Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) · report

Migration Trends across the OSCE, 2015–2025

September 22, 2025 OSCE

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Migration trends across the OSCE 2015-2025 Copyright Published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Vienna, September 2025 © OSCE 2025. Layout and design: Štefan Benci All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means — electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise — without the prior written permission of the publishers. This restriction does not apply to making digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within the OSCE, and for personal or educational use when for non-profit and non-commercial purposes, providing that copies be accompanied by an acknowledgment of the OSCE as the source. Office of the Co-ordinator for OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities OSCE Secretariat Wallnerstrasse 6, A-1010 Vienna, Austria https://www.osce.org/oceea

Disclaimer The contents of this publication, including the views, opinions, findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein, are those of the authors and contributors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the OSCE and its participating States. The designations employed and the choice and presentation of material in this publication do not constitute or imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the OSCE concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area, of any authority therein, or concerning the delineation of any frontiers and/or boundaries. The OSCE accepts no liability for the accuracy or completeness of any information, for instructions or advice provided, or for misprints. The OSCE Secretariat may not be held responsible for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication. Any references in this publication to third-party materials, such as third-party websites, publications, and documents, do not imply an endorsement of the material’s content or the third party.

Required citation: Restelli, G. and Tintori, G., 2025. Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: Vienna.

Contact information Guido Tintori, Economic Affairs Officer, Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities Email: Guido.Tintori@osce.org

ISBN: 978-92-9234-195-4 Migration trends across the OSCE 2015-2025 Acknowledgments

This report has been possible thanks to financial The authors would like to thank the following OSCE contributions from the United Kingdom. colleagues for providing valuable comments and expert insights: Margot Araujo, Anisa Doty, Ralf Ernst, Lillian Langford, Camille Marquette, Alessandra Rognoni, Mariana Roibu, Andrea Salvoni, Kimberly Schneider, Birgitte Skarboe, Vera Strobachova-Budway, Phillip Templeton, Siegfried Woeber.

The authors gratefully acknowledge Sophie Hofbauer and Dejan Kladarin (UNHCR) for their ongoing support and collaborative spirit throughout this work.

II Foreword

The growth in remittance flows reported here highlights migration’s enduring socioeconomic importance, reinforcing the link between migration and sustainable development that the OSCE has championed for decades. Of particular significance are the shifting dynamics in labour migration that this report documents. The intensifying global competition for workers and talent has positioned labour migration as essential for sustaining economic growth across many participating States. As labour migration continues to evolve, the OSCE is called upon to support policies facilitating legal migration pathways while tackling irregular migration In an era of unprecedented human mobility, the OSCE’s with targeted, human rights-compliant measures. unique mandate and inclusive structure position us to address migration challenges and opportunities with Faced with demographic shifts, geopolitical crises, a comprehensive approach that spans economic, and climate change impacts, this analysis validates social, environmental, and security dimensions. At a the prescience of the OSCE's migration-related time when migration patterns are increasingly complex framework, from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act's and multifaceted, this comprehensive report provides recognition of migration's economic and social essential data-driven insights that are vital for informed dimensions to recent Ministerial Council decisions policymaking and effective regional cooperation. addressing large-scale movements and migration management. Our organization’s strength lies not The evidence presented in this analysis reveals a only in its broad membership but also in its ability to region experiencing simultaneous convergence and convene dialogue, share best practices, and coordinate divergence with global migration patterns. This report regional efforts. As we move forward, the evidence demonstrates the critical importance of drawing from presented here must inform our collective efforts to multiple authoritative sources to paint a comprehensive transform migration into an opportunity for enhanced picture of regional trends. However, gaps in data cooperation, shared prosperity, and regional stability. availability and methodological differences across national statistical systems continue to limit our collective understanding of migration phenomena.

There is an urgent need to ground responses in robust, harmonized data across OSCE participating States. Data-based evidence is the cornerstone for designing Bakyt Dzhusupov migration policies that are both effective and respectful of human dignity. By deepening our collective understanding Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic through consistent statistics and analytical rigor, we enable and Environmental Activities more effective policy coordination, foster transparency, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe anticipate demographic trends, and enhance the capacity to manage migration in a way that benefits migrants, sending and receiving communities alike.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 III Key Takeaways

The OSCE region’s migration • Migration growth at the global level outpaces migration patterns both reflect and growth in the OSCE region

diverge from global trends for In the last decade, the global estimated stock of international immigrants increased by 22 percent (from the period 2015-2025. The 250 million to 304 million). The OSCE area experienced a slightly lower growth of 19 percent in immigrant most striking differences include stock (from 140 million to 167 million). As a share of the global population, immigrant stock has increased the region’s simultaneous role from 3.3 percent to 3.7 percent, marking a 12 percent increment. In the OSCE region, the share grew from as both a major destination 12 percent to 12.8 percent, marking a 6.7 percent increase. Globally and in the OSCE region alike, and source of migration, diversification of migration flows is increasing both in terms of origin and destination. the unprecedented scale of intra‑regional displacement due • The OSCE region shows stark regional divergence in migration to the war in Ukraine, and the and demographic dynamics

significant regional variations Within the OSCE, regional patterns vary dramatically. In the OSCE Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe, and Central within the OSCE area itself. Asia immigration stagnated or even contracted, contrasting with the broader OSCE trend of increasing immigration. OSCE Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe recorded a marked increase in emigration. OSCE South-Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe face accelerating rates of depopulation, while OSCE Central Asia's population grew 16 percent (69 million to 80 million).

• Migration patterns show regional variations in gender dynamics

While OSCE-wide patterns show balanced gender distribution, OSCE regions exhibit distinct profiles. Labour migration corridors drive the geographic distribution of migrant workers as well as their composition by gender, depending on the nature of the

IV demand for migrant labour by specific sectors. Displaced • The war in Ukraine has been Ukrainians are predominantly women and children due a transformative force of to conscription policies. OSCE Central Asia maintains migration dynamics marked female majorities in both emigrant (52%) and immigrant (57%) populations. The war in Ukraine fundamentally reshaped migration patterns across multiple OSCE regions. Ukraine became the world’s second-largest refugee source. Refugees • Remittance flow intensifies and hosted by OSCE participating States nearly tripled from remains a vital lifeline to many 4.8 million in 2015 to 13.9 million in 2024. Unlike in OSCE regions and participating previous decades, nearly half of all refugees hosted in States’ economies the OSCE area are now nationals of OSCE participating States themselves (primarily Ukrainians). The war The OSCE region demonstrates a more intense disrupted some historic labour mobility patterns, with remittance relationship than global averages. Remittance migrant workers from OSCE Eastern Europe and Central outflows from the OSCE grew by 51 percent (reaching Asia rapidly diversifying their destination, often in the $327 billion), while inflows increased by 43 percent (to context of bilateral labour migration agreements. $235 billion). The regional impact varies, with some OSCE regions showing extreme remittance dependency. OSCE Eastern Europe relies heavily on inflows (9 percent • Irregular migration fluctuates of GDP) while paying minimal outflows. Areas such as across regions and time Tajikistan (38 percent of GDP), Kyrgyzstan (19 percent of GDP), and Kosovo1 (17.5 percent of GDP) rank Despite representing a small fraction of total migration, among the highest beneficiaries of remitted inflows as irregular migration remains a priority concern for many percentage of GDP globally. participating States, in context of dangerous routes, high numbers of deaths, with inconclusive policy responses. Irregular flows show distinct regional concentrations and • Labour migration plays a key role fluctuations across time. These variations highlight how in offsetting workforce shortages irregular routes are shaped not only by geopolitical crises and in driving economic growth, and root causes in the countries of origin, but also by the in a context of intensifying global legal and policy responses of the receiving countries. competition for workers and talent These findings reveal that, while the OSCE participates in The size of the OSCE’s working-age population (15- global migration trends, it exhibits unique characteristics 64 years) stagnated between 2015 and 2024 (slightly driven by economic disparities, demographic dynamics, shrinking from 846 million to 844 million). The broader and intra-regional conflicts. As a comprehensive security OSCE region faces workforce shortages. In most organization with participating States spanning major participating States, attracting foreign workers is origin, transit, and destination countries, the OSCE is becoming essential to offsetting workforce shortages uniquely positioned to leverage its inclusive structure and sustaining economic growth. In contrast with the and diverse membership to facilitate the dialogue broader OSCE trend, OSCE Central Asia’s working-age and cooperation that multifaceted challenges of population grew 24 percent. migration require.

1 All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, should be understood in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 V Table of Contents

Acknowledgments II Foreword III Key Takeaways IV List of figures VII 1. Introduction – Global Outlook 1 2. Key trends in the OSCE area 6 3. Regional insights: OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) 15 4. Regional insights: OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) 20 5. Regional insights: OSCE South Caucasus (SC) 25 6. Regional insights: OSCE Central Asia (CA) 30 7. Conclusion 35 Glossary 36 References 38

VI List of figures

Figure 1.1 Estimated stock of international migrants worldwide, 1990-2024 ................................................................. 1 Figure 1.2 International migrants as share of the global population, 1990-2024 ........................................................... 2 Figure 2.1 OSCE Region - Immigrants’ stock (total) and by continent of origin (%), 1990-2024 .................................. 6 Figure 2.2 OSCE Region - Immigrants’ stock and resident population, 1990-2024 ...................................................... 7 Figure 2.3 OSCE Region - Demographic changes (2015=100) ........................................................................................ 7 Figure 2.4 OSCE Region - Stock of hosted refugees, 2000-2024 ................................................................................... 8 Figure 2.5 OSCE Region - Stock of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 2000-2024 ................................................... 9 Figure 2.6 OSCE Region - Detections of irregular border crossings into the European Union, 2009-2024 .............. 10 Figure 2.7 OSCE region - Detections of irregular border crossings at the South-West US border, 2000-2024 ....... 10 Figure 2.8 OSCE region - Detected small boats arrivals to the UK, 2018-2024 ........................................................... 11 Figure 2.9 OSCE Region - Net migration flows, 2000 - 2023 ........................................................................................ 12 Figure 2.10 OSCE Region - Estimated value (in current US$) of personal remittances to (received) and from (paid) OSCE countries ..................................................................................................................... 13 Figure 3.1 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) – Stocks of emigrants and immigrants, 1990-2024 ........................................ 15 Figure 3.2 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) - Stock of emigrants and immigrants as share of resident population, 1990-2024 ...................................................................................................................... 16 Figure 3.3 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) - Stocks of refugees and IDPs, 2000-2024 ...................................................... 16 Figure 3.4 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) - Irregular arrivals from Ukraine and Moldova and on the Eastern Borders Route, 2009-2024 .................................................................................................... 17 Figure 3.5 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) - Estimated value (in current US$) of remittances paid and received, 2005-2023 ................................................................................................................................. 18 Figure 4.1 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Estimated population and Stock of emigrants and immigrants as share of resident population, 1990-2024 ....................................................................... 20 Figure 4.2 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Detections of irregular border crossings to the EU, 2009 - 2024 ......... 21 Figure 4.3 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Irregular migration to the EU, 2009 - 2024 ...................................... 21 Figure 4.4 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Estimated value (in current US$) of remittances paid and received, 2005-2023 ........................................................................................................................ 22 Figure 4.5 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Displacement trends, 2000 - 2024 ................................................... 23 Figure 4.6 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Number of refugees by origin, 2014 - 2024 .................................... 23 Figure 5.1 OSCE South Caucasus (SC) - Estimated population and Stock of emigrants and immigrants as share of resident population, 1990-2024 .................................................................................................. 25 Figure 5.2 OSCE South Caucasus (SC) - Emigrant and immigrant stocks by gender, 1990 - 2024 ........................... 26 Figure 5.3 OSCE South Caucasus (SC) - Detected irregular border crossings into the EU, 2009 - 2024 ................. 27 Figure 5.4 South Caucasus (SC) - Estimated value (in current US$) of remittances paid and received, 2005-2023 ....... 27 Figure 5.5 OSCE South Caucasus (SC) - Displacement trends, 2000 - 2024 .............................................................. 28 Figure 6.1 OSCE Central Asia (CA) - Estimated stocks of emigrants and immigrants, by gender (1990 - 2024) ...... 30 Figure 6.2 OSCE Central Asia (CA) - Stock of emigrants and immigrants as share of resident population, 1990 - 2024 .................................................................................................................... 31 Figure 6.3 OSCE Central Asia (CA) - Estimated remittances received and paid, 2005 - 2023 ................................... 32 Figure 6.4 OSCE Central Asia (CA) - Estimated stock of refugees, 2000 - 2024 ......................................................... 32

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 VII 1. Introduction –

1 Global Outlook 1. Introduction – Global Outlook

International migration2 has continued to rise in lived elsewhere in the continent. At the same time, long- absolute figures over the past decade, reaching distance migration corridors, such as Asia-to-Europe and an estimated stock of about 304 million worldwide Latin America-to-North America, continue to expand, in 2024, a 22 percent increase from 250 million contributing to ever-greater diversity in destination in 2015 (Figure 1.1). This growth in absolute numbers societies. Permanent-type migration to OECD countries is largely driven by global population increases. Most set a new record in 2023, reaching 6.5 million. This international migrants move within their continent of number was 10 percent higher compared to 2022 and origin. For instance, more than 69 million Asians resided 28 percent above 2019 levels (OECD, 2024). in other Asian countries in 2020, and 21 million Africans

Figure 1.1 Estimated stock of international migrants worldwide, 1990-2024

320M 304M

280M 250M 240M

200M

160M

120M

80M

40M

0M 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Females Males Total

Source: UN DESA (2025)

Migrant workers, across all skill levels, represent (World Bank, 2023a). The number of internationally the majority of migrants. Worldwide, workers account mobile students has also significantly increased over the for 62 per cent of the international migrant population last decade. (ILO, 2021). There is also evidence that temporary migration for work is overtaking permanent migration, for example in Canada and Poland, often as a result of the The share of female migrants stayed relatively adoption of specific policies or migration partnerships consistent at about 48 percent (Figure 1.1).

2 There is no internationally agreed upon legal definition of international migration. However, the 1998 United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration has developed a statistical definition to ensure a common baseline: an international migrant is defined as “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence and established a new residence in another country within a given year” (UN, 1998). In addition, a threshold, usually of 12 months, is used to specify the amount of time a person must have lived continuously in another country to qualify as a migrant. The international migrant stock is a measure of the number of persons who are considered international migrants at a given point in time. (UN DESA, 2025). UN DESA’s estimates rely on population censuses and define international migrants based on their country of birth except for 46 countries where this information is not available, and citizenship is used instead. The statistical definition of an international migrant makes no reference to the reason for migration or to the legal immigration status of persons changing their country of residence.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 1 1. Introduction – Global Outlook

Nonetheless, the share of females in the migrant small: in 2024, about 3.7 percent of people globally population varies significantly by region of destination, were international migrants (Figure 1.2). The share with the lowest in Asia (42%), and the highest in of migrants in the global population has remained Europe (52%), Northern America (51%), and Oceania relatively stable around 3 percent between 1990 and (51%). Labour migration corridors drive the geographic 2010. In the last decade, this share has increased from distribution of migrant workers as well as their 3.3 percent (2015) to 3.7 percent (2024), marking a composition by gender, depending on the nature of the 12 percent increment. When looking at specific regions, demand for migrant labour by specific sectors. since demographic growth has been uneven across the world, the share of immigrants in high-income countries increased more than three times faster than population, Despite a robust growth in the absolute number and only half as fast as population growth in low-income of international migrants over recent decades, countries (World Bank, 2023a). their share of the world’s population remains

Figure 1.2 International migrants as share of the global population, 1990-2024

320M 304M 6%

280M 250M 5% 240M 3,7% 4% 200M 3,3% 160M 3%

120M 2% 80M 1% 40M

0M 0% 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Share of global pop. Total

Source: UN DESA (2025)

Rising populations in low-income countries, to decline by 14 per cent over the next thirty years alongside the aging demographics of high- and (with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania, and middle-income countries, are becoming key forces the Republic of Moldova recording the largest relative influencing contemporary international migration. reductions) (UN DESA, 2024). In stark contrast, low- High-income countries are aging rapidly, while many income countries — especially across Africa — continue middle-income countries have also started to face to experience substantial population growth. slowing population growth and declining birth rates, marking a transition from countries of emigration to future destinations for migrants (World Bank, 2023a). In regions In most countries, the impact of international such as Europe, North America, Australia, Eastern migration on population change is generally limited, and South-Eastern Asia, the population is projected with notable exceptions. Demographic changes are

2 creating large mismatches between labour supply and demand across the world, and spark an intensifying global competition for workers and talent. In regions such as Europe, North America, and Australia, attracting foreign workers is now viewed as essential to offsetting workforce shortages and sustaining economic growth. Immigration is projected to become the main driver of population growth in 52 countries by 2054, including Australia, Canada, and the United States of America (UN DESA, 2024). In lower-income regions, migration remains both a channel for development and a response to youth unemployment. Regional migration patterns are thus being fundamentally shaped by these economic and demographic factors, in an era of shrinking workforces and shifting global population centres (IOM, 2024). Labour migration and remittances remain vital to economic development and demographic sustainability in many countries, even in the face of disruptions such as conflicts and the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, international remittances rose to US$831 billion – the highest number on record so far, with remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries totalling a record US$647 billion, outpacing both foreign direct investment and official development assistance in many regions. Major economies such as India (US$111 billion received in 2022), Mexico (US$61 billion), and China (US$51 billion) have stood out as recipients globally, but smaller and lower-income countries are often the most remittance-dependent, with inflows comprising over 20 percent of GDP in places like Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, and Tajikistan (World Bank, 2023a). Remittances are often more stable than other capital flows, and have shown exceptional resilience, rebounding quickly after COVID-19 and providing essential support to households and national economies in regions with high rates of international migration, such as South and Southeast Asia, West and Central Africa, parts of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (World Bank, 2023b). On the outflow side, major sending countries include the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland. As of mid-2024, the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide reached an unprecedented high of nearly 123 million — almost double the 65 million recorded in 2015 — driven by persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations, and severe disruptions (UNHCR, 2025). This figure encompasses 45 million refugees and asylum-seekers. The number of refugees alone (36.8 million) has more than tripled compared to a decade ago. This global increase in forced displacement has been driven primarily by major and protracted crises in Afghanistan, the Sahel, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela, with just six countries accounting for more than three-quarters of those requiring international protection. Most refugees (69%) continue to be hosted in neighbouring countries, and low- and middle-income countries host 71 percent of the world’s population in need of international protection, enduring significant pressure on regional resources and infrastructure. Iran is the world’s largest refugee-hosting country, with nearly 3.8 million refugees in 2024, followed by Türkiye (3.1), Colombia, Germany, and Uganda, underscoring the combined influence of proximity and national asylum policies. Asylum pressures reached new highs: in 2023, 3.6 million new individual asylum applications were registered globally, with the United States (1.2 million) and Germany (329,100) as leading receiving countries. At year-end, there were 6.9 million pending asylum claims worldwide, the highest ever (UNHCR, 2024). These mounting pressures have deepened both humanitarian and policy challenges, highlighting the urgent need for coordinated international responses to support both displaced populations and the communities that host them. the largest Irregular migration remains one of the most significant concerns, in context of dangerous routes and high numbers of deaths, with inconclusive policy responses. Detected irregular border crossings fell during the initial COVID-19 pandemic period. They surged again in 2022 and 2023 in response to protracted crises and the reopening of routes. The Central Mediterranean remains the world’s deadliest migration route on record, with more than 20,000 deaths and disappearances reported between 2014 and 2022 (inclusive of nearly 2,800 deaths across Mediterranean routes in 2022 alone) – numbers that are likely underestimated (IOM, 2024). Risks extend far beyond the Mediterranean: the West African Atlantic route is highly lethal, the Darien Gap between Colombia and Panama remains treacherous, and at least 950 deaths were documented crossing the Sahara Desert between 2021 and 2023. These movements are increasingly facilitated by transnational smuggling networks. An estimated

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 3 1. Introduction – Global Outlook

60 to 80 percent of irregular migrants to Europe rely on rights, fundamental freedoms, and migrants’ dignity smugglers, paying up to US$10,000 per journey (IOM, (EMN, 2024; Adamson and Tsourapas, 2019). 2024). Migrant smuggling is extremely lucrative. A multi-

2 billion-euro worldwide trade annually that, in many areas, is more profitable than drugs.3 Climate change and environmental shocks are accelerating displacement, through both sudden- and slow-onset impacts. The effects In terms of policy responses, a number of countries of environmental and climate-related factors on have opted for restrictive immigration and asylum laws, both internal and international mobility, as well as drawing criticism for exacerbating risks and violating in reshaping migration patterns globally, remain rights, with NGOs reporting increased incidents of insufficiently understood. Extreme weather events pushbacks, family separation, and detention (UNHCR, and slow-onset environmental degradation displaced 2024). Others have expanded regular migration about 33 million people internally in 2022, with sudden- channels. Germany’s Skilled Worker Immigration Act onset disasters accounting for 98 percent of these attracted 650,000 non-EU workers in 2023, while displacements (IDMC, 2023). By 2050, the World Gulf states issued 2.1 million new work permits and Bank’s projections estimate that climate-related internal Australia increased its permanent skilled visa intake migration in developing countries could range from by 15 percent (IOM, 2024). However, there is not a 44 million to 216 million people (World Bank, 2023a). direct zero-sum relationship between regular and These challenges are compounded by the intersection irregular migration channels: decreases in one do of climate change with conflict, and economic and not necessarily and automatically lead to increases in institutional fragility: three-quarters of the world’s forcibly another (Belmonte et al., 2019). A clearly growing trend displaced population reside in countries highly vulnerable is the intensification of bilateral and multilateral to climate hazards (UNHCR, 2024). Quantitative evidence agreements with partners in the neighbourhood on exposure to climate-related hazards (heat waves, and along the main migration routes, where floods, droughts, wildfires, crop failure, sea level rise) the management of cross-border population and projections of future vulnerabilities at the global movements is tied to other policy areas, such as scale are increasingly scientifically robust. However, while trade, visa facilitation, economic or development aid. experts agree that climate change may compound the While this policy approach has led to effective results in economic, political, and social drivers of human mobility, decreasing irregular crossings, its efficacy in addressing the evidence-based understanding of the climate-mobility organised immigration crime is yet unclear, and has nexus is still not robust enough to inform policy measures raised public concern regarding the respect of human (GDI IOM, 2023).

3 See: UNODC (2024), 5 facts you need to know about migrant smuggling.

4 2. Key trends

2 in the OSCE area 2. Key trends in the OSCE area

Between 2015 and 2024, the OSCE area the predominant continent of origin, with migrant stocks experienced significant growth in its immigrant climbing from about 47.9 million to 55.3 million, though stock, increasing from nearly 140 million to almost its share of the total slightly decreased from 34 percent 167 million people — a rise of roughly 19 percent to 33 percent. While the long-term trend reveals steady (Figure 2.1). This trend reinforces the overall increase expansion, the acceleration after 2015 highlights the recorded since 1990, when the immigrants’ stock in the growing role of migration in shaping demographic and OSCE area amounted to 87.5 million. Europe remains social landscapes across the OSCE region.

Figure 2.1 OSCE Region - Immigrants' stock (total) and by continent of origin (%), 1990-2024

60% 167M 180 000 000

160 000 000 50% 140M 140 000 000

40% 120 000 000

100 000 000 30% 80 000 000

20% 60 000 000

40 000 000 10% 20 000 000

0% 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

TOTAL ASIA EUROPE LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN NORTHERN AMERICA OCEANIA AFRICA

Source: UN DESA (2025)

Over the past decade, the diversification of Demographic trends in the OSCE area highlight migration flows into the OSCE area has increased. the increasing relative importance of migration Data show increased diversity both in terms of origin in driving population changes across the OSCE and destination. Immigration from Africa, starting from a region. The immigrant stock as a share of the total smaller base, records the fastest proportional increase OSCE population increased from 11 percent in 2015 to — by about one-third — rising from 10.1 million (2015) 13 percent in 2024 (Figure 2.2). This two-percentage- to 13.5 million (2024), and growing from 7 percent to point rise reflects a growth of the total immigrants’ stock 8 percent of total stocks (Figure 2.1). Asian immigration by 19 percent in the last decade, from roughly 140 million also grew substantially, with the estimated stock rising to 167 million. The demographic contribution of migration from 38.4 million to 47.1 million, and its relative share is notable, considering that the overall population in the from 27 percent to 28 percent. Latin America and the OSCE area in the same period grew by approximately Caribbean contributed consistently, with estimates 3.5 percent, from an estimated 1.27 billion in 2015 to of stocks growing from 30.5 million to 33.5 million, around 1.316 billion in 2023. maintaining around 20 percent of the total. Meanwhile, migration from Northern America and Oceania remained relatively stable, accounting for just over 2 percent and 0.2 percent of the total, respectively.

6 Figure 2.2 OSCE Region - Immigrants' stock and resident population, 1990-2024

1 400 000 000 14% 1.316bn 1.27bn 1 200 000 000 13% 12%

1 000 000 000 11% 10%

800 000 000 8%

600 000 000 6%

400 000 000 4%

200 000 000 0.140bn 0.167bn 2%

0 0% 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Population Immigrants’ stock (total) Immigrants’ stock (share)

Source: UN DESA (2025; 2024)

If managed effectively, labour migration could grew more than 19 percent over the same period. The play a key role in offsetting workforce shortages contrasting trends between the growth in the immigrants’ and driving economic growth. The size of the OSCE stock, the modest expansion of total population, and area's working-age population (15-64 years) stagnated the stagnation of the working age population underscore between 2015 and 2024 (slightly shrinking from 846 migration’s potential role in sustaining demographic million to 844 million). Working-age individuals compose vitality and labour force dynamics across the OSCE the large majority of the immigrant population, which region (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 OSCE Region - Demographic changes (2015=100)

119,4% 120%

115%

109,3% 110%

103,5% 105% 103,0% 100,3% 99,8% 100%

95%

90% Immigrants’ stock Population Population (15/64)

2015 2020 2024

Source: UN DESA (2024; 2025) and World Bank (2025).

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 7 2. Key trends in the OSCE area

The refugee landscape within the OSCE region has neighbouring OSCE countries, most notably Germany changed dramatically in the last decade. The total (1.14 million), Poland (0.96 million) and the Russian number of refugees hosted by OSCE countries Federation (1.22 million) (UNHCR, 2025). As a result, increased from 4.8 million in 2015 to more than the composition of the refugee population in the OSCE 13.9 million in 2024 - a growth of almost 190% area has changed dramatically —today, nearly half of (Figure 2.4). Particularly notable is the surge since all refugees hosted in the OSCE area are themselves 2022 in refugees originating from OSCE participating nationals of OSCE countries, illustrating the region’s dual States and hosted within the OSCE itself. This shift is role as both a destination and a source of large-scale largely due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, which has forced displacement. resulted in more than 6 million people seeking refuge in

Figure 2.4 OSCE Region - Stock of hosted refugees, 2000-2024

14M 13,94M 12M

10M

8M 6,61M 6M 4,80M 4M

2M 0,59M 0M 20 0 20 1 20 2 20 3 20 4 20 5 20 6 20 7 20 8 20 9 20 0 20 1 20 2 20 3 20 4 20 5 20 6 20 7 20 8 20 9 20 0 20 1 20 2 20 3 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 20

Total refugees OSCE refugees

Source: UNHCR (2025). Notes: Data for the year 2024 are available up until the mid-year.

Internal displacement in the OSCE area grew over and Kosovo.4 This changed from 2014 onwards. While the past decade, reflecting the impact of the war Ukraine had virtually no IDPs prior to 2014, its displaced in Ukraine (Figure 2.5). According to UNHCR’s data, population jumped to 823,000 in 2014, climbed to the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 1.6 million in 2015, and then surged to nearly 6 million in the OSCE area remained relatively stable and below 2022. By 2024, Ukraine accounted for the overwhelming 1.5 million until 2013, with most IDPs concentrated in majority of the OSCE region’s nearly 5 million IDPs. Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Serbia

4 Please, note that UNHCR collects data for both Serbia and Kosovo S/RES/1244 (1999) together as part of its regional data collection and operations in the SEE situation data. All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, should be understood in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.

8 Figure 2.5 OSCE Region - Stock of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 2000-2024

7M 6M 5M 4M 3M 2M 1M 0M 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Azerbaijan Bosnia and Herzegovina Georgia Serbia and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)

Ukraine

Source: UNHCR (2025)

Irregular migration is notoriously challenging to measures and international agreements, such as the track as, by definition, there are not much official EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016. This downward data. Across the OSCE, estimates or data concerning trend continued through the COVID-19 pandemic, border crossing detections are available for the EU, US, during which recorded numbers fell below 100,000 in and the UK. Irregular arrivals to the European Union 2020. Irregular arrivals have rebounded modestly since reached an historic peak in 2015 (Frontex 2025). 2021. As the EU adopted the decision in 2022 to assign Authorities recorded more than 1 million detections those fleeing war in Ukraine the right to temporary across all major routes — particularly along the Eastern protection, detections along the Eastern Border Route and Central Mediterranean corridors (Figure 2.6). showed a relatively moderate increase. This highlights This surge was primarily driven by the Syrian conflict, how irregular migration to the EU is shaped not only by resulting in more than 885,000 detections on the geopolitical crises and root causes in the countries of Eastern Mediterranean Route and around 154,000 on origin, but also by the legal and policy responses. As of the Central Mediterranean Route in that year alone. 2024, irregular arrivals reached 217,948 detections, with Following 2016, irregular flows declined sharply, the Mediterranean routes still accounting for nearly all thanks largely to a combination of border enforcement irregular border crossings into the EU.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 9 2. Key trends in the OSCE area

Figure 2.6 OSCE Region - Detections of irregular border crossings into the European Union, 2009-2024

1 200 000

1 000 000

800 000

600 000

400 000

200 000

0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Central Mediterranean Route Eastern Mediterranean Route Western Mediterranean Route Eastern Borders Route Black Sea Route Other

Source: Frontex (2025)

During the past decade, detected irregular entries Detected irregular entries then progressively slowed down, along the United States’ South-Western border until reaching an all-time low of about 200,000 in 2023. show a fluctuating trend with a peak of more than Preliminary data for 2024 suggest another spike, with more 1.5 million in 2019 (Figure 2.7). After steady declines than 851,000 detections reported. The recent surge is since the year 2000, annual apprehensions along the characterized by a diversification of origins with Guatemala south-west US border reached a low of about 304,000 in (31%), Honduras (30%), Mexico (20%), and El Salvador 2017. This trend reversed in 2019, when apprehensions (11%) being the main countries of origin. This evolving surged to more than 1.53 million, driven primarily by more profile highlights the south-west US border as a persistent than half a million Mexican nationals and large numbers focal point of migration pressures, shaped by both regional from Guatemala (195,294) and Honduras (111,155). instability and shifting US migration and border policies.

Figure 2.7 OSCE region - Detections of irregular border crossings at the South-West US border, 2000-2024

1 800 000 1,53M 1 600 000 1 400 000 1 200 000 1 000 000 0,85M 800 000 600 000 0,33M 400 000 200 000 0 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Other Total

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (2025)

10 Irregular migration to the United Kingdom has 2022. The overwhelming majority of detected arrivals are become increasingly visible since 2018, particularly male individuals (over 84% in most years), with young through the rise in small boat crossings across the adults (ages 18–39) making up the largest share. As English Channel (Figure 2.8). While comprehensive data of 2024, the main nationality groups were Afghanistan, on irregular migration remains elusive, official statistics Syria, and Iran.5 Nearly all (99%) those who arrived via on detected small boat arrivals provide a window into small boats submitted an asylum claim upon arrival, with recent trends (UK Home Office 2025). Between 2018 about 10 percent of them also holding a National Referral and 2024, annual detections rose from 299 in 2018 to Mechanism referral.6 more than 36,000 in 2024, with a peak of 45,774 in

Figure 2.8 OSCE region - Detected small boats arrivals to the UK, 2018-2024

50 000 45 000 40 000 35 000 30 000 25 000 20 000 15 000 10 000 5 000 0 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Male Female Unknown

Source: UK – Home Office (2025)

Small boat arrivals have remained a consistent feature the European Union, net (regular) migration rose between of the UK’s migration landscape in recent years. This 2015 and 2023, and non-EU immigration reached a has occurred against a backdrop of increased efforts record high in 2022. In 2024, net migration declined to manage and reduce irregular migration over the sharply to its lowest level since 2021, a change largely past decade, particularly through measures aimed attributable to reductions in work and study-related at enhancing border security, deterring illegal entry, immigration, following the introduction of more restrictive and addressing the root causes of migration. Despite visa policies, but levels remain higher than pre-Brexit implementing more restrictive migration policies and figures (House of Commons, 2025).7 practices, particularly following the UK’s withdrawal from

5 Home Office, How many people come to the UK irregularly? https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-system-statistics-year-ending- march-2025/how-many-people-come-to-the-uk-irregularly? 6 The National Referral Mechanism (NRM) is the UK’s framework for identifying and supporting potential victims of modern slavery or human trafficking. An NRM referral means that, in addition to seeking asylum, the individual is recognized as potentially requiring protection and support as a victim of exploitation. 7 Office for National Statistics, What’s driving the fall in net migration? May 22, 2025. Retrieved from https://blog.ons.gov.uk/2025/05/22/taking-a-look-at- what-is-driving-the-fall-in-net-migration/#:~:text=Our%20provisional%20estimates%20show%20net,related%20visas%20%E2%80%93%20especially%20 student%20dependants.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 11 2. Key trends in the OSCE area

Although the OSCE area as a whole has recorded net migration through 2019, consistently above 4 million positive net migration, the region has shown per year. However, this trend reversed sharply in 2020 marked variability over the past two decades and with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, as positive across participating States. Net migration flows in net migration dropped to about 2.1 million (0.16%), and the OSCE region have fluctuated considerably from year remained lower through 2022 (1.6 million; 0.12%). By to year. A sustained positive trend emerged after 2010, 2023, positive net migration moderately rebounded, culminating in a peak of over 5 million net immigrants in returning to nearly 2.9 million (0.23%). These fluctuations 2015, representing 0.4 percent of the OSCE population underscore the sensitivity of migration flows to political, (Figure 2.9). The region then maintained high positive economic, and health shocks.

Figure 2.9 OSCE Region - Net migration flows, 2000 - 2023

6M 5,09M 5M

4M 2,94M 3M

2M 1,62M

0M 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

Source: UK – Home Office (2025)

Data confirm the ongoing importance of the OSCE Remittance flows to and from the OSCE area region as a major hub of migration - serving as both recorded robust and sustained growth over the a destination and an origin of migrants. As of 2024, past decade. The OSCE area plays an important role reflecting persistent regional demographic and both as a significant source and recipient of remittances. economic disparities within the broader OSCE area, In 2015, personal remittances received by households participating States recording the highest positive net in OSCE participating States amounted to about migration are the United States (+1.3 million), Germany US$165 billion, and those paid out by immigrants to (+0.6 million), and the United Kingdom (+0.45 million); countries of origin reached US$217 billion (Figure 2.10). whereas participating States with the highest negative These figures correspond to, respectively, about 0.41 net migration are Türkiye (-0.32 million), Ukraine and 0.54 percent of the OSCE area’s aggregated (-0.30 million), and Greece (-0.16 million). Gross Domestic Product (in current US$). Since 2015,

12 the inflow of remittances has grown steadily, rising both inflows and outflows in the OSCE region quickly by 43 percent to US$235 billion in 2023 (stable at rebounded and set new records. As of 2023, the top net roughly 0.41% of the aggregated GDP). Outflows have exporters were the United States (-85.3 billion US$) and increased even more sharply, surging by 51 percent to Switzerland (-33.6 billion US$). The main beneficiaries of US$327 billion over the same period (about 0.57% of remitted inflows as percentage of GDP were Tajikistan the aggregated GDP). This upward trend reflects both (38% of GDP), Kyrgyzstan (19%), Kosovo (17.5%), rising global mobility and the increasing importance Uzbekistan (13.8%), Georgia (13.7%), the Republic of of migrants’ financial contributions for families, Moldova (12%), Montenegro (10.7%), and Bosnia and communities, and economies in origin countries. The Herzegovina (10.2%). Overall, these trends underscore resilience of remittance flows was particularly evident the critical role remittances play as an economic lifeline during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, when for millions.

Figure 2.10 OSCE Region - Estimated value (in current US$) of personal remittances to (received) and from (paid) OSCE countries8

350 bn $ 327 bn $

300 bn $

217 bn $ 250 bn $

200 bn $ 235 bn $

150 bn $ 165 bn $ 100 bn $

50 bn $

0 bn $ 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

Remittances Received Remittances Paid

Source: World Bank (2025). Note: Remittances paid and received are not perfectly comparable because data availability is not complete for every participating State between 2005 and 2023. For instance, data on remittances paid are missing for Turkmenistan and San Marino in 2023 but are available for remittances received.

8 Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. Personal transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or in kind made or received by resident households to or from non-resident households. Personal transfers thus include all current transfers between resident and non-resident individuals. Compensation of employees refers to the income of border, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by non-resident entities. Data are in current U.S. dollars.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 13 3. Regional insights:

3 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) 3. Regional insights: OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) Migration trends in OSCE Eastern Europe (Ukraine of female emigrants increased relatively more (204%) and Moldova) over the past decade are defined than men (187%). At the same time, the immigrant by a marked increase in emigration and relative stock remained largely unchanged, rising modestly from stagnation in immigration. Trends in the region must 5 million to 5.25 million. Unlike the broader OSCE area, be considered in the context of the ongoing war in OSCE EE’s demographic profile is now shaped by mass Ukraine. From 2015 to 2024, the number of emigrants outward flows and limited new arrivals, underscoring its nearly doubled from just over 5.4 million to more than significance as a region of emigration. 10.6 million (Figure 3.1), a 97 percent increase. The stock

Figure 3.1 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) – Stocks of emigrants and immigrants, 1990-2024

11 000 000

10 000 000

9 000 000

8 000 000

7 000 000

6 000 000

5 000 000

4 000 000

3 000 000

2 000 000

1 000 000

0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Emigrant Men Emigrant Women Immigrant Men Immigrant Women

Source: UN DESA (2025)

Compared to the OSCE as a whole, OSCE EE’s are estimated to be working abroad (IOM, 2024). At the soaring emigration rates and stable immigration same time, immigrants account for about 13 percent underscore accelerating depopulation and potential of the OSCE EE’s resident population, reflecting a labour shortages. By 2024, emigrants from OSCE 3-percentage-point growth over the past decade – in EE accounted for more than a quarter (26%) of the part, due also to the inflow of refugees to the Republic region’s population, up from around 11 percent in of Moldova from Ukraine. The region’s overall population 2015 (Figure 3.2). Similarly, more than a quarter of the continues falling from 56.4 million in 1990 to 41.1 million Republic of Moldova's economically active population in 2024.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 15 3. Regional insights: OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) Figure 3.2 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) - Stock of emigrants and immigrants as share of resident population, 1990-2024

30% 60 000 000

25% 50 000 000 49,2M 20% 40 000 000 41,1M

15% 30 000 000

10% 20 000 000

5% 10 000 000

0% 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Population Emigrants (as % of pop) Immigrants (as % of pop)

Source: UN DESA (2025; 2024). Note: population data only covers until 2023.

The war in Ukraine of 2022 has dramatically Ukrainian refugees are women and children, due to accelerated population movements in OSCE EE and conscription requirements that primarily affect men. forced displacement. By the end of 2023, Ukraine was Similarly, women and girls accounted for 58 percent of the world’s second-largest source of refugees, with more IDPs in 2023. Children made up 24 percent of Ukraine’s than 5.6 million registered abroad and about 3.6 million IDP population, significantly higher than their share (18%) internally displaced (Figure 3.3). The vast majority of of the overall population (UNHCR, 2024).

Figure 3.3 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) - Stocks of refugees and IDPs, 2000-2024

14M

12M

10M

0M 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

Total refugees in OSCE Total refugees from EE IDPS in EE

Source: UNHCR (2025). Note: 2024 data only cover up to mid-year.

16 The war in Ukraine has had an impact on irregular While the vast majority of Ukrainian displacement has migration patterns into the EU, with a measurable been managed through legal channels – particularly increase in detections of Ukrainian nationals the EU's Temporary Protection Directive – these figures attempting illegal border crossings since 2022 suggest that a subset of displaced Ukrainians and (Frontex 2025). Until 2021, the number of detected illegal migrants of other nationalities have resorted to irregular border crossings by nationals of Moldova and Ukraine routes, potentially due to documentation challenges, remained relatively stable and negligible (Figure 3.4). family separation, or attempts to reach specific The numbers surged dramatically in 2022, when destinations outside formal protection frameworks. detections of Ukrainian nationals rose from 112 in 2021 In contrast, detections of Moldovan nationals have to 5,148 in 2022, and reached 14,503 in 2024. Looking continued to decline, indicating that Moldova's migration more broadly at the detected irregular crossings by pressures have not translated into significant increases in all nationalities along the Eastern Borders Route, the irregular border crossings during this period. numbers increased from 615 in 2021 to 17,260 in 2024.

Figure 3.4 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) - Irregular arrivals from Ukraine and Moldova and on the Eastern Borders Route, 2009-2024

18 000

16 000

14 000

12 000

10 000 8 000 6 000

4 000

2 000

0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Moldova Ukraine Eastern Border Route

Source: Frontex (2025)

OSCE EE stands out as a net beneficiary of in 2022 – more than three times their 2015 level – remittance flows. As of 2023, Ukraine and the Republic declined significantly as the war in Ukraine disrupted of Moldova received about US$17 billion in remittances both labour mobility and economic conditions. In terms (at current prices), while total personal remittances of economic weight, remittance inflows represented paid from the region amounted to about US$0.5 billion about 9 percent of the region’s GDP in 2023 (slightly (Figure 3.5). Moreover, while inflows grew by nearly declining from 10.1% in 2015). These trends highlight the 70 percent between 2015 and 2023, outflows were region’s strong reliance on international remittances to about 30 percent lower. It should also be noted that both support local economies, making them especially crucial inflows and outflows declined in 2023 compared to the during periods of crisis and displacement. previous years. Outflows, after peaking at US$2.56 billion

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 17 3. Regional insights: OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) Figure 3.5 OSCE Eastern Europe (EE) - Estimated value (in current US$) of remittances paid and received, 2005-2023

4 20,18 bn $ 20 bn $

15 bn $ 17 bn $

10 bn $ 10 bn $

5 bn $ 2,6 bn $ 0,8 bn $ 0 bn $ 0,5 bn $ 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Remittances Received Remittances Paid

Source: World Bank (2025)

18 4. Regional insights:

4 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) 4. Regional insights: OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) The OSCE South-Eastern European region (Albania, declined from 18.1 to 17.0 million (Figure 4.1). During Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,9 Montenegro, the same period, the share of emigrants increased North Macedonia, and Serbia) continues to be from 21 to 26 percent, while the share of immigrants characterized by increasing emigration and remained stable at 6 percent. Among emigrants the declining population. High rates of poverty, wage share of women decreased from 51 percent in 2015 to gaps compared to other countries in Europe, and lack 50 percent in 2024 (UN DESA, 2025). Between 2018 of trust in institutions reportedly contribute to decisions and 2024, the number of work permits issued to foreign to leave (IOM, 2024). Young people and skilled workers workers across the region more than doubled, from often seek better-paying jobs in Western and Northern 40,000 to more than 100,000, as the regional economy Europe. Depopulation across the region is significant due experienced significant labour shortages, especially in to a combination of low birth rates and high emigration. the sectors of hospitality, construction, agriculture and Between 2015 and 2024, the resident population transport (IOM, 2024).

Figure 4.1 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Estimated population and Stock of emigrants and immigrants as share of resident population, 1990-2024

30% 21 000 000

25% 20 000 000

20% 19 000 000

18,1M 15% 18 000 000

17,0M 10% 17 000 000

5% 16 000 000

0% 15 000 000 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Population Emigrants (as % of pop) Immigrants (as % of pop)

Source: UN DESA (2024; 2025). Note: population data only covers until 2023.

After peaking in 2015, irregular migration from 2024. At the same time, thousands of young Albanians OSCE SEE to the EU has declined consistently have taken difficult journeys crossing the English Channel (Figure 4.2). From more than 33,000 detections in 2015, in small boats to try and reach the United Kingdom irregular arrivals from OSCE SEE decreased to less than (IOM, 2024; see also Chapter 1). Kosovo experienced a 1,000 in 2023 and 2024. According to Frontex data brief surge between 2013 (about 6,350 detections) and (2025), Albania has been the main source of irregular 2015 (almost 23,800 detections), quickly returning to migrants to the EU within the OSCE SEE region. historically low levels (less than 40 detections in 2024) However, detections of Albanians irregularly crossing the (Frontex 2025). EU border declined from 39,000 in 2009 to about 600 in

9 All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, should be understood in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.

20 Figure 4.2 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Detections of irregular border crossings to the EU, 2009 - 2024

45 000 40 000

35 000 30 000

25 000 20 000

15 000 10 000

5 000 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Serbia Albania Kosovo* Bosnia and Herzegovina North Macedonia Montenegro

Source: Frontex (2025)

The region has been characterized for being a the Hungarian border (Frontex 2025). However, after the transit corridor (the ‘Western Balkans Route’) peak in 2015 the number of migrants transiting via the for people coming outside of the OSCE SEE, and Western Balkan Route has remained low compared to moving towards Northern and Western Europe. The other routes, such as the Mediterranean (Figure 4.3). The main route used by migrants arriving in the region often three largest nationalities travelling this route between pass through North Macedonia and Serbia, and then 2015 and 2024 were Syrians, Afghans and Pakistanis. involve attempts to cross into the European Union across

Figure 4.3 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Irregular migration to the EU, 2009 - 2024

800 000

700 000

600 000

500 000

400 000

300 000

200 000

100 000

0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

WBR (transit) SEE (origin)

Source: Frontex (2025)

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 21 4. Regional insights: OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) Remittances remain a defining feature of OSCE GDP), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (10.2% of GDP). At the SEE’s economies. During the last decade, remittances same time, remittances paid by immigrants in OSCE received in the six OSCE SEE jurisdictions increased SEE to their countries of origin increased from about from about US$8 billion in 2015 to almost US$14 billion US$0.6 billion to US$1.4 billion, equivalent to about in 2023 (Figure 4.4), marking a 67 percent increase and 1 percent of the region’s GDP. Despite the difference in accounting for about 8 percent of the region GDP. As volume, remittances paid off the OSCE SEE region grew of 2024, the main beneficiaries of remittances inflows by 133 percent between 2015 and 2023. were Kosovo (17.5% of GDP), Montenegro (10.7% of

Figure 4.4 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Estimated value (in current US$) of remittances paid and received, 2005-2023

14 bn $

12 bn $ 14 bn $

10 bn $

8 bn $ 8 bn $ 6 bn $

4 bn $ 1,4 bn $ 0,6 bn $ 2 bn $

0 bn $ 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

Remittances Received Remittances Paid

Source: World Bank (2025)

The war in Ukraine has shaped displacement trends to nearly 69,000 and peaking at more than 118,000 in the OSCE SEE region (Figure 4.5). The number in 2023. As of 2024, Ukrainians accounted for almost of refugees hosted in the region remained relatively 70 percent of refugees in OSCE SEE. The number of stable and low from 2015 to 2021, fluctuating between internally displaced persons (IDPs) remained stable over approximately 44,000 and 26,000. In 2022, there was a the last decade, consistently hovering around 300,000. sharp increase, with the number of hosted refugees rising

22 Figure 4.5 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Displacement trends, 2000 - 2024

900 000 800 000 700 000 600 000 500 000 400 000 318 k 301 k 300 000 200 000 118 k 100 000 0 73 k 63 k 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Refugees hosted in OSCE SEE Refugees from OSCE SEE IDPs

Source: UNHCR (2025). Note: 2024 data only cover up to mid-year.

There was a slight increase in the number of people 62,000 to 73,000 (Figure 4.6). Notably, the number from OSCE SEE seeking refuge abroad, reversing of Albanians enjoying international protection more a 20-year long decline. In 2021, the number of people than doubled between 2015 (ca. 10,400) and 2024 from OSCE SEE seeking protection abroad rose from (ca. 22,000).

Figure 4.6 OSCE South-Eastern Europe (SEE) - Number of refugees by origin, 2014 - 2024

90 000 80 000 70 000 60 000 50 000 40 000 30 000 20 000 21 940 10 000 10 404 0 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina North Macedonia Serbia and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999) Montenegro

Source: UNHCR (2025). Note: 2024 data only cover up to mid-year. UNHCR collects data for both Serbia and Kosovo S/RES/1244 (1999) together as part of its regional data collection and operations in the SEE situation data.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 23 5. Regional insights:

5 OSCE South Caucasus (SC) 5. Regional insights: OSCE South Caucasus (SC) The OSCE South Caucasus region (Armenia, with a predominance of Eastern European destinations Azerbaijan, Georgia) displays a persistent pattern of (UN DESA, 2025). At the same time, immigrants were emigrant stocks consistently exceeding immigrant less than 575,000, but increasing from 492,000 in stocks, but the gap has gradually decreased in 2015. In relative terms, emigration decreased from recent years. As of 2024, the total number of emigrants about 14 percent of the resident population in 2015 to reached about 1.9 million, in decline from 2.2 million in 11 percent in 2024. The immigrants’ stock increased 2015 (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2). About two thirds of slightly from about 3 percent to 3.4 percent of the those who emigrated were residing in Europe in 2024, resident population.

Figure 5.1 OSCE South Caucasus (SC) - Estimated population and Stock of emigrants and immigrants as share of resident population, 1990-2024

24% 17,0M 18 000 000 16,4M 21% 16 000 000

14 000 000 18% 12 000 000 15% 10 000 000 12% 13,7% 8 000 000 9% 11,4% 6 000 000 6% 4 000 000 3% 2 000 000 3,0% 3,4% 0% 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Population Emigrants (as % of pop) Immigrants (as % of pop)

Source: UN DESA (2024; 2025). Note: population data only covers until 2023.

The percentage of women among emigrants stable between 2015 and 2024, at about 55 percent of increased to 50 percent in 2024. The proportion of the immigrant stock. This persistent predominance of male emigrants declined from 52 percent in 2015 to women immigrants reflects broader demographic and 50 percent in 2024 (Figure 5.2). Women continue to social trends in the region, including the feminization of represent the majority of immigrants. The prevalence migration and the significant role of women in cross- of women among immigrants has remained relatively border family reunification and labour mobility.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 25 5. Regional insights: OSCE South Caucasus (SC) Figure 5.2 OSCE South Caucasus (SC) - Emigrant and immigrant stocks by gender, 1990 - 2024

2 000 000 1 800 000 1 600 000 1 400 000 1 200 000 1 000 000 800 000 600 000 400 000 200 000 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Emigrant Men Emigrant Women Immigrant Men Immigrant Women

Source: UN DESA (2025)

Available estimates suggest irregular migration SC citizens in the EU (Eurostat, 2025).10 The number from OSCE SC countries remains negligible of orders to leave issued yearly to citizens from OSCE compared to regular emigration. According to SC by EU Member States fluctuated between 6,090 Frontex (2025), the number of individuals from Armenia, and 20,250 in the case of Georgia, with a peak in 2023. Azerbaijan, and Georgia who have been detected Orders to leave issued to Armenian nationals remained attempting irregular crossings into the EU remained between 2,500 and 5,000 annually, with a peak in 2017; below 500 annually throughout 2015–2024, with a and, in the case of Azerbaijani nationals, between 900 notable decline since 2020 (Figure 5.3). Complementing and 2,000, with a peak occurring in 2017. These figures these figures, return order statistics between 2015 and underscore that irregular migration into the EU from the 2024 demonstrate the limited irregular presence of OSCE OSCE SC is minor in scale and continues to decrease.

10 Specifically, data series: Third country nationals ordered to leave - annual data (migr_eiord).

26 Figure 5.3 OSCE South Caucasus (SC) - Detected irregular border crossings into the EU, 2009 - 2024

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

24 09

23 20 20

20 Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia

Source: Frontex (2025)

Despite a declining stock of emigrants, remittances residing in the region remained relatively stable between paid into OSCE SC countries have grown in nominal US$1.1 and US$1.8 billion, declining from 2.2 percent of value. The value of remittances received in Armenia, GDP in 2015 to 1.2 percent in 2023. As of 2024, remitted Azerbaijan, and Georgia grew from about US$ 4.2 billion inflows as a percentage of GDP amounted to 4.6% in (at current prices) in 2015 to almost US$10 billion in 2022 the case of Armenia, and 1.8% in the case of Azerbaijan (Figure 5.4). While remittances declined in 2023 to US$7.6 - both cases marked a decrease from 2015, when the billion, they still marked an 80 percent increase compared figures were 14.1% for Armenia and 2.4% for Azerbaijan. to 2015. As of 2023, remittances received in the OSCE In 2024, Georgia recorded about 11.8 percent GDP-worth SC correspond to nearly 6 percent of the region’s GDP. of remittances received, marking a 22.9 percent increase On the other hand, remittances paid out by immigrants from 2015 (9.6%) (World Bank, 2025).

Figure 5.4 South Caucasus (SC) - Estimated value (in current US$) of remittances paid and received, 2005-2023 10 bn $ 9% 9 bn $ 8% 8 bn $ 7,6 bn $ 7% 7 bn $ 6% 6 bn $ 5% 5 bn $ 4,2 bn $ 4% 4 bn $ 3 bn $ 3%

2 bn $ 2%

1 bn $ 1,8 bn $ 1,5 bn $ 1% 0 bn $ 0% 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20

Remittances Received (as GDP %) Remittances Paid (as GDP %) Remittances Received Remittances Paid

Source: World Bank (2025)

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 27 5. Regional insights: OSCE South Caucasus (SC) Between 2015 and 2024, the OSCE SC experienced During the same period, the number of refugees a notable rise in both internal and cross-border originating from the OSCE SC surged from 27,000 to displacement (Figure 5.5). The number of IDPs 188,000, a seven-fold increase in less than a decade

6 increased from more than 895,000 in 2015 to almost (Figure 5.5). This sharp rise was especially pronounced 956,000 in 2024 — a 6.8 percent rise over the period. By between 2020 and 2023, largely due to conflict between the end of 2023, Azerbaijan accounted for 68 percent of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. As of 2024, Armenia provided all IDPs in the region (657,749), Georgia for 31 percent temporary protection to more than 148,000 people. (295,831), and Armenia for 1 percent (7,600) (UNHCR, Azerbaijan became a major country of origin for new 2025; IDMC, 2023). asylum applications and temporary protection abroad, with more than 156,500 individuals receiving international protection in 2024 (UNHCR, 2025).

Figure 5.5 OSCE South Caucasus (SC) - Displacement trends, 2000 - 2024

1 000 000 900 000 956 k 800 000 895 k 700 000 600 000 500 000 400 000 300 000 188 k 200 000 100 000 27 k 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Refugees hosted in OSCE SC Refugees from OSCE SC IDPs

Source: UNHCR (2025). Note: 2024 data only cover up to mid-year.

28 6. Regional insights:

6 OSCE Central Asia (CA) 6. Regional insights: OSCE Central Asia (CA) OSCE Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, an 8.7 percent decrease. Meanwhile, the number of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) remains immigrants residing in the region saw a slight increase, predominantly a region of emigration, although in from approximately 3.8 million to 3.9 million over the the last decade the emigrants’ stock decreased same period. As of 2024, women made up a majority of while the immigrants’ stock slightly increased. The both emigrant (52%) and immigrant (57%) populations. stock of emigrants from OSCE CA declined from about The prevalence of women among international migrants 6.9 million in 2015 to 6.3 million in 2024 (Figure 6.1), has persisted over time (UN DESA, 2025).

Figure 6.1 OSCE Central Asia (CA) - Estimated stocks of emigrants and immigrants, by gender (1990 - 2024)

4 000 000

3 500 000

3 000 000

2 500 000

2 000 000

1 500 000

1 000 000

500 000

0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Emigrant Men Emigrant Women Immigrant Men Immigrant Women

Source: UN DESA (2025)

Unlike the broader OSCE area, OSCE CA’s an important feature of OSCE CA, rapid population population growth has outpaced migration growth and shifting age structures are increasingly patterns. Between 2015 and 2024, the resident important factors shaping the region’s demographic population grew from 69.1 million to 80.1 million, and economic landscape. The war in Ukraine disrupted marking a 16 percent increase (Figure 6.2). At the the historic mobility patterns from OSCE CA to the same time, the working age population (16 to 64) grew Russian Federation, a primary destination for migrant by 24 percent, from 40.8 to 50.6 million (World Bank, workers from the region. Migrant workers from OSCE 2025). Relative to the size of the resident population, CA have rapidly diversified their destinations, shifting to both emigration and immigration have shrunk between the European Union, the UK, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and 2015 and 2024 (Figure 6.2). Emigrants as share of the other parts of Asia such as the Republic of Korea, often resident population dropped from 10 to 7.9 percent, in the context of bilateral labour migration agreements while immigrants reduced from 5.5 to 4.9 percent. (ICMPD 2025). These trends underscore that while emigration remains

30 Figure 6.2 OSCE Central Asia (CA) - Stock of emigrants and immigrants as share of resident population, 1990 - 2024

13% 90 000 000 12% 80 000 000 11% 10% 70 000 000 9% 60 000 000 8% 7% 50 000 000 6% 40 000 000 5% 30 000 000 4% 3% 20 000 000 2% 10 000 000 1% 69,1M 80,1M 0% 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024

Population Emigrants (as % of pop) Immigrants (as % of pop)

Source: UN DESA (2024; 2025). Note: population data only covers until 2023.

Despite a decline in (long-term) emigration, where inflows represented almost 38 percent of GDP remittances received in OSCE CA have continued in 2023, followed by Kyrgyzstan (18.8 percent) and to grow at a remarkable pace.11 Remittances Uzbekistan (13.7 percent). These ratios are among received by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the highest globally and underscore the relevance of Uzbekistan increased from about US$9 billion (at labour migration for OSCE CA’s economies. During current prices) in 2015 to more than US$22 billion in the same period, remittances paid by immigrants in 2023, marking a 144 percent increase (Figure 6.3). the area grew by 19 percent, from US$4.0 billion in As of 2023, the total amount of remittances received 2015 to US$4.8 billion in 2022. Relative to the region’s accounted for about 5.6 percent of the region’s GDP, GDP, estimated remittances paid out of OSCE CA have up from 3.2 percent in 2015.12 The importance of remained stable around 1.4 percent. remittances is especially pronounced in Tajikistan,

11 Data on remittances received and paid in Turkmenistan are not available. 12 Excluding Turkmenistan.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 31 6. Regional insights: OSCE Central Asia (CA) Figure 6.3 OSCE Central Asia (CA) - Estimated remittances received and paid, 2005 - 2023

8% 24 bn $ 22,0 bn $ 22 bn $ 7% 20 bn $ 6% 18 bn $ 16 bn $ 5% 14 bn $ 12 bn $ 4% 9,1 bn $ 10 bn $ 3% 8 bn $ 6 bn $ 2% 4 bn $ 4,8 bn $ 1% 2 bn $ 4,0 bn $ 0 bn $ 0% 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Remittances Received (as GDP %) Remittances Paid (as GDP %) Remittances Received Remittances Paid

Source: World Bank (2025)

In the last decade, the number of refugees and of Afghan nationals, in the context of the seizure of refugee-like individuals hosted in OSCE CA surged power by the Taliban. The number of people receiving (Figure 6.4). The stock of persons receiving international international protection rose again in 2023 and 2024 protection in the region was as low as 3,144 in 2015. peaking at 115,076. As of 2024, Kazakhstan (57%) and This figure started increasing in 2020 and continued to Kyrgyzstan (22%) host the majority, with their country of grow in 2021, reaching 24,000. This first increase was origin reported as “unknown” (UNHCR, 2025). due to an influx, particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,

Figure 6.4 OSCE Central Asia (CA) - Estimated stock of refugees, 2000 - 2024

140 000 115 k 120 000

100 000

80 000

60 000

40 000 18 k 20 000

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Refugees hosted in OSCE CA Refugees from OSCE CA

Source: UNHCR (2025). Note: 2024 data only cover up to mid-year.

32 During the same period there was a slight increase have recorded the greatest increases between 2015 in the number of OSCE CA’s citizens receiving and 2024. The main countries of asylum are Germany, international protection abroad. The number of France, and the United States (UNHCR, 2025). Overall, refugees registered with UNHCR grew from 10,194 OSCE CA’s countries are a negligible source (less than in 2015 to 18,841 in 2024, almost an 85 percent 0.1%) of global displacement as well as within the increase. In relative terms, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan OSCE area.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 33 7. Conclusion

7 7. Conclusion

The migration trends documented in this report reflect economic, social and environmental factors; the both the prescience of the OSCE's comprehensive stark regional variations in migration patterns across approach to migration and the ongoing relevance of its the OSCE; and persistent challenges connected to foundational commitments. irregular migration, climate displacement, and record forced displacement levels require enhanced focus and From the 1975 Helsinki Final Act’s recognition of operational capacity, especially within the remit set forth migration's economic and social dimensions, to by the Ministerial Council Decision 5/09 on Migration Ministerial Council Decision 3/16 on the OSCE’s role management. in the governance of large movements of migrants and refugees with its focus on large-scale movements, Decision 5/09 tasks the Permanent Council and the the OSCE migration-related framework continues to OSCE executive structures to “Provide a broad regional provide essential guidance for addressing contemporary platform for dialogue on migration and security issues challenges. […]; Continue working on gender aspects of migration; Assist participating States, upon their request, to The resilience and growth of remittance flows, reaching improve migration legislation […]; Contribute to record levels despite global disruptions, demonstrate international efforts to assess the possible impact of migration’s continued contribution to sustainable environmental degradation on migratory pressures, development and co-development, validating the which climate change may magnify, in order to ensure OSCE’s focus on these connections since the Ministerial better preparedness in this area; Continue to assist the Council Decision 2/05 on Migration. participating States, upon their request, to promote effective migration management, including exchange The multifaceted nature of migration dynamics of best practices, and to facilitate legal migration and evidenced in this report, shaped by a constantly evolving fight illegal migration, while paying particular attention to set of global and regional factors, underscores how the bilateral and multilateral co-operation in this field”. OSCE’s mandate remains relevant. The organization's comprehensive, cross-dimensional approach offers a As a comprehensive security organization with framework for transforming migration into an opportunity participating States spanning major origin, transit, and for enhanced cooperation, shared prosperity, and destination countries, the OSCE is uniquely positioned regional stability. to leverage its consensus-based, inclusive structure and diverse membership to facilitate the dialogue and At the same time, the described scale and complexity cooperation that multifaceted challenges of migration of current migration dynamics; their linkages with require.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 35 Glossary 13

Asylum seekers - are individuals seeking international International migration - refers to the act of relocating protection, typically through an asylum application. In one’s place of usual residence across an international countries with individualized procedures, an asylum border to another country. Depending on the country seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been fully and institution, the definition of international migration processed and decided upon. Not all asylum seekers will may or may not include a temporary threshold (e.g. for ultimately be recognized as refugees, but every refugee is at least 12 months). International migrants are commonly initially an asylum seeker. defined based on their nationality or country of birth. These distinctions are relevant for both statistical and Emigration - refers to the act of leaving one’s country legal purposes. of nationality, birth or usual residence and relocating to another country with the intention of making it the Irregular migration - refers to movement of persons new country of usual residence. This is viewed from the that takes place outside the laws, regulations or perspective of the country of departure. international agreements governing the entry into or exit from a State of origin, transit or destination. Although Immigration - refers to the act of moving into a country a universally accepted definition of irregular migration other than one’s country of nationality, birth, or usual does not exist, the term is generally used to identify residence with the intention of making the destination persons moving outside regular migration channels. The country one’s new usual residence. This is viewed from fact that they use irregular migration pathways does the perspective of the country of arrival. not imply that States are not, in some circumstances, obliged to provide them with some forms of protection Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) - are persons under international law, including access to international forced to flee from their home or place of usual residence protection for asylum seekers fleeing persecution, as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts or generalized violence. Refugees are protected conflicts, generalized violence, human rights violations, under international law against being penalized for natural or human-made disasters and who, differently unauthorized entry or stay if they have travelled from a from refugees and asylum seekers, do not cross place where they were at risk. international borders. Labour migration - refers to movement of persons Internal migration - refers to the act of relocating one’s from one State to another, or within their own country of permanent residence within the same country without residence, for the purpose of employment. crossing international borders.

36 Migrant flow (international) - refers to the number of Refugees - Refugees are persons who flee their country international migrants arriving in (inflow) or departing from of origin and are unable or unwilling to return due to a (outflow) a country over a specific period, usually a year. well-founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social Migrant stock (international) - refers to the total group or political opinion. Refugee status is usually number of international migrants present in a given recognized as the positive outcome of an asylum country at a particular point in time who fall under the application and related process. However, under definition of “international migrant” applied by that state international refugee law, recognition as a refugee is (for legal purposes) or institution (for statistical purposes). declaratory and not constitutive. For example, a person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as Mixed migration - refers to the movements of people soon as they fulfil the criteria contained in the definition. across borders, generally in an irregular manner, involving They do not become refugees because of recognition, individuals and groups who travel alongside each other, but they are recognized because they are refugees. using similar routes and means of transport or facilitators, but for different reasons. People travelling as part of Regular migration - movements that occur in mixed movements have different needs and profiles compliance with the laws of the country of origin, transit, and may include asylum-seekers, refugees, victims and destination. of trafficking, unaccompanied or separated children, stateless persons, and migrants (including migrants in Remittances - in the migration context, private irregular situations or migrants in vulnerable situations). international monetary transfers made by migrants individually or collectively. Remittances are primarily sent Net Migration - is the net total of the number of to individuals in countries of origin with whom migrants immigrants minus the number of emigrants, including maintain close ties, although they may also be sent to both citizens and noncitizens, during the period. relatives in other countries of destination. The terms “social remittances” or “social capital transfer” are also Permit - in the migration context, documentation, increasingly used in reference to non-monetary transfers such as a residence or work permit, typically issued by resulting from migration such as transfers of knowledge, a government authority, which provides evidence that know-how, networking, and skills. a person has permission to reside or carry out certain activities (such as working or studying).

13 This glossary is based on the following sources: https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms; https://www.unhcr.org/glossary; https://population.un.org/wpp/ glossary-demographic-terms.

Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 37 References

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Migration trends across the OSCE, 2015-2025 39 Notes Supported by

OSCE Secretariat

Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic

and Environmental Activities

Economic Governance Unit

Wallnerstrasse 6

1010 Vienna, Austria

E-mail: Guido.Tintori@osce.org

www.osce.org/oceea

Key facts

Organisation Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Document type report

Adoption date September 22, 2025

Source OSCE