и.0а l,оаl7.оо l.оап.оо 1к.оo-17.оо 1п.оo-и.оо t:.oo-17.оо 1:.оа17.оо б/ Yoie6tгd аrвибг ot Ы11г lиигд оС tвадет. pf Мtв at v6ieh Свеегвl еваб ргов(ди вдrвоеи te еоиегеlвl ЬваЬв вгеиггд 67 Gапгеиеt вдд боrггевгоt Wвиаtгод иwгlеlгв. бв!(ивоев , !вellitiЧ for рsодиее{во ригрош по еигnдеlр вЧllвЫв ае евtвв не{ise [гов LSO-17.OOi. f,/ Ieernп nеев [or еЬв Cq1oe fвrta{г евеt, tбo роп 0!!iЧ edvlap 1вгR, вад еhв 1вгlор Свгt!liыев риад. Thore laetleutioea rыг игегд ritб tЬв 11ве{оивl lвrlеев 1ва6 оо Aprl1 1, 1977. �/ Ое двдивq l, И7l, t6e дег(taltueвl вед [едивег{в1 Сгвд(е СогрогвЧоог еггв виlеwеед ioto еЬг еtвtв Магцв{о евs►. ееигивг Сгоlгвl eвsk ol Су1еа. 1 Table 6,02: MONETARY SURVEY, 1971-84 A/ (go Million, and of period) B71 1972 1973 1974 1975 1M IM 1984 Hot Foreign Assets -376 = 28 -211 -429 38 3,625 LB-0 6.706 ILM L= LM L= Central Bank -572 -551 -250 -530 :738 432 i,517 4,408 5,362 1,602 1,049 131 480 7,475 Commercial Banks 117 175 222 319 309 470 1,108 1,092 1,344 1,875 1,731 1,980 2,269 2,077 Not Domestic Assets 5.010 6.016 LM AAK JM LM 10,258 12,848 17,963 32,040 39,618 48,313 51,620 57,599 Not Credit to Government 2,724 2,900 2,679 2,532 2,831 3,316 3,009 1,889 2,962 11/ 9,100 12,889 17,236 17,639 14,605 Credit to Private Sector 1,760 2,167 2,165 3,239 3,404 3,985 5,785 B,812 11,082 16,208 20,763 24,934 31,345 34,979 Other Credit 29 13 15 86 20 15 21 -100 142 -168 -142 14 514 26 Other Assets 497 916 567 593 669 1,049 1,443 2,247 3,777 6,901 6,108 6,129 7,122 7,989 Central Bank (excluding I Guarantees) (66) (71) (81) (78) (149) (278) (681) (681) (1,462) (2,938) (1,557) (884) (948) (1,171) Commercial Banks (429) (845) (486) (515) (520) (595) (1,165) (1,566) (2,315) (3,963) (4,251) (5,245) (6,174) (6,818) Monetary Liabilities 3.AM 3.917 4.094 jJO4 4.712 6.250 8.635 10,803 14,957 19,709 24.28Z 30,249 36,818 43,015 Honey 2,128 2,461 2,757 2,922 3,064 4,133 5,332 5,895 7,643 9,333 9,950 11,673 14.589 16,647 Currency (1,115) (1,202) (1,437) (1,539) (1.610) (2,080) (2,792) (3,015) (3,774) (4,181) (4,823) (5,988) (7,200) (8,561) Demand Deposits (1,013) (1,259) (1,320) (1,383) (1,454) (2,053) (2,540) (2,879) (3,869) (5.152) (5,127) (5,685) (7,389) (8,086) Quasi-Money 1,251 1,456 1,337 1,582 1,648 2,117 3,303 4,908 7,314 10,376 14,337 18,576 22,229 26,368 Other Liabilities LM LM 1.302 LM 1,783 2,153 5.LW I_uM 9,713 15. SU JJaU 20pl75 22,550 24,135 Central Bank (excluding Guarantees) 456 490 522 634 708 957 ' 2,806 3,970 5,329 9,124 9,572 10,352 10,471 11,204 Commercial Banks 720 1,233 780 1,101 11075 1,196 2,441 3,576 4,384 6,684 8,539 9,823 12,079 12,931 ,L/ This table is not consistent with the Country Data sheet, which uses as a source the monthly bulletin of the Central Bank of Ceylon. k/ Adjusted for amounts in Suspense Account Paddy Marketing Board and/or Goods Receipts. lource: Central Bank of Ceylon. Table 7.01: VOLUME OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1/ 1970-84 (Indices, 1968 - 100) 190 1 22 1973 7A U 21 12-71 1M 12M 12L 18 1983 1984 h Tea 94 97 95 94 91 95 87 93 89 92 85 93 83 79 92 Rubber 107 95 94 104 89 104 106 98 104 103 89 83 83 93 95 Coconut 97 100 114 82 85 92 80 74 B6 91 81 90 100 92 79 Paddy 120 100 94 94 118 82 90 123 139 141 158 164 159 183 179 Highland Crops 130 157 164 222 254 284 295 310 310 286 298 316 354 361 343 Livestock and Livestock Products 104 109 129 125 118 113 111 120 124 131 138 148 156 172 179 Minor Export Crops 93 64 78 113 121 88 158 251 211 222 212 293 298 325 293 TOTAL 105 102 105 105 112 109 ill 123 129 131 135 144 147 155 158 A/ These indices are calculated on the basis of value added figure. h Provisional. Sources: Central Bank of Ceylon. TaeL7.Z PADDY CULTIVATED AREA AND PRODUCTION; RICO AVAILABILITY, PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION, 1970-64 1. li 1 m 111 121 1A 19 122 a im 120 m198 A/ ua,A am W Cultivated Area ('000 hectares) Eatent Asedduaised S/ 570 575 586 563 607 622 621 643 659 684 653 702 706 724 740 of which: Major Irrigation Scheme (179) (181) (184) (188) (196) (203) (205) (208) (217) (226) (243) (258) (258) (270) (284) Minor Irrigation Scheme (162) (163) (166) (165) (168) (173) (177) (181) (165) (184) (177) (177) (178) (180) (184) Grose Area Sown 760 726 727 725 625 696 724 828 876 839 845 877 645 625 990 Net Ars Harvested ('000 he) 611 590 543 571 681 509 541 666 724 697 728 740 661 689 779 Maba 384 375 356 373 447 302 363 431 471 494 496 501 424 495 451 Yale 227 215 187 198 234 207 178 235 253 203 232 239 237 194 328 Paddy Production and Yields Paddy Production ('000 tons) 1,616 1,396 1,312 1,312 1,602 1,154 1,252 1,677 1,891 1,917 2,133 2,230 2,156 2,484 2,398 Maha 1,033 867 883 876 1,096 719 862 1,144 1,286 1,393 1,453 1,523 1,363 1,786 1,353 Yala 563 529 429 436 504 435 370 533 605 524 680 707 793 698 1,045 Average Yield (a per hectare harvested) 2,664 2,366 2,416 2,298 2,353 2,270 2,315 2,521 2,613 2,750 2,927 3,014 3,260 3,591 - Rice Availability ('000 tons) Rice Production 4/ 1,131 977 918 918 1,121 808 876 1,174 1,286 1,304 1,450 1,516 1,466 1,689 1,631 Net Domestic Supply S/ 995 860 808 808 958 711 771 1,033 1,132 1,148 1,276 1,334 1,290 1,486 1,435 Opening Stock of PC L/ n.. 259 180 74 73 63 98 61 173 116 129 68 105 115 74 Opening Stock of PIG A/ n.a. n.a. n.&. a.&. 12 49 17 15 103 128 65 38 32 34 112 Rice Imports h/ 534 339 266 344 332 457 419 526 160 212 190 157 160 123 26 Total Consumption J/ 1,228 J/ 1,245 J/ 1.150 1/ 1,109 j/ 1,255 1,134 1,197 1,316 1,320 1,420 1,394 1,521 1,487 1,627 - Procurement and Distribution Rice Procured by PHB ('000 tons) 379 473 383 332 303 169 188 358 469 378 142 85 59 217 113 Rice Distributed by FC ('000 tons) 650 893 805 696 567 629 634 722 671 447 327 159 161 140 174 Memorandum Items (as a percentage) Imports/Rice Consumption 43.5 27.2 23.1 31.0 26.5 40.3 35.0 40.0 12.1 14.9 13.6 10.3 10.8 7.5 - Imports/Rice Distribution by PC 82.2 38.0 33.0 49.4 58.6 72.7 66.0 72.9 23.8 47.4 56.1 98.7 99.4 67.9 14.9 Procurement/Production 34.5 49.8 42.9 37.2 27.8 21.5 22.1 31.4 36.7 29.0 9.6 5.6 3.9 12.5 6.9 PC Distribution/Mice Consumption 52.9 71.7 70.0 62.8 45.2 55.5 53.0 54.9 50.8 31.5 23.4 10.4 10.9 11.7 - A/ Revised, hi/ Provisional. C/ Leveled and bunded land s4itable for paddy cultivation. / Based on conversion factor of I metric too ot paddy - 0.68 metric tons of rice. A/ Equals rice production les seed and vastage, estimated at 125 of total production, / PC T Food Commissioner. AL PHB M Paddy Marketing Board. h/ Total rice imports not adjusted for 2.52 slackage lose. J/ Apparent consumption, estimated as net domestic rice supply plus imports, adjusted for slack, plus change in the stocks held by FC and PMS, Change in stocks of private traders is ignored. J1 Does not take into account changes in stocks of PMB. Note; There had not been any rice Imports in 1984, but a shipment ut 26,000 MT indented in 1983 arrived in 1984. SoSces: Food Commissioner; Agricultural Implementation Prograume; and Central Bank of Ceylon. Table 7.031 CULTIVATED AREA AND PRODUCTION OF SUBSIDIARY FOOD CROPS, 1972-84 121 1973 1974 1975 I 1977 IZi 122 1980 1981 ji 1983 19 !L&/ Cultivated Area ('000 hectares) Manioc (cassava) 31.3 51.5 91.3 79.2 69.4 54.6 39.9 33.5 27.0 37.1 52.9 37.9 26.2 Maize 16.3 24.2 38.5 40.1 30.4 36.7 28.6 23.6 23.4 28.0 44.9 47.3 47.5 Chillies 24.2 36.5 41.6 33.0 43.3 44.1 33.8 20.1 25.5 24.1 28.4 32.1 29.0 Red Onions 5.7 7.0 6.5 6.3 7.7 8.2 6.3 5.9 7.4 8.1 8.2 11.7 3.7 Groundouts 4.8 6.2 7.7 7.8 6.7 6.5 8.3 5.1 11.2 12.0 14.4 13.8 9.5 Green Gram 2.9 5.3 10.7 9.3 8.4 12.3 12.2 12.2 14.2 18.1 21.2 28.6 31.3 sorghum 0.1 0.3 2.2 3.8 1.0 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.1 s/ 0.1 0.1 ... Soyabean 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.1 0.7 1.0 1.9 1.2 1.1 2.2 17.4 14.6 11.3 Potatoes 3.2 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.8 3.2 2.6 4.2 5.2 4.6 5.7 6.6 5.6 Sesame 12.3 9.7 13.0 12.7 19.0 13.5 17.0 16.7 31.5 25.1 32.7 31.6 5.2 Cowpea 0.5 1.3 3.0 8.7 19.2 30.2 27.6 30.3 25.5 38.8 35.7 45.1 34.6 Black Gram 0.5 0.5 1.4 2.0 5.1 13.9 14.1 8.7 8.4 10.1 10.0 17.5 33.0 Dhal 0.03 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.07 n.a. n.a. n.a. a.e. n.. sweet Potatoes 6.0 11.9 23.1 21.2 15.0 12.8 8.8 6.4 6.3 9.0 9.1 8.0 8.5 Production ('000 tons) Manioc (cassava) 390.5 610.7 848.3 767.0 683.7 544.8 497.5 365.1 334.5 440.2 637.8 619.7 363.8 Maize 13.7 13.6 23.8 34.6 31.2 42.0 35.3 26.1 31.4 35.3 44.6 51.1 51.7 Chillies 12.0 19.6 18.5 16.4 19.1 32.1 28.3 21.9 25.5 21.4 26.8 28.7 23.6 Red Onions 59.0 68.2 71.0 72.8 76.7 66.3 72.3 62.8 79.1 92.2 92.7 139.9 16.5 Groundnute 5.5 5.7 7.5 7.6 6.1 5.7 7.5 5.4 14.1 14.5 13.8 18.9 6.4 Green Gram 1.4 3.0 5.9 6.0 5.1 7.8 8.4 9.7 12.9 18.9 17.7 16.2 9.6 Sorghum 0.03 0.6 3.1 6.3 1.7 2.0 0.6 0.2 0.1 S/ 0.2 0.06 Soyabean 0.04 0.2 1.3 1.2 0.7 1.1 2.9 1.3 1.1 2.4 11.1 11.6 8.2 Potatoes 46.9 39.6 30.4 27.3 38.7 33.4 38.4 52.7 75.9 63.4 65.2 82.5 42.5 Sesame 7.1 4.6 4.9 6.4 8.6 7.4 9.7 17.2 23.5 14.0 23.2 20.0 2.5 Cowpea 0.5 0.6 2.4 7.6 12.0 21.3 22.6 18.8 23.5 39.3 35.6 31.4 23.7 Black Gram 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.0 2.4 11.7 8.7 6.1 5.5 7.3 9.0 13.0 4.2 Dhal 0.04 0.2 1.6 0.2 0.04 1.4 0.4 0.05 n.a. n.a. n.S. n.a. n.a. Sweet Potatoes 50.8 71.2 144.8 142.2 125.8 97.3 82.0 42.6 66.8 77.5 85.8 73.1 73.0 A/ Revised. h/ Provisional. N abs only. n.a. - not available. Notes There was severe crop damage during 1984. Iouss Ministry of Agricultural Development and Research; and Department of Census and Statistics. т.ы. 7.а, лее сеагб поохтг0е етАт76г7сб, 1я7о-и 1v4 1sц цгг lsza 1яz! 1яi�. 1ц.4 1v.t 1tu tsц ца4 1�41 1sц 1l41 Ь/ Um. !/ !�!f е/ � froduetioe fr1l11oo kp) ги пе 7и :и :а :14 1яб :оя 1яя :об 1яа :1о 166 1л :01 я: et rЬiеЬ� ецЬ lrove и 63 и и ео бо 76 7я 7г 77 7] 61 н бе гя .... 1(вдlив lrove 7t 76 75 70 7! 7з 6S 67 61 бз SS S9 S1 41 33 в... Lov erow S9 S7 57 60 S7 60 S6 6] бб 67 б] 70 64 67 74 ■,в. егрогев t.ulie. еб.) гоб 707 еяг. 7оЕ 173 :1з :оо 1еб 1яз 1еб 1ц 1ы 161 1se :а 1яs nвогед ene ('000 ЬееЧгее) г4: :4i t4: :4t �4: г4t зи :и t4з гм us us t4: :з0 г11 .... Аигце 7iв1д (ip рвг Ьвrvиtвд Ьвеевгв) �/ яоя язз я!4 .о: ябб 1,оп s4o l,оо7 яsб яяэ я7а е... .... е.., .... .... Rврlвеtед AoeueL (Ьвееееи) :,776 i,66e �,sяб :,ио 1,7ц 1,764 1,иб 1,:4к 1,7оя :,4я1 �,1s6 а,б77 :,оо4 1,зб7 е... .л. ирlееева ео.,lвеlве (Ьгеепн) 16.з1о 16,яяб n,sяь :4,ооб зs,74о :7,sa :б,ыя :я,еб! з1,яо ц,аб1 зб,п7 зе,бя4 40,бяе 4:,нs ел. ..е. tиеи ргодоееlоо (вillioo kев) е/ 1S9 14t !10 1SS 1з7 1И 1S7 !4б 136 137 1зз 1I4 !�5 140 !41 146 or �Ьiел� рbме гvЬЬвг яб ео ы я: 7п n n es • я1 а 7: ы б: s7 к .... er.v. w►e.r бз ы 36 F1 s6 sя б: » sя s7 so 47 4я 7з 64 .... Еарагtв (вi111oe Ыв) !61 1t9 l]0 i61 1�1 161 177 1ц 17! 176 l71 177 1з1 175 1!! 1�S п..е.д .гв. е•ооо ыеевгвв) гзо �зо гзо •��я a6 ие �77 :n 1�6 :n :n :об �об :об :об .... Авегаее 71в1д Itp рвг Ьвnевtад Ьвеевгв) 7я7 7зб 7з7 77е п о 774 7яо 77з ыs по п р 7os 7:я и 1 64о .... 11вр1.оевд Аооидв (Ьпсвnв) 4,us з,4]: з,sзя .,е46 г,ебs ],:з1 :,sso г,б17 з,ггб 4,16е 3,4з4 Ь,Чг 3,мб 4,66: s,3зо в... s рврlеее.д со.,lвеhе fмеевги) иs,э4о иэ,зп 1г:,я11 1гs,esa lзб,нl 1з1,яs: 1зь,sоз 1з7,11s 140,з46 1м,sи 1и,я46 1ss,7яs l61,661 166,s=з 173,оя .... �, s� Теодоееlое t.uueo г�ев) :,s1o :,6i0 7,яб3 1,я» :,оз1 :,зяе :,ззо 1,6i1 г,�о7 г,зяз т.о76 г,:3е г,s�1 :,з1з 1,яа :,s74 ог �ыеь: еоеооое ои ц лтя l,ооб 1,оэ: 46е sго яб0 еао зяз би еоз soo бos лто би :бя боо Dиiеевевд Сосеоие �/ з7з з74 ззз гsе 3яг зs4 з!з гоб ги г7: г17 n6 :еб as з:1 з:3 екрога с.и11о. е„н .qui..l.ec е7з 1,0l0 1,иб 417 46о бьs еоз :и sэs sя :зя 4оз s77 3и :а 7и е/ tвrlвИ. Ь/ hовlвlоовl. 1/ епtв.и., д/ 14ппевд пвв меlиди пи иодвг lввtиn tы вед, вf(вееlvг 1я74, ■Ьаедоовд tв■ 1.одв. Dп■ tor 1974 оеrпда вгв ealeulatвd ое еМ Ьиlв о[ еЬв авr дг(1nieloe ot Ьвnевtед ■га вед tЬив вкв еее eseieel7 еоврвгвЫв rleh еhац of ветlИг 7ввn. е/ lоtвl iаеlаlвв "аеЬвг" гиЬЬвг оее вЬою вврегеевl7. j/ 7и дие ваиlввlвае соеввгеЧ et 1 вt. toe oil • р,000 еиЧ. l вt. еое Dиiеевегд еоеееие • б,600 оин. а... • eot вrвilвllв. /еигев� Свеегвl 1ееЬ ot Cq1oe. jAble 7,05: TEA PRODUCER MARGIN, 1970-84 (Re per kg) IM 1978 IM 1980 1981 1982 19133 g/ LM I/ A. Average Export Unit Value 5.37 LJOA 10-50 LLK 33.22 30.51 33.41 2JLU 2LM ULU 77.20 Less: Export Duty 0.86 0.86 0.86 1.98 15.50 13.27 bL/ 10.50 10.20 bL/ 8.00 8.00 7.00 b/ Cesses 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.42 0.70 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.50 FOB Charges, Exporters Margins, etc. c/ 0.52 1.09 0.13 0.15 2.76 4.04 3.68 3.35 2.69 0.25 6.16 B. Colombo Auction Gross Price 6.90 Dill MLLA IL2 ILU min IL4A J= 62.79 C. Salem Tax J/ 0.22 0.86 1.52 3.07 2.82 1.19 0.59 1.84 0.92 6.31 16,34 D. Colombo Auction Not Price (B-C) 7.73 13.24 LIJA ILJI MJLZA IWI IzX A" 46.45 B. Cost of Production 27.15 JAJI of which; Tranaportation/Fuel Oil n.s. 0.54 0.56 0.67 0.95 1.10 1.82 2.25 2.30 2.65 3.39 Fertilizer n.a. 0.78 0.86 0.56 0.85 0.85 0.79 1.11 2.12 1.93 2.47 Tom Chests n.a. 0.65 0,71 0.71 0.84 0.95 1.19 1.45 1.62 1.93 2.47 Labor 0.6. 3.06 3.29 3,74 5.98 7.20 7.59 e.4o 11.51 13.26 16.97 Other Costs/Depreciation n.a. 1,70 2.02 2.95 3.57 3.60 4.06 5.45 5.50 7.38 9005 F. Producer Margin (D-E) 0.24 rSl_a 9JI AAI -0.75 -2.59 2.28 -0.95 -0.53 2AR "All &I Provisional. bj The specific export duty an tea was raised to Its 15.50 per kg in November 1977 and then lowered in July 1979 to Re 10.50. The average specific duty shown for 1977 and 1979 is calculated by dividing revenues from the specific duty by total exports. On November 13, 1981, the export duty was lowered to Re ONE. On November 14# 1984, the export duty was lowered to Re 7/kS. The figure shown above is the estimated average for the year. I/ Residual. SL/ Ad valorem tax receipts divided by total amount of tea sold at Colombo suctions. n.a. - not available. Sourest Central Bank of Ceylon. т.ы. 7.Об: ты 1н �1ие Риsьlс евстоа, 198з-е4 Сое! of Сокроrасв P:otte N.rвin Bstaдt iд Yis1d рет Ркодиосlод вt СовС ot йеС 8в1ее Eetat• Сокроквtв � Eeariog iotal Оиерие Ввосака �/ Eetвte Leva1 Productioд Реiев Lвve1 t,a�a1 (Ьв) ('000 kп) (ke) (ве/kп) (Вв/kв) (tв/kt) (!в/ke) (!в/kв) 1� �$4 .1.�� �.�.4 �� i�4 �$� IZ� Ji�� �4 �� }�� � �� I�� � ,tедек �I Avieeavellв 1,592 1,825 2,317 ],069 1,298 1,514 24.07 ]2,77 27.11 ]б.27 42.]1 4В.Об 18.24 15.29 15.20 11.79 н.ссод 8,з5о в,]аа 10,2е2 12,Оя0 1,17о 1,]99 2а.во ]].ы 27.8з ]7.11 э9.бs ае.оа 1a.es 14.4s ц.е2 1o.9s 1<адд� 9,711 5,099 5,582 7,076 978 1,151 24.18 ]2.90 27.22 ]6.40 ]7.]6 41.71 1].18 8.81 10.14 5.31 иwакв в1iТв 1s,o19 1s,e9e 1е,ба4 2],a7s 1,217 1,447 22,7о ]1.2о 25.7а за.7о з7.5s 4а.17 t4.e5 11.s7 11.е1 е.47 е.диllв 15,1es 17,801 19,�га 2а,ззо 1,17э 1,2зе 24.22 з2.94 sт.2б зб.4а зв.з9 45,ов 14.17 12.14 ц.1] е.б4 R.е.це 1,401 1,5]9 1,927 2,]е] 1,аб] 1,1ц 2б.7s э5,85 29.79 ]9.]5 а1.97 47.22 15.22 11.]7 12.1е 7.е7 иawlвpieila s,9э9 б,з7� б,а1о �,7еэ 929 1,111 2s.91 ]4.ее 28.95 ]е.]е з7,7о а2,9е 11.79 8.1о 8.7s 4.ао iоевl/Аvвеаiв 52.797 i6•887 ��¢ .�ьgQ�. 1.ь1.?1 1�.34� I4a31 ,1L.4Y �L1�. �.е�� ,'�.,.4з S$� L4a� 1La� L.eZ4 ��. 8L8РСк • Паtсод 6 Маtвlв 19,277 19,111 17,56] 19,467 843 94] 24,99 ]].90 д.а, д,в, ]7,49 46.63 12.50 12.7] д.в. д.в. Кwвев C1ipa, gaputale д lаlвд8одв 24,171 23,879 27,516 30,120 1,025 1,1]9 25.01 ]1,Вб д,в, д.л. ]7.62 46.Об 12.61 14.20 д.в. д.в. Rвlиевка б ltatмpurв 5,66] 5,595 7,970 8,496 968 1,004 27,5] ]5.21 д.а. д,а, 40,60 47,01 1].27 11.60 д,в. д.в. S Оа11• Ь Маtвк■ 6,14] 5,90] 12,198 1],7]8 1,075 1,164 28.]б ]5.51 д.в, д.в. 41.14 46,8] 12.78 11.72 д.в. д.в. У, iotal/Averвge 55.254 54.44В ¢.�a�Q.Z .j�.�2�1 _�L62 1•OS9 2�,,4,4 }�,,�. BaL. L►a,lL }§�� ,4�sL 1sZ 12s4? PxSs Р:!s Сквдд Tota1 30б^051 �.I. �.�9�93� 152.027 д,в, д,в, , д.в. д,в, д.в. д.в. д.в. д.в. д.в. д.в. д.в. д.в. Мевотвддив Iеевег Op:ooCiдg/ Nev Plвot{дg Iд-fillia� Aeplanciдg Pвrcili:вr Аопliевtiод Г1ввп{св (Ьв) - (Ьв) (Ьв) (Ьв) ouaдeier (еодв) � �$� �.L4 �Z� iZ�4 3i� �.4 �� �� U�. %S� .�� L�� ��а а4о ]91 а5 ]0 - - 428 577 за,ое2 aa,ss7 721 e5s BLBPC 1,485 1,248 2]9 126 3,469 4,2В2 4б7 60b 35,120 31,500 £% б]6 379 А/ i/ Dвrivвd fков lieldr оЬtвiдед at tЬв ркодиесiод 1eve1 адд dlffвr еовеvhвс Етов tбe oucput дасв 1ддlевеед ■bova. �f Рок 19!], tЬie дове доt iдеlиде даtвilв оЕ Rвеасве v61еЬ vегв tтадеfвггвд со Laoka бetatвe Davelopsвot 1td. J I.ovвr applieatioe iд 1984 див to iaereaeed eubeeieutloo оЕ игав Еог виlрhаса of аводiв. д.в. • доt аvаilвЫв. Nоtвк 1. Стор адд yield асtивlе to Novиber 1984 адд ееtiвасв� Еог DвсевЬве 1984, Z, Совt оЕ p:oduetion вt ввtвев 1вvвL iв bвеед од lвtевс вeturle вvвilвЫа. 3, 1lкеlидее adвioiecratioд еЬвк8ее iдtereac, lевее гедt to L4C, depreciвtl0a, видiс Ееев адд Ъодик. 4. iдеlидва а екор еЬве8в of Ra 0.75/k6. JLD6 ■ JадвtЬа 6etatae Dвvеlориде еовтд, 8G8PC • 8:i 1•еаkв ВСвев Р1вдСвtiоо Corpo:aCioa. 8еиrеввк Miдietrr of JвдаtЬв Eetвtee Developвent{ and Miдi�Crl оЕ 8Свtв Plвntвtiooв. • т.ыв Т.о7к ьОьььь 1н Таь роьtlс ьытОь, 1983-84 СоеС ot Сотротвев proiit Mareie ькtедt in Тiв1д pas production ве Сове ot Nвс ьаlев бatstв Сотрохвtе ьевтiкц Тоеа1 Оиерис 8аасвт• �/ ьвtвСа Lavв1 produetian prieв Lвве1 Lавв1 (Ьв)_ ('000 kв1 (kв) (Re/kв) (ьа/ke) (ьа/ka1 (!в/kt) (L/tt) �24� 1�. 1L� 3.��4 1� 1� 3.4$� ��.4 �24� 14�4 3.�4$ 14.� 144'д 1Р44 �4$ 3�4� ��,к �/ Аviаевrвllв 9,380 10,482 11,102 19,044 1,111 1,181 11.15 14.53 13.08 16.02 16.29 16.34 3.14 1.99 3.21 .S2 ьадиllа 3об 3об zs7 20о ьа2 бsa 9.ьs 1з.об 11.Т8 14.s3 14.о8 13.46 4.23 .4о 2.3о с1.о» chi1.� 4о ао 29 3з 723 е2з 1o.s2 1э.вз 1:.4s 1s.зо 1s.13 1з.24 4.ы (.s9� 2.бе с:.об� [в8в11е 3,187 б,126 6,630 7,730 1,190 1,191 10.92 14.29 12.В5 15.76 15.94 19.67 5.02 1.38 3.09 .09 Rитидеьаl. з2 218 зо бо 9оа 263 1а.бе 1е.б1 16.61 2о.ое 13.о1 12.91 с1.б» cs.7o> с3.бо) е7.1Т) Тоса1/Аvегаьа 14.эаs 17•172 18.оае 21.Оь7 L.l9.Z L1� 1W� L�.s� j.L4.� 1 00 1¢,,11 16 2 �,,р� �,,,¢,t ,'�,iQ�, � вьы�с к � Мвtаlе 1,198 987 621 б94 5l9 9S3 12.3] 14.61 n.r, о.в. 19.77 17.98 о.в. о.в. а.в. n.в. ьаlвоiода 2,001 2,OS! 2,092 2,203 1,047 1,046 9.94 13.33 а.в. д,в. 1S.7T 15.11 а.в. д.в. tл.в. е.а. Ralutara i ьatoapura 16,489 16,б22 1i,910 1б,1i2 92S 940 1l.22 I3.5B о.а, д,в. 15.64 15.30 д.в. л.а. о.в. е.в. Ов11е � Маtвта 5,OS7 S,2б0 5,366 5,38] 1,031 997 10.52 12.46 о.в, я.в. 15.41 15.03 д.в, д.в. а.а. д.а. Тоtв1/Аvвтаьв �.ьZ4J. ��4 1�.а� 3�ь�.�3 2�1 � 14�34. 13.]б д.а. д.в. 1S.5S 15.17 д.в. д.в. д.а. а.в. к 1 Сrвпд Tota1 ,�%ь�ISt ��SGaRL S�Z ��. д.а. д.в. д.в. д.в. д.в. n.в. д.а. д.в. n.a. п.в. п.в. в.в. � Nesoraedu� Itвввг Jprootiog/ Nw plaoting 1д-Еi111о{ Rарlвдtiдь fвeeiliser Авдliевtiод- Сlевоiов (Ьв1 (Ьв) (Ъв1 (Ьв) __ Ouaeticв (садвl (kв/Ьв) 1� �� �й� �.4�. �Z�. 1Р.� ��. 1Z�. �? �� �� �L44 дьDь S62 642 87 4В - - 871 890 Э,О64 3,б49 20S 22S 9LlRC 1,933 1,226 275 AS6 - - 1,030 910 7,428 7,В68 308 716 �/ Dетlввд trow уiвlд■ еЬtвiдвд ве еЬв produatioo 1вvв1 ■дд diEler вorвvбat tеов thв output даса iддlевсвд вЬоvв. ]t,/ 1от 1983, thi• довr aot iдеlидв двtвilв о! ьвtаtев r61еЬ rвre trвдаЕаттед to Lвдkв беtвtев Developвeoc Lcd. о.а. ■ дас вvаilккЫв. Notвs 1. Стор вдд �iв1д аеtивlв to Noveвбae 19ь4 вдд eeeieuta• tor Deeerbвe 1984. 2. Coet of produetlon at eatвte 1eve1 i• bu ед оп lвtere веtивlв вvвflвЫе. 3. ьксlидве вдвiдlаСтаеlоо сЬвкьве lосвтвве, lваее твдt to 4ьС, двртвеiвtiод, ■udit fвее вnд bодив. 4, Inetudea а етор еЪагВе of Rв 0.35/kь. J®ь ■ JвмtЬа ьвсвсва DвvelopreaC ьовrд, 81�8рС ■ 8ri Laдka ьtвсв Рlадtасiод Corposвtioд. еоигеввк Mioiвer7 ot Jаавеhв Rвсвtв■ DвУаlорввдt{ адд Mioietr7 оЕ 8cate Plвдtвtione. � Table 7,08: FERTILIZER ISSUES BY CROPS, 1970-84 ('000 tons) LM 1975 1976 1977 1978 LM 1980 1/ IM A/ Paddy 88.5 96.9 89.8 127.5 98.0 97.9 72.4 128.7 136.1 130.4 190.0 155.6 167.1 162.2 181.0 Ton 108.4 112.8 98.9 93.4 102.1 106.7 95.3 80.1 115.5 105.2 109.9 103.3 102.7 115.5 137.8 Rubber 20.7 17.4 11.7 14.8 12.4 20.3 13.0 12.4 20.9 23.2 22.0 1648 16.5 18.5 27.8. Coconut 64.8 59.1 49.0 39.2 40.1 40.6 30.7 29.1 42.6 49.6 55.8 37.7 30.3 35.7 49.7 Others _UA 61.2 AU 55..0 46.5 50.8 2.9 .2 64.9 64.0 62.0 52.9 62.8 73.2 68.3 TOTAL 339.8 347.4 299*1 329.9 299.1 316.3 264.3 303.5 380.0 372.4 439.7 366.3 379.4 405*1 464.6 JL/ Provisional. Sources; National Fertilizer Becretariati Ceylon Fertilizer Corporation; A. Daur A Co. Limited. Table 8.01: GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, IL/ 1976-84 17ZA 2. 21 .fL 12Z2 1980 19.L 1982 1il 1924 1976-84 (Ra million) Annual Increase in Constant Friceas (z) Gross Output at Current Prices Food, Beverages, Tobacco 1,715 2,295 2,609 2,856 3,899 4,496 5,246 6,998 8,623 7 Textiles, Clothing, and Leather 680 698 1,008 1,128 1,923 3,040 3,863 5,136 7,565 24 Wood and Wood Products, including Furniture 129 127 124 166 289 315 361 522 640 8 Paper and Paper Products 203 270 376 445 476 626 725 901 940 8 Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber and Plastic Products 2,336 2,469 3,279 4,508 9,416 12,015 13,099 11,888 14,328 14 Non-metallic Mineral Products (except fuels) 360 411 592 710 1,156 1,250 1,370 1,468 1,829 8 Basic Metal Products 138 132 219 349 478 428 262 302 199 -5 Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 474 571 590 569 620 782 904 1,129 1,456 2 Other Manufactures __2 34 __ 50 Ag 5A 58 74 90 _106 10 Total Manufacturing 6,061 7,007 8,852 10,781 18,311 23,010 25,904 28,434 35,653 12 All Manufacturina Value Added, Current Prices 2,462 2,688 3,109 3,437 4,893 6,030 6,760 7,987 n.a. n.a. Value Added, 1970 prices h/ 1,039 790 953 964 1,187 1,320 1,413 1,507 U.a. n.a. A/ As covered in the Central Bank's Annual Survey under which questionnaires are sent to all firms believed to have an output of Ra 500,000 or more. Around 5,000 questionnaires are sent out, but there have long been around 1,500 responses only, employing in 1978, 136,000 (almost half of these in the public sector), or approaching 402 of total manufacturing employment. h/ Implicit deflator for manufacturing, 1970 - 100. U.a. * not available. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. Table 8.02 MANUFACTURING SURVEY, 1982 AND 1983 Value of Value Value Added Capacity of Import Content in No. at Firms Emplovaent Production Added Per Worker Utilization #/ low Material Use ('000 persons) (Is Million) (Re Million) (Ra '000) 11 8 11 128 1992 IM 1 W t IM M M Industrial Group Food. Beverages a Tobacco 187 n.S. 21 23 5,246 6,998 2,259 3,276 108 142 77 73 i 20 (20.2) (24.6) (33.4) (41.0) Textiles, Wearing Apparel 6 Leather Industries 316 n.a. 23 13 3,863 5,136 488 759 21 58 94 h/ 98 1I 66 64 (14.9) (18.1) (1.2) (9.5) Wood 6 Wood Products 25 U.S. 6 9 361 522 134 284 22 32 92 95 29 16 (1.4) (1.8) (2.0) (3.6) Paper & Paper Products I n.. 5 5 725 901 257 388 51 75 70 * 71 50 49 (2.8) (3.2) (3.8) (4.9) Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber, Plastic Products 225 U.a. 14 12 13,099 11,888 1,927 1.608 138 134 77 63 99 98 (50.6) (41.8) (28.5) (20.1) won-setaltic Mineral Products (except Petroleum & Coal) 129 U.S. 16 16 1,370 1,468 862 866 54 54 85 17 63 88 (5.3) (5.2) (12.8) (10.6) Basic Metal Products I U.a. 2 2 262 302 14 81 7 41 33 25 92 56 (1.0) (1.1) (0.2) (1.0) fabricated Metal Products, Machinery & Transport Equipment 373 n.a. 2 3 904 1,129 790 684 395 228 83 81 44 64 (3.5) (4.0) (11.7) (8.6) Other Kanufactured Products 79 na. - - 74 90 29 41 - - 73 81 73 81 (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5) TOTAL/AVERAGE 1,426 n.e. 89 85 25,904 28,434 6.760 7,987 76 94 76 76 81 88 A/ Based on data provided by major private sector firms and State Industrial Corporations. h/ Excluding the Investment Promotion Zone. U.S. * not available. Sotes 1. Due to rounding off, components may not add up to totals. 2. Figures in pareuthese-i ara percentage distributions. oMsjs Central Bank of Ceylon. , tвRe 1 о! 2 Рв{вв х.л1. !.о], есlrolимс! Or нм0а втлтs lмооепиь соlгоипоав, 1977-ез Cereeeвeiee 9в1ив еЕ lredueeiea (!в ML111ee) ввt }rolie (!в Mi11(ее) 1967 /ве lceHt вв 2 е!s i4IZ 3SZa iSZ�. 1P4.Q SY�1 i$� i�1 1/ )4.�. ✓ 141i 14i.4 1PL4 �� iSl1 1}!Z �3�. JI 13�. 1I Iавввеивt j/ aPi� 1вв Св}1ое Рвtсоlвw к:,16s п,169 �,)�s е,з9: 1о,оез 11.обб е,)]9 n... -1)е.9 -])+.1 19:.о 9о.] -�.т -ыи.s 9о).] s/ 1,)о7.о 1о7 6 tвеlо..1 т.:ец.• ]ц 6s9 бse ]so s/ sse б)е е:1 .... -е.1 -:б.) -б).з -1эе.б -1os.: -е1.б -s.6 а... -: -1 � ее.е. поиг ицllве ц) 1е2 :ы ]1s ]91 о... - - -1s.] •s.s 1о.г е.1 -�1.7 ..в. - - - - eci t.au�. с...ее 16а :о9 :9з 7s6 6n )я 9а 766 -z6.1 1s.6 7.а 1w.9 7.6 s.) ie.) ..,. • б cqto• еее.1 1з: :19 н9 �)е 4:9 26: ц) хое 1.s us п.7 гд.] ss л.б -б:.я -ы.о -ц -19 er1 woka т7тв 91 161 1s: :о9 sп1 z:1 :ео г97 :.+ •:.9 з:.9 s:.a 17.е s1.� о.] о.1 - - �вllоо,l r.p.c 111 2об s1o и9 зss з)] ]аа аи 1:.а и.0 -о.9 1.1 --1е.б Ь.б s.e 1 1 Со71ое Свгввiев 64 79 1l! 170 1S0 1!0 161 1е1 !.б I�.6 26.] 41.9 ]4.1 10.б 0.� -1].S - 3 Cq1ou Р17vоодв 61 68 87 160 111 l64 161 100 -13.0 -].1 ).0 ]0.7 9.l 7.7 0.1 а.в. - - СΡ� 5 eri lвоkв тоывго зs �а бо ьб ц ь - - 11.о �о.б эз.з 1о.� 19.6 s.] - - - - ' ввсiоевl e„te е t: 11 а: бб тб и о... s.6 б.7 е,] ц.т у л 19.6 х].9 to.e зi з9 Всвсо ввгдrвге 32 18 37 �b Ч 14 ]9 1в -9.4 -1.] -O.i 7.1 -3.0 -2�.) -1б.� -27.! -]S �б с.71оа 1.овеь.г тгоаоге. ц so s4 ]: ]о �о зв s9 о.) ].б б.е �.: :.е :.� г.е 1л б б Расааtлаа СЬввiеаlв _,--� 1] __1е �г �� ]7 �� � ].б ].9 6•2 7.6 1•1 1.6 1.S о.в. 3 ,,,� готбь/вvавсе ]з,н) ],ебз 9,ео] 11,п1: 1],1е7 1з,19о 1,ы: д/ :,197 -аоа.1 -:о1.1 s7].е :ы.б -s1.e -б)6.s :� eeб.s 1,6]:.б т� а9 вseludio! гвдгоlеи 11,1е: 1,69а i,06e s,eao з,1аа п,1гд з,1а б/ а... -:9.: 1)].о ы.е 19з.1 -:е.б -н.о -2о.е -)б.б -1 - Table 8.03 Tage 2 of 2 pages Employment (Non.) 1963 Production Capital Investment Capacity Corporation 1981 1982 A/ iper, Worker per Worker b/ utilization (go '000) Us '000) Ceylon Petroleum 5,190 5,809 5,944 6,186 6,232 1,413 136 56 National Textiles 6,573 6,842 8,647 9,128 n.a. 90 36 58 State Flour Milling 665 617 600 U.A. - - - Sri Lanka Cement 5,959 7,507 5,152 4,875 n.a. 185 164 60 Ceylon steel 2,243 2,214 2,305 2,230 1,749 115 lie 25 Sri Lanka Tyre 1,921 1,888 1,904 1,874 a.&. 153 95 60 National Paper 4,604 4,383 4,562 4,340 n.a. 88 211 se Ceylon Ceramics 5,819 6,136 7,234 7,255 n0a. 23 29 86 Ceylon Plywoods 3,684 3,519 3,547 3,700 43 41 55 Sri Lanka Tobacco 956 959 939 National Salt 1,008 1,055 1,778 1,939 7 39 - State Hardware 1,578 1,439 1,385 1,327 1,286 30 35 30 Ceylon Leather Products 1,087 1,062 1,070 1,155 1,179 33 38 72 Paranthan Chemicals - 424 435 __M 541 _LJ03 _U -a _n TOTAL/AVERAGE 43,711 45,865 45,820 44,550 10,949 266 88 Excluding Petroleum 38,!21 40,056 39,876 38.364 4,717 81 so j/ Provisional. Capital investment is defined as capital reserves and long-term liabilities accumulated losses. Estimates. Excludes National Textiles Corporation and State Flour Milling Corporation. For Textile Corporation complete data are not available. State Flour Milling Corporation ceased milling activities from and-August, 1982. Excludes State Flour Milling. Ij Physical production as percent of nominal physical capacity, main products only (where appropriate, weighted) according to their contribution to turnover. a.&. - not available. sources: Central Bank of Ceylon; and Ministry of Industries and scientific Affairs. ТвЫ• д.01: д1г11Wе. 9tl9l3CJL GMCITY dJfD OOTNfT Ор ее#�10t fT�lS6 31lDO3T336l, 1l76-l1 �/ - --- hylеlев - -- ---- --- - аеоое - ... т�. isгa �' шп шs isen � iяsк �sa� и iя.�. и isгa. �sгг lттп �и � isii ' ци � и�sr. и Су1ео 9веrеlвиа ('000 tеев) о.в. е.в. а.в. 1,490 1,749 3,]00 t,3S0 3,430 3,430 1,396 1,330 1,3i6 1,369 1,713 1,fOl 1,7f! 1,3�3 1,717 tгвеlоыl tоееиов (вlllioe вгевгв) 1os 1о1 1оь 13о о... о... ео е: е1 se sг s: ]ь 3г �s 4г и s9 Су1ед ie..1 с•ооо еоо.) ы ы ы 107 и1 109 1о9 109 д... 3ь ]о 43 ss ss и :7 :7 и cq1e. с...ое r000 ееев) w3 во3 7я1 еи е1о ац ие ие д... 4я 3sь sn s9: еп 7оь 974 907 .... tri !ваlв /tвtв 11оиг ии1lот с•000 еоsв) 1:в и9 93 1о1 и3 1:е о... ел. о... и1 101 ее 1оо n ы ss - - ltвtleul hрве с'000 tоев) 3э 3� л ]е ]е ]в ]s ]е о... 1е :0 3s 3: :1 37 :3 st ■... 9rt wo►. т7гг с•ооо) 3и и 1е3 г9: 1яе 3а 2и :ы 3ео ол. ие 97 1п иа :оо 109 1ы 1и .... Мвеiоеаl Ml1k bвгд (вllllee lleeu) 16 36 36 11 37 2] 31 ]] s.в. l3 16 17 l9 30 30 33 l!f •.в. esi e�ota ги�вг ('ООо еоев) 44 44 40 92 ♦9 е.в. 41 ]7 s.в. 34 37 ц 30 37 33 3S ]! а.а. Cq1oa Сегиlсв ('000 tеов) 11 1S 1S 34 36 37 31 31 37 6 10 12 36 3S 1] 23 37 ц Cq1ee 011в вад tвев ('000 еаав) 99 99 б0 10 9l 9l 91 92 ' 3д •9 44 43 Ч �3 SO 93 i3 S4 с.�1оо гlrоод с•оао .q. ..нг.s э.зю б,9в9 s,яея е,и7 е,е77 e,ea е,зз9 s,ee] о... ♦,4п 3,s7� ],о94 7,1s4 ],47s ],4ss •,497 •,3l� .... ивее оiвеiппгвв (егии~в> с'ооо иег.в) 3,7з0 :,903 :,so3 :,so3 д.•. и.в. о... д... о.в. :,o7s t,9o1 :,ses ь,s61 ..в. я.99е д7,3и 39su ■... tевlе f1rDп ('000 еи. восегв) о.в. о.в. о.в. 93 t>S l93 117 1S7 1Ч �3 df 70 103 l9S 3S9 1SS 17i 131 рвгвдеьвд сье.iевlв (ееав) s,oso ],вео 7,9ео б,eso 7,:оо 7,4оо 7,300 s,0оь е,90е 3,е�е 3,7]9 ],9н 4,sss 4,7еь ♦,s4s ],ц1 ]s3] ],1тА � !/ 1д tho евге о3 tЬове iaduвtrieв eyeufвeturiп{ гюгг thвa оаа ргодиоt, еврвеit7 вед output двtв вге pr.вeeted G ia иврсt о[ oaJet ргедиеtв ов1�. и frov[вlоыl. �,/ Сврвгiе7 bввгд ад веводвrд еlгев. д.в. - дое nвllвЫв. �!: Сгеегвl 7воt о! СвТ1ае. т.ее. e.OS, tвоавлга иnиптпl ипоvт дво werмclw 1т Оtытв cowlao 1а0rоиlс тlаииаУ, tлlя-еь б/ �j1j0=Y еиевг ot O.itв геиlав Iввввеиеt (вв N) твевl iпиеивt U■ М) Ьnlелввt теtввtевl (еев.1 1f.I.L Llд4 L!ц цц 1!!l ц!!. l!L! ll04 L}.IL i!Н It4: 114! 1l1:. I:IO 1l11 1iц U)l L1.1! 1l1L 1%I4 1!!L 1!!i iS11 1!8 ЫiЬ4Т1k! 1еод, fвtacata, вы Seбseee 1 1 - - - ' =0 !б - - - - 76 И ' - ' • 7S1 1,i1! • ' • ' 1ваеllи, Уввгlц �Орвеаl, вы ивдве ггЧrее■ и б 6 7 1 6 sev :о1 11о де и n 1а ки !1: 1: 7о 1ы 1,иs •.иа s,1:r 1,)а а1 к.и1 Уеод вы Уаед lгвдиев (iаеlвдlц гвnlеигв� 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 - 1S - 2 l ! - 26 - � 44 2f0 - !00 - 1t! fвОвг вд lqвг hodutв l ' ' ' 1 ' 7 ' ' ' ty • S • - - 31 - 1Ч ' ^ • Sf - С1tвп(еа1в, hегаlви, Са1, lдМг ев�д г1■всiе tгЧвеb 1 6 s с к 1 и и1 11е 1е 1s s 1s !н )и 1оо и )б • sd 1Tt беб :То Т1т а1 вее-веевlllе Nlил1 hodecte (иеqе гвегеlев вед Совl1 6 6 1 1 ) - е1 иб 1е 17 г . 101 :а 7s г1 7 - 1,sц 1,н1 н1 1s1 ио - 1в►гiевеЧ Mtвi hodвeb аы тгвоврее увlрвме : ь : 7 t 7 » 1ц ц 1о) 1+ 1е 77 1е: 1о цо яо n д!1 1,16s •и sf7 1о= 7s1 lииtвсе■гвд hедоеев (д.в.в.1 1 и 6 1 1 д 11е 776 s1v 1о ы ги и1 1ая 1,11: ио 1s я: :,би 1,ьы д,яо 1,Ч1 1.1» цs рпlеи 1 1 �. 1 _ 1 -1 11ц _-114 �!. 1� _:1 3..5i1 - LO1S. 1! _ii _!4 .Llр1 _ 1ь491 ...1!! �!1 тот,и. ь0 н и и 17 1s ие :,не я1 1,и1 11о ы 6 1.а1 7,1ы 1,бы 1,доо 1и и1 и,1а lо,и! 11,4о1 6,1и •.и1 •.а1о У � � tood, Мвпцв, ид tett►eeo - - - • • _ _ • • . • • - - - - - - - • • • • • Tuelln, Уигiц вррвевi, вв1 1..we rso+.u. е r ! 7 1 1 116 цо и1 1об бб 71 w 6s1 1s7 ие 11 107 l,11: s,a! к,1и :sa 1ьу 1,tn Уоо1 вМ Уаед holretв ti+aЧly Imlerr•) - 1 - - - 1 - 1 - - - ! - t - - - � • ц0 • - - 11f hувс вд h/ве hедвеtв - - - . . 1 . - ' ' ' S • • ' - • !f • ' - ' ' Sd Сt,вв[евU, hesolвa, е'ов1, lrfl•вr вы tlвetle Тгодоеев 1 7 7 1 - 7 7 бб 7S S1 l1 11 � Я !S 7f 70 Н 17i S11 S7f 77! 111 111 tо+-ваев111е Мlвгевl lеедиев (.аев0е негеl.а ..д еа.и ! д ► 1 к - 1и s1 и 1 и - ья и я и 70 - ба :,1оь и� ss1 и� - hlslневд МвеаL hыки вы lгиврее ЧаlРввве - ! 1 1 - : - 10 6 1, и - я1 1к а 7о - 1оь ио т� - и! wииеевоа еtоевеев а.....) 7 6 : е а s 1о 7er и! :я й !е1 1л н1 я1 4и ц нд s1e 6,1да sп :,!>а 1,lи 1.и1 Чnteu _ .1 _ .1 1 1 _ 1! = LS91 ц! J1 _�2 _ L41t L1i}. 3! _.г �11 ._ I3iL L]!1! �1 iOLL 17 tS ! 12 10 17 S17 М7 11! 1,1/t М1 7i/ 676 1,t66 117 !,flб 1,71! Sf) д,l1е 11,O7i е,117 1,ff1 1,1l0 6,077 6J lnieвd. )�dt Ceueat Саtавбо tеатвlс Саввiвеlае. i.ы. б.аь, lпоиблиь геvитхит 6rnovu.6 п гоигбе ме wг�►1. lгvипает ддnбобт соаеlrnы, иео-ы Geвi°г* еивЬве е[ Ов1tв tвев(вв Ievueввet (!в в111fев) теевl fвrввtввве (tв вillевв) �вlелвве lееввееЛ_ (Мв_J 1l.44 1.441 L443 14�3 144�. !/ 1У�4 1441 144Е 1441 14SS. !/ 14.4.4 13.41 14а1 i9.Qi Ii4S 1l/ iL44 1iAL LZ4I � 11Q�. !/ Тоц{,qL�вппият ввпбобт qq�{пи cruc) iooa, бг..с.и, вод гоевеев s б s б ) иь 1а9 ит г: ) вэз 1и цб as s9 бь1 ио �11 аое ат Тваtilвв, Унгiаб бррвгвl, rod GиЬп реадоеы е е !г 16 и и �о вя so :!: n �s )бх )бо su 1,s1o :,ip1 �,:и 6,1я t,as Утд вод Утд ргедиеtв ( ([seludle6 puceitaq) (: б / е : 1 ьs s :е s ь 1so ) 1� и si sи l,о:б s6: 16s ?врвг аод Рврвг hодиеев ( Сlввlаlв, hеееlеи, Севl, • lиЬЬег виа r1.веlс гrоеиеев го 1) 1о ♦ б и1 1оь 41 ц б sг� iiг fs1 ы sя :,drs r/б f,oto tте :ор 11оо-ввев111е Mloeul Tcodecte (neepe hero).� .оа со.1> ь ь 1 ь б :о1 ы я ее :{s i66 и )о 1ы 1/) 1,w: /оо sбv /ц s4s IвЬгlевtвд Neu) ргодвесв, МвеЫ овгТ .ва тгввгрвге гтиlр,вввг я ): s !г е /! :� бб )б б) )) )э1 иб :д: !е1 ы1 1,sэо )бэ 1su 6se Мвво[вееогвд heduetв (в.в.в.) „f � 1 � ,�, � � �, � � ,�,j _j1 � �� �t ]]7 16) ]76 2,j�( f16 татдь ss �1 •s sь .1 яо1 61> >и • ss1 s/i 1,�об l,os) ео1 1,ол 1,:и б,пб s,/м т,)n е,тl6 6,T6s � елг�ь еп anvuoп еааепбе иис) Iоид, Фвввеабt, вад lеЬвею 10 !7 17 70 76 - - - - - ц )/ 1� бб 76 SЧ 1.717 �91 606 Ч7 lнеilи. Уигiаб 6ppвsai, вод и.еЬ.г IrWueee 1ье )е �) 4) s)s - - - - - s1 :! ьо �: кТб �,Тба i,яб �,oss б,н� )�eos6 Мао1 вsд Уоед ргодаеtв i (Ioelydlц prce(eurв) (S6 !1 )1 �б 69 - - - - - l6 16 ! 7) !1 1,�75 660 446 •б! !01 hрвг вод hрве ргодиеЧ ( СЬвiыlв, рвеееlеьв, Сеа), weac вед лвпtе ггодвеи 16а 11) п )s se - - - - - )os еб и иь и♦ 1,1ьs :,оо 1,боб ),ni t,uo 1bе-ввевlllе Мlавrвl ргодоеее , (вsевре рвеееlеиа вед Ceal) бб �7 )t 9t 1р - - - - - Ч t7 1) 7 11 !,lqS 1,!]о ),о6! ),10) 371 p.ectc.ud кве.t ггмиеев, м.еЫо.гТ ввд iueвpoct eqoipввet 1)1 1и sь бе S1 - - - - - 61 N St бб �f t,9л ts59 ),00) t.3ь1 Ч� Мвои[веtогвд hoduatв (о.в.в.) �,( J¢ � �, � - _ _ _ _ Jj � � "• ... ууц 1гб �jj, �4 �1 тота ь9s 6s6 tэ) и9 6to - - . - . ю) iц и1 би sы и,еп lо,ы! б,бл t6,o�■ я,sтб �/ Гtовlвlоавl. бЪев, 1. Dив to rwodieб еlt, гевреогоев ввр mt вдд ир ео tоевlв io еЬв риС tвЫв. L ТЬв /иС двtв иеlиди e1r11 •eбleurleб ввд eeertraetlee uetee. Jруцц� lerвl6n еввиtввве дdviвoq Соввiеtввт Lаев1 )arutuo! бдвiвоs/ Совsiеtив: вид Сваегвl ца► о! СеТ1ов. jable 9,01t PITROUUK WORTS, 1970-64 1977 im 1982 LM A/ YAJU 0 million) Crude Oil 22.0 132.6 135.9 139,2 143*7 20loG 435.8 448.4 488.9 332.9 372.4 Gasoline 006 - - 0,3 0.6 1.2 - - - 4.4 - Avtur - 0.5 - 3.3 8.2 2293 22o5 16.4 108 3.2 laroxece 3.2 - 1.3 4.9 3.6 1291 - - 15.2 M$ 2:5 Automotive Diesel 1.6 1.1 2.6 10.7 51.9 14.8 35.5 56.6 102.0 33.7 Other 3.7 -W -LA __U 14.9 11,4 m 6 TOTAL 31.1 141.7 144.1 156.9 175.2 297.7 493.4 515.2 573.9 468.5 408.6 Volume ('000 tons) Crude Oil 1,819.5 1,464.6 1,447.1 1,529.6 1,443.9 1,444.0 1,861.1 1,710.5 1,940.3 1,492.0 1,733.2 Gasoline 32o9 - - 2,2 3.7 6.5 - - - 15.0 - Avtur - 4.2 - 15.8 55.7 65,3 58.4 45.0 5.4 10.9 - Kerosene 99.0 - 9.8 32.2 23.4 41.9 - - 43.4 55.8 6.5 Automotive Diesel 69.8 9*2 26.7 82.7 198.6 42.6 110.9 183.9 405.9 140.6 IL/ Provisional. Now 1. Totals may not add up due to roundinS. 2. Date may differ with Customs data used elsewhere in this report. "cat 0syloo Petroleum Corporation. Table 9,02: IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1970-84 ('000 tons) 1970 1976 1977 1978 M 1980 1981 1982 1983 1j.4 a/ Saudi Arabia - 1,145.3 796.6 849.0 939.1 787.0 950.0 1,248.8 866.3 346.0 1,387.9 Iran 1,819.5 319.3 650.5 680.7 504.8 293.4 629.7 432.2 838.7 969.1 126.2 Iraq - - - - - 304.7 281.5 - - - - Libya - - - - - 58.9 - - - - - Malaysia - - - - - - - 29.4 235.5 177.0 94.4 Qatar - - - - - - - - - - 124.7 A/ Provisional. 8ource: Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. Table 9.03; PETROLEUM PRODUCT EXPORTS, 1970-84 1975 1976 1911 191 1911 120 U1L 19I 122 11R8&/ AVIATION AND MARINE SALES Value ( million) Avtur - 7.8 7.5 12.5 14.6 27.5 43,0 47.7 41.9 31.1 28.6 Marine Gas - 1.8 1.8 2.9 3.7 7.7 7.7 6.8 7.9 6.0 5.1 Marine Diesel - 3.4 3.2 7.1 6.1 10.9 12.3 7.3 8.9 7.2 9.7 Furnace Oil - 12.8 12.3 27.2 20.9 42.9 55.8 42.1 39.4 35.0 51.3 Other - 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 LA 0.4 TOTAL 6.4 b] 26.1 25.1 50.7 45.3 89.6 119.6 104.7 98.9 80.1 95.1 Volaume ('000 tons) Avtur - 84.7 68.2 68.1 81.1 73.8 193.0 104.0 91.7 74.1 72.3 Marine Gas - 24.5 20.2 22.1 25.3 26.2 19.1 17.8 20.8 16.8 16.6 Marine Diesel - 45.2 47.9 52.3 43.0 33.5 30.7 19.0 24.2 21.4 32.6 Furnace Oil - 340.9 316.4 359.7 263.2 316.6 306.9 203.3 219.0 194.6 294.7 DIRECT EXPORTS YLal (0 million) Naphtha 1.9 7.2 7.5 10.6 9.2 28.1 38.2 28.4 20.7 14.2 17.4 Gasoline - neg. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 Furnace Oil 1.4 - 3.3 4.4 5.8 8.0 30.1 41.2 34.9 11.2 15.7 Other -0.i 0.3 .. ng. Ut. nel .1 0 ,i 1 TOTAL 3.3 7.3 11.2 15.2 15.1 36.3 68.5 69.9 55.9 26.4 34.2 Volume ('000 tons) Naphtha 115.0 127.7 108.8 101.0 75.0 99.3 130.3 91.2 75.6 54.6 71.6 Gasoline - 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.0 Furnace Oil 161.0 - 92.5 59.1 87.5 55.5 182.9 236.5 212.1 121.5 92.5 TOTAL xPORTS ( million) 242 111 ALL 21d AL 1"2..jd 111d 1_A_2AL6 11L 1 122a L/ Provisional. h/ Details not available. Note: 1. Individual columns may not add up due to rounding. 2. Data may differ from Customs figures used elsewhere in this report. Source Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. Table 9.041 DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUx PRODUCTS, 1970-84 (tons) HZ 2 MAs.1 I HSi2A n tn tn li s/ Gasoline 143,441 86,788 99,448 103,348 120,623 97,843 109,371 99,553 113, 927 94,800 115,865 Diesel, Automotive 266,636 255,178 276,336 276,620 242,200 246,002 384,311 309,583 336,232 175,528 358,727 Diesel, Other 158,331 87,259 88,318 91,708 117,243 90,196 95,758 107.186 135,104 213,130 107,572 Furnace Oil 698,461 537,473 513,678 545,349 547,377 534,756 744,877 701,419 715,302 492,549 657,776 Ierosene 266,990 195,470 188,311 185,447 211,318 186,936 179,341 148,811 155.233 132,473 148,233 Naphtha 113,263 107,391 103,484 102,197 82,372 90,237 150,850 137,653 157,616 119,638 144,337 Bitumen 30 467 20,721 26,921 25,202 24. 872 24,100 26,174 15,516 24, 871 23,022 35,211 10 32 1,030 2,130 3,101 5,355 6,199 7,477 6,425 8,197 7,074 8,631 Avtur - 54,879 76,884 71,482 34,465 31,325 62,171 83,772 114,985 65,450 115,717 Solvents - 1,700 1,863 2,130 2,565 3,374 2,350 3,386 2,549 2,983 4,238 Fuel Cas - - -- - ----- -- Total 1,677,621 1,347,889 1,377,373 1,406,584 1,388,390 1,310,968 1,762,680 1,626,565 1,785,479 1,345,422 1,696,818 Memorandum Items Energy Products 1,533,891 1,218,077 1,245,105 1,277,055 1,278,581 1,193,287 1,583,306 1,457,067 1,600,443 1,199,779 1,513,032 Non-Energy Products 143,730 129,812 132,268 129,529 109,809 117,681 179,374 169,498 185,036 145,643 183,786 Light Distillates 256,736 196,051 205,968 209,782 209,629 195,954 268,986 258,292 302,279 241,529 273,582 Middle Distillates 691,957 593,644 630,806 626,251 606,512 556,158 722,643 651,338 743,027 588,322 692,987 Beavy Ends 728,928 558,194 540,599 570,551 572,249 558,856 771,051 716,935 740,173 515,571 730,249 A/ Provisional. iuis Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. Table 9.051 LOCAL BALES VOLUME OF PETROLEUM Ph 'UCTS, 1970-84 (tons) 1A75 1I 1i I E 12A 191 199 .3 s/ LPG h/ 35 582 807 3,108 2,432 6,404 7,110 6,663 8,197 7,150 8,718 Gaeoline 148,411 95,057 101,065 111,491 129,994 115,146 107,691 109,028 114,217 117,477 118,814 Ierosene 272,514 209,764 206,593 212,886 244,832 229,918 188,288 168,266 174,098 159,146 150,229 Diesel, Automotive 254,530 245,515 257,557 261,988 308,792 349,404 397,710 420,912 464,594 464,268 481,902 Diesel, Marine g/ - 5,232 5,183 5,497 5,869 3,726 3,027 2,585 5,515 7,829 3,859 Diesel, Industrial 87,831 37,314 35,663 46,245 62,015 64,188 63,953 105,000 143,121 295,885 78,552 Furnace Oil, Domestic 208,810 143,664 125,578 135,530 162,556 183,539 259,731 240,326 247,138 253,098 211,560 Furnace Oil, Marine - 20,108 20,088 18,762 21,233 16,099 12,887 22,884 26,974 26,881 8,577 Avtur - 13,571 8,614 16,499 6,749 8,169 22,843 30,967 31,415 34,262 43,806 Lubricants !/ 16,128 15,648 19,696 14,933 17,345 18,899 21,312 20,430 20,614 20,715 20,294 Bitumen 30,924 22,444 26,023 25,152 26,190 24,265 10,259 16,477 21,116 24,423 33,212 Naphtha - - - - - - 33,642 66,063 98,021 75,044 78,428 A/ Provisional. h/ Since March 1977, reflects transfers to Colombo Gas & Water Company. Inclutes Marine Gas Oil, Marine Diesel Oil and Heavy Diesel. Other than marine and aviation lubricants. Sourest Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. Table .06: PRODUCTION, TRADE, AND APPARENT COINSUMION O LEERGY PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, 1970-84 ('000 tons) 11 l lit l 1i i m 1Ml5 191 i Im 1980 .9 1913. 1.9.1 1 Production 1,534 1,334 1,519 1,489 1,304 1,218 1,245 1,277 1,279 1,193 1,583 1,470 1,600 1,200 1,513 Imports 321 208 46 33 20 6 20 78 168 312 102 156 270 488 150 Exports 276 121 223 184 120 129 203 160 163 155 314 328 288 179 96. Bunkers 565 510 410 462 358 412 385 435 332 377 357 241 264 233 344 Aviation 12 105 84 95 74 85 69 68 81 74 93 104 92 74 72 Apparent consumption 1,002 806 848 781 772 598 608 692 871 899 921 953 1,226 1,202 1,098 Per Capita consumptionk/ 80.07 63.51 65.94 59.66 58.12 44.31 44.32 49.63 61.38 62.12 62.41 63.58 80.72 77.97 70.39 I- J/ Provisional. k/ In kilograms. Boure.i Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. 7вЫв 9.07t PeftCLNM РАОООСТ PRICe СвА110{8, 1970-б4 �/ � (еа р�г L1cer; !в рег Iвретiвl Ов11оn 1n ТвгаоtЬе�ев) ¢J � � Оввоliпв Autorotiw Iедивtтlаl 'rieвel Рnкnвев Oi1 Виоет g{�цj,{� q/ �¢цД} �L Lor ¢уlоЬиг j/ НiеЪ lulebnr S00 двееодв б00 евееадв 1.000 евееодв Ревvвiliоб Реiев .7в.и.� 1, 197о: о.7е с3.sы о.7о с3.1ы о.1е ro.eo) о.37 и.бы - - о.22 с1.оо) - - o.1s (о.7о) - - бЧbЧаиед[ СЬвА{l1i 1970 - Oeeobes 26 0.84 (3.В1) 0.73 (3.41) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1971 - ltare6 1 0.90 (4.10) 0.82 (3.73) 0.20 (0.92) 0.40 (l.бl) - - 0.25 (1.15) - - 0.19 (О.б3) - - - о�саьвг 2е 1.1о cs.oo) 1.ао c4.ss) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1972 - 1еЪгивеr 22 1.15 (S.2S) 1.06 (4.80) 0.24 (1.0В) - - 0.29 (1.30) 0.26 (1.II0) 0.21 (0.93) 0.20 (0.40) 0.14 (0.65) - ов�в.ьвг з1 1.26 cs.75) 1.17 с5.зо) о.29 с1.а2) о.47 (2.14) о.зь с1.бз) о.з4 с1.sз) о.2е c1.se) о.г7 с1.:з) о.26 с1.1е) 14» - Аибиве 2а 1.аа (ь,s5) 1.за сб.1о) о.а2 с1.42) о.бо с2.7а) о,а4 с2.23) ол7 с2.13? о.41 (1.ее> о.4о с1.еэ) о.э4 (I.7n 1974 - .lвоиат7 9 2.75 (12.50) 2.64 (12.00) - - - - - - - - - - - - О.е4 (Э.еы - а.оивг� 1о - - - - о.79 с3.бо) 1.об с+.ео) 1.ов (4.9о) 1.о1 (4.бо) о.ее с4.оо) о.еб сз.4о) - - 1973 - ОесоЬег 3 2.93 (13.70) 2.е2 (12.80) 0.90 (4.08) 1.17 (3.30) 1.19 (3.40) 1.12 (5.10) 0.99 (4.50) 0.97 (4.40) 0.93 (4.30) � 1477 - м.гвь 1s - - - - о.77 сэ.+е) - - - - - - - - _ - - - - � 197в - де�е,ьее ц а.ао с2о.оо) а.о7 cle.so> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1979 - Jиов 13 6.60 (30.00) - - - - 2.31 (10.5ы 2.64 (12.00) 2.27 (10.30) 2.13 (9.70) 2.09 (9.50) 1.98 (4.00) - ВврtаЬвг 1 - - - - 2.35 (10.бВ) - - - - - - - - - - - - 19ео -.7.ви.г� 26 e.2s сз7.sо) - - э.о1 (1з.ье) 2.97 c13.so) 3.+1 cls.so> 2.4з с13.зо) :.79 с12.то) 2.73 и2.5о) :.64 (I:.oo) - ди.е 2о е.ао с+о.оо) - - з.за cls.te) 4.62 и1.оо) 5.об (2s.oo) +.se (2о.ю) +.м с:о.2о) +.+о с2о.оо> +.2я (1я.5о) 19е1 - Jвnивг7 19 9.35 u:.so) - - з.ея с17.бы 5.яа с27.о0) б.бо сзо.оо> s.бa ca.eo) - - - - - - Apri1 4 10.00 (43.50) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 198Э - Маге6 2 12.00 (54.38) - - 3.20 (2Э.бе) 6.75 (]0.69) 7.90 (Э5.91) 6.43 (29.32) - - - - - - аи1� 22 1з.s0 сб1.4о) - - е.3а с29.9» е.и (зб.9е) 9.2е с4:.го) 7.ы с33.би 4.е9 с22.22) +.е4 с2:.оо) +.72 с:1.+3) 19еа - - - - - - - - - - - - s.:: с2э.7з) 4.е7 c:2.1s) - - �/ Ргiеев вге СоlовЬо вроt ртiеев{ в итбlс to еоvве егвивроеt еовtв iв вддвд to out-вtвtioo prieeв tor в11 produet• e:eept бввоltпв, vAicб вв о[ Арг11 19е1, вв11в вt в ие1lол ргiев iвlвndwlde. �/ АltbоибЪ ег1 Lвпkд Ьвв otlieiвllp бодв ввегiе, ргiавв for рвtгоlвив ргодиаев aootiouв, tor ебв [iвв Ьв1ов, ео Ь• врвеl[iвд ia iврвгiаl баllовв евлв. liсвт ргiевв Ьвvв bввд оbевiдвд Ьу diridlag lврвsiвl бвllоо ркiевв Ь7 4.5461. J Мвгkвtiц о[ гебиlвт бгвдв бавоliпв rвв diвeoncinuвd io ввг1� 1979. �/ Ieduetriвl дiевеl iв о[сео кв[вггвд to а. Ьввvу дiвввl= еЬв мо tвлв вге иввд i6[вгеЬвебввЫр ie бг1 Lвata. lrior ео 1972, 1ov виlрЬит induвtriвl дiвввl vв• доt игtвсвд. �/ Dt[fвгв.[lвевд [игме• oi1 vвв аое игkвtвд ргiог ео 1972. fJ Ав о[ Jвowr� 19е1, lw виlрЬиг ioduвtriвl дiвввl iв икkвtвд вв 8ираг дiвввl. и вг Cq1ee Рптоlеиа Coepoeвtion{ вед Свосгаl Daak о1 Св71оо. • Xq_IjL9" : CEB ELECTRICITY GENERATION, 1970-84 Generation C02AC111 (MV), ----------------------------- Energy Generated (GWh) ----------------------------- Thelmal Ineral CgMRougggs Installed Effective ftin Th2MAJ DIU Relanitiess Gas Steam Turbines Otbgr &I SgRugaskAWL& 1970 262 243 740.3 41.6 781.9 2.0 - 39,6 1971 262 243 825.2 23.8 649.0 17.9 - 5.9 1972 262 243 648.3 93.7 942.0 87.5 - 10.2 1973 262 243 698.3 281.9 980,2 260.9 - 21,0 1974 362 339 997,9 14.3 1,012.2 12,5 - 1.8 1975 362 339 1,077.8 1.2 1,079.0 1.2 - 0.1 1976 402 377 1,108.5 24.3 1,132.8 23.9 - 0.4 1977 402 365 1,214.5 2,1 1,216.6 1.7 - 0.3 1978 402 365 1j365.7 19.3 1,385.0 14.0 - 5.2 1979 402 363 1,461.2 64.0 1,525.2 58.0 - 6.0 1980 422 399 1,479.4 188.8 1,668.2 140.1 18.4 30,3 1981 522 519 1,571.3 300.3 1,871.6 98.0 182.7 19.6 1982 562 539 1,608.1 457.6 2,065.7 89.1 352.6 16.0 1983 592 569 1,217.2 897,2 2,114.4 147.1 734.5 15.5 1984 h/ 882 850 2,088.0 169.0 2,257.0 11.0 117.0 2,5 38.5 IL/ Primarily Chunnakam (14.0 MW) and Pettah (6.0 MW) diesel plant and Sapugaskanda diesel (80 KW) from May 1984. bj Estimates. Notes Capacity figures are end-year, &MIggs: Ceylon Electricity Board; and Central Bank of Ceylon. -123- Table 9.09: CEB ELECTRICITY SALES, 1970-84 (in Ggh) Street Domestic Industrial Commercial Authorities Lighting a/ Total 1970 62.5 343.0 88.0 167.5 10.5 671.5 1971 64.6 373.2 92.8 180.5 11.0 722.1 1972 72.5 436.4 96.8 193.1 11.5 810.3 1973 81.5 466.6 107.6 198.4 12.0 866.1 1974 82.6 477.2 118.1 201.9 12.5 892.3 1975 84.9 522.6 122.5 222.2 13.0 965.2 1976 95.2 516.3 137.4 237.3 13.5 999.7 1977 106.5 519.4 147.9 252.8 14.0 1,040.6 1978 119.2 592.0 158.9 275.9 15.0 1,161.0 1979 153.2 629.9 203.0 296.3 16.0 1,298.3 1980 190.8 625.6 223.2 335.5 16.5 1,391.6 1981 216.6 647.5 219.9 380.6 8.5 1,503.1 1982 258.3 739.2 262.5 417.5 8.6 1,686.1 1983 304.3 752.0 291.8 433.0 9.0 1,790.6 1984 g/ 312.0 780.0 292.0 444.0 12.' 1,840.0 a/ Estimated. Source Ceylon Electricity Board. -124- Table 10.01: MINIMUM WAGE RATE, 1968-84 (December 1978 - 100) Year Private Public Money Real a/ Money Real aI 1968 30 60 55 109 1969 30 56 57 105 1970 31 53 62 108 1971 31 53 62 105 1972 34 52 62 99 1973 36 53 65 95 1974 46 59 74 95 1975 52 63 82 98 1976 54 64 86 103 1977 66 78 87 103 1978 95 99 100 105 1979 120 113 117 111 1980 147 111 129 97 1981 152 97 146 93 1982 176 101 188 108 1983 188 96 216 109 1984 212 92 247 107 1981 1st Qtr. 148 100 143 97 2nd Qtr. 150 97 143 93 3rd Qtr. 155 97 143 90 4th Qtr. 157 94 155 93 1982 1st Qtr. 174 102 184 108 2nd Qtr. 174 101 187 108 3rd Qtr. 176 101 190 108 4th Qtr. 179 101 191 108 1983 1st Qtr. 181 99 203 111 2nd Qtr. 189 97 219 113 3rd Qtr. 191 95 220 109 4th Qtr. 194 91 221 104 1984 1st Qtr. 189 85 229 103 2nd Qtr. 225 97 246 106 3rd Qtr. 217 92 251 107 4th Qtr. 217 92 260 111 a/ Money vage deflated by Colombo Consumer Price Indez. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. -125- Table 10.02: COLOMBO CONSUMER PRICE INDEX NUMBERS, 1976-84 (By Commodity Group) All Items Food Clothing Fuel Rent a/ Misc. Weights 100.0 - 61.9 9.4 4.3 5.7 18.7 Index (1978 - 100) 1976 88.1 85.1 93.6 101.1 100.0 90.7 1977 89.2 85.6 98.9 98.3 100.0 92.7 1978 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1979 110.8 153.0 102.2 125.3 100.0 112.3 1980 139.7 143.0 106.1 215.1 100.0 130.7 1981 164.8 168.3 114.0 293.0 100.0 153.8 1982 182.6 189.7 121.0 311.4 100.0 167.8 1983 208.2 213.2 128.7 414.9 100.0 192.9 1984 242.9 251.8 136.0 489.6 100.0 220.1 1983 January 188.9 196.5 126.1 325.1 100.0 170.8 February 190.4 197.3 126.2 325.1 100.0 177.0 March 197.6 201.4 127.8 381.7 100.0 186.0 April 202.0 207.4 128.3 381.7 100.0 188.6 May 204.9 210.4 128.7 397.2 100.0 189.7 June 207.5 213.9 128.9 397.2 100.0 191.0 July 209.5 215.3 128.9 .415.5 100.0 191.7 August 212.0 214.7 129.0 466.0 100.0 1S4.8 September 214.6 216.4 129.0 469.1 100.0 203.0 October 219.7 223.2 130.2 471.3 100.0 204.8 November 223.7 228.6 130.3 471.3 100.0 207.6 December 227.3 232.S 130.9 478.0 100.0 209.5 1984 January 229.9 236.8 131.3 478.0 100.0 209.4 February 234.3 243.1 131.7 478.0 100.0 209.6 March 238.0 248.3 131.9 478.0 100.0 210.9 April 241.0 251.2 132.1 478.0 100.0 217.4 May 243.2 253.3 135.8 478.0 100.0 220.1 June 245.3 255.4 137.7 486.6 100.0 221.3 July 246.3 255.7 138.0 497.1 100.0 223.0 August 246.8 256.0 138.0 498.6 100.0 225.2 September 246.0 254.1 138.6 498.6 100.0 227.6 October 246.7 254.9 138.7 500.0 100.0 227.6 November 247.2 255.3 138.9 500.0 100.0 229.5 December 248.9 257.5 138.9 500.0 100.0 230.9 a/ Movement of this index reflects controlled rents. Source: Central Bank of Ceylon. ?вblе 10.ОЗк MBOLEBALB PYICB IlсDЕЛ� 1977-84 (1974 ■ 100) 13j,Z jBi,� ],y,j� i�$Q iq,�,� г�$i jQ$� j2$¢ 1983 ,,,i984 1вс 2дд зтд 4tЬ 1ее 2nd 3гд 4е6 Meiкht■ 4lк,. 4.Li� 4Э.[,. 9Sк,. 4LL. 4tf� 4.tкL 4�к+. А11 Item 100.0 133.3 156.7 171.6 229.6 268.5 283.3 334.1 444.7 315.0 341.8 355.В 40].8 458.4 443,1 433.4 443.7 8r еоеетд;е•г рооа 67.в 1а0.в 155.5 1ы ,3 21а,2 249.s sьз.7 з42.9 4ss.9 зоs.ь зz8.s зз8.о 4о2.б 478,9 ass.a азе.е 4so.6 А1аоЬоliс driдke 4.9 125,8 136.2 156.4 202.1 252.9 267.6 281.2 310.1 274.6 281.9 274.4 294.0 а06.б 305.В 30f.2 320.9 . iвseile ,дд lооеwвт а.0 16а.б 23е.4 2as.6 249.о 279.3 эое.9 29о.б 29s.e 293.о 291.в 2в9.4 2ве.1 289.6 294,4 297.8 301.5 ререт ртодиеlе 1.4 117.6 152.8 194.1 279.0 288.3 289.1 340.7 40i.0 293.2 302,5 368.б 39В.5 401.1 403.1 403.1 412.5 СЬеwiевlв вод еЬвwiееl prcduat■ S.1 62.7 80.5 91.5 108.5 173.2 183.2 213.4 246.2 186.4 207.3 223.5 236.3 240.2 246.2 249.2 249.2 раетоlвио ртодиеев б.4 109.4 109.4 183.1 355.6 467.3 473.3 608.8 685.1 506.1 5BS.3 658.9 685.1 645.1 685.1 685.1 685.1 11од-кееlliс рсодиеее 1.8 172.7 254.1 2В2.2 407,4 412.6 444.6 517.4 633.3 490.1 501.3 510.1 567.2 597.1 612.4 662.4 бб1.3 Mete1 ртодиее• о.9 9s.1 11б.9 151.5 17а,о 2об.о 229.9 2аь.1 э1о.2 :зо.з :зо.в :зб.а 286.9 29а.з 299.о 323.е э:3.е ?еедерое[ еqиlркде 0.8 127.4 141.6 148.1 171.0 193.9 200.6 279.5 295.0 218.3 232.4 273.6 279.5 285.8 488.0 300.1 306.2 Blectriasl вррliвдсав .де .�ррце. 1.о 117.3 1:э.б 138.з 15а.а 185.3 232.а 26s.s 275.9 247.а 249.1 2sз.3 26s:5 271.б 274.6 278.4 :79.о КаеЬiаат� 1.3 102.6 109.2 124.2 139.2 161.7 167.6 192.4 197.5 172.0 184.3 190.3 193.4 146.9 196.9 196.9 199.3 Рие1 едд light 1.8 179.s 253.8 319.5 388.9 402.5 409.2 419.6 511.7 432.1 441.2 418.7 419.6 478.3 489.4 539.5 539.5 Мiеовllадаоив 4.8 150.В 222.9 2б0,е 328,7 337.9 359.5 452.0 451.8 ]98.4 442.8 467.3 432.0 459.6 450.4 431.6 4б5.4 е о�"оФ :ii 5о.э 115.а 13з.9 1аа.5 17т.о 217.о 239.6 25э.7 282.4 247.а 25ь.5 2so.9 2ьо.1 абе.9 zв2.3 287.4 291.1 � Ie�parte 27.2 93.0 138.8 l64.9 2Э7.б 301.4 295.2 325.4 346.9 298.2 318.7 340.6 ц4.0 344.5 цб.3 цS.1 ц7.б Bspore• 22.s 229.9 229,1 241.э s37.o за3.7 зьs.е б12.9 9zб.а аеб.з 5s9.в бОе.а 797.1 1�019.б 919.1 e6s.a 9оо.9 8в евсеогс , Содеикт 75.Э 140.7 157.2 1б7.б 227.1 252.8 268.3 345.8 453.5 306.8 372.4 ц1.9 402.1 472.9 451.2 479.3 450.6 Iocarmediate 20.3 116.7 152.4 184.1 249.5 318.4 329.8 381.9 420.4 337.8 371.8 402.6 415.5 420.7 421.1 415.7 424.2 Ioaвrtкдt 4.2 13D.б 169.2 195.2 264.7 303.1 325.1 367.0 �99.0 349.5 363.1 375.3 3В0.2 3В3.б 385.9 413.0 413.4 Ваите•t Свnетвl Bank оЕ Се�1од. Table 10,04: COST INDICES FOR SELECTED BUILDING MATERIALS AND DIFFERENT CONSTRUCTION ACTWITIES, 1972-84 (1969 - 100) Item 1972 1973 1974 1977 MI UR IM IM 1963 19 94 Aj Cement 100 111 164 164 164 164 ;99 292 636 713 $14 624 924 steel (N.G. BarO 139 161 279 261 261 255 274 458 504 572 573 632 $17 Bricks (Hand molded) 89 124 156 156 156 156 268 285 393 388 442 461 540 Asbestos Shoot (Corrugated) Ill 1" 213 254 295 286 327 411 607 627 706 799 R31 Timber (Sava) 100 100 129 129 129 129 217 376 634 814 814 833 63B Metal (314") 100 100 120 124 148 Ifis 338 533 617 551 557 632 '698 P.V.C. Pipes (3/4") 153 227 267 237 237 264 362 459 520 520 520 $62 619 Housing Construction 110 123 149 160 163 173 252 347 519 617 645 691 767 Non-Residential Buildings 117 134 174 181 186 199 254 320 463 548 386 631 708 Other Construction Vorks 115 130 166 169 175 187 220 278 366 457 493 534 599 All Construction Activities 114 129 164 171 175 186 247 327 469 558 592 637 717 Al Estimates. So-uxjce: Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction. Table 10.05: ADMINISTERED PRICES OF BASIC CONSUMER GOODS, 1977-84 (Re) Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. i 111 M2A 9 1981 982 1W M 1984 198 Rice for Food Stamps kg 2.15 2.15 3.48 4.48 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.16 6.25 6.72 6.72 Rice (Open Market) kg 3.70 4.24 5.13 6.72 6.07 8.60 7.69 7.87 7.74 8.94 8.65 8.89 Flour kg 1.32 2.47 3.00 5.23 5.50 6.65 6.65 5.95 6.82 6.82 7.75 7.75 Bread kg 1.32 2.21 2.76 4.52 5.06 5.95 5.95 5.51 6.17 6.17 6.78 6.78 Kerosene liter 0.76 0.76 2.35 3.34 3.89 3.89 3.89 3.89 5.20 6.58 6.58 6.58 Electricity unit 0.12 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 Bus Fare journey 0.50 0.60 0.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 2.00 2.50 2.50 2.50 Coconuts each 1.42 1.00 1.82 2.48 2.02 2.58 2.41 2.47 2.54 4.13 3.89 3.98 Coconut Oil bottle 4.58 4.24 7.06 8.38 8.43 8.50 8.23 8.07 10.00 20.80 23.70 19.75 Milk Powder kg 12.13 12.13 18.74 26.28 32.50 31.25 34.47 35.88 52.00 52.00 52.00 58.20 Sugar (Open Market) kg 6.62 6.62 6.62 14.55 16.50 13.50 12.63 11.90 12.50 13.00 12.38 12.50 W Souraei Central Bank of Ceylon. т.ы. 11.oi, еаsст�а �осш. квакг�твt, 19аб-еь 1�5lе 1Я�.� �34� 191А 1911 141i 3l1� 1l1� 1�1� 1.Pi.� J3ll 391.4 131! ll�4 1!!1 а!!,i в/ 1!!Z д 3!!! д �Q�I �du1t LiСвгвеу (t) Sa b3 7i - 7В - • - - 8S • - - бд б1 1� а•в• в•в• lеЪооl serollseoe 9acio с.е•• s-1�) �1 sa бs 99 100 б9 еб - - бо - 9ь - � �° в� °•�• °''' ''`' хв::.та А«о оnlасалрвч Litв Rsрвесвпе� 4] S6 б7 - бб - 6S - - - 69 41 69 b9 бб о.в. а.в. t.a. Iatвoe Moeealie� (рег '000) 141 11 56 4! 4S 1б 46 51 �S �� А2 77 ,36 42 S4 о.в. ' а.в. а.в. сгие. еlгеь евсо ср.г •ооо� з1�4 ае.1 а4.� :9л so.4 �о.о аа.0 :1s :1.а г1.е х1.9 :e.s :е.9 :�� :а.0 �.е �.: .л. Стиде оисЬ iaee (рат •ооо) 1о,? 1о.9 е.ь 1.s 1.1 е.1 1.1 9.о e.s 1.е 1.4 б.б бs б.: б.о д,/ б.1 б.1 а... Lt• о! Nвеигвl Populвtion � lеегвив fi) 1.1 :.в п.б 1.а 1.� :.Z s.o 1.9 1.9 I.o а.1 г.а :.х 2.t г.! а/ :.! !.о .... р Мас мiSтsioп (р.т •ооо� s,z s,: -1.о -е.о -s.1 -�.s -з.е �.о -п.з -�.е -9.1 -ze -з.о -4.б -эл -б.о -б.е •.•. АrвевRе А{в ■е Маггiв�в: И.1е а1.о г1.п а1.9 - яа.,, s1.9 п1.д п1.а :1.з г1.б s1.s я1.б :1.е :1.е о.в. .... ..в. ■... ree�1. :о.1 то.9 :п.� - ц.s �.о х:.1 Т:.1 гг.е хэ.а хз.4 гз.4 и.1 ц.б А.•. ол. •л. ■.•. ИивЪвг of Nev 1лi1 рlвооiоа "Аееереогв" с•ооо� - - - ss +9 11 9б 1п 11 еа 1s 1б 9: 1s� 11о ta 11з 1� 1ем1е �Стидв) Lrboт роrев • lвrtieipвeloo lвсе (в11 цев, 3) - - IS�S 19.5 19.1 - • - 20.7 20.6 - - - - 21.5 19.i а.в. ••в• �/ Troвiвioмl. игеввl Aeprтtaeet оЕ Седвив ввд бcatiвtieв (Ьагвд ое tЪв 10х ввrрlе рориlвеiое евевив 19l1)i lееiеагве Gепегвl'в Depвrtвenc; впд Гаа11r Bealth �иееаи. �l . • � таыа 11.о2: wttOH вОСкеь еттвМ�гтvtее кМ пв.лтl0М то тоlы, соиаит еохвти! прогдlтОtав лМи То сое, lябя/70-м S of lotal Cuereet Rкeandilureв Adluated __ У оЕ CD! (enrrвse ввгkеt екiев) lоСа1 8осiвl lосаl доеiвl Tota1 Ситтеде iocal 8ervieaв вод lоеаl Ваквiеаа вад Espenditure Soeiвl Net food МеС lood 8аа1[Ь Едиевtlоо Воеiвl 1ве lоод iat lеед lввг Ад wted �f Н а � бdueвtion J 8 е в� 8ubвidie• J BubaLdiв!- ¢/ lotal �f lоtвl �/ $�j�,: bf 8иЪв;д;ав �f lоЬвiдiи �/ 8в rillioa 1969/7о :,577 9.1s 1е.33 2в.4а 12.66 а1.1о 2.оо 4.о1 б.:: 2.77 е.99 1970/71 ],019 1.84 16.01 24.14 17.76 42.49 1.99 4.07 6.21 4.48 10.71 1971/72 4,02] 6.71 16.1] 19.88 16.34 41.20 2.47 5.06 7.80 5.13 12.9� 1я 7э з, 777 6.94 1а.9о 22.69 17.9в з9. еs 1, а2 3.об 4.4а а.бя е.17 1974 4,sьs б.ао 12.n 19.9е 2о.вб ао.о: 1.2] 2.45 з.бе 4.ао 7.и 1975 5,265 6.15 12.43 19.39 2Э.37 41.95 1.23 2.48 3.11 4.бб 8.37 1976 s,6o2 б.в9 1а.о7 21.в] 16.7з ]7.7о 1.29 2.бэ ].92 ].1э 7.os 1977 6,55] 6.94 13.13 20.86 21.73 41.79 1.26 2,39 3.бS 3.95 7.б0 : уΡМ� 1978 10,491 4.95 9.37 14.89 20.33 35.21 1.22 2.31 3.66 5.00 В.бб Г 1979 10,887 5.В1 10.40 16.87 21.36 38.24 1.21 2.16 3.51 4.44 7.l5 1яе0 12,7]о 5.в1 1о.9о 17.а2 2.4о 19.е2 1.11 2.о9 з.зз о.46 ].79 1981 1s,o2s 5.п 1о.ба 17.а х.об 17.59 1.оо 1.е7 з.оо о.1о а.о9 198z �/ 19.11г 4.99 1о.sэ 16.:1 о.49 16.7о o.9s 2.о1 3.о9 о.о9 3.1е 19е3 J 24,а99 5.оа 9.В5 1s.61 о.а1 16.о2 1.о2 2.оо . 3.16 о.ое з.:4 1984 J 27,61] 5.49 9.68 15.84 0.]б 16.20 1.09 1.92 �.15 0.07 3.22 f,/ lоtвl еигтвдt асрвддiситв adJuatad ■ totвl eureent e:paodituee - 8товв food виЬаiд� ♦ деt food виЪвlд�. �/ бspaoditurвв оа еигтвдt аееоидt оо1у. g/ Ia 19б8/69, 8ri Laoka introdueed а диаl ехеЪво8а твеа. 8оvвvвг, food iapoetв, rhi¢Ь datвлina виеЬ о[ of с!к еовt of tha Еоод виЬвiду, vвте valuad at tЬв offieiвl акеЬво8е гаев аод аое ае tбa >!`ЕС гаев ehua иадвгвевеing !Ьа erue совt ео ehe budgвt. 1Ъ• 8товв Еоод виЬвiдr� ввlиед ае the aw la 16 екеhао8е таев, vould иоипt to 6,4Х оЕ ODp in 1977. �,/ 1bc eooвiвteot viCЬ fi8ure• вЬом iu сЬе bud8et tаЪlев (5.03-5.04). 8оиеее: Саlсиlасад froa Bcaciвcieal Appeadi: SвЫев 2.01, 5.03, аад 5.04. t.ы . и.о�ь tиьте fтбтппее, 1м91�о`е1 I.4alL.L4 1324L.i1 1!ц 1.l2,i ]!1! 1l11: 1.l2lь JЯ11 ].!i! 1!]3 J.ilQ 1.lц 1!ц !!!3 1!!i torpicaц fprulietoe Яеп�тп •гбieinв) б/ 4» 4�9 4s� 4s6 4s� вsе 46о 46� 4м 4ы ьео 4ее 49: м3 .... Игwав рп tоврiевl 2i,�os 2�,ы I 2е,и1 �бв�ое 19,обе 29,462 2l,и9 :9,eso :l,зоб 29,lи зо,Iа 3o,IU 3o.n2 31,2�о ■... lвтвевв рвт eN 320 310 31S 319 332 331 334 736 341 341 3�0 ц0 3S0 ц! в.а. Ceetnl DUpвeuHu 772 776 7б] 749 756 355 331 756 77! 367 717 цо 77! 7S7 в.е. ртеев р.г оlвр..в.и 3�,бяг 3е,ооо з�,нs 3г,s1о 3�,31s 3e,o1I 3я,оео и,1sl sl,4ss и.:12 ь:,и3 м,ое: 44,9)е и.а1 .... ме.т е! Оеееем 1,93: 1,бя3 2,о3е :,ое9 :,1:� :,ие 1,:4е :,16е 2,2se 2.2и 2.оп 2,:33 :,оц 1,9я .... т.т.оо. р.т Оекеет б,ы г е,г44 а,71о 6,2aI 6,2so а,31: б,lо: .,429 6,2е: 6,794 I,1e6 б,п: 2.46о г.9а: +... ыи.ьет о[ Аит. Мвдiевl Гтвееiеlооетв 1,22s 1,нs 1,:os 1,1a 1,111 1,отs 1,os! 1,o1s 1,пе 931 1,аое 9a евб I,osт .л. fвтводо рвт 1ввt, Medieвl prвeeieioeвs 1о,213 10,42t 10,613 1l,бц l1,966 12,SS4 1.• 9S] 1�,733 12,041 11,266 14,611 l6,203 l2.1ег 16,SeS r.в. во.�ь.т ог rитввв s,s4: s,s4: s,oo7 б,э2s s,:ee s,69s ;,�7: s,бto 6,169 б.еье 6,:n б,eos �,sI4 I,:16 в... ь М lвевеав pas мтв. :,2ы т,зоз 1,sг1 1,е9о 1,s14 :,369 :,зя3 2,и: :,299 :.и3 2.3sт t,1a 1.aos :,ul .... � виьевт о! lервеiиЧ t'оооl 1,os4 1,COI 2,os1 2,о3е 1, иб 1,1и 2,:е1 1,1ее 1,II4 2.42s 2,3s4 :,:n 2,мs 1,so2 .... иь.л.т е[ аер■тiвитв t•аоо� :9,бяо 14,и3 :1,о19 16,:м :о,316 r,,a4 31,ы я а,тб4 :е.419 :9.4оо u.e9l 3о.1и ц.б96 3о.по .... Rвr �ееврtогв о! рввill plвaeie6 МвеЬодв 3S•169 И.31] jj,� 95.9l1 7l.927 7l•30{ ee.als 76.6f0 Z¢,1l� �LiS4 ]1)л).i4 JIl,S.11 111ыы. 11l.7.71 f/ I].L3iL f/ 1„ер. 1s,Iя9 1I,u6 16,s9я 1г,s1е 19,и3 3:,1и :1,о3о 1е,311 23,ов 2о,Iет и,13: u,us 1s,бте Is.63s jI I1,u3 е/ tuтtlis.elee 4,9п :4s 9,s26 2о,246 42,174 »,164 3s,see и,oss :1,9м 3s,6u 112,пб и,9п боди Ioe,I63 д �LS3т е/ • оеь.т и.елодв цв4яя 3I,63: 42,еь! 4e,1ss - - 2s,slг 2I,s14 31,1и 36,326 39,оо2 36,Ч: зs,м3 4r,3r д/ 3о.4т4 s/ еиаеевве e:pвodlenre (ев aillioe) 236 13f 2S4 262 292 324 3еб 4SS S1e i32 140 t3] !37 l,733 j/ 1,]М j/ Сврlевl евреодllnее Uв вlllieal �¢ 7¢ �¢ �¢ ,,,�,г ,4¢ ]!4 � 1I! ��lL .,.l43 1!! _i1�. _I!1 J..4! s/ тое.1 (1• ■i11lое) 2�4 166 2ео 29е s19 41о soo 4!е иi 1.о13 I,ц1 !94 1,12I 1,a1t 1,2м j/ 6рувд[еите Рвг рвтвоо (ео) Q/ 1е.о 1е.о 2г.: :1.е 14.t 3о.• s6.4 3s.I и.3 Io.a l1.I 66.9 3�.г 112.6 и.I s/ tотвl t:peodltигев ав 1 ot oDp 2.1 1.9 1.! 1.f 1.4 1.6 1.е !.4 1.7 2.0 2.2 1.2 1.2 1.S 1.о � 1аеlидвв вtвrsit! боввв. �/ Iаеlадвв евр{!в1 орвадlturu, екввtв вед eooteibutio•в. j/ 1го�lвiеиl. �рgтеевь CqвrWet о! tевltЪ /етьlевв аад Oqвrtыet е[ Свти■ аед iutluieв. 7в►f• 1l.Мк t01К�t1011 6TA7I/TiC/� !l7Р�М 1�1II и21 �41i 1lLi 1lLi 1�i1 1lL�. 1!ц 1lLl 1lZL 1� 1lJ1 цi! I!� 1!!3 N Теlв1 ta+бer е! tebele �вliJ, }ы,tL L,1}Z !ьl1,Q �а4� L4if L� l..1I1 l.111 l.S1E :+Il4 L11L Ll4L }вbL l':`� u...ee.R б,ие 7.lя 6,s4f е.�и 7.ьы 7,иь 7,и7 7,6�6 4,о:б �,п� 7.1и �ли 4,и> >лn ь,еоо йееедвq 1.Чб l.S77 l.1б1 7.10! I.[0! l.770 1,7i7 l.777 l.4Ч S.S1! 1.7[t 3.i01 4,f11 S.Sf! 3.3Si Ot►■!е t17 !1] !10 []0 [б0 !1! [S! 760 !Si 774 677 �S1 )S7 Л7 7S6 1kвбer о[ ооигьеа! бгЪеоlе 6.74s e.s6s 6,ss1 7.иб 6,s71 l.166 6,4ss 6,w [,о7Т l,ои !.[и е.sп l.sм f.sls r.es4 Тоeв1 11sд■г о[ [el1U 1,2Jj,1lL 1.lil,914 L4il.12L 1.4lL1},! ia4i1,l�:► L1i�,La1 i.�11.l.li L34L1l1 L�.61.1i! i+2Q1ь:l1. �+?!l+111 L�}1.i11 LlИ.�1 ��].$iZ i.11�.1lz ir■ди ! !о б i.вs�,so� 7,4п.7s4 :,я�.иs 7,47s,u� :,ы [,ва :,4ы,sо� :,4sк,lи �,яо,lоs �,7�s,716 .... �,7�б,иб �,d:,ls: :,n[.я7 ■... .... аl.ае !!о l! и4,sы иэл7: !slлl! !и,!!! и[,оls 1[о,4и !а.[74 l1.б:о н,ыs ■.■. бя,»о б:И4об иТ,[[4 ..■. .... [еiве!■ /еleol ТевеМгв 5.734 4.tЯ в.е. !�t[[ е.в. в.■. . в.в. в.в. ■.в. �.7[! !.[76 4.717 4,3!! �.К1 7,7[7 ое.еге.е.! аеьоеt тиеьеге lо,ыг fo.e7s fo.ss6 ,в�7ы lе.еll !l.оь7 1os.lso u�.�n [гs.4вб 1�ыы е 1�,п4 и[.б� [�l.�[е [:[.46е [�s.s[4 гориlт.■!м! [,гtе 7е гя 7е 7ь 7s ts :� 7: a 74 :4 �б :б :7 � � FлЬп ot 0■iв■ке[![ iwd■■!е !l.цs и.еl1 и.777 u,7os [Т,мо 11.[ьо [7,[1о lг.7и 1е,1Ч [ti!u !б.�и [б,[[� [a.1sT ■... ■.е. У вn►п о[ а.lикеtq 7ее■ы!е l,ои !,!и !а!7 !�1[е [,4lо �,ооо [,o7s [,ае :.м! [.бя 1�ба [.sи .... .... .... б.�, и.l..lе.е �,l:! �,4s7 �,»б �,4�о �,б�> >,4n �,�4 4.ж 4,7n 4.[бь 4.иб 4.бх s.[а s.и� s,6�e w.ь.е о!■eo,w 4.1» �л4! �,l�1 4,обт �,юs �,l�а �,1so �.р[ �,ио �,�7i �,[s> >,бl� .... �.[sэ .... [ипlо! д[е■/llrn a..u7te.! и[ 4и s!! ц1 sы бss 7и ио !п 1,[�: [.�и 1.slf 1.lfs �,su �.7п ' Glit■1 Ьр■sdltorn (1e вi1!{о■1 ,� ,.�1 �4 1! �1 .31 1Ii iLQ, �Z �1 ��L �i1 -.�i1 -44! -i}1 7оlе! ([в .и1lо■� s!к s[ь �б ео: 6:4 7об !!t !76 !.и! [.�lt [,н4 :,о:е i,иб �.ls1 �.�l� 7еlв7 tr[editalе и i е[ fд! 7.! 7.6 7.1 �.4 !.7 !.7 �.f !.б t.7 !.7 !.1 7.4 =.S 7.6 !.S �/ heвbieal. М/ А[/говМ ■■tlиЧе. ■.■. • ве! ■веilеllе. �� Сиlul 1во► е[ Cplea. Table IlLai TOURIBM: ARRIVALS BY REGION, 1975-84 (Number) im im 12L2 1984 Western Europe 60,187 72,624 103,807 125,664 160,664 213,482 245,785 232,290 176,310 185,413 Asia 24,604 25,417 27,447 38,560 56,975 74,676 88,744 135,0" 124,620 91,826 North Apterics 6,823 6,279 8,907 10,729 11,701 12,878 13,946 15,528 14,686 15,353 Eastern Europe 4,957 5,825 4,480 6,102 5,496 4,906 5,311 4,160 4,488 3,264 Australia 3,683 4,199 5,415 6,629 7,374 8,724 9,584 12,634 10,554 11,655 Others 2,950 4,627 3,602 4,906 - 5J54 7,114 7,372 7,330 6JZ2 12,489 TOTAL 103,204 118,971 153,665 192,592 250,164 321,780 370,742 407,230 337,530 320,000 Memorandum I&M: Tourist Night@ (1000) 1,015 1,194 1,645 2,061 2,777 3,548 3,907 4,048 3,179 3,200 Guest Might@ JI/ (.000) 656 847 1,109 1,350 1,637 2,008 2,097 2,056 1,652 1,766 loops in Graded Acc dation 3,632 4,581 4,851 5,347 51599 6,042 6,691 7,539 8,698 8,979 Tourist Receipts S/ 0 Million) 22.4 28.2 40.0 55.5 77.7 110.7 132.4 146.6 I26s9 11S.0 JL/ Estimtes. JL/ Tourist eight@ In Graded Acememindation. Data not consistent with the foreign travel receipts date presented in Table 3.01 which are based an Central Back of Ceylon date. Source: Ceylon Tourist Board. 于