Water user association development in China : participatory management practice under Bank-supported projects and beyond

No. 83 / June 2003 SOCIAL ANALYSIS Water User Association Development in China: Participatory Management Practice under Bank-Supported Projects and Beyond Irrigation is crucial to China's agricultural productivity. and instead worried about getting enough water delivered Though less than 40 percent of the cultivated land is on time. Lack of feeling of ownership and inadequate irrigated, those lands yield two-thirds of the nation's farmer participation thus contributes to the problems produce. The Chinese government and farmers have thus mentioned above. In the peak irrigation season, farmers invested heavily in irrigation. The economic reforms that would conspire against one another to get better access to China began in the 1980s revealed several problems with water. As these examples suggest, China's irrigation its irrigation systems: low system capacity, slow and spotty problems required institutional as well as physical change. water delivery, massive water waste, and low productivity As part of its 1990 rural reform strategy, the Chinese relative to the water used. These problems stem as much government proposed to rehabilitate the irrigation sector. from poor operation and management as they do from any The Bank's assistance in this period proved crucial. lack of funds for maintaining and fixing the systems. For The first Bank-supported water project to propose both decades, many irrigation systems began falling apart as physical rehabilitation and management reform was the soon as they were built. Yangtze River Basin Water Resources Project ("the Yangtze Under the old command economy, irrigation-system project"), in the early 1990s. The project involved building management was dispersed among different levels of two new, large-scale irrigation systems in Hunan Province government administration, rather than concentrated in and improving four large-scale systems in Hubei Province, more efficient hydraulic units. Water was priced below where the "vicious cycle" of poor performance followed by cost, or not charged at all. As a result, each new irrigation system deterioration was fully evident. Detailed field system became another burden on government administra- preparation work indicated that, although the design and tion, which lacked funds for the operation and mainte- upkeep of the physical systems contributed to irrigation nance (O&M) of any of them. There were widespread "gray inefficiency, irrigation management was more important. water charges," fees nominally collected for water but used The Bank task team and its Chinese counterparts decided for other purposes. Moreover, the water charges that the to prepare a project that would address institutional reform farmers actually did pay were calculated by land area alongside physical rehabilitation, to make the new systems irrigated rather than by volume of water used (volumetri- sustainable. cally); farmers thus had no incentive to use water effi- Local and international experience has shown that ciently. participatory irrigation management by farmers (PIM) Since the government administered the irrigation sys- contributes to institutional improvement. In Hubei, the task tems, farmers had no say in their operation even though team discovered some participatory incentives that were they had invested much labor and capital in them. The already in place and were improving management at the farmers therefore cared little about system maintenance user-end of the irrigation system. For some years, farmers This note was prepared by Zong-cheng Lin of the World Bank. For more information on social analysis, contact the Social Analysis and Policy team at the World Bank, 1818 H St., NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, Fax: 202-522-3247, E-mail: socialanalysis@worldbank.org, Online: http://www.worldbank.org/socialanalysis SD Notes represent the views of their author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the World Bank. had operated several experimental "water user groups" (WUGs) on each lateral canal. Each of these groups then that had responsibility for the local irrigation networks. elected a head (larger groups might elect two) to represent These groups had delivered water and maintained the them at a branch-level water users' conference to establish lateral canals quite well, suggesting that farmer-group a WUA. In their groups, farmers discussed local irrigation management at the distribution-network level might work. needs and their expectations for change, and reviewed and The groups had two main weaknesses, though. First, they amended the WUA charter and regulations produced by had to be re-established each year. Second, they could not the conference. In accordance with that charter, the repre- elect their own leaders; local officials appointed them. sentatives to the conference elected a WUA executive Despite these drawbacks, the farmers saw these groups as committee. The committee proposed a one-year plan to the their own and jumped at the chance to manage their own conference for discussion and approval; once approved, local irrigation networks. With elections and formal legal the WUA was formally established. This process, begun in recognition, these groups could become permanent, farmer- the Yangtze project, has since been repeated in several managed water user associations. Bank-supported projects in dozens of provinces, with the enthusiastic cooperation of local farmers. The team found a model for managing the other end of the irrigation system in Hunan Province. The reformed The WUAs could mobilize farmers so easily because Tieshan Water Supply Corporation in Tieshan Irrigation farmers saw the obvious advantages in the system. Their District was designed to gather the irrigation-management mobilization in turn gave new impetus to local village authority that had been dispersed among different levels of works. Villages were rarely and coincidentally set up on government into a single body responsible for a defined hydraulic boundaries, and they were happy to let the WUA hydraulic unit. The Yangtze project combined these two help deal with irrigation matters and distribution-network innovations to create "self-financing irrigation and drain- maintenance. In many cases, villages voluneered resources age districts," or SIDDs, which would maintain a "virtuous to help establish the WUA, either lending it offices or cycle" of timely water delivery and efficient O&M. A SIDD providing the workspace with some furniter. Villages also has two main parts: a water-supply corporation (WSC) or often helped mobilize the community for both the WUA organization (WSO) that supplies water from the main conference and the executive-committee election. In most headwork, and water-user associations (WUAs) that take cases, WUAs and villages serve different purposes in rural care of the distribution networks. The two parts act like life, and they can thus cooperate without intruding on one sellers and buyers of water. Neither the WSC nor the WUA another's authority. In fact, they normally serve the same is a for-profit entity, though; both act as a non-profit social/ interests of the local population. Such clear allotment of productive service for farmers. The SIDD approach thus institutional responsibilities and authority has helped involved two meaningful transfers, one economic and one farmer participation and WUA operation. social: it transferred the irrigation system from a command The WUAs were established to take over the branch economy to a market one, and it transferred management of system O&M, but first their irrigation-management skills the local irrigation systems from the government to the had to be strengthened. The project authorities and local farmers themselves. water bureaus held repeated training programs for farmers The first WUA was established in June 1995 at on water delivery, facility maintenance and financial Hongmiao branch canal* in Zhanghe No. 3 Main Canal management. Each year the WUA committee presented the Irrigation District, in Hubei Province. Twelve more WUA water users' conference with its plans regarding the pilots were established in this district alone in following amount of water needed, the irrigation schedule, any years; the approach also spread to other project districts in facility construction or repairs, and the related labor and Hubei and Hunan. Intensive preparation work--including finance arrangements. It then signed a contract with the socioeconomic surveys, village meetings and household water supplier and coordinated with it during the irriga- interviews--was done for each WUA initiation. The teams tion season to deliver, measure and submit charges for disseminated project information, consulted farmers, and water. mapped local water and land resources, so as to contrast WUAs coordinate water delivery among the lower, proposed hydraulic boundaries with existing township middle and upper reaches of the branch canal and orga- and village irrigation management. nize water guards from the WUGs to monitor water-taking. Farmers warmly welcomed the project's incentives for The amount of water sold to the WUA was calculated improving the canal system and its management. As their volumetrically at the branch in-take; wherever possible, first step, the farmers established water-user groups WUA internal water delivery to the WUGs along the lateral canals was also calculated volumetrically. Within the WUGs, farmers usually calculated water use according to * A branch canal can usually irrigate 5,000-10,000 mu of the farm area of individual households (farmers are rarely farmland (6.07 mu=1acre), covering 500-1,000 households (note that there is not a direct positive correlation between these two able to measure the volume of water delivered to each figures). Lateral canals feed off of branch canals and cover 50- farm). In turn, the WUA collects water charges based on the 300 households. Both irrigation and plot size obviously vary, use by household, group and association, and then pays depending on the terrain, rainfall, and availability of ground the water supplier according to the contract. This is very and surface water. different from before. Previously water charges were 2 collected from the village or township, even though the improvement contributed more than 40 percent of the village or township's farms might draw water from several increase. different lateral or branch canals. The charges flowed into The improvements in management and O&M allowed the administration alongside agricultural taxes and other more land to be irrigated. The Zhanghe sub-project, for fees. It was difficult to tell which monies were actually example, expanded its irrigated land by 15 percent. Fur- spent on water--hence the room for "gray charges." To thermore, because of the better canal system and manage- remove this ambiguity, the SIDD approach involved only ment, individual households in Zhanghe district could rely two entities in water charges: the water supplier (WSC/ more upon canal water rather than pump water from local WSO) and the water user (WUA). ponds or rivers. Since pumping is much more expensive, The institutional reforms had their desired effects: timely such a switch had been a major goal for many of the delivery, efficient water use, and better O&M. Take the WUGs. Zhanghe No. 3 Main Canal and Dongfeng Irrigation The SIDD approach has several pro-poor impacts. Districts--two of the major subproject areas in Hubei. Several SIDDs are located in impoverished areas, like Water-delivery efficiency and capacity through branch and Liuduzhai in Hunan and Hetian, Kashi and Kerkzi in lateral canals was raised 50 to 100 percent in Zhanghe and Xinjiang. The improved water service means that farmers 30 to 50 percent in Dongfeng. Since water delivery was can secure their harvests each year regardless of the now calculated and charged volumetrically, farmers began weather. This contributes greatly to local poverty allevia- to use water more efficiently. Each WUA saved about 1.18 tion. The poorer and weaker households have some extra million cubic meters of water per year benefits. One major cause of poverty in such households is The SIDD approach also needed less labor. Because the the lack of able-bodied male laborers, which made it hard WUA ensured orderly water delivery, far fewer water to compete for scarce irrigation water in the old system. The guards were needed during the irrigation season. On an WUA eliminated such competition, both by increasing the average, a WUA saved about 1,548 labor days per year.* total amount of water available and assuring such house- This amounts to Y120,000 in labor costs, no small sum for holds some say in its allocation through their participation poor farmers. in the WUGs. To keep the costs down, the WUAs had to keep the In Zhanghe, a disabled married couple with two school- physical system in good shape. Most WUAs make annual age children had to pay Y200 for a water guard during the plans for canal and facility maintenance, and organize irrigation season. The increase in available water under the labor and capital inputs in accordance with their priorities WUA reduced the incentive to steal. The WUA also ap- and needs. Like unified water delivery, the WUA system pointed guards for the entire system, thus saving the family promotes unified maintenance. The physical system has the special fee. Another poor family in Hubei's Yindan thus improved under WUA management, which in turn district could previously use only the water left after others keeps costs down. had finished their irrigation. With the WUA's help, they now cultivate three mu of paddy, from which they earn Agricultural production has risen in the SIDDs. An Y800 per year. The SIDD system thus extends the opportu- independent investigation team from the Chinese Academy nities to benefit from irrigation to previously excluded of Agricultural Science found that, because enough water groups, even as it lowers the costs for prior beneficiaries. was delivered when farmers needed it, WUAs raised paddy yields in particular and agricultural outputs in The SIDD approach's impacts on improving irrigation and general. More concretely, the yield per mu had risen from alleviating poverty are encouraging. It gives farmers a 722.1 kg before the WUA to 764 kg after; about a 6 percent sense of ownership, increases system efficiency and increase, of which about 35 percent was due to improved transparency, encourages social inclusion and equity, irrigation. Moreover, since yield per unit rose while irriga- reduces costs and enhances productivity. By the time the tion water per unit fell, the average grain output value per Yangtze project was completed in 2002, WUAs covered cubic meter of water rose from Y0.47 to Y1.7. Irrigation most of the irrigation/drainage districts in Hubei and Hunan. Meanwhile, about 500 WUAs (and 40 WSCs/ WSOs) had been established under other Bank-assisted * In the late 1990s, the cost for a man-day of rural labor on agricultural-development projects. The Ministry of Water public works was Y20, up from about Y15 in the early 1990s; Resources (MWR) disseminated the WUA approach as a Y8.26=$1. This rate is much higher than a farmer's normal daily good practice throughout the country. A SIDD Training earnings from agriculture. In the Yangtze project areas, a farmer's average net annual income was Y2,000-Y2,200 per Textbook, co-edited by the Office of Comprehensive Agri- person, about half of which came from crop production. A cultural Development, the MWR, and the Ministry of household normally has 4-5 members. In poor areas like the Finance's State Office of Comprehensive Agricultural Liuduzhai Irrigation District, income would be closer to Y1,000- Development, was published in 2001. With Bank help, a Y1,200. series of SIDD/WUA training programs have been carried Y1.70 would buy 1.70 kg of grain in China in 2000. This out nationwide. These have included numerous field visits output is comparable to the 1.60-2.00 kg of grain produced per to the pilot areas and experience exchanges among WUA cubic meter of irrigation water in the United States in the same practitioners: government officials, line agencies and WUA year. chairmen. By 2002, when the MWR hosted the Sixth INPIM 3 International Conference in Beijing, China had some 2,000 but the price of water in many areas is still set far below real WUAs spread through most of the provinces. costs. On the one hand, although the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) and the MWR encouraged The experience of WUA development in China also water price reform to meet the full water costs, most provin- identified some constraints and challenges for deepening cial governments continue to impose price ceilings on and expanding the reform. More attention and effort are irrigation water, in order to "protect agriculture and needed for four things. First, most SIDDs were established farmers from too high production costs." On the other with project support and thus had favorable policies and hand, farmers also oppose raising water prices, because funds. Not all irrigation and drainage districts will have they already suffer under the heavy burdens of taxes, fees this advantage. There needs to be overall policy support at and compulsory labor. Water will not become a freely the national and provincial levels, including funds for traded commodity overnight. Still, with the SIDD reforms, initial system rehabilitation. the government has agreed to separate water charges from Second, support from governments, especially from local other fees and taxes. This is an important step toward fair township authorities, proved crucial to success. Because and transparent prices, and it makes self-management and the reform threatens some of their vested interests, however, self-financing easier for farmers. In fact, based on the cost- some township authorities might oppose a WUA. Such recovery studies of WUAs carried out during the SIDD attitudes have indeed hampered the development of some training program, most WUAs were able to raise water WUA pilots. Efforts are still needed to sell the idea of charges 5-10 percent to meet their own operation expenses, participatory management to township staff. Meanwhile, as discussed and agreed at the WUA conferences. This substantial policy support from higher levels of govern- action reflects the WUAs' innovative attitude toward ment and demonstration of results by the WUA will help constraints and gives hope for their future performance. build township support. In 2002, a combined SDPC/MWR research investigation Third, for decades, many local water authorities and of water prices in one hundred large- and middle-sized irrigation districts have had a top-down, command ap- irrigation and drainage districts reviewed the roles of the proach to managing water delivery and system mainte- established WUAs. It recommended formally regularizing nance. Such authorities often try to apply the same ap- the WUA's status and functions in irrigation management. proach to SIDD/WUA. This behavior retards the bottom-up It further recommended mobilizing farmers and strengthen- concept of the SIDD/WUA approach and distorts its ing the coordination between the local water sector and participatory nature. As a similar case study* urged, the township authorities, so as to expand the WUA approach. traditional entrenched interests must be dislodged by It also recognized that water prices are a bottleneck to replacing the conventional "patronage with participation" further reform. These recommendations show that the with a new paradigm of "partnership with empowerment." government agrees that WUAs can both improve the lives To this end, four key principles of WUA have to be empha- of farmers and contribute to China's ongoing agricultural sized: reforms. a) A WUA is the farmers' own organization; farmers elect, farmers manage, farmers make decisions b) A WUA is organized hydraulically, not on existing administrative divisions c) A WUA measures and charges for water volumetrically d) A WUA has the right and capability to collect water charges and submit them to the water supplier, to pay for water and for its own self-financing and -manage- ment Fourth, water charges must be revisited. The SIDD/WUA approach changes how charges are levied and collected, * See Douglas L. Vermillion, "Irrigation Sector Reform in Asia: From `Patronage with Participation' to `Partnership with Empowerment,'" paper presented at the Asian Irrigation in Transition Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, 22-23 April 2002. "Social Development Notes" are published informally by the Social Development Department in the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank. They are aimed at encouraging discussion and comment among the development community on good practice in social development. SD Notes represent the views of their author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the World Bank. For additional copies, contact the Social Development Department, World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, MSN MC5-507, Washington, DC 20433, USA, Fax: 202-522-3247, E-mail: socialdevelopment @worldbank.org. Printed on Recycled Paper 4