Report No. 494a-SL RLE Ctpy Sierra Leone Current Economic Position and Prospects (In Five Volumes) Volume III: Annexes II & III November 27, 1974 Western Africa Region Not for Public Use Document of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Development Association This report was prepared for official use only by the Bank Group. It may not be published, quoted or cited without Bank Group authorization. The Bank Group does not accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the report. CURRENCY lQUIVALENTS Ourrency Unit a Leone (Le) a fixed parity exista between the Leone and the pound sterlings L * Le 2 The Leone floats against the dollar. Between February 1973 and April 1974 the rate at the end of each manth has fluctuated as followas US$ 1 - Leo.877 - 0.775 Throughout this report the following rates have been used for the conversion of Leone into US dollars and vice versa: 1968 and earlier: US$ 1 - Le 0.714 1967 : US$ 1 - Le 0.735 1968 - 1971 : US$ 1 = Le 0.833 1972 t US$ 1 = Le 0.816 1973 t US$ 1 = Le 0.833 PREFACE This report is based on the findings of an Economic Mission which visited Sierra Leone in November/December 1973. The following participated in the Mission and in the writing of the Report: Emerich M. Schebeck - Chief of Mission Hendrik T. Koppen - General Sconomist Roger S. Smith - Fiscal Economist (IMF) Cornelius P. Cacho - Planning/Administration Specialist Gerald L. Karr - Agricultural Economist (Consultant) Gerhard Gerhardsen - Fishery Specialist (Consultant) Judith A. Edstrom - Education Economist Claude Delapierre - Transport Specialist Rolf Giisten - Transport Economist Ibrahim Kande - General Economist (ADB) Lu- R. Pangilinan - Mission Secretary Ms. 'Edstrom and Messrs. Delapierre and GUsten visited Sierra Leone in the spring of 1974. ANNEX II AGRICULTURE Table of Contents Page No. I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 1 II. THE AGRICULTURAL SETTING ...................... 1 Composition of Sector ......................... 1 Production .................................... 5 Farm Labor and Employment ..................... 6 Agricultural Marketing ........................ 7 Transport and Storage ......................... 11 Agricultural Credit ........................... 11 Farm Supply Delivery System ................... 13 Veterinary Services ........................... 14 III. CONSTRAINTS ................................... 15 Policy ........................................ 15 Government Expenditure for Agriculture ........ 17 Price Incentives ........................................ 17 Faragate Prices ............................... 20 Farm Supply Delivery System ................... 22 Agricultural Extension Service ................ 23 Rural Credit .................................. 24 Training and Research ......................... 24 IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS ................... 26 Physical Resources ........................... 26 Market Prospects .............................. 26 Rice .......................................... 28 Other Food Crops .............................. 32 Palm Products ................................. 32 Coffee and Cocoa .............................. 34 Minor Export Crops ............................ 34 Other Crops ................................... 34 Livestock ................................... . 34 Sources of Sector Growth ...................... 37 Table of Contents (Cont'd) Page No. V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS . ................. 39 A. Short-Run Measures ....................... 39 Adequate Price Incentives ................ 39 Elimination of Subsidy Programs ... 42 B. Long-Run Measures ...... ............ 44 Marketing Institutions ................... Input Supplies ........................... 4g The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources ................... 6 Credit and Other Services ................ 46 Storage and Transport .................... 46 Rural Credit ..................... 47 Extension Services ....................... 47 Research and Training .................... 48 Land Tenure ...................... 50 VI. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY ...... ........... 51 Impact on Rural Incomes ....................... 51 Provide Focus ................................. 51 Maximum Coordination ......................... 51 Training/Learning Experience .................. 52 Likely Strategy .............................. 53 Kambia Center ................................ 56 Njala Center .................................. 56 Other Centers ................................. 57 VII. MAJOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS .... ......... 59 On-Going Projects ............................. 62 Supportive Services ........................... 63 Projects under Consideration .................. 63 Northern Project ......................... 63 Multi-Chiefdom Centers .................. 64 Eastern Project-Phase II ................. 64 Sugar/Rice Project ....................... 65 Coconuts ................................. 65 Other Tree Crops ......................... 65 Other Regional Projects .................. 66 MAP ANNEX II Page 1 I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 This report deals with the constraints, issues, opportunities and strategies for the development of Sierra Leone's agricultural sector. Sector analysis takes on special importance at a time when the Government is serious- ly considering its priorities and adjusting its financial outlays to afford more rapid development in agriculture. Because of Sierra Leone's stage of overall development, special attention is given to institutional and policy changes in order to accelerate sector development. 1.02 The conclusions are based upon a review of available statistics and research studies related to the agriculture sector. In some cases crucial data were not available or had limited reliability and this has limited, in some respects, the sophistication of the sector analysis. Special attention, therefore, should be directed to the construction of data series, that will be useful in future analysis and policy planning. II. THE AGRICULTURAL SETTING 2.01 Sierra Leone has a population of about 2.8 million and area of 73,326 square kilometers (27,925 square miles). Average population density has in- creased from 78 per square mile in 1963 (first population census) to 100 per square mile in 1974. Located in the rainforests of West Africa, it is in the center of the "rice zone" which extends from the Bandama River in the Ivory Coast to the Senegal River. 2.02 Annual growth of agricultural production was 1.5 percent during the last decade. Thus growth did not keep pace with population growth which in- creased from 1.5 percent a year in the 1960's to 2.3 percent in the 1970's. Sierra Leone's agriculture is based on traditional farming, with the relative size of plantation agriculture being insignificant. As with most other West African nations, only 3-4 percent of expenditures on imports are for agricul- tural inputs. 2.03 Composition of the Sector. Traditional farming which is still most- ly outside the monetized economy, consists of about 290,000 farmers cultivat- ing over 1,305,000 acres. Only about 40 percent of the agricultural sector is monetized, with most of this concentrated in export crops, rice and palm oil. Agriculture provides the principal livelihood for nearly three quarters of the population; contributing about 30 percent of the GDP and providing less than 20 percent of total domestic exports. Smallholder agriculture is based upon the classic bush fallow system which comprises some 70 percent of the total crop acreage. ANNEX II Page 2 2.04 Some 73 percent 1/ of the total population live in rural areas, with 47 percent of the rural population included in the rural labor force. Sixty percent of the farm population of 10 years of age and older define farming as their primary occupation. The average size of rural households is estimated to be 6.7 persons. Over 57 percent of farm holders are over 45 years of age, with only 1.4 percent under 25 (see Table 1). Since 1965 an increasing number of farm holders in the Southern and Eastern Province were 55 years or older. In absolute terms, the growth in number of holders was entirely in the age groups of 35 and older. The age groups under 25 and 25 to 34 decreased nearly 23 percent and over 5 percent, respectively. This absolute loss of younger farmers points to the ever growing challenge of rural-urban migration caused by the high urban-rural income disparities and past problems in maintaining growth in agricultural production. Table 1: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDERS BY AGE, 1965/66 and 1970/71 South East North Sierra Leone Age Class 65/66 70/71 65/66 70/71 65/66 70/71 65/66 70/71 (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) under 25 1.5 0.4 2.2 2.4 2.3 1.5 2.1 1.4 25 to 34 13.7 11.5 21.6 14.6 21.7 23.8 19.5 16.5 35 to 44 23.4 23.2 27.9 24.8 23.4 26.8 24.8 24.9 45 to 54 24.8 23.1 22.1 22.1 23.5 26.0 23.4 23.8 55 and over 36.6 41.8 26.2 36.1 29.1 21.9 30.2 33.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Central Statistics Office. 2.05 Land under cultivation increased from 5.6 to 7.4 percent of total land area between 1965/66 and 1970/71 (see table 2). Variation in the in- tensity of land use among districts ranged from 18.5 percent in Kenema to 2.3 percent in Koinadugu (see table 3). This is primarily a reflection of the better land resources available in the Eastern Province compared to the drier conditions of the Northern Province. 2.06 Average acreage under cultivation per holder is about 4.5 acres with wide variations ranging from 7 acres in the Eastern Province to only 1 acre in the Western Area (Statistical Appendix Tables 4.8 and 4.9). Nearly two thirds of all farms have a size below 5 acres. The largest concentra- tion of farms below 5 acres is found in the Northern and Southern Provinces whereas the Eastern Province contains the largest proportion of farms above 5 acres. 1/ FAO estimates for 1970. ANNEX II Page 3 Table 2: LAND USE, 1970/71 (in thousand acres) Forest Reserves Administrative Land Under and Residual- Total Division Crops Projected Forest Land Area Acreage Percent Acreage Percent Acreage Percent Acreage Percent Southern Province 340 1.9 61 0.4 4,466 25.1 4,867 27.5 Eastern Province 502 2.8 430 2.4 2,910 16.5 3,83 21.7 Northern Province 454 2.6 257 1.5 8,170 46.0 8,880 50.0 Western Area 9 0.1 44 0.2 85 0.5 137 0.8 Sierra Leone 1,305 7.L41 791 4.5L/ 15,631 88.1 17,727 100.0 1/ Comparable data for 1965/66 indicated 5.6 percent and 4.2 percent land under crops and forests, respectively. Source: Central Statistics Office. ANNEX II Page 4 Table 3: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LAND UNDER CROP CULTIVATION BY DISTRICTS Administrative 1965/66 1970/71 Division (percent) (percent) Bo 9.4 Bonthe 2.4 Moyamba 8.6 Pujebun 5.0 South 5.5 7.0 Kailahun 17.3 Kenema 18.5 Keno 4.3 East 9.0 13.1 Bombali 4.4 Kambia 10.0 Koinadugu 2.3 Port Loko 9.8 Tonkolili 4.8 North 41.3 1.1 West 1 6.7 Sierra Leone 5.6 7.4 1/ Western Area included in the Northern Province Source: Central Statistics Office ANNEX II Page 5 2.07 There is a definite trend showing less land being newly cleared each year. This trend is a reflection of a more intensive use of land in improved swamp cultivation (acreage in swamp rice has increased at 6.4 percent a year since 1965/66, see Table 4), as well as of reduced fallow periods in the uplands. There is also an increase in the number of fields under culti- vation by each holder (see Statistical Appendix Table 4.10). While these facts indicate an increasing pressure on the land resources, particularly in the high population density areas, there is no shortage of undeveloped and unimproved swamps throughout Sierra Leone. As a land surplus economy, Sierra Leone's more serious long-term problem will be one of mobilizing the rural population to resettle in areas now controlled by different tribal groups. The land tenure system, which does not now appear to be a serious barrier to current development, will require major changes as increasing population pressures develop in selected areas of the country, particularly in some northern chiefdoms. Table 4: ACREAGE UNDER RICE CULTIVATION 1965/66 and 1970/71 Acreage Acreage Percentage Growth 1965/66 1970/71 Increase Rate (percent) Acreage Under Cultivation with Upland Rice as Major Crop 591,000 649,408 9.9 1.9 Acreage Under Cultivation with Swamp Rice as Major Crop 152,200 207,766 36.5 6.4 Total 743,200 857,174 15.3 3.0 Source: Central Statistics Office. Production 2.08 Rice, the basic staple food, is grown on over 50 percent of all land under cultivation and by 80 percent of all farmers. Together with Liberia, Sierra Leone has the highest per capita consumption of rice in West Africa (100 to 120 kilograms). Rice imports have been significant since the early 1950's; prior to that period Sierra Leone was a net exporter of rice. Rice imports amounted to only 9 percent of Sierra Leone's national production during the first decade of independence, but import requirements have increased to about 20 percent of production in 1973 (see Statistical Appendix Table 4.5). The main causes for this change are found in (1) the increased diamond mining activities, which resulted in a sharp increase in rice demand owing to high mining incomes, and (2) a decline in rice produc- tion below the long-term trend as a result of labor migration and inadequate price incentives. ANNEX II Page 6 2.09 About 75 percent of the total rice acreage were under rainfed up- land rice in 1970/71, compared to about 80 percent in 1965/66, reflecting the expansion of swamp rice cultivations. Rice farmers operate within a communal land tenure system. Capital for crop production includes basic hand tools, non-improved seed rice and very limited fertilizer; only 3 per- cent of the farmers use fertilizer. Sixty-three percent of the fertilizer used is on swamp rice, with another 28 percent available for upland rice production. Over half the fertilizer (54 percent) is used in the Northern Province, primarily on the less fertile bolilands 1/. Rice accounts for over 40 percent of the total value of all crop production, while providing about 50 percent of the calories in the diet of the population. 2.10 Production of rice has shown annual increases of 2-3 percent, similar to that for most other foodcrops. Expansion of output of export crops has been primarily limited to coffee and cocoa. Cocoa exports have doubled since 1961 (from 3,000 to 6,000 tons), primarily because of increased plantings just prior to independence and during the plantation scheme of the mid-1960's. The expansion in coffee production and exports has been erratic but appears to show nearly a threefold increase during the 1960's and early 1970's. The growth in output of other export crops (palm kernels, ginger, piassava and kola nuts) has been very slow. Livestock and livestock pro- ducts have shown marginal increases in recent years, with the exception of poultry which increased 54 percent since 1965/66. Except for coffee, cocoa and possibly rice, the increases in agricultural output have been due to smallholder initiative and not the direct result of government policy or programs. 2.11 Farm Labor and Employment. The annual growth of farm-employment was 2.8 percent between 1965/66 and 1970/71, about equal to the increase in the rural labor force. Average rural incomes range between Le 45 to Le 60 per capita (US$51 to US$73). Nearly 81 percent of the rural households re- ceive less than Le 40 monthly, while only 4.5 percent have monthly incomes of over Le 100. 2.12 The average farm wage paid throughout Sierra Leone is about 63 Le cents per day including food valued at 18 Le cents. Higher wages in Kono (diamond mining) and the Western Area totaled 91 and 98 Le cents, respective- ly. These wage rates compare to the government's minimum rate of 99 Le cents per day for unskilled agricultural labor employed by institutions (agriculture college) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Even in the framework of a smallholder agriculture, 60 percent of the farmers hire labor to meet peak seasonal labor demands for brushing, planting and harvesting. 1/ The bolilands are low swamp grasslands in the central and northern parts of Sierra Leone. They are the focus of the Mechanical Cultivation Scheme of the MANR in the Northern Province. ANNEX II Page 7 Internal wages generated by crop holders for their family labor and management are highly dependent upon crop yields and possible farmgate prices. For ex- ample, traditional upland rice farmers in 1972 were earning less than hired labor while a successful swamp farmer could generate returns per manday of labor and management of about 75 Le cents. The 1973/74 increases in commodity prices (especially rice) should raise returns per manday to over Le 1 (see Table 5). 2.13 Agricultural Marketing. Sierra Leone is a "price taker" in the world markets for its export crops (except possibly ginger). Most of these crops are handled through the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB), a public corporation established during the early 1940's with the aim of stabilizing prices. Yet the concept of price stabilization has actually been used as a means of collecting indirect taxes from tree-crop farmers by holding domestic prices lower than world prices. The surplus obtained by the Board has been partly directed to economic development, but not nec- essarily in the agricultural sector. To afford effective marketing of ex- port crops throughout the nation, the Board established a system of private licensed buyers. As Table 6 indicates most of the licensed buyers, in charge of the crop collection, storage and transport to Freetown, are Lebanese. The producer prices set by the Board have stabilized prices of primary export crops at a fairly low level relative to the export value. As Table 7 shows, announced producer prices (not farmgate prices) seldom are over 60 percent of the final export value. These producer prices are sometimes maintained for several years without any adjustment. Farmgate prices range from 60 to 80 percent of the Board's announced price. This deprives the sector of dynamic price signals which would be useful in bringing about both short and long-term adjustments in production. Later analysis will show the ef- fects of pricing at both the micro and the macro level of the sector. 2.14 Rice marketing is handled by the Rice Corporation, a public cor- poration established in 1965, in an attempt to regulate rice supply to urban areas through import controls and the establishment of minimum producer prices. With the growing gap between domestic production of rice and domestic demand, the Rice Corporation has become the focus of the rice trade (See Figure 1). Rice imports have risen to 63,000 tons annually and at the current approved wholesale price (Le. 350 per ton), the 1974 government rice subsidy will be over Le 6 million. The granting of consumer subsidies on imported rice has had the effect of damping the price of domestically produced rice, resulting in more confusion of price incentives at the producer level 1/. 2.15 Both the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board and the Rice Corpora- tion are organized under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. This structure prohibits adequate coordination of agricultural policy with the MANR, especial- ly in areas related to pricing and marketing. Both corporations are Freetown- based, with a limited number of field officers, and each corporation maintains 1/ Since the Mission's visit to Sierra Leone, the rice subsidy to consumers has been abolished completely in May, 1974 and the producer price for paddy has been raised to Le 5 per bushel (equivalent to about US$222/ton of milled rice) a more than two-fold increase of the 1973 producer price. Table 5: COMPARISON OF INPUT/OUTPUT MEASURES FOR SELECTED RICE FARMING SYSTES age 8 (per acre) Measures Upland Upland Inland Swamp Mangrove Boliland Traditional Improved Average Improved Old Land Mechanized 1. Husk rice yield (lbs) 1294 2062 2875 3187 1244 2. Value of rice: a) High price(Le 4.00) Le 86.27 Le 137.47 Le 191.68 Le 212.48 Le 82.94 b) Low price (Le 2.50) 53.92 85.92 119.80 132.80 51.84 3. Value of fam inputes a) Seed rice Le 1.92 Le 1.92 Le 2.50 Le 5.92 Ie 2.34 b) Fertilizer -- 5.10 3.60 --- 1.60 a) Hand tools 0.61 0.61 0.86 0.86 0.42 d) Machine hire -- -- -- --- 6.00 (24.00) 4. Total cost of inputs Le 2.53 Le 7.63 Le 6.96 Le 6.78 Le 10.36 (28.36) 5. Returns after inputs: a) High price Le 83.74 Le 129.84 Le 184.72 Le 205.70 Le 72.58 (54.58) b) Low price 51.39 78.29 112.84 126.02 41.48 ( ) 6. Prorated development costs --- --- Le 5.00 Le 5.00 7. Returns to labor and agti a) High price Le 83.74 Le 129.84 Le 179.72 Le 200.70 Le 72.58 (54.58) b) Low price 51.39 78.29 107.84 121.02 41.48 (23.48) 8. Labor inputs (mandays) 101 106 146 191 31 9. Return per mandayt a) High price Le 0.83 Le 1.22 Le 1.23 Le 1.05 Le 2.31 (1.76) b) Low price 0.51 0.74 0.74 0.63 1.34 (0.76) 1/ Assumes fanmers paid the Government the real cost for machine services. Machine hire charge increases to Le 7.00 when seed harrowing is included. Sources Based upon field data collected by Dunstan Spencer (Njala University College) during the 1971/72 crop year for his Ph.D. dissertation ("The Efficient Ue of Resources in the Production of Rice in Sierra Leone." University of Illinois, 1973). Table 6: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TONNAGE OF SELECTED EXPORT CROPS PURCHASED BY VARIOUS BUYERS, 1971/72 Type of Buyer Palm Kernels Coffee Cocoa Ginger (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) Non-African Traders 75.1 79.7 56.2 73.0 Sierra Leone Traders 15.4 19.2 40.2 27.0 Large Expatriate Firms 9.5 n.s. 2.0 0 Cooperatives 0 1.1 1.6 0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board Page 10 Table 7t SL(B PRODUCER PRICES AT UP-COUNTRY BUYING STATION 1I (Leones per ton) Year Palm Kernels Coffee Cocoa (Grade I) 1961 Le 63.20 (75) 159.36 (67) n.a. 1962 63.20 (79) 174.97 (69) n.a. 1963 54.20 (59) 194.50 (58) n.a. 1964 59.62 (64) 194.50 (42) 242.57 (67) 1965 63.62 (56) 290.81 (84) 246.40 (80) 1966 63.62 (69) 268.80 (65) 208.07 (65) 1967 50.00 (50) 261.30 (56) 230.22 (60) 1968 63.22 (47) 291.20 (59) 257.60 (55) 1969 65.00 (59) 313.60 (60) 302.40 (39) 1970 65.00 (55) 313.60 (48) 302.40 (46) 1971 65.00 (56) 313.60 (37) 313.60 (55) 1972 65.00 (86) 313.60 (50) 313.60 (63) 1973 68.45 313.60 313.60 1974 80.42/ 403.20-/ 425.60W! 1 Percentage of announced producer price to export value shown in parenthesis. 2/ Based upon prices announced in December, 1973. Source: SLIB and Bank of Sierra Leone. ANNEX II Page 11 its own stores and transport. Both corporations operate outside the govern- ment structure and pay their employees on a higher salary scale. The Rice Corporation has continually lost money in the operation of its large rice mills. Currently, it is in the process of adjusting rice milling to the small- er Japanese mills. The Board has also incurred losses in operating its palm oil mills, which were established to promote the export of palm kernels (it is too early to evaluate the effect of the reopening of the palm kernel mill at Wellington). The value added in processing palm kernels within Sierra Leone is only about 5 percent. 2,16 A third institution involved in agricultural marketing with its rice and cocoa societies is the Cooperative Department. By 1970/71 only 8 percent of all farm holders were members of local societies compared to 10 percent in 1965/66. In 1970/71 nearly 85 percent of all members were located in the Southern Province, which was the only area showing an increase in membership since 1965. The drop in membership in the Eastern and North- ern Province can be directly related to the financial problems of the mar- keting societies, which were partly linked to the SLPMB's failure to provide timely payment for purchased export crops during the mid-1960's. The coop- erative movement, while active in Sierra Leone, has also suffered by virtue of its being an institution imposed by the Central Government upon the ex- isting village structure. In efforts to simplify the operations of coopera- tives, emphasis has been placed upon single functions (rice marketing, thrift and credit, etc.), rather than all purpose societies. The movement has pro- vided Sierra Leone with a cadre of cooperative leaders who are gaining ex- perience in agricultural marketing, handling of rural credit and mobilizing of rural resources; however, more attention must be given to the improvement of technical and management abilities if the cooperative movement is to be strengthened. Because of the critical shortage of leadership for sector development, it is important that the cooperative staff be provided the opportunities to merge their efforts with those of the MANR and the public corporations. The 931 societies registered in 1973, continue to represent a base for development in selected areas of the nation. 2.17 Transport and Storage. Currently, nearly all the transport and storage of farm produce is handled by the private sector. With the closing of the railroad, all movement of commodities is by road transport. Because of the poor system of feeder roads, over half of the farm products are con- veyed to market by headloading (on foot). The volume of products currently marketed has not seriously taxed the available transportation fleet. Crop storage involves farmers, merchants and to a limited extent the marketing corporations and the cooperatives. As in transport, the private sector appears to be able to expand storage capacity as needed. Most of the produce losses in storage relate to insects damage. 2.18 Agricultural Credit. After the collapse of credit schemes operated by the MANR and the cooperatives in the 1960's, institutional farm credit is virtually non-existent. Inadequate institutional structures to handle direct lending to a large number of small farmers and too lenient lending policies (i.e. low interest rates and lending to preferred customers) both contributed to a building-up of arrears and to the eventual collapse of the credit schemes. ANNEX 11 Page 12 Figure 1: FLOW CHART SHOWING THE MOVEMENT OF RICE THROUGH THE MARKETING CHANNELS IN SIERRA LEONE IMPORTED RICE VILLAGE ITINERANT CO-OPERATIVE MERCHANT MERCHANT SOCIETIES I WHOLESALE MERCHANTS I APPOINTED BUYING AGENTS RICE CORPORATION - PRIMARY RETAILERS 1- SECONDARY RETAILERS CONSUMERS Distributors Local Rice, Primary Flow Local Rice, Secondary Flow Bulkers - - - Imported Rice Source: Spencer, Dunstan, Rice Production and Marketing in Sierra Leone, paper presented at the Conference on Agricultural Development in West Africa held in Accra, Ghana, March 1971 World Bank-9074 ANNEX II Page 13 Presently, the unorganized financial market -- composed of moneylenders, traders and relatives -- with not uncommon interest rate charges in excess of 150 percent a year, is the primary source of credit in rural areas. Still, most of the capital formation in traditional agriculture is created through farm labor. Transforming traditional agriculture into a modern farm sector will, however, necessitate some form of institutional credit in order to provide short and long-term finance for input purchase and rehabilitations and plantings of tree crops. 2.19 Some revival of institutional finance is presently taking place. A National Cooperative Development Bank was established in 1971, but has not become truly operative., While there is no doubt that farm credit is needed, it is questionable, based on past experience, whether the cooperative struc- ture is the right institutional form or whether a new approach to agricultural credit is needed. Some long-term credit for agriculture is now provided by the National Development Bank, but this source is very limited and nearly all of these funds have gone to few large-scale commercial farms. 2.20 It is difficult to estimate credit requirements for traditional agriculture. Based on the 1970/71 Agricultural Survey, farmers borrow on the average Le. 29 per year. This would represent an effective credit demand of about Le. 8 million. Assuming that credit requirements would double with the increased availability of farm supplies and planting material, the total credit requirement (short and long-term) for agriculture could be in the order of about Le. 16 million a year. Of this total up to 40 percent would be in the area of consumption credit or subsistence credit for the rainy season. 2.21 Farm Supply Delivery System. The MANR has attempted to provide farm supplies (fertilizer, chemicals, etc.) as a direct part of the overall exten- sion effort. About 3 percent of the farmers use fertilizer and 1 percent of the rice farmers can annually obtain improved seed. However, most of the fertilizer (2,850 tons in 1972/73) is used in small special project areas, such as the mechanized bolilands in the north and the Eastern Project and is sold to farmers at less than 30 percent of the real cost. This subsidy, has increased over time with increasing world prices and stable farm prices for fertilizers. Recently the SLPMB has provided chemicals and sprayers free for distribution by MANR field staff for disease control on cocoa farms. The Board became active in this area in order to fill the vacumm created when expatriate firms were discouraged by the 1971 Non-Citizen Act from further sales of chemi- cals for disease and weed control. Since the spraying program has not been successful there is probably a need to mount a better organized program for spraying of cocoa and coffee. Agricultural machinery and spare parts have been handled by private dealers. Because of frequent changes in tractor makes, pri- vate dealers in farm equipment have tended to maintain very few spare parts on inventory, and this policy is adversely affecting the operations of both government and private machinery services. The related problems of transport. storage and financing have tended to limit farm use of all types of improved inputs. Without readily available farm supplies, extension programs lose their effectiveness as a means to increase agriculture productivity. ANNEX II Page 14 2.22 Veterinary Services. Animal health services are for practicable purposes not available to livestock farmers. Of the eleven trained veterin- arians, only four are currently posted outside the capital city. Critical disease problems include contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, trypanosomiasis, and various respiratory diseases in poultry. Calving rates are low and the mortality rate among calves is about 20 percent. Internal parasites are special problems for swine, sheep and goats. While the animal sub-sector is small, it does represent the primary livelihood for some tribal groups, especially the Fullah in the Northern Province. ANNEX II Page 15 III. CONSTRAINTS 3.01 In evaluating the constraints to rural development in Sierra Leone, it is critical to note that the interplay of various interest groups and individuals removed from the productive structure of the sector have often nullified past efforts in agricultural development. The pursuit of these interests, as in many other developing countries, has frequently interfered with the objective of improving the income situation of the smallholders located in rural villages. In addition, government policies and institutions have promoted projects that have resulted in greater inequalities in rural/ urban incomes. The Government has devoted little attention to agriculture in the past as evidenced by low budget allocations, which have represented less than one percent of GDP; this policy has restricted available finances needed for improving the rural infrastructure. Moreover, the pursuance of a pricing policy that has subsidized the cost of foodstuffs for the urban population has adversely affected farm income and food production. Pricing policy of the SLPMB has discouraged investment in and production of export crops, a further factor contributing to the increasing inequality between rural and urban incomes. 3.02 Policy. The government policy outlined in the budget address of June 30, 1972 stated that "the strategy of Government's agricultural activities is still aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in production of foodstuffs particularly rice". However, the budget statement and the 1972 "White Paper" prepared by MANR 1/ only indicate the direction the ministry's policy might take in the future in order to: (i) Increase rural incomes and improve their stability and even distribution by encouraging self sufficiency in food and reducing dependence on food imports. (ii) Increase rural employment by encouraging optimum production aimed at home and export markets. (iii) Improve the nutrition of both rural and urban population by encouraging increased production and utilization of suitable crops, fish, livestock and the products thereof. (iv) Provide cheap and more readily available food and raw materials for other sectors of the economy. (v) Protect the flora and fauna and conserve the fertility of soil and other natural resources for the benefit of future generations. 3.03 Neither the budget speech nor the policy paper define an overall strategy for improving both agricultural productivity (and thus farm incomes) and village living conditions. Undoubtedly an effective agricultural strategy 1/ The "White Paper" was in draft form only and never formally approved. ANNEX II Page 16 must involve all government services at the village level even with the realization that this will delay progress in urban areas. Increased rural incomes (and thus effective demand) will, in time, expand the market for out- put from other sectors of the economy. Improved rural well-being will mini- mize rural migration and reduce future unemployment problems in the urban centers. The lack of such an operational strategy has permitted the implement- ation of "piecemeal" projects that have political impact, but whose technical or economic feasibility may be questionable. 3.04 Examples of such projects are the planned expansion of the mechanical plowing scheme and the projected development of state farms 1/. The Govern- ment's purchase of 200 new tractors (on contractor credit) for the 1974 crop year will continue a 20-year experience with a mechanical cultivation scheme for rice lands. An experience that has not serviced more than 3 percent of the total rice acreage under cultivation and absorbs one-third of the develop- ment budget in 1973/74. Because of the heavy demand of mechanical cultivation on both the field and administrative staff of the MANR (literally six months each year), it would seem that the planned tractor expansion will further delay the extension effort to increase productivity on the other 98 percent of land under crops. 3.05 The lack of experienced and skilled human resources available to the MANR has been a critical factor in the planning and execution of agri- cultural projects. At independence, Sierra Leone found itself heavily dependent upon a few expatriate professional staff for implementing invest- ment programs in agriculture. By 1966 only four of the 10 agriculturists in the MANR were nationals. In recent years the staffing of the ministry has expanded, but the absorptive capacity of the MANR is still a limiting con- straint to future development. Shortages in trained agriculture manpower were responsible in varying degrees for the failure of government programs such as the farm credit scheme, the in-land valley subsidy scheme, and the District Council poultry scheme. The marginal success of the planting scheme for onions was likewise dampened because of a shortage of staff and finances. 3.06 The mechanical cultivation services deserve fuller comment, since they continue to draw heavily upon the resources of the MANR. In an attempt to improve labor efficiency and overcome labor bottlenecks, tractor cultiva- tion was introduced in Sierra Leone in the early 1950's. The general focus was upon custom plowing, disc harrowing and seed harrowing of rice land that is difficult to manage with hand tools. The program under the direction of 1/ Since the Mission's visit to Sierra Leone, the Government has abandoned the idea of state farm development. ANNEX II Page 17 the MANR has gradually expanded to a maximum of 26,000 acres plowed at a real cost of nearly four times the farmers' custom fee. Even the scheduled custom fees of Le 6.00 for plowing and Le 1.00 for seed harrowing has been difficult to collect. Based upon available input/output data, it would appear that rice production within areas plowed by the MANR has been extremely profitable for a few farmers. In the light of the needs for some 300,000 farmers in the rural sectors, the need for this selective subsidy of about 5,000 farmers should be reappraised. Furthermore, the subsidized plowing scheme has not encouraged the development of a viable private sector to handle mechanical services. The low fees (Le 7.00 per acre) charged by Government has made it difficult for private tractor operators to charge economic rates. Only four out of 15 private plowing contractors in Sierra Leone could more than break-even using the government custom rates. At the current subsidy of about Le 15.00 per acre, a program to plow 25,000 acres costs the Government Le 350,000. This acreage adds 12,500 to 15,000 tons of husk rice to the aggregate supply, with a current wholesale value of over Le 3 million. 3.07 Extension stations at Newton and Musaia and nurseries in the East- ern and Southern Provinces have declined rapidly in recent years because of staff and financial limitations. A fertilizer distribution scheme financed by the Federal Republic of Germany has been reasonably successfu;. When the MANR assumed full responsibility for this project in 1973, fertilizer supplies were not available for distribution until late after the planting season. The very marginal record of the MANR has certainly reinforced the urban- oriented policy-makers in limiting government funds available for agriculture. 3.08 Government Expenditure for Agriculture. Budgetary appropriations for the MANR's recurrent expenditures represent less than 5 percent of the Government's total expenditures and are at this level inadequate to provide the necessary supporting service (see Table 8). The MANR's share of the national development budget has grown from 3.7 percent in 1968/69 to about 25 percent in 1973/74, with total development expenditures for agriculture accounting for less than 1 percent of GDP; however, nearly 60 percent of investment outlays for agriculture has been financed by multi- and bilateral aid. Apart from the low allocation of budgetary resources to agriculture, which is related partly to the overall fiscal problem and partly to the low priority given to agricultural development, there is also a severe problem of timely allocation of these expenditures. Delayed appropriations have made it increasingly difficult for the MANR to procure farm inputs and to carry-out program development on schedule. 3.09 Price Incentives. The pricing policy for agricultural commodities, especially for export crops, has been aimed at generating tax revenues for the Government rather than at providing the necessary production incentives to farmers. The effects of SLPMB's pricing policy have been two-fold: first, farmers have realized lower incomes through low farm prices; and second, potential farm exports have been lost as farmers have not received price incentives to expand production or to intensify the gathering of available export crops. ANNEX II Page 18 Table 8: REVIEW OF GOVEWN EXPENDITURES BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES (in millions of Le) Percentage Percentage Year Recurrent of Total Development of Total Expenditure Expenditures Expenditure Expenditures (le) (M (le) (W 1961/62 1.001 4.6 n.a. - 1962/63 1.082 4.7 n.a. - 1963/64 1.206 4.5 n.a. - 1964/65 1.911 6.3 n.a. - 1965/66 2.152 7.2 n.a. - 1966/67 2.042 6.8 n.a. - 1967/68 1.231 4.0 0.4 5.1 1968/69 1.311 4.0 0.4 3.7 1969/70 1.929 4.8 0.7 5.6 1970/71 1.829 3.5 1.0 10.5 1971/72 2.3761 3.9 0.9 10.4 1972/73 2.850 4.3 2.82/ 18.2 1973/74 2.90521 4.4 4.2. 24.7 3/ Provisional actual expenditures 2/ Revised estimates I/ Estimates Source: MANR: "Estimates of Revenue and Expenditures, 1973-74" and "Development Estimates. 1973-74" ANNEX II Page 19 3.10 While stability of internal commodity prices for a given season is desirable for orderly marketing, price stability between seasons may increase instability of farm income. This is especially true when weather conditions create wide fluctuations in yields, such as in the case of cocoa and coffee. A recent review 1/ of SLPMB's financial statements over two decades, 1949 to 1969, shows that Le 16.5 million were accumulated in reserves. The alterna- tive would have been an upward revision of producer prices by about 12 per- cent during this period. Table 9: PROFITS OF SLPMB AFTER DEVELOPMENT LEVY 1968/69 - 1972/73 Year Profits 1968/69 Le 1,543,751 1969/70 1,834,386 1970/71 1,945,547 1971/72 (267,985) loss 1972/73 1,000,000 (est) Source: SLPMB In recent years, annual profits have been at an even higher level, although Le 0.5 million has been contributed annually to government revenues. In addi- tion, the progressive nature of the export tax 2/ on coffee and cocoa has re- cently accelerated the tax burden on these select farmers. A readjustment of these tax rates would allow further increases in producer prices. 3.11 The secondary effect upon expanded tonnage of commodities exported is difficult to measure; however, in a recent paper 3/, time series data were used to estimate the effect of SLPMB pricing upon the marketing of palm ker- nels and the findings indicated a supply elasticity for palm kernels of about 0.8 and an export loss for the period 1950 to 1970 of Le 33.3 million or an annual loss of Le 1.7 million (current prices). In the case of cocoa, the study estimated an annual export loss in the order of Le 1.0 million. 1/ Fenn, M.G., "The Marketing of Farm Crops in Sierra Leone", Unpublished Working Paper, PAO, Rome, March 1970. 2/ Duty on palm kernels is 10 percent ad valorem, while cocoa and coffee are taxed an additional 1 percent ad valorem for every Le 20 the f.o.b. value exceeds Le 400 per ton. For ginger the rate is a flat 5 percent ad valorem. 3/ Levi, John, "Anti-Agricultural Bias in West Africa: The Case of Sierra Leone', paper presented at the Queen Elizabeth House Development Seminar, Oxford University, February, 1974. ANNEX II Page 20 3.12 Farmgate Prices. An announced producer price does not guarantee the same price at the village level. Njala field studies 1/ have shown that pro- ducers actually receive as low as 60 - 70 percent of the Board's announced price when they sell to itinerant merchants that work for the purchasing agents of the Board. The percentage of final export value received by farmers averaged an estimated 50 percent, 46 percent and 47 percent for palm kernels, coffee and cocoa respectively (Statistical Appendix Table 4.7). Part of the lower farm- gate prices that are actually received by smallholders can be linked to the absence of institutional farm credit -- farmers in debt to local traders are in a poor bargaining position regarding price and time of marketing. What- ever the cause, it will prove difficult to accelerate the output of export crops unless farmers gain a higher percentage of revenues realized in world markets. Currently, the marketing system for export crops is providing a situation for a net transfer of resources out of the agricultural sector. Reserves and export duties from the marketing could be redirected via higher producer prices (encouraging private investment) and special agricultural projects, rather than going for general budgetary support. Unless it can be proven that these funds could be invested at a higher rate of return in other sectors, a continuation of these transfers does not appear to be warranted. At the least, a reduction in these transfers should be considered. 3.13 The minimum farmer prices for husk rice set by the Rice Corporation have nearly always been above world prices. In 1974, farmer prices are to be increased from Le 2.30 to Le 3.20 per bushel; however, the support price is still less than half the cost of imported rice (c.i.f. price) 2/. Table 10 presents a wide array of rice prices for Sierra Leone, with particular focus on the following three price series: (1) the average import purchase price (c.i.f.); (2) the official guaranteed producer's price (milled equivalent); and (3) the actual consumer price for local rice. Additional marketing cost must be considered in order to compare the official producer's price with the cost of imported rice or, possibly more important over the long-run, the average world price. Estimates prepared in a recent marketing study 3/ show that processing, storage and transport costs would add another Le 50 - 60 per ton to the farmer price. For example in 1970, this would place the domestic milled rice price at Le 165 to Le 180 per ton, while the world price was Le 100 and the average imports cost for the Rice Corporation was Le 112. However, in 1974 the cost of locally produced rice is about Le 250, over Le 100 less than world and import prices. With a wholesale price for imported rice of Le 350 per ton in 1974, farmer prices should increase to levels between Le 4.75 and Le 5.00 per bushel of husk 2/. 1/ Field studies conducted by Mr. I. I. May-Parker. 2/ Since the Mission's visit to Sierra Leone the Government raised the producer price of rice to Le 5 per bushel in May, 1974. While this price announcement may have been too late to effect planting in 1974, it will certainly provide the much needed price incentive for the 1975 planting season. 3/ "Rice Milling and Marketing Study: Sierra Leone", Agra-und Hydrotechnik Gmbh, October, 1973. ANNEX II Page 21 Table 10: COKEARISON OF VARIOUS RICE PRICBS EFFECTING SIERRA LHONE: 1961 to 1974 (Leones per Ton) Average Average S. L. Average S.L. Con- Guaranteed Pro- Average Consumer Year World ket Imort Purchase samer's Buying ducer's Price Price for Local Price r Price (c.i.f.)& Price (Official)-1 (Official) / Price (Actual) .Y (Milled) (Fnsk) (Equiv.) 1961 92.60 102.24 n. a. 66.60 103.38 n. a. 1962 92.60 88.10 n. a. 62.90 97.64 172.65 1963 95.30 90.25 n. a. 59.20 91.90 150.60 1964 100.90 173.11 n. a. 59.20 91.90 173.44 1965 103.60 99.77 n. a. 59.20 91.90 202.65 1966 103.60 95.19 120.60 59.20 91.20 191.15 1967 120.40 100.00 130.60 74.00 114.87 193.64 1968 148.80 148.91 130.60 74.00 114.87 196.44 1969 126.00 120.35 159.60 74.00 114.87 213.12 1970 100.00 112.24 159.60 74.00 114.87 251.40 1971 86.80 100.11 159.60 88.10 136.70 202.79 1972 79.30 (17) 132.11 159.60 85.10 132.10 239.65 1973 (350) 140.30 201.60 (238) 85.10 132.10 232.10 1974 (350) 387.87 358.40 (est.) 118.40 183.79 n. a. 1/ FA0 and IBRD Rice Corporation and Agar-Und Hydrotechnik MBH Ministry of Labor Field reports through February 1974 indicate a consumer price of Le 34 per bag or Le 476 per ton. ANNEX II Page 22 3.14 Effective pricing of all farm production has to be judged equal in importance to efforts to increase output per acre. West African farmers have proven responsive to prices and they will increase output when given financial encouragement. Based upon the high 1973/74 farmers' prices, it is reasonable to expect a sizeable increase in domestic rice production in 1974/75. The 1969 and 1970 crop years provide a similar framework in which domestic produc- tion (measured in clean rice) increased 15 percent or 37,000 tons, although half of the increase merely represents recovery from low production caused by weather conditions in 1969. Production in 1974 should increase, at least 10 percent, reflecting an adjustment back to normal production conditions. The key factors to look for are: (1) the increased number of upland farms prepared in January and February; (2) an -increased demand for tractor services in the bolilands and riverain areas; and (3) an accelerated farmer interest in the swamp rice component of the Eastern Project. The most serious short-term constraint for increased yields per acre will continue to be the availability of fertilizer and improved seed. 3.15 Farm Supply Delivery System. Sierra Leone does not have a viable farm supply (fertilizers, chemicals, etc.) delivery system. Limited supplies handled by the MANR are highly subsidized 1/ and are not packaged for retail- ing to the smallholder, who must headload supplies to farms off the road system. The headloading of produce and supplies reflect the need for an expanded feeder road system (see Table 11). Limited transport and storage facilities of the MANR and the marketing corporations are not coordinated or fully utilized to aid in the marketing of farm supplies. Until viable pro- duction projects are developed within the sector, it is doubtful that private enterprise will find it profitable to engage in the distribution of farm inputs. Until such time and in order to accelerate the adoption of new technology (seeds, planting material, fertilizer, etc.) it will be necessary at a mini- mum for the MANR and the marketing corporations to join efforts in establishing a delivery system in key production areas, with special attention to seed multiplication. 1/ The subsidies provided by the Government include: (1) Le 3.50 per cwt. of fertilizer; (2) an estimated Le 14.00 per acre for plowing services; (3) a limited spraying service for cocoa and coffee farmers provided by SLPMB without cost; and (4) planting material provided free or at a token charge of 5 cents per seeding. The annual cost of subsidies has been increasing and is currently in the range of Le 500,000 per year. Farmers pay only 80% of the real cost of subsidized services, materials and development grants. ANNEX II Page 23 Table 11: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FARM HOLDERS BY MEANS OF CONVEYING PRODUCTS TO MARKET, 1970/71 Headloads Headloads Other* Province (on foot) Lorry and Lorry Means Southern 16.5 9.4 7.2 0.8 Eastern 14.8 15.2 3.5 0.4 Northern 17.6 4.8 6.0 0.8 Western Area 2.1 0.3 0.6 - Sierra Leone 51.0 29.7 17.3 2.0 * Includes canoes and bikes. Source: Central Statistics Office. 3.16 Agricultural Extension Service. The extension field staff is limited in size with one field worker to 1,470 holders 1/, and the program is poorly financed. There are many problems. Staff transfers occur without consideration for program development or the professional experience of the agricultural officer and/or field worker. The use of field staff to manage the sale of farm supplies and to issue farm credit has in the past confounded other extension education work; it has also opened opportunities for field workers to periodically misuse funds collected from farmers for services and supplies. Other problems of the extension service include: (1) senior experienced staff are over extended; (2) operating budgets for field programs are low and delayed in availability; (3) extension policy is confused by rapid changes in political leadership within the MANR; (4) farm supply and credit systems are not available to backup the extension fieldworkers; (5) poor trans- portation and communications make for difficult movement and coordination of field staff; (6) field staff are spread too thinly to make an impact as a development team; and (7) work of agricultural workers are not effectively ,coordinated with field work conducted by Ministries of Health, Education, Social Welfare, Works and Interior and by special programs directed by CARE, C.R.S., and U.S. Peace Corps. 1/ Including Junior Instructors, Instructors in Training, Instructors and Senior Instructors. The availability of field workers outside of special projects (Eastern Project and the Mechanized Plowing Scheme) is very low, therefore making general extension services throughout the balance of the sector nearly impossible. ANNEX II Page 24 3.17 Rural Credit. With no institutional credit, the only source of finance is the village-level moneylender. The efforts by the National Develop- ment Bank (long-term loans) and the National Cooperative Development Bank (cocoa marketing credit) are insignificant in relationship to the total credit require- ments of the sector. Without a broader production credit system, it will be difficult for individual smallholders to finance the use of non-traditional inputs needed to increase agricultural productivity. The indebtedness of farmers has been estimated at Le 39 per holder 1/. The problem of farm debt is not serious at this stage, but could rapidly increase if farmers were to expand their use of new technology. Thus, a rural credit system that can provide the smallholder ready access to credit at realistic rates of interest (probably in the order of 10 - 15 percent to account for the higher risk factor) is critical in the adoption of improved methods of agricultural production. 3.18 Training and Research. Njala University College and the Rice Re- search Station operate without adequate financial support. This is of parti- cular concern since agricultural field workers may represent the most serious bottleneck in implementing any development projects. At the present time, trained human resources are insufficient to meet requirements for reorganized extension, research and farm service systems. Although the University College has the institutional structure, additional investments would be required to make Njala a center for training of field workers. To ensure, however, that such training is relavent to the practical needs of agricultural development the Government should consider to place Njala under the control of the MANR rather than the Ministry of Education. In addition, the training program demands more attention on sub-degree work and improved balance among major technical subject areas. The past low demand for agricultural graduates from Njala -- due to the low level of government investment in the agricultural sector -- resulted in low intakes of students during the early 1970's. It will take another four to five years for the degree program to expand to its earlier size. The sub-degree program has shown erratic growth since 1964 (see Table 12). This pattern is primarily related to employment opportunities, low salaries offered to field workers, available scholarships and changes in number of students sent to Njala by the Government of the Gambia 2/. The dropout rate of the sub-degree program has been high (over 30 percent) and this is a reflection of both quality of secondary school training and the nature of the NUC program. 1/ Moinuddin, S. Hamid, "Agricultural Credit in Sierra Leone", Bank of Sierra Leone, unpublished study, January 1969. 2/ Njala agreed during the 1960's to serve as a regional center for West Africa in special programs in agricultural education and home economics. The Gambia and Sierra Leone also agreed to share NUC for training of extension workers. ANNEX II Page 25 Table 12: OUTPUT AND CURRENT ENROLLMENT OF SELECTED PROGRAMS OF NJALA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, 1965/66 to 1971/72 Degrees in Degrees and Certificates Agriculture and Certificates in in Agriculture & Year Home Economics Agricultural Education Home Economics 1965/66 29 1966/67 - - 27 1967/68 35 9 20 1968/69 23 2 29 1969/70 18 19 20 1970/71 10 9 36 1971/72 5 12 43 1972/73 n.a. n.a. n.a. Enrollment in 1973/74 61 69 111 3.19 Agriculture research, especially in tree crops, has fallen some two decades behind other West African nations. MANR support of research has been spasmodic, and there has been no research program. Some good agricultural researchers have become frustrated and found employment in other African nations. However, compared to other African nations of similar size, Sierra Leone still has a very good staff base to develop a viable research program. During 1973/74, there were 29 staff members at NUC and the Rice Research Station with advanced degrees in agricultural science, home economics and agricultural education. What is lacking is a long-term research program and adequate budgetary support. ANNEX II Page 26 IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS Physical Resources 4.01 Sierra Leone is comprised of four main geographical areas: (1) interior plateau and hill region; (2) interior plains; (3) coastal swamp and beach bar regions; and (4) Freetown Peninsula. Over half of the land area lies below 500 feet, while more than one quarter is between 1,000 and 2,000 feet above sea level. The country is crossed seasonally by a tropical front which is associated with an equatorial low pressure belt. Thus there are well-defined wet (May to November) and dry seasons (December to April), with 85-96 percent of the annual rainfall occurring during the wet season. Vari- ability throughout most of the country is about 10 percent, with no more than 20 percent over a 20 year period. The range is from over 200 inches on average near Freetown to less than 80 inches in the very northeast corner of the country. The mean daily temperature ranges between 78* and 84oF, while mean sunshine varies from a minimum of two hours in August to eight hours in January and February. 4.02 Soils are only moderately fertile with the exception of the alluvial deposits. Nearly all upland soils are light and easily leached of soil nutri- ents. Soils are acid (pH between 4 and 6) but water tends to neutralize the pH of the soil, therefore minimizing the acidity problem in swamp rice farming. Most of the upland soils are lateritic with a high alumina to silica content. The basic nutrients of potash, phosphates and nitrogen are deficient in vary- ing degrees. Coastal tidal swamp soils are also confronted with problems of salinity, especially during the dry season. The potentially most productive and fertile soils are the alluvial deposits located in the deep flooding grasslands, mangrove swamps, and the widely dispersed inland-valley swamps. Market Prospects 4.03 World market prospects for Sierra Leone's exports of agricultural commodities appear to be favorable throughout the 1970s. The major world price adjustments which occurred in 1973 are expected to stabilize at higher levels in 1974 and during the remainder of the decade prices for key exports crops (cocoa, coffee, copra and rubber) should remain strong. Because of the limited volume of fertilizer used, it is doubtful that high input prices will have any measurable impact upon the aggregate supply in the short-run. However, in the long-run the relative relationship between fertilizer and commodity prices will be a critical factor in determining the speed at which improved technology will be adopted, especially in rice production. 4.04 Projected prices for 1980 in constant dollars (see table 13) in- dicate that the real unit value of exports will be lower than the high cur- rent levels. In order to maintain the 1973/74 real value of export earning, it will be necessary that the volume of exports be substantially increased. Without both higher farm prices and increased productivity, real farm incomes could decline during the 1970s. At a time when productivity must be stressed, Table 13: PRICE OUTLOOK TRHOUGH 1980 FOR SELECTED COMONDITIES ANNEX II (in current US $) Page 27 Commodity 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19801/ Constant Food/Feed Cropes Rice (A) 147 350 550 460 450 44o 430 420 420 (265) ($/MT) Palm Oil (B) 217 378 500 427 427 442 450 470 477 (300) ($/T) Maize (C) 56 98 120 125 130 133 136 143 143 (90) ($/XT) Export Grops: Cocoa Bean (D) 32 65 80 69 79 83 79 81 83 (52) (C/lb.) Coffee (E) 50 62 72 83 95 96 96 96 103 (65) (0/lb.) Rubber (F) 18 36 44 41 42 45 48 52 56 (35) (0/lb.) Copra (G) 141 353 580 516 514 529 540 563 574 (361) (tWr) Imports Sugar (H) 7.3 9.5 21.0 15.0 12.0 12.0 11.5 12.4 13.5 (8.5) (,/lb.) Tobacco (I) 961 992 1035 1153 1250 1370 1493 1625 1765 (1110) ($/MT) Phosphate Rock (J) 12 14 43 43 42 42 44 47 50 (31.5) ($/MT) Muriate of 34 43 52 50 50 53 56 59 62 (39) Potash (K) ($/MT) Urea (L) 59 95 250 210 190 160 145 140 145 (91) ($/NT) 1/ Prices shown in parenthesis for 1980 are in constant 1974 $. Source: IBRD (A) Thai, milled 5 percent broken f.o.b. Bangkok. (G) Philippines, c.i.f. Europe. (B) Malayan, c.i.f. U. K. (H) ISA daily price, f.o.b. Caribbean. (C) U. S., No. 2, yellow, f.o.b. Gulf Port4. (I) India, export unit value of flue-cured. (D) Accra, spot New York. (J) 75 percent BPL, f.a.a. Casablanca. (E) Guatemalan, prime washed, spot New York. (K) f.o.b. Vancouver. (F) RSSI, spot New York. (L) f.o.b. Europe and Middle East, bagged. ANNEX II Page 28 the continued use of a fertilizer subsidy may be required, at least temporari- ly to encourage a more rapid adoption of new rice technology. However, over the medium-term the Government must gradually phase out the subsidy program since expanded use of fertilizer could put too great a burden on the already strained government finances. As the example in Table 14 shows, the recent price adjustments for fertilizers will double the government subsidy. 4.05 Rice. Domestic production was about 400,000 tons of husk rice in 1965/66 and has grown to around 450,000 tons in the early 1970s 1/. This less than 3 percent annual growth in output has been related primarily to acreage expansion rather than to increases in yields per acre. The nation's rice yields increased a total of only 3 percent for the five-year period (1965/66 to 1970/71), while swampland yields declined by 29 percent and upland yields actually increased for the five-year period by 18 percent. Yields on swamp- land are still higher than those obtained on uplands, but swampland cultivation does demand a higher labor requirement per acre. The long-run potential for increasing yields are the better in swamplands. 4.06 A feasible production target for 1980 would be 550,000 tons, based upon a continuation of the trend growth rate of about 3 percent. To secure this growth would require a continued expansion of land under rice cultivation (both swamp and upland), increased adoption of new technology (improved seed and fertilizers) via an intensified extension effort, a steady reduction in field and storage losses and improved milling standards. 4.07 In projecting the demand for rice, a 2.6 percent population growth rate, an income elasticity of 0.4, and a 0.9 percent real per capita GDP growth rate were used. This suggests a 2.9 percent annual increase in rice demanded, leading to a total demand requirement in 1980 of nearly 400,000 tons or an equivalent of over 600,000 tons of husk rice. With a projected output of 550,000 tons of husk rice by 1980 (or 358,000 tons of milled rice), the result- ing import requirement should be in the order of 39,000 tons of clean rice 2/. Thus, it is rather unlikely that self-sufficiency can be anticipated within the decade (Figure 2). Of course, higher consumer prices could dampen consumer demand. A study by Agra-und Hydrotechnik determined a price elasticity for rice of -.84. Provided Government takes steps to eliminate the rice price 1/ As a consequence of drought conditions in 1973, production reached only 420,000 tons, a shortfall of 30,000 tons below previous years. 2/ Agra-und Hydrotechnik made three projects regarding the 1980 milled rice surplus/deficit: (1) high variant, surplus of 12,000 tons; (2) medium variant, deficit of 40,000 tons; and (3) low variant, deficit of 59,000. Projections by the MANR indicate a milled rice deficit of nearly 30,000 tons by 1978/79. This projection was based upon the inclusion of all projects in the MANR draft plan, including the introduction of a Southern Area Project and the rapid expansion of mechanical cultivation in the hands of the private sector. ANNEX II Page 29 Table 14: COMPARATIVE COSTING OF MANRtS 1972/73 FERTILIZER ORDER WITH PROJECTED COSTINGS FOR 1974 Cost Item 1972/73 1974 Unit Cost Total Est. Unit Cost1/ Total Fertilizer: (Le) (Le) (Le) (Le) (a) 2000 T. (20-20-0) @ Le 67.00 Le 134,000 Le 167 Le 334,000 (b) 150 T. (15-15-15) * 63.48 9,522 158 23,700 (c) 300 T. (Single super) @ .80 12,240 100 30,000 (d) 200 T. (Potash) @ 78.40 15,680 100 20,000 (e) 150 T. (Urea) a 76.64 11,496 180 27,000 (f) So T. (Basic Slag) @ 31.10 1 76 900 Le 17,W3 Le 3,0 + 10 % price adjustment 189 93,860 Le 202,842 Le 4o2,460 Other Costs: (a) Postage (Le 3.75 a Ton) Le 10,687 Le 10,687 (b) Transport Depr. 16,800 16,800 (c) Store Depr. 3,000 3,000 (d) Transport Operating Expenses 28,500 50,000 Ce) Staff 5,200 5,700 (f) Driver and labor 15000 16,000 Grand total Le 280,028 Le 584,647 Cost per Ton Le 98.95 Le 205.14 Real Cost per out. Le 4.95 Le 10.26 Farm price per cut. 1.50 1.50 Government subsidy per out. 3.45 8.76 Percentage subsidy 67.70% 8540% 1/ Field estimates fra the Eastern Project Sources MANR Figure 2: RICE PRODUCTION, 1961-1980 (000) Tons Husk Rice 700 650 - ,£) (C) 600 550 - (b) 500Projects 450 350 300 250 200 <a) 4ormal outputtrend 150 ·b) Trend plus effectsof Projects -fcl Consunption trend 100 50 50 - 1961 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80 1981 World Bank-9073 ANNEX II Page 31 subsidy, consumer prices could average over Le 350 per ton (Le 232/ton in 1972). This would suggest that per capita demand could drop from 120 kg to 80 kg, and such action could nearly eliminate the current rice deficit, which is largely a result of subsidy policy 1/. 4.08 Accelerating rice production beyond the current trend would require substantial improvements in productivity which could be feasible. Such pro- ductivity increases could come from both existing and new rice varieties in conjunction with improved (but simple) methods of cultivation, such as (1) use of fertilizers, (2) good weeding procedures, and (3) early preparation of nursery beds in swamp rice production and timely transplanting. The following table indicates the possible production potential: Table 15: CURRENT AND IMPROVED RICE YIELDS (lbs per acre) Current Yieds Improved (1970/71) Yields Uplands 1,189 1,400 Bolilands 1,044 1,500 Riverain 1,300 1,600 Inland Swamp 1,423 2,400 Mangrove Swamp 1,317 2,400 4.09 Provided that yields could be raised by 200 lbs/acre on the 640,000 acres of uplands the incremental production of 64,000 tons of husk rice would be sufficient to close the current production/consumption gap. Such improve- ments would necessitate, however, that required farm supplies (fertilizer and improved seed) and extension services reach 215,000 upland farmers. Con- sidering: (1) that only 3 percent of all farmers are using fertilizer pre- sently; (2) that the distribution of improved seed rice amounts to less than 1 percent of the total needs; and (3) that the ratio of extension field staff to farmers is 1:1,470; then it is questionable how rapidly rice production can increase above the projected trend. However, the uplands provide the best alternative for rapid short-term changes in the total production. The total import cost of the fertilizer (even at 1974 prices) for use on all the land under upland rice is still less than 30 percent of the cost of 1974 rice im- ports. Yet, the existing weakness of extension services and the lack of a farm supply delivery system prevent the successful implementation of such a program. Yield opportunities per acre appear even greater for swamp culti- vation, but the adoption of improved technology will require more skills on the part of both farmers and the extension workers. Over the long-run an increasing percentage of the total production must come from swamplands. 1/ Since May, 1974, the Government has raised the consumer price for rice to Le 420 per ton, an action which abolished completely the consumer subsidy. ANNEX II Page 32 Swamps provide the opportunity for higher yields per acre and represent the biggest source of undeveloped land. With improved technology, swamplands also represent the best alternative for increasing farm incomes, especially if advantages of double cropping can be realized. 4.10 The planned 1974 expansion in mechanical cultivation could reason- ably provide an added 10,000 tons of husk rice to the 1974 output and 5,000 tons in 1975. This assumes that the acreage targets of 73,000 to 115,000 set by the MANR for mechanically cultivated rice lands in 1974 are technically impossible, but that 35,000 acres might be realized with a maximum effort by field staff in the MANR. Without further machinery purchases, the net addi- tion to the rice output from mechanical cultivation would be zero by 1976. There is strong indication that the total economic and social costs of the Mechanical Cultivation Scheme have far exceeded the realized benefits. The Government should consider the termination of the scheme as soon as the current equipment and facilities can be transferred to the private sector. 4.11 Other Food Crops. Other basic food-crops include coarse grains (millet, sorghums, maize, etc.), oil seeds (groundnuts and benniseed) and a wide range of fruits and vegetables. Also, cassava, yams and sweet po- tatoes are grown widely and used as a substitute for rice. Many farmers handle cassava as an emergency food crop and harvest it only when rice yields are low 1/. These other food crops represent about 25 percent of the value of all crops and livestock produced by the sector. It is estimated that these crops will have an annual growth rate of about 2 percent. Many of these food crops are grown on uplands in the mixed farming system; however, onions, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, and possibly maize represent crops that can utilize swamp soil conditions as a second crop after rice. All fruits and vegetables are grow for domestic consumption, and it is doubtful that output could be raised to either afford an export trade or to develop any processing. More- over, the logistics of marketing and general quality of the available pro- ducts, would suggest that such developments, would be of a long-term nature. 4.12 Palm Products. Oil palm production is expected to expand during the 1970's, primarily because of the Eastern Project and Gambia Plantation. The gradual loss in both kernels and oil from wild palms will be offset with the increased output from improved palms. Because of the higher ratio of oil to kernels in the improved palms, oil output will grow faster than kernels output, which will remain at about its present level. The projected annual increase of palm oil production of 2.2 percent will not be sufficient to meet the larger demand due to population growth in the 1970s. 4.13 The kernel processing plant at Wellington has the capacity to handle over 60 percent of the nation's kernel production. The resulting kernel oil 1/ Data from the Central Statistics Office indicate that only 10 percent of the cassava producers actually reported sales and that only 6 per- cent of the nation's cassava production is marketed. ANNEX II Page 33 Table 16: QUANTITY OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS FROM SIERRA LEONE, 1 961 -73 Palm Kernels Coffee Cocoa Piassava Ginger Kola Nuts 2 Year ('000 tons) (Tons) (Tons) (Tons) (Tons) (Tons) 1961 58 5,023 2,972 5,732 592 960 1962 61 2,381 4,705 5,192 377 851 1963 53 3,895 3,252 5,578 586 558 1964 52 5,934 3,125 7,041 690 986 1965 49 3,875 2,932 4,452 815 666 1966 55 9,436 4,1j63 1,572 458 863 1967 11 657 3,808 2,769 917 603 1968 64 6,317 k,959 6,016 1,539 773 1969 49 5,778 3,722 3,401 746 592 1970 59 6,580 5,000 3,754 433 414 1971 51 4,073 4,695 4,193 611 673 1972 51 114,047 2 6,517 4,035 499 954 1973 (eat.) 40 9,000 6,000 4,000 500 800 Projected 1980 20 / 15,000 11,000 4,000 600 800 1/ Reductions in palm kernel exports are related to increased activity of the palm kernel mill. Output for 1973/74 was estimated at 5,000 tons of kernels oil and 6,000 tons of cake. Z/ Carryover stock of coffee on June 30 of 1971 and 1972 were 8,105 and 2,621 tons respectively. 2/ Not marketed by SLPMB. Source: Central Statistics Office. ANNEX II Page 34 (14,000 tons) could partly be used as a substitute for some of the oils and fats now imported (about 5,000 tons). This would reduce the foreign exchange now earned directly by palm kernel exports. See Table 16 for details regard- ing past exports of palm kernels and other export crops. 4.14 Coffee and Cocoa. Production of these crops is primarily located in the Eastern Province (90 percent of the cocoa and 80 percent of the coffee acreages). The projected annual growth rates in production of cocoa and coffee is estimated to be 7.4 and 8.8 percent, respectively. The projected trends follow the two to three-fold increases in cocoa and coffee shown in Figure 3 and 4. This growth rate is also dependent upon increased farm prices for both commodities. Realization of adequate price incentives is necessary to encourage both the rehabilitation and new planting of tree crops. Experience gained with the IDA-financed Eastern Project suggests that the broader impact of adoption of improved tree crop technology will be realized during the next decade; nevertheless, substantial improvements in establishment of nurseries, plan distribution and disease control are indispensable for both short and long- term gains. 4.15 Minor Export Crops. Ginger, piassava and kola nuts have been generat- ing annually about one million leones in foreign exchange. World ginger prices depend to a large extent on supplies from dominant producers, especially India. Future piassava exports are difficult to project, as they (like kola nuts) are handled entirely by private traders, and the harvesting and processing of this wild fiber tend to respond slowly to price changes. There is no reason to expect any drop in the demand for the kola nut, trade of which is primarily with the countries north and east of Sierra Leone. 4.16 Other Crops. Coconut, rubber and cashew production may be possible export crops but more detailed investigation regarding their prospects in Sierra Leone is needed. A feasibility study for possible coconut development on the Turner's Peninsula (plantation) and in the Mahera-Lungi area (small- holder scheme) is presently under consideration by the Government. Rubber represents an export crop that technically could be developed in Sierra Leone. Rubber development also could be of interest to foreign private investment. Sierra Leone does have the physical resources suitable for cashew production and cashews do well on less fertile soils and could provide needed cash in- come for farmers in the Northern Province. Tobacco is an additional cash crop for farmers in the Northern Province and Aureol Tobacco Company has successfully promoted this crop through its own extension program. Domestic production has expanded from 10 percent of domestic needs to the point that future production could involve some tobacco exports. 4.17 Livestock. The cattle population is estimated at 207,000 head owned by some 14,000 farmers (predominantly from the Fullah Tribe) and primarily located in the Northern Province. Annual off-take from the national herd is estimated at 8 percent, while annual per capita consumption of fresh beef is 6 to 7 pounds. Annual imports, mostly from Guinea, are estimated at about Figure 3: COCOA PRODUCTION, 1961-1980 (000) Tons 12 11- Eastern Project 04 0 10 9- 7 6 5 O Cocoa purchases by SLPMS ) X Cocoa exports '- 1- 0 1-4 1961 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 1981 1/ - Assumes that a 50% price increase (from Le 313 to Le 470 per ton) will result in a 25% increase in production. The 1974 price is Le 425 per ton. World Bank-9070 ANNEX II Page 36 Figure 4: COFFEE PRODUCTION, 1961-1980 (000) Tons 16 15 - 14 N_____ _____ 0000___ 0- .0001 00_ 13 1 12 0 00,*#*-1.0 Price respor se 11 - 10 0000_ 9 - 6 5 1/ OCoffee purchase by SLPMB 3 3 X Coffee 00-Vexports 2 1961 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 80 1981 - Assumes that a 50% price increase (from Le 313 to Le 470 per ton) will result in a 25% increase in production The 1974 price is Le 407 per ton. World Bank-9071 ANNEX II Page 37 32,000 heads and have an estimated value of Le 1.6 million. Any major im- provements in the off-take from the national herd is not expected within this decade. The increased demand for beef (estimated growth rate of 3.5 percent) must, therefore, be met through cattle or meat imports; however, higher meat prices and increased substitution of fish for beef should act to stabilize imports. Swine, goats, sheep and poultry also supply some of the protein needs of the nation. There are no major projected increases expected in any of these enterprises. It appears that the private sector will provide the necessary investment required to produce the increased demand for meats other than beef and fish. 4.18 Sources of Sector Growth. In summary, it appears that cocoa, coffee and groundnuts will be the commodities with growth rates above the projected sector growth rate of at least 3.1 percent (see table 17). Expansion in sugar, tobacco and onions might afford an overall growth rate of 3.6 percent. The basic food crops (including rice, palm oil and other subsistence crops) are projected to grow at rates between 2 and 3 percent. However, the likely food crops expansion will not eliminate rice imports requirements by 1980, unless the Government is willing to discontinue subsidizing urban consumer demand 1/. Likewise, the Government must invest in the infrastructure needed to develop a strong domestic marketing system for foodstuffs. 1/ Since the Government discontinued the rice price subsidy in May, 1974, it is likely that, as a result of reduced consumer demand for rice, Sierra Leone may reach self-sufficiency prior to 1980. ANNEX II Page 38 Table 17: PROJECTED GROWTH RATE OF AGRICULTURE SUB-SECTORS THROUGH 1980 Projected Percentage Contribution Weighted Sub-Sector Growth Rate to Output Value /1 Growth Rate Rice (450,000 to 550,000 tons) 2.9% 0.412 1.195 Palm Kernels 0.4% 0.037 0.015 Palm Oil 2.2% 0.095 0.209 Coffee (9,000 to 15,000 tons) 7.4% 0.071 0.525 Cocoa (6,000 to 11,000 tons) 8.8% 0.047 0.414 Groundnut 5.6% 0.011 0.062 Other subsistence crops 2.0% (est.) 0.327 0.654 and livestock TOTAL 3,074 Inclusion of onion, tobacco and sugar projects would increase the sector growth rate by another .50 percent .............. 3.57 /1 Based upon distribution of agricultural output shown in National Accounts, 1970/71. Source: Central Statistics Office, MANR, SLPMB and ODA. ANNEX II Page 39 V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 5.01 To overcome the basic constraints to agricultural development, which must be removed regardless of what development strategy is followed, the Government will have to address itself to various policy adjustments. Some policy measures can be affected by the Government in the short-run, while others (particularly those relating to institution building) will take a longer time to implement. A. Short-Run Measures Adequate Price Inventives 5.02 The primary reasons for raising producer prices are: (1) to cor- rect undue economic discrimination against farm incomes; (2) to provide the incentives necessary for increasing production and adoption of improved technology, (3) to encourage rehabilitation of existing tree crops and there- by promote higher yields; and (4) to encourage increased farmer investment in export crops via new planting 1/. Higher producer prices paid by the SLPMB would also discourage the periodic smuggling of cocoa and coffee out of Sierra Leone. The recent price,increases certainly indicate that the SLPMB is aware of the need for price adjustment (see Table 18); nevertheless, even these higher producer prices may fall short of providing the necessary price in- centive to realize both short and long-term production goals, as well as reducing income disparities between rural and urban incomes. The progressive export tax represents a serious limiting factor for further significant price increases for cocoa and coffee. In relationship to current world market prices, the effective tax rate is 40 and 30 percent for coffee and cocoa, respectively 2/. These effective rates do drop rapidly with decreases in the average export price as shown in Table 19. Increased farm prices can come from the following three sources: (1) a reduced export duty 3/; (2) a more systematic sharing of Board profits; and (3) increased marketing efficiency of the SLPMB. 1/ In addition, higher farmgate prices would encourage producers to actuallv harvest and prepare for market certain crops that are now left in the fields. This has been especially true in the case of ginger, piassava and coffee. 2/ For further discussions of the tax implications, see Volume II, Annex 1: Fiscal Trends and Prospects para. 4.40-4.47. 3/ The Fiscal Report recommends that the initial tax adjustment for cocoa and coffee involve a 10 percent rate for prices up to Le 600 per ton and then raised by 1 percent for each additional Le 40 or part thereof above Le 600. ANNEX II Page 40 Table 18: PRoDUCER PRICE ADJUSTMENTS DURING 1973 by SLPMB Mid-1973 August December Commodity Prices Quoted Prices Quoted Prices 2/ (Le) (Le) Palm Kermels Per ton 65.00 71.50 80.44 Per bushel 2.00 2.20 2.47 Coffee Per ton 313.60 336.00 403.20 Per pound 0.14 0.15 0.18 Cocoa Per ton 313.60 358.40 425.60 Per pound 0.14 0.16 0.19 Ginger Per ton 224.00 246.40 246.40 Per pound 0.10 0.11 0.11 1/ The buying season opened the first of November for cocoa and the first of February for coffee and ginger. Source: SLPM ANNEX II Page 41 Table 19: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON EXPORT CROPS, 1971/72 AND 1972/73 /1 Commodity 1971/72 1972/73 Palm Kernels 10 10 Coffee 19 28 Cocoa 10 17 Giner 5 5 /1 Export duty as percentage at average export price (f.o.b.). Source: SLPMB 5.03 Reducing the highly progressive nature of the export duty may not have a serious impact upon government revenue in the long-run. If farmers' respond favorably to higher prices, as they showed, the tonnage marketed would be increased and thereby the revenues to Government might return to near the present level. The export taxation, reflected in high Board profits, also raises equity questions regarding their future use. During the 1960s, past SLPMB profits were returned directly to the agricultural sector albeit to sup- port the ill-conceived Industrial Plantation Scheme; besides the critical factor of poor pre-project planning, the sector did not have the capacity to ef- ficiently absorb this major investment. Since 1968/69, the Board has been obliged to contribute to the Government a development levy of Le 500,000 per year, which has amounted to about 30 percent of the Board's profits. This levy combined with the excess reserves 1/ held by the Board should be ear- marked for sector use. While part of the funds can be used to further strengthen farm prices, the Government should initiate action with the Board, in concert with the Rice Corporation to use some of its past profits to develop a viable marketing and inputs delivery system in the rural areas. Expanding the marketing services offered by the public corporation would allow for more efficient use of present overheads, and would also further reduce the range of service roles currently assigned to the MANR. 5.04 Only a rough guideline can be offered as to what producer price should be paid for each commodity. It is suggested that a base price (at the farmgate) of 50 percent of export value should be maintained for several years for each export crop and combined with an early season annual adjustment 1/ The current legal minimum for the price stabilization fund is Le 2.5 million, while total reserves are now over Le 5 million. ANNEX II Page 42 of 10 to 20 percent in accordance with fluctuating world prices. The pro- ducer would then have the floor or base price for long-term investment plan- ning and could share in the benefits of significant increases in world prices (for example, coffee and cocoa). The current need is to adjust all farm prices upward in concert with the generally higher level of world prices. This demands a base price for cocoa and coffee of nearly Le 500 per ton, supplemented with an additional seasonal adjustment of Le 50 to Le 100 per ton. A new pricing policy will.demand increased attention to market analysis on the part of SLPMB personnel. Also, more attention must be directed to early announcement of Board prices and firm enforcement of actual payments to farmers. 5.05 The SLPMB and the Rice Corporation are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and this organizational structure was appropriate as long as both agencies were primarily engaged in exports and imports of agricultural produce. As these corporations become more produc- tion oriented, the link to the Ministry of Trade and Industry becomes un- desirable because it impairs an effective implementation of marketing and pricing policies by the MANR. Therefore, considerations should be given to link the SLPMB and the Rice Corporation to the MANR. Moreover, the primary aim of the farm pricing policy should be the encouragement of production and not the taxation of agriculture and the generation of SLPHB's profits. 5.06 The current system of buying agents for export crops represents a possible obstacle to an effective flexible pricing system. This problem could partly be overcome through the establishment of a stronger core of field officers working for the marketing organizations. Moreover, the co- operatives have shown the ability to market cocoa, and could possibly be restructed to serve as the primary buying agents for selected crops. Elimination of Subsidy Programs 5.07 Rice Subsidy. Domestic rice marketing is currently flowing through private channels (less than 5 percent of domestic production purchase by the Rice Corporation) to the high rice consumption areas (Freetown and the mining areas). Given a normal production shortage of between 5 to 10 percent of the total rice crop, it would seem that the concern over rice imports and the long-term policy attention to self-sufficiency in rice production should diminish. If the demand function shown in Figure 5 is realistic 1/, it would appear that the price mechanism should have eliminated the need for imported rice in 1974. It would appear that the high rice demand and the growing import requirements have therefore been largely stimulated by low consumer prices. 5.08 The program of government subsidies primarily benefit the rice con- sumers in the urban areas and a small selective group of farmers. In both 1/ The reported high consumers' prices in 1974 suggest an upward shift of the demand function. ANNEX II Page 43 Figure 5: SIERRA LEONE DEMAND FUNCTION FOR RICE Price (Le/Ton) 500 475 Retail Price (Le 476/Ton) reported in Feb., 1974 450 - 425 - 400 375 350 -------------- ----- Retail Price based upon a Rice Corp. 325 ---------- ------------------- Wholesale price of Le 350/Ton 300I 275 250 200 I i 100 1973/74 1974 Domestic Production Imports I______I__________I 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Milled Rice (000 Tons) World Bank-9072 Source. Agrar-und Hydrotechnik GMBH, Rice Milling and Marketing Study: Sierra Leone, 1973 ANNEX II Page 44 cases they tend to induce inefficient use of productive resources and create greater problems in the area of income distribution. The consumer price subsidy for rice and the consequent import requirements discourage the devel- opment of an efficient internal marketing system for domestic output. More- over, providing low priced subsidized food to the urban population contributes to the inequalities in the rural-urban income distribution 1/. 5.09 Input Subsidies. Subsidies for agricultural inputs and services should be discontinued in light of the overall resource shortage, but more importantly on grounds that subsidies tend to encourage inefficient use of scarce economic inputs. Moreover, such subsidies would be inconsistent with the proposed higher producer prices. As development programs increase over the years, the greater part of fertilizers used will be through such programs, and generally profit margins will be-sufficient not to warrant fertilizer sub- sidies. For this reason, future input marketing should follow commercial guidelines. But marketing of inputs will be profitable in project and growth centers only if programs are active and expanding. Government funds now spent on input subsidies (fertilizer, planting material, chemicals, and tractor services) should be directed to the development of infrastructure required to make new services more available through the marketing corporations and the private sector. This includes feeder roads, village markets, and a price information system. The rapid discontinuation of all input subsidies represents the basic precondition for the successful establishment of a farm supplies delivery system. 5.10 Plowing Subsidies. Similarly, subsidies granted to support the mechanical cultivation scheme should be phased out. Guidelines for such programs have already been developed by the ODA Technical Team of the MANR. These guidelines call for transfer of tractor services to the private sector (individuals and cooperatives) during the next three years. Suggestions include a hire-purchase scheme for the transfer of tractors and equipment (financed by the National Development Bank) and a direct subsidy (Le 4 per acre) to private operators during the phase-out period of about three years, Yet the problem of tractor repair shops and maintenance of privately owned tractors will remain. Commercial companies are normally reluctant to involve themselves in providing dispersed maintenance services to farmers. It would be preferrable for the Government to continue the operation of repair shops until such time that local enterprise is willing and able to take over the responsibilities. B. Long-Run Measures Marketing Institutions 5.11 Merging the operations of the Rice Corporation and the SLPMB would reduce overhead costs and provide an institutional framework for a more efficient marketing and service corporation. In the longer run, the 1/ Since the mission's visit to Sierra Leone, the Government has abolished the consumer price subsidy for rice. ANNEX II Page 45 new corporation should establish service centers in all the larger chiefdom headquarters. Initially, distribution units would be focussed upon growth points. All stores and transport of the current corporations could be co- operated for more efficient marketing. The trained personnel in both corpor- ations have the capacity for management of more marketing functions, providing they were assigned a broader scope of activities and protected from undue interference. The evolving market corporation, operating as a commercial venture, would focus its services primarily upon the smallholder. 5.12 The cooperative marketing societies maintain facilities, such as commodity stores, and have had village-level experience that needs to be incorporated into the broader development of an agricultural marketing system. Currently, the cooperative movement does not have the managerial manpower that is available to public corporations. A blending of the strengths of both the cooperatives and the corporations should provide a stronger base for building a viable marketing and farm supply system. Cooperatives acting as agents of a new marketing/service corporation could possibly operate dis- tribution centers at the chiefdom level. 5.13 Input Supplies. Presently, the volume of inputs marketed is very low and is not attractive to private enterprise. It is not likely that the demand for these inputs will expand rapidly unless appropriate marketing channels for inputs are established and a program for farm development is offered to farmers with accompanying extension and credit services. Although the distribution of some types of improved farm inputs may go beyond the terms of reference of a new marketing/service corporation, the handling of external- ly produced farm supplies such as fertilizer, hand sprayers and crop chemicals primarily involves traditional marketing functions (purchasing, storage, trans- port, wholesaling, etc.) which could be incorporated into the marketing activi- ties of the corporations. The distribution of improved seeds and planting material, however, demands links to domestic seed farms and well established area nurseries. Only after the proper type of seed rice is developed, multi- plied and tested, for example, can the marketing corporation handle the final distribution. Nurseries for tree crops need to be strategically located and supplied with planting stock that will maximize the field results for the smallholder. 5.14 Production of improved seed for field crops, especially rice, should receive increased attention. Seed multiplication farms should be developed near Newton (Western Area) and in the Scarcies area. Because of the general shortage of improved seed, the Eastern and Northern Projects will for the present time have to operate their own seed multiplication schemes. 5.15 Ministry-operated nurseries for tree crops such as cocoa, coffee, oil palm, rubber and citrus have not been routinely maintained for several years. The regeneration of the nursery system and importation of the highest yielding planting material available should be given top priority. Past policy of providing seedlings free of charge should be discontinued. For the foreseeable future seedling production should remain in the hands of the MANR ANNEX II Page 46 in order to ensure the necessary quality control and should where possible be related to properly planned developments. Improvement of quality standards is particularly important in the case of the small nursery development ope- rated by agricultural demonstrators in some chiefdoms. Because the avail- ability of improved planting material imposes a constraint on future projects (i.e. coconuts) and the development of seed gardens need several years lead time, steps should be taken soon to establish seed gardens in Sierra Leone. In the case of rubber, any joint venture would need initially to import high-yielding clones from neighboring West African countries. The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources 5.16 Though the will of the Government is behind a major shift to the emphasis of rural development, both a lack of concrete projects and absorptive capacity of the MANR will limit the quantity of resources that can be effective- ly channelled into agriculture. During the last two years with the planning assistance from the U.K. Government and the advent of the IDA financed Eastern Area Project the MANR has improved its organizational structure. Yet still much more needs to be done should the ministry be effective to promote the rapid changes required in developing the rural sector and not to perpetuate the shortcomings of the past. Part of the MANR's problem lies in the failure to set out a clear development strategy and in undue political interference, but there is also the problem of shortage of qualified technical and adminis- trative staff which severely restricts the ministry's ability to plan, coordi- nate and execute programs and projects. A further constraint is the division in agriculture policy making between the MANR and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. It is difficult to see how the MANR can effectively monitor pro- duction policies unless it is made responsible for formulation of marketing and pricing policies for agricultural prbduce which is presently the domain of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 5.17 Currently, the MANR is reviewing its own organizational needs, in- cluding the strengthening of planning, training and research. While the mission cannot say which organizational setup is particularly suitable for Sierra Leone, it would appear that as a first step the MANR planning team should be strengthened, and a special unit should be established to control, advise and coordinate the activities of ongoing and new projects. The actual restructuring of the MANR may require further external assistance during the period of transition, but more important, the ministry must have a genuine commitment of maximum budgetary support. Strong policy statements of the importance of agricultural development must now be converted into accelerated financial outlays for agricultural activities. Credit and Other Services 5.18 Storage and Transport. At this stage of commercialization, storage and transport of agricultural commodities are not serious constraints and can be effectively handled by the private sector; however, the low level of development of the domestic food-marketing system suggests a need for selected ANNEX II Page 47 improvements in all functions of marketing. In general, the private traders involved in the transport and storage of agricultural products will adjust their activities pending improvements in two specific areas. First, the entire marketing effort has been delayed by the very limited feeder road system in Sierra Leone. The minimal feeder road system requires producers to transport crops on headloads over footpaths. In addition, the quality of some secondary roads, combined with the low volume of produce marketed, does not encourage competitive trucking in many villages. The Government, through "self-help" funds allocated at the chiefdom level, could encourage some pro- gress on field to village roads, but the major move forward in feeder road construction will demand direct activity by the Ministry of Works. The U.S. Peace Corps and CARE have shown special interest in this area and should be actively encouraged. 5.19 The second constraint discouraging more active involvement of the private sector in food marketing relates to the general pricing policy of the Rice Corporation. Private traders hesitate to expand investment in facilities (storage and transport) when they do not know the effects of the Corporation's decisions regarding guaranteed producer prices, maximum consumer prices and volume of rice imported. 5.20 Rural Credit. A successful credit system will develop only after the smallholder begins to realize expanded production. Higher net returns per acre and/or manday of labor must then be tied to increased farmgate prices. The very sad repayment history of farm credit as handled by the MANR and the cooperatives can partly be linked to the failure to tie credit to improved production and better markets for farm output. While the development of a viable rural credit system will be a long-term effort, measures must be found in the short-run to increase the flow of credit to agriculture. Operating alone, the National Cooperative Development Bank does not have the resources to make any impact upon the required needs of the sector. The special projects (Eastern and Northern) likewise have a restricted clientele, but systems developed within the projects should provide invaluable guidelines for the future. For the short-run, an institutional form of handling produc- tion (seasonal) credit could be that of channeling finance to the marketing/ service corporation for onlending to cooperatives and groups of farmers in areas outside regional projects. Over the long-run, these credit functions will need to be incorporated into a national rural credit system (see also Main Report, Volume I, paras 223-224). 5.21 Extension Services. The current extension system can and must be changed to provide the leadership for rural development and the MANR is actively assisted in this effort by the British ODA team. Meanwhile, as the current extension staff gains experience, and the overall changes in the ministry are affected, the following short-term steps should be taken: (1) Two or three young promising agricultural officers (Aos) should be assigned to the MANR planning team to experience the process of preparing a feasibility study, confronting an appraisal team, and becoming involved in further project identification. ANNEX II Page 48 (2) The increasing number of Agricultural Instructors (AIs) in training should be concentrated at points like Kenema, Mange, Rokupr, Daru and Batnaku in order to maximize their learning experiences during the one year prior to training at NUC. These future field workers must have improved supervision, servicing and encouragement in order that a maximum number will actually become available for the extension service during the 1970s. (3) Increased attention must be given to in-service training of all AO's and AI's in order that each field workers has at least two to three weeks updating per year. (4) It might be worth exploring the link between the Eastern and Northern Area regional projects and training programs, as young extension workers could receive good practical training on those projects prior to more formalized training at NUC. (5) A system of special incentives should be developed for all field workers serving in difficult posts (financial bonus and/or more rapid promotions). 5.22 The final reorganization of agricultural extension services will be difficult for the MANR to execute, unless the Government provides clear direction and increased financial support. The extension service must be released from farm supply and credit responsibilities in order to carry out its functions effectively. 5.23 Research and Training. The most pressing element in agricultural strategy is trained manpower. Currently, the MANR has in post about 200 field men (including Junior Agricultural Instructors through Senior Agricultural Instructors) and 33 Agricultural Officers (including Senior Agricultural Officers). This basic extension field staff must service an estimated 300,000 farm holders. By 1980, the number of farm holders could grow to 340,000 (based on the growth pattern of the late 1960s). To maintain the current level of service, and to afford the staff necessary for new development projects, the available trained manpower in agriculture must be expanded. 5.zq Improved agricultural training and applied research are necessary preconditions for an effective development strategy. The non-degree training program in agriculture should be expanded to the point that 140 students can begin formal training either by 1976/77 or, at the latest, by 1977/78. By the end of the decade, degree enrollment in agriculture should be doubled over the current level. The expanding extension service will need the backup of a more dynamic agricultural research program, which is able to rapidly screen results from other countries and adopt them to the micro soil and climate differences found within Sierra Leone. ANNEX II Page 49 5.25 Given current enrollment in the degree program at NUC, less the expected drop-outs during training and loss of staff to other areas of employment, the MANR can expect a net addition of 18 Agricultural Officers by the end of the decade. The ratio of supervision Instructors (AI) to Officers (AO) could increase from the current ratio of 6:1 to 10:1 by 1980. Assuming a desired ratio of 8:1 of AI's to AO's, it would seem highly desirable for the Government: (1) to increase financial incentives for Officers in order to discourage any transfer out of the extension service, and (2) to encourage other possible candidates from NUC to join the extension field staff 1/. The supervision problem of Instructors will be further complicated with the in- creased addition of more Instructors in training (up to 200 per year) 2/. 5.26 Whether the critical shortage of staff within the extension service during the latter 1970's can be overcome will depend upon the rapid expansion of the training programs at NUC. Because of the over commitment of senior experienced staff in the MANR and the annual operating costs which would be involved should a separate center be established, it is strongly recommended that certificate-level training be expanded within the existing institution. This will demand that both the University College and the MANR cooperate and adhere to a rigid plan for development which places increased emphasis on practical aspects. 5.27 The programmed expansion suggested would involve an intake of over 80 non-degree candidates by 1975, with intakes expanding to over 100 for the balance of the decade. Considering the wastage both in training (also pre- training) and in service, a target of 450 field workers in post by 1979/1980 seems reasonable. The biggest constraint in a more rapid expansion (and even in the suggested expansion) will be the availability of candidates both in- terested and capable of training for field work in agricultural extension. Experience in the early 1970's suggests that this may be a serious bottleneck. This emphasizes the need to improve the agricultural education programs with- 1/ As of July 1, 1971, only 20 percent of the agricultural degree holders from NUC were actually hired by the MANR. See detailed study of NUC by John Roth, "Employment and Suitability of Training of Graduates from Niala University College, Sierra Leone, 1666-1970," unpublished EdM. Thesis, University of Illinois, 1973. 2/ Given the current organization structure and staffing problems of the MANR, it may be that trainees could actually realize negative benefits from work in the ministry prior to certificate training. While they certainly represent heavy responsibilities for the young staff of Agriculture Officers, the concept of practical experience with the MANR staff prior to work at NUC is to be recommended. ANNEX II Page 50 in the secondary schools 1/. A final constraint affecting the availability of an increasing number of candidates for training in agricultural exten- sion involves the generally low salary levels. A detailed study of pay scales of all field workers should be initiated 2/. 5.28 Land Tenure. The land tenure system at this time does not seem to be a serious barrier to rural development. Nonetheless, a better understanding of local chiefdom government and the tenure system is required by all field workers and government policy makers, especially over the long-run as the land resource problem becomes a more serious constraint. Currently, there does not appear to be a shortage of land or total labor (although there are serious seasonal constraints in some areas) within the existing tenure system. Sierra Leone can still be classed as a land surplus economy. 5.29 Since Sierra Leone is not richly endowed with funds for sector investment, it is critical that a firm development policy be formulated for the sector, a policy that is supported throughout the entire Government. Such a policy should focus upon: (1) providing opportunities for maintaining a regional balance in rural incomes; (2) promoting social as well as economic welfare at the village-level; (3) creating viable employment opportunities within the sector (both farm and rural non-farm); and (4) reducing the income gap between the urban and rural population. 1/ Special attention must'be given to agricultural education programs in primary and secondary schools. Teachers in the area of agriculture must be rewarded with pay equal to science teachers. Likewise, secondary schools must budget funds (Le 1,000 instead of Le 50) to maintain practical programs in agriculture. 2/ Since the Mission's visit to Sierra Leone, the MANR has completed such study but its implementation is still lacking. The findings of the study show that many of the extension workers still receive salaries far below those paid to rural teachers and as a result many agricultural trained persons move into teaching positions. ANNEX II Page 51 VI. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 6.01 With declining prospects for diamond mining and limited opportunities for any significant development of an industrial base, agriculture must become the controlling factor in Sierra Leone's economic development. Accelerating sector transformation is crucial for the nation since agriculture will have to: (a) absorb nearly all the net addition to the total labor force; (2) provide food for a rapidly increasing population; and (3) become an increas- ingly important generator of foreign exchange. Fortunately, as was noted in Section IV, there are good prospects within the sector for an accelerated rate of growth. 6.02 For Sierra Leone's agricultural sector to realize the projected growth rate of 3.6 percent, it will be necessary for both internal and external investment in agriculture and rural development to be pushed to the limits of the nation's absorptive capacity. Emphasis has to be placed upon developing the productivity of the 300,000 smallholders. Additional invest- ment in the East (best area for production of high-value export crops) should be balanced with further investment in the north and the south in order to maintain a regional balance in rural incomes. Effective structuring of the extension, marketing, farm supply and credit systems should receive priority in planning a development strategy. Any strategy for the sector should include the following basic conditions: 1) Impact on rural incomes: The development strategy selected should have a substantial impact upon rural incomes by increasing cash incomes realized by individual smallholders. Output per farmer and farmgate prices must increase before village development can occur. Since enclave plantation projects have only a limited effect upon smallholders, they should be of second-level priority. 2) Provide focus: In order to employ the limited human and fi- nancial resources most effectively, agricultural development programs cannot attempt to provide for a complete coverage of the entire nation at the present time, but should concentrate on some strategic areas which would become the centers for expanded regional development later in the decade. The MANR's current strategy as implied in the Five-Year Plan includes too many projects in too many locations to provide the desired focus. 3) Maximum coordination: Since rural development is a multi-functional and multi-dimensional effort, it is necessary that field staff of all ministries and agencies coordinate their programs. Also, it is critical that local leaders (Paramount Chiefs and Speakers) understand that the Central Government's policy of rural develop- ment should not become a process of enriching chiefdom leadership ANNEX II Page 52 at the expense of the smallholders and that they should cooperate with each other in multi-chiefdom planning and development. Likewise, the Government should provide greater opportunities for "grassroot" involvement in rural planning on the part of traditional leaders. 4) Training/learning experience: The strategy should incorporate the maximum learning experience for both the policy makers and the field workers. Field workers should be provided realizable goals and have the opportunity for continued in-service training. Policy makers should evaluate the strategy through time to take advantage of new resources and adjustements that occur in the market place. 6.03 The policy objectives of a new strategy will be judged upon its impact at the micro and macro level of the economy. At the farm level, a new national development strategy must improve real family income by afford- ing increases in agricultural productivity. In order to maximize the micro impact more research is required in problem areas such as: (1) comparative advantage among various crop and livestock enterprises; (2) labor allocation between farm and non-farm activities; and (3) marketing decisions at the farm and village level 1/. 6.04 At the national level, a reallocation of resources demands consi- deration of a number of macro objectives and the question should be asked whether added financial resources invested in agriculture, as compared to other sectors of the economy can: (1) create more employment; (2) generate higher levels of foreign exchange; (3) conserve more effectively the scarce human and financial resources, or (4) distribute more equitably the added income created. Government should first rank and evalute these macro objec- tives in its establishment of an economic development strategy. Selected observations tend to demonstrate a need to redirect more resources from the urban to the rural economy; for example, capital intensive investment in the larger industries has created a situation of stagnant employment in manufac- turing even though output doubled from 1964/65 to 1970/71. Expansion of manufacturing industry should be cautiously considered from the viewpoint of employment, income distribution, and the net impact on foreign exchange. The expansion of manufacturing can be used to satisfy only a very limited domestic market, indicating that the advantages of import substitution will rapidly diminish. Small nations are seldom able to obtain plants that are large enough to obtain the economies of scale that large nations enjoy. Small scale industry 2/, primarily rural based, would provide greater employment and 1/ A three-year rural employment study has recently begun at Njala University College. The planned research works in cooperation with Michigan State University, will include subprojects in the areas of: (1) farm-decision making; (2) agricultural marketing; (3) rural non-farm employment; (4) rural-uran migration; (5) rural consumption; and (6) policy alternative for the rural economy. 2/ Small scale industry includes fuel collection, house construction, tailor- ing fabrication and agricultural marketing, storage and processing. Small scale industry will be evaluated in the NUC study. ANNEX II Page 53 income in rural areas without making a large demand on foreign exchange and it would avoid isolation of the working force. The mining industry, exhaus- tive in nature, has definite limitations in satisfying employment and income distribution objectives. It is in agriculture that Sierra Leone has its best opportunities for labor intensive expansion of output with a positive effect on the distribution of urban-rural incomes. With three quarters of the popu- lation employed in the rural sector, even a small rural to urban migration will create difficult employment problems; and, conversely, any government policy that discourages relocation of rural workers will have long-run social benefits. Likewise, a campaign focused upon food production would also benefit the urban population via a larger supply of lower priced food items. An agricultural strategy that balances emphasis between the production of food and export crops will also contribute to the best distribution of rural and urban incomes. 6.05 Likely Strategy. The focus of the Government's agricultural strategy is upon regional development. The Integrated Development Project in the Eastern Area, initiated in 1973, covers about 1.5 million acres 1/. This Project, and a Northern Project which is being prepared for IDA consideration, will demand a high proportion of the trained agricultural manpower of the MANR. Any additional regional projects in the northwest and the south appear in the short-run beyond the likely availability of technical manpower and financial resources. Currently the MANR has about 200 fieldworkers (AI's) and 33 Agri- cultural Officers (see table 20). The Eastern and Northern Projects when fully operaltional will utilize over half that staff. In addition, a Sugar Cane Project sponsored by the People's Republic of China and scheduled for production by the mid--1970's, will make additional demand on trained agricul- tural manpower and budget resources. The Gambia Oil Palm Plantation will require up to 20 Instructors, 2 Officers and a top Senior Administrative Officer from the MANR. The balance of available staff is demanded for general extension work. 6.06 The Government should, therefore, examine ways in which the absorp- tive constraint can be eased, while still promoting agriculture in the North- western and Southern Regions. One possible alternative is to establish key production centers in selected chiefdoms outside the Eastern and Northern Projects with the primary aim of increasing cash incomes through intensified production. The multi-chiefdom development should lead to the creation of development poles - where social services are added to production centers, or new centers are formed as staff and financial resources became available - which at a later stage could be integrated into a larger regional rural development program. Both regional and multi-chiefdom growth strategies appear as complementary approaches to viable sector development. The multi- chiefdom strategy has also the advantage that the selective location of growth centers could have positive effects upon income distribution. In the recent past, the chiefdom and village structure has been considered as an obstacle to rural development. Since independence, the Government has not seriously I/ This regional project focuses upon 2,500 smallholders located in an area with a total population of 242,000 and average population density of 103 per square mile. ANNEX II Page 54 attempted to base rural development upon the existing chiefdom structure. Agricultural programs and projects have been conceived, but without "grass- root" support they have failed to become a reality. A new strategy that would include multi-chiefdom growth centers should insure a maximum involve- ment of local leaders and the farm population in order to reduce the cost per participant in development projects. Local participation would also assist in overcoming the absorptive constraint of the MANR. There are several possible actions which could be taken to reduce project costs of rural development programs through inducing participants to undertake more responsibility for project actions, such as organizing themselves into pur- chasing, marketing, and processing groups of one form or another. Experi- ence in other developing countries has clearly shown, that this form of participant involvement is the only way of reducing the Government's costs in sponsoring rural development. The alternative route of Government being responsible for all the support services needed for agricultural development is not only inevitably expensive but may also lead to inefficiency. 6.07 Initially the MANR should select at least two growth centers to further examine its abilities in effectively promoting rural change jointly with traditional leaders. The selection of these centers should be based upon the agricultural potential of the land, the density of population and location factors such as: good roads, effective communication, farm-input service centers, existing farm markets and available training and research centers. The brief presentation in Table 21 compares four selection factors that could be used in determining sites for multi-chiefdom growth centers 1/. Based upon population and farmer density, it would appear that Bo and Moyamba Districts in the South and Kambia and Port Loko Districts in the Northwest deserve special attention. Although land resources may be better in the Pujehun District, land may have to be a secondary factor to population during the 1970's. This is especially true considering the mobility problems among different tribal areas. Current regional projects serve areas of relatively dense population 2/. Further development in the Northwestern and Southern Regions would provide regional balance with current (or planned) integrated projects. Because of the existing critical shortage of MANR manpower and the difficulty of controlling and operating multi-chiefdom centers from Freetown, it is suggested that the first two pilot multi-chiefdom centers link closely to the Research Station and the University College, provided that NUC can be integrated closely with the MANR activities. These institutions could provide manpower and administrative support, thus expanding the absorptive capacity of the MANR. 1/ For more details on the population and farmer distribution throughout Sierra Leone see Statistical Appendix Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 2/ The current Eastern Project Services Kenema and Kailahun Districts (re- latively dense population and high agricultural potential) and parts of Pujehun District (relatively low population and high agricultural po- tential). The Northern Project focuses upon the more densely populated chiefdoms surrounding Makeni and Magburaha (Bombali and Tonkolili Dis- tricts). ATNEX IT Page 55 Table 201 DIVISION OF AGRICULTURE STAFF POSITION, DECEMBER, 1973 / Position Posted Establishment Vacancy Chief Agricultural Officer 1 1 0 Assistant Chief Agricultural Officer 1 1 0 Principal Agricultural Officer 5 6 1 Senior Agricultural Officer 2 3 1 Agricultural Officer 31 35 4 Agricultural Officer Specialist 0 4 4 Senior Agricultural Superintendent 2 2 0 Agricultural Superintendent 15 16 1 Senior Agricultural Instructor 11 12 1 A. I. (Grade I) 3 15 12 A. I. (Grade II) 28 30 2 A. I. (Grade III) 95 111 16 Junior A. I. 27 29 2 A. I. in Training 75 2/ 150 75 1 There are 29 students currently enrolled in the degree program in general agriculture at NUC, that could over the next four years join the Ministry as Agricultural Officers. Another 81 students are in the two year program, with an addition of 20 to 30 awaiting admission to college. Also, this December, 118 candidates for A. I. in Training were approved by both the College and the MAMR. 2/ This involves between 53 to 75 A. I.s who have complete training in 1972 and 1973 but have not been promoted to A. I. (Grade III). ANNEX II Page 56 Table 21: SELECTION FACTORS FOR MULTI-CHIEFDOM CENTERS District Population Density Farmer Density Agricultural Transport & (per sq. mile) (per sq. mile) Potential Commuunications Kambia 142.1 12.0 average poor Bo 136.6 16.4 average good Port Loko 138.8 12.0 average good Kono 113.8 12.3 below average average Moyamba 77.5 12.2 average average Bonthe 74.6 5.8 average poor Pujehun 65.9 10.9 above average poor Koinadugu 34.0 3.1 below average poor 6.08 Kambia Center: One multi-chiefdom growth center (4 to 6 chiefdoms) should be located in the Kambia/Rokupr/Mambolo Area, where it would permit maximum use of the rice station at Rokupr and the station at Mange. The Kambia District has the highest population density of any rural district in Sierra Leone (142 per square mile). This rice surplus area, on the main road to Guinea, could become the pilot center in the Northwest Region. Rice and other basic foodcrops could initially be featured, while sugar could become a major cash crop pending the success of a likely sugar project to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. 6.09 Niala Center: A second multi-chiefdom growth center could involve a centrally located area (four chiefdoms) in the Moyamba District. This center, involving the University College, could serve as a means of relating training in rural development to the realistic problems of about 5,000 smallholders, distri- buted over 695 square miles (population density of 72 per square mile). The Njala Center could be developed from the experience gained over the past five to six years by the college's extension and village improvement teams. 6.10 Whether the multi-chiefdom development strategy - with its concen- tration on development in the more populated and progressive areas - will be successful and can be implemented at low cost (both human and financial) will be contingent upon several factors. First, the availability of farm inputs, institutional credit and marketing facilities is a basic prerequisite for an effective agricultural extension program and the consequent adoption of improved technology. Considerations should therefore be given to whether SLPMB could establish local offices in the selected chiefdoms and expand its operation into marketing of inputs and the provision of credit in kind. Local offices ANNEX II Page 57 of the marketing corporation would also ensure that farmers receive the highest possible farmgate prices because the employment of buying agents could be dis- countinued. Second, while the utilization of NUC and research station staff for extension programs would permit to overcome the temporary manpower shortage of the MANR, there is definitely a need for close supervision of this staff by MANR. Third, all the necessary infrastructure development should, where possible, be undertaken through self-help efforts and for this effort to suc- ceed, chiefdoms will require support from field staff in education, health, social welfare and public works. Because it is imperative that these efforts be also closely linked to the agricultural development, proper attention should be given to improve the inter-ministerial coordination. 6.11 A multi-chiefdom council, including smallholders, chiefdom leaders, local traders and the District Officer, would serve as a steering committee for the technical staff, The staff would focus upon problems in all related areas of rural development (agriculture, health, education, family planning, etc), pending identification by the national and the local councils (see figure 6). This would demand a breakdown of barriers that now separate agricultural efforts from human and community development programs. 6.12 Other Centers: The selection of other centers will involve a review of the population, land and infrastructure factors. The agricultural potential (for swamp rice and tree crops) of Pujehun District could be encompassed in the Second Phase of the Eastern Project. Bonthe District will be affected by the Gambia Oil Palm Project and could be the primary site for a future Coconut Project. A Sugar Project to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China would likely be sited near Magburaka. Preparation for additional multi-chiefdom work at Moyamba, Bo and Kabala would logically link all areas of Sierra Leone to the total development process. The list of sites should be built upon the existing physical facilities now under the control of the MANR and the marketing corporations. The availability of manpower and finances will determine the rate of expansion of the "minimum package" approach to rural development. Figure 6: INTEGRATION OF MULTI-CHIEFDOM CENTERS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM Sources of Funds (Government, Seek Funds National Rural Development Council (MANR, Bilateral, Commercial Banks, Health, Education, Public Works, Develop- etc.) ment, Regional Project Management and Director of Multi-Chiefdom Centers) Provide Policy & Marketing/Service C Ministry of Agriculture Priorities Corporation (formed and Natural Resources by merger of S.L.P.M.B. and R.C.) New Ideas Farm Credit, Farm Rural Development Rural Planning and Supplies and Fieldworkers Project Preparation Marketing Services Unit Regional Development Multi-Chiefdom Advise Regional/Multi Chiefdom Local Service Centers Project (Eastern & Development Evaluation Rural Development Northern Projects) Centers Councils (Villages, P.C , Local Traders and District Officers) 1 Advise J L ------------------------------ - L Evaluation Bk 0 World Bank-9075 ANNEX II Page 59 VII. MAJOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS 7.01 The MANR and the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning have prepared a preliminary Five-Year Development Plan and a summary of the pro- posed projects is contained in Table 22. The estimated investment of over Le 78 million;equal to US$94 million (constant 1974 prices) in projects far exceeds both manpower and finances that can be made available for agricul- tural development. Earlier evaluations of prospects for the sector have been adjusted to the expanding resource base expected during the 1970's. Two critical factors should be noted regarding the realization of major projects during the decade. First, a "project pipeline" is nearly nonexistant; thus the actual choice of projects is quite limited; and furthermore, project preparation work is basically nonexistant beyond the nearly completed work on the Northern Project. A second critical element is the past low priority given to such areas as a land resource survey, agricultural research and extension training. Work done in 1974 is expected to bring some improvements in all three areas, but there will be a lag of some years before the results of such investments can be realized in improved preparation and execution of major sector projects. 7.02 The overall financial constraints of the Government and the absorp- tive capacity of the MANR would, however, suggest that an attempt should be made to reduce the proposed program to a manageable level. It would, there- fore, be advisable to focus primarily on project planning and development for the Northern Project, a second phase of the Eastern Project, and on selected multi-chiefdom development centers. The location of each project is important for balanced regional growth, and this fact will be discussed below. Currently, Sierra Leone does not have the capacity (field staff, admi- nistrative structure and financial control) within the agricultural sector to manage more than two large integrated development projects. A basic condition for the funding of future investment projects has to be the strengthening and reorganization of the MANR and the expansion of the sector's overall absorp- tive capacity. 7.03 A revised investment program proposed by the Mission and presented in Table 23 places emphasis upon projects that: (1) improve smallholder income; (2) increase rural employment; and (3) conserve foreign exchange. Of the pro- posed projects only the multi-chiefdom centers, the integrated agricultural development projects in the Eastern and Northern Areas and the Gambia Oil Palm Plantation are expected to have any significant effect upon the aggregate supply of either food or export crops during the Five-Year Plan (1974/75 to 1978/79). Availability of trained fieldworkers and domestic investment for the agricultural sector could require further reduction in both size and number of major projects. The proposed investment program would require capital out- lays of about Le 70 million (current prices) during the five-year period. As Table 24 indicates, several nations and international institutions have shown interest in assisting Sierra Leone in its development of the agricultural sector, but before seeking bilateral or multilateral aid, the Government should set new Table 22: SUMMARY OF DEVELOPAENT EXPENDITURES FOR THE FIVE 4 RICULTURAL PYE ANNEX II 197L75 to 1978/79 Page 60 (in millions of Le in 1973/74 prices) ProJects Integrated Agricultural Development: Eastern Phase 1 5.88 Eastern Phase 2 2.25 Northern 12.16 Southern 2.25 Northwestern 1.00 23-5T Rice: Rice Crash Program 4.08 Mechanical Cultivation (MANR) 0.37 Mechanical Cultivation (Private) 2.39 Inland Swamps 1.49 Rice Planting Scheme (Chinese) 2.72 Seed Multiplication 1.72 Fertilizer Distribution 0.33 Power Tiller Project 0.66 13.76 Tree Crops: Gambia Oil Palm Plantation 5.35 Coconut Project 1.25 Smallholder Oil Palm and Mills 046 Other Crops and Livestock: Pineapple and Tomato 0.49 Sugar Cane 9.93 Fiber 1.34 Livestock 3.46 Onions 1 Suporting Services: National Research Institute 4.05 Extension Training Center 2.47 Land Resource Survey 2.00 Staff Rousing, offices and stores 1.75 Mechanical Research 0.52 Irrigation Research 0.26 W.F.P. Village Stores and Distribution 0.20 Transport 0.29 Others 0.20 11.74 Total 71.59 Source: Ministry of Development and Ebonamic Planning ANNEX II Page 61 Table 23: PROPOSED INVESTMENT PROGRAM 1974/75 to 1978/79 (in millions of Le, current prices) Project Starting Total Investment Within Project Year Investment Plan Period Status Productions Projects: Gambia Oil Palm 1973/74 Le 3.97 Le 2.85 Founded by ADB astern Area, Zxtension 1975/76 3.4 3*4 Under consideration for Phase I IDA financing Multi-Chiefdom Centers 1975/76 3.0 3.0 Proposed Northern Area 1975/76 8.2 8.2 Under consideration for IDA financing Northern Area, Zxtension 1977/78 6.0 5.0 Phase I Feasibility study reprh-ed Sugar/Rice Project 1975/76 13.10 12.40 Under consideration by Peoples Republic of China Bastern Area, Extension 1977/78 6.0 6.0 Phase II Feasibility study zequdred Coconut Project 1977/78 8.0 3.0 Feasibility study requked Southern Area 1978/79 12.0 _0O Feasibility study requUmd 1. Sub Total 64.67 45.85 Possible Sunortive Services: Assistance from: Planning Unit 1974/75 1.00 1.00 U.K. Zixtension Training 1974/75 2.50 2.50 U.K. Agricultural Research 1974/75 4.00 4.00 UND Land Resource Survey 1974/75 2.00 2.00 UNDP Seed Farms 1974/75 1.0 1.70 U.K. and Germany 2. Sub Total 11.20 11.20 75.87 57.05 Price contingency (20 percent) 15.17 1141 Total 91.0 68.46 ANNEX II Page 62 targets for its own agricultural investment. It will be necessary to consider an increase in the domestic contribution to sector investment from the Le 1.6 million of 1973/74 to at least Le 8 million by 1978/79. Likewise, the budgeted recurrent expenditures for the MANR would realistically have to increase from the 1973/74 allocation of Le 2.9 million (4.4 percent of budget) to a target of about 25-30 percent of the total recurrent budget. 7.04 In 1975/76, project execution for the sector may reach a critical point. The overall availability of finances from the Government will become more difficult (see Fiscal Report), but more important is the fact that the availability of trained manpower for field work will be at a critical level. Whether the manpower shortage can be overcome in the short to medium-run will depend upon the success of stepping-up the training of certificate level ex- tension staff and the implementation of a salary scale which provides an adequate incentive for work in rural areas. The manpower pressure could be futher increased if the Government should decide to go ahead with a Sugar/Rice Project initiated by the Peoples Republic of China. Throughout the Plan Period, but especially during the first half, Sierra Leone will need to in- troduce outside management assistance for the various projects. The Government must realistically evaluate the critical shortage of senior, experienced per- sonnel available for agriculture work. The present policy of using expatriate staff in simply advisory roles within the ministry structure may need reconsi- deration. 7.05 Ongoing Projects. The Eastern and the Gambia Projects are the two major projects initiated in 1973. The first phase of an Integrated Agri- cultural Project (Eastern Project) focuses on improving the agricultural productive abilities (swamp rice, cocoa and oil palm) and available processing facilities (rice and oil palm) for 2,500 smallholders in the Kailahun, Kenema and Pujehun Districtsl/. The Eastern Project is progressing satisfactorily under the joint supervision of expatriate and national leadership. Extension personnel from the MANR, assigned to the project, appear to have a high commitment to smallholder development. The unexpected high commodity prices should further expand the opportunities for the success of this integrated project. The planned involvement of staff members from NUC will allow for internal evaluation of the project's progress. 1/ The three year investment period (1973-1975) allows for the completion of the following elements of the project: (1) completion of establish- ment of a 2,000 acre nucleus oil palm plantation; (2) planting 1,830 acres of outgrowers oil palm; (3) development of 6,000 acres of inland swamp rice; (4) planting 750 acres of cocoa; (5) construction of an oil palm mill for estate and outgrowers; and (6) establishment of 20 small rice mills. IDA is providing Le 3.3 million out of a total project cost of Le 4.3 million. ANNEX II Page 63 7.06 The second active project includes the development of an additional 8,000 acres of oil palm in.combination with an existing 2,500 acres of estate and outgrower holdings. The Gambia Oil Palm Project, supported by a loan 1/ granted in 1973 by the African Development Bank, is primarily focused upon the palm oil needs of the domestic market. This specialized treecrop project is expected to require up to six years to complete and should have an annual out- put of 9,800 tons of palm oil and 2,200 tons of kernels. The 6,100 acres of estate combined with 4,400 acres of outgrowers will provide a growth point for the southeast part of Sierra Leone, although its broader economic impact outside of Bonthe District may be restricted. 7.07 Supportive Services. A number of services must be strengthened before additional projects can become operational. Special assistance from UNDP for 1974 should aid in the upgrading of the Rice Research Station and in the development of a land resources survey. Yet it must be recognized that the upgrading of the Research Station will not solve the research problem. Sierra Leone does not have a research policy for agriculture and the limited research activities undertaken are not coordinated. In order to ensure that activities of the research station and the NUC are directed to the most eminent research needs and linked to ongoing and planned development activities, every effort should be made to prepare and implement a national research program under the leadership of the MANR. The research and the land survey work will have a long-term payoff in the evaluation of the technical prospects for project development. In addition, the establishment of a viable planning unit within the MANR is the first step toward providing a systematic flow of projects. Bilateral assistance from United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany should aid with improvements in extension training and in the establish- ment of seed multiplication farms during the plan period. All these suppor- tive services, combined with the creation of an improved marketing system, are necessary to effectively manage future major agricultural projects. As these services are being restructed and the sector is gaining strength for further regional projects, it is recommended that the MANR also explore a strategy that involves the integration of multi-chiefdom centers with the regional development projects in the Eastern and the Northern Areas. Projects Under Consideration 7.08 Northern Project. A compact eight chiefdom project - featuring swamp and upland rice, groundnuts, onions, a cattle component and supportiag infrastructure - is being designed for the Makeni and Magburaka area in the Northern Province. It is anticipated that the internal organization of this project be patterned after the Eastern Project-Phase I. The Northern Project, as presently being prepared for IDA consideration, will balance regional development within the sector. 1/ The ADB granted Sierra Leone a loan for Le 2.8 million for the comple- tion of the Gambia Project. The loan involves a six-year grace period, a nine-year amortization period and a rate of interest of 6 percent. ANNEX II Page 64 7.09 Multi-Chiefdom Centers. During the first six months of 1974, all available extension personnel will\be absorbed into the expanded tractor plowing scheme. Assuming a decreasihg emphasis on this narrowly focused mechanized scheme, the MANR activities could be directed to the development of two pilot multi-chiefdom centers 1/ beginning in 1974/75. These centers should be located in areas that would permit an integration with the expanded programs at the extension training and agricultural research insti- tutions. In each center (Kambia and Njala) the extension worker to farmer ratio should be about 1:500. A system of MANR supported infrastructure investment should include local village stores, improved farm to village roads and the maximum introduction of new technology. In both cases, the college and station personnel should be available to assist with the organ- ization of the local centers. The two sites demand high priority because of the need to complement training and research work with nearby MANR supported extension programs. 7.10 The chiefdoms in the Kambia District utilize rice as a cash crop, while the farmers around Njala depend upon ginger and some coffee for cash earnings. Both suggested multi-chiefdom centers are located on important road links. The Njala center has the benefit of some structural develop- ment via field efforts of the University College teams in extension educa- tion and home economics. The area of the Kambia center has also realized some effects of the Rice Station's work in contracting local farmers to multiply seed rice. Each pilot center must also explore means of total village development, which demands involvement of other ministries and agencies. Aspects of education, health, marketing, transportation, etc., must be integrated with increased agriculture production. 7.11 Other possible centers could include Bo, Moyamba and Kabala. Kabala might be considered as a third growth center for development late in the decade. Early findings from the cattle component of the Northern Project should be available by 1980. The far northeast of Sierra Leone represents climatic conditions suitable for both the livestock and vegetable enterprises. A site at Kabala/Musaia, or at any other point, should await early evaluation of results of the first two centers. 7.12 Eastern Project-Phase II. A second phase of the Eastern Project would demand an intensive feasibility study in order to successfully link it with the progress realized during Phase I. The initiation of the second phase should be timed to match the completion of the first phase and avoid a vacuum in project activity. While the primary focus of Phase II should be upon ex- panded production of rice, cocoa and coffee, increased attention should be given to infrastructure elements including: roads, markets, health and edu- cation facilities. At this stage the new marketing corporation should begin to increase field activity in movement of farm supplies, as well as farm 1/ See Section VI for detailed discussion of multi-chiefdom centers. ANNEX II Page 65 produce. Improved marketing and pricing of farm commodities produced within the project will further strengthen the project's success. 7.13 Sugar/Rice Project. Sugar and rice production provide the focus of bilateral aid granted by the Peoples Republic of China. The lack of know- ledge of technical factors 1/ make it difficult to evaluate the economic ef- fects a sugar enterprise may have upon the sector. Imports of sugar, by 1975/76, may reach 26,000 tons. Chinese sugar and rice teams are now studying the alternatives open for this project. The locations currently being re- viewed for sugar production is in Mabunta. A successful sugar enterprise would allow an opportunity to diversity farm incomes in the Northwest Region. However, the technical unknowns suggest that the sugar component of the project be considered with caution. The rice component of this larger assistance package involves the establishment of 13 rice production centers and the addition of 4,500 acres of double cropped rice. About 25 percent of the annual costs of these centers are projected to come directly from the Government. The Chinese Technical Assistance Program will also supply the majority of the man- power and the aim is to allocate one Sierra Leonean agricultural instructor for each production center. 7.14 Coconuts. Coconut is another project that is still in the early planning stages. A coconut project (Phase I) could involve up to 15,000 acres of planting on Turner's Peninsula and Bonthe Island. Such an enclave-type project would provide high yields and income per acre, with relatively low development costs as compared to oil palm. A second phase of coconut work could include 6,000 acres in the Makera/Lungi Area and could be handled by smallholders. This project needs a detailed feasibility study beginning in 1974/75, especially if project work is to be initiated by 1977/78. Nurseries using seed imported from Ivory Coast, will need to be established at least a year before planting can commence. 7.15 Other Tree-Crops. The Government should begin studying the feasi- bility of rubber and cashew production. Rubber development could involve expansion of existing estates but should be based upon assistance of a foreign commercial company. The Zimi/Portou area in the Pujehun District, near the proposed Sierra Leone-Liberia road, has been the site for the limited develop- ment of government estates and some outgrowers of rubber. Cashews represent an export crop that has some promise for development on the soils in the Northern Province, but more detailed technical and marketing work is needed. 1/ Serious technical factors that need more study involve questions of light intensity, rainfall effects, actual sugar content and finally expected farm yields. These unknowns make it difficult to recommend this project. ANNEX II Page 66 7.16 Other Regional Projects. Around 1980, there should be greater opportunities for two additional regional projects in the Southern and Northwestern Regions. The base for these additional regional projects must be formed now by the strengthening of all institutions supporting the productive aspects of the sector. 7.17 Other areas demanding more detailed technical and economic research include: (1) the future growth of the livestock subsector; (2) the costs and returns of dry seasons irrigation; and (3) the economic impact and feasibility of agroindustries. While studies are not always popular with any developing nation, the experience of past schemes in Sierra Leone indicates that feasi- bility work is an essential investment. Some of the current discussion re- garding the rapid expansion of agroindustries can be compared to concepts used in launching the Industrial Plantation Scheme of the 1960s. Agroindustries may have an important role in future development, but for the 1970s it is recommended that they be given second priority to the improvement of the pro- ductive capacity of the smallholder. 7.18 Because of the nearly total absence of prepared projects for the sector, it is necessary that prompt attention (and required financial support) be given to the following areas: 1) Reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources -- to increase its effectiveness as a development agency. 2) Reorganization of the SLPMB and Rice Corporation into a single produce marketing and input supply corporation. 3) Assessment of the appropriate institutional structure for agricultural credit. 4) Preparation of a second phase for the current Eastern Project. 5) Field evaluation of production potentials for possible multi-chiefdom growth centers. 6) Preparation of a Coconut Project. 7) A countrywide survey of the possibilities for cashew production. 8) Evaluation of opportunities in rubber production and processing. 9) Land resource survey -- provide physical data for project location. 10) A national livestock subsector survey. IBRD 11223 .. ... - - - --SENEGAL MALl NI UP R~O -,Jy j, , U) I . GUINEA ltLEON OS GHANA SS: T!-ANilC ECEAN (PROPO ED) NQR'THERN AREA 9ROJECGT PGRT'LOKQ L ---- -ATOTOKA LUNGI FREETOWN-. TAlA SURFACEO ROADS -------- UN5URFACED R-ADS RAILROAU -TR R fE C <? DI,-NS 0 AMI A IA-TE IRON ORE COFFEE SIERRA LEONE QIL PALMS AGRICULTURE ^E INTEGRATED AGRICULTURAL CATTLE - ~DEVEtOPMENT PROJECT GNE -7- FUREST 2SAVANNAH LUSH lir AUGUST 1974 ANNEX III FISHERIES Table of Contents Page No. I. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE INDUSTRY 1........ 1 Structure of the Industry 1... 1 Fish Supplies 2...... 2 Processing and Marketing 5....... . .... 5 II. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS .... 10 Fisheries Administration .. 10 Joint Ventures ..................................... 11 Fisheries Research ................................ 12 Foreign and External Advisory Services ..... 13 III. AQUATIC RESOURCES AND THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1974/75-1978/79 ...................................... 16 The Resource Base ... 16 The National Development Plan 1974/74-1978/79 ...... 19 IV. OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PLAN ........... 21 Fish Production and Supply Targets ...... 21 Fishing Operations .. 23 Processing and Marketing .. 26 Training and Extension Services ............. ...... 27 Infrastructure and Auxiliary Industries ... 28 Administration and Business Management ............. 29 Tentative Investment Program ........... ........... 31 APPENDIX Map List-of Important Commercial Fish Species of Sierra Leone List of Chartered Fishing Boats Lisenced for Fishing from Freetown ANNEX III Page 1 I. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE INDUSTRY Structure of the Industry 1.01 Artisan Sea Fisheries. Artisan fisheries, also known as "tradi- tional" fisheries, account for the bulk of the fish catch in Sierra Leone waters. From an estimated 4,500 metric tons in 1942, the first year for which an estimate is available, total catches developed to a level of 20,000-25,000 tons in the 1960's. In this 20-25 year period, a transition to improved methods took place, greatly helped by the extension service. Ghana fishermen, who settled along the coast, had a very favorable impact. The total number of fishermen has increased considerably and recent surveys have shown that some 10,000-11,000 fishermen make a living in the coastal fishery, particularly within the main estuaries. Some of these are part- time fishermen who also engage in agriculture. 1.02 The fishing fleet in this sub-sector comprises small one-man dugout ('kroo") canoes, 4 m in length, medium size "standard" canoes for 1-5 men, larger (10-15 men, 10 m, Ghana type) planked canoes, and specially designed "snapper boats" (8 m long, for 3-5 men). All boats are built in the villages from local timber. Main fishing gears are "ali" (ring) nets, driftnets, cast nets and set nets, beach seines and lines and hooks. Practically all fishing is operated from open beaches. The main fishery is for bonga, which occupies some 5,000 full-time fishermen with some 3,500 boats. Sardines also pay an important part. Bottom fish is caught by various methods such as gill net, beach seine and line and hook. According to a pilot survey for the Western Area carried out in 1972, 73 percent of all landings were taken with Ghana type canoes and 23 percent with "standard" canoes. 1/ 1.03 The coastal fishermen are distributed all along the coast, but fishing settlements occur mainly along the northern shores of Sherbro Island and along the Shenge, Freetown, Bullom and Scarcies peninsula (see Map). Many fishermen move along the coast, and the number of men operating from each village will vary with the season. The "snapper boats" sometimes cover great distances in their fishing trips, and fish catches are often smoked on board to preserve the quality. 1.04 Over the years there has been a considerable improvement in the artisan sub-sector. New types of equipment, such as the Ghana type canoe and the "ali" (ring) net and the beach seine have been introduced, and manmade fibers are now common. But there has also been a decrease in the number of mechanized boats (mainly with outboard engines), which declined from 280 in the early 1960's to some 150 in 1973. A rather drastic upheaval in the industry occurred in 1968, when some 1,800 Ghanaian fishermen were expelled from the country. This exodus was one cause of the decrease in mechanized boats, though it was also due to insufficient maintenance. However, the gap 1/ Another conclusion drawn from the survey was that in the past, total catches had most probably been underestimated. ANNEX III Page 2 left by the Ghanaians to some extent may have been compensated by an increase in the number of non-mechanized Ghana-type boats and in the number of fishermen. 1.05 Industrial Sea Fisheries. Following several experiments by the fisheries authorities during and immediately after the World War II, commer- cial bottom trawling out of Freetown was initiated in 1955 by Italian settlers. The number of operating trawlers soon increased to 18, some registered in Sierra Leone, but then operations gradually declined and by 1965 the daily catch was only half what it had been at the beginning. At the end of 1973, there were no registered trawlers, but four private companies in Freetown maintained charter operations. Twenty-two trawlers from Spain, Italy and Greece, ranging in size between 90 to 1,100 Gross Register Tons, were licensed for fishing from Freetown. 1/ But only a small number actually landed fish in this harbor. Some itinerant factory freezer-trawlers deliver fish to Free- town, and some of these fish may be taken off the Sierra Leone coast. Also, 23 tuna boats, 14 purse-seiners and one meal manufacturing factory ship have been licensed to fish in Sierra Leone waters, but none of their catches are landed in this country. The licence fees charged do not provide the benefits that could be derived if catches were landed and processed in Sierra Leone. A favorable development in this direction is a newly established company for shrimp fishing, processing and exports. 1.06 Artisan Inland Fisheries. Wild fish stocks exist in rivers and lakes, and perhaps 2,000 - 3,000 people, mainly women, are engaged in inland fishing as a part-time occupation and mainly for subsistence purposes. The estimated catch figure is 1,000 tons annually, but this figure may be too low; the real catch may be as high as 4,000 - 5,000 tons. Very simple fishing methods are now used. The importance of inland fisheries in other West African countries with similar conditions gives reason to believe that the inland resources are greatly underutilized. No studies have yet been made of the potentials for inland fishery development. Fish farming has been tried with some success, although no real development has taken place. The situation warrants a very careful study of development prospects in various parts of the country. Oysters found in the mangrove areas is but one example of a possible basis for aquaculture. Fish Supplies 1.07 Data on fish supplies, both the local catch by species groups and imports, are summarized in Table 1, and the fish catch by sector is summarized in Table 2. Prior to 1968, the total annual catch was reported to be as high as 33,000 tons. But it was reduced, probably by as much as 8,000 tons in early 1968 when some 1,800 Ghanaian fishermen were expelled from the country. From 1968 to 1970, there was a sharp increase in the artisan sector; but as the number of trawlers fishing from Freetown was reduced, there was a decline in the industrial sector to a level of 1,500 tons annually. Fish imports increased from 5,000 tons in 1967 to 12,000 tons in 1971 so that the total supply of fish available for consumption in Sierra Leone exceeded 40,000 tons 1/ For details, see Appendix. ANNEX III Page 3 Table 1: FISH CATCHES BY SPECIES GROUPS AND IMPORTS Catches by Species Quantities in thousand metric Value in Groups tons thousand Le. 1969 1970 1971 1972 1971 Total catch 2306 30.6 1.0 Miscellaneous freshwater fish 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 85 Flounder 0.2 0.2 0.2 3.6 72 Redfish 1.5 1.5 1.5 7.0 200 Jack 2.0 2.0 2.0 5.2 320 Herring 20.0 25.0 25.0 30.0 3,100 Shark 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.2 10 Miscellaneous marine crustaceans 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 30 Miscellaneous marine mollusces 0.3 0.3 0.3 - 30 Imports Total 11.1 12.1 10.1 2,227 Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen 8.9 10.8 9.1 1,531 Fish, dried, salted or smoked 0.6 0.0 0.6 91 Fishproducts and preparation whether or not in airtight containers 1.6 1.3 1.2 594 Source: FAO Yearbooks of Fishery Statistics and FAO Department of Fisheries. ANNEX III Page 4 Table 2: FISH CATCHES AND IMPORTS BY SECTORS 1967-72 (in tons) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Catchesi! Artisanal sector 29,600 19,500 23,000 28,100 28,100 48,500 Industrial sector 3,000 3,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 Inland fisheries 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 Total catches 33,600 23,500 25,500 30,600 30,600 51,000 Imports All fisheries productsi 5,300 4,700 11,000 12,000 12,000_ 9,000_ Total supplies 38,900 28,200 36,500 42,600 42,600 60,000 Imports of frozen fish ? 4,700 8,200 8,700 9,200 5,800 1/ Total catches and imports as reported in FAG statistics (see table 1). Breakdown by sectors are Mission estimates. 2/ Mission estimates. I/ Included in total imports ANNEX III Page 5 by 1972, according to official statistics. However, the collection of statis- tics is not systematic, and the actual supply of fish is probably higher than reported. According to FAQ statistics, for example, total catches jumped from 30,600 tons in 1970 and 1971 to 51,000 tons in 1972. This jump must reflect a revision in the statistics and probably the outcome of a survey which the Fisheries Division made in the Western Region, revealing a consider- able underestimation of fish catches. Underestimation probably holds for both inland and sea fisheries. Although no accurate information is available, it is felt that total catches may be closer to 50,000 tons. This means that total supply, i.e. domestic catches plus imports, amounts to some 60,000 tons annually. It should be noted that no statistics are available on catches which have been taken in Sierra Leone waters and landed in other countries. 1.08 Frozen fish imports amounted to a level of 8,000 - 9,000 tons in 1969-71, and then dropped (temporarily) to 5,800 tons in 1972. These quanti- ties are purchased from freezer trawlers -- mainly from Japan and the Soviet Union -- which operate in the West African area and freeze their catch on board in order to provide supplies for their home markets. Fish that is less popular and fetches a low price at home is sorted out and sold in markets near the fishing grounds. For Sierra Leone, this means that some reasonably priced fish is made available. In addition to the frozen fish, there is also an annual import of about 3,000 tons of dried and canned fish, so that total imports in 1970-71 amounted to 12,000 tons, or 21 percent of total supplies. 1.09 According to FAO sources, 1/ annual per capita fish consumption is 17.3 kg with considerable regional differences: in the Northern Province it is 9, in the Western 34, Southern 14, and Eastern 15 kg per capita. Compared with other coastal countries, the per capita consumption in Sierra Leone is higher than for Ghana and Ivory Coast and lower than Senegal and Gabon. Measured in proteins, fish supply in Sierra Leone is 6.0 grams per day per capita out of a total supply of 9.1 grams animal protein and a total supply of 49.2 grams all proteins. As the annual protein requirement is placed at 70 grams per day per head, total consumption falls far short of requirement, and the fisheries may probably offer some of the best prospects for additional supplies of protein at a fairly reasonable price. Processing and Marketing 1.10 The traditional method of preservation is artificial drying with incidental smoking. This method provides maximum protection of the food for sale in inland markets. There is little quality control, however, and as one observer has remarked, "the quality of dried fish varies greatly and ranges from fish carried and blackened by actual burning of the flesh to relatively attractive-looking consignments that are sweet and palatable even when eaten in the dried state without further cooking ..... There is like- wise no uniformity in the time that fish dried the traditional method will keep ....... This period must, of course, be as variable as the quality of 1/ The Demand for Fish to 1980, FIEF/C 131, September 1971. ANNEX III Page 6 the product itself. All that can be said, therefore, is that ...... dried fish will remain edible (to African taste) from a few days to a few weeks or even a month or two in very favorable circumstances. When periodical re- drying is resorted to, dried fish may be kept in usable condition for even longer." 1/ 1.11 The primary marketing intermediary is the female trader, known as "mammie", who operates as both money lender to the fishermen and fish buyers. The bulk of the fish caught in the artisan sector is smoked in the villages and sold to various traders who transport the fish to the hinterland. Usually the fishermen are not paid immediately but at more or less regular intervals. Beach prices for herring in November 1973 varied between Le 0.40 and 3.00 per "pand" (13 kg) i.e. 3 and 23 cents per kg, according to abundance in the market. Bonga prices varied between Le 0.30 and 0.60 per dozen, and as each bonga = 1/4 kg, the price per kg varied between 8 and 15 cents (see Table 3). 1.12 For the industrial sector, the relatively small quantities landed in Freetown are sold to traders by the various companies concerned and mostly retailed in the Freetown area. Examples of ex vessel prices for fish sold in 12 kg boxes (November 1973): Le 0.58/kg for snapper, Le 0.40 - 0.42 for sole and Le 0.42 - 0.47 for catfish. These prices may to some extent be com- pared with prices obtained for 20 kg cartons of frozen fish at the Freetown depot gate. On September 1, 1973 these were Le 0.39 for the highest and Le 0.24 for the lowest quality group. Imported frozen fish, which both comple- ment and compete with fish landed by traditional fishermen, is distributed by the importer, Sea Products (1963) Ltd. through 11 cold storage depots. The fish is transported to the depots by private contractors in insulated lorries provided and fitted out by the company. Import duty for frozen fish wa's waved for some time but reintroduced in June 1971. As a result prices per kilo for best quality imported fish increased from Le 0.31/kg on June 1, 1971 to Le 0.35/kg on June 27, 1971. Trends in prices over the period 1969-73 for imported 20 kg cartons are shown in Table 4. Prices at the various depots on September 1, 1973, for the various quality groups are shown in Table 5. The difference in price between Freetown and a depot is reported to be due to transport charges only. Partly because of the import duty but also because of the general price increase frozen fish prices ex-Freetown depot, as shown in Table 4, increased 35-40 percent from 1969 to 1973. No information is available on consumer prices. 1/ Report on the Sea Fisheries of Sierra Leone, G. A. Stevens, June 1945. Stevens was Fisheries Development Officer at the time. ANNEX III Page 7 Table 3: FISH PRICES El-VESSEL FREETOWN 1973 (Le Der box of 12 kg) OCTOBER. 1973 NOMBERS 173 LADY Le3.4O - 3.80 Le3.50 CROCUS Le3.80 - 5.40 Le3.60 - 4.50 SPANISH Le6.o0 - 7.00 Le6.80 - 7.00 SNAPPER Leh.oo - 6.00 Le7.00 TENNY Le4.80 - 5.00 n.a. WHITING Le3.00 - 3.40 Le2.40 - 2.50 GWANGWA Le3.00 - 3.40 Le3.50 - 3.70 SOLE Le3.00 - 3.40 Le4.80 - 5.00 SHEEPHEAD Le3.00 - 3.40 Leh.00 - 4.60 SHINENOSE Le3.00 - 3.40 Le4.60 - 5.60 BUTTERFISH Lel .40 - 1.80 Le3.4O SKATE Le2.60 - 3.00 Le3.60 CAIMAN Lel.00 - 1.40 n.a. CATFISH Le2.60 - 3.20 Le5.00 - 5.60 CUTA Le5.00 - 6.00 Lel0.00 HERRING 1 pand (13.0 kg) 40 cents - Le3.00 according to abundance in the marketi BONGA 30 cents - 60 cents per dozen. Each bonga kg. *e.g. During October price per pand was as low as 40 cents and high as Le3.00 Source: Fisheries Division, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources ANNEX III Page 8 Table 4: FREETOWN DEPOT GATE PRICES FOR FROZEN FISH, IMPORTED IN 20 KG CARTONS Quality Oct. 1 June 1 June 28 Sept. 1 Increase Group 1969 1971 1971 /1 1973 /1 1969-73 ----------- Le cents per kg ------------- --- %- 1 29 31 35 39 35 2 26 28 32 36 37 3 24 25 29 33 40 4 18 19 23 29 62 5 21 22 26 27 30 6 19 20 24 26 41 7/8 16 17 21 24 49 /1 Inclusive of import duty. 1.13 Short-term price behavior is conditioned by the lack of proper storage, transport facilities, etc. Thus pricer may reportedly drop considerably both in the artisan and industrial subsectors if landings are above the usual level, but this may not necessarily mean that demand for fish is inelastic. Attempts have been made to improve both fish processing, which leaves much to be desired, and fish marketing, which has a number,of constraints. 1.14 A shortage of refrigerated storage and the high price of ice are often cited as two constraints. Sea Products (1963) Ltd. and affiliated companies have, at Kissy Dockyards, 2,500 tons cold storage at -180 C and 15 inland cold storage depots. At Murray Town they have 280 tons cold storage. All ice production plants are at Kissy with a total capacity of 8 tons per day. Price for ice in 1973 was Le 12.50 per ton. For the shrimp industry, plate freezing facilities were built in 1973. Sierra Leone Joint Stock Fisheries Ltd. has two cold stores, each of 50 tons capacity (0 to -20. C) at Murray Town, and additional storage is being built. ANNEX III Page 9 Table 5: WHOLESALE SELLING FRICES EX DEPOTS BY SPECIES (QUALITY) GROUPS, SEPTEMBER 1, 1973 (Prices in Leones per 20 kg. carton).L DEPOTS GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 GROUP 5 GROUP 6 GROUP 7 Freetown 7.87 7.26 6.59 5.86 5.35 5.24 4.79 Port Loko 8.07 7.46 6.79 6.06 5.55 5.44 4.99 Lunsar 8.07 7.46 6.79 6.06 5.55 5.44 4.99 Makeni 8.27 7.66 6.99 6.26 5.75 5.64 5.19 Njala 8.27 7.66 6.99 6.26 5.75 5.64 5.19 Moyamba 8.37 7.76 7.09 6.36 5.85 5.74 5.29 Magburaka 8.37 7.76 7.09 6.36 5.85 5.74 5.29 Bo 8.37 7.76 7.09 6.36 5.85 5.74 5.29 Sefadu 8.47 7.86 7.19 6.46 5.95 5.84 5.39 Kabala 8.57 7.96 7.29 6.56 6.06 5.94 5.49 Kenema 8.57 7.96 7.29 6.56 6.05 5.95 5.49 Kailahun 8.67 8.06 7.39 6.66 6.16 6.04 5.59 Source: Sea Products (1963) Ltd., Freetown 1/ Frozen fish is also sold in 27 and 30 kg. cartons but prices per kg. are more or less the same as for the 20 kg. cartons. ANNEX III Page 10 II. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS Fisheries Administration 2.01 The Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MANR) has a small Fisheries Division, headed by the Chief Fisheries Officer with offices at the Kissy Dockyards. The professional administrative staff consists of two Principal Fisheries Officers, one Senior Fisheries Officer and four Fisheries Officers. In addition, the Division employs one master fisherman, and 13 fishermen, one workshop superintendent and 12 mechanics, one master boatbuilder, seven fisheries assistants and 18 clerks. 2.02 The Fisheries Division has engaged in various kinds of development work, but no reports on its activities have been published since 1965. For this reason, it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the Division's objectives and its achievements in recent years. One of the administrative functions is to issue fishing licenses but the Division also instigates and enforces fisheries legislation and advises the MANR of all fisheries matters, both domestic and international. 2.03 The Division has five boats: the biggest one is a 50 foot "Fulman" which, several years ago, was used as a patrol vessel and for experimental fishing, but has now been out of commission since 1971. There are also four smaller boats, one 28 feet, one 34 feet, and two 15 feet long, and all these are used for experimental fishing. It was hoped that the UNDP vessel "Awefu" which participated in a survey of the Sierra Leone fisheries (para 2.17) would be retained in the country, but unfortunately this was not the case. Extension is one of the Division's functions, but it has no field staff to retain direct contact with the fishermen. At Kissy dockyards the Division has a boatbuilding yard and a reasonably well equipped mechanical workshop with a mobile workshop and facilities for repair of fishing boat engines. Nevertheless, many engines are out of order. 2.04 The Fisheries Division provided counterparts for the UNDP staff during a recent project on pelagic resources, and generally maintains contact with all expatriate fisheries advisors. It is, moreover, responsible for liason and cooperation with research units at the university, and for fisheries statistics. Research is exclusively in natural sciences and tends to be rather esoteric. Fisheries statistics are not adequate for planning purposes. A survey of fishing villages was initiated in 1973, but collection of data in the field had not yet started at the end of 1973. 2.05 It is beyond doubt that the Fisheries Division is not sufficiently staffed and structured for comprehensive development work. The main con- straints are-the absence of a specific program and the scarcity of fully trained personnel. As there are no adequate training facilities in the country, Sierra Leone relies to a very great extent on training in foreign countries, and even if the programs for such training are modified to meet ANNEX III Page 11 the needs of a developing industry, there is hardly time to wait for addi- tional personnel to be trained; foreign experts will be needed for several years to come. 2.06 Lack of coordination within the Government is one of the biggest problems. Important decisions seem to be taken without involvement of the Fisheries Division. For instance, the decision regarding the Government's engagement in a joint shrimping venture (para 2.10) seems to have been made without consultation with the Fisheries Division. Similarly, the terms of reference of an Italian firm of consultants which is to survey the fisheries wa',not available in the Division. The result is that development of fisheries has become haphazard. The Fisheries Division should be equipped to articulate the benefits to be derived from fisheries development and thus to enable fisheries to compete for its fair share of development resources. Joint Ventures 2.07 There are three companies active in the Sierra Leone fisheries. Two companies are jointly owned by a Liberian company, Mesurado Fishing Co. Ltd. (1962), which has 50 percent of the shares and provides joint management and working capital, and the other 50 percent is held by the Government of Sierra Leone, which, as was explained to the mission, "provides the aquatic resource". These two companies are: Sea Products (1963) Ltd; and Sierra Leone Shrimp Export Company Ltd. The third company is Fish Industries Sierra Leone Ltd., which is owned 50-50 by Sea Products and an American company. 2.08 Sea Products buys frozen fish from foreign freezer-trawlers and markets the fish through a number of inland cold storage depots in Sierra Leone. The Shrimp Export Co. was recently established for the purpose of fishing, processing and exporting shrimp from Sierra Leone waters and was expected to start operations in early 1974. Fish Industries provides cold storage and base facilities for international tuna fleets operating from Freetown. 2.09 In 1973, estimated foreign exchange earnings on the tuna storage and trans-shipment activities of Fish Industries was $640,000. In the same year, Sea Products Ltd. paid out for imported frozen fish about $1.9 million. The Shrimp Export Co. expected to export some $570,000 worth in the first year of operation (1974), but from this should be deducted the amount (not known) which would be paid for foreign boats chartered for shrimp fishing. 2.10 The outstanding question is what role the Government should play in joint ventures. When government engagement in the shrimp firm was being negotiated, it was argued by some officials that the Government, to have full control, should own at least 51 percent of the shares. This would probably have been preferable to a 50-50 arrangement, but on the other hand it might be better for Government to avoid direct partnerships altogether. It is difficult to assess its position in the shrimp export enterprise. There is, for instance, no information on what benefits the Government will derive. During negotiations, Government refused to give the company an ANNEX III Page 12 exclusive right to exploit the shrimp resource, and this is in the best interest of the industry. According to the "Development Certificate", con- cessions are confined to a "tax holiday", exemption from import duty on packaging material and fishing gear, and reduced duty on trawlers and diesel fuel and lubricants. The evidence suggests that decision making during the preparatory phases of the shrimp fishing venture was not very orderly. Ten shrimp trawlers were ordered from a State-owned Mexican boatyard and presented as a fait accompli to the Government of Sierra Leone. The Mexican Government requested a guarantee of US$1.5 million from the Government, and this was granted, but subsequently cancelled the contract. It was then decided that operations would now be based on chartered boats. It appears that arrangements for these charters were made unilaterally by the Liberian company. Joint ven- tures with experienced foreign companies may offer many advantages, but there is a good argument that the Government should refrain from direct partnership and leave such businesses to private enterprises. The Government could then play a more effective role in assisting to arrange partnerships and rendering services which would be conducive to rapid development. Fisheries Research 2.11 Starting in 1948, Freetown was the headquarters for research activities under the aegis of West African Fisheries Research Institute (WAFRI), which was established to serve several countries in West Africa. However, very little was achieved and all work was terminated in 1958. In 1966, an Institute of Marine Biology and Oceanography was established at Fourah Bay College of the University of Sierra Leone. Laboratory facilities have been made available by the Fisheries Division of the Ministry of Agri- culture and Natural Resources at Kissy - the former site of the WAFRI facili- ties. Fisheries research at the national level has so far been severely limited by the lack of sufficient financial resources, equipment and personnel for applied research. A number of problems have been taken up by the Insti- tute but these are rather esoteric problems of basic research. UNESCO has been assisting in the development of the Institute, and will also assist in providing equipment. 2.12 A review of current joint projects by the Institute and the Fisheries Division, held at Kissy dockyard in September, 1973, highlighted several areas of work requiring "urgent and resolute prosecution, under the general aim of providing adequate and relevant biological and hydrological data required for improved fishery development:" (i) catch statistics; (ii) study of the benthos; i.e., the fauna and flora of the sea bottom; (iii) hydrographic survey; (iv) mapping of fishing areas within the estuary and continental shelf; ANNEX III Page 13 (v) biology of the pelagic fishes of economic importance; and (vi) survey, ecology and culture of shellfish. 2.13 Much of this work is already in progress: hydrographic studies, the recording of local catches and landings (undertaken by the Fisheries Division), studies of eggs and larvae of the pelagic fishes, and comparative stock assessment of the Sierra Leone River Estuary. Work is also covering the food and feeding interrelationships of some demersal fishes in the estuary, as well as growth studies of bonga and sardines, and investigations to determine the productivity of the estuary. Zooplankton studies have recently been completed, while productivity and pollution studies continue on the estuary. 2.14 The topics listed above are very general and cover a wide range of problems which could keep a big research team busy for a long time. Unfortu- nately, the program does not include follow up of the research which was recently carried out by the UNDP/FAO Project. The approach of this research was realistic, and specific follow-up topics were described in the Terminal Report: Fishing operations and their effect on stocks and catches should be mentioned by appropriate sampling. Further appraisals of marine resources in Sierra Leone waters should be directed towards fish that are caught or might be caught by artisanal fishermen. These include demersal and semi- demersal fish as well as pelagic fish. The studies should also include shellfish...". 2.15 It was further recommended by the Project that the Government should continue -- and one should add, strengthen -- regional activities of resource appraisal and research. Joint research with adequate boats and other equip- ment operated by experienced and development oriented people could be instru- mental ina joint West-African resource management and exploitation program where each individual country would participate as an equal partner. As most of the fishing in Sierra Leone waters is now carried out by foreign boats which are landing in other countries, this is a matter of great urgency and it is essential, therefore, to supplement the research staff with experienced experts. Foreign and External Advisory Services 2.16 A number of multilateral and bilateral organizations as well as foreign firms have expressed a keen interest in the development of Sierra Leone's fisheries. Below is a summary of some of the projects which have materialized and those which are being initiated. 2.17 In 1968-72, a UNDP project on "Survey and Development of Pelagic Fish Resources" was in operation. The program of this project emanated from a Gulf of Guinea Fishery Trawling Survey. At a planning and programming ANNEX III Page 14 meeting, it was decided that future emphasis of the work in Sierra Leone should be on the development of inshore, small boat fisheries. Despite the fact that the UNDP project was not properly equipped for such work, some useful information on the resources was obtained and some fishing experi- ments were carried out, particularly with regard to pelagic species. Based on the preliminary findings of this project, a new and well designed UNDP project for "Assistance in Integrated Artisanal Fisheries Development Program" was drafted but the final outcome was, on account of insufficient priority given to the fisheries by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, a very small project which is to be initiated in the near future but involv- ing only advisory work and no equipment. 2.18 Some time ago, the American organization CARE Inc. prepared a draft outline of an "Integrated fisheries development program for artisanal fishermen in Sierra Leone". Some 400 ocean going canoes were to be mechanized and the catch thus increased by 2,800 tons over a five year period. Following this increase, processing and marketing was to be improved and cooperative societies established, all with an eye to a socioeconomic uplift.in the villages. Total estimated costs of this project was about US$750,000. No parts of this project materialized. 2.19 The British Overseas Developrent Mission in Sierra Leone was to provide, from April 1973, a fisheries adviser who was to cooperate with the FAO adviser but so far, no suitable candidate for this assignment has been found. However, under the ODA fellowship program, two Sierra Leone fisheries officers are now being trained in the United Kingdom. 2.20 In the field of industrial fisheries, a German advisory team from the "Batelle Institute E.V." Frankfurt am Main, presented a development scheme in 1965 at the request of Messrs. J. Milhelm & Sons Ltd., Freetown. The scheme included 27 trawlers as well as refrigeration facilities and a fish meal plant. Expected capacity was 10,000 tons of fish landings per year. Total cost was put at US$5.5 million. The project did not materialize, as neither the Government nor the firm acted on any of the recommendations. 2.21 In.1972, the Fisheries Department and a Sierra Leone fishing firm had contact with FIDECO, a Norwegian firm of consultants, who were prepared to present a project on the condition that there would be government backing. The Department has requested recently.that contact should be re-established with FIDECO and also with NORAD, which some time ago financed training in Norway for some fisheries officers from Sierra Leone. As of November 1973, there was no information on the fate of this proposal. 2.22 In October, 1973, Government signed a contract with an Italian firm of consultants (PROPESCA), probably linked with bilateral aid from the Govern- ment of Italy, f6r assistance in developing the fisheries with the main emphasis on industrial fisheries. The terms of reference are to determine number and types of boats, locate and prepare a preliminary project for a fishing harbor, introduce new techniques, and arrange for marketing, training etc. ANNEX III Page 15 2.23 At that time, an agreement was also about to be signed by the Government with the International Development Research Centre of Canada on a project for development of an oyster industry, involving a grant of Can $164,500. One Sierra Leone student has already been trained for this in Canada. The main purpose of the project is to "increase potential yields of the mangrove oyster and to establish a practical and economic system for their cultivation...", and to "evaluate current processing and marketing of oysters and suggest practical improved techniques...". 2.24 In this connection it is interesting to note that an expert from Taiwan Fisheries Research Institute in 1965 surveyed oyster production in Sierra Leone, and that, in 1966, the Tropical Products Institute, London, submitted a report on "Canned Mangrove Oysters from Sierra Leone". These reports, however, did not entail any further activities. 2.25 In 1972, MANR submitted a list of items(boats and gear) to the Ambassador of the Peoples Republic of China, with a letter that stated the Government was "anxious to have these in order to fully exploit our fish which are being surreptitiously exploited by foreign vessels with very modern fishing gear." For unknown reasons, no assistance scheme materialized. However, Sierra Leone has received from China a number of gunboats for which crews are being trained, and these might be used effectively for patrol of territorial waters. 2.26 It seems clear that many reports have been prepared, opinions have been expressed and agreements made, but very little has had any impact on the fisheries. The proposals for development have been for the most part uncoordinated and much of what is needed in the fisheries could be provided through commercial channels. With regard to the public sector and the role of the Government, there is an urgent need for advisory services in the fields of planning, preinvestment surveys and experiments with regard to fishing, marketing, processing and overall research. The goal should be a comprehensive program for rational development of the fisheries sector. ANNEX III Page 16 III. AQUATIC RESOURCES AND THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1974/75-1978/79 The Resource Base 3.01 Total landing from sea fishing in the West African region north of the Congo River mouth is estimated at 2.6 million metric tons (1971). Of this, 0.9 million tons were taken by the local fishing fleets of these countries, while 1.7 million tons were taken by non-African fleets from America, Europe and Asia. This is now likely to change, as with the development of indigenous fishing fleets in West African countries and the seaward extension of national fishery jurisdictions, a much greater part is likely to be taken by the West African countries. The fact that many species migrate from one country to another underlines the international nature of the resources and points to the need for a regional approach to the management and utilization of these re- sources. For this purpose, the Central East Atlantic Fisheries Committee (CEAFC), covering the West African area, has been formed. 3.02 The continental shelf area determines the overall availability of fishing grounds for bottom (demersal) species. The West African shelf is generally narrow, with an average width of about 30 nautical miles. Sierra Leone's coastline is 570 km long, and the shelf within the 100 fathoms contour is 20 miles wide in the south and 90 miles in the north. Coastal upwelling, which brings nutrients up from the bottom to the surface, and the subsequent transformation of these materials is the most important process maintaining high production of plankton, on which the fish feeds. The main areas of upwel- ling in West Africa occur along the northwestern and southwestern coast. The Sierra Leone coast is between these two strong upwelling zones; seasonally, the influence of upwelling in the northern area extends southward as far as Freetown. The bottom is sandy in the north and muddy in the south. In the Gulf of Guinea, between 10* north and the Congo River, the sea is less pro- ductive except where seasonal upwelling occurs. A great variety of demersal stocks occur mainly on the inshore grounds and, to a lesser extent, in the deeper portion of the shelf. The total potential of pelagic fish resources in this area, found nearer the surface but sometimes quite deep, and which includes sardinella and bonga, is undoubtedly much greater than that of demersal species. For shrimp, run-off from rivers and the existence of brackish lagoon areas are particularly important factors in providing nutrients and environment at the nursery stage. 3.03 Even though some stocks in the CEAFC area are perhaps capable of supporting further increases in the catch, it may be said that, as a whole, most of the important resources of traditional species are now approaching a level of maximum sustainable yield. However, Sierra Leone and some of the other countries in this area have not yet fully exploited the resources of their coastal waters and it is therefore possible for them, even at the present rate of exploitation in the West African waters, to increase production by ANNEX III Page 17 developing near-shore fleets of medium size trawlers or purseseiners. 1/ If and when the activities of the foreign fishing fleets are reduced, their "share" should be taken over by indigenous fleets equipped for off-shore fisheries. 3.04 In Sierra Leone, one single pelagic specie, bonga (Ethmalosa imbriata), constitutes more than 70 percent of the total catch. The bonga is found prin- cipally in coastal estuaries from Sherbro Island northward and are caught throughout the year. It is always within the range of canoes, and in the dry season (November to April) moves very close to shore as it favors water with relatively low salinity. It moves further up the river as the dry season pro- gresses and further down the river with the advent of the rainy season (May- October). Next in importance are the herrings or the sardines: Sardinella eba and Sardinella aurita. Between them they account for some 8 percent of the total catch, sardinella eba so far having been the most important one. 3.05 As very little was known about these species, a UNDP/FAO 2/ Project was executed in 1968-72 in order to study the biology of coastal pelagic fish, evaluate stocks, and compare yields obtained with different fishing methods. It was found that the Sardinella eba populations of Sierra Leone are to a large extent an off-shoot of those of Guinea waters. It seems to occur in coastal waters in the rainy season. The stocks in northern Sierra Leone waters were found to be limited to relatively shallow areas. Concentration of Sardinella eba detected within the coastal waters off Sierra Leone were estimated around 80,000 tons and although the potential yield of the whole stock cannot be esti- mated with any degree.of accuracy, the stock of this sardine species which moves into Sierra Leone from Guinea waters may exceed 300,000 tons. Sardinella aurita can occur in large quantities north of St. Ann and up to the Guinea border. In January, when catches are known to be highest, the project vessel had catches up to 60 tons, but seining operations were made difficult by strong currents and size of schools. It was considered "doubtful whether, without appropriate refrigeration such as ice or, better, refrigerated water, small boats could bring worthwhile quantities of fish from northern fishing grounds back to Freetown." 3.06 The Project also had sizeable catches of demersal (bottom) species and concluded that two distinct concentrations of demersal species appeared to exist and that the key factor in this seems to be the difference in the bottom deposits. (The northern area is sandy whereas the southern part of the continental shelf is muddy). In the northern area, the snapper (Pagrus ehrenbergi) seems to be the most important bottom species, but a number of other species such as grouper and caiman are also available. In the southern area conditions are not quite as favorable. Experimental fishing included 1/ In purse-seining the ring net encircles the fish shoal when set as a cylinder and then "pursed" together at the bottom. The trawl is a con- ical bag net dragged by one or two powered boats. 2/ Terminal Report (FI:DP/SIL/66/507) of the UNDP/FAO Project. Report on Project Results. Conclusions and Recommendations. FAO, Rome, January 1973 (Restricted). ANNEX III Page 18 a great proportion of small fish of little commercial value. But shrimp (Pineus duorarum) resources were found to be sufficiently dense for profitable fishing, and this was later confirmed by the operation in this area by foreign shrimp trawlwers. Spiny lobster (Palinurus Spp.) is caught by local fishermen but no information is available on the magnitude of this stock. 3.07 Total value at landing of the entire 1971 catch was stated to be Le 3.8 million or Le 125 per ton. At the same prices, the value of 1972 catches would be Le 6.4 million and taking the subsequent price increase into account, the present landed value of such catches would probably be around Le 10 million. 3.08 The main conclusion drawn by the UNDP/FAO Project is that local resources can support a rate of exploitation significantly higher than at present. These resources, which include a variety of species, could form the basis for an immediate development with fishing relatively near the coast and then a gradual extension of these activities to utilize off-shore stocks and among them even some tuna species in certain seasons when the fish is near the shore and can be caught by relatively small boats. 3.09 Deep-swimming large tunas are found across the Atlantic while sur- face schools of yellowfin tuna and skipjack occur in waters relatively close to the coast. A large number of boats from Japan, Korea and China (Taiwan) using longlines 1/ fish in off-shore waters across the Atlantic. Medium-sized purse-seiners and rod fishing boats 2/ are based on local ports 3/ but largely operated by non-African firms. The most recent development is a sudden in- crease in the number of very large tuna purse-seiners, mainly from the United States. Unlike long-liners, boats using other methods are fishing on surface schools in waters relatively close to the coast, and it is particularly in this type of fishing that Sierra Leone fishing boats could also participate. 3.10 According to available information, as of June 1973, six West African countries (Liberia, Ivory Coast, Spanish Sahara, Togo, Dehomey and Equatorial Guinea) had a 12 mile exclusive fishing zone which in most cases coincided with the territorial limits. Sierra Leone was the only country in West Africa which has a 200 mile limit; Guinea had 130, Senegal 122, Gabon 100, Gambia 50, Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria and Congo all had 30 miles. 4/ Most West African countries fish in their own waters only, but Ghana, Ivory Coast and Liberia have fleets 1/ Lines with many baited hooks. For tuna, longlines are often used in mid- water areas. 2/ These use sardines as live bait and are therefore licensed to fish for bait. 3/ The main ports which are used as shore basis for tuna boats are Tema, Abidjan, Freetown, Dakar, and Las Palmas. 4/ The extent of the territorial waters and/or fishing zones, as well as the obligations and prerogatives of coastal countries with regard to these waters may change in the light of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. ANNEX III Page 19 of far-ranging fishing boats. A recent FAO report 1/ on the Eastern Central Atlantic area pointed out that "development plans should emphasize increasing participation by local countries while maintaining full utilization but avoid- ing over-exploitation ... While needing adequate technology, financing and ex- pertise, locally- based fisheries would benefit from low labor costs and large potential markets. Reduction in work can also be expected by basing some in- stallations on land rather than on the vessels ..." 3.11 According to the 1964 report of the Fisheries Division in Sierra Leone, 74 patrols of territorial waters were made by M/S "Fulmar" and other vessels, and as in 1964 the fishing limits were extended to 12 miles, an appeal, which proved futile, was made for a second patrol vessel. A large number of infringements and clashes between canoes and motor vessel owners were reported: "Set nets and even the ring gill nets operated from canoes have been mutilated by trawlers in in-shore waters to the detriment of the fishing effort". The 1965 annual report, the last one which has been issued by the Fisheries Division describes similar problems and the situation prob- ably has deteriorated in subsequent years. Local fishermen have complained about foreign fishing boats which came very close to the shore and interfered with their fishing. It seems clear that a patrol service is a necessary pre- requisite to further fisheries development in the country. The National Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79 3.12 In 1973, the Ministry of Development and Planning in collaboration with the Chief Fisheries Officer prepared a draft Plan for fisheries develop- ment over 1974/75-1978/79. Since this is a tentative program of investments that is not supported by feasibility studies, our comments on the plan are limited to particular aspects. 3.13 The Plan envisages a production target of 48,000 tons in 1978/79. Since the industrial fisheries production is expected to remain at about its present level of 8,600 tons during the plan period, all production increase is to come from the artisanal sea fisheries and from inland fisheries. Artisanal sea fisheries are expected to increase their catch from about 25,000 tons to 36,200 tons, while that of inland fisheries should rise from 900 to 3,500 tons. Apart from the fact, that present catches may be greatly underestimated, it appears rather unrealistic not to count on any increase in the industrial sector. 3.14 The total plan investment for fisheries foresees an outlay of about Le 7.6 million or US$9.1 million (at constant 1973/74 prices), of which Le 6 1/ FAO Fisheries Report No. 134, Rome 1973; based on Technical Conference on Fishery Management and Development held in Vancouver, Canada, February 1973. ANNEX III Page 20 million is public sector investment. The striking element of the Plan is the little attention given to the development of artisanal fisheries, although practically all production increase is supposed to originate in this sub-sector. Investment in artisanal and inland fisheries is estimated at about Le 0.5 million an additional Le 0.5 million is provided for research, training, fisheries survey and an oyster culture. 3.15 The Plan suggests that Le 710,000 should be invested in the boat- building yard which is operated by the Fisheries Division. The alternative to this, which should also be considered, would be to utilize the boat-builders in the villages. The design of their boats may have to be modified for mechanization, but this could easily be done by a qualified naval architect familiar with the construction of small fishing boats. The government yard, which should preferably be transferred to private enterprise or a development agency, could then help in providing the necessary training and advisory services for village carpenters. 3.16 Plans for the industrial sector call for an investment program of about Le 5 million "for the gradual buildup of a modest fleet of about 10 trawlers and 20 purse seiners and four deep sea trawlers, over a period, and shore facilities for handling production of about 50 tons per day." It is not made clear why investment in freezer trawlers would be profitable, for such boats operating on the west coast of Africa are encountering prob- lems as more and more countries extend their fishing limits. Such ships are expensive, they have sophisticated equipment and are very difficult to operate and service. If used at all by Sierra Leone, freezer trawlers will have to operate far away from their home port for most of the year and should not really be necessary for at least some considerable period of time to come. 3.17 The Plan recognizes that substantial investment in infrastructure will be required, but no amounts and no details are given regarding location, layout and capacities, except for the investment in the Freetown boatyard. As a cautionary remark, it should be pointed that some infrastructures are available and could be improved with a relatively modest input: temporary jetties may be built and existing repair facilities improved without waiting for a comprehensive feasibility study. 3.18 Marketing arrangements are not covered in the Plan. There is, of course, an urgent need to develop a policy in order to achieve a balance between imported and domestically produced fish and to design a marketing and distribution system for the channeling of domestically produced fish to the interior markets. 3.19 It is suggested that Sierra Leone should go forward with a more comprehensive development plan that would cover formulation of policy, strategy, details of equipment and methods, and analysis of the economic forces which are at play. ANNEX III Page 21 IV. OUTLINE OF AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PLAN Fish Production and Supply Targets 4.01 Available statistics on fish catches are rather rough estimates, but they do provide a starting point. An upward adjustment to a total of 51,000 tons was,made in 1972, and this appears to be a realistic base. For purposes of illustrating the kind of exercise that is needed, a projection of supply targets has been made on the assumption that fish production in 1973 was equal to that of 1972 and that, beginning in 1974, there will be a gradual increase in fish production and a decline in fish imports as.shown in Table 6. In the final form of such an exercise, a number of details will have to be included on such matters as raw material for the shrimp-export industry and, possibly, a tuna export industry and exports of frozen bottom fish. At a later stage it may also be possible to include target figures for the main species or species .groups. The above targets have been estab- lished on the basis of the following considerations: (1) Taking into account the population increase and the need for a gradual albeit modest increase in per capita supply, there should be an annual increase of 5 percent in the total supply of fish for consumption. (2) By 1979, fish imports should be substituted by domestically caught fish. (3) Past experience has shown that a greater quantity can be caught in the industrial sector based on Freetown. A total production in 1978 of 5,000 tons of table fish, or more than three times the present quantity, should be possible and the target may be reached earlier. Raw material for fish meal production has not been shown for each sector, but most will probably come from the industrial sector. (4) In inland fisheries a trebling of the quantities by 1979 is envisaged. (5) The greater part of fish catches will continue to come from the artisan sea fisheries but the increase here will only be about 60 percent. (6) It is assumed that a fish meal plant could be ready by the end of 1975. A small canning plant should come at a later stage but preferably in the plan period. 4.02 One of the main problems in making such projections is the extreme paucity of data. It is still uncertain what the real level of production is and information on production capacity and market conditions is also very Table 6: FISH PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY TARGETS 1976 - 79 121i .131 12Z i2Z i 1211 i2 1t22 Artisanal sea fisheries -.98,500 48,500 52,700 58,200 61,300 66,600 70,?00 76,500 Industrial sea fisheries 1,500 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,500 4,5oo 5,00 5,000 Inland fisheris 1,000 1,000 1,400 1,800 2,200 2,600 2,800 3,000 Total 51,000 51,000 56,100 61,500 67,000 72,700 78,500 84,500 Imports 9,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 - Total supplies for food 60,000 63,000 66,100 69,500 73,000 76,700 80,00 84,500 Raw material for fish meal production - - - - 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 Sources Mission estimates. '-4 ANNEX III Page 23 limited. But the magnitudes do suggest that considerable development could take place within a five year period. As Table 6 shows, fish catches for human consumption could increase to 84,000 tons in 1979. The production in- crease over five years would, therefore, be 33,500 tons--a 65 percent in- crease. Even a lower figure, say, 20-25,000 tons, would be a considerable achievement. Ways and means of achieving the targets will be discussed in the sections that follow. Fishing Operations 4.03 Sierra Leone does not perhaps have the very best trawling grounds in the West African area, but there is a good deal that can be done. The best development prospects for demersal species are probably in fairly shallow waters near the coast and in the estuaries. Some of the pelagic species such as sardinella aurita are mainly to be found in areas which are still well beyond the reach of the present canoe fleet. Hence, for effective exploitation, small boats designed for mechanization and the use of trawl and purse-seine (in addition to methods already in use) should be introduced. The use of outboard engines in the Ghana-type canoes and "ali" (ring) net fishing has been and can continue to be a useful intermediate step. The efficiency of existing boats would be greatly enhanced if a greater number would be mechanized with outboard engines and simultaneous to this there could be further development, with mechanized boats of new designs and the use of small trawls and purse-seines. 4.04 Future prospects of the sea fisheries should be assessed in a simul- taneous evaluation of the two sectors, industrial and artisan, because they exploit the same resource, cater for the same markets and when new technology is used, rely on the same kind of infrastructure, such as safe anchorage, land- ing facilities, etc., and marketing services. 4.05 A beginning might be made by increasing the fleet of small and med- ium sized multipurpose boats, mainly for trawling and purse-seining, to be stationed in Freetown. As soon as possible, provisional landing facilities should be provided and, when a fishing harbor engineering survey has been made, suitable shore facilities should be established. In evaluating the capacity of such facilities, the desirability of continuing the present tuna transship- ment arrangement should be considered. Similarly, as import substitution is desirable, there will likely be fewer foreign boats calling on Freetown. Thus the size of boat to be serviced in the proposed fishing harbor should basic- ally be determined by the biggest boat in Sierra Leone's own fleet, unless, perhaps, joint ventures for processing tuna and other species could be developed in Freetown or some other suitable site in Sierra Leone. 4.06 The small boat approach in fish production offers the advantage of being labor intensive, and thus would contribute to increased employment in the country. In the operation of small and medium sized boats from Freetown valuable experience can be gained which could be applied in the artisan sec- tor. Government's engagement in this experimental stage of development should in fact be adjusted to this end. It will then probably be found that inlets exist along the coastline which are well suited as fishing centers; and with ANNEX III Page 24 the greater mobility of mechanized fishing boats, fishermen from smaller vil- lages along the coast would probably move to one of the centers. There is need for a fishing harbor engineer to survey potential centers and to determine their suitability and the approximate cost of harbor works and installations. 4.07 The small scale fishing of wild fish stocks in inland waters is pro- bably of much greater importance than the current yield estimate of 1,000 tons. A comprehensive survey might reveal that the total catch is closer to 5,000 tons, and that it could at least be doubled. Fish farming was tried in the mid-1960s but failed owing to faulty water supply to the ponds. There is, however, no reason to doubt that many areas are suitable for fish farming and that, with sufficient expert advice and the development of local skill, fish farming may offer a considerable contribution to the fish supplies of the countries. Brackish water fish farming and oyster culture, based on oysters found in the mangrove swamps, offer real development possibilities which must be subjected to intensive experiments before commercial ventures are launched. 4.08 Since the exploitable fish stocks are mostly in the continental shelf area, they are well within the 200 mile limit. Some boats operating from foreign ports have obtained a licence for purse-seining sardinella eba, as this species is not yet fully utilized; but unlicensed trawlers also fish in Sierra Leone waters and often very near the coast. It would be advisable to establish a firm resource management policy and to limit fishing in these waters to Sierra Leone fishing boats, in the industrial as well as the artisan sector. In support of realistic resource management, intensive resource re- search must be carried out, preferably by an independent research organization in cooperation with neighboring countries exploiting the same resource. 4.09 All inshore waters should be reserved exclusively for smaller boats. To implement a resource policy and reserve the fishing areas for indigenous fishing boats, a patrol reserve is necessary to supervise the activities. At the present time, considerable damage is being done to the local fishermen by foreign boat operations. And in the case of the fishing boats which will be chartered for the newly formed Sierra Leone Shrimp Export Company, Ltd., and any other boats which may be chartered by Sierra Leone Companies, their activ- ities must be supervised. 4.10 It is useful to envisage how fish production could be increased by an additional 30-35,000 tons by 1979. The 1979 fishing fleet will have to be the outcome of an evolutionary process which, it is hoped, will commence shortly. Various types of boats and equipment should be tried. There is not sufficient information for a detailed plan, so that the production pattern listed below is only one of many alternative production patterns, which might be envisaged for the late 1970's: Method Catch (a) Mechanization of 400 ocean going canoes, and improved maintenance serving to existing mechanized canoes 3,000 tons ANNEX III Page 25 (b) 70 mechanized 34 foot boats, as now produced by Fisheries Division Boatyard, for fishing in estuaries and inshore waters, each catch- ing 150 tons 10,000 tons (c) 25 Ghana-type 50 foot multipurpose boats, mainly for purse-seining and trawling, and fishing gear, each catching 280 tons annually 7,000 tons (d) 15 large (70-80 feet) fully equipped stern trawlers for fishing in deeper water (but within Sierra Leone's 200 miles limit) each catching 700 tons annually. Their total yield will be 10,000 tons (e) Improved methods in inland fisheries could be expected to yield additional 2,000 tons Total 32,000 tons Before any investment can be made in fishing boats, or supportive facilities, details would have to be worked out by specialists, and several trials and experiments would have to be carried out. 4.11 In the industrial sector the most effective way would perhaps be to increase the number of boats now fishing from Freetown. This should pre- ferably be done by assisting some of the fisheries firms with credit to pur- chase secondhand or new boats suitable for these fisheries. A good basis for this can be found in the earlier experiments which have been carried out in Sierra Leone, and similar experience gained in neighboring countries also supports this approach. 4.12 In the artisan sector, development should take into account earlier suggestions from CARE Inc., a draft outline of a proposed UNDP/FAO Project, and from previous fisheries officers. A possible approach is summarized below. There should be a more extensive mechanization of existing boats and an accelerated introduction of modified boats and inboard engines and, finally, the introduction of new methods such as trawling and purse-seining. 4.13 An increase in fish landings will only occur through the improvement of fishing vessels, gear and techniques. For this purpose there should be a pilot experimental and demonstration program which would help in formulating a sound development scheme for the labor intensive artisan sector. A begin- ning should be made from a selected fishing community north of Freetown. Several experimental fishing boats of different design could operate in an area of some 80 miles long and 40-70 miles wide north of Sherbro Island, where the coastal pelagic fish resources of the country are concentrated. The project would also have to deal with the marketing problems, assist in improving boat-building in Freetown and in the village and attend to over-all servicing problems. Generally speaking, such a project could spread to several areas and help in improving productive capabilities in fishing and fish pro- cessing by upgrading existing technology and techniques. ANNEX III Page 26 Processing and Marketing 4.14 If one assumes that imported fish will gradually disappear, and that consumers are pleased with the selection of species now offered in the market, the basic question is simply whether an indigenous fishing industry can satisfy the domestic market. The answer is probably "yes" if there is a simultaneous development of the artisan and industrial sectors. 4.15 The bulk of the catch in the artisan fisheries consists of pelagic species; bonga and sardinella (herring), and it is likely that in the first stages of development, this situation will still continue. Fortunately, pela- gic species seem to be popular all over the country and it should be possible to find market outlets for considerably more than the present catch. At a later stage there will be extensive fishing for bottom species, with small trawl and other gear, and most of this fishing will be in shallow waters near the coast and in the estuaries. In the meantime, the industrial sector has to be relied on for a full supply of bottom species caught with medium sized boats in deeper water but well within the territorial limits. 4.16 One of the first steps in the fields of fish processing and market- ing should be to improve existing smoking and drying methods, and transport and storage facilities for the traditional products. If and when development projects are established in coastal communities, these problems should also be attended to as a necessary corollary to fish consumption promotion. Prior to such promotion work, however, detailed information on prices and qualities, etc., in the various local markets, as well as on regularity of supplies have to be collected and collated. 4.17 Freetown and villages with reasonably good road connections will play the main role in the supply of fresh and frozen fish. It is assumed that the refrigeration facilities which are now available in Freetown (prim- arily in Kissy Dockyards but also in Murray Town) would be made available to the entire fishing industry on acceptable terms. If imports are gradually reduced, this should create no technical problems with regard to storage facilities, baring.substantial increases in the quantities of tuna which are being transshipped. Some additional freezing capacity may have to be pro- vided for. But frozen supplies going into the hinterland may be limited since improvement in smoking and drying methods and additional smoking faci- lities may be the best solution. Some additional ice producing equipment may have to be provided, to service the many fishing boats which will have to carry ice. 4.18 As increasing amounts of fish will come from the artisan sector, and as the quality should be improved regardless of the form in which it is marketed, several villages which have road connections will have to be pro- vided with refrigerated storage facilities for ice and fish and, eventually, with ice making equipment. Siiilarly, inland distribution must be improved by extending the network of depots and improving transport. Fishing villages which have no easy road connections will have to continue to rely on the trad- itional processing methods. ANNEX III Page 27 4.19 A fish meal factory should be established as soon as possible, preferably by private enterprise and in Freetown. It would be based on pelagic species, scrap fish from trawling operations and, if any, offal from fish processing. An annual capacity of 5,000 tons raw material (yielding about 1,000 tons fish meal) might be sufficient; based on 150 days of opera- tion per year, the cost would probably be about US$400,000. While priority should always be given to fish for human consumption, there would be no con- flict in periods of abundant supply. A fish meal factory would have a stabilizing effect on prices and relieve the market of any surpluses, in terms of both excessive supplies and marketing residues. 4.20 A canning factory would also be desirable, aimed at import substitu- tion of some 2-3,000 tons of canned fish. But it is conceivable that this factory might be linked with a tuna canning project. Some preparatory work has been done by the UNDP Planning Team on a tuna canning industry to be es- tablished in Freetown. A capacity of 20-40,000 tons of raw material has been mentioned which implies a large investment. This project would pre- sumably be based on tuna landed by the specialized foreign boats which operate in the Central East Atlantic area. Sierra Leone boats could only provide a very small part of this quantity. A project of this magnitude would require very careful consideration and is worth exploring on a joint venture basis with an appropriate partner. 4.21 There are other potentials for export. As the domestic fishing enterprise grows, there will likely be increased supplies of premium priced species, of types which the foreign freezer trawlers normally reserve for their home market. Since the domestic market would probably be small for such high priced fish, they could be exported frozen to markets in developed countries, as will the frozen shrimps. Export of frozen lobster, which has been tried, should be revived and oyster culture, which should be developed, may also form the basis for an export industry. Also, there may be pros- pects for a trade in smoked and dried fish with neighboring countries. 4.22 The organizational aspects of fish marketing will require a con- siderable amount of attention. Eventually, producers cooperatives should be brought into the picture. But it will take time to encourage a coopera- tive movement, to train personnel and provide essential equipment. In the meantime, it might well be that a Fisheries Development Agency will have to engage in marketing, directly or through a specialized marketing board. It might also be possible to leave the marketing of fish to a private firm under government control. Whichever organization is established to deal with fish marketing, its activities should cover both the artisan and industrial sec- tors. Measures have to be provided to ensure that uneconomic competition does not occur, as has happened in some West African countries. Training and Extension Services 4.23 With the exception of some specialized training in marine sciences which is provided and a two year diploma certificate course which has been started in the Fourah Bay College in Freetown, there are in Sierra Leone no special training facilities for fisheries personnel. There has, therefore, always been great reliance on training in foreign countries, not only for ANNEX III Page 28 administrative work but also for the various specialized functions on fishing boats. As the fisheries staff is very small and no field stations are oper- ated at the moment, the extension service is virtually nonexistent. 4.24 The number of fisheries workers on the Government's payroll should be increased, but even if the staff should be doubled or trebled, it would still be too small to form the basis for specialized institutional training. Both for this and for the training of navigators for larger boats, fish processing specialists, etc., the aim should be to have a joint West African training scheme. In view of the relative small size of the industry, such an arrangement, which could be supplemented by some specialized training in developed countries, would be the most economical and also the most efficient solution. Education schemes in Sierra Leone could then specialize in train- ing of lower level fisheries personnel and various categories of operatives, including courses in rudimentary navigation, engine operation and maintenance, and fish processing techniques. On this basis, an effective and genuine extension service could be reestablished. Infrastructure and Auxiliary Industries 4.25 Sierra Leone is fortunate in having an excellent natural harbor in Freetown and a number of sheltered inlets along the coast. Both the harbors and the facilities in the harbors and on the beaches should be available to all who participate in the fisheries. Such utilities should include boat- building yards, slipways and repair shops, ice manufacturing and storage plants, fuel and water supplies, etc. 4.26 The existing rudimentary infrastructure leaves much to be desired. For the industrial sector, there is an urgent need for berthing facilities, which would involve dredging and the building of jetties. As an illustra- tion of the order of magnitude in such investments, Sea Products Ltd. and its affiliated companies have suggested a new 225 foot pier at Kissy, at the cost of Le 125,000, and there are similar needs in the Murray Town section of the harbor area. Slipway and repair facilities will have to be improved and an expansion in the industrial sector may also involve further investment in refrigerated storage, and, most probably, smoking and drying facilities, de- pending to some extent on the future location of fish receiving stations. 4.27 How much should be invested in infrastructure will largely depend on the fleet which is to be serviced; in other words a big servicing harbor is not needed for a paper fishing fleet. Foreign boats should only be catered for in so far as they provide raw material for processing activities in Sierra Leone, and this should basically be a temporary arrangement in the interim period while a national fleet is being developed. 4.28 Fisheries development in the artisan sector will depend largely on general infrastructure such as roads for the provision of proper supplies and services and, even more, for marketing. Thus, as small boat development in the artisan sector is realized, a number of small harbors will be needed. The Fisheries Division of MANR has suggested that some coastal harbor centers ANNEX III Page 29 should be developed, and it seems clear that the need for this will become urgent as progress is made with mechanization. As all fishing villages could not possibly be helped in this way, some will either have to continue fishing from the open beaches or they will have to move to other development centers. As pointed out, careful studies have to be made by harbor engineers before harbor sites are selected and estimates prepared for harbor works and harbor installations. 4.29 Most of the fishing boats and gear needed to implement a development plan will have to be imported, but a realistic aim would be to have all boats below 50 feet built in Sierra Leone. The boatbuilding yard and adjacent metal workshop, now operated by the Fisheries Division, could become an im- portant center. The Division has plans for expanding this yard in two stages at an estimated cost of Le 91,000 for Phase I and Le 126,000 for Phase II. These plans, however, are not based on any comprehensive considerations of fisheries development, and they would have to be studied in more detail. A program will have to be prepared for cooperation with and training of village boatbuilders along the coast to facilitate a gradual transition to a variety of boats adopted for mechanization. Similarly, a net loft where fishing gear could be made up from imported webbing is needed. 4.30 All auxiliary industries should preferably be in the private sector, although initially they may have to be handled by the proposed Fisheries Development Agency and, possibly as an off spring of this agency, a Fisheries Corporation. Administration and Business Management 4.31 Implementation of a development program will require a considerable quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the administrative structure. The basic role of the Government would be to formulate and carry out a re- source research and management program, with experimental and exploratory fishing, to patrol the fishing grounds, to provide such infrastructure as may be required, and to build up an information and extension service for the fisheries. To remain objective and "neutral" and at the service of all who are engaged in the fisheries, the Government should not enter into partner- ship with any individual firm or group of firms. In Sierra Leone's situation, joint ventures with foreign partners may be beneficial to the country but private firms rather than the Government should be engaged in such cooperation. 4.32 In the past, there have been several attempts to organize coopera- tive societies, including loan and thrift societies, but generally speaking all these efforts have failed. Management and control have been insufficient and, in the loan scheme which was introduced in the 1960s, too much was left to the fisheries field officers who had a number of other duties. 4.33 New attempts are being made to form producers cooperatives in the fishing communities, based on experience in and, presumably, with the same by-laws as agricultural cooperatives. However, in one village which was visited, and which may be typical, the newly formed society failed to obtain ANNEX III Page 30 a loan from any credit institution to purchase a fishing boat which they wanted to operate on a communal basis. As a result they had to borrow from a financier member, who very soon siezed control of the society. The con- clusions to be drawn from past experience is that Sierra Leone should not rush into formation of cooperative societies, and that the operation of fishing boats should hardly ever be one of their functions. 4.34 Almost all fishing boats in the villages are now owned by individ- uals, many of whom do not take part in the fishing enterprise. This owner- ship pattern may have to continue for some time. But the ultimate aim should be for all boats and fishing gear to be owned by one or more of the fishermen who use them. 4.35 The most important function which a cooperative society could have, would be to constitute the local link with credit institutions and not with the cooperative bank only, but this function can only be taken up when the blueprint of a credit scheme has been worked out. Another important function which the cooperative societies could take up eventually is marketing. Each individual community would need refrigeration and processing facilities of their own, but when engaging in marketing, they will soon come to recognize that they cater for the same market and that they can only succeed through a joint effort of all cooperative societies with respect to price, transport and storage. Unfortunately, there seems to be little interest among village leaders to cooperate on matters of common interest. 4.36 In the industrial sector, small private companies situated in Freetown have been serving a useful purpose. There seems to be a general feeling that much could be gained through a closer cooperation between these companies and between them and the Government in a number of fields such as harbor facilities like jetties and ice plants, credit, advisory service, and not least, marketing. 4.37 If in the future the Government should find it necessary to engage directly in the fisheries business, this should be through a Fisheries Cor- poration which should then have at least 51 percent of the shares. As the aim should be to obviate fish imports by gradually expanding fishing opera- tions of boats registered in and manned by fishermen of Sierra Leone, it is particularly important that the Government not be financially interested in the company which is in charge of these imports. The.Government's coopera- tion with other countries should be confined to resource management, foreign influence, training schemes and the overall approach to economic cooperation. 4.38 Some of the facilities necessary to render proper service to the fishing industry may, as a long-term solution, be owned jointly by the various firms and, ideally, the producers' cooperative societies in the traditional fisheries. Alternatively, these facilities may be owned and operated by the Government, so long as it could be kept separate from the regular administra- tive function, and then made available to the industry on a hire basis. ANNEX III Page 31 4.39 As an intermediate step in the evolutionary process of creating a genuinely indigenous fisheries industry, the establishment of a Fisheries Development Agency should be considered. This. agency should be concerned with both sectors of industry. It should be the executive agent for all ex- perimental fishing and for this purpose be equipped with a variety of boats and fishing gear. The boat building yard and adjacent metal workshop should be transferred, at least temporarily, to this agency. A number of expatriate fisheries experts will be required and they should work directly for the Fisheries Development Agency. Permanent contact with the industry should be established through an advisory board for which the firms in the industrial sector as well as the village in the artisanal sector shall appoint their representatives. 4.40 Some personnel should be transferred from the present Fisheries Division which should be reduced to, say, four professional officers and transferred to the premises of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Re- sources and become an important advisory body to the Minister, and, through him, to other ministries on domestic, regional and international policy matters. The Division should have one representative in the advising board of the agency. 4.41 One of the main functions of the new agency will be to deal with the implementation and coordination of foreign aid, including a reasonable amount of equipment standardization. Tentative Investment Program 4.42 It is not possible to set forth a detailed investment program for fisheries development on the basis of the information that is currently avail- able. A very thorough examination will be required of possible courses of action. Nevertheless, it is believed that an illustrative exercise would serve a very useful purpose in pointing toward the steps that should be taken in the near future. It may also help to indicate the order of magni- tude with regard to finances. 4.43 A tentative investment program for a five year period may be roughly outlined as below: ANNEX III Page 32 1. Mechanization of canoes and improvement of maintenance service US$ 700,000 2. Small mechanized multipurpose boats in the 25-40 foot range for use in estuaries and inland waters. US$ 1,800,000 3. Ghana-type purseseiners/trawlers for coastal fishing US$ 2,500,000 4. Medium sized stern trawlers for deeper water US$ 2,000,000 Total fishing boats and gear US$ 7,000,000 5. Fish meal plant US$ 400,000 6. Harbor improvement US$ 1,000,000 7. Improvement in refrigeration plants US$ 300,000 8. Boat building and repair facilities US$ 200,000 Total (in constant 1973/74 prices) US$ 8,900,000 4.44 With the exception of experimental boats and equipment, to be operated by the Fisheries Development Agency, and infrastructure, to be organized by the Government, all these finances should preferably be chan- neled through an institutional credit scheme which has still to be estab- lished. There is at present no real institutional credit arrangement for fisheries because (a) the credit scheme which was tried in the 1960s failed, and (b) the Cooperative Bank has no funds available for the purpose. A few loans have been granted by commercial banks to individual firms in the indus- trial sector, but fishery financing is considered very difficult. Servicing problems in Freetown harbor, difficulties with spare parts, etc., may also have played a part. As is well known, however, a number of fisheries coun- tries have succeeded in making special arrangements where the peculiarities of fishery investments -- such as the vagaries of the sea, the difficulties in forecasting production as well as breakdown and repair problems -- have been taken into account. 4.45 .A special credit scheme, based on mortgage security and linked with an insurance scheme for boats and gear, could be and should be worked out for the fisheries of Sierra Leone. The scheme should embrace both sectors and deal with investment as well as operational credit and could perhaps be extended to processing and auxiliary industries. A credit scheme should, moreover, include both new and traditional fishing and could be instrumental in gradually enabling the village fishermen to become the owners of boats and gear which they operate. ANNEX III Page 33 4.46 Some details of a credit scheme will hinge on policy decisions which have still to be made. Thus, for instance the role of cooperatives in fisheries development work has still to be determined and, similarily, the role of the Government in business engagements such as joint fishing and fish processing ventures and boatbuilding, and the operation of a repair shop. Since the Cooperative Bank lacks special skills and experience, and is occupied in activities such as commodity marketing, the proposed credit scheme should be organized under one or more of the commercial banks. When properly organized, village cooperatives could become the link between the scheme and individual borrowers. In so far as possible, special government guarantees to individual firms should be avoided. 4.47 The alternative to the development of a larger indigenous industry is to continue to rely on imports and to charge a higher licence fee from foreign boats for permission to fish in Sierra Leone's waters. The advantage which an indigenous fleet would have vis-a-vis foreign boats is that it could use smaller and less expensive boats, as the resources which they exploit are so close to their shore base. The question-of capital intensive versus labor intensive methods, therefore, becomes a major concern. 4.48 If the entire catch in Sierra Leone were to be taken by capital in- tensive methods, no more than 1,000 fishermen might be required, and this would adversely affect the fishing communities. It has been assumed that there are few alternative employment opportunities and that, therefore, em- ployment should be available in the fisheries for a fishing population which, like the population as a whole, will increase at approximately 2.6 percent per year. With labor intensive methods in fishing, this could be achieved even if, with mechanization, production output per man is bound to increase considerably. If, however, fish imports are retained at the present level, this may be a serious threat to the domestic fleet and the people who are employed on it. 4.49 The employment opportunities provided by processing plants are not as great as one would hope. In the shrimping industry, it may be a question of a few hundred workers; but in the proposed fish meal plant which would handle 5,000 tons of raw material, about 10 workers only would be employed. 4.50 The foreign exchange balance on the proposed investment program and the inflow from an export industry will have to be calculated on the basis of realistic price assumptions. There should be reason to assume, however, that the fisheries industry at the end of a five year development period should be able to reach a stage of "self sufficiency", e.g. export earnings should be sufficiently large to cover downpayments and interest on foreign loans, reason- able profit to foreign partners in joint ventures, and equipment imported for the fisheries. 4.51 In the Bank Group's further engagement with the fisheries sector, the following stages could be envisaged: ANNEX III Page 34 (1) An Identification mission to modify the investment plan as required and work out a program for an experimental project in the artisan sector. (2) Preparation mission to prepare a loan project to cover fisheries infrastructure and a fisheries credit scheme. The fisheries problems which have to be further studied, are multifarious and it is not to be expected that all of them will be dealt with at once. Thus, for instance, further knowledge about the resources is desirable but development could start immediately, and further information gathered in the process of development. 4.52 In the Development Plan 1974/75-1978/79, the total cost is Le 20.6 million at constant 1973/74 prices (US$24.7 million), of which an unspecified amount of Le 13.0 million is earmarked for a fish cannery (included in the industrial investment program of the Plan). While an alternative detailed estimate has not been prepared, it appears that a total investment of US$10.12 million (in current prices) should be sufficient to create a considerable self generating power. 4.53 It is recommended that fisheries development work should be centered around a Fisheries Development Agency which should coordinate all activities in the artisan as well as in the industrial sector. With regard to inland fisheries, the best arrangement would probably be to engage a few experts for realistic experiments. As the lagoon areas in the south are main nursery grounds for shrimp and oysters, both commodities with a high export value, a fisheries adviser should be stationed on the Turner's peninsula. Generally speaking, all inland and brackish water fisheries should also be developed under the aegis of the Fisheries Development Agency. 4.54 The most important element in any likely fishery project should be a multipurpose approach to both sea and inland fisheries, based on the fact that there is no single panacea for the problems. IMPORTANT COXMERCIAL FISH SPECIES OF SIERRA LNE CWLR NAME GEUS & SPECIMS FAMILI Awefu Ethmalosa fimbriata (juvenile) Clupeidae Bonga Ethmalosa fimbriata (adult) Clupeidae Catfish (marine) Arius Spp. Trachisuridae Coureh (Horse mackerel) Caranz carangus Carangidae Couta (Barracuda) Sphyraena dubia Sphyraenidae Crocus Pomadasys jubelini Pomadasyidae Grouper (rose or red) Lutjanus agenes Lutjanidae Grouper (black) Lutjanus goreensis Lutjanidae Grouper (brown) Lutjanus dentatus ormoaeszus Lutjanidae Gwangwa Pseudotolithus elongatus Sciaenidae Herring (round) Sardinella aurita (or Cameronensis) Clupeidai Herring (flat) Sardinella eba Clupeidae Hognose Plectorhinchus macrolepis Pomadasyidae Joe-fish Trachinotus goreensis Caragidae Ladyfish Pseudotolithus senegalensis Sciaenidae Ladyfish (longneck) Pseudotolithus typus Sciaenidae Spiny Lobster (crustacean) Palinurus Spp. Palinuridae Mackerel Scomber japonicus Scombridae Flat Mollit (mullet) Mugil falcipinnis Mugilidae Jombo Mollit (mullet) Mugil cephalus Mugilidae Trangabak Mollit (mullet) Mugil grandisquamis Mugilidae Red Mollit (mullet) Pseudupeneus prayensis Mugilidae Pollock Decapterus punctatus Carangidae Pomp Scyris alexandrinus Carangidae Pomp Vomer setapinnis Carangidae Record (red cod) 'Spinephelus aeneus Serranidae Record Serranus Spp. Serranidae Sailfish Istiophorus Spp. Istiophoridae Sand Mackerel Trachinotus goreensis Carangidae Sand Mackerel Trachinotus glaucus Carangidae Shark (Selachians) Scolodion Spp. Eulamiidae Sheephead Drephane africana Ephippidae Shinenose Galeoides decadactylus Polynemidae Shrimp Penaeus Spp. Penaeidae Skeet (sting ray) Dasyatis Spp. Dasyatidae Skeet (sting ray) Trygon Spp. Dasyatidae Black Snapper Dentex angolensis Sparidae Red Snapper Pagrus ehrenbergi Sparidae Sole Cynoglossus Spp. Soleidae Spanish Polydactylus quadrifilis Polynemidae Tenny Albula vulpes Albulidae Ihiting Pseudotolithus brachygnathus Sciaenidae CHARTERED FISHING BOATS LICENCED FOR FISHING FROM FRTOWN Gross Nam of Year of Register Country Boate ers Construction Tons (GRT) HP of Origin National Fishing Company Ltd. El Teasorillo 25 1961 92.6 ? Spain Delfin Blanco 29 1958 101.0 ? Conchita Pelayo Lolita Gomey Recently registered. No further information available Oneto Tere Meli" Liberty Fishing Company Vicenzo Campize 28 1968 114.5 40 Italy Peninsula Fishing Company Nuova Speranza 25 1958 74.4 200 Sierra Leone Transport and Tradin Company lifias I 67 ? 838 1750 Greece lifias II 68 ? 781 1250 Evangelistria 10 56 1962 596 1hoo Panarmitis 62 1958 604 1250 ? Sephyras V 43 1960 397 800 Okearis 73? 1947 1164 1150 Zephyras VI 43 1960 360 800 Posidon 70 1950 1147 1650 Koutouriaris S. III 61 1951 794 1665 Daloa 21 1969 103 300 Ivory Coast Cap Palmas 26 1972 113 400 Avra I 42 1938 277 600 Greece Avra II 63 1943 651 1500 Avra III 62 1943 634 1500 Sierra Leone Joint Stock Fishing Compazu Had 3 Las Palmas vessels on contract January-September 13 0 GU INEA130 120 30' 200 The boundanes shown on this map do not MAURITAN A ehbuva islandä mply endorsemen or acceptance by the YY:- ~Ikorld Bank and us affdites xymihåva 131.nd 0 .. .... NIGER SENEGAL 'MALI AND BULLOM A 1 GUI1ÙlEA S ( INLAND BI SA 1j" GUINEA 7 . .......~ ......EN . IVORY (GHANAýO! k80k30' sJr 8030 COAST ..SMALL FULL 1 . ....... TIM T E..... . .......... ....11~ .. . ... wtmoYTIME TIME WESTERN AREA 120 11030 PART SIERRA LEONE k t& Banana TIME COASTAL WATERS 80~MOYAMBA AND 8 N ORTH BONTHE l~-cl - Depth Contours in Feet Depth Less Than 36 Feet Depth Greater Than 36 Feet ...Tu International Boundores Shinbro El.k 0 _ S Ann ain Fishing Settlements SHERBRO1SLAN PENINSULA AND PUNJEHUN 0 00 70- N 2,0 40 60 & 600 LIBERIA z ~KILOMETERS 40 0 SIZE OF CIRCLES PROPORTIONATE TO TOTAL NUMBER OF FISHERMEN mans m MILES 2. Lake 14030' 140 130 30' 130 120 30 120 11030
Группа Всемирного банка · Pre-2003 Economic or Sector Report
Sierra Leone - Current economic position and prospects (Vol. 3 of 5) : Annexes 2 and 3
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