Rwanda - Agricultural sector review

Report No. 1377-RW FILE COPY Agricultural Sector Review Rwanda June 30, 1977 Regional Projects Department Eastern Africa Regional Office FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Document of the World Bank This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS US$1 = RF 92.84 RF 100 = US$1.08 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System TITLES Agronome Agronomist Vulgarisateur Extension Supervisor Mcniteur Extension Worker ABBREVIATIONS AIDR - Agence internationale pour le Developpement Rural ASPY - Association des planteurs de pyrethre BRALIRWA - Brasseries et limonaderies du Rwanda CCS - Centre communal de stage (communal training center) CERAR - Centre d'education rurale et artisanale du Rwanda CNPE - Commission national des prix CPM - Contribution personnelle minimum (Head tax) CRS - Catholic Relief Service ETIRU - Etablissements techniques et industriels du Rwanda FED - Fonds Europeen de Developpement ILACO - International Land Development Consultants INFAC - Institut National de Recherches Agronomiques du Congo ISAR - Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Rwanda (Rwanda Institute for Agronomic Sciences) OBM - Office de Valorisation du Bugesera-Mayaga OCIR - Office des Cultures Industrielles Rwandais OPROVIA - Office National pour le Developement et la Commercialisation des Produits Vivriers et des Productions Animales OVAPAM - Office de Valorisation des Produits Agricoles du Mutara PAC - Plan d'action communale (Communal Action Plan) PECDA - Projet d'Entreposage et de Commercialisation des Denrees Alimentaires RF - Rwandese Francs SOVAKIR - Societe' pour la Vulgarisation du Quinquina au Rwanda TRAFIPRO - Travail, Fidelite, Progres (Work, Fidelity, Progress) a nationwide cooperative of long standing  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY RWANDA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REVIEW Table of Contents Page No. SUMMtARY ........... e......................................... i-iii I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1 II. THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE ...... ..................... 2 A. Agriculture in the Economy, and its Constraints ... 2 B. Population and Land .............................. 6 C. Agricultural Production ...... ..................... 10 D. Demands on the Agriculture Sector 11................ ll E. Requirements for Agricultural Development ......... 13 III. THE DIRECTIONS OF GROWTH ...........................,... 15 IV. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ................................... . ... 20 A. Growth and Agricultural Exports .. ................. 20 B. Finance for Agricultural Development ....... ....... 23 V. THE MEANS FOR DEVELOPMENT ........ ..................... . 27 A. The Communal Action Plan ..... ..................... 27 B. Extension Services ... . ........................... . 28 C. Training for Agriculture .......................... 29 D. Agricultural Credit ...... ......................... 31 E. Marketing . ........................................ 32 F. Cooperatives .... ........................... *......... 33 G. Land Reform and Grouping of Dwellings .... ......... 34 VI. PROJECT POSSIBILITIES .......... **.*** . ... . .. ... . .... 36 VII. CONCLUSIONS ............... ...e....................................... 38 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may ...t otierwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  RWANDA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REVIEW Annexes Annex 1. The Agrarian System and Structures of Rwanda Annex 2. Extension Services: Scope, Systems and Methods Annex 3. Marketing of Farm Products Annex 4. Export Crops Annex 5. Manpower and Training for the Agricultural Sector Annex 6. Farmers' Production Patterns and Returns to Crops Annex 7. Development Structures Annex 8. Statistical Annex Maps IBRD 3595 R Relief IBRD 3596 Rl Population density IBRD 12833 Location of Agricultural Projects  SUMMARY i. Agriculture is the most important sector in Rwanda's economy, con- tributing over half of GDP and three-quarters of the country's export earn- ings, of which coffee alone produces 60%. It also provides 45% of total government's revenue, while it only receives 12% of public expendliture. Growth of the sector in recent years has been only about 1.5% a year in real terms while the population has been growing at 2.6%. Over 95% of the population is employed in the rural sector where the absolute poverty level is $65 per capita, a level that only 40% of the rural population exceeds. Agricultural development is slowed by fiscal constraints and a lack of skilled manpower for development planning and implementation, but the most severe of Rwanda's problems is the country's limited availability of agri- cultural land and its rapid population growth. ii. The present population of 4.4 million, which is expected to double in 25 years, gives Rwanda a population density of 350 inhabitants per square kilometre of arable land, 171 per square kilometre overall. The average farm size is only about one hectare: although in absolute terms land holdings (and incomes) are fairly evenly distributed, there is a bimodal distribution such that two-thirds of the farms are of less than one hectare. As popula- tion density increases, fallow periods are reduced and soil conservation meas- ures ignored so soil fertility declines; at the same time farm sizes decline and are now on average 40% smaller than in 1953. Nutritional standards, that presently only meet about 75% of adult requirements, also decline as popula- tion outgrows the food supply. More and more people - especially the young - are landless, and as the smallest farms become too small to be viable units they are bought by richer farmers, thereby creating social differences that could be potentially divisive of Rwanda's generally unified rural society. iii. Because Rwanda could not depend for its survival on imported food because of its landlocked position and the lack of opportunities, apart from these provided by the agricultural sector, to earn foreign exchange, it is to agriculture that Rwanda must look to meet its food needs and to finance its future development as well as providing future employment for its population. An increase in production is therefore essential. The technology to achieve this only exists in part, so there is a need for a research effort to provide the missing elements, especially for the smallest farms, and for a reassess- ment of present research findings as they apply to the ordinary farm. To meet food production needs without endangering soil fertility by reducing fallow periods, a 3% growth rate in yields is called for. This will also ensure that sufficient land remains to be planted to export crops (without prejudicing the food supply) to allow a 5% annual increase in area. This, together with the 3% annual yield increase, will allow the growth in foreign exchange earnings needed to sustain an increasing volume of imports in the future. iv. A steady growth of 3% implies a radical change of the existing situation little short of revolutionary. In launching a national program to achieve the target, consideration must be given to the conflicting ends of growth and equity, for it is important in the reasonably unified rural  - ii - society of Rwanda not to add to the pressures that potentially exist in a land-hungry nation by increasing income differentials. It may therefore be necessary to sacrifice some short-term growth to maintain this unity. Implementation of the program should also be fully integrated with the ex- isting social and administrative structures, even though to achieve this may make it necessary to ignore, for the time being, potential growth oppor- tunities that lie outside the structure. v. Attainment of this target would provide the foreign exchange to allow Rwanda to sustain a reasonable growth of import volume in the long run, and would increase government revenue to the extent that without unduly raising the tax burden on the rural sector, it would allow a substantial increase in the proportion of locally generated resources to finance the agricultural development program. Since investment in the agricultural sector at present offers the greatest opportunity for increasing GDP, agriculture and the rural sector should receive a larger allocation of resources. vi. The Government's rural development policy is based on devolution of the planning and implementation to the communes, the smallest administra- tive unit, the people of which are now to be largely responsible for their own development. In Rwanda's relatively uniform rural society, this policy is probably well suited to mobilizing local resources, but the central gov- ernment should not allow leadership to be overridden by populism and for local level initiatives to usurp resources that should be devoted to the national priority of increasing production. However, the framework of com- munal development proposed by government sets a suitable stage for the intro- duction of improved extension services using the elected leaders of groups of farmers to receive training in the communal training centre from trained extension staff, who would also provide field extension support, and the stimulating of a community spirit makes the possibility of cooperatives as appropriate channels for credit, marketing and input supply become real. Credit organizations, too, of this nature, such as the people's banks (credit unions) managed by the people of the communes themselves, are much more likely to be effective in such a climate than cumbersome bureaucratic central credit agencies. vii. The Government views land reform as a possible method of easing the land constraints, and two government commissions are considering the problem. A formal recognition of customary tenure rights would give security of tenure to farmers, and there is scope to prevent under-used land being tied-up in fallow and some very small farms could profitably be consolidated to make them viable units, but some of the measures apparently being consid- ered go well beyond that and even envisage compulsory re-grouping of farms to allow rationalization of cultural methods. Experience in other countries has shown this to be dangerously disruptive of agricultural production as well as having long term adverse effects on soil fertility, and hasty solu- tions should be avoided.  - iii - viii. In conclusion, to secure the survival of Rwanda's people by the attainment of a 3% annual increase in production, Rwanda needs to invest especially in those agricultural projects that will improve soil fertility, that will provide training for meeting future manpower needs and that will fit into the existing administrative structures to allow participation of the people at the communal level. Agricultural projects should be produc- tion oriented, and different aid donors could finance different elements of the same integrated project, such as research, training, seed multipli- cation, etc. Three possible projects can be identified: implementation of the first phase of the agricultural development program of the government's Communal Action Plan, the Byumba rural development project that has already been prepared by the Ministry of Planning and which conforms to the same priorities, and a rural re-forestation project to meet Rwanda's urgent needs for fuel and building wood.   RWANDA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REVIEW I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 Rwanda features in the 1976 World Bank atlas as one of the five poorest countries in the world. It is the most densely populated country in Africa as well as being one of the smallest; it is landlocked and isolated, and has virtually no mineral resources. These characteristics give it the problems that make Rwanda's development a special challenge: its high rate of population growth and lack of further land resources make an intensifica- tion of its production a first priority; its lack of skilled manpower makes a continued reliance on foreign expertise necessary and its lack of financial resources have made it largely dependent on external aid for its capital re- quirements. In the framework of these constraints, therefore, this report examines the needs for agricultural development and the possibilities for increasing agricultural production and improving rural living conditions. 1.02 The Ministry of Agriculture recently drew up a development plan for the agricultural sector, which covered the 1976/81 period, and which indicated production targets for the major crops as well as outlining the method by which these targets were to be achieved. While the need to plan for a finite horizon is clear and the exercise itself fundamental, it is also useful to review the role of the agricultural sector in the longer term to examine prospects for meeting the nation's food and foreign exchange needs and to provide a remunerative and attractive livelihood for farmers. For these purposes a substantially longer time horizon is essential, par- ticularly when, as in Rwanda's case, a rapid growth of the population is anticipated. This analysis examines the demand on the agricultural sectors in terms of the country's present and future needs over a twenty-five year period, analyzes the implications for yields, land use, farmers' incomes, public finances and foreign exchange earnings, as well as the prospects for financing agricultural development. A twenty-five year period was chosen following the projections of the study by the Ministry of Planning on Avail- ability and Use of Lands (November 1973): ("Disponibilite et Utilisation des Terres au Rwanda: Situation Actuelle et Perspectives"), which set the year 2001 as the terminal date for its own projections. 1.03 After an analysis of the role of agriculture in the country's economy and a review of some of the constraints on agricultural development, the report examines the options for a development strategy, the consequences of adopting a particular strategy, and the means of implementing it. A de- scription of the agrarian structures of Rwanda is given in Annex 1, and Annex 2 discusses agricultural extension services in the context of the Government's policy of decentralization. It is not possible in a report of this length to give a thorough discussion of all aspects of the agricul- tural sector and space limitations have inevitably meant that some topics have been lightly treated and some specific problems - such as livestock and forestry - are hardly discussed at all. For a more complete picture of the  Rwandese economy, reference should be made to the Memorandum on the Economy of Rwanda, IBRD report number 1108-RW of July 27, 1976. 1.04 The present report is based on the findings of two missions to Rwanda: one in February/March 1976 by Messrs. Le Breton (IBRD) and Lesire (FAO/CP) and the other in May/June 1976 by Messrs. Le Breton (IBRD), Lesire (FAO/CP), Prefol and Gentil (consultants). The economic analysis was con- tributed by Mr. Key (IBRD). The missions collaborated closely with Rwandese Government officials, particularly those of the Ministry of Agriculture whose representative, Mr. Theophile Fundi, accompanied the second mission on most of its visits, and the Ministry of Planning. A draft of the report was dis- cussed with the Government in May 1977 and the conclusions of the report were substantially agreed upon. The mission used the draft documents of the five year development plan as a basis for reviewing Government's strategy and targets. As in any government, opinions among government officials are divided about the course to be followed for agricultural development in Rwanda, and responsibility for the statements made rests with IBRD. 1.05 In common with many other countries, Rwanda's statistical infor- mation is often incomplete or inaccurate, so best estimates have sometimes to be used in preference to official figures. This lack of statistics makes generalized assumptions about Rwandese agriculture particularly hazardous as there has been no agricultural census since a 1964 study by the BPDA (Bureau pour le Developpement de la Production Agricole, a French consult- ing group). Enough is already known about agricultural techniques to allow agricultural development to make immediate progress, but much is less known about socio-economic factors such as land distribution, labour use, etc. than is necessary for proper development planning. It is therefore to be hoped that the resources for an agricultural census will be available in the not too distant future. II. THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE A. Agriculture in the Economy, and its Constraints 2.01 Since agriculture has a crucial role to play in the Rwandese economy Rwanda is fortunate in having certain advantages that favour it. The climate allows two growing seasons a year and the country's varied topography offers a wide range of crop alternatives according to temperature and altitudes. Though much degraded by erosion, its soils are fertile in comparison with those of most equatorial African countries. 2.02 In 1970 - the last year for which national accounts were prepared in a systematic way - agriculture represented 55.6 percent of GDP directly, and of this 94.6 percent represented value added in farming traditional subsistence crops, while the remainder of value added in agriculture was derived from the production of cash crops, most of which are exported. Coffee was the principal one of these crops. Food processing on the farm  - 3 - accounted for a further 10.2 percent of GDP. Since 1970, only broad esti- mates of GDP have been prepared, and these use a different basis for calcu- lation. They indicate that the role of agriculture in the overall economy had diminished slightly by 1974 but was still preponderant. The role of cash and export crops had increased somewhat, largely reflecting improved prices for coffee at the farm gate, and a diversification of production to include a greater volume of tea, cinchona, and pyrethrum. The growth of agricultural production was 6.9 percent annually from 1969 to 1974, valued at current prices. No deflator is available for the agricultural sector, but if the value added in agriculture is deflated by the overall GDP deflator, the real growth of agricultural production was only 1.5 percent annually. 2.03 Agricultural products contributed 77% of commodity exports by value in 1974; coffee alone produced 60% of all exports and tea, pyrethrum, and livestock products accounted for a further 15%. Movements in export earnings have been irregular since 1970 which can be explained by the limited number of exported products. Insofar as producer prices for coffee are linked to export prices, a decline in the export price such as that experienced in late 1974/ early 1975 reduces the supply for export causing a wider fall in export earnings; furthermore coffee production is in any case inclined to fluctuate according to climatic conditions. Increasingly unfavorable terms of trade have meant that Rwanda's deficit on current account has been widening since 1970 (with the exception of 1973 when there was a small surplus) to average about 4% of GDP over that period. 2.04 Despite the adverse balance of trade, Rwanda has been able to increase its foreign exchange reserves since 1972 by capital inflows in the form of external assistance from bilateral or multilateral agencies. Dis- bursements of external assistance,almost entirely on grant terms, rose from an estimated US$22.0 million in 1970 to US$45.7 million in 1974. External assistance now finances about 50% of public expenditure, including almost all capital expenditure as well as a substantial proportion of current expendi- ture: it is not possible to quantify the precise proportion of each type of expenditure since such aid contributions are not channelled through Govern- ment's ordinary budget and often take the form of technical assistance paid directly by the donor agency. The agricultural sector receives about one third of the technical assistance and about 20% of all foreign aid. 2.05 The agricultural sector has been an important contributor to Gov- errment finances in recent years, when the taxes paid by the rural population (directly or indirectly) consistently exceeded expenditure on agriculture. The table below illustrates that in 1974 the tax contribution of rural areas amounted to RF 1,643 million (US$17 million), equivalent to about 8.2 percent of rural incomes. On the other hand Government expenditure on agriculture, including funds from foreign aid sources, was RF 1,004 million (US$11 million), of which an estimated RF 800 million represented project expenditure financed directly by external assistance. Only RF 204 million of Government's own funds were spent on agriculture. Given that the capital-output ratio for agricultural projects is significantly below that of projects in other sectors, greater investment in agriculture would have achieved a more sub- stantial impact in GDP.  - 4 - Table 1: AGRICULTURE'S SHARE OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE (1974) Amount As % of As % of Total As % of million RF Total Revenue Public Expenditure Government Budget Rural Taxes 1,643 44.6 19.3 38.3 Cattle Tax 86 2.3 1.0 2.0 Head Tax 249 6.8 2.9 5.8 Coffee Export Tax 484 13.1 5.7 11.3 75% of Consump- tion Taxes 290 7.9 3.4 6.8 50% of Import Duties 534 14.5 6.3 12.5 Expenditure on Agriculture 1,004 27.2 11.8 23.4 Ordinary Budget 153 4.1 1.8 3.6 Extra Budgetary Accounts 22 0.6 0.3 0.5 Development Budget 29 0.8 0.4 0.7 Project Expenditure /1 800 21.7 9.4 18.6 /1 Financed directly by external assistance. Disbursements of external assistance are not included in revenue, but are considered as a financ- ing item. 2.06 As regards Government's recurrent budget, current revenue covers about 85% of Government ordinary budget expenditure, the remainder being financed by Central Bank advances and subscription to Government bonds. Expenditure on personnel is the largest and increasing proportion of the budget and the ministries with the largest staffs - education, health, defense - receive the largest shares. Despite agriculture's major contri- bution to GDP, the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture for 1975 only amounted to 4% of the total Government ordinary budget. Of the Ministry's allocation, 74% was for staff salaries, 16% for materials (including anti- erosion planting materials) and 10% for travel allowances, maintenance of vehicles and office expenditure. The budget allocation of the Ministry of  Justice, for comparison, was 5% of the total and that of the Ministry of Defense 21%; Education and Health were allocated 27.5% and 9% respectively. The development budget, which consists mainly of counterpart contributions to externally financed projects, amounts to about 5.7% of total budgetary expenditures in 1975, and agriculture received 4.4% of this compared with 9.0% on housing, 12.3% on roads and 28.8% on administrative buildings. 2.07 There is only a small urban population, estimated at little over 4% of the population, though the rate of increase of 6.3% per annum is much higher than the overall population growth rate of 2.8% p.a. Scanty data exist on income levels, but estimates show the absolute poverty level for the rural population to be $65 per capita per annum in 1975 and $120 per capita per annum for the urban population. About 60% of the rural popula- tion and 30% of the urban population are below these levels. Although farm sizes range between 0.3 ha and 7.0 ha, a wide range in relative terms, income distribution is still fairly even, differing probably by a factor of three to five between the tenth and ninety-fifth percentile groups, compared with about 10 in many other African countries. Commentators on Rwanda often note the homogeneity of the population, a remark which is frequently taken to mean a linguistic and ethnic homogeneity which is less true than the homogeneity of the living standards of the people, since ethnic differences, though less numerous than elsewhere in East Africa, are still significant. 2.08 About 5 percent of the economically active population was estimated to be in wage-earning employment in 1970 and new employment opportunities over the period 1970-1976 were estimated by the Ministry of Planning at 43,000, whereas over the same period 258,000 new job seekers were expected to enter the market. With population growth outstripping the growth rate in employment opportunities, there is no shortage of agricultural labour except perhaps at sowing and harvesting times, and indeed many farmers are already acutely aware of the unemployment problem facing their children, particularly those on the paysannat 1/ schemes who may not subdivide their holdings among their heirs. 2.09 However, the ready availability of labor does not mean that Rwanda has no manpower constraints: on the contrary, since no more than a quarter of the population is literate, and only 2 percent have received a secondary education, there is an acute shortage of skilled manpower in Rwanda that has a severe effect on the country's ability to absorb investment, as planning mechanisms and project implementation capacity are limited. In most Minis- tries a few highly capable people have not only to conduct the orchestra but to play the parts as well for lack of capable staff below them, which 1/ Paysannats are organized settlement schemes on which the tenants hold plots of 1.5-2.0 ha, including a cash crop, by lease from the state. Failure to observe the terms of the lease may result in expulsion. Extension services, social services, water supply, roads, etc. are usually much denser than elsewhere.  detracts from the overall quality of the performance. The quality of agricul- tural extension services, too, suffer as much from a lack of trained staff as from the financial constraints that deprive it of the means to implement its role. Foreign aid makes an important contribution towards satisfying the need for trained agricultural staff and future needs for the higher level staff will continue to be met partly by foreign personnel and partly by Rwandese trained abroad. It is at the middle and, even more urgently, lower levels, that the needs are greatest if any nation-wide progress towards development is to be reinforced at all levels of society by leadership and technical ex-- pertise. Present Government policy has concentrated on the training of higher level technical staff for which the existing facilities, including foreign bursaries, are sufficient, whereas the need for re-training of the 1,000 extension agents has been somewhat overlooked. The Ministry of Agriculture's own projected needs for extension staff by 1981 cannot be met unless the effort is made to provide facilities for training staff at this level. An assessment of the needs and existing facilities is given in Annex 5. 2.10 The deficiencies of planning mechanisms suffer also from a lack of organization and coordination as much as from the lack of trained staff, with the result that the manpower resources that are available are not used to the best advantage. The Ministry of Planning, responsible for national policy, is not well organized so that the separate departments within it that deal with plan preparation and plan implementation tend to work independently, resulting in duplication. Furthermore, the Ministry of Planning has been hampered by the lack of coordination with the technical ministries at critical stages of the planning procedure. While this state of affairs has undoubtedly improved in recent months, there is still a certain suspicion of the Ministry of Planning on the part of the technical ministries as they are not convinced of the usefulness of the Ministry's role - possibly because its importance has not been reinforced by the authority it needs to assure its function. Within the Ministry of Agriculture, there is no unit with specific responsibility for planning, but planning is done by the chief adviser to the Minister, and the technical studies are carried out by the studies unit (Bureau d'Etudes) within the Department of Agricultural Economics. This unit prepares the technical documents for the individual projects of the Ministry. On the sectoral front, agricultural planning is done by the Ministry of Planning with the help of a UNDP team, but the relationship between the two ministries is not close and cooperation is weak. If a planning unit is to be created within the Ministry of Agriculture it will not be as effective as it ought to be unless a good working relationship is established between the two ministries. B. Population and Land 2.11 Foremost of all Rwanda's problems is that posed by its rapidly growing population and limited land resources. The population growth rate  has exceeded that of agricultural production, and is estimated to have aver- aged 3.2 percent annually over the last 20 years when immigration is included. If the small amount of immigration is excluded, the natural growth rate was around 2.8 percent. The rapid growth of the population is moreover likely to continue in future because birthrates are generally high and the average age is very low. In 1970, some 58 percent of the female population were under age 20 and a further 26 percent were of normal childbearing age (between 20 and 40), suggesting high birthrates in future, while the relatively healthy climate and natural conditions of the country, combined with a fairly well- developed and dense medical network, have reduced mortality rates and extended life expectancy. In 1970, life expectancy at birth was 46 years compared with only 39 in 1949. 2.12 Faced with the prospect of its population doubling by the end of the century and doubling again by 2030, Rwanda has little choice but to adopt some policy to limit population growth. Many Government officials prefer to talk about "political" solutions rather than "technical" solutions, but, in recent years the possibilities for Rwandese to emigrate have diminished rather than increased as neighboring countries have faced strong social and economic pressures to meet the needs of their own populations before opening their doors to Rwandese immigrants. The Government has recognized the existence of the problem, if not its urgency, and has set up two commissions to examine various aspects of it which may eventually result in the emergence of a popu- lation policy. Even a vigorous population policy could not hope to achieve great results in the short run, and by the end of the century it would be more than satisfactory to hold the population size to 10 percent below its presently projected level of 8.2 million. The benefits would accrue in the even longer term, when it might be possible to stabilize the population at around 10 million instead of the 16-17 million population that would result from lack of a policy. 2.13 As a result of past high population growth, Rwanda is today the most densely populated country in Africa.  - 8 - Table 2: COMPARATIVE POPULATION DENSITIES, 1970 Country Population per square km Rwanda 140 Burundi 130 Uganda 43 Malawi 39 Kenya 20 Tanzania 14 Zaire 8 Africa 11 Source: Trends in Developing Countries, World Bank, 1973. With a total area of 25,595 square kilometers, 1/ there were on average 171 inhabitants per square kilometer in 1976, and 350 per square kilometer of arable land, including pasture land. If pasture is excluded, there were 488 inhabitants per square kilometer. The high average density is exacerbated by regional differences in density ranging from 372 per square kilometer of land in Ruhengeri prefecture to 109 in Kibungo. The more densely populated areas tend to be those at medium altitude (1,500-1,900 meters) where cultivation conditions are most favorable. 2.14 The implications of the high population density together with a rapid population growth rate are alarming. The gradual increase in popula-- tion density has been accompanied by diminishing average farm size despite additional planting of food crops and occupation of new land. As a result, the average farm size is today barely one hectare (40% lower than the esti-- mate of 1953); almost all the good land has now been occupied and only tracts of marginal land are still uncultivated. 2.15 Figures showing the declining farm size reveal the distribution pattern of land holdings. Ihe study of the Byumba prefecture, carried out by consultants for the Ministry of Planning in 1974 and to date the only comprehensive agricultural survey conducted in Rwanda, showed that the dis- tribution is not a normal one with the largest number of farms grouped about the mode of one hectare, but bimodal, with a large group of farms below one hectare and a smaller group of farms above one hectare. If the assumption is made (it should be verified by studies) that a bimodal distribution of the type found at Byumba exists in the territory as a whole, the statistical average farm size of 1 ha therefore probably means that: 1/ Using the figure calculated in the Ministry of Planning study on Avail- ability of Land, which is probably more accurate than the official figure of 26,338 sq. km.  - 9 - one third of the farms have more than 1 ha; one third of the farms have between 0.5 and 1 ha (between the average and half of the average); one third of the farms have less than 0.5 ha (less than half of the average). It could also be expected that the spread between the farms is equally wide in such respects as the employment of wage-earners, the percentage of pro- duction marketed, the extent of food and monetary surpluses, attitudes to indebtedness, social prestige, etc. 2.16 Increasing pressure on land must inevitably lead to the point where no more land is available for cultivation. According to the study on the Availability and Use of Land by the Ministry of Planning in 1973, all usable land will be under cultivation by around 1990. The land avail- able for each family is rapidly decreasing and in some cases it is already impossible to settle the younger generation on the land. Some parents have already been obliged to persuade their sons to look for work in the towns, a largely ineffectual search that encourages juvenile delinquency. 2.17 At the same time, pasture land and land with limited agricultural potential (particularly land with steep slopes) is being progressively brought into cultivation. Under the present system of free-range grazing as opposed to stall feeding, livestock production will continue to fall. The number of head of cattle has already begun to drop. In face of the pressure on the land, periods of fallow are being shortened or disappearing. The agronomic impact of such short periods of fallow (one or two years) is adverse; the land reverts to couch grass, requiring a major effort to eradicate it before the land can be returned to cultivation. The use of steep slopes for culti- vation, the shortening of fallow periods, the deterioration in erosion con- trol (often associated by the farmers with the coerciv-e methods of coloniza- tion) and depletion of organic matter all lead to the exhaustion of the soil. In some regions there has been a very marked drop in yields. 2.18 Social distinctions are progressively increasing. Land is being consolidated in the interest of the wealthier farmers. The emergence of a social group of wealthy farmers encourages the intrusion of commercial rela- tionships to the detriment of the traditional social framework. Land (or, more precisely, the right to use land) more and more frequently changes hands for pecuniary considerations. The agricultural proletariat is expand- ing to the advantage of the well-to-do farmers and traditional forms of work- ing cooperation play a decreasingly significant role. It is already possible to see, in Ruhengeri on the pyrethrum paysannat, the larger land owners who were the first to plant pyrethrum increasing their incomes to the extent that they can then afford to buy up small farms and employ the owners on their  - 10 - farms. The growth of marketing ("urban" demand, regional imbalances) re- stricts the scope for solidarity at the level of the colline: 1/ reciprocal exchanges between neighboring farmers and lineage solidarity have already been compromised by settlements that have become increasingly remote and scattered. The cohesiveness of Rwandese rural society, a major national asset on which Government's policy of cooperation and communal development is based, is threatened and, as population pressure on the land increases, the seeds for future strife are sown. C. Agricultural Production 2.19 In 1966, the Ministry of Agriculture estimated that about 603,000 hectares of traditional food crops were harvested (including about 230,000 hectares which were double cropped), whereas by 1974, the area harvested was 797,000 hectares, of which about 294,000 hectares double cropped. This is equivalent to an annual extension of plantings by 3.5 percent, slightly more than the population growth rate and considerably more than the growth rate of production. 2.20 As well as highlighting the growing pressure on land, the growth rates of population and area cultivated, and the reduction of fallow periods suggest dwindling average yields for food crops, though lack of reliable data has not allowed this to be statistically proved. As land is no longer freely available for settlement, production levels will depend principally on yields. 2.21 Nutritional standards in Rwanda are below internationally estab- lished norms, and more so given the rigorous life and work style of the typical farmer. Moreover the possibility of famine is always present, espe- cially in recent years when the pressure on land has been increasing. There are already periodic and localized shortfalls in food supplies in many places in the country. Table 3 below indicates that the population as a whole re- ceives perhaps 70 to 80 percent of the minimum daily requirements of calo- ries recommended by FAO, though protein deficiency is believed to be less pronounced. 2.22 The statistics for caloric intake (Table 3 below) may suffer from some inaccuracies for several reasons. The 1973-75 production figures on which the caloric intake is based may be somewhat lower than for a typical three year period because of drought conditions that prevailed in 1974, nor is any adjustment made for imported food, though very little of this is consumed by the population at large. There is nonetheless a clear and 1/ Administrative divisions in Rwanda (described more fully in Annex 7) are the prefecture, subdivided into communes, in turn subdivided into sectors, which group collines, the smallest unit comprising about 50 families. For want of an exact translation this original terminology is used, and the word "commune" and "communal" when used in this report refers to these administrative units.  - 11 - disturbing trend apparent in the figures, namely that nutritional standards are not only low but are deteriorating. This confirms the need for an increased food supply, whether produced locally or imported, and makes the projected food balance one of the most critical indicators of economic well-being in the future. Table 3: AVERAGE DAILY CALORY INTAKE Average 1959 1969 1973-75 Vegetable Products 2,194 2,108 1,850 Animal Products 90 76 76 /1 Total 2,284 2,184 1,926 Requirements: Moderately active man 3,000 3,000 3,000 Moderately active woman 2,200 2,200 2,200 /1 Assumed unchanged since 1969, as production figures are not available. Source: FAO, Rapport de Mission au Rwanda 1971, and mission estimates. D. The Demands on the Agriculture Sector 2.23 Rwanda's most urgent priority is to ensure an adequate food supply for its population, within the constraints of the increasing man-land ratio. As President Habyarimana has remarked, "the objective of producing more is less a political option than a question of survival for our people." Even if it could finance - either from its own resources or from foreign aid - food imports to close the growing gap between its domestic production and its needs, Rwanda's poor access to international transport routes would make dependence on imports very risky as the recent disruption of fuel supplies has shown, quite apart.from ensuing problems of distribution within the country. If present production levels are maintained (i.e. if there is no increase in production but the current decline is halted) domestic produc- tion would only meet 40 to 45 percent of food needs in 2001 (measured in the common denominator of calories) and in terms of volume would require well over one million tons of food imports a year, a ten-fold increase in the present volume of imports. 2.24 To set long-term agricultural production targets, projections of food requirements over a 25 year horizon have been prepared using the methodology of the draft 5 year plan in determining targets for 1981. The population growth rate has been assumed to be 2.6 percent per annum (assuming a slowing in the historic rate in the longer term), giving a  - 12 - projected population of 8,180,000 by 2001, and the calorific intake aimed for is 2,450. The resulting food production targets are shown in Table 4. Table 4: PRODUCTION TARGETS FOR SELECTED CROPS (in thousands of metric tons) Average 1973-75 1976 1981 2001 Bananas 1,717 1,810 2,000 2,340 Beans 133 240 278 464 Peas 55 75 87 145 Sorghum 136 180 209 349 Maize 62 79 91 152 Sweet Potatoes 571 810 940 1,570 Potatoes 133 140 200 334 Cassava 372 360 460 768 2.25 Even without the need for importing food, Rwanda must depend on agriculture to a great extent to provide its foreign exchange needs, as the potential for expansion of other sectors such as tourism, industry and mining is limited and the possibility that they could supplant agriculture's contri- bution to foreign exchange earnings is remote. If the growth rate of total GDP were to be maintained at 5 percent annually in the longer term, it is possible that the import volume might have to increase by as much as 8 per- cent annually. It is not possible to calculate Rwanda's needs for foreign exchange as far ahead as 2001 but projections point to a widening deficit of its resource balance from the current level of RF 2.6 billion (US$28 million) to about RF 3.8 billion (US$41 million) by 1980. Since Rwanda depends on imports for almost all its manufactured goods at present and cannot be expected to substitute domestic production for more than a small proportion of its imports of consumer goods, future growth of imports will continue to depend on export earnings even if the political risks of depend- ence on foreign aid for capital are acceptable. While the country will not be able to become self-sufficient in foreign exchange for a long time ahead, it is desirable that Government long-term policies should have in view a greater contribution than is now the case. 2.26 Until the manufacturing and other sectors have developed more fully - in part this would depend on the performance of the agricultural sector - the sources of Government revenue will remain rather limited. Import duties and excise taxes on consumer goods naturally offer some potential, but direct taxes such as income tax and the head and cattle taxes can be expected to grow only moderately. In these circumstances, the most readily taxable item will remain exported crops, and although the level of taxes might have to be adjusted on occasion to maintain farmers' incen- tives, agricultural exports clearly offer the best potential in the imme- diate future for enlarging the tax base. 2.27 It is to the agricultural sector, too, that Rwanda must look to meet its employment needs for the future since, as has been seen above, even an optimistic estimate of the employment opportunities created in the  - 13 - non-agricultural sector could not absorb more than 20-25% of the economically active population. This presupposes that the possibilities exist to inten- sify labor requirements on farms by increasing production: such possibil- ities do exist for the larger farms (over I ha) on which stall-fed cattle could be introduced, but there is a limit to the amount of labor that a farm can absorb which is reached more quickly as farm size declines; while a farm of 0.5 ha may be able to provide sufficient employment for an average sized family of 4.46 persons, the cultural methods at present advocated can only provide full employment for 2.0 persons on farms of 0.3 ha unless their production is devoted to a labor intensive crop such as tea or pyrethrum. E. Requirements for Agricultural Development 2.28 While it is clear that increasing agricultural production will be a major aim of a sectoral strategy, it must first be established that the technical base for such an increase exists, and if it does not exist, to find the means of providing it (see Annex 2, paras 4 and 5). The Rwanda Institute for Agronomic Sciences (Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Rwanda - ISAR) carries out research on foodcrops and the principal export crops and has produced proven improved selected varieties and improved cultural tech- niques, and these are disseminated by the Service des Semences Selectionees, a largely Belgian financed project that is likely to be considerably expanded in the near future. 2.29 Almost every research institute is criticized for failing to pro- vide the link between research and application, and in this respect ISAR is no exception. The reports of ISAR's researches are published in Technical Notes, and the conclusions in technical sheets which are sent to the Ministry of Agriculture to be distributed to extension workers. That this distribu- tion is not effectively carried out constitutes a serious break in the re- search-extension chain, but responsibility for this deficiency cannot be laid at ISAR's door. Rather, the shortcoming of ISAR is that the research is in itself not sufficiently directed to meeting the most urgent needs of Rwandese agriculture such as the development of farming systems for farms of less than 1 ha. There seems to be a need for a critical reassessment of the directives of agricultural research in Rwanda which could establish clearly what technical improvements can be introduced to the ordinary farm. 2.30 An imaginative research effort should be made to find technical answers to the problems of these small farms which constitute a majority in Rwanda. The defeatism of technicians and researchers in the face of these problems is somewhat disturbing. Too frequently one hears that "there is no solution for them." Special programs should be planned for the small farmers (beekeeping, peppers, small livestock, silkworms, fruit trees), marshlands set aside for them (particularly for vegetables and fish ponds) and their energies should be used for the vast communal tasks of reforestation of hill tops. To complement erosion control and the improvement of the soil by the in- corporation of organic matter, special emphasis should be laid on experiments  - 14 - with fertilizers at the farm level under ISAR supervision. The program pro- posed by FAO could be very valuable in this respect. The application of lime to improve degraded high altitude soils for wheat cultivation offers promising possibilities that have not yet been exploited. The use of chemical fertil- izers, and the introduction of leguminous green manures where the small size of the farm does not allow for long fallow periods, could be a major contribu- tion to improving productivity on its small farms. It also appears desirable to move gradually towards the regionalization of certain crops such as peas, potatoes, groundnuts, and soya beans, according to the ecological zone (high, medium or low altitudes). 2.31 In an effort to improve soil fertility and prevent erosion, research and extension efforts have recently been putting much emphasis on the "fermette" i.e. small mixed farm in which a stall-fed cow and calf are kept to provide manure to fertilize crops, and are fed on forage grown in part on anti-erosion terraces. This system, described in more detail in Annex 2, is beginning to be taken up by farmers on their own initiative as the benefits of application of manure to crops are more widely understood. While it provides a solution to the increasingly difficult problem of finding pasture for cattle, the system cannot be the panacea it is sometimes thought to be, since it is not practicable on farms of less than one hectare and requires additional capital and labor that may be beyond the means of many farmers. Nevertheless, it does provide a simple technology for expanding production on a significant number of farms, in fact precisely those farms that could give the greatest increase in productivity. 2.32 Since bananas play so important a part in the economy of the Rwandese farm and banana plantations cover so large a proportion of the cultivated land area, it would seem important to give more effort to increas- ing their productivity. Although bananas give the highest returns to farmers of almost any crop in Rwanda, yields are low and banana beer, the principal end use of the fruit, provides little nutrition. Increasing either yields or nutritional value would have far-reaching benefits. The resources of ISAR are too small to allow it to embark on a full-scale banana breeding program to select those capable of satisfying the discriminating tastes of local farmers, but more could be done to test and disseminate higher yielding varieties to supplement the Gros Michel variety presently produced at ISAR. 2.33 Once the technical base is established it remains to find the method to diffuse the technology. Extension methods are discussed in a later chapter of this report, but the implementation of any extension system depends amongst other things on the quality of the staff who will carry it out. Insufficient training facilities exist at present for lower level staff and the emphasis in those courses that do exist is not well adapted to the actual needs of the staff in terms of the kind of work that they will be doing. For intermediate and senior level staff, existing and planned facil- ities, including foreign bursaries, should be sufficient to meet the expected needs within five to ten years and foreign technical assistance can be ex- pected to meet the shortfall in the meantime.  - 15 - III. DIRECTIONS OF GROWTH 3.01 The need to assure a sufficient food supply and adequate revenue base for the future predicates some growth in agricultural production. The rate of growth and the sub-sectors within the sector (traditional crops and cash crops) where it is to be sought will depend on the availability of suit- able land for increased production, the technical base on which it is to be founded, the speed at which investment can be expected to pay off, and the relative priorities of economic growth and social equity. 3.02 The pattern of future land use depends critically on the increases in yields that can be attained for foodcrops. With the same yields as in 1973-75, the area devoted to food cultivation would clearly have to increase at the same rate as future production estimates, that is to say, at a slightly greater rate than that of the population, as an improvement in nutritional standards is built into the production projections. In estimating the future pattern of land use, it has been assumed that no further land can be made suitable for cultivation other than that which is available for use at pres- ent. Effective soil conservation measures, swamp reclamation, or extensive irrigation could conceivably increase land availability but cost limitations of such actions might prohibit making it practicable on a large scale. It is also assumed that the extent of double cropping will remain the same in future. 3.03 Since long term strategy based on food imports would be ruled out by Rwanda's geographical situation even if lack of foreign exchange was not a constraint, the amount of land needed to assure the food supply will deter- mine the area available for export crops. Subsistence farmers do look to cash crops to meet their cash needs to pay taxes, dowries, etc., and cash crops, usually perennials, are more reliable than annual crops and require less labour in the planting season, but, as Annex 6 demonstrates, under the present price structure, food crops give higher returns to the farmer on both land and labor, which reinforces his natural preference to meet his food needs before diverting his attention to cash crops. Farmers will not generally voluntarily transfer land from food to export crops, unless the food supply of the family is assured either on the remaining diminished area or from some reliable, reasonably priced outside source, and the export crop prices offer a good incentive. Hence an increase in yields is a prerequisite for allocating more land to export crops. 3.04 Agricultural yields determine the amount of land required to meet a given production target. The historical trend of yields is widely believed to be downward on balance, with some exceptions, notably beans. In a situa- tion of land scarcity and growing production demands, the future would be bleak if such a trend were to continue, and indeed some increase in yields is clearly necessary, if the available land is to prove adequate in the longer term. The following projections indicate patterns of land use for varying rates of change of yields for food crops.  - 16 - Table 5: ALTERNATIVE LAND USE PATTERNS (in thousands of hectares) Ave. 1973-75 1976 1981 2001 Total agricultural land 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 (i) Food crop yields decrease 1 percent annually: Food crops 504 700 876 1,178 /1 Settlement schemes 72 72 72 72 Other /2 674 478 302 (-) (ii) Food crops yields constant: Food crops 504 687 816 1,178 /1 Settlement schemes 72 72 72 72 Other /2 674 491 362 (-) (iii) Food crop yields increase 1 percent annually: Food crops 504 673 762 1,044 Settlement 72 72 72 72 Other /2 674 505 416 134 (iv) Food crops yields increase 2 percent annually: Food crops 504 660 711 798 Settlement schemes 72 72 72 72 Other /2 674 518 467 380 (v) Food crop yields increase 3 percent annually: Food crops 504 647 663 613 Settlement schemes 72 72 72 72 Other /2 674 531 515 565 (vi) Food crop yields increase 4 percent annually: Food crops 504 635 620 474 Settlement schemes 72 72 72 72 Other /2 674 543 558 704 /1 Land area is insufficient to meet production targets. /2 Includes fallow, pasture, presently uncultivated land and land under export crops. See Annex 8, Table 2. Source: Annex 8, Tables 1 and 9.  3.05 The implications of these calculations suggest that an increase in yields of at least 2 percent annually would be needed to meet the food production targets. A lesser growth of yields would imply turning over the whole agricultural land area to food crops, with no allowance for fallow or pasture, a situation which is clearly most undesirable and which would require far-reaching solutions going well beyond the realms of agriculture. Even with a 2 percent annual increase in yields the amount of fallow and pasture land would be severely curtailed, and it would be impossible to justify allocating any additional land to export crops. It therefore seems that a minimum target for agricultural yield increases should be 3 percent annually. This compares with stagnant or declining yields over the last decade and signals the difficulty facing Government. Even with the most dedicated action and policies, it is not certain that such an output tar- get can be reached given the many physical constraints, though there is no apparent alternative but to try. Moreover the difficulties are likely to persist into the next century even if the target for 2001 can be achieved. 3.06 It was noted earlier that a policy to limit population growth is overdue. If Government were to adopt a vigorous approach in this respect today, the long run task in agriculture would be less arduous though still forbidding. For example, the experience of other countries indicated that although no reduction in the population growth rate would be likely for at least the first ten years of an intensive family planning program because. reduced infant mortality would offset any fertility decline, in the longer run, a well-conceived program could reduce the population growth rate by one tenth of one percent annually. By the end of the century the population growth rate could therefore be slowed to a little over one percent annually, in which case the population in 2001 would be around 7.4 million instead of 8.2 million. Thereafter however the benefits would be much more substantial, as the population would perhaps increase only to 10 million by 2030 instead of the projected 16-17 million. The burden on agricultural land as well as the pressure to create massive amounts of alternative employment would there- fore be enormously reduced. 3.07 It was estimated that in 1974 about 6 percent of the land suitable for agriculture not under food crops - about 50,000 ha - was planted to export crops; 52 percent was under pasture, 26 percent was lying fallow and 15 percent was not under cultivation at all. On the assumption that food crop yields can be raised 3 percent annually, the amount of agricultural land not under food crops would have to decrease from 674 thousand hectares in 1973-75 to 515 thousand hectares in-1981 but would increase to 565 thousand hectares in 2001. While the precision of these figures is spurious, they suggest that about 100,000 hectares, now under food crops, could be released to export crops by the end of the century without prejudicing the food supply. On this basis the total area under export crops could be increased to around 150,000 hec- tares, equivalent to a growth in area of 5 percent annually. This might rea- sonably be coupled with a 3 percent increase in yields, in line with yields ,in other branches of agriculture to give an increase in production of 8 per- cent annually. It goes without saying that failure to reach a 3 percent growth of food crop yields would substantially hinder the expansion of export crops, while the achievement of a higher rate would increase the land avail- ability. As the present area under export crops is small, the sensitivity of projections of the available area in future years is relatively great.  - 18 - 3.08 The study on The Availability and Use of Land projects an urban (i.e. non-rural) population of 1,783,000 in 2001 out of a total populat:ion of 8,100,000 leaving a rural population of 6,317,000 persons or 1,416,000 families. If all the rural population is to be accommodated on the 1,250,000 hectares available for agriculture (including pasture and fallow land) aver- age farm size (including paysannats) will fall from the present 1.03 ha to 0.88 ha in 2001. There is, of course, the possibility that areas at present considered unsuitable for agriculture might be used for grazing, and marginal land might be improved, thus increasing the availability though it has already been stressed that this would be costly and the additional land thus gained might be only poor at best. Discounting this possibility and omitting the paysannats from the calculation (40,000 farm families), the "average" farm in 2001 would comprise 0.09 ha for housing, 0.11 ha of export crops, 0 23 ha of fallow or pasture, and 0.45 ha of food crops. This compares with the present estimated breakdown of 0.03 ha of export crops (coffee), 0.09 ha for housing, 0.24 ha for fallow and 0.67 ha of food crops out of the present "average" farm of 1.03 ha. In other words to maintain the present level of food production for home consumption without any increase in nutritional stan- dards while achieving a three-fold increase in the area devoted to cash crops (5% per annum over 25 years, see para 3.07 above) and 35% of crop land in fal- low to meet the desirable standards of crop rotation, food crop production must increase by at least 69% over 25 years. 3.09 The assumptions for 2001 also have important consequences for the future of animal husbandry in Rwanda. The land available for perimanenl: pas- ture in 2001 will only be 0.07 ha per farm, and even when fallow land is in- cluded, the total area for pasture will only be 0.23 ha per farm - only a quarter of the area per farm that was available in 1970 when there was still some uncultivated land that could be used for common grazing. If Rwanda's national herd is to survive at all it must be sustaLned by stall-feedi'tg anid not by free-range grazing, which makes it imperative to perfect and introduce the farming system of mixed crop and forage cultivation described in para. 2.31 as soon as possible. 3.10 To meet the target growth rate of 3% per annum of food crop produc- tion allowing an improvement in nutritional levels, production must increase by 110% over 25 years. For certain crops, yield increases of 100% are already possible using improved seeds and cultural techniques, which is an encouraging indicator that the 110% increase sought for is achievable, but it should not lead to any complacency: indeed, since yields have been declining or at best static for a number of years, a steady growth of 3% a year represents a radi- cal change little short of revolutionary. The teclhnology does not yet exist to bring about such yield increases in all food crops, nor do the institu- tional structures yet exist that are needed to diffuse this technology through- out the country, so very major efforts are needed in these fields to achieve the target. For export crops, only coffee at present has the immediate poten- tial for an increase in yields that could exceed 3% per annum initially but probably could not exceed 5%. Hlowever, even a 5% annual inicrease in coffee yields over 5 years would, in terms of export earnings, more than compensate for no yield increase in other export crops.  - 19 - 3.11 The launching of a national program to increase yields must inevi- tably take some time to get underway since it requires a build-up of staff, seed and input supplies, research programs, etc. to the level needed to sup- port the effort. The possibility might therefore be considered of putting the initial emphasis on an area where results can be achieved more quickly, in order to develop a firm resource base while longer term policies mature. In particular, it may seem to be a better use of resources to devote them to intensifying coffee production in the short term, which would compensate to some extent for the decline in prices than can be expected after 1980. This course of action could probably be justified if the yield increases expected from it were to be considerably higher than 5% per annum, but previ- ous IBRD calculations of probable yield increases do not support such an ex- pectation. It is likely to take at least 4-5 years before the intensifica- tion effort on either coffee or food crop production begins to show any results, and if the emphasis is initially to be put on coffee, it would delay implementation of the food crop intensification program since Rwanda does not have the resources - particularly manpower - to execute two special programs at the same time. The result would be to postpone the benefits of the food crop program by as much as ten years, a delay that the country cannot afford. It would therefore be preferable to include coffee (and other export crops) among the points of emphasis for the overall program, maintaining the pres- ent proportions of resource allocation between coffee and foodcrops, rather than to embark on a special coffee-oriented effort that would divert resources from the principal task of increasing yields of all crops. On the other hand the continuing importance of coffee requires that foodcrop development should not be carried out at the expense of coffee. 3.12 Even within the range of foodcrops, there are particular crops that might be singled out for intensive action, just as there are geographic areas that might be singled out for intensive development as strategic points from which development might spread outwards gradually, eventually to cover the whole country. The choice can be made therefore of whether development is to be extensive, in order to stimulate general growth throughout the country, or intensive, to concentrate the limited resources stimulating growth in those points that give the best response. 3.13 An intensive approach, whether crop specific or region specific, would by definition exclude a part of the population from its embrace. In a country where income distribution is so even, it must be questioned seriously whether it is desirable to promote social differences by benefit- ting one section of the population rather than another. Whenever the oppor- tunities for growth are offered there are some people who will accept them and some who will not and if an improvement in living standards in Rwanda is achieved, it will certainly be at some cost of evenness of income distri- bution, but to aggravate this deliberately might well introduce divisive forces into a society which has hitherto remained reasonably unified despite the pressures that a dense population and increasing man-land ratio usually entail. The balance has to be found between the conflicting ends of growth and equity. 3.14 As far as points of action selected geographically are concerned, the intensive approach, creating centers of development and hoping for an "oil-stain effect" to spread its development over surrounding areas, has not proved very effective in Rwanda. The expected demonstration effect has  - 20 - not materialized: the expectation that visiting farmers will see a develop- ment scheme and then be inspired to adopt its measures in their own milieu has not been met. One probable reason is that such projects are not inte- grated into the administrative structures of the country: very often the project has its own organization or its own special links with the local administration which make it a special case. Not only is its replicability limited since it depends on such special conditions being created, but it also tends to be viewed by others as unrelated to their environment and therefore a mere curiosity rather than an object lesson. A much greater chance of success exists if a development program covers a whole prefecture since it can then be fitted naturally into the whole administrative struc- ture (making it more easily adaptable as a national policy) and its points of interaction with the administration could be tested at all levels. Fur- thermore, there would be an economy of scale: intensive development cen- ters all require trained manpower for a complete structure, whereas an extensive scheme would need only a single structure to cover a whole pre- fecture. 3.15 The need to cover a whole prefecture at a time could probably mean that potential growth points outside the prefecture may have to wait their turn to be developed instead of being immediately exploited. It must be accepted that there will be a cost to such selectivity, and that if all growth points could be immediately developed regardless of whether they would fit into the prefecture structures or not, then a higher growth rate might be achieved. Given the importance of organizational structure in Rwanda, it would not be possible to sustain this higher growth rate without addressing the organization question. While short term gains may deliberately not be maximized, sustained growth based on sound infrastructures may, over the long term, show a higher return; IV. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS A. Growth and Agricultural Exports 4.01 In Rwanda's confined circumstances, where achievement of substan- tial yield increases is essential merely for survival, the potential for growth is necessarily limited. In fact, it is clear that a program that achieves only a continuing self-sufficiency in food will have no impact in raising living standards and real per capita incomes. Thus even the three percent target for increasing yields each year would leave Rwanda's rural population in the same real per capita income bracket in 25 years as at present. There is clearly, therefore, a need for some additional growth stimulus if the country is ever to escape from the closed circle of poverty. 4.02 Government is looking in part outside the agricultural sector for this stimulus. It has ambitious plans for both the industrial and tourism sectors, which it sees as a source of employment and money incomes for the population and of foreign exchange and fiscal revenue for itself. Nonethe- less, the small size of these two sectors circumscribes their potential  - 21 - impact and it is still on the pervasive agricultural sector that Government will have to rely for the foreseeable future. In this respect the role of export crops is critical. These at present provide about 10 percent of the national income, over half of the country's export earnings, and a varying but large portion of Government's revenue (15 percent in 1974 from coffee export duty alone). 4.03 The extent of export crop cultivation clearly depends on the avail- ability of suitable land. In the past years the emphasis of Government's programs have concentrated on crops other than coffee in an attempt to diver- sify exports. The major diversification crops are tea, cinchona, pyrethrum and cotton. Only two of these (plus coffee) have major world market potential as a long term basis for growth - cotton and tea, and cotton is only grown on a very small scale in Rwanda. The two other crops - cinchona and pyrethrum - have proven themselves profitable to grow and have attracted farmers readily. Unfortunately their world markets are small, and any continuing attempt by Rwanda to expand production would relatively soon depress prices as well as risk the possibility that not all the output could be sold. This is not to say that a moderate expansion program would not be beneficial, but to point out the impossibility of basing a long run development strategy on either. 4.04 Although the agricultural development strategy under discussion indicates a need for export crop production to increase much more rapidly than food crops in the longer term, the amount of investment that this strat- egy requires for export crops in the immediate future is relatively modest, perhaps between 10 and 20 percent of agricultural investment in the initial years. The share allocated to export crops would naturally increase as these come to occupy a more prominent place in the economy of the country, even- tually reaching as much as 40 percent of total agricultural investment. Most importantly, however, these figures indicate that the greater share of agricultural investment, both now and in the longer term, needs to be channelled into food production if the nation's targets are to be achieved. 4.05 The assumption that the production of export crops would grow at 8 percent annually would imply a growth of just over 4 percent for the entire agricultural sector at constant- 1975 prices (the prices of this year were chosen as they are the most recent ones available and also reflect several major adjustments since 1974). The value of production would be as follows: Table 6: PROJECTED VALUE OF OUTPUT AT CONSTANT 1975 PRODUCER PRICES (in millions of Rwandese francs) Average 1973-75 1976 1981 2001 Food crops 20,950 23,740 30,760 51,380 Animal products 2,300 2,300 5,590 9,340 Export crops 1,560 1,740 2,560 11,790 Total 24,810 27,780 38,910 72,510  - 22 - 4.06 A growth rate of this magnitude would represent a substantial long term achievement, particularly if the main thrust of the growth strategy rests on smallholder farmers. In fact, Rwanda's growth rate for agricul- tural production would equal the best achieved by the smallholder population of any other African nation. It would raise the value of production about three times by the end of the century, and would raise per capita incomes from farming by around 45 percent on average by the end of the century. Of course, other activities may succeed in contributing to further increases in per capita income, such as the expansion of industry or the service trades. 4.07 Estimates of the impact of an 8 percent growth of production on exports have been made using the IBRD long term commodity forecasts for coffee and tea. These projections assume that the world market is in an equilibrium position, emerging in the later years from short-term fluctua- tions. The forecast prices are as follows: Table 7: INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICE PROJECTION (in terms of constant 1975 dollars) Coffee Tea Coffee Tea (cents per lb) (RwF per kg) 1974 74.8 71.9 153.0 147.1 1975 65.3 62.8 133.7 128.6 1976 141.1 68.7 288.7 140.5 1977 256.6 100.6 525.0 205.8 1978 173.9 89.1 355.7 182.2 1979 136.5 78.1 279.2 159.7 1980-84 114.3 72.3 233.8 147.9 1985 and beyond 75.2 70.0 153.8 143.2 4.08 When coffee prices stabilize in 1985 around their 1974 level, Rwanda, if it achieves the 8% p.a. target growth rate, will have increased its share of the world market by 50%, though its share would still be less than 1% of the total. It Ls recognized that thereafter there might be re- strictions placed on the growth of tea and coffee exports, in which case export earnings from those commodities will stabilize at the 1985 level and Rwanda will need to diversify her production with other export crops of equivalent value. On the basis of an 8% annual increase in export vol- ume, the following projection of exports is made in terms of constant 1975 prices.  - 23 - Table 8: EXPORT PROJECTIONS FOR COFFEE AND TEA 1973-75 1976 1981 1985 2001 Volume (in thousand tonnes) Coffee 20.8 24.2 35.6 48.4 166.1 Tea 3.4 4.0 5.8 8.0 27.1 Value /a (in millions of Rwandese francs at 1975 constant prices) Coffee 2,810 6,503 7,611 6,476 22,224 Tea 330 418 649 895 3,032 Total 3,140 6.921 8,260 7,371 25,256 /a The price projections in Table 7 refer to specific grades of each com- modity sold in international markets, and hence an adjustment has been made in Table 8 to convert these international prices to the equivalent grade Rwanda sells and to an f.o.b. Rwanda basis. 4.09 The projections indicate a rapid real growth of export earnings from agriculture in 1976 but practically no further increase by 1985. This reflects the fluctuating real value of coffee in the world market, as present prices have been inflated due to the 1975 frost in Brazil. As the market recovers its equilibrium, the world market price of coffee is expected to return to a long-term value around that pertaining in 1974. There are therefore expected to be only relatively minor changes in the terms of trade for Rwanda's agricultural products in the longer term, and hence growth of export earnings will be determined almost entirely by the levels of produc- tion achieved. The possible growth rate of agricultural exports would be adequate to sustain a reasonable growth of import volume in the longer run. B. Finance for Agricultural Development 4.10 Most agricultural investments and expenditure on agricultural services have been financed jointly by Government and external agencies in Rwanda. There is very little private investment, apart from quite substantial contributions of non-governmental organizations in kind, and farmers' contributions in the form of family labor. There are very few private farmers in a position to make monetary investments, while corporate investments related to agriculture have been insignificant. A few small investments have been made by religious and other private groups, usually financed from the exterior. Thus to all intents and purposes, agricultural capital investment is synonymous with public investment in agriculture. Consequently the main focus of this section is on public finances.  - 24 - 4.11 In the past the ability of Government to contribute financially to its agricultural development programs has been very limited. The overall Government budget is constrained, and the share of agriculture has been relatively small as has been shown in Table 1, p. 4. It is difficult even to know what the amount of actual expenditure on agricultural projects has been in past years, as external assistance does not pass through any Governl- ment budget and hence is not accurately recorded within Rwanda; in fact, to obtain even a general idea of expenditure on agriculture it is necessary to consult with the agencies directly. As a first step towards improving the allocation of external assistance, Government should as a matter of course channel all aid contributions through its Development account. 4.12 The bulk of expenditure has been for specific projects, which may include elements of recurrent and capital expenditure. Government's own project expenditure has been limited to counterpart contributions to externally-financed projects, while its recurrent budget has been small. I]n part this reflects the fact that many items normally considered recurrent costs - notably some extension services - are included in project costs financed by the donor agency, which in turn makes it difficult for Government to provide for recurrent project costs after the external financing has ended. Overall Government's contribution has been between 20 and 25 percent of the total spent on agriculture. In order to increase its impact on the way in which project expenditure is allocated and in which projects are designed, Government would need to increase its contribution to total expenditure. An increase in Government's contribution would also free it from some of the delays involved when external financing is required. 4.13 The volume of public expenditure 1/ that is required to support an increase in food crop production in time with the growth of the population, and an 8 percent annual increase in the production of export crops cannot be quantified with precision without the benefit of a well-costed list of proj- ects. Figures can at best indicate an order of magnitude. As an approxima- tion, investment needs have been calculated on the basis of an incremental capital output ratio for agriculture of around 2.5. This figure is somewhat arbitrary, but corresponds reasonably well with the figures obtaining in other countries at comparable stages of development, as well as with Rwanda's own past experience. The total expenditure required over the next 25 years would thus be around RF 120 billion (US$1.3 billion), an average of RF 4.8 billion (US$51.7 million) annually, as compared to RF 1.3 billion (US$13.9 million) in 1975. The total level of expenditure would be reached if annual expenditure on agriculture were to grow by around 10 percent annually in real terms, to reach 20% of public expenditure by 2001. By the year 1981, ex- penditure would be around RF 2.2 billion on this basis, and around RF 12.0 billion by 2001. This proportion of resources allocated to agriculture would 1/ No distinction is made between investment and recurrent expenditures, a1s one of the key items in an agricultural investment program is the provi- sion of extension services, which is a recurrent expenditure. The use of the term "investment" should be understood to include recurrent ex- penditure.  - 25 - represent an entirely reasonable level in view of the high dependence of the country on agriculture. It could require strengthening of the absorptive capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, but there is no reason to believe this to be beyond the possibilities of the existing resource base in the country. The budget of the Ministry of Agriculture, currently less than 5% of the total, would need to be increased to 10% of the total by 1981 to meet the needs of the extension services proposed in Annex 2 (Table 1). 4.14 The financing of expenditures of this magnitude is clearly beyond Government's present means. Its means would, however, increase as the level of incomes in the country is raised, and as the tax base is widened. An agricultural development program would in this respect play a major role in increasing the resources of Government. These in turn could be channeled back into agriculture or other activities in a continuing cycle. As an approximate estimate of the revenue Government could hope to derive directly and indirectly from agricultural development, different tax rates have been applied to projected rural incomes and exports based on the 1974 tax ratios shown in Table 1, p. 6. They indicate that Government need not impose a much higher burden than in 1974, when the tax burden on rural incomes was estimated at 8.2 percent on average, since it is the level of incomes rather than the tax ratio that will increase. 4.15 Applying these rates of tax to the projections of agricultural incomes and exports presented earlier, the revenue which Government might reasonably expect to receive would be as follows. (Alternative figures are presented for slightly higher average tax rates.)  - 26 - Table 9: PROJECTED TAX REVENUE (in millions of Rwandese francs in constant 1975 prices) 1974 1981 2001 (actual) Rural Incomes 19,500 44,750 83,400 Agriculture 16,960 38,900 72,500 Other (15% of agriculture) 2,540 5,850 10,900 Exports 2,100 22,800 Government Revenue (i) Existing Tax Rates 5.9% of rural incomes 1,159 2,640 4,900 23.3% of export earnings 484 1,380 5,300 Total 1,643 4,020 10,200 (ii) Higher Tax Rates 8% of rural incomes - 3,580 6,675 30% of export earnings 1,780 6,850 Total 5,360 13,525 4.16 The conclusion from the preceding estimates for Government revenue are twofold. Firstly, the amount of tax currently levied on rural incomes and coffee exports far exceeds the amount spent on agriculture both by Government directly, and also the amount of public expenditure including the contribution of external agencies. In the 1973-75 period about 13 percent of Government expenditure and aid disbursements went to agriculture. If only 50 percent of rural taxes had been channeled back to agriculture the share of that sector in public expenditure would have been between 25 and 30 percent. Naturally,, Government also spends a considerable amount on providing other services in rural areas such as education and health, but overall there is probably a net transfer of resources from the rural to the urban areas. As a step towards redirecting expenditure to agricultural and other rural services, the net flow could be reduced or eliminated, as the incomes of rural areas are barely adequate to support their own development. 4.17 Secondly, the revenue likely to accrue to Government from rural taxes in future would enable the agricultural development program to be financed to a much larger extent out of locally-generated resources. Taxes on agricultural exports and rural incomes would be adequate to cover over 80 percent of expenditure in the later years, and even if part of the rural taxes were channeled into other rural sector activities, the share remaining  - 27 - for agriculture would still be large. In short, the proportion of external financing could be diminished over time without prejudicing the long term growth of the sector. The volume of assistance required would probably increase in absolute terms, though the rate of real growth would need to be only modest. V. THE MEANS FOR DEVELOPMENT A. The Communal Action Plan 5.01 Recognizing that the commune is, to quote President Habyarimana, "the basic unit of national development," "the administrative level closest to the people ... and best suited to help the masses develop themselves," the Government of Rwanda has the declared policy of devolution of the planning and execution of development to the communes. The Ministry of Planning, in furtherance of this policy, has drawn up a Communal Action Plan (Plan d'Action Communale) which describes how social services would be organized to carry out their tasks effectively in the rural areas and sets out the investments to be made for the necessary administrative buildings, multi- purpose training centers, silos, social centers, hostels, vehicles, tele- communication facilities, etc., and the personnel needed to execute the program. The intention is to give the burgomaster (the administrative head of the commune) administrative responsibility for all the activities of the agencies in the commune, while the technical responsibility will remain with the technical ministries of the Central Government. The initiative for pro- posing projects and preparing them would lie with the people of the commune through the Development Committee and the Technical Commission of the commune; the burgomaster coordinates the communal activities and reports to the pre- fect (head of the prefecture), who approves the projects and either allo- cates the funds or recommends the project for financing by the Central Government. 5.02 While it is probably true in the cohesive rural society of Rwanda that involvement of the people in the direction of their own destiny stands the best chance of motivating people towards greater productivity, the prob- lems of providing the necessary leadership and technical support should not be underestimated, and the danger of cutting local level agents off from the source of technical advice by separating technical and administrative respon- sibilities should not be ignored. While local authorities should rightly feel that it is local initiative that determines local policy, they must nevertheless be responsive to new technology that will come from outside agents such as ISAR or the technical ministries of the Central Government. Conversely, while it is desirable that the top levels of the hierarchy be able to leave implementation of the details to the lowest levels, they must nevertheless maintain the capability of convincing the lowest levels of the need to adopt certain courses of action, and maintain sufficient super- visory capability to ensure that local initiatives are consistent with national priorities. When deciding local investment needs, a delicate balance  - 28 - must be sought between meeting national economic priorities and local level social priorities and in implementing the Communal Action Plan the government will need to ensure that agricultural production receives the emphasis that is due to it as the prime basis for improving living standards. 5.03 The Communal Plan does not discuss the investments in terms of their effects on productivity though a resulting increase in production is implicit in the assumption that the revenues of the communes will increase sufficiently to allow them to cover their recurrent costs, including payment of salaries of local government agents. The accent on improved social ser- vices should not divert the effort needed to concentrate on raising produc- tion on which the financing of such services will depend. This is the targel towards which the thrust of this report is directed and therefore the discus-- sion of the means for development in this section considers more the factors that will encourage growth in production than those that implement the Communal Action Plan. B. Extension Services 5.04 The existing extension service is not effective in diffusing tech- nical knowlege to farmers because it is inadequately staffed with underpaid, poorly trained agents who lack the physical means (transport, stationery, technical inputs) to carry out their work. During the next five-year plan, the Ministry of Agriculture proposes to retrain the existing extension service and to intensify its coverage to one field advisor for each sector (i.e., approximately one agent per 500 farms, instead of one per 800 farms as at present). It is planned to provide housing, equipment, transportation facil- ities and travel allowances for all personnel. The estimated investment cost is RF 682.3 million (US$8.2 million) over 5 years (i.e. RF 136.5 million (US$3.3 million) per annum) with forecast operating costs of RF 302.2 million per annum, i.e., more than double the current budget. 5.05 This traditional hierarchic system works well in conditions where the staff are well trained, have no other functions to perform apart from extension work - such as statistical reporting, supply of inputs and admin- istrative functions - and do not have too large an area to cover. It has not generally worked well in practice in Africa because these necessary condi- tions have been absent and in Rwanda budgetary constraints have restricted supervision of field staff which limits both the amount of administrative control exercised over the field staff and the amount of technical direction they receive. A new extension system has been proposed and tried in certain parts of the country, but it has not yet been decided to implement it nation- wide. 5.06 This proposed system is described in full in Annex 2. In summary, the principle is to rely on a 'Leader farmer, elected as their representative by a group of ten farmers, to bring them the improved technical knowledge he has been taught at periodic week-long courses at the communal training center..  - 29 - The farmer is not paid for his services for he is not himself an extension worker, but his group supply him with food to take with him for the course and tend his fields during his absence. The leader farmers are supported by trained extension staff who visit them in the field, but the density of extension staff required is much less than than under the traditional system and provided that the staff of the training center have a good technical training themselves and that at the prefectural level there are specialists who can respond to particular technical problems that are beyond the compe- tence of the field extension worker, the field staff do not have to be highly qualified. 5.07 This system has a number of particular advantages for Rwanda. Firstly, it does not demand a large increase in the number of paid extension staff, though it does require a higher standard of training for them. In the conditions of Rwanda, where it is relatively easy for the farmers to get to the communal centers, it makes fewer demands on the Government's limited resources to bring the farmers to the extension worker rather than the inverse, but the impossibility of bringing all the farmers individually dictates the need for a choice of representatives - the leader farmers. Although more costly than the present ineffective system (about RF 0.8 million per commune per annum) the new system would be considerably cheaper than that proposed in the Ministry of Agriculture's draft 5 year plan (RF 2.3 million per commune per annum as opposed to RF 3.0 million). Secondly, the new system, by bringing the farmers together in groups, puts more emphasis on the communal development effort and fosters the cooperative spirit that is an essential element of Government's policy of "grass-roots" communal development. Thirdly, by giving the initiative to the farmers themselves the system makes the best use of one of Rwanda's strongest assets: the willingness of the farmers to improve their situation and their awareness of the precariousness of the present existence and the discouraging prospects for their children. C. Training for Agriculture 5.08 Estimates of the manpower required at the various levels and in the various specialized fields to provide uniform coverage of the agricul- tural sector vary considerably according to the source (Ministry of Agricul- ture, Ministry of Planning, external missions). The results also differ depending on the system of extension services selected and the presence or absence of a budgetary constraint. 1/ 5.09 Inasmuch as requirements for graduate agronomists (ingenieurs agronomes) are limited (about 100), it seems preferable to continue training personnel abroad (76 are presently being so trained). Preference, however, could be given to training at African universities (e.g., Yaounde) and 1/ For example, requirements for graduate agronomists range from 60 (World Bank, 1974) to 503 (Ministry of Agriculture).  - 30 - intensive courses of familiarization with local conditions could be given upon the return of the students from abroad. If a Faculty of Agronomy were to be established in Rwanda, the training cost per graduate would be very high, probably about five times higher than in the United States. 5.10 Details of the requirements for middle and lower level personnel are shown in Annex 5, and show that the deficit is qualitative rather than quantitative. The most logical solution would therefore be to take advan- tage of the work experience of the advisors, selecting the best ones and advancing them to a higher level. Half of the advisors could be selected and given alternating theoretical-practical training for one year, followed by regular annual refresher courses. Such a program would be less costly than the establishment of a new school specializing in refresher training for field advisers. 5.11 To carry out the national program for cooperatives (para 5.19), a training school for cooperative instructors will be needed. The instruction should be highly practical, with applications in the field and should focus on the methodology for establishment of cooperatives, instruction, simplified management, problems of marketing, credit, organization, etc. As far as possible the instruction should be given by in-service personnel such as TRAFIPRO 1/ instructors and personnel of the People's Banks. After several years of field experience the most promising personnel could be given advanced training abroad. The other suggestions in Annex 5 refer in particular to the following: (i) the need for all personnel to have annual refresher training, planning and evaluating each farming year and updating their technical know-how; (ii) improvement of the teaching of extension work in schools of agriculture (familiarization with the rural sector, practical work on farms, establishment of an extension service area served by the school); (iii) better integration of general education and extension services (support for instructors from agricultural technicians in practical work, use of teachers and students for agricultural statistics); (iv) better integration of the School of Agriculture at the local level (establishment of an organizing board); (v) training of personnel to instruct women in farming and stockraising; 1/ TRAFIPRO: Trevail, Fidelite, Progress - a nationwide cooperative of long standing that mainly retails consumer goods.  - 31 - (vi) basic and advanced training of burgomasters (the admin- istrative head of the commune) in adult education and promotion techniques, introduction to farming and stock- raising, introduction to management and finance. D. Agricultural Credit 5.12 Farmers' needs for credit fall into two main categories: short term needs for consumption credit which to obtain they may be obliged to sell standing crops, sell the usufruct of their land or leave their farms to seek paid employment; and production credit, either long term for investment such as purchase of livestock or construction of a stable or short term, for purchase of tools, seeds, etc. At present, the lack of credit facilities is not a major bottleneck since investment opportunities are rather limited, but as the intensification program progresses the needs will become more urgent especially for the facilities needed for stall-fed cattle. The People's Banks (Banques Populaires - in effect closer in function to credit unions than banks), a Swiss aided project, have made an impressive start in receiving deposits and making loans to cooperatives and others for working capital; and have adapted their procedures well to local conditions, and if the initial momentum of this project can be maintained it could go a long way towards meeting the needs of farmers. 5.13 It is however, likely that with the development of the extension services and new technologies the needs will increase rapidly in the years ahead. The Ministry of Agriculture is accordingly now studying a draft law that would set up an Agricultural Credit Bank and an Agricultural Loan Fund. The purpose of these would be to provide all types of agricultural credit for smallholders and for farmers' organizations. Financing would be derived from a 1% levy on the receipts of the parastatal agencies such as OVAPAM (Mutara Project) and OPROVIA (foodcrop Marketing Office) which would produce RF 15-20 million a year. The staff of these agencies, plus extension and cooperative agents and the Bank's own staff, would provide advice to farmers, forward loan applications to the Bank and receive repayments, a mix of credit and extension activities that does not foster a favorable relationship for the transfer of technical knowledge from these agents. The procedure would be very complicated (13 approvals would be needed to obtain a loan); the gua- rantees envisaged are pledges on the crops, cattle and farm buildings coupled with limitation of the loan to half of the value of the marketed crop. 5.14 Credit to small farmers is an extremely risky business and the history of agricultural credit in Africa is primarily a chronicle of failures. The central problem is that of guarantees and, where such credit systems have succeeded, the key has-been control by groups of farmers over the granting  - 32 - and recovery of the credits and a very close link between credit and joint marketing, or between credit and saving. 1/ 5.15 The preliminary plan in its current form is based on a highly bureau- cratic approach and fails to solve the problem of a guarantee fund, the guaran- tees proposed lacking substance. It accordingly appears desirable: (i) to limit agricultural credit as far as possible (cost limit in the case of small farms, cash payment wherever possible, improvement of the traditional formulae in the case of cattle) (see Annex on extension), and (ii) to monitor closely the agricultural credit experiments of the people's banks. Introduction of this type of credit should be gradual and thoroughly thought out. In this field the people's banks have considerable advantages: the credit-savings link, mutual acquaintanceship of the members which allows sound selection and control of borrowers, and the possibility of a joint guarantee. 5.16 Annual conferences on agricultural credit with Ministry of Agricul- ture representatives, development agencies, the people's banks and other financial institutions should make it possible to follow the development of the credit picture (needs and solutions), providing an opportunity to stan- dardize terms and conditions and to decide on the advisability of setting up an Agricultural Loan Fund. This Fund would serve to supplement the people's banks, meeting the needs they do not cover. The activities of the two would be closely coordinated to prevent any overlapping or variations in terms, conditions, etc., for loans for similar purposes. Until the needs for credit have been more closely identified, the function of the Fund cannot be well defined and its creation should therefore await a closer study of its role. The IDA-supported Bugesera Est-Gisaka-Migongo Project provides for the ela- boration by Government of a credit scheme which it is hoped will be replicable on a national scale. E. Marketing and Prices 5.17 Marketing of export crops poses relatively few problems that are within the control of Rwanda, and other commercial crops not exported - sugar, rice, oilseeds, and cereals - are currently produced in quantities small enough to cause no major difficulties, though an expansion of oilseeds 1/ Cf. G. Belloncle: Le Credit Agricole dans les Pays d'Afrigue d'Expression Francaise au Sud du Sahara (Agricultural Credit in the French-speaking Countries of Africa south of the Sahara) FAO, Rome, 1968, p. 162.  - 33 - and cereal production will require coordination with the establishment of pro- cessing facilities. Prices for export crops are determined by world market prices since the internal market is negligible, and these in turn limit the flexibility of producers' prices after processing and handling charges are covered. However, as Annex 6 shows, returns to labor for foodcrops are considerably higher than for export crops except in the case of cinchona, though, as explained in para. 3.03, there are other factors that influence farmers' choices. To take the most readily comparable crops, the return on bananas is 3.5 times that on coffee, the return on potatoes is 2.5 times that on pyrethrum, and the return on cassava 4.8 times that on cotton. The mission was not able to study these phenomena in depth or to suggest possible effects of a price policy to even out these imbalances. 5.18 The primary characteristic of the marketing of foodcrops are the low volume marketed (15-30% of total production) and wide price fluctuations, both seasonally and regionally. Price levels are set by a National Price Commission that is intended to control wholesale and retail prices of all goods, an aim well beyond its means. The lack of a weights and measures control (or even a repair services for scales) and lack of staff to man a market supervision service makes policing of strict price control virtually impossible, so the Government has made the entirely rational choice of using market intervention and buffer stocks to influence prices. To this end, a state food crop marketing office (OPROVIA) has been set up, to buy stocks of staple foods to bolster prices when they are low and to release the stocks when prices rise. This organization has only been in existence a short time and it is still too early to judge its efficacy, though at present it appears to operate as a privileged merchant rather than as a market regulating agency. (Annex 3 describes its functions and recommends some improvements). On a smaller scale, the Catholic Relief Service has recently started a project of building small storage silos in the communes to which farmers may sell their crops after harvest and repurchase it when they need it: the main intention is to assure the availability of seeds for planting but ultimately the effect on prices could be very significant. F. Cooperatives 5.19 Government policy of development of the communes puts considerable emphasis on development of a cooperative movement to perform a number of functions including storage and marketing of produce, supply of consumer and capital goods, savings and insurance. Undoubtedly a well developed coopera- tive movement is an essential element in a grass-roots development policy to serve very useful functions especially in the fields of marketing and agri- cultural credit, but numerous failures in other African countries demonstrate the difficulties. To have a reasonable chance of success, it is essential to have experienced and properly trained cadres; to hold broad discussions  - 34 - with farmers on their specific problems, enabling them to decide when the cooperative is to be established and the manner in which it is to be organized; and to have simple structures so that they can actually be managed by the farmers. For this reason, it seems desirable to set up a training school for the personnel of cooperatives as quickly as possible, to eliminate bureau- cratic methods of implementation that impose the same structure everywhere and require, according to the draft plan of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Cooperative Movement, "every family unit or every adult producer to sub- scribe to the capital of the cooperative," and to maintain separate structures for marketing/supply and for savings/credit. 1/ G. Land Reform and Grouping of Dwellings 5.20 The jumble of family farms and the dispersion of dwellings are basic features of Rwandese agriculture (see Annex 1, paragraphs 11 et seq.) The form of land tenure is a simple right of usufruct granted by the State to the farmer, though the traditional customs by which the usufruct is granted are exceedingly complex. As population pressure is felt more and more acutely, the government is planning a rational reorganization of land tenure through land reform and the concentration of dwellings. 5.21 Although an ad hoc commission on land reform was formed over two years ago, it is still not known whether there is to be a fundamental agrarian reform aiming at an equal distribution of land or a land code recognizing private property, while setting limits on its extent. According to the Ministry of Planning (preparatory documents for the Second Plan, 1977-1981) the latter alternative should be adopted, since the recognition of customary rights acquired is likely to encourage the farmer to invest and to produce more. Meanwhile, the Byumba study has shown that many lands with right of usage have not actually been worked (lands "frozen" by the wealthier farmers for their descendants). Accordingly, the Ministry of Planning recommends that rental contracts be concluded with the life tenants, with the commune as arbitral body. The same document also recommends that the Lands Office of the Ministry of Agriculture register existing rights and undertake a classification of soils by type of use assuming that a soil survey has been carried out. At present the plan is still a first draft and the only measure taken by the government is a decree-law of March 1976 regulating transfers of land (sales or free transfers of rights of usage) and specifically making authorization by the Lands Office contingent upon the two-fold requirement that the seller retain a minimum of 2 hectares and the buyer not possess more than 2 hectares. 1/ A cooperative with too many functions is difficult to manage, and failure in one area (e.g., credit) may result in the failure of the cooperative as a whole. However, common services (building, accounting, secretarial. services, etc.) can certainly be shared by the types of cooperatives.  - 35 - 5.22 It also would appear that - in addition to the "egalitarian" impli- cations of land reform - the government plans to make it an instrument for restructuring land tenure, which it regards as inseparable from the grouping of dwellings. This policy has already been implemented in regard to the paysannats, without, however, leading to the establishment of villages as such. Nevertheless, the paysannats were settlements on virgin land where plots were marked out in advance and farmers were willing to accept the rigid structure. It is entirely different in a densely settled rural area where each field may be held under a different kind of customary tenure governing its use. The early failure of an experiment attempted several years ago in the Rusumo basin paysannat demonstrates the difficulty of establishing villages by decree. 5.23 Whatever may be the advantages public authorities hope to gain by restructuring the land tenure system by regrouping fields and dwellings (ease of contact and administrative control, centralization of infrastructures, development of new collective activities, agricultural rationalization and mechanization), it is difficult to understand the desire of some Rwandese officials to impose such a structure in an authoritarian fashion. The present organization of land tenure reflects long-standing socio-economic patterns and only with the slow evolution of production conditions will the organiza- tion of land tenure evolve in turn. Furthermore, it is not at all certain that grouping will result in real economic advantage for the community. For instance, the location of the house among the fields facilitates spreading of organic manure, and since the type of soil varies greatly from one place to another in the colline, identical crop rotations would unquestionably be risky. It has been the experience in Tanzania that the concentration of fields around a village can lead to rapid exhaustion of the soils of the fields close to it, while those further away, too far to be accessible daily, may be underutilized. As to the often heard argument that the grouping of dwellings "frees land for crops" it seems totally illusory short of imagining skyscrapers taking up a minimum of space at the top of each hill. 5.24 In summary, land reform and some grouping of dwellings are long- range measures that go well beyond the scope of a five-year plan. Nonethe- less, to begin the process, the following measures might be taken: (i) guarantee farmers the perpetuity of their customary rights to the land (recognition of a degree of ownership, since insecurity does not favor efforts to conserve the land-capital); (ii) discourage the "freezing" of land in unnecessarily long fallow periods by the larger landowners, possibly by allowing public pasturage on "frozen" lands. (iii) see that land accumulation and speculation are kept within strict limits (this is the purpose of the decree law of March 1976 mentioned above);  - 36 - (iv) encourage farmers with small land holdings to combine their holdings with those of relatives when land rights are registered; (v) develop communal (and commercial) centers so that they may become true focal points around which villages can be encouraged to grow in a natural way. Whatever policy might ultimately be adopted, it is essential to avoid any violent changes that would disrupt Rwandese agriculture; when the balance between sufficiency and starvation is so fine the country cannot afford measures that would disrupt production. VI. PROJECT POSSIBILITIES 6.01 To achieve the target discussed in the report, Rwanda should give priority in agricultural investments to projects designed to retain or improve soil fertility to arrest the present decline in yields and to ensure a sound basis for future growth in yields. Such projects might include the association of farming and stall-fed livestock, erosion control measures, use of organic or chemical fertilizers and reaforestation. In devising projects, maximum account should be taken of existing administrative structures, particularly at the commune level to avoid the awkward growth of present project units that do not fit into Government's policy of communal development. When possible, projects should include training facilities for the lowest level staff or for farmers themselves, and the training offered should not ignore the needs of women and young people. In view of the urgency of the population problem, consideration should be given to including a family planning component in rural development projects. Projects offering a high ratio of output per unit of land used are obviously especially valuable in the Rwandese context and the possiblities of activities such as small livestock beekeeping and fish breeding should not be overlooked. Projects that bring new land under culti- vation such as these involving the draining of marshes tend to be expensive and technically complex, and cannot be justified economically solely by the additional land brought under cultivation since the addition to the country's available land resource is small in relation to its needs. Such projects need to have additional benefits to justify them, such as the production of a high value crop like sugar cane or horticultural produce. 6.02 This does not mean to say that there is no place in Rwanda in future for the type of project that has been common in the past, with the accent on one geographical area or one particular culture such as tea, coffee, livestock or cinchona. Many of the discreet sub-sectors in which investments are or have been needed already have their own aid sponsors. Thus the FED and Belgium have made important contributions in the development of the tea industry; Belgium has supported the research institutes and the distribution of improved seeds; Chinese aid has been instrumental in the development of sugar and rice; the World Bank is financing the development of cinchona plantations; and USAID and the Catholic Relief Service have taken the  - 37 - initiative in dealing with storage and marketing problems. Despite its long establishment in the country, there is still major work to be done in improving coffee yields, and this is the aim of a national program carried out by OCIR using local resources. Projects of this nature still have an important place in Rwandese agriculture, and, as has been shown in an earlier chapter, by 2001 Rwanda will need to devote about 40% of its investment in agriculture to cash crops, and intensive development in one field or area may have spill-overs into surrounding areas. However, the demonstration effect of such efforts in the present conditions of relative isolation of project centers should not be overestimated because of the immobility of farmers and other workers in agriculture. 6.03 For future World Bank or other donor agency agricultural projects, the priorities described in paragraph 6.01, should be observed and it is very desirable that donors coordinate their efforts so that the priority needs are met, and the best use is made of local resources, particularly skilled staff. During the course of the present review, the Government did not make any specific proposals of projects for which Bank assistance might be sought but there are three possibilities which would conform to the requirements discussed above. The first is the implementation of the agricultural development program within the Communal Action Plan. Considering only the production- oriented agricultural requirements (which the plan itself does not discuss), there are several separate elements in the program that could attract foreign financing, such as research, farmer training, seed multiplication, organization of extension services, etc. The program can be looked upon as a series of projects, each one covering a particular "time-slice" of the overall program; the emphasis of the program and its investment needs could change as it progresses and other elements, for which foreign aid may be necessary, such as credit and marketing, become important. With the exception of those elements such as research that have a national, rather than regional, impact, the program, during the first phase, should be implemented only in one or two selected regions, preferably covering a whole prefecture. This first phase would include the building and staffing of communal training centers and other infrastructure to facilitate the implementation of the extension methods proposed in Chapter V of this report, assisting the implementing organization with technical staff and providing the necessary technology and research support for the extension effort. Provided that the right formulation can be found to preserve the flexibility needed to ensure active local partici- pation and to avoid stifling local initiative with a blanket of bureaucratic inertia, external agencies could make a useful contribution. 6.04 The second possible project is the Byumba rural development project, emphasizing intensification of agricultural production in Byumba prefecture, that was prepared in detail by consultants for the Ministry of Planning. It has essentially the same elements as those described in paragraph 6.05 and has the advantage over other possible pilot schemes to implement the Communal Action Plan of having been already prepared. Having been reviewed by other ministries, the project is now been revised in the light of their comments.  - 38 - 6.05 The third is a rural re-forestation project that is being prepared under the Swiss technical assistance program with an ultimate target of re-forestation of 200,000 ha to provide firewood and building materials for local consumption. Rwanda's minimum needs for firewood are estimated at 800,000 ha by 2000, and very urgent measures are needed to meet these requirements without further destroying Rwanda's limited existing forest resources and aggravating soil erosion. Rwanda has 526,000 ha of land un- suitable for agriculture (Annex 8, Table 2) because of its topography, soil conditions, etc., but much of it would be suitable for forestry. A first phase project to plant 10,000 ha of communal fuel plantations and 5,000 ha of timber plantations has been provisionally identified by a recent World Bank mission. VII. CONCLUSIONS 7.01 By the year 2001, as has been shown above, Rwanda will have a popu- lation of 8.1 million. With no increase in yields, but assuming that off-farm employment opportunities increase at 7% p.a. from 1977-1986 and 4% thereafter (as the absorption capacity of an economy still based on subsistence agricul- ture must slow) to be able to support 1.8 million people, 6.3 million people must be supported by agriculture while the available cultivable land will only be sufficient for 1.3 million farms of 1.1 ha, i.e., 5.7 million people, leaving 630,000 people who could be supported neither by farming nor by non- farm sector. As the study on Availability and Use of Land states (p. 85) Rwanda finds itself in a vicious circle: the smaller the family farms the more unlikely is any improvement in their standard of living, the higher is population living off agriculture and, finally, the more dramatic the struggle for available land. 7.02 If on the other hand agricultural production can be increased by 3% a year, as proposed here, by an intensive production campaign supported by new extension methods based on communal development, Rwanda's population would be assured at least of the minimum food requirements and increase its fiscal resources while the amount of land available for export crops would allow a sixfold increase in Rwanda's export earnings by 2001. However, whatever hopes might be held out for new organizational schemes, new extension methods, new technology and new sources of finance, nothing can bring about the changes if the farmers themselves are not convinced of the need to change, and are shown the means of improving their conditions. No matter how highly equipped, qualified and motivated an extension service may be, it will achieve nothing if it does not recognize this fact. It is therefore essential that farmer training, through the communal training centres, have a major priority, with the first aim of alerting the farmers to their own situation. 7.03 The apparent modesty of a 3% target for an annual increase in pro- duction should not conceal the arduousness of achieving it. It calls for a concerted effort to mobilize the resources of the country and to motivate its people and requires the full commitment of farmers and officials alike to the development of the country. Nor should the grave consequences of failure  - 39 - be overlooked. Without an increase in productivity, Rwanda will be unable either to feed or to provide employment for its people in 2001 and even a total reliance on international charity would not be enough to prevent the starvation and famine that would by then be as common in Rwanda as they are now in the overpopulated regions of Southeast Asia. Even if the 3% target is attained, the net increase in subsistence levels is only 10% over 25 years, and per capita incomes is only 45% in constant terms (paragraph 4.06). 7.04 Furthermore the choice of 2001 as the far time horizon for these projections should not be taken to mean that the dawning of the new millenium brings spectacular prosperity to Rwanda. True, if measures to slow population growth are introduced now, by that time the population growth rate might begin to slow sufficiently to allow population growth and economic growth to enter an equilibrium, but this is only no more than a hope and no action has yet been taken to suggest it might be fulfilled. Without a reduction in its growth rate, the population will reach 16 million people by 2030 giving a density of 630 inhabitants per square kilometer, and the possibilities for survival would be slim. At best it can be said that if Rwanda can achieve the targets set out for 2001, it will have strengthened its position enough to allow it to enter the century with some chance for survival, but not with the opportunity to rest on its laurels.   ANNEX 1 Page I RWANDA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REVIEW AGRARIAN SYSTEM AND STRUCTURES IN RWANDA 1. Although the rural sector includes the vast majority of the popu- lation of Rwanda, it is relatively poorly documented, at least in quantita- tive terms: (i) The numerous and thorough studies made by INRS (National Institute for Scientific Research, Butare) are principally investigations of a historical and sociological character, with the exception of the 1970 survey on food consumption; (ii) All the statistical studies are very old, i.e. those by BDPA (Agricultural and Economic Studies in Rwanda, 1964) by P. Gourou (Population Densities in Ruanda Urundi, 1953) by Ph. Leurquin (The Standard of Living of Rural Populations in Ruanda-Urundi, 1960) the latter studies being based on a 1955-56 statis- tical survey; (iii) The few more recent regional studies did not actually involve the collection of any new data: Study of Lake Kivu Region (CINAM, 1973, Prefectures of Cyangugu, Kibuye and Gisenyi), Global Development Study in the Prefecture of Gikongoro (FULREAC, 1970), Study of the Prefecture of Kibungo (1966, in preparation for the AIDR project); (iv) Certain other studies, principally in the form of scat- tered monographs: the various development studies on marshland made by SCET, the survey of the Icyanya paysannat (Sylvestre, 1972-74), The Development of Cultivated Areas in the Pilot Paysannat of Muhero (OBM by G. Delepierre), survey on working hours at Muhero (Delepierre) (which goes back to 1959 and has never been fully utilized) and a very full monograph in course of completion on the Gatovu colline adjacent to ISAR (Delepierre);  ANNEX I Page 2 (v) Lastly, except for the demographic sample survey made in 1970 and an ISAR/Ministry of Planning tech- nical memorandum on the Availability and Use of Land in Rwanda (1973, but based on 1970 figures), the only recent work containing statistics on agrarian struc- tures notwithstanding its geographical limitations is the Socio-Economic Study of the Prefecture of Byumba (1973/75, SEDES/Berger). Agrarian System 2. An agrarian system can be defined as the way in which a human group develops a natural environment. In Rwanda this natural environment is mainly characterized by: (i) by ecological zones whose potential varies according to altitude i.e. zones of high (2,000 m), medium, (1,500- 2,000 m) and low (1,300-1,500 m). The proximity of areas to centers of volcanic activity is an additional factor in determining the fertility of the soil; (ii) the special relief characteristics of its hills. As most fields are sloping, soil conservation is a vital problem; (iii) a biannual rainy season permitting two crops a year, in September/December and February/June. Total rainfall is 800 to 1,600 mm (1,000 mm at Kigali). 3. Each family endeavors to develop land and, whenever possible, marshland, under varying conditions such as differences in slopes and in the orientation of hills. Housing takes the form of a rugo, which is a compound enclosed by euphorbia and generally containing one principal dwelling with mud walls and a roof of thatch or tiles or, increasingly often, corrugated iron; a small cooking hut and a granary. At night the cattle, if any, are brought in. The best maintained fields and the banana plantation surround the rugo. 4. Production is centered on the satisfaction of the family's food needs: beans/maize interplanted on, perhaps, 20 to 30 ares 1/, principally in the first season, sweet potatoes, sorghum (20 to 25 ares in the second season) and bananas, averaging 23 ares per family farm. Other supporting crops such as potato, cassava, taro, yams, sometimes groundnuts, wheat on the uplands, vegetables, and tobacco are also grown with varying provisions for fallow periods. The banana plantation (the "poor man's cow") is the vital component of the farm. Immediately adjacent to the rugo, it receives the 1/ 100 ares = 1 hectare.  ANNEX 1 Page 3 most attention and is a symbol of family status. 85% to 90% of its produc- tion, some 9 tons of bunches to each hectare, is used to brew beer, as is 75 to 85% of the sorghum crop. Traditional forms of beer play a major part in social relationships such as dowries, visits, repayment for services in the form of labor, as well as being the main source of the cash return produced by the farm, often representing a half of its earnings. 5. The subsistence consumption of the family leaves little marketable surplus, further reduced by undependable storage as produce is not always very dry, never processed, and often stored in the living space or in large woven baskets. Overall, excluding the various beers the proportion of produce marketed represents some 10 to 20% of harvests. Moreover, more often than not, it is a token form of marketing, money serving as nothing more than a cover for a kind of reciprocal and extended bartering process i.e. transfers between farmers. Only about half the amounts exchanged pass through genuine commercial channels such as rural markets, itinerant traders. The situation is quite different in the case of coffee where the entire crop is sold at the official price to "approved" traders. The industrial crops are principally coffee, each planter having on the average, about 100 trees, and, in some regions, tea, quinine and pyrethrum. 6. Although housing is scattered, the social relationships between those who live on the same coll;ne are close, whether it is one of the privileged areas in which token'trading e.g. in beers, takes place or whether it in effect comprises the majority of the members of a single lineage or a segment of the lineage i.e. all the brothers in a single nuclear family. As a result of population pressures, family members can often no longer find land close to each other and membership of a single lineage or of a single segment of a lineage now plays a less important role in questions of land tenure and exchanges of labor than it did in the past. 7. The possession of cattle is traditionally symbolic of social pres- tige in Rwanda. The cow, like banana beer to a lesser extent, plays a major role in social relationships. It is the principal component in the dowry that a suitor must pay to the family of the girl of his choice. This is why, outside the savanna regions in the east where a few large herds are still to be found, many family farms include one or more herd of cattle which may be either their own property or held on behalf of a third party which is throwback to the old contracts. As this dispersed pattern of animal husbandry is socially, rather than economically, justified, it yields little financial return. For instance, many of the cows kept are sterile. 8. Methods and techniques of cultivation are mainly primitive as few tools are available and the hoe and the sickle is used on every occasion, together with a sickle and harvesting or storage baskets. Crops are inter- planted; seed densities are ignored and sowing in lines, regular weeding, hilling of beans and tubers, hilling and staking of peas and certain varieties of pole beans are all far from being traditional techniques. Notwithstanding  ANNEX 1 Page 4 a sound understanding of soil requirements and the importance they attach to manure, the Rwandese farmers neglect erosion control, which is identified with the colonial period. 9. In practice it might appear that, as in the case of agrarian struc- tures, farmers are content with assumptions and prejudices. In point of fact, no effective analysis has yet been made of farming methods and techniques. The following distinctions should be made: (i) local farming methods adapted to local situations, for example, in the case of peas and sweet potatoes, traditional planting densities appear to give higher yields and require less maintenance than those recommended by ISAR; (ii) methods that were in themselves sound but are now applied in different conditions from those for which they were designed. For example, a long period of fallow is beneficial but if limited to as little as one year it is harmful; (iii) methods that are at once both beneficial and harmful, such as interplanted crops, for example beans/maize, which produce significant yields and ensure sound utilization of the soil but often make it difficult to sow at correct densities and maintain a high quality of fieldwork; (iv) farming methods known to and accepted by farmers but that are not applied, either because of lack of finance or because the existing price and marketing structure does not justify the additional work, or because the products are not on hand in time; (v) traditional farming methods that are injurious, for example, to soil conservation; (vi) "modern" techniques and implements that are either unknown or rejected by the farmers, in which case, the reason should be determined. A genuinely scientific study, supported by group discussions with the farmers themselves, is essential in order to determine the level of their technical understanding and the rationale for their agrarian system. It should con- stitute the basis for any extension service action. 10. As in other African countries, the overall impression is that a relatively balanced agrarian system once existed with long fallow periods,, animal husbandry, and self-sufficiency in food but that the old balance  ANNEX I Page 5 has now been upset (largely as a result of population pressures, the expansion of industrial crops and urbanization). The many constraints encountered make it urgently necessary to define a new balance and with it a changed agrarian system. Agrarian structures 11. According to the current statistics, in 1975 there were 800,000 farms with an average area of 1 ha. Each farm generally supported five persons i.e. father, mother, and three children, one half of the family unit being employed on the farm. This exposition of the facts is useful and provides a basis for various plans, projects and development policies, but unfortunately, the socio-economic realities are in practice somewhat different and a more sophisticated breakdown of the concept of the farm is needed in face of the major disparities concealed by the notion of an average farm. With such an approach it should be possible to draw conclusions with respect to various potential development techniques e.g. technical problems, extension- service methods, cooperative organization, etc. The Rwandese "farm" 12. A farm is generally envisaged as both a homogeneous economic unit and a production, decision-making and consumer unit. In point of fact, the situation in Rwanda is much more complex:- (i) If the nuclear family and the rugo 1/ can be largely identified with one another, the correlation between rugo and isambu is less apparent - the latter term connoting all the fields belonging to a single farm - for whilst belonging to the same rugo, the various wives of a single polygamous husband 2/ may each have their own isambu. On the other hand, an isambu may be exploited by several ingo, such as when the various wives of a polygamous husband live in different ingo, although they cultivate the same common isambu or, again, when aged parents farm the isambu of one of their married sons 3/. (ii) More often than not the land making up a farm is not all one piece. If the entire farm is located around the rugo, the fragmentation is great and of the five family fields (imilima), two at least are from 15 to 30 minutes walking distance away. 1/ Housing unit. (Plural: ingo). 2/ Some 7 to 10% of married men are polygamous, 16% according to the Byumba survey. 3/ Byumba study, op. cit.  ANNEX 1 Page 6 For those fortunate enough to adjoin bottomland, the farm will also include a small area of marshland which can be cultivated in the dry season. (iii) Status and use may differ according to the way in which fields have been obtained, either through the family by different types of grant known as ubutekesha, umumani, imgaligali and umutware or from sources outside the family i.e. grants from the authorities, land clearance, or gift. For instance, the right to use 1/ certain fields may be neither sold nor lent, whereas others are set aside for relatives struck by misfortune. (iv) The segment of lineage and the lineage play, in certain regions at least, an important part in financing mechanisms 2/. (v) The concept of being economically active in agriculture also gives rise to numerous distortions as, very frequently, only men and women between the ages of 15 and 60 are included as economically active with a 0.7 weighting for female labor (cf. Furnemont, How to marry arable farming with animal husbandry, p. 17). In fact, more than 10% (11% at Byumba) of agricultural labor was provided by children under 15 and by the elderly over 60. Although men and women quite frequently work together, there is nevertheless a clear-cut distinction between the tasks they perform, the role of women being predominant in both arable farming and animal husbandry. Little information is available on this, but the initial results of a survey made in 1959 in the pilot paysannat of Muhero on 6 families for 18 months are fairly clear and confirm the substance of these observations. Division of labor between men and women 13. The survey was concerned with the "justification" for a 12 hour day. A little more than one-fifth of this period appeared to be devoted to activities other than work such as meals, rest, visits, meetings, etc. The balance of some 10 hours per day was broken down as follows: 1/ Land does not belong to the farmer but to the State. 2/ At Byumba 69% of production unit chiefs indicate they acknowledge a segment of lineage and/or a lineage chief.  ANNEX I Page 7 Table 1: DIVISION OF LABOUR Relative importance Division between in total men women a. Domestic activities 15.5% 10 90 b. Processing activities 5.1% 5 95 c. Marketing (markets) 1.2% 51 49 d. Handicrafts 1.7% 1 99 e. Animal husbandry 10.7% 44 56 f. Food crops 34.5% 21 79 g. Banana plantation 0.7% 93 7 h. Coffee trees (some 200) 23.0% 30 70 i. Outside work 7.6% 66 34 Total (all work) 100.0% 27 73 Subtotal (f+g+h) 58.2% 25 75 (i) Even if the workforce is provided primarily by the family, the extent to which outside labor is obtained in the traditional form of mutual aid (kuguzania) or on a wage- paying basis is by no means negligible 1/, especially at the time of the principal bottleneck in the agricultural year, i.e., at plowing time in the main growing season September- October. Mutual aid is practised both amongst relatives and amongst neighbors. (ii) A proportiQn of working hours, which may be substantial on some farms, is set aside for non-agricultural activities like handicrafts and trading. This information, which should be supplemented with detailed regional studies, is included for the sole reason of making it clear that in practice there is no such thing as a homogeneous farm but merely a series of overlapping sub- systems. 1/ At Byumba 33% of families avail themselves of outside workers. It averages 34 days per production unit per annum.  ANNEX 1 Page 8 14. According to the nature of a problem, it may be handled at any *one of the following levels: part of the isambu, the household or one of its members (man, woman, child) the immediate neighborhood, the colline, the communal sector or the commune, the segment of lineage or the lineage itself 1/. The disparities between farms 15. If a more sophisticated breakdown of the concept of farm is needed, that of the average farm is open to even greater criticisms. So far as size is concerned, the average of 1 ha conceals wide disparities. 16. First of all there are the paysannats, whose existence goes back to the end of the fifties and which are currently in course of completion. They represent the first flaw in the picture of a society of homogeneous farms: they accounted for 38,000 families in 1975 i.e., some 5% of the total number of the family farms, they are in an "advantageous" socioeconomic position and, in any event, stand in a class by themselves. Their average area is between 1.8 and 2 ha and they occupy well-designed plots. Their infrastructures, es- pecially water supplies, are more highly developed and the extension services available to them generally have denser coverage and are better equipped. Nevertheless, however favored they may be, those farmers who receive a paysannat plot are now increasingly faced with the question of how to "find" an isambu for each of their sons. The only solutions they have to adopt are the coexistence of two or more ingo on the same parcel, or departure of young people for hypothetical virgin lands, and both are unsatisfactory. 17. In the second place, the figure of around I ha usually adopted for the average area of family farms is never more than an estimated statistical mean and little is known of the spread in the sizes around this mean. The major factor in this spread is undoubtedly the differences between various regional situations. Here the note on the Availability and Use of Land represents an initial attempt to evaluate these on the basis of a breakdown of the mean by prefecture. 18. The table below illustrates this breakdown and shows the relative margin of error indicated in the technical note. 1/ For example, a food-producing activity involves the participation of women. Seed multiplication in the Setaria (panic grass) fields and work in the tree-nurseries (afforestation) can only be undertaken at the communal level or at the level of the communal sector. In prac- tice, these factors can be shown in the form of a matrix: functions- objectives/decision-making level.  ANNEX 1 Page 9 Table 2: AREAS OF FAMILY FARMS BY PREFECTURE Prefecture Family Farm (ares) 15% marginal error Butare 78.4 66.6 90.2 Byumba 83.8 71.2 96.4 Cyangugu 101.8 86.5 117.1 Gikongoro 99.3 84.4 114.2 Gisenyi 79.5 67.6 91.4 Gitarama 98.7 83.9 113.5 Kibungo 210.3 178.8 241.8 Kibuye 102.0 86.7 117.3 Kigali 135.0 114.8 155.3 Ruhengeri 115.0 97.8 132.3 Rwanda 103.6 88.1 119.1 19. Regional disparities are not, however, confined to divergences from average areas. The differences in soil quality, steepness of slopes and above all, altitude, affecting temperature and rainfall are all very significant factors contributing to heterogenity. Highland regions especially the Zaire- Nile ridge, may be regarded as less well favored than the rest of the country and extended growing cycles make them particularly vulnerable to any, even minimal changes, in the rainfall pattern: the 2,000 m contour is an ecological ceiling for coffee, bananas and even beans which are replaced by peas. More- over, even if recent developments in the cultivation of pyrethrum and tea and those expected in the case of wheat, potatoes and barley can be off-set against the relative drawbacks of these regions, it is difficult to assign highland farmers, comprising 15 to 20% of the country's population, to any "average" category. 20. Turning to animal husbandry, although its distribution is unknown, current estimates indicate that all cattle holdings are concentrated in the hands of 20 to 25% of the family farms, a situation that inhibits the idea of combining arable farming with stockraising.  ANNEX I Page 10 21. On this point, and with reference to the disparities in individual situations in general, the socio-economic study of Byumba prefecture provides many insights that can certainly be applied in qualitative and perhaps even quantitative terms to the rest of the country. The study mainly points to a wide social disparity in all respects, and one that is progressively increas- ing. Two separate classes of farmers coexist on the collines: the abakungu (singular: umukungu, i.e., rich) and the abacyene (singular: umucyene, i.e. poor - a category that also includes those farms managed by a woman alone, usually a widow). The first of these usually have an isambu three times larger than the second and they account for a little more than one-third of all the farms. The distribution of farm areas is not normal, but rather bimodal, the two modes corresponding roughly to the averages for the two major socio-economic "classes". The overall average size of farms is 1.60 ha, those of the abakungu (rich) averaging 2.83 ha and those of the abacyene (poor and widows) 0.92 ha. It follows therefore that in Byumba prefecture: (i) 36% of the farms have less than 80 ares (half the average); (ii) 35% of the farms have between 80 and 160 ares (between half the average and the average); (iii) 29% of the farms have more than 160 ares (the average) and the largest are 5 times the size of the average. It can be expected that the same distribution patterns apply to the other areas in the country, in which case the national average of 1.03 ha is mislead- ing in describing the distribution of land in Rwanda as the proportion of farms smaller than one hectare is much larger than the statistical mean would indicate.  ANNEX 2 Page 1 RWANDA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REVIEW EXTENSION SERVICES SCOPE, SYSTEMS AND METHODS 1. Since extension activities are centered on the dissemination of technical innovations among farmers, major technical innovations that are proposed should first be reviewed. 2. Since 1969 ISAR (Institute of Agronomic Sciences of Rwanda) has been experimenting at the Rubona station with "fermettes" that farmers have been encouraged to adopt as models. These fermettes are based on integrated crop and livestock farming 1/, and for erosion control use orderly Setaria hedgerows, providing an excellent source of forage. Their main characteristics are: (i) Area: 1.5 ha, distributed as follows: Food crops 0.5 ha, bananas 0.2 ha, coffee trees 0.1 ha, forage crops 0.3 ha, improved fallow under Mucuna 0.1 ha, erosion control system 0.24 ha, and housing 0.05 ha. (ii) Cows with calf, kept up to 10 months in permanent stalls, supplying 12 tons of manure per annum. (iii) Cowshed built of cement and plastic sheeting, with corruga- ted iron roof, manure pit and tank to catch rainwater. The total cost of the installation is RF 19,400, (US$200), to which should be added the price of the cow i.e., approximately RF 10,000. 3. The Ministry of Agriculture has adopted the ISAR model. The strategy proposed concentrates on the following areas 2/. (i) erosion control; (ii) organic manure; (iii) cultivated fallow (Mucuna planted with maize); 1/ Furnemont: Comment marier l'agriculture et l'elevage. (How to combine cropfarming with stockraising) ISAR, 1974, 64 pp. 2/ Preliminary draft plan 1977-81, Ministry of Agriculture, pp. 13-20.  ANNEX 2 Page 2 (iv) crop rotation: (v) other improved cultivation methods (row seeding, proper densities, second dressing); (vi) chemical fertilizers (vii) improved seed (viii) protection of plant health (ix) storage of produce (x) agricultural credit. 4. Principal technical problems. (i) The ideal model farm covers 1.5 ha, preferably contiguous. At the time when the experiment was started, this was the average size for Rwandese farms, but now the average farm size is only 1 ha and the model cannot be applied to farms smaller than this. Therefore the model cannot be applied to two-thirds of Rwandese farms. There is a submodel for sheep, but it would not provide enough manure, as sheep only produce 600 kg manure each as against 12 tons for a cow and a calf, and it can be viewed only as an interim measure leading to the purchase of a cow. (ii) The proposed model, at RF 19,400, is still relatively costly and sophisticated, with corrugated iron roof, cement and plastic sheeting, and although it is now essential to introduce it on a large scale to the rural sector it should be in a more simplified form. Experiments on these lines have just begun in Nyakabanda commune 1/, on the Kibuye farm project supported with Swiss aid, and on the Mayaga project which distributes improved bulls, in collaboration with Office de Bugesera et Mayaga. In the Icyanya Paysannat it is planned to develop small demonstration farms which will, however, be carried out by hired labor and not by the settlers themselves. (iii) Regarding soil conservation and improved fertility, as the technique of erosion-control with hedges of Setaria splendida reduces the need for the heavy work 1/ In the stalls that were visited the only cash outlay was for nails.  ANNEX 2 Page 3 involved in digging ditches and also provides a source of forage, its use should be extended. Similarly, it is essential to increase manure production and the incorporation of organic matter in the soil, either manure or Mucuna, to maintain soil quality and thus increase its productivity. With erosion control and a soil that is not too degraded, it would seem that the application of fertilizers is the next stage in the process of technical intensification. In Rwanda little research has been done in this field, and the application of fertilizer has been confined to indus- trial crops i.e. coffee and especially tea. It does appear, however, from the experience of the FAO Burundi fertilizer project amongst other, that the fertilizing of food crops on soils that are not yet degraded and are protected against erosion can give excellent results, in some cases, doubling yields. This, together with the current fall in fertilizer prices, ensures that its correct use will be economically worthwhile 1/. (iv) ISAR does not seem to have succeeded in developing varieties of all crops that are clearly more productive and resistant than the local varieties. The problems regarding storage of potatoes and increasing yields of bananas have not really been solved, while these are both very important crops in the farm economy. Any policy aimed at limiting the size of banana plantations is going to meet with heavy opposition, both from an economic and sociological standpoint as bananas currently provide the best income per hectare and per tuan-day and banana beer is associated with important social occasions. The solution, therefore, is to be sought through an improve- ment in banana productivity and a thinning out of plantations, to permit intercropping. (This practice is already fairly widespread). (v) It seems that the coffee tree pruning techniques recommended in Rwanda are not the most effective. It is to be hoped that contacts can be developed between ISAR or OCIR and other African countries, for example, Kenya. 5. Suggestions and recommendations on techniques (i) The priority requirement at this stage is the dissemination and adaptation of the "fermette" model i.e. erosion control 1/ Rwanda is planning the establishment of a calcium cyanamide plant, the utilization of natural (and even volcanic) trachytes and the possible installation of a urea manufacturing unit (using methane gas from Lake Kivu).  ANNEX 2 Page 4 with Setaria, stall-fed stock, incorporation of manure, etc. Priority might be given to the establishment of these "fermettes" as part of various development projects, in the paysannats, at training centers for key personnel e.g. Butare and Kibuye and farmers, in CERARs 1/, etc. At an early stage a data sheet should be prepared for each "fermette" indicating farm area, area of forage crops, types of stock, amount of manure, investment cost, method of water supply, principal results obtained, etc. On the basis of periodic meetings conducted by ISAR and the extension services, the data could be reviewed and alternative sub-models proposed (with cattle, with sheep, with partial housing of stock and with various types of cowsheds and systems of water supply) adapted to the varying conditions under which the farmers live. When a farmer has sufficient land but has no cattle to start with, traditional herding and cattle loan systems can be adopted. Group discussions among farmers would make it possible to work out for each region the contracts that would be most appropriate and acceptable to both parties. (ii) Imagination and research are required to find technical solutions for the small farms of less than 1 ha which are the backbone of the Rwandese farming system. Hence, the defeatism of technicians and researchers is a source of considerable concern. "There is no solution" is a comment heard only too often. Special programs should be planned for these miniature holdings such as beekeeping, peppers, silk worms 2/, fruit cultivation etc, and marshland should be set aside for them especially for vegetables and fish-farming. They should also be included in large-scale communal reforestation programs for hill and mountain tops. The possibility of a cooperative effort in specific areas such as animal husbandry to produce manure, between two or three kin groups or neighboring farms should also be discussed with the farmers. (iii) As a corollary to erosion control and the incorporation in the soil of organic matter, special emphasis should be placed on fertilizer experiments on the farms under ISAR supervision. FAO support would be desirable. 1/ Centre d'Education Rurale et Artisanale du Rwanda - CERAR - for post primary education. See footnote in Annex 5, page 4. 2/ The value of silk by weight is very high, a factor of great importance to landlocked countries. It offers excellent market prospects. Silk appears technically feasible in Rwanda (cf Colonial experiments). This might involve a program of experiments with ISAR and the CERARS.  ANNEX 2 Page 5 (iv) The gradual regionalization of certain crops, in particular peas, potatoes, peanuts and soya by ecological zone appears necessary, i.e. mountains - upland, intermediate and lower altitudes; the Center; the East. Present extension sytem 6. The existing system is hierarchical; research topics are fed into the Ministry of Agricultures which issues instructions to agricultural technicians at the prefecture level, who in turn pass them on to the communes and field advisors of which there are approximately 1,000 for 143 communes or 800,000 farms. This very typical system has certain evident defects: (i) dilution of content in the course of transmission (from researchers to advisors); (ii) failure to adapt content to local needs; (iii) entrusting final dissemination to an advisor under training who has limited knowledge and lacks supervision, regular instructions and resources, especially transportation. It is generally agreed that, in many cases, the advisor knows less than the farmer and does not serve a very useful purpose. In an effort to solve these problems, an attempt has been made under a FAQ project (RWA/74/002 - Agricultural Extension) to retrain personnel already at work and improve existing methods in ten pilot collines. 7. For its parts, the Improved Seed Service (Service de Semences Selectionees - SSS) has established communal agricultural centers throughout the country. Usually located near the seat of the commune and cultivated by staff (in the communal work program - umuganda) or by farmers, these centers are able to distribute improved seed and minor plowing equipment and spread improved techniques. The project is currently receiving Belgian support and negotiations are under way to expand this service. 8. In the paysannats, extension services are much denser, but the level of motivation is, if anything, lower. Improvements proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture (Preliminary Draft of the Second Plan) 9. During the next five-year plan, the Ministry of Agriculture proposes to retain the existing extension system but to intensify its coverage to one field advisor for each sector i.e., approximately 10 per commune, together with 2 agricultural technicians and one A2 veterinarian per commune.  ANNEX 2 Page 6 One graduate agronomist, one graduate veterinarian, one assistant agricultural technician, one forestry assistant and one stockbreeding assistant will be assigned to each prefecture. This staff will require housing, equipment, transportation facilities, and travel allowances. The estimated investment cost is RF 682.3 million (US$6.7 million) over 5 years (i.e., RF 136.5 million per annum), with forecast operating costs of RF 302.2 million per annum, more than double the current budget. The problem is to know whether this very much more expensive system will prove more effective. The shortcomings noted will still apply and, in particular, the field advisor will have considerable difficulty coping with 500 farms, even if he is provided with a bicycle. To be effective, the ratio should be approximately one advisor per 100 or 200 farms instead of the present I to 800 and the system of supervision very strict. Communal training center system 10. A very interesting experiment has been taking place for some years in the commune of Nyakabanda, and in January 1976 a decision of the prefec- tural council was made to broaden its base to cover the whole of the Gitarama prefecture. The Communal Action Plan (PAC) proposed by the Ministry of Planning was also inspired by this experiment, envisaged as the basis for a national strategy. It involves the formation of teams of ten families selected by the farmers, with a regular training system of team leaders of three one- week courses each year together with follow-up, and discussion sessions with farmers to accelerate their awareness of the constraints of the agrarian system. Joint activities, such as farming, nutrition, hygiene and home economics, are undertaken among women and, among young people, farming, building and carpentry. The results are very encouraging, especially in erosion-control and on the small farms. Integration of key farmers into the administrative structure. 11. The system now proposed, based on the Nyakabanda experiment, grew out of the following considerations: (i) Farmers are convinced whenever they see positive results achieved by other farmers. However, it is widely recognized that officials in research institutes fail to explain modern techniques adequately and that farmers seldom learn much from the demonstration plots of such officials in Africa. (ii) Farmers accept the advice of officials only if they are well-informed and are capable of dealing with the many practical problems that arise on the farms. They will not follow set prescriptions. (iii) An effective administrative system must necessarily be very costly.  ANNEX 2 Page 7 12. The following, therefore, appears to be needed at the level of the commune - the basic unit of development: (i) key farmers chosen by the communities. A ratio of 1/10 seems reasonable. If the ratio is too low, 1/100 for example, the farmer becomes no more than a "pilot farmer", is isolated and divorced from his community, and seeks remuneration only for himself. When the outlook of 10% of the farmers is pro- gressive, there is normally solidarity and emulation and the beginning of a mass impact. In the case of Rwanda, with the introduction of units of the Popular Revolutionary Movement corresponding to 50 families, it appears desirable to recruit a leader and four other farmers for each unit. There should also be periodic elections of key farmers, either annually or every two years. (ii) Communal Training Center. This could be combined with communal agricultural centers providing fields for practical work and such facilities as stores. The center would be geared initially to the training of adults in agriculture, and would thus be open to young leaders, cooperative leaders and craftsmen, gradually covering all the training needs of the commune. (iii) Limited but quality staff, provided with working facilities, responsible for training and follow-up on a regular basis. This could mean two A2 agricultural technicians, one con- centrating on follow-up and the other on training, one A2 veterinarian and three to five extension workers, at the A3 level, or former field advisors selected and retrained over a period of at least nine months. 13. The situation in an average commune might be as follows 1/; (i) average commune: 30,000 persons or 5,000 "farms" (ii) key farmers: 500 (iii) training: concentrating only on one theme at a time, one week every six months in groups of 25, i.e., 40 weeks of training. Another possibility, assuming 70% average participation, would be to take groups of say 40 and to hold 3 sessions per annum (36 weeks), or groups of 40 for 2 sessions each year, which would have the advantage of leaving the center free for other training activities for young people, trades, cooperatives, etc. 1/ This is simply a typical model, which will, of course, have to be modified according to the characteristics of each commune.  ANNEX 2 Page 8 (iv) One extension agent to each 150 or so key farmers. He would participate in the training of these farmers and it is, of course, essential that he should know exactly what they have learnt in order to help them apply and spread their knowledge. He would conduct a regular follow-up program (1 or 2 units or collines per day). His time would be organized as follows: (v) 10 months of the year, one week at the center plus three weeks' follow-up. (vi) 1 month's refresher training (vii) 1 month's leave. (viii) At the level of the communal center, the two A2 agricultural technicians would share the work of training and follow-up. One could handle three quarters of the training and one quarter of the follow-up and the other, three quarters of the follow-up and one quarter of the training. It is always highly desirable that a training officer should consistently verify the results of his training program in the field. (ix) The burgomaster would continue to be the coordinator and leader of the communal team, responsible in particular for the recruitment of key farmers and for supervising operations.  ANNEX 2 Page 9 125 Leaders 1 vuLgarisateur (niveau A3) Extension Agent 125 Leaders CCS - CommunaL Training Center 125 Leaders Bourgmestre A2 superviseur A2 formateur 1 VuLgarisateur 1 VuLgarisateur (niveau A3) (niveau A3) Extension 2A veterinaire Extension Agent Agent 125 Leaders 1 vuLgarisateur (niveau A3 Extension Agent Une commune type Extension Work Among Women 14. Women play a fundamental role in crop and livestock farming in Rwanda, accounting for more than 60% of the work done. Unfortunately, the main emphasis in extension work among women in social centers, nutrition centers, and family groups, lies outside agriculture but rather concerns nutrition, sewing, cooking, embroidery, child care, etc. while the female cadres themselves only have a limited training in agriculture. This leads to a sense of frustration among women who would rather learn to farm than to sew, and among key female workers who cannot answer questions put to them by women interested in farming. 15. In October 1976, it is planned to open a school in Nyagahanga (Byumba prefecture) to train female agricultural technicians at the A2 level. Although it would clearly have been preferable to develop co-educational schools with a view to future collaboration between men and women, this is nevertheless a good move that represents an initial effort to deal with the problem. Prior to the graduation of the first female agricultural techni- cians in 1980, it is essential that all efforts to upgrade the status of women should include a substantial crop and stock farming component (at least one third) and that all other activities especially nutrition and cooking, should be closely tied in with agricultural programs. This approach will require coordination at the commune level (between the female field advisor and the extension agent, the CCS, the social center and the nutrition center,  ANNEX 2 Page 10 and also the retraining of existing women cadres and the modification of programs at the various Ecoles. I/ Extension work amongst young people 16. Agricultural training in primary schools and CERARs must be inten- sified and brought into line with regional extension programs, and the communal training center must also train young team leaders. It should be noted, however, that activities among the young are likely to be successful only if preceded by an awareness campaign among adults covering the same subjects. The young will also be given additional training in trades and building methods. 17. Although extension work is conducted at the communal level, it is supervised and supported at the prefectural and national levels. The prefecture is responsible specifically for the regionalization of technical know-how, the follow-up of communes and the retraining of cadres. At the national level, the Extension Service can be regarded as the backbone of the Agriculture Division. 18. Any well-organized extension program depends on good liaison, in both directions between research and extension activities. As in most African countries, this link continues to be tenuous in Rwanda. 19. To strengthen it, the following immediate steps are recommended: (i) research and extension workers should work together on the adaptation problems of small farms in a rural context; (ii) research and extension workers should work together on the technical solutions to the problems of the small farm such as crop husbandry, peppers, silk worms, etc.; (iii) research workers should participate each year in the retraining of cadres at the prefecture level, and research workers could distribute and discuss various technical instructions and notes and hear the views of farmers on the difficulties encountered in their application. 20. At the level of the commune, the cost of the various systems proposed for agriculture would be substantially shown in Table 1. 1/ A UNESCO consultant, Mrs. M-1. Boschloos, making similar comments, recommended that the present Section F of the Institut Pedagogique National, which specializes in the so-called female skills (home economics and dressmaking) should be converted into a co-educational development techniques section.  ANNEX 2 Page 11 Table 1: Cost per Commune of Varying Proposals for Extension Services Type of Expense Present Situation Ministry of Agriculture System Proposed Draft Plan I - Salaries Moniteurs 7 x 46 800 = 327 000 10 x 46 800 = 468 000 A3 1 x 117 600 = 117 600 3 x 117 600 = 352 800 4 x 117 600 = 470 400 A2 1 x 146 400 = 146 400 2 x 146 400 = 292 800 2 x 146 400 = 292 8QO 591 600 1 113 600 763 200 II - Housing 117 400 1 x 50 000 = 500 000 3 x 50 000 = 150 000 2 x 200 000 = 400 000 1 050 000 III - Eguipment 10 x 10 000 = 100 000 3 x 10 000 = 30 000 4 x 10 000 = 40 000 2 x 10 000 = 20 000 2 x 10 000 = 20 000 150 000 60 000 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 IV - Vehicules = environ 30 X de = 2 x 500 000 = 200 000 4 x Z75QQ = 100 000 5 ~~~~~~~3 (vehicule leger) (moto) 2 x 500 0QQ 333 000 3 433 000 V - Travel Allowance 15.j. x 12 mois 15 x 12 x 2 x 100 F. = 36 000 x tOO x I 18 000 VI - Mileage 10 x 3 000 = 30 000 Allowance (bicyclette) 3 x 3 000 = 9 000 4 x 1 OOOkm 2 x 3 000 6 000 x 5F./km = 20 000 x 20F./km = 120 000 2 x 3 OOOkm x 20F./km = 120 000 159 000 140 000 VII - Feminine Investist Investist Training 3 000 000 = 750 000 8 Fonctiont = 400 000 VIII - Retraining Investist Estimation VIII Stf- Re1rn OC) Q1 = 215 000 forfaitaire = 100 000 5 ans x 14 c Fonctiont 1 7 000 = 125 000 14 communes 340 000 T O T A L 769 999 3 048 600 2 664 200  ANNEX 2 Page 12 NOTES TO TABLE 1 Housing. Since the beginning of 1976, the Government has been posting agents to their home communes, but they can now use their own housing and official accommodation is no longer required. The staff can apply for bank loans. Vehicles. The best approach appears to be by Government loan, the vehicle becoming the official's property. According to the geography of each commune, the most appropriate vehicle will be either a bicycle, a motrocycle or a small car. Training of farmers. According to its size, the type of construction and the level of popular participation, the cost of a center will vary between RF 2 and RF 11 million. A figure of RF 3 million would cover a first segment of buildings and equipment, devoted exclusively to agriculture and built with help from the population. So far as the operation of the center is concerned, the cost of food for 500 trainees can be estimated at 500 x 10 days x RF 60/day, i.e.; RF 300,000, to which should be added staff and miscellaneous costs amounting to RF 100,000. Financing. Assuming that the construction of the center can be financed with external aid, the agricultural costs to be met by Rwanda would be multiplied by 2.26 and would increase from RF 769,000 to RF 1,741,200. As the country is 95% agricultural, at the national level, the agricul- ture budget will have to be slightly more than doubled, from only 4.3% of the national budget in 1975 to a target figure of 10% over a period of 5 years. Increasing it to 5% in 1976, 6% in 1977, 7% in 1978, 8% in 1979, 9% in 1980 and 10% in 1981, would approximately bring it into line with the expenditures required. In practice, communal budgets have to cover a large proportion of the expenditures and part of the national agricultural budget increase should therefore be allocated to these. Extension methods 21. Whatever system is chosen, the most effective method over the long term will be one which succeeds in convincing farmers of the need to make changes in the agrarian system. The main stages of any such system will be as follows: (i) analysis of the agrarian system with the farmers, i.e. the old balanced system 1/, the constraining factors, and the need for change in order to survive and provide for the future of their children. 1/ To start by telling the farmers that their techniques are bad will provoke a defensive and aggressive reaction. By getting them to discover that the old techniques - the lengthy fallow period, for example - were good but are no longer applicable at this time, the way will be paved for them to accept technical innovations.  ANNEX 2 Page 13 (ii) selection of farmers for experiments with technical innovations. (iii) launching of experiments with training and follow-up. (iv) group evaluation and discussion of results obtained. This can often be done using traditional yardsticks such as the amounts of harvested in relation to amounts sown and the different units of volume used in the region, to compare the results on plots with and without innovations. Uncomplicated economic calculations (income and expenses for each technical solution) can be demonstrated with simple visual aids such as the flannel graph. Visits to neighboring communes or the showing of slides made in Rwanda could also generate discussion. (v) If the results obtained by the experimental farmers are conclusive, their universal adoption will be largely spontaneous. This process can be speeded up by the use of simple and appropriate audio-visual aids, including brochures in Kinyarwanda, posters and radio broadcasts. These aids are already being tried in the Nyakabanda experiment, by INADES, and in the FAO soil conservation project. There is an urgent need for the extension service to coordinate all these efforts in order to avoid their being dissipated and wasted. (vi) Annual evaluation will give rise to new needs and therefore to new experimental programs which in turn will require evaluation and wider application. Such measures will ensure that extension activities give increasing support to experimentation by farmers and are no longer a mere application of cut and dried prescriptions from above, often ill-adapted to local conditions. With such highly motivated farmers as the Rwandese, such methods are un- doubtedly the most effective in both the short and the long terms as wit- ness the results already obtained at Nyakabanda using similar methods. They can, however, only be adopted on the assumption that a sound relationship exists between supervisory personnel and farmers with mutual trust, and free discussions; personnel who can act as advisors to the farmers and as catalysts for their thinking. 22. This approach is rather far removed from the view of many Rwandese cadres. For them, the farmers are just "children" and "incompetents", "the only way to deal with them is by coercion", and "they have to be broken in ". This view conflicts with what the mission was able to observe and hear. It is the result of a technocratic approach that fails to take the time to discuss matters with farmers and to understand their reasons for the rejection  ANNEX 2 Page 14 of innovations, which may be that the projects are ill-adapted to the real structure of the farms or farmers lack a cash surplus for investment, or a substantial increase in work is required to generate only a meager supple- mentary income, etc. If coercive methods were applied, it would be necessary to strengthen the machinery of repression which would very probably generate passive resistance on the part of the population. Any temporary success would be followed by prolonged setbacks. Colonial methods based on these principLes always proved to be ineffective in the long-term. Establishment of a new extension system 23. The new extension system must be viewed as a national option and not as just one more experiment. All new projects should be based on it and provide communal training centers as part of their infrastructure. However, if strengthening of the extension service at the national and prefectural levels appears necessary (with an organization to provide audio-visual aids) it would seem better to avoid spreading the effort too thin and to give the new organization a full-scale test in one or two prefectures 1/. The real need is for mass action and to be able to see how relations develop between prefecture and communes. The first stage would be devoted mainly to develop- ing the awareness of cadres and farmers, to setting up teams and electing key farmers and to the selection and retraining of cadres. In many places, farmer training can begin in temporary facilities which are often readily available in the communes. Permanent facilities would be built gradually, and their construction could also serve as on-the-job training for young farmers or CERAR students. If the experiment is successful, it could be introduced into other prefectures after two or three years and then extended throughout the country. In view of the multipurpose role of the Communal training Centers, involving a number of government ministries (Agriculture, Interior, Youth, Social Affairs and Planning), perhaps some form of coordination, or the direct supervision of a specialized department of the Office of the President, will be needed. (See Annex 7 on development structures). 24. Summary of principal suggestions Technical problems (i) The priority task at this time is the dissemination and adaptation of the "fermettes" 2/ model in a rural context. Priority could be given to the establishment of "fermettes" as part of various development projects, in the paysannats, 1/ The Gitarama Prefecture has already begun the experiment, but now needs follow-up and support. The Gikongoro prefecture, where the population faces serious food shortages, could also be selected and be given the support of a "restructured" FAO project. 2/ Small farms.  ANNEX 2 Page 15 at training centers for officials and farmers and at CERARs. On the basis of the various experiments, it should be possible to obtain submodels adapted to the different conditions under which the farmers live. (ii) Imagination and a research effort are required to work out technical solutions for small farms (bee-keeping, peppers, silkworms, afforestation, marshlands, fish-farming, fruit trees, etc.). (iii) Fertilizer experiments should be extended. (iv) Crops should be gradually regionalized. Extension system (v) The extension system should be based on key farmers (10% of the population), a communal training center (CCS) and a limited but quality staff, provided with working facilities. (vi) A special effort must be made with women who account for approximately 60% of the agricultural labor force. All efforts to upgrade the status of women must include a substantial crop and stock farming component that should comprise at least one third of the curriculum and all other activities, especially nutrition and cooking, should be closely tied in with agriculture. This approach will require coordination at the commune level, the retraining of existing women cadres, and the modification of programs at the various Ecoles. (vii) Agricultural training in primary schools and CERARs should be intensified and brought into line with regional extension programs. Communal training centers will also train young team leaders. (viii) The links between research and extension activities should be improved to include joint action on the adaptation of small farms and technical solutions to the problem of small farms, and participation of research workers in retraining national and prefectural officials). (xi) Whatever extension system is established, it will require an increased financial effort that should be approximately double current expenditure levels. Extension methods (x) The most effective methods, over both the short and long terms, are those that convince the farmers of the need to change the agrarian system. Rwandese farmers already possess sufficient motivation to experiment with technical innovations.  ANNEX 2 Page 16 (xi) Methods based on coercion are to be strongly discouraged because of the cost of the machinery of repression; passive resistance of farmers; and ineffectiveness over the long term. Establishment of the system (xii) The new system should be regarded as a national option although, initially, it should be put to the test in one or two prefectures.  ANNEX 3 Page 1 RWANDA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REVIEW MARKETING OF FARM PRODUCTS A. INTRODUCTION 1. The chief characteristics of Rwandese rural economy is that it is a relatively non-commercial economy in which about 60% of the production is consumed on the farm, the only exceptions being such cash crops as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, cinchona, (quinine), cotton and export vegetables (Table 1). Trade within the country is increasing, however, partly because of the growth of the towns, chiefly Kigali and Butare, but also as a result of regional imbalances, some high altitude regions having been more seriously affected than others by the unusual weather conditions of 1974 and 1975. This situ- ation, together with the government's desire to start Rwanda on the road to a market economy by encouraging regional specialization in farm and livestock production, has led to a number of recent administrative measures to promote and organize marketing. The most important of them is clearly the establishment of OPROVIA in 1975 (National Office for Development and Marketing of Foodstuffs and Livestock Products). 2. Rather than complicating a system that is in course of development or strengthening a natural tendency to nationalize any sector that encounters growth problems, the recommendations here will be primarily intended to improve structures and rationalize existing methods. Tableau 1 - Importance de la commercialisation (en %) Table 1 - Scale of Marketing Pourcentage commercialise/ Secteur Percentage Marketed Agriculture vivriere/Foodcrop production 30.8% Agriculture pour industries et exportations/ 100.0% Industrial and export crops Elevage/Livestock 35.1% Produits forestiers/Forest products 59.5% Peche/Fish 19.4% Total Production Rurale/Total Rural Production 41.9% Mines et undustries/Mines and Industries 87.2% Activites tertiaries/Tertiary activities 100.0% Total P.I.B./Total GNP 69.5% Source: Ministere du Plan - Annee 1976 - Projections.  ANNEX 3 Page 2 B. MARKETING OF TRADITIONAL CROPS 3. By "Traditional" foodstuffs are meant products that constitute the staple diet of the Rwandese: bananas, legumes (peas and beans), cereals (sorghum, maize, eleusine) and root crops (sweet potatoes, potatoes cassava, cush-cush, yams). Only very rough production figures on these crops are available, and information on their marketing is even scantier, both with respect to channels and to prices and quantities. Estimated Volumes 4. According to Table 1, about 30% of the total value of foodstuffs is marketed or traded in one way or another. There are two sources of data on quantities: the 1970 Economic Accounts and the 1975 Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. Tableau 2 - Importance de la commercialisation Table 2 - Percentage of Crops Marketing Selon Comptes Economiques 1970 Selon Minagri 1975 Source Economic Accounts 1970 Source Min. of Agr. 1975 Tonnages/Tons % Tonnages/Tons % Bananes/Bananas 820.400 50 520.200 30 Haricots/Beans 24.000 12 38.200 25 Pois/Peas 10.200 16 13.200 23 Sorgho/Sorghum 61.200 39 47.600 33 Mais/Maize 6.000 9 14.800 22 Eleusine/Millet - e 400 15 Patates douces/ 67.000 10 161.900 24 Sweet Potatoes Pommes de Terre/ 15.000 14 53.900 36 Potatoes Manioc/Cassava 8.400 6 78.900 20 Colocase/Coco Yams 100 e 2.700 l' Igname/Yams 100 e 700 12 Ensemble 1,012.400 31 932.500 27  ANNEX 3 Page 3 It is clear that, if the figure of 30% can be generally applied to both volume and value there are nevertheless marked differences between one product and another and one estimate and another even allowing for the fact that the two sets of figures are separated by five years. In fact both estimates are equally without foundation to the extent that no effective research has been undertaken in this field. Many quantitative reports on market flows, channels and prices do, however, exist. Flows, Channels and Prices 5. In the absence of any national survey, a regional study 1/ has made it possible to confirm the existence of a well-known phenomenon arising out of the nature of the trade in foodstuffs. Much, possibly half, of this trade takes place within a very limited geographic (or socioeconomic) unit and shows a rather marked pattern of staggered reciprocity. In other words, farmers at the level of the colline frequently engage in reciprocal trading according to the size of their respective harvests or the acuteness of their need for cash. These are not commercial transactions in the accepted sense but represent a pseudo-commercial regularization of varying production situations within a limited territorial area. This pattern applies to all the products discussed here but more especially to maize, to the beer crops (banana and sorghum), and to root crops, except potatoes. 6. Apart from a considerable flow of bananas to urban markets (especially from Kibungo to Kigali), the banana is marketed in the form of beer. According to the Economic accounts, nearly 90% of the bananas are made into beer which is sold to bars or neighboring farmers and thus accounts for practically all the banana market. Much the same is true of sorghum though less is traded. In both cases, the unstable nature of the fermentation rules out effective marketing on a regional or national scale. 7. Similarly, it is partly the perishability of sweet potatoes that restricts their sale to very small areas around the place of production. Furthermore, as this rootcrop is extensively grown in Rwanda, and can adapt to nearly any altitude, the absolute value of the trade in it is small and its range limited. Cush-cush (taro) and yams are marginal and exist only as interplanted crops that vary the diet of the farmers, and are not actually marketed. 8. Cassava, the anti-famine crop introduced into Rwanda after the 1943 and 1945 famines, shows a relative increase in marketing chiefly to Kigali, from the low and medium altitude regions, in the form of dried chips. 1/ Socioeconomic study of the Prefecture of Byumba, 1974.  ANNEX 3 Page 4 9. Mention should also be made of the existence of fairly substan- tial clandestine exports of bananas (particularly the Gros Michel variety) and cassava from the Cyangugu region (Bugarama plain) to places in Burundi and Zaire. 10. The production of eleusine is very small: it replaces sorghum in high altitudes. Maize, a ubiquitous catch or cover crop, is mostly consumed fresh on the farm and only recently have sizeable quantities of cobs been seen on urban markets. A certain number of products are effectively marketed: beans, peas and potatoes. 11. The market system for potatoes is the oldest, and the only one worthy of the name. The ecological production area, the Ruhengeri region above 1,900 m altitude, is fairly well defined, and an important outlet has developed to the urban markets, particularly Kigali. Collectors in the rural markets of the production region purchase potatoes from the farmers and pack them in wicker baskets. These baskets are then sold to merchant-carriers who take them to Kigali where the potatoes are sold in a number of wholesale and retail stores. 12. Peas are marketed mostly by taking surplus production from high altitude regions into the towns. The marketing of beans, the staple of the Rwandese diet, is rather badly organized. They are generally taken from low or medium altitude regions to urban markets or to those in higher altitude regions. 13. The marketing of all three products has certain characteristics in common: (i) Producers are generally in a weak position vis-a-vis tradi- tional traders as in most cases they approach them individually at one of the country's 381 markets, except for the AIDR co- operatives at Kibungo, the O.B.M. cooperatives and a few other isolated marketing cooperatives. (ii) Surpluses are usuaLly sold to these traders by farmers for cash, generally immediately after the harvest, i.e. at a time when prices are low. Prices then rise gradually to a peak during the off-season period, i.e., September-November, preceding the next harvest. There are very wide variations in prices from one region to another, especially for beans (see table 3, p. 6). The traditional outlets are unable to correct regional quanti- tative market imbalances, as they lack market information and adequate transportation. Government Policy and Organization of Marketing 14. The policy of the government and the recent efforts it has made in the face of the problems posed by the marketing of the principal food products, can be analyzed as follows:  ANNEX 3 Page 5 (i) Promotion and encouragement of producer groups to market surpluses. (ii) Setting of floor prices (for the producer) and ceiling prices (for the consumer). (iii) Construction of strategically located storage depots in the regions to stabilize prices. (iv) Establishment of a National Office for Development and Marketing of Food Products and Livestock Products (OPROVIA). Incentives to Form Marketing Groups and Cooperatives 15. An important objective of the government is to develop the cooper- ative movement. The Ministry of Social Affairs has become the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Cooperative Movement with a department specially formed to handle cooperative affairs. The goals are ambitious: one cooperative is to be established either through supportive or by mandatory action, in each communal sector, i.e. about 1,400 in the country as a whole. At present there are about 100 cooperatives, less than half of which are approved. The best examples come from the area supervised by AIDR with some 28 cooperatives in Kibungo Prefecture covering over 7,000 families, and the O.B.M. area with 14 cooperatives including about 17,000 families. However, even in these two areas, they are not completely successful: frequently farmers prefer to sell their produce to merchants rather than the cooperatives, sometimes because they are nearer and sometimes because they are already in debt to the merchants. Determination of Floor and Ceiling Prices 16. The National Price Commission was set up in August 1974 under the price-control Law of July 5, 1967. Its function is to establish prices and margins for all products, domestic or foreign, traded in Rwandese ter- ritory, as well as to set charges for road transportation. This is an enormous task, possibly somewhat out of proportion to its resources. The following principle applies to foodstuffs: the commission sets a minimum price to the producer for the coming crop year and a maximum price to the consumer. In any case, the Price Commission (which meets whenever necessary, but in principle every six months to consider food prices) made a start, early in 1975, by setting prices for beans, and later, in June 1976, for bananas and potatoes. It also set prices for wheat and fish. Most of the other foodstuffs should have been reviewed by the end of 1976. Prices are set by a ministerial decree and broadcast by radio. 17. Seasonal prices for beans have been set for the first half of 1976 at RF 20/kg to the producer and RF 25/kg to the consumer. This is the second occasion on which prices have been controlled as previously,  Table 3: Food Crops Market Prices 1975 PRIX DES VIVRIERS SUR LES MARCHES EN 1975 (RF par kg) Bananas Beans Peas Sorghum Maize Millet Sw. Potatoes Potatoes Cassava Coco Yams Yams Prefectures Bananas Haricots Pois Scrgho Mais Eleusine Patates doux P. de terres Manioc Colocases Ignames R S R S R S R S R S R S R S R S R S R S R S Kigali 6 7 21 36 22 40 8 15 6 14 10 20 4 8 7 15 7 12 10 20 12 20 Gitarama 7 10 21 32 24 34 7 12 8 11 - - 5 8 10 15 8 13 10 15 8 10 Butare 7 10 25 30 31 40 10 13 8 12 - - 4 7 10 12 12 16 5 7 5 7 Gikongoro 5 7 26 30 27 35 10 15 8 10 12 18 3 5 8 12 8 12 7 10 8 10 Cyangugu 5 6 19 30 20 36 12 20 5 9 -- - 7 8 11 15 9 16 10 15 5 9 Kibuye 5 5 20 34 20 36 9 18 9 16 10 18 4 8 7 13 5 8 8 9 9 11 Gisenyi 4 7 19 32 20 34 12 18 10 15 10 15 4 7 6 11 4 8 4 8 5 10 Ruhengeri 4 5 20 27 20 25 12 19 6 10 9 14 4 5 5 10 5 10 4 5 - - Byumba 4 8 20 30 18 30 8 12 6 11 13 20 3 6 8 13 10 14 10 15 - - Kibungo 4 6 20 30 20 28 8 12 9 15 - - 4 6 8 13 6 8 3 5 - - Rwanda 5 7 20 31 22 34 10 15 8 12 11 17 4 7 8 13 7 12 7 10 5 8 R - Recolte - Harvest S - Semis - Planting Source: Rapport Annuel du Ministe6re de l'Agriculture  ANNEX 3 Page 7 in early 1975, they were set at RF 20 and RF 27. There is an accompanying ministerial instruction (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs) laying down the conditions for obtaining an authorization to market beans, requiring payment of RF 1,000 to the prefectures, maintaining records of purchases and sales etc. The results are somewhat disappointing, to the extent that producers usually fail to receive the floor price as merchants pay from RF 8 to 15/kg, and final prices often exceed RF 25. 18. As for bananas, a ministerial decree of December 1975 sets prices in the Kibungo region at RF 4/kg to the producer, RF 6/kg wholesale in the Kigali market and RF 7/kg retail in that market. Moreover, it is mandatory to employ scales and to discontinue the old methods of selling by the bunch. A visit to the Kigali banana market raises serious doubts as to the practical effectiveness of these measures. 19. Potato prices have been set since July 1976 at a minimum of RF 7/kg to the producer and at RF 12/kg to the Kigali consumer. While the latter price appears to have been observed, it is certain that (at least during the harvest) the producer does not receive RF 7, but RF 3 to RF 5/kg. However, the decree is too recent for its true impact to be measured. 20. The Price Commission is also responsible for setting charges for the transportation of goods. At present the cost per ton/kg is offi- cially RF 8, although the prices actually charged are around RF 10. The Domestic Commerce Department is aware of the need for an upward revision of the official rates. Development of Storage Resources 21. Here two plans have recently surfaced: one relating to storage at the commune level, (Catholic Relief Service silos), the other, more ambitious, seeking to build up strategic buffer stocks at the regional or prefectural level in order to stabilize prices and launch a national redistribution of surpluses. The Catholic Relief Services Silos 22. The original idea was to build medium-sized silos (88 tons in 6 airtight tanks) near the nutrition centers which are supervised by CRS in order to offer the farmers visiting nutrition centers a soundly conceived system for storing their crops. Losses of stocks in the rural sector fluctuate between 15 and 35% and chiefly affect beans, peas and sorghum. The simple design of the silos, bulk storage without processing in an airtight receptacle, and their useful location within a reasonable walking distance from the production areas, permit a very low operating cost. It is a fact that in 1976 beans are being purchased for RF 20/kg and in a few months will be sold back to the same farmers who deposited them in the silos for RF 23/kg. Besides reducing losses, this should also have the effect of stabilizing  ANNEX 3 Page 8 prices and consumption over a period of time. Moreover, the farmers are assured of being able to get seed when they need it. Six of these silos have already been built (at an average cost of RF 1.8 million, including RF 0.6 nillion operating capital). Twenty more should be built by the end of 1978 (with UNICEF funds). At present no one knows what will be the position in the off-season period, sometime towards the end of the year - whether the silos have unsold surpluses or not. USAID storage depots 23. In 1974, after a study conducted at the request of the Rwandese Government, an agreement was signed with USAID for the building of 6 stores with a total capacity of 2,000 tons (4 of 250 tons and 2 of 500 tons) at 6 strategic locations of the country: i.e. Byumba, Kibungo and Kigali (lst phase) and Nyabisindu (double), Ruhengeri (double) and Cyangugu (2nd phase) for a total cost of about RF 80 million, including operating capital (RF 3.8 million) and the training of the managers. 24. The idea is to purchase, preferably from cooperatives but also from "approved" merchants, beans, peas and sorghum, to process them, bag them in plastic bags and jute sacks, and resell them in the off-season. This action should help to stabilize prices through the formation of buffer stocks (2,000 tons, representing about 10% of the estimated quantity of marketable beans), and also facilitate interregional trade. At the beginning of 1976, the Government decided to make available to the PECDA project (Foodstuffs Storage and Marketing Project) an old metal go-down built for OCIR near Nyabisindu, with a capacity of 3,500 tons, thus raising the total storage capacity of the project to 5,000 tons. 25. The first season of purchases (early 1976) provided the follow- ing information: (i) the finished depots at Kibungo, Kigali and Nyabisindu were able to store a total of 1,107 tons of beans, distributed as follows: Kibungo 410 tons (110 tons in a rented shed) Kigali 308 tons Nyabisindu 389 tons. These efforts appear to have been genuinely successful, at least in terms of quantities. (ii) the purchase price was RF 22/kg delivered to storehouse. Outside Kibungo most of the contributions were, however, made by private merchants.  ANNEX 3 Page 9 (iii) The storage cost will certainly exceed RF 3/kg: probably RF 4 for 3 to 4 months, assuming 5% for losses, and RF 7 to 8 for prolonged storage, 8-10 months. The effectiveness of malathion is limited to 2 months when a fumigation process must be employed using phostoxin. Furthermore, the fixed costs are relatively high. 26. As yet it is not known how the stored produce is to be sold. Ini- tially the Price Commission will probably raise the final price of the beans, perhaps to RF 30/kg. It has been suggested that TRAFIPRO might be the prefer- red buyer, as with its 27 branches and 10 "associate" cooperatives, it would constitute an ideal outlet. TRAFIPRO is reluctant to market foodstuffs, but it might be possible to overcome this and make a start with beans if the storage risks were assumed by the PECDA project. Another question to be resolved is the relationship between the PECDA and the central organization that was to be set up to manage and coordinate the operation of the storage facilities. For the moment OPROVIA seems to be acting alone. Establishment of a National Office for Development of the Marketing of Foodstuffs and Livestock Products (OPROVIA) 27. For a long time the Rwandese authorities have been convinced of the need to organize the domestic marketing of food and livestock products. The PECDA project therefore provided an opportunity to put an old idea into practice and a National Office was established in July 1975 to make use of the storage depots as the basis for a more rational marketing system. The new organization was to be responsible for both foodstuffs and animal pro- ducts and a plan for a separate office for animal products, ODEPRA, has been abandoned to prevent proliferation of agencies. Now, after less than a year of operation it can be affirmed that: (i) OPROVIA's terms of reference are much too ambitious: i.e. the development of food and animal production (even to financing of development projects), marketing of such production, and not simply promotion of marketing. (ii) OPROVIA for the moment has been concentrating on marketing beans (except for emergency food assistance in 1974/75), which is not per se a bad thing, but it has also been acting as if it were itself a merchant and claims to have purchased more than 4,500 tons for the early 1976 bean season, though it lacks its own storage capacity; it often encroaches on existing marketing systems and sometimes competes with the cooperatives such as the O.B.M. in their own spheres of activity and markets (contract to supply 2,735 tons of beans to the Rwandese army at RF 27/kg.). (iii) OPROVIA has to date no official and regular system of liaison with the PECDA project except through meetings of the National Economic Policy Council (CNPE) when it is represented there.  ANNEX 3 Page 10 (iv) OPROVIA plans to set up retail sales offices in Kigali and Butare, although retail sales are not really amongst its primary functions, and the two cities already have TRAFIPRO and OBM stores. In other words, OPROVIA, although it is too young for any definitive evaluation to be made, does not seem to be performing the role it was intended to play: that of an Office of Marketing Promotion. C. MARKETING OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 28. Industrial agricultural products are those that are processed before being traded. They are generally import substitutes rather than export products: oilseeds (groundnuts and soybeans), cereals (wheat, rice, and before long, barley), and sugarcane. Their marketing is characterized by the existence of an assured domestic market. Oil Seeds 29. The Rwandese diet has a major deficiency in fats. This is the long-standing reason for developing the production of oilseeds, essentially groundnuts and soybeans, pending completion of further experiments (sunflower, rapeseed). 30. At present groundnuts are grown chiefly in the low-lying Bugesera- Mayaga and, especially, Kibungo regions, the driest in the country. Production is of the order of 12 to 14,000 tons of unshelled nuts or about 8,000 tons of shelled groundnuts. 31. Soybeans were introduced rather more recently than groundnuts and their expansion (1975 production estimated at 2,700 tons) is hampered by the difficulty of overcoming objections to them rooted in traditional pat- terns of diet: their strong flavor, their reputed medicinal properties in case of kwashiorkor, their problems of culinary preparation. On the other hand, soybeans, because of their hardiness and similarity to regular beans, do not present any significant difficulties at the practical farming level. 32. Present sales of soybeans are minimal and are confined to the OBM cooperatives. Sales of groundnuts are somewhat larger, as they are highly esteemed 1/. Prices reached record levels during the 1974/75 food crisis and have remained fairly high: RF 35/kg for peanuts in the shell, or RF 55 to 60/kg for shelled peanuts. 33. In course of preparation is a project to set up a medium sized multipurpose oil mill, possibly at Kigali, with a capacity of 3,100 tons 1/ Estimates run from 1,000 to 7,000 tons, or 7 to 50% of the 1975 production.  ANNEX 3 Page 11 of oil per year, or a little less than present consumption, using a solvent- based process of extraction. For groundnuts, which are richer in oil, there would be an initial extraction by pressure prior to the final treatment with solvent. The small RWANDEX oil mill at Kigali, which was completed in January 1976 but is not yet in operation, would be used for this. The oil mill would be supplied primarily with soybeans (15,300 tons/year), for which a vast production plan is contemplated affecting nearly 40% of Rwandese family farms throughout the medium altitude zone. The profitability of the mill would depend on the marketing of soybean cake (and, to a lesser extent, groundnut cake). Much of the production (40%) would be exported to Kenya as cattle feed, and the rest would be sold locally in the form of meal and various preparations with a view to improving the protein content of the traditional diet. 34. The two main problems to be solved, aside from the marketing of the cake, are: (i) The fixing of a price to the producer for soybeans that will be sufficiently remunerative but will not result in a pro- hibitive and noncompetitive price per liter of oil in relation to prices for imported oils, such as palm and cottonseed from Zaire. At present, there is talk of a price of RF 25 per kilo. With an assured market, such a price should make it possible for the soybean operation to succeed and for oil to be produced at RF 120-140 per liter ex-mill. (ii) Collection and transportation of soybeans to Kigali. The prevailing idea seems to be one of joint participation by the commune in collections at the communal level, which in theory should assure that the producer receives the price set for the season. Wheat 35. Rwanda produced 2,300 tons of wheat in 1975, in the high altitudes, chiefly Ruhengeri. To this should be added large donations in kind from the EDF (wheat and flour) and from Belgium (wheat). Bread consumption is increas- ing in urban areas. Domestic production, of which about 40 to 50% is consumed on the farm and donations in the form of grain are processed at the only flour mill in Rwanda, that of Ruhengeri (ETIRU). Its inadequate capacity of perhaps 5,000 tons a year and a desire to help the people of Gikongoro Prefecture, which is particularly unsuitable for farming and was hardest hit by the recent famine have led the Rwandese authorities to consider developing wheat growing in the prefecture and establishing a second flour mill. 36. At present ETIRU is supplied by a network of collector-merchants, and grain prices, following a recent increase by the National Price Commission, are RF 15/kg to the producer and RF 17 delivered to the mill, the selling price of the flour being RF 40/kg. The proceeds of the sale of flour and  ANNEX 3 Page 12 grain donations are deposited in a number of Wheat Funds or Flour Funds, depending on the donor at the Banque Nationale du Rwanda. No precise infor- mation is available on the use made of the margin earned on flour; the price paid to ETIRU is RF 28/kg; the selling price is RF 40/kg. Rice and Sugarcane 37. These products are considered together because both were introduced into Rwanda by a Chinese technical mission and their production and processing methods on industrial estates are somewhat similar. 38. Rice (2,480 tons of paddy in 1975) is cultivated under irrigation in improved valley land in the prefectures of Kigali (Kabuye), Gitarama (Mukunguri) Butare (Cyiri), Cyangugu (Bugarama) and Byumba (Buyoga). The Kabuye rice mill in the Nyabugogo valley, near Kigali was established by the Chinese mission and processes all the paddy produced with the exception of production at Bugarama; about 20% is consumed locally. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs now manages it, the Chinese assistants confining their activities to technical assistance. The Kabuye production is bought by a cooperative for RF 17 per kg of paddy, the selling price of hulled rice being RF 55/kg in bulk or RF 56.20/kg bagged. The margin seems wide (of the order of RF 20/kg) and it is not known what use is made of it. 39. Sugar cane (about 14,000 tons in 1975) is grown only in the Nyabugogo valley (Kabuye) on an area amounting to 478 ha in 1975 of which 165 ha are in production. Sugar production amounted to 960 tons in 1975, which was insufficient to meet domestic needs. Imports from 1973-75 averaged about 800 tons a year. Sugar is produced on an industrial estate with hired labor. The cost of cane delivered to the mill at Kabuye is estimated at RF 600/ton. Sugar costs RF 36/kg ex mill (not including RF 5 to 7 for amortization) and is sold for RF 60 per kg wholesale. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs manages the sugar mill (as it does the rice mill) and is therefore responsible for using the mark-up on sugar sales (of the order of RF 20/kg). In principle, this margin is to be employed to finance the expansion and renewal of the plantations. 40. If, in future, a sugar complex is planned on the Bugarama plain, the problems that may be expected to arise will not be related to the market- ing of the sugarcane by growers, as there will be industrial plantations with paid workers, but rather to the transportation of the sugar to consumer centers. Barley 41. For various reasons, particularly the demolition of the Malthouse in Zaire, the BRALIRWA (Primus) brewery of Gisenyi ceased to use local barley from Byumba toward the end of the 'sixties. It now imports all of its malt - nearly 2,500 tons in 1975. The Government, anxious to save  ANNEX 3 Page 13 scarce foreign exchange, is contemplating the resumption of barley production in the north of the country, in association with the building of a malt house in Rwanda (in Byumba or Ruhengeri). The target is 4,750 tons of barley in 1981, which would be enough to produce about 3,500 tons of malt per year. It will, therefore, be necessary to take care to determine a producer price that will ensure an adequate return for the farmers, the malt house and the brewery. The communes might be involved in the operation, as has been the case with barley in the past, with wheat at present, and will be with soybeans in the future. D. MARKETING OF ANIMAL PRODUCTS 42. By "animal products" is understood the production of meat, milk, hides, eggs, fish and honey, the latter two being of little importance at the moment. 43. Honey has traditionally been produced in rural areas, but by un- scientific methods, such as destruction of the swarms. A Beekeeping Authority has therefore been established with Belgian assistance and, with support from various agencies (FED, AIDR, Lions' Club), it is endeavoring to expand honey production by modern methods which are, however, often costly in terms of initial investment, and through the training of beekeepers. In 1975 there were about a thousand beekeepers with 2,500 modern hives, concentrated in the prefectures-of Kigali, Gitarama and Kibungo. Production rose to 9.3 tons of honey and 12 tons of wax. All the wax is purchased by the Authority, together with about 30% of the honey at RF 78/kg; the rest is probably consumed locally in its natural state or in the form of hydromel. 44. Fish production is developing rapidly and 1,200 tons of dried fish were produced in 1975 by 2,200 fishermen with 1,675 canoes on about 20 lakes, with Lake Kivu accounting fQr about 60%. The Fish and Fish Hatchery Office of the Ministry of Agriculture recently made a general census of the fishermen and their tackle and initiated a project to develop the Lake Kivu fisheries on the basis of recommendations in a FAO-UNDP preliminary project. At the same time it is promoting fish hatcheries and 1,403 ponds existed in 1975 with a total area of 68.53 ha, some having been produced by draining more than 500 kg/ha. The marketing of dried fish is on traditional lines: for example, the fish are taken by bicycle from Bugesera to Kigali. Efforts to organize fish production have nevertheless begun. Groups of fishermen are being formed nearly everywhere: e.g. at Lake Bulera and Lake Luhondo in the north, Lake Bugesera in the south. A sales outlet has been opened in Kigali for fresh fish from the Bugesera lakes (COOPEDIRWA sales cooperative), and The National Price Commission has "controlled" the retail price of fish at RF 65/kg fresh and RF 15 a piece dried (about RF 75/kg). The price to the producer is of the order of RF 40/kg ("uncontrolled").  ANNEX 3 Page 14 45. Figures for the raising of minor livestock (poultry, rabbits, eggs) are very rough estimates. The most that can be said is that there is a marked increase in interest on the part of the Rwandese farmers. Very little is marketed. Sales are larger near the cities and involve a few cooperatives such as Shyorongi and Kanombe around Kigali. 46. The trade in hides is in the hands of a single company, Old East which buys and officially exports the hides of cattle and goats, and to a lesser extent, sheep. A lot could be said about the effectiveness of the collection of export duties on hides which dropped over 50% in 1975. 47. The meat trade generally begins with the sale of livestock on the hoof, except for individual slaughtering. The farmers attend markets held at intervals and organized throughout the country by the communal authorities; there are about 60 in all, most merged with the traditional agricultural produce markets. Merchants (often butchers) purchase livestock for slaughter or to be driven to other markets, usually westward to Zaire or to Kigali. Exports of livestock to Zaire are large and are mostly carried on outside official channels to evade export taxes. Figures for these smuggled exports vary from 20 to 40,000 head of cattle a year, not counting sheep, goats and pigs. Domestic trade in livestock is not organized, prices are not controlled and there are no organized cattle routes or holding grounds. 48. According to Ministry of Agriculture estimates, the production of carcass meat was probably 20,400 tons in 1975, 3,200 tons were exported on the hoof. Domestic consumption would therefore appear to be of the order of 4 kg/person/year. The country has only three small abattoirs at Kigali, Butare and Rusumo. The Kigali abattoir, enlarged and renovated, should finally reopen sometime in 1976. Official statistics indicate a figure of 65,184 regulated slaughterings in 1975 1/ or 10% of the probable total. 49. The domestic demand for low quality meat is limited by the very restricted purchasing power of the population. There is a heavy unsatisfied demand for high quality meat, particularly in Kigali, partly met by research stations and from Kenya. Prospects for official exports of meat to Zaire and Gabon are good, but targets can only be met if the quality of the traditional herd is improved and the abattoirs and refrigeration plants are enlarged. In principle, OPROVIA, established in July 1975, should also concern itself with animal products. So far it has done nothing. 1/ At 3 abattoirs, 28 slaughterhouses and 276 unimproved places of slaughter.  ANNEX 3 Page 15 50. Milk production in 1975 amounted to about 70 million liters, which, after deducting consumption by calves, left 21 million liters available for human consumption, i.e., 5 liters per person per year. This inadequate level of production makes it necessary to import powdered milk for children. About 5% of the available milk production appears to be marketed at relatively high prices (about RF 15 per liter in the collines and even RF 30 in the Kigali market supplied by roundsmen on bicycles). Only one dairy at Nyabisindu is now collecting milk for the Kigali market, purchasing milk for RF 12/liter on the collines. The other modern source of supply for Kigali is the Rubirizi State farm near the capital. E. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 51. Apart from export crops and, to a lesser extent, crops for local industry (two types of crop for which marketing channels are set or semi- automatic), the marketing of farm and livestock products in Rwanda is a relatively recent phenomenon and is poorly organized. Two obvious indica- tions of this are: (i) the existence of wide price variations (producer or retail) over a given period (harvest - off-season) and from one region to another. (ii) the absence of substantial flows of trade between surplus and deficit regions and between early crop regions (medium altitude) and late crop regions (high altitude). 52. The Rwandese Government is aware of these shortcomings and has taken or encouraged a number of steps to promote and organize marketing: the estab- lishment of a National Price Commission (August 1974); the advantages accorded to cooperatives, the formation of OPROVIA (July 1975); the construction of strategically located storage depots (1975-1976) and of silos with local coverages (1975 onwards); the opening of the Kigali abattoir (1975?) and the expanded tannery project, the launching of the livestock development project in Mutara (OVAPAM 1975) and the forthcoming completion of crop and grazing project in the regions of Bugesera-Migongo-Gisaka (1977); projects for the flour mill in Gikongoro, the malthouse in Ruhengeri or Byumba and the oil mill (Kigali) are all expressions of a growing interest in the expansion and rationalization of commerce. 53. The striking thing about all these projects, however, is that they exhibit a certain dispersal of effort, even a confusion of roles, together with, perhaps, the absence of a policy-making decision in favor of any parti- cular type of commercial organization. In any case, the desire to see "the elimination of the middleman," voiced by the working party on planning of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance in preparing the second plan  ANNEX 3 Page 16 (1977-1981), is the expression of a traditional reflex rather than the mani- festation of a policy preference. The organization of marketing in a country like Rwanda should not take the form of supplanting traditional networks by administrative or semi-government agencies, that are often inefficient, always awkward to manage and slow to react, but should rather concentrate on making such traditional networks perform better and more "equitably." Marketing of agricultural products 54. Recommendations on agricultural products (except for export crops) are along four principal lines: Action at the producer level Price-related action Role of OPROVIA Establishment of a pilot retail marketing channel. Action at the producer level 55. The traditional methods of storage used by producers (baskets/ imitiba, granaries, no processing, produce not always dry) result in considerable losses (10 to 30%, according to the product). Research and tests undertaken by ISAR have made it possible to recommend the use of 2% malathion in storing beans, sorghum, wheat and maize. Simple to use and inexpensive, a 100 gram bag costing RF 5 is sufficient to protect a tradi- tional storage unit of 80 to 100 kg for 2 to 3 months. This product should be widely distributed and its use encouraged by the extension services. Trials should also be made using pyrethrum powder. In addition, efforts should be made to maintain and encourage the success the Catholic Relief Service silos appear to be having. By the end of 1978, 26 silos should have been built with foreign financing. Each rural commune (141 out of 143) should have at least one by the end of the second five-year plan (1977-1981). Assuming that 3/4 of the sorghum is marketed in the form of beer, the overall tonnage traded in beans, peas and sorghum amounts roughly to 4 to 500 tons per commune. A typical 88-ton silo represents about 20% of the quantities marketed, which should be quite sufficient for storage of seeds and building local reserves. Promotion of Group Action 56. Here the numerous failures experienced in other African countries (and even, sometimes, in Rwanda) should counsel prudence. The groups should not be compulsory "cooperatives" remotely controlled by the central government. The numerous advantages that producers and Rwandese society as a whole can derive from the establishment of marketing groups should be sought through:  ANNEX 3 Page 17 (i) "Cooperative" education of producers; (ii) Training of cooperative management staff; (iii) Formulation of a simplified statute for informed groupings; (iv) Preferential prices for products marketed by such groups. Easier access to crop credits. Credit 57. Producers often find themselves in debt to traditional traders, who lend money against the promise of delivery of a future crop. This explains the difficulties groups sometimes have in persuading members to pool surpluses for group marketing. Official credit to farmers between harvests may there- fore be a vital means of freeing the producers from the grip of middlemen. The development of the mutual Credit Banks (People's Banks) should be encouraged. Price-related Action Establishment of crop prices 58. The role of the National Price Commission is of such magnitude that a subcommittee on agricultural prices will certainly be needed, com- posed principally of experts from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock and OPROVIA and of representatives of the Department of Internal Trade. This subcommittee will be responsible for reviewing the entire problem of producer prices in the light of the return per hectare and per man day, how to regulate them, what modifications can be made in the price system to support a parti- cular crop in a particular region and to promote cooperative marketing groups with, for example, preferential prices and volume rebates. It is therefore very necessary to improve the terms of reference of the National Price Commission. 59. Price control presupposes giving extensive publicity to the decisions of the National Price Commission, which still remains largely a theoretical objective. Broadcasting should therefore be used more intensively. It would also be desirable to strengthen trade inspection services by providing prefec- ture inspectors with transportation and introducing a system of unpaid agents at the commune level (sector advisers could perform this function). In any case more effective regulation could be provided with an orderly system of marketing against cash payments.  ANNEX 3 Page 18 Role of OPROVIA 1/ 60. In future OPROVIA should act as a Marketing Promotion Office rather than as a privileged trader. It should perform the function of broker between producers and consumers, confining itself to putting them in touch with one another, starting, of course, with producer groups on the one hand and supply cooperatives on the other. As the PECDA project (storage facilities built with American assistance) wishes to remain autonomous for a period of perhaps 5 years, its role would be confined to creating buffer stocks to be brought: onto the market at OPROVIA's request, in order to stabilize prices. 61. OPROVIA also has a fleet of about 25 trucks. To date the manage- ment of this fleet has not always been of the highest quality and large tonnages are sometimes immobilized for lack of transportation. OPROVIA might therefore act as a transportation center, renting out its trucks and drivers at cost, plus a slight margin, to make better use of its fleet. 62. In order to perform this central role in marketing promotion, OPROVIA urgently needs official agents at the prefectural, even communal levels. Payment for its services by commissions or rental of vehicles should enable it to establish gradually a network of communal listening points responsible for keeping the central office informed on local supply and demand situations. With this rethinking at the national level, and support at the local level, OPROVIA could devote itself to a whole series of vital studies and research projects: reports on regional imbalances, market research, studies (in collaboration with ISAR) of storage (e.g. root crops) etc. The financing of agricultural projects, for which the enabling legislation empowers OPROVIA, does not appear to be the function of a genuine "Marketing Board." Establishment of a parallel retail marketing circuit 63. This is not a new idea (see First Interim Emergency Plan 1966- 1970) but it is more than ever a topical one. Just as the existence of buffer stocks provides the best assurance to the producer of some stability in prices, the establishment of a pilot retail marketing organization offers the best means of holding down final prices to the consumer. The TRAFIPRO cooperative seems cut out for this role, with its 27 branches and 10 "asso- ciated" cooperatives. Despite successful action in the market for beans in 1969, TRAFIPRO appears to contemplate the marketing of foodstuffs with caution, not to say reluctance, chiefly because of the risks and difficul- ties presented by storage. The existence of 6 modern soundly managed storage depots of reasonable capacity is likely to help here. TRAFIPRO, 1/ See below for OPROVIA's role in livestock products.  ANNEX 3 Page 19 both a supplier to the strategically located stores and a preferred buyer from them, would be relieved of storage problems. The pilot marketing organization would therefore concentrate initially on beans, peas and sorghum. Marketing of Livestock Products 64. The main problems are presented by milk, meat and hides. Recommend- ations are confined to the proposals made by the Livestock Department in its preparatory report for the second five-year plan. Milk 65. Efforts will be concentrated on supplying the towns through improved collections: (i) expansion of the activities of the Rubirzi dairy (20 collection centers in the area around the station). (ii) establishment of a milk processing unit in the Ruhengeri- Gisenyi region (also 20 centers). It is further recommended that small processing units be installed in prefecture and business centers for separating, churning, and making local varieties of cheese. Meat 66. OPROVIA is the principle body responsible for organizing the market- ing of animal products. Its first objective appears to be to regulate exports on the hoof to Zaire. So far as the organization of the domestic market is concerned, what is needed (the Livestock Department shares this view) is an in-depth study prior to any program of action. The following proposals have, however, been made for OPROVIA: (i) provision of scales for the 20 principal livestock markets in Rwanda; (ii) establishment of "livestock trading centers" in Cyangugu and Gisenyi; (iii) establishment of 25 staging points for livestock movements; (iv) establishment of a holding ground for livestock at Masoro near Kigali; (v) preparation of a study of the meat market;  ANNEX 3 Page 20 (vi) construction of 10 small abattoirs on the Rusumo model in 8 prefecture centers and 2 urban centers (Rwamagana and Nyabisindu); (vii) operation of the modern slaughterhouse at Kigali. In view of the magnitude of its task, OPROVIA should have a separate depart- ment of livestock products. Hides and Skins 67. The principal objective here will be to improve the quality of exported products through: (i) the construction of 30 hide and skin purchasing offices; (ii) equipment for slaughtering areas (tools, fleshing tables, drying frames); (iii) construction of storage sheds at Kigali and Cyangugu. There is also the question of legislation covering hides and skins (qualities, storage, transportation, prices) and of defining OPROVIA's role in the organi- zation of exports without specifying that of the present exporter.  ANNEX 4 Page 1 RWANDA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REVIEW EXPORT CROPS 1. Like all poor countries, Rwanda is very concerned with the prob- lem of obtaining the hard currencies essential for its economic development. Coffee has been its principal export for many years, but there has been a very marked desire, expecially since independence, to diversify export crops. At the present time, tea, pyrethrum, quinine, horticultural produce, and, to a lesser extent, cotton are accounting for a progressively rising share of Rwandese exports. In the near future, it is planned to develop the production of medicinal plants (Vinca, Catharanthus), aromatic plants (Geranium rosa, eucalyptus) and ornamental plants (flowers, Euphorbia, etc.). 2. The development of export crops is creating a number of problems: (i) Because of heavy population pressure, it is becoming in- creasingly difficult to expand areas devoted to export crops as farmers are primarily concerned with the produc- tion of food crops. Increased production for export should therefore be achieved mainly through intensification. (ii) The marketing of agricultural products is subject to fluctuations in world prices for raw materials. Thus the need already exists to consolidate what has been achieved with various crops (role of OCIR) and to promote local processing as much as possible for crops such as pyrethrum and quinine. (iii) Producer prices for the various export crops should be calculated so as to bring first an adequate return to pro- ducers in relation to other traditional products and second a comparable return on both land and labor for each crop. A. COFFEE 3. Coffee is the oldest and most widespread of cash crops. Slightly more than half the family farms i.e., 431,831 families in 1975 grow an average of 115 Arabica coffee trees each 1/. In 1975 these trees produced 1/ In the paysannats, about 25,000 planters have an average of 256 trees each.  ANNEX 4 Page 2 a total of 24,385 tons of parchment coffee corresponding to 18,045 tons of green coffee, an output clearly higher than in preceding harvests which gave between 12,000 and 15,000 tons of green coffee in the years from 1969 to 1974. Since 3.6 million trees are young and have not yet started to produce, the average yield amounts to 528 grams in zones where the altitude is too high in the Ruhengeri Prefecture to 1,023 on good soils at the edge of lake Kivu in the Kibuye and Gisenyi Prefectures. This yield is the highest since the record years of 1959 and 1960 (824 grams and 580 grams of parchment coffee per tree respectively) and strengthens the current view that a substantial tonnage of parchment coffee had illegally entered the country from the Kivu region of Zaire, bordering on the Gisenyi prefecture. One fact is clear: coffee pro- duction has tended to stagnate over recent years, as the price paid to the producer has not offered an adequate return in comparison with the earnings normally expected from bananas 1/. 4. The producer price set for parchment coffee for the 1975/76 season (March to March) was RF 45/kg. As a result of further frosts in Brazil, world prices reached a high level in the second half of 1975, more than compensat- ing for the substantial fall in price at the beginning of that year 2/. In fact, the price for the 1976/77 season was fixed at RF 65, representing a huge increase of 44%, and was further raised to RF 80/kg for the 1977/78 season. The Government is counting on this improved return to encourage the producers to reach the target for the Second Development Plan (1977/81) of 30,000 tons of parchment coffee in 1981 - about 22,000 tons of green coffee - an increase of 23% over five years. The level of producer prices does not however have a large immediate effect on production as the price is only set shortly before the harvest. 5. For a number of years, the OCIR "Coffee Plan" (see below, Office of Industrial Crops of Rwanda) has been recommending that: (i) the plantation density for new plantations be increased from 1,600 to 2,000 trees per ha (current average 1,600); (ii) old stocks be replaced with new varieties such as Bourbon and Jackson that offer higher yields, a policy that is now beginning to take effect; (iii) intensification be increased through the use of appro- priate cultivation methods, such as mulching, pruning, insecticide dusting (although this is not the general rule) and even the use of mineral fertilizers on good soils; 1/ See annex 6. 2/ Prices fell continuously from August 1974 to May 1975 reaching their lowest level in five years. Had the Stabilization Fund not intervened, the price to the producer would have fallen to RF 35.  ANNEX 4 Page 3 (iv) coffee growing be abandoned in ecologically unsuitable zones (mainly a matter of altitude, since coffee trees give poor results in Rwanda at altitudes below 1,500 m or above 1,900 m) establishing for this purpose 13 (cof- fee zones" instead of the five zones recognized up to 1974. 6. Insecticide treatment is now of particular importance. In 1975, Rwandese coffee trees suffered a heavy infestation of coffee bugs (Antestiopsis) 18% of the beans being affected (against 13% in 1974) and losses amounted to 6% (against 3% in 1974). There were a number of reasons for this situation; (i) coffee trees ought to be treated twice annually: although 90% of producing trees were treated once, only 78% were treated twice; (ii) farmers do not always apply the recommended 20 g per tree of insecticide keeping some back for their food crops; (iii) finally, these bugs seem to some extent to have become resistant to DDT, the most frequently used insecticides. 7. Insect damage in addition to the poor quality often noted in pulp- ing 1/, has had the effect of appreciably reducing the quality of Rwandese coffee. Table 1: CLASSIFICATION OF THE COFFEE QUALITY OCIR classification % of total Former Present 1960 1970 1975 Arabica Rwanda Fully Washed (FW) .06 0.08 0.00 2 Superior (SVP) 36.09 2.90 1.75 3 A Standard (STD) 52.90 86.52 67.17 3 B Ordinary (ORD) 4.52 8.00 27.26 4 Ungraded (UG) 0.42 0.40 0.66 5 Triage (T) 6.01 2.10 3.16 100.00 100.00 100.00 1/ OCIR currently has 538 centers (i.e., 1 per 800 planters) and in future years, proposes to increase the supply of new pulping machines from 50 to 100 per annum.  ANNEX 4 Page 4 8. In 1975, 325 OCIR field advisors, who are responsible for providing advice on coffee-growing methods, and for the supervision of pulping were withdrawn by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. 9. Coffee is marketed as follows. Parchment coffee is sold by producers to accredited private merchants or cooperatives (especially, TRAFIPRO which buys approximately 20% of total production). Parchment coffee is then sent: to the Rwandex factories, in Kigali and -- less frequently -- Gisenyi, for hulling, grading and packing, the last two operations being effected under the supervision of OCIR. Exports are made under OCIR in license. 10. There is therefore an organized marketing channel that operates satisfactorily. However, frequently the producers sell their coffee to merchants at a price below the official price, either because the purchasing center is too far away, or else because the suspension of trading, in principle done by OCIR extension staff, is inadequate, or again because of their indebt- edness to merchants. 11. To ensure that the producer effectively receives the full RF 65/Lkilo, it is necessary to: (i) to replan the distribution of purchasing centers in rela- tion to the density of coffee-growing activities. (ii) to fix a single day each week for the purchase of coffee, preferably other than the local market day; (iii) To ensure that an agent either of OCIR or of the Ministry of Agriculture exercises effective supervision over each purchasing center. 12. Exports rose in 1975 to 22,121 tons of green coffee, i.e., 4,000 tons more than recorded production. This does not mean that there has been any reduction in stocks but is the result of the inclusion of Robusta coffee from Uganda, whose economic problems have led planters to export their pro- duction to Rwanda illegally. It should be pointed out that in 1974 Ugandan Robusta coffee accounted for almost half of Rwandese exports, approximately 11,000 tons out of a total of 25,125 tons of green coffee. 13. These 22,121 tons sold at an average price of RF 117/kg FOB Mombasa, thus earning Rwanda almost RF 2.6 billion in foreign exchange out of a total export turnover of RF 3.8 billion (68.4%). The average price of Robusta has risen to approximately RF 70/kg and the average FOB Mombasa price for Arabica has therefore been of the order of RF 130/kg.  ANNEX 4 Page 5 B. TEA 14. Tea cultivation was launched on a large scale in Rwanda during the early 1960's at Mulindi plantation. By the end of 1975, there were 5,500 hectares of tea plantations, 3,459 in production. The production of green leaf amounted to 17,226 tons in 1975, producing some 4,000 tons of made tea, a yield of some 1,160 kg of made tea per ha. The first plantations were for the most part established on low-lying reclaimed land, (former marshlands). But at present, in the region of the Zaire-Nile ridge, a number of projects are under way to grow tea in a "dispersed rural environment", often on the hillsides. Of the 5,500 ha planted to tea, 540 are worked by foreign planters, 4,540 ha are so-called "village plantations" and only 420 ha are "industrial estates". 15. The target of the Second Development Plan is to increase the area under cultivation to 10,000 ha and to raise production to 8,300 tons of made tea by 1981, full production being achieved by about 1986 with a production of some 12,000 tons of made tea per annum. 16. The purchase price of green leaf to the producer (at the factory) was RF 8.3 in 1974, RF 8.8 in 1975 and RF 9 in 1976. The marketing organiza- tion is highly satisfactory to the extent that the factories are all close to the plantations, except for Kitabi, where the situation is being corrected. As the "village plantations" are generally grouped together, the planters usually belong to "cooperatives", which look after both the harvesting of leaf and the distribution of fertilizer and chemicals. 17. Since 1974 tea exports have been a monopoly in the hands of OCIR's Tea Department which has taken over the various factories in the country. In 1975, 3,775 tons were exported (US$4 million) in part by charter air freight, valued at approximately RF 359 million, i.e., at an average price of RF 95/kg FOB Mombasa. C. PYRETHRUM 18. The production of pyrethrum flowers in Rwanda is confined to the high altitude areas between 2,600 and 3,000 meters at the base of volcanoes in the northwestern part of the country, which have good lava soils. Total produc- tion of fresh flowers, amounting to 8,765 tons in 1975 has been increasing steadily since 1-970. Pyrethrum is grown by:  ANNEX 4 Page 6 (i) 5,865 planters in paysannats, each cultivating 0.54 ha of pyrethrum (compared 0.44 ha in 1973), i.e., a total of 3,200 ha; (ii) approximately the same number of farmers outside the pay- sannats, cultivating a total of 785 ha, i.e., an average of approximately 0.12 to 0.15 ha; (iii) other planters (Regie Bonde, Mudende, Tamire-ISAR and Regie Kinigi) cultivating 225 ha. The area actually in production in 1975 amounted to 1976 ha in the paysannats, 660 ha outside the paysannats and 214 ha by "other planters" category (i.e., a total of 3,850 ha), the average yield of fresh flowers being 2,275 kg/ha, corresponding to 455 kg/ha of dried flowers, a yield that was below the tar- get of 620 kg/ha. 19. The entire output of fresh flowers is purchased by ASPY (Pyrethrum Planters Association) a cooperative that operates a number of drying plants in the area of the paysannats. Some of these are wood-burning and others use fuel oil, now being replaced by peat, with an 80% saving according to an ILACO 1974/75 experiment. The ratio of fresh flowers to dried flowers by weight being about 5:1, the production of dried flowers in 1975 was 1753 tons. The dried flowers are subsequently shipped to the Ruhengeri plant (USINEX) which crushes them and distils the powder obtained in a solvent to produce the raw and partially wax-free pyrethrum extract. The average pyrethrum content of the flowers is 1.55% of which 96% is recoverable, 1 kg of dried flowers therefore produces on an average, 14.88 grams of unrefined extract. Accord- ing to whether this unrefined extract is diluted to 25% to 33%, 1 kg of dried flowers supplies either 59.52 or 44.64 grams of unrefined extract in solution. Since most sales are for 25% solutions, it is reasonable to assume that 16.8 kg of dried flowers will produce 1 kg of marketable extract. 20. Up till 1971, the ASPY cooperative exported the dried flowers through OCIR. When the USINEX refinery was opened in 1971, it was obliged to purchase ASPY's output of dried flowers and it became the sole exporter of the pyrethrin extracts produced. 21. The international market for raw pyrethrin extracts is controlled by a very small number of buyers who are either manufacturers of insecticides (especially aerosols) themselves or who resell to manufacturers. This unsatisfactory situation has existed for some time and a project is being considered that will involve the further refining of the crude extracts in order to obtain pale refined extracts 1/ that can then be marketed directly to the insecticide manufacturers under long-term contracts extending over a 1/ The ratio of refined (pale) to unrefined extract is 94.545%, the dif- ference (5.455%) consisting of various waxes and other impurities.  ANNEX 4 Page 7 number of years. At the present time, following a number of UNIDO studies, a feasibility study for the expansion of USINEX is to be entrusted to the Swiss, the Netherlands having indicated that it is willing to finance its execution. 22. The fact remains that in 1975, almost the entire output of un- refined pyrethrin extract had to be put in store at Ruhengeri, the inter- national market being virtually closed to USINEX. In 1975 some 104 tons of 25% unrefined extract were produced, whereas exports at the beginning of the year were still being met from 1974 stocks (36.8 tons being sold at an average price of RF 2.143/kg, i.e, total proceeds of RF 79 million). 23. As a result, owing to lack of financing, USINEX has been unable to pay for all the flowers purchased from ASPY, in spite of recommendations by the "Pyrethrum Committee" in support of a bank loan to USINEX, and ASPY, in turn, has been unable to make full payment to the planters. Most of these have not been paid since April 1975, which is bound to cast a shadow over future production. ASPY has even had to have recourse to exports of dried flowers to Tanzania, but these were insufficient to tip the balance. 24. Another serious problem that arises at the stage prior to marketing, has to do with USINEX's buying price for dried flowers. The cost of producing a kilo of dried flowers is constantly increasing, due partly to increased dry- ing costs and partly to progressive rises in the price paid to the planters for fresh flowers (an additional 51% since 1969, i.e., RF12/kg in 1975). This has raised the prime cost of a kilo of dried flowers in 1975 to RF 101.30 (i.e., 40% over 1969), resulting in a loss of RF 16.66/kg that ASPY had to bear. 25. It is clear that this situation cannot go on. A dual effort should be made: (i) by ASPY to reduce costs (e.g. by substitution of peat for hydrocarbons; and (ii) by USINEX whose position as monopoly purchaser cannot be allowed to prevent ASPY from at least covering its costs. Finally, there can be no doubt that the "reintegration" into the OCIR system of the marketing of the extracts produced by USINEX will provide a solution to two problems: (iii) marketing promotion and research are not part of USINEX's expertise;  ANNEX 4 Page 8 (iv) it would consolidate the market earnings of coffee + quinine + pyrethrum (+ tea ?) and make it possible to deal with the kind of situation that arose in 1975 and to pay the planters in any event. The Government appears to be very aware of this need and is currently studying the formation of an OCIR pyrethrum department. D. QUININE (Cinchona bark) 26. Rwandese production and exports of dried cinchona bark have again made great strides. In 1975, 1344 ha were planted, of which approximately 402 ha were in production, producing 333.4 tons of bark, all of it exported by air. Sales receipts were RF 79 million at an average price of RF 237/kg FOB Kigali. The plantations are mainly located in Cyangugu prefecture and are worked by European planters, often corporations, such as ACF and Pharmakina and State corporations (Mara, 17 ha); there is now, however, an increasing number of so-called "village plantations": in 1974 there were 776 planters, 267 of them grouped into three cooperatives with an average of 3,720 trees per planter and a density of 10,000 trees/ha). 27. In November 1974, under a reorganization, a quinine promotion divi- sion was established in OCIR (as part of its coffee department). OCIR thus obtained a "monopoly" of the purchase and export of bark, which does not, however, appear to include production on the European plantations. 28. In 1975 OCIR therefore became the principal Rwandese exporter of dried bark: Tonnes _ OCIR 127.4 38.2 ACF 106.0 32.8 Pharmakina 88.0 26.4 Bigicu 12.0 3.6 29. OCIR's role in the marketing of bark includes collection by the Cyangugu cinchona divisions, transportation, warehousing, repacking, prepara- tion of samples and exports. The price was RF 100/kg in 1974, RF 150 in January 1975, and RF 220 in December 1975, the selling price reflecting increases in world prices.  ANNEX 4 Page 9 30. The three problems that arise here are: (i) the tendency of Rwandese planters to harvest too early, with the result that the content of the bark is too low (sometimes below 3%, whereas the best world prices are paid for contents of 5% to 10%); (ii) the lack of warehousing facilities at Kanombe airport, with enforced immobilization of OCIR trucks; (iii) financing for marketing, a problem often raised by OCIR 1/ which needs the assistance of a commercial bank for the discount of documentary bills, warehouse receipts and export documents against guaranteed exports of bark. E. COTTON 31. Production at the Bugarama plain cotton paysannat, established a few years prior to independence, gradually declined until it reached 100 tons of seed cotton in 1974. Although production increased in 1975 (238 tons for 350 ha, i.e., 626 kg/ha of 78% white cotton), the problem remains. A total of only 470 of the original 800 families planted 0.8 ha of cotton in 1975. There is therefore a very evident lack of interest. There is no marketing problem, however, as the entire output is purchased and sent to Bujumbura by a Burundi cotton company operating in the Ruzizi plain (of which Bugaramma is the Rwandese part). 32. The real problem is the proposed price to the planters of RF 15/kg for white and RF 8/kg for second quality seed cotton, i.e., for a 78% yield this year, an average price to the producer of RF 13.46/kg for seed cotton. At 626 kg/ha, gross receipts would thus amount to some RF 8,400/ha, which is clearly inadequate in relation to other crops 2/ and also in the light of the labor and care required by cotton plants. F. Horticultural Crops for Export 33. The production of fresh vegetables for export is included in an FAO (UNDP) horticultural project which is active in a number of marshy valleys surrounding the capital; in all there are 2,055 farmers of which 1,300 are in the Kajevuba Valley). The farmers are grouped into cooperatives. Exports are shipped by air and totalled 416 tons in 1975, as follows: 1/ OCIR Coffee report, 1975. 2/ See Annex 6.  ANNEX 4 Page 10 sweet peppers 272 tons (66%) hot peppers 105 tons (25%) pilipili 26 tons (6%) eggplant 13 tons (3%) Vegetable exports declined by 16%, but exports of ornamental plants offset the decline. The need for market research and the availability of air freight are the main problems. 34. The solution doubtless lies in a drying, freeze-drying and canning unit for horticultural produce and the Government has long been anxious to see such a project. The Kigali urban market can no longer take the surpluses and rejects in view of the limited scope and in face of the active competition of other horticultural crop cooperatives and individual producers.  ANNEX/ANNEXE 4 APPENDIX APPENDTCE SCHMA DES RECOMMDATIONS (PRODUITS VIWRIS) RECOMM(ENDED MARKETING CHANNELS PRODUCTEURS REGROUPES M EXTERIEUR PBCCUCTEUBS ISOLES (AIDR, OBM, Autres Coop6ratives dons et Groupement3 de collecte) alimentaires SW | (type CRS) | ,.' / e s . j i ""*. /~~. - MARCHES RURAUX, COLtECTEURS C CQMMERCANTS, IRASPORTEURS .. ___ .................. 0 - (R6seaux Traditionnels)_ P.E.C.D.A.| R6gulateur |i S < t TAP COOPERATIVES E G COLIECTIVITES MARCHES MAGASINS (circuXit (AIDR OBM, Autres) (Ecoles, ArmCe, URBAINS PRIVES temoin) Aspect Consommtion Prisons .. c o n s 0-M M A T E U R S Circuits actuels Circuit reconmndg ......... Circuit possible mais non recommandd  ANNEX 5 Page 1 RWANDA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REVIEW MANPOWER AND TRAINING FOR THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR A. Proposals for the 5 Year Plan 1. The Ministry of Agriculture's draft proposals for the Second Five Year Plan envisage the reorganization, enlargement and strengthening of the existing staff of the agricultural services. In each of the 10 Prefectures, a team of one graduate agronomist, one veterinary doctor, one graduate animal husbandry specialist, one agricultural technician (A ) and one forester (A ) is planned. In the 141 rural communes, under the aAministrative authority of the "bourgmestre", there will be two "agronomists" (A 2), one assistant veteri- narian (Animal Health assistant) (A ), one cooperative organizer (A3) and one agricultural assistant (A3) specialiy for beekeeping. It is proposed to add one female agronomist (A2) to this team. A communal training centre will be established in each commune. The commune will be divided in sectors (about 10 sectors in one commune) in which one sector generally covers one colline. In each sector there will be one agricultural assistant (A ). Thus in each sector, the ratio of agricultural assistants to farm families will be about 1:560. 2. In order to intensify agricultural production in selected areas, several special projects (coffee, tea, cinchona plantations, paysannats, livestock, etc.) have been set up with bilateral and multilateral assistance. A three-year project by FAO/UNDP on agricultural extension and community development began in 1974 and is continuing. The projected education reform can also be expected to have an impact on the rural and agricultural develop- ment. The main points of this reform are (i) postponing the age of entry into primary education from six to nine or ten years so that primary education then becomes terminal for 90% of the students; (ii) stressing practical subjects in grades 5 and 6, with emphasis on rural and vocational education and the introduction of agricultural subjects in the curricula of both primary and secondary schools. This reform has not yet been implemented and is meeting with some resistance; but in any case, the agricultural subjects will soon be introduced regardless. Agricultural manpower resources and needs 3. The existing situation of the agricultural manpower, the additional needs and the deficit in 1981 have been calculated taking into account working documents of the Ministry of Agriculture for the five-year plan (1977-1981) and  ANNEX 5 Page 2 various information collected by the mission, and assuming a 3% rate of attrition on existing stock and flow. A summary is given in the following table: Level of Existing Total Total Under Total Deficit training Stock Additional by train. attri- end Local Expat. needs by 1981 through tion 1981 1981 1981 through 1981 A University 19 86 225 330 177 15 63 A1 Higher tech. 4 10 57 71 30 2 29 A2 Upper Second. 221 - 793 1,014 369 55 479 A3 Lower Second. 187 - 2,112 3,679 150 243 2,205 A Others 1,380 - - - - 4 Total 1,811 96 3,187 5,094 626 315 2,776 4. The tables give details of the various qualifications and their distribution within the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock I.S.A.R., various agricultural projects, Ministry of Planning and Ministry of National Education. 5. The aforementioned tables shows that the proposals made in the working documents for the next five-year plan appear impractical and have to be considered over a longer period, for simple reasons of budget and avail- able personnel. According to the proposals, the number of personnel would increase from 1,811 to about 5,000 and the future annual budgets should include a significant increase, not only for new salaries, but also for an equal amount to cover costs of transport, demonstration material, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, etc. Physical facilities - such as offices, stores and houses, have also to be taken into account. In the 1975 budget of the relevant Directorates for agriculture and livestock, salaries account for 77% and 69% respectively; the lack of a budget for support costs reduces the efficiency of existing personnel. Before increasing the number of personnel it is necessary to distribute the existing budget more approriately and provide for any resulting increases in it. Nevertheless, the proposals made in the 1977-1981 Plan give a good idea of the intentions of the authorities for the future agricultural development of the country.  ANNEX 5 Page 3 6. At the university and higher technician level (A and A ) the est:l- mated deficit could be temporarily filled by expatriate technicallassistance. In the longer term, the Agricultural Section of the Faculty of Sciences will satisfy all the likely effective demand for "graduate agronomists by 1984; thereafter, new graduates may have considerable difficulty in finding employ- ment in Rwandese agriculture unless by then the pace of agricultural develop- ment justifies a graduate agronomist in each Commune. Scholarships should continue to be awarded to students with a view to filling the vacant posts of veterinary doctors, graduate animal husbandry specialists, graduate foresters, and higher technicians if necessary. 7. At the upper secondary level (A2 ), the estimated deficit can be broken down as follows: agronomists 279 veterinarians 57 female agronomists 140 foresters 3 479 Agronomists and Veterinarians (A 2) 8. The agricultural school at Butare run by the Ministry of National Education is training agronomists and veterinarian (A 2) over a four-year programme (Grades 10 to 13). The first year of studies is common: the other three years are specialised. The last year includes a field training period of eight months and only the last month is spent at the school for report writing. Total enrollment is theoretically 160 with 40 students in the first common year and 25 agronomists plus 15 veterinarians in the last three years; present total enrollment is 154. 9. With a regular output of up to 15 veterinarians per year, the needs will be satisfied as early as 1985. For agronomists there are three possibilities of satisfying the estimated deficit: (i) increasing the facilities of the school at Butare; (ii) creating a second school with an output of about 40 agronomists or (iii) concentrating the training of all intermediate level technicians (including the training of the veterinary assistants) in a new school located in a different part of the country. This last possibility would be economically preferable: the existing buildings at Butare could then be used by the agricultural section of the Faculty of Sciences which, at present, is located in a temporary building. Another advantage of this last possibility would be to reduce the concen- tration of the student population at Butare. On the other hand, there is also a project in the Ministry of National Education to set up a new agri- cultural school for agronomists and veterinarians (A 2) at Busamana (Gisenyi Prefecture) with a total enrollment of 145 students and this would have the advantage of serving regional needs of the country. In addition, Belgian assistance has been contacted by the Government to transform the technical  ANNEX 5 Page 4 school for Burundi refugees at Ridima (Bugesera) into an agricultural school - this could better serve as the vocational training center of that area. 10. A school to train female "agronomes" (A2) has been established at Nyagahanga (Byumba) with a four-year curriculum. The first batch of 30 students will be enrolled in September 1976. Serious consideration should be given to integrating the training of female agronomes in existing or future technicians training schools to benefit from the many technical and economic advantages which would accrue. Foresters A2 11. The small number of forest rangers (Forester A 2) required can be most economically trained abroad (Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Uganda). 12. At the lower secondary level, the deficit of the personnel is esti- mated as follows: Agricultural Assistants and "Vulgarisateurs" A 3 1,842 "Moniteurs Agrocoles" A4 ) Veterinary Assistants A3 153 Junior veterinary assistants A4 54 Forest Guards 156 2,205 13. The existing "Vulgarisateurs" (about 100) were trained in 1964 and 1965 at Murambi, with a one-year program. The Agricultural Assistants are trained in the Agricultural Training Centre at Nyamishaba (Kibuye) created in 1966 with strong Swiss bilateral support under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture. The annual output is now about 30. The well- balanced two year program included about 50% of the time devoted to field training periods. In March 1975 a decision was taken to extend the duration of studies from 2 to 3 years and to transfer the school to the Ministry of Education. Extending the duration already raises problems with the students since there is one year of difference with the training of Agronomists A2, and might be revised. Nevertheless, this center is unable to satisfy the needs, even if enlarged, and it is urgent to establish new training centers. The facilities of some CERARs 1/ could be temporarily used to establish such 1/ The "Centres d'Education Rurale et Artisanale du Rwanda (C.E.R.A.R.) are institutions providing post primary teaching, essentially oriented to the rural problems and principally to agriculture, livestock and rural craft. At present there are 18, with a capacity of 1,500 students but their number will probably be extended to 60 in the next five-year plan.  ANNEX 5 Page 5 training centers. The program would be the same as it was in Nyamishaba (Kibuye), or preferably reduced to one year followed by in-service training. These converted CERAR would have to be properly equipped, provided with the requisite technical staff and an appropriate budget for the other recurent expenses. If the deficit of Agricultural Assistants is to be filled up in five years, and if the Agricultural Training Centre at Nyamishaba continues to produce 30 Agricultural Assistants per year, it would be necessary to provide an accelerated training program by transforming 3 CERARs into Agri- culture Training Centres with a total enrollment of 80 students each and an output of 80. The best "moniteurs" could be given as a priority for this training. After these five years, these CERARs could revert to their former function, but with better equipment. 14. If it is still considered necessary, the training of veterinary assistants could be reintroduced in the institution that trains veterina- rians A ), as used to be done at Butare. If not, a program for strengthening and providing short-term practical training to junior veterinary assistants (skilled animal health workers) could be introduced. 15. The training of forest guards could be carried out during the vacations in the premises of the Agriculture Training Centre at Kibuye. A first training of three months would be followed in subsequent years by periods of in-service training. 16. With regard to the 978 existing Moniteurs, about 800 received a training varying between 2 and 4 months in 1960 and 1961; the others were engaged without any training. Many Moniteurs are considered completely ineffective. In practice, most Moniteurs should be replaced or retrained. However, if the reorganization of the communes proceeds as proposed, with the introduction of the new extension service designed in Annex 2, Moniteurs will no longer be necessary; as there will be an "Assistant Agricole" in each sector or colline. 17. The main points of this study on the agricultural manpower needs can be summarized as follows: (i) The proposals for the five-year plan will have to be reduced in accordance with the budget possibilities and the manpower likely to be available. (ii) By 1984 the Agricultural Section of the Faculty of Science will have satisfied all the estimated needs, and the new graduates will probably meet with diffi- culties in finding employment. (iii) It is necessary to create one new agricultural school to train a sufficient number of Agronomist A2, but the training of Veterinarian A in only one school will satisfy the needs. Nevertheless, an economical alter- native might be to concentrate in one new school the  ANNEX 5 Page 6 training of all the agronomists and veterinarians A2, so that the Agricultural Section of the Faculty of Sciences could use the building of the existing school at Butare. 4. The accelerated training of about 1,400 Agricultural Assistants A is urgent. This could be done by trans- forming 3 CE AARs into a real agriculture training center if the deficit is to be filled by 1981. Cooperatives 18. The cooperative movement is under the responsibility of the Min- istry of Social Affairs. There are 157 cooperatives and pre-cooperatives; 85 cooperatives are recognized. The existing personnel is as follows: Categories A A1 A2 A3 A4 Management - 6 2 1 - Prefectures (Inspectors) - - - 10 - Communes (Encadreurs) - - - - 40 A request for a cooperative expert has been made to ILO. The personnel of categories A2 and A1 have been trained abroad. For other personnel, the training can be summarized as follows: For the A3, 6 to 9 months of coop- erative training at the Murambi polyvalent training center following 4 to 5 years of secondary education; for the A4, 3 to 6 months of cooperative training at Murambi, following 1 to 3 years of secondary education. 19. In the new organization of the commune it is planned to have an encadreur (organiser) in each commune. As about 20 encadreurs are attached to special projects (coffee, tea, pyrethrium, and others), there is a deficit of about 120 encadreurs. It is necessary to provide permanent cooperative training facilities to train new encadreurs, to upgrade and retrain regularly the existing personnel, and to train the personnel (managers, bookkeepers, etc.), and the members of the cooperatives - preferably at Murambi or other existing institutions. B. PROPOSALS FOR THE MODIFIED EXTENSION SCHEME 20. If the proposals made in this report for a modifed extension system based on the Communal Training Centers are adopted, the estimates of staff needs would be somewhat different from these proposed by the Ministry of Agri- culture for the 5 year plan. Substantial changes would also be needed in the policies of staff training, and the budgetary consequences would also be very different. The figures which follow in this section are above all orders of  ANNEX 5 Page 7 magnitude rather than precise estimates and are given to provide a frame of reference in establishing future policy. Findings with Regard to the Number of Agricultural Training Institutions University level 21. It seems doubtful whether the Faculty of Agronomy will justify it existence by being fully utilized. Despite estimates of requirements that are much higher than those of the mission (195 against 100), the Laval University report points out that "the maximum number of students attending the Faculty of Agronomy probably would be 46, and this level would not be reached until 1987-88." In that year there would be about 15 graduates per year; and there would only be 8 until 1983. The program would require 10 to 11 full-time professors, or six fulltime and 8 to 13 part-time (most of whom would be provided by ISAR). The cost of training per student is significantly high, but would possibly be reduced if a higher thoroughput could be achieved by accepting students from neighbouring countries. The costs are estimated as follows: Without ISAR participation With ISAR 1976-77 US$17,610 US$12,648 1988-89 US$8,039 US$6,230 (c.f.) United States US$2,800 Source: ACDI-Laval University Report. 22. Furthermore, the instruction envisaged seems rather theoretical, for example, there is nothing on extension services. It therefore seems preferable to continue training specialists abroad, if possible sending them to African colleges of agronomy (e.g., Yaounde). Intensive workshops could then be held for graduate economists returning to Rwanda on the spe- cific features of Rwandese agriculture and agricultural policy. ISAR and senior personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture would participate in these workshops. Agricultural technicians A and veterinarians A2 22 23. The same uncertainties exist concerning requirements for middle- level personnel: the Ministry of Education estimates the need at about 50%; 1/ the Deheyn report estimates that 33 agricultural technicians and 132 veterinarians in 10 years 2/ while the present mission's estimate is for 227 agricultural technicians and 127 veterinarians. Since the capacity of Butare is limited to a maximum of 25 agricultural technicians and 15 veterinarians, it is advisable that a second school be established at this level regardless of the estimates adopted. On the other hand, a third school would merely create an oversupply from the time its first classes were graduated. 1/ Ministry of Education, Preliminary Study on the Construction and Equip*- ping of an Agricultural and Veterinary School at Ngarama (May 1976). 2/ Deheyn, Report on the Conversion of Rilima College (March 1976).  ANNEX 5 Page 8 24. Studies have already been made on two locations: (i) Rilima (Kigali prefecture): conversion of Rilima Col- lege, at present comprising orientation and science departments, into a school of agriculture, stockraising and animal health. Cost: RF 93 million. Assistance envisaged: Belgium. (ii) Ngarama (Byumba prefecture): The school would be estab- lished on a former private concession of 78 hectares. Estimated cost: RF 205 million. Plans had also been made to request FED support for a school of agriculture at Busasamana. The project seems to have been withdrawn. The school for female agricultural technicians (level A2) at Nyagahanga (Byumba prefecture), was expected to open in September 1976. Basic extension agents 25. At present the school at Kibuye trains 20 to 30 agricultural assistants, and the last class had 18 graduates; 33 students enrolled for their first year in September 1975. The training lasts two years, with appropriate alternation of theoretical and practical work, and numerous detached assignments. Field advisors and extension agents (level A4) have received only very brief training and this in the distant past, more than ten years ago. 26. Under the proposed system of extension services, total requirements would be about 665 persons at level A3 or upgraded A4 with 4 per commune plus 100 for miscellaneous projects and activities. There are now 158 agricultural assistants and about 1,000 field advisors or extension workers. 1/ By all accounts the level of field advisors is not very high, but at least half could be upgraded. 27. The most logical solution would therefore be to take advantage of the work experience of the field advisors, selecting the best ones and advancing them to a higher level. Specifically, half of the advisors 2/ could be selected and given alternating theoretical-practical training for one year, followed by annual refresher courses. This advanced training would be spread over a period of time and would begin in the prefectures where the new system is to be tested. The premises of the largest communal training center in the 1/ The current figures are somewhat uncertain since responsibility for these personnel has been taken over by the communes, and there have been layoffs. 2/ The others would be gradually eliminated from extension work and shifted to other occupations (managers, overseers) or provided with credit to start on their own, or retired.  ANNEX 5 Page 9 prefecture could be used (such facilities already exist at Gikongoro and Nyakabanda). Practical work would take place directly in the prefectures. 28. Another solution would be to convert Kibuye into a center for refresher courses, and to use as well the A training center envisaged in the Bugesera Est project to be financed by he World Bank. The instruction teams would be quite small of about three persons, and would be provided chiefly by existing projects or schools and supported by the Extension Service. INADES could be used for some intensive workshops and as a source of teaching materials. The same process would be followed for training veterinary assist- ants and auxiliaries. Such a program seems much less costly than the establish- ment of a new school specializing in refresher training for field advisors (c.f. FAO proposal). 29. To sum up, the order of priority would be: (i) A3 or upgraded A4 (ii) A2 (iii) graduate agronomists, which is the inverse of the order of priority under the present policy. Training School for Cooperative Specialists 30. The development of cooperatives has become a national issue with multipurpose communal cooperatives in view. For the present, however, there are few specialists and they have had only brief training, not always tai- lored to the real problems of Rwandese cooperatives. Rather than setting up a third school of agriculture, it seems preferable to establish a school for training specialists in cooperative at level A2. 31. It would be necessary to ensure that the new school does not suf- fer from the deficiencies observed in other school of this kind in Africa: too much emphasis on legislation, the Rochdale principles and the history of the world cooperative movement, etc. Instruction should, rather, be highly practical with applications in the field, and should focus on methods of establishing cooperatives, educational techniques, simplified management, problems of marketing, credit, organization, etc. Insofar as possible the instruction should be given by in-service personnel, such as TRAFIPO in- structors, personnel of the People's Banks. After several years of field experience the most qualified personnel could be given advanced training abroad, e.g., Doula Training College (Pan-African Institute for Development); College Cooperatif in Paris. Refresher Training 32. It is essential to provide for annual refresher training of spe- cialists at all levels, enabling them to reflect on their work, to prepare  ANNEX 5 Page 10 for their future activities and to bring themselves up to date on the latest research findings or new approaches in agricultural policy. Two sessions could be held each year to prepare and evaluate the agricultural season. Refresher training for prefecture specialists would be given with the support of the Research Department and national agencies. Commune specialists would be given refresher training by prefecture specialist, possibly with educational support at the national level (Extension Service). Extension agents could be given facilities to enroll in INADES correspondence courses. Teaching of Extension Work in Schools of Agriculture 33. Students at Butare and Kibuye are already taking courses in exten- sion work 1/ and carrying out practical work and assignments (study visits). The job analyses made at Butare underscore the importance of extension work in the future activities of officials. Accordingly, the measures recommended below merely complement the actions already taken. (i) Study visits at the beginning of each year to familiarize the students with the rural environment. In this way the students will become aware of the diversity of the sector as regards area, manpower, livestock holdings, financial position, etc. and of the real problems facing farmers. This awareness will motivate students to consider the extent to which the instruction meets the expectation of farmers. (ii) Practical work on the small farms and testing of various submodels. Study of the actual results obtained (in terms of production, income and amount of labor). Such practical work and studies will provide the basis for their future role as extension agents. (iii) Establishment of an extension services zone served by the school. Under the supervision of their professors, teams of students, will visit the collines regularly, say one day a week, to discuss technical matters with farmers and to help them test and evaluate techniques. They will be introduced gradually to the different forms of extension work such as individual contacts, group meetings, demonstrations, use of audio-visual aids, training of leaders. It would 1/ With, however, "some weakness in the conceptualization of extension activities." Cf. Schmidtgall report, FAO Beringer mission, December 1975.  ANNEX 5 Page 11 be well if the school could organize the occasional attendance of key farmers. 1/ (iv) This program of familiarization with the rural setting could easily fit into the time schedule if the study visits in the fourth year were shortened at level A2 As a matter of fact, quite often the study visit merely anticipates the situation in which the students will be working later, but is not real training. It could be reduced to about three months without difficulty. Better Integration of Schools with the Rural Sector 34. Each school could have an organizing council composed of represen- tatives of the local administrative authorities (prefect and burgomasters),, research and extension agencies, teachers, students and, of course, the Ministry of Education. This council could play a key role in the modifica-- tion of programs and the organization of extension service areas and study visits. Better Integration of General Education and Extension Activities 35. The reforms of the general educational system under way call for a much more important role for courses and practical training in agriculture. Despite the refresher training programs of the Ministry of Education, many teachers have little more than a passing acquaintance with this field, and this can present a bad example to the students. Accordingly, the instructors should be assisted by the agricultural technicians of the commune or by extension agents. As a counterpart, it would be highly desirable for in- structors and their best students to be able to assist in the preparation of agricultural statistics, which in turn are a valuable and inexhaustible aid in the teaching of arithmetic for weight, volume, area, percentages, etc. With a properly followed sample of five farms per school, 2/ the agricultural statis- tics of Rwanda could be improved and the gap between the school and the rural sector narrowed. 1/ This is primarily a continuation and refinement of the activities already undertaken, and the motivation of farmers in this regard seems good. The 1974-75 report of the chief of the Butare extension service notes "some dispersion of efforts, which is due to the fact that heavy demands are made upon the agricultural section to meet the pressing requirements for extension services around Butare. These requirements are voiced both by local authorities and by the farmers themselves, who to some extent see in this agency a miraculous solution to all their problems." 2/ There are about 2,000 schools, mostly located in rural areas.  ANNEX 5 Page 12 Training of Women Specialists (cf. Annex on extension services) 36. Women play a basic role in agriculture, providing 60 to 70% of the farm labor. Thus it is important that all instructors of women have a minimum knowledge of farming and stockraising so that they are in a position to answer the simpler questions of farmers, assist extension workers, and associate their activities (nutrition, cooking) with those of the extension programs. All schools could devote about a third of their program to prob- lems of farming and stockraising. Training of Burgomasters 37. As the commune is increasingly becoming the basic nucleus of devel- opment, the qualifications of the burgomaster are now of major concern. If strictly administrative functions are to be entrusted more and more to the bookkeeper of the commune with the burgomaster responsible for supervision, the burgomaster should provide general orientation and leadership and coor- dinate the activities of the teams of technicians under this authority. 38. For this reason, it is essential (and this is already being done) that the burgomaster take refresher training each year, with emphasis on adult education and promotion techniques, introduction to farming and stock- raising, introduction to management and finance and, of course, upgrading of administrative skills. This refresher training could be given at the Murambi center, or, for some subjects, at the prefecture level (in the Prefectural Training Center or the various educational establishments). 39. Outline of Principal Suggestions and Recommendations (i) Number of agricultural training schools a) the establishment of a College of Agronomy has no priority. b) it is advisable to set up a second school to train A2 level agricultural technicians and veterinarians. c) about 500 field advisors should be given a one- year advanced training course. (ii) A training school for cooperative specialists, based on practical work, is necessary. (iii) It is essential to provide for annual refresher training of specialists at the various levels. (iv) The teaching of extension work in the schools of agri- culture can be supplemented by study visits in the rural sector, by practical work focusing on the small farms and by the establishment of an extension services area.  ANNEX 5 Page 13 (v) The establishment of an organizing council with represen- tatives of local administrative and technical personnel would facilitate the integration of the schools with the rural sector. (vi) The collaboration of agricultural specialists in agricul- tural training within the general educational system, and the collaboration of teachers in the production of agri- cultural statistics, would provide better coordination between extension services and general education. (vii) All instructors of women should have received a good introduction to farming and stockraising. (viii) Burgomasters should take annual refresher courses, es- pecially in adult education and promotion techniques, introduction to agriculture, finance and management.  IWANL?A AGRICULTURAL SICTOR RRVIEW AiEIC"LI'lAt? !A7TZ-MMR CUEISTI" '7.TIPATIOT' tAPPEtpc orDrpy v _- WUTIIATTON AMUELLE "Isnl of *rrrl',, r,.eo.1T.I,,.s_er.olt44,.,i.o Ao 1 '-,-r,,rlre P er 1c 'lElans t rolecc nod Various | Xtisr MiYnDiF nnistry of Education Q=nltiicstion Ar--ltOrO 7ort rr 'itheiss Livlclc -1 K epin_ . I ..E |- rolAte riovre MtiiPln= MiiEd-c Total Roret. P.tieo Ciivago Apicoit.re wnee E-dpatuioto %anloe