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India - Bihar Plateau Development Project

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Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 21798 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-24390) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 80.7 MILLION (US$ 117.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO INDIA FOR THE BIHAR PLATEAU DEVELOPMENT PROJECT January 31, 2001 Rural Development Sector Unit South Asia Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective 1992) Currency Unit = Rupees (Rs) Rs. 26 = US$ 1.00 US$ 1.00 = Rs. 44.00 Completion Year (June 2000) FISCAL YEAR April 1- March 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BAU Birsa Agricultural university BPDP Bihar Plateau Development Project CAS Country Assistance Strategy CCA Culturable command area DOA Department of Agriculture ERR Economic Rate of Return FAO/CP FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program FD Forest Department GOB Government of Bihar GOI Government of India ICB International Competitive Bidding MID Minor Irrigation Department MTR Mid-Term Review NCB National Competitive Bidding NGO Non-government organization NPK Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Potash Fertilizer NPV Net Present Value O&M Operation and Maintenance PHED Public Health Engineering Department RCD Road Construction Department RDC Regional Development Commissioner REO Rural Engineering Organization SAR Staff Appraisal Report SCD Soil Conservation Department SDR Special Drawing Rights TSP Tribal Sub-Plan WATSAN Water and sanitation associations WHT Water harvesting tanks WUA Water users associations Vice President: Mieko Nishimizu Country Manager/Director: Edwin R. Lirn Sector Manager/Director: Ridwan Ali Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Harideep Singh FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT INDIA BIHAR PLATEAU DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit No. 2439-IN) CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data l 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 1 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 10 6. Sustainability 11 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 13 8. Lessons Leamed 16 9. Partner Comments 16 10. Additional Information 17 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 18 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 20 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 22 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 23 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 25 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 26 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 27 Annex 8. Borrower Evaluation of the Project (unedited) 28 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT INDIA BIHAR PLATEAU DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit No. 2439-TN) Preface This is the Core Accountability Implementation Completion Report (CAI) for the Bihar Plateau Development Project in India, for which Credit 2439-IN in the amount of SDR 80.7 million (US$117.0 million equivalent) was approved on November 19, 1992, and made effective on March 16, 1993. The Credit closed on June 30, 2000, two years later than planned at appraisal. The final disbursement was made on January 18, 2001. Disbursement totaled to SDR 67.9 million (84% of the Credit), and SDR 12.8 million is to be canceled. The ICR was prepared jointly by Harideep Singh (SASRD) and John Weatherhogg (FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program), and peer-reviewed by Syed Husain (EASRD) and Christine Cornelius (AFTR1). No comments were received from the Borrower on the ICR prepared by the Bank staff though Government of Bihar's views on the draft ICR were received from time to time and have been reflected in the final ICR. The Borrower contributed to the ICR by preparing an Evaluation Report of the Project which is attached as Annex 8. The June 15-22, 2000 ICR Mission Aide Memoire and the Financial and Economic Analysis for the ICR are available in the project files. Project ID: P010408 Project Name: BIHAR PLATEAU Team Leader: Harideep Singh TL Unit: SASRD ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: January 31, 2001 1. Project Data Name. BIHAR PLATEAU LIC/TE Number: IDA-24390 Country/Department. INDIA Region: South Asia Regional Office Sector/subsector: Al - Irrigation & Drainage; AR - Research; TR - Rural Roads; WR - Rural Water Supply & Sanitation KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: Effective: 03/16/93 03/16/93 Appraisal: 05/01/92 MTR: 12/01/95 02/02/96 Approval: 11/19/92 Closing: 06/30/98 06/30/2000 Borrower/lImplementing Agency: India/Govemment of Bihar, through the Regional Development Commissioner Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President. Mieko Nishimizu Joseph Wood Country Manager: Edwin Lim Heinz Vergin Sector Manager: Ridwan Ali Shawki Barghouti Team Leader at ICR: Harideep Singh Gallus M. Mukami ICR Primary Author: Harideep Singh (Bank) and John Weatherhogg (FAO/CP staff) 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: U Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: 3.1.1 The overall objective of the project was to increase rural income and alleviate poverty of the tribal people in the underdeveloped southern plateau of Bihar state, which was linked to five development objectives: (i) increase agricultural production; (ii) improve market access: (iii) introduce a participatory and integrated approach to planning; (iv) improve access to potable water; and (v) strengthen the Tribal Area Development administration model. These objectives were to be achieved through: * making investments in infrastructure to facilitate delivery of agricultural services for increasing production and improving access to markets; * strengthening planning, coordination and monitoring by the local administration; * expanding beneficiary involvement in project activities; and * promoting environmentally sustainable activities. 3.1.2 The project's development objectives and direction of assistance to the poor tribal population of Bihar matched Government of India (GOI) and Government of Bihar (GOB) priorities. Project scope was quite ambitious covering an area of some 23,000 sq. kms. in 67 administrative blocks, including 7,370 villages and a population of about 3.7 million of which over 80% belonged to scheduled tribes and castes. In line with both Government and World Bank development strategy the project placed emphasis on sustainable agriculture, water and rural development as key components for poverty alleviation. In this respect the project is also fully consistent with the 1997 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). Bihar is one of the poorest states in India with less than adequate project management capacity as demonstrated by previous and other on-going Bank-assisted projects. Acceptable implementation performance has always been a key challenge. This project was therefore ambitious in its expectation of satisfactory implementation but relatively modest in its scope. 3.2 Revised Objective: 3.2.1 Project objectives remained unchanged at the Mid-Term Review (MTR), although there was some adjustment in the size of the components. 3.3 Original Components: 3.3.1 The project consisted of five components, namely: * agricultural development (applied agricultural research and extension, improved crop varieties and animal species, watershed development); * minor irrigation and drainage (lift and gravity schemes, including some smaller microlift schemes); * rural roads (including bridges); * drinking water; and * project implementation support, including institutional strengthening of the Minor Irrigation Department (for irrigation) and the Rural Engineering Organization (for roads). 3.3.2 The Agricultural Development component was small, accounting for less than 6% of project cost and focused on funding the Birsa Agricultural University (BAU) to: test and improve crop varieties and animal breeds; support adaptive research through on-farm trials, demonstrations and training; test improved seed of rice, sorghum and millet; and pilot soil and water conservation in selected catchments. 3.3.3 The Minor Irrigation and Drainage component amounted to almost one third of project cost, and included: rehabilitation of about 5,000 ha of existing gravity schemes and construction of 7,000 ha of new schemes; rehabilitation of 2,500 ha of lift irrigation schemes and 500 ha of new schemes; construction of about 1,500 ha of small gravity schemes of sizes less than 30 ha each; construction of about 4,000 dug wells, each irrigating about one ha; and construction of about 690 water harvesting tanks (WHT) serving an area of some 3,500 ha. The total irrigated area to be rehabilitated or newly created by the project was - 2 - estimated at about 24,000 ha. The component also included funds for constructing and equipping a design office and materials testing laboratory, providing equipment, transport, technical assistance, training and meeting incremental operating costs. 3.3.4 The Rural Roads was the largest component, accounting for about half of project cost. It consisted of upgrading about 1,200 km of intermediate roads, tracks and bridges. Funds were included for road maintenance during the project period, consultant services for road survey, design, preparation of civil works contracts and supervision of construction, equipment and vehicles for survey, materials testing and quality control, construction of an office, laboratory and workshop, and staff training. 3.3.5 The Drinking Water component at about 12% of project cost financed boring 13,060 wells and installing a hand-pump on each, providing equipment and chemicals to improve an existing water quality testing laboratory, transport, pump spare parts, formation of water user groups, and mechanics training. 3.3.6 The Project Implementation component provided about 1.5% of project cost to strengthen the Regional Development Commissioner's (RDC) office, including training and recruiting additional staff, providing vehicles and equipment, meeting operating costs, funding supporting activities by non-government organizations (NGOs) and additional innovative schemes to be developed during implementation, preparing a training program for project staff, developing a monitoring and evaluation system and carrying out a baseline social survey. At the State-level the project financed vehicles, office equipment and operating costs for the Development Commissioner's office in Patna, and provided funds to conduct studies intended to develop innovative activities in the project area. 3.3.7 Project design reflected the GOI and GOB policies, the Bank's development strategy, and was well related to the achievement of project objectives. It also incorporated lessons learned from previous IDA assisted projects. The main problems of earlier projects listed in the SAR included delays in project mobilization and procurement, poor quality design and construction, and inadequate maintenance of roads and other infrastructure, institutional weakness, inadequate financial support by the State Government, and limited beneficiary participation. These were also listed as risks for the project. To mnitigate these risks, the project was designed (a) to be managed with reduced government involvement through extensive participation of local communities (in planning of project investments, sharing a portion of the initial investment cost, and assuming full operating and maintenance responsibility following asset handover to the user groups formed during project implementation); (b) to use extensive NGO support in irrigation and drinking water components; and (c) to overcome departrnental weaknesses through use of technical design and contract supervision consultants in irrigation and rural roads components which would improve preparation, implementation and supervision of these components, and also build capacity in these departments to undertake future programs more effectively. These measures were to be further supplemented by thorough project preparation, emphasis on staff training, and a strong monitoring and evaluation system. 3.3.8 The Bank did not include in its preparation and appraisal missions a financial analyst or a procurement specialist to undertake an in-depth reviews of the implementing agency's capacity (as is now required). Consequently, project design was relatively weak in these areas. This weakness was further exacerbated by a failure to include a financial analyst on supervision missions during the first two years of the project. In particular, the project design (a) did not suggest a workable arrangement for adequate and timely release of funds for project activities. Setting up a Steering Committee under the chairmanship of the Development Commissioner with participation from Planning and Finance Secretaries was not a very effective mechanism to ensure funds flow to the project; and (b) required the Project Director's position to be filled by an officer higher in level only to the line department heads. The project should have required - 3- the incumbent to be sufficiently senior to the Deputy Commissioners too, who had the responsibility for coordinating project activities at the district level. These two inadequacies resulted in slower than expected project implementation. 3.3.9 With the exception of the above two areas, the overall project design was responsive to the potential risks identified from previous IDA assisted projects, and is rated as satisfactory. 3.4 Revised Components: 3.4.1 A number of changes were made to project components at the time of MTR, though the main structure of the project remained the same. The main changes were to: * increase the size of the rural roads component. The road length rose marginally from 1200 km to 1290 km, but the number of bridges expanded from 65 to 230 and total bridge length from 4,780 m to 10,280 m since a number of missing link bridges were identified for inclusion. * reduce the size of the agricultural development component by dropping eight of the twelve catchment areas selected for soil and water conservation. * focus mainly on rehabilitation of existing defunct schemes (with almost no irrigation) and drop development of new irrigation schemes. * increase Birsa Agriculture University (BAU) involvement in the project by including sub-components for tissue culture and mushroom spawn production (including construction of a very fine Biotechnology Center on the BAU campus), floriculture, expansion of breeder seed production, and soil micro-nutrient analysis. 3.5 Quality at Entry: 3.5.1 Apart from the weaknesses noted earlier in terms of financial management and procurement assessments, and requiring the Project Director to be at a sufficiently senior level in the hierarchy, a key risk identified at design stage related to weak management of government departments and inadequate participation by beneficiary groups. The proposed risk mitigation approach required (a) thorough preparation of the first year schemes (using extemal consultants) to mitigate delays in start-up; (b) formation of, and fiull participation by, user groups in the irrigation and drinking water components for first year schemes; (c) appointment of technical and supervision consultants in the roads and irrigation components before commencement of project implementation; and (d) identification of NGOs, assessment of their capabilities, willingness of GOB to use these agencies, and formal NGO contracting for first year schemes. These actions should have been completed before project effectiveness but not being required, took over two years to be completed during implementation, resulting in delayed start-up. Thus, while the project was designed to respond to this key risk, its readiness for implementation was weak. Quality at entry is, therefore, rated as unsatisfactory. 3.5.2 No Quality Assurance Group (QAG) review of Quality at Entry (QAE) was carried out. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: 4.1.1 Overall Outcome. The project was reasonably successful in achieving its objectives. However, completion of the project required two years extension of the original Credit closing date and most of the project's construction activities were completed in the last two and a half years of implementation. By March 1997, four years after credit effectiveness, disbursement was only 17%, compared to the appraisal - 4 - target of 72%. Due to delays in hiring consultants, late and inadequate budget releases, and failure to fill essential project staff positions, the project was rated a "problem project" during May-November 1997. Major effort by project management and Bank supervision teams since 1997 led to the achievement of most project outputs by the revised June 30, 2000 Credit closing date. 4.1.2 The overall development objective of increasing beneficiary incomes has been achieved. Farm income is expected to increase by over 100% over pre-project level at full development. Per hectare retums are expected to increase from US$108 (without project) to US$390-435 at full development. In terms of returns per labor day, income would increase from US$2.0 to US$3.5 for gravity and to US$3.3 for lift schemes. The achievement of the five specific development objectives noted in paragraph 1, and linked to project components, is discussed below. 4.1.3 Increase agricultural production. Data collected by the project staff on benefits from minor irrigation indicate that, with assured irrigation water, farmers are interested in adopting improved technology. The main changes in schemes already handed over to water users associations have been increased use of improved seeds and fertilizers, and increased cropping intensity, particularly in the Rabi (winter) and Garma (summer) season, including increased production of vegetables and other cash crops. The area under irrigation would increase by 36,600 ha. In the sample of some 30 irrigation schemes, cropping intensity has increased to 137% with project compared with 105% without project, with an expectation of further increase over the next 2-3 seasons. Most of the increased gross cropped area has been devoted to production of vegetables, potatoes, mustard, and wheat. While area under paddy and pigeon pea increased too, its share in the gross cropped area declined in relative terms. Crop yields have improved overall by about 20-35% but the most significant increases are seen in vegetables and paddy. Thus, despite an increase in overall gross cropped area and paddy yields, increase in production of vegetables and wheat have overshadowed paddy production compared with appraisal estimates. 4.1.4 Improve market access. Development of the rural roads has improved farmers access to markets, particularly for sale of the increased production of perishable commodities such as vegetables, fruit and flowers. It has also improved accessibility for large areas of the Chotanagpur Plateau and the Santhal Parganas, making it much easier for farmers to get agricultural inputs and extension advice, apart from other social services. 4.1.5 Introduce a participatory and integrated approach to planning. The objective at appraisal of heavy reliance on devolved planning and implementation by communities has not been fully realized, although some progress has been made towards achieving this aim. The main problems appear to have been the long established and recognized responsibility for the line departments to implement programs, a bias toward keeping government funds for govenmment agency operation, a cautious attitude by GOB towards working with NGOs, especially since this also involved financing, and the poorly developed community institutions in the tribal areas. 4.1.6 Improve access to potable water. This development objective has been fully realized - the target set at appraisal of supplying drinking water to a rural population of about 2 million has been realized. Additionally, there are reports of a sharp fall in the incidence of water-borne diseases in the areas where project-assisted hand pumps have become operational. 4.1.7 Strengthen the Tribal Area Development administration model. Increased devolution of decision making and institutional strengthening including increased staff and training was expected to result in a stronger administration for the tribal areas. The project has been successful in strengthening the office of the RDC, and implementation of the project has also left the Regional Engineering Organization (REO), the - 5- Minor Irrigation Department (MID) and the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) stronger and more competent than at project commencement. 4.2 Outputs by components: 4.2.1 Output indicators are presented in Annex 1, linked to project components and development objectives. Appraisal or MTR estimates, compared with actual achievements, or estimates based on project monitoring data and implementation experience, indicate that the project outputs met MTR estimates for all components, except rural roads (with a 90% achievement). 4.2.2 Agricultural Development. The main physical achievements of the component have been the success of the BAU in (a) developing improved strains of cross-bred pigs and goats which are popular with farmers, (b) establishing the six seed processing facilities with the arrangement for them to be run by farmer cooperatives, with a combined capacity of around 3.5 ton/hour of paddy seed (or about 6 ton/hour of wheat seed), and (c) developing soil and water conservation works. For the latter it was originally intended for 12 watersheds to be treated, two by the Soil Conservation Division of the Department of Agriculture (DOA) and 10 by the district administrations. By MTR, the sub-component was well below its original target and little had been done by the districts. In view of the fact that there was already a major watershed management project being implemented in the plateau area at the same time, it was decided to reduce the target to four watersheds, all to be implemented by the Department of Soil Conservation. These four watersheds cover an area of about 2,000 ha and activities have included crop demonstration, involving 2,200 families, agro-forestry and dryland horticulture, including distribution of 66,000 plants, vegetative hedges on about 300 ha, check dams, silt detention dams and bio-mass management. 4.2.3 The seed sub-component has successfully established an integrated seed production system with BAU providing breeder seed, DOA using this to produce foundation seed, and contract farmers multiplying this to produce seed suitable for subsequent certification and sale. Technical plant operating and management assistance is provided by the Bihar State Seed Corporation. Despite interruption of the program due to lack of a Director of Agriculture in 1998-99, some 216 tons of foundation seed have been produced in the latest kharif season. Pilot scale activities in floriculture and fruit tree planting have been the responsibility of the Department of Horticulture, and have been satisfactory in providing planting material and training to farmers, many of whom are women. With project finance, BAU has constructed a Biotechnology Center with laboratories equipped for tissue culture and mushroom spawn production. The University is also successfully developing floriculture activities. Overall the training programs in the component have included 19,540 farmers in all 67 blocks, training for 1,248 field and extension staff at BAU, and training of 73 DOA staff at institutions outside Bihar. 4.2.4 Minor Irrigation and Drainage. Although project implementation has been much slower than anticipated at appraisal with over 70% of the gravity and lift schemes being completed only in 1999/2000, the overall physical targets have been achieved and the appraisal target of creating 24,000 hectares of culturable command area (CCA) has been exceeded. Comparison of achievement and target for the various schemes is as set out in the table on the following page. 4.2.5 The PIU estimates culturable command area (CCA) of 36,000 ha by July/August 2000. At present some 20,000 ha are actually under irrigation, and a further 10,000 ha are reported to be ready to be used for irrigated agriculture. No details are available for schemes under implementation by the district administrations. Cropping intensity of 137% on a sample of about 30 commissioned schemes compared with an SAR target expectation of about 130%. Some further expansion in cropping intensity can be expected, particularly in the lift irrigation schemes where a profitable summer (Garma) crop can be grown. - 6 - Considerable cropping pattern diversification is taking place with more HYV paddy and maize, potato, and vegetables (latter, particularly in the Garma season). Water Users' Associations (WUAs) have been formed in all the 424 schemes where works have been undertaken. Of the 417 gravity and lift schemes completed, about 292 schemes have so far been handed over to the WUAs for O&M responsibility. Of the 116 lift irrigation schemes handed over to the WUAs, many are already meeting their own fuel costs, but have yet to commence providing for maintenance in a formal and systematic way. Performance in sharing of cost of rehabilitation has not been encouraging. At appraisal it was expected that beneficiaries would contribute about 20% of the cost; this is however restricted to 2-5%, either as labor or cash. Beneficiaries of all 424 WUAs have been trained, and about 100 WUAs have had a second round of training. Planned ax Achi'evement as on Achie\ement at full NMTR June 30. 2000 d.evelopmen' /a (December31, Number of Schemes Rehabilitation of gravity schemes 245 240 245 Rehabilitation of lift schemes 179 177 179 Sub-Total 424 417 424 Dugwells 4,564 3,521 /b 4,564 /b Water Harvesting Tanks (WHTs) 612 487 /b 612 /b Other schemes 315 181 /b 315 /b /a SAR provided 15,000 hectares of CCA for lift and gravity schemes (without number of schemes), 4,000 hectares (4000 schemes) for dugwells, 3,500 hectares for WHTs (690 schemes), and 1,500 hectares for other schemes (without any indication of the number of schemes) /b For these schemes, the June 30, 2000 target achievement information is based on reports which are at least 12 months old. Actual achievement is estimated to be close to 90% of the target, with full achievement expected by December 31, 2000 4.2.6 Rural Roads. The scope of the component eventually attempted (excluding work not started due to lack of either land/forest clearance, design or funds), covered 1069 km of roads and 177 bridges and causeways with a total length of 9,310 meters. Achievement at credit closing was about 95% for roads and 88% for bridges, as shown in the following table. Packages Road i Bndges Causeav ay- (kms ) Numbers ' lerers A. Appraisal target 1,200 4,780 B. Revised target at Mid-term 73 1,290 230 10,280 Review C. Work awarded 66 1,183 218 9,750 D. Work not started in 66 packages 31 440 E. Packages frustrated due to 7 114 10 340 insurgency F. Work effectively taken up 59 1,069 177 9,310 G. Work completed by June 30, 53 1,005 168 8,213 2000 H. Achievement as on June 30, 2000 90 94 95 88 of work taken up (% of G over F) -7 - I. Work to spill over and expected to 6 64 9 (eight bridges 527 be completed by January 31, 2001 and a causeway) 4.2.7 Drinking Water. The appraisal target of 13,060 pumps was raised at MTR to 15,542 to compensate for failed borings. A total of 13,336 wells have been commissioned, indicating a reasonable and acceptable failure rate of not striking water of around 14%. Capacity building of user-based Water and Sanitation Committees (WATSANs), and training of caretakers and mechanics has been taken up with the assistance of some 20 NGOs with good results. A total number of 13,114 samples from commissioned water sources were tested for potability. Only 358 samples were found to be unsuitable for drinking as per ISI standard. It was also reported by the project authority (based on an assessment study of 15 hospitals and Primary Health Centers) that there has been sharp fall in water borne diseases in the areas where project-assisted hand pumps have become operational. About 11,800 schemes have been handed over to the WATSAN committees by credit closing, and the balance of around 1,900 hand pumps are expected to be handed over by December 31, 2000. Many of these committees have already taken up maintenance of the facility handed over to them, and have even started accumulating funds for future repairs. An impressive 17,560 caretakers and 4,824 mechanics have been trained, and equipped with toolkits, to facilitate maintenance of these facilities in the post-handover stage. 4.2.8 Project Implementation. Physical targets were small, and achievements were limited to provision of vehicles and equipment to the Development Comnnissioner's office in Patna, the RDC's office in Ranchi, undertaking a staff training program and recruiting the services of NGOs. The component only partially achieved its objectives, since the budget for provision of management training was not drawn, and until the last year no funds were provided to NGOs. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: 4.3.1 The overall impact of the project has been re-evaluated, and the economic rate of return (ERR) re-estimated using the latest information on prices, actual project costs, physical achievements, agriculture productivity, and other accrued benefits. Detailed information on these analyses and assumptions are provided in the Report on Financial and Economic Analysis (document in project files). Two scenarios have been assumed in the re-estimnation of the ERR. Scenario 1 follows the SAR's approach, and includes only the Minor Irrigation and the Rural Roads components. Scenario 2 includes Scenario 1, and the Drinking Water component as well as the link bridges sub-component. 4.3.2 The ERR of Scenario 1 was estimated at 27%, which can be compared favorably with 17% of SAR's estimate. The increase of the overall ERR for scenario I is attributed mainly to the improvement in the Minor Irrigation component with its ERR increasing from 13% (SAR) to 29% (ICR). Major factors contributing to this higher ERR of the Minor Irrigation component are: (a) lower cost of investment as the project focused only on rehabilitation of existing schemes; (b) larger irrigated area achieved; and (c) higher proportion of vegetable production in the farmning system. When the Drinking Water component as well as the missing link bridges sub-component are added, the overall ERR drops to 24% (scenario 2). Comparison of ERRs estimated at appraisal and ICR for all major components as well as the whole project is summarized in the table below: SAR ICR Minor Irrigation 13 29 Rural Roads 21 23 -8 - Watershed treatment 13 Drinking water 1j 7 Missing link bridges 1_6 Whole Project (scenario 1) 1 7 27 Whole Project (scenario 2) l_ 24 4.4 Financial rate of return: 4.4.1 The project has provided good opportunities for wage employment to the rural communities in two ways: (a) direct employment of rural labor during implementation of the project; and (b) increased labor requirement through irrigation and improved farming. During implementation of the project, it is estimated that about 19 million person-days were employed for the Rural Roads component alone. As for agricultural labor required for irrigation and improved farming, it is estimated that the increase would be gradual and that an increment of about 2.3 million person-days would be generated per annum at full development. 4.4.2 Farm income would be improved due to: increase in cropping intensities, increase in crop yields, and change in cropping patterns toward higher values crops represented by vegetable. It is estimated that the income before labor would increase from about Rs.5, 1 00 per hectare to about Rs. 1 8,000-20,000 per hectare at full development (Report on Financial and Economic Analysis - document in project files). In terms of returns per labor day, it would rise from Rs.88 to Rs. 159 for gravity and to Rs. 151 for lift irrigation. In addition to the positive impact on farmers in irrigated areas, there are also positive financial impacts on farmers in general due to improved seeds and agriculture extension work. 4.5 Institutional development impact: 4.5.1 The funding provided by the project and the experience of project implementation have strengthened the RDC's office and have increased the competence of the line agencies, in particular REO, MID and PHED. Technical assistance provided by the expert consultants financed by the project has resulted in a good transfer of skills in contracting and tendering procedures, infrastructure design, construction and supervision. Some progress has also been made in strengthening community organizations in the predominantly tribal areas. Formation of user groups for the drinking water component in some cases has resulted in the groups maturing into self-help and savings groups with a much broader focus than mere well and pump maintenance. Maintenance of these schemes is ensured through more than 22,000 technically trained caretakers and mechanics. Formation of water user associations (WUA) on minor irrigation schemes started late. Although some assistance in formation and training of WUA was provide by the consultants, there was a delay in recruitment of the supporting NGOs. Support is now being provided by three NGOs which have been contracted to continue their activities until end-March 200 1. Positive results are already visible in many schemes where WUAs have transfonned into effective institutions. These achievements, and the partial success the project has had in institutionalizing the participatory and integrated approach to planning, indicate substantial institutional development impact. 4.6 Environmental Impact: 4.6.1 The main environmental benefit has been the provision of safe drinking water to a rural population of around 2 million, with subsequent very significant reduction in health problems. Risks of increased incidence of malaria as a result of increased irrigation, and creation of borrow pits for road construction identified at appraisal, do not appear have materialized to any significant extent. Continued attention will -9- be required with the drinking water component to ensure that the waste water is safely disposed of and does not provide a breeding ground for mosquitoes. Some felling of forest trees was reported in the MTR report prepared by consultants (Report on Mid-Term Review of Bihar Plateau Development Project, Agricultural Finance Corporation Ltd., December 1995) to accommodate road widening in forest areas, but this seems to have only occurred in very isolated instances. The effect of the much reduced soil and water conservation sub-component has been positive in reducing erosion, moderating runoff and increasing water retention, and hence in enhancing the productive ability of the rainfed areas. An environmental report by consultants in 1997 (Bihar Plateau Development Project Rural Roads Component: Environmental Review, Scott Wilson Resource Consultants, October 1997) gave the project a positive environmental rating. The overall environmental impact of the project is positive, but rated as modest. 4.7 Other Outputts: 4.7.1 The project was successful in encouraging GOB to develop a Roads Maintenance Policy. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: 5.1.1 The problem of insurgency constrained project implementation in a number of areas, in some cases, leading to abandonment of road construction, and in many other cases considerably slowing the progress. Four General Elections and two State Elections also disrupted project implementation. Steady devaluation of the Rupee against the US$ (the Rupee devalued from Rs.26 per US$ at appraisal to Rs.44 per US$ at ICR) made it possible to undertake a much larger rural road construction program without major funding difficulties. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: 5.2.1 Project implementation was seriously constrained by inadequate and late release of budget by GOB. Slowness in filling essential staff positions, over-frequent transfer of staff (In Chapter IV of the SAR, Agreements and Recommendations, para. 4.1 (b) it is mentioned that the Government would also minimize staff transfers, although this did not subsequently appear as a covenant in the Credit or Project Agreements, or in the President's Report) and long delays in recruiting consultants and NGOs were also instrumental in slowing project implementation. The main responsibility for implementation fell on the Project Director (PD) who was generally appointed at a grade equivalent to, or lower than, a District Collector (DC), and was therefore able to obtain limited cooperation from the district administrations. Land acquisition for rural road improvement from private landowners and the Forest Department (FD) was very slow. In the case of FD, by credit closing no agreement had been reached and consequently those sections of roads in forest areas, totaling some 65 km, spread over 18 blocks, as well as one bridge, have remained untouched, with consequent reduction in value of the whole road connection. The degree of managerial and financial autonomy of the RDC anticipated at project preparation and appraisal was never achieved, and flow of funds was a continuous problem (including difficulties due to lack of check drawing authority - in REO the Project Divisional Executive Engineer only had such authority from March 1995, more than two years after project start-up; also failure to fill senior posts had a simnilar effect, as for example when there was no Director of Agriculture in 1998-99, which dislocated the seed production program). Timeliness of fund release was also unhelpful, since budget was generally released only in July or August whereas construction work needed to be undertaken in April to June, before the onset of the monsoon. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: - 10 - 5.3.1 Lack of staff familiarity with IDA procedures for procurement and reimbursement slowed project implementation. Project management arrangements did not work as well as planned. As mentioned above, for most of the implementation period the seniority of the PD was inadequate to ensure full collaboration of the district administrations. From the line departments' viewpoint, the PD/PIU seemed to have too much executive power, rather than mere coordination of activities and tended to assume responsibilities the line departments regarded as their own. Despite the original idea for the project to have its own independent management, no separate Chief Engineer was appointed for the large road component, following the decision of appointing external agencies for design and supervision. This responsibility was taken by the Chief Engineer, REO, who also remained responsible for all other REO operations in south Bihar and was therefore not able to give his full attention to project implementation. Project management throughout implementation followed a traditional pattern with little devolution of responsibility to district administrations or to community groups. Where devolution to districts was tried, as with the soil and water conservation proposals, very little progress was made. Exceptions to this general pattern have been the successful formation of drinking water operation and maintenance groups, and more recently, the formation of WUAs to operate and manage the minor irrigation schemes. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: 5.4.1 At appraisal, total costs for the project were estimated at US$132.2 million. This was to be financed by contributions of US$15.2 million (equivalent) from GOB/ beneficiaries, and a Credit of SDR 80.7 million (equivalent to US$117.0 million) from IDA. Preliminary estimates place the project cost as US$121.4 million. GOB/beneficiary and IDA shares are reduced to US$14.7 million and US$106.7 million respectively. 5.4.2 An important aspect to note is that despite the lower project cost in US$ terms, actual amount in local currency has increased from Rs.3,895 million at appraisal to about Rs.4,722 million. Most of the increase was for rural roads (up from Rs.1,910 million to Rs.2,888 million) due partly to the increase in the physical target at MTR and partly to cost escalation. Slight increase was also experienced for drinking water (up from Rs.422 million to Rs.537 million) due to the increase in the drilling targets resulting from unsuccessful bores. Minor irrigation costs actually reduced from Rs.1,302 million to Rs.1,137 million due largely to the early dropping of the development of new schemes, and focusing more on rehabilitating existing schemes at lower cost. 5.4.3 Of the Credit of SDR 80.7 million, actual disbursement totaled to SDR 67.9 million (84% of the Credit); undisbursed balance of SDR 12.8 million is due to be canceled. The Credit, equivalent of US$ 117.0 million at appraisal, is equivalent to US$109.2 million (sum of the disbursement of US$92.7 million over the project period and the undisbursed balance of US$16.5 million at closing) due to the strengthening of the US$ vis-a-vis the SDR. Due to expenditure (mainly on rural roads) being incurred post-Credit closing, and also some expenditures remaining unclaimed due to some unresolved issues, disbursement totaled to US$92.7 million against IDA share of US$106.7 million. These contractual obligations will now have to be financed out of GOB's internal resources, effectively increasing GOB/beneficiary share in project costs from US$14.7 million to US$28.7 million. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationalefor sustainability rating: 6.1.1 Sustainability of the project components depends on the effectiveness of the arrangements made for their future operation and management. For the agriculture component (3% of project cost), arrangements - I1 - have been made for the six seed processing units to be operated in future by farmer cooperatives, with technical assistance provided by the Bihar State Seed Corporation. Three of the six plants are already functional with these arrangements which appear to be adequate. The animal breeding activities of BAU have already produced improved breeds of pigs and goats which are proving popular with farmers. BAU have successfully developed a second line of breeders competent to multiply the improved breeds for subsequent sale to farmers on a commercial basis. The soil conservation component focuses on increasing water retention on rainfed areas and conversion of gulleys into paddy land by provision of small checkdams/gully plugs. These activities are reported to be popular with farmers. The sustainability of this component is therefore rated as likely. 6.1.2 The minor irrigation component (25% of project cost) includes handover of the facilities rehabilitated to WUAs. As on October 31, 2000, about 75% of the schemes were transferred to farmers groups; the process of handing over for the remaining schemes was expected to be completed by December 31, 2000. Farmers in a large number of these schemes are already meeting the operating cost, although provision for maintenance and replacement is not yet being made. A majority of the WUAs were registered in 1997-98, and support was required to turn the existing groups of beneficiaries into proper WIUA institutions to operate and maintain the schemes, and to be fully self-financing. This was of particular importance for the lift irrigation schemes. GOB formally recruited three NGOs in March 2000 (although these agencies had commenced work earlier in January 2000) to provide further support to the WUAs on some 308 prioritized schemes. Positive impacts of the NGO involvement were witnessed during the June 2000 field visits, and further confirmed during October discussions with the project and departmental staff. With the underlying financial viability of these schemes, the active NGO involvement, which has been arranged to continue providing support to user groups and to mobilize savings for maintenance for a 15 month period, up to end-March 2001, and the encouraging initial evidence of functioning WlUAs compared with the situation in the earlier years, the likelihood of successful group operation with NGO assistance is strong. Sustainability is therefore rated as likely. 6.1.3 For the rural roads component (60% of project cost), about half the investment cost of the component is in bridges which are virtually maintenance free. The roads portion of the component will need regular maintenance and repair if they are to continue in existence. These roads are of low-cost, low-traffic volume specification with the option of future upgrading to black-top standard. Funds allocated for maintenance by the project could not be used, particularly since with the approaching closing of the credit all attention was directed at construction activities. GOB policy is that all roads of more than 20 km length and connected to main roads should be transferred to the Road Construction Department (RCD) for maintenance. At the insistence of the project, GOB has also adopted a Roads Maintenance Policy for implementation. Project constructed hard crust murrum roads require application of murrum blindage every year and the renewal of the top wearing course every three years. Cost of such maintenance is relatively low of the order of Rs. 10,000 per km per year and renewal costing Rs.50,000 per km every three years. Total annual cost of road maintenance would be of the order of Rs. 15 million. One possibility would be for the work to be financed under the governnent's Employment Assurance Schemes (EAS) at the district level, which requires about 30% of the budget to be devoted to maintenance of assets. The annual budget in the 10 project districts (in which project roads are situated) for such schemes is about Rs. 1 billion, Additional funds are also available from RCD and REO. GOB now needs to clearly spell out a mechanism to put the institutional arrangement, the Roads Maintenance Policy, and the fund sources together to evolve a Roads Maintenance Plan. At the ICR mission's final meeting the RDC indicated that funds for adequate road maintenance were available and that keeping the project-constructed rural roads in a good state would not be a problem for the state government. Though there is a risk that adequate funds may not get allocated for roads maintenance, the huge social and economic benefit accruing from this component, the intermediate nature of these roads, the relatively small amount required for their - 12 - maintenance, and the assurances on the availability of funds at the district level give a sufficient level of comfort on their regular maintenance. Creation of a separate maintenance fund with regular transfer of funds would have been a more satisfactory arrangement. However, the move towards defining and prioritizing the rural roads maintenance needs under the Policy and the Plan, and identifying and setting aside the required funds at the district level for this purpose suggests a step in the right direction. The component's sustainability is therefore rated as likely. 6.1.4 The drinking water schemes (12% of project cost) are rated fully sustainable. The hand-pumps used are relatively maintenance-free (even for those installed in 1995, no significant repairs have been necessary), the Water and Sanitation Associations (WATSANs), mostly with women members, have already started collecting funds for maintenance of the facility, and are in some cases, also beginning to mature into small credit self help groups. The maintenance requirement will be met by the cadre of trained caretakers and mechanics with the required toolkits. 6.1.5 The proiect implementation component allows for the termination of the PIU after completion of the implementation phase and handover of operation and management of the various components to the responsible government agencies and associations of beneficiaries. Project management, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation skills imparted to the project staff will be retained and be available for use elsewhere in the government after the PIU is disbanded. 6.1.6 On the basis of the above analysis, the agriculture and the drinking water components (15% of project cost) are clearly sustainable. There could be some element of uncertainty in the minor irrigation component (25% of project cost) but given the basic financial viability of these schemes, and the already witnessed positive outcome of the NGO involvemnent, there is good reason to believe that this component would be sustainable with group effort. Maintenance of rural roads could have been a matter of concem but on a balanced consideration of the share of virtually maintenance-free bridges (30% of project cost), the social and economic benefit accruing from this component, the intermediate nature of these roads, the modest amount required for their maintenance, and the assurances on the availability of funds at the district level, the risks and uncertainties associated with this component do not appear to be high. The project's overall sustainability is therefore rated as "Likely". 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: 6.2.1 The PIU is in the process of handing over the various components to the responsible government agencies or to beneficiary user groups. No formal project operation plan (POP) has been prepared but the PIU will continue to monitor the performance up to March 2001, based on indicators provided in the Monitoring & Evaluation Report prepared by the Agricultural Finance Consultants. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: 7.1.1 The project was identified with assistance of an FAO/CP mission in late 1990. FAO/CP also assisted in project preparation in June/July 1991. As set out in the preparation report (Report No. 100/91 CP-IND 86, of 14 August 1991, India: Bihar Plateau Project, Interim Preparation Mission Main Report and Annexes 1-8), the project was to include block development (block planning, adaptive research and trials, extension and training, and NGO activities), hydro-power, irrigation, rural roads, credit, and project management. At appraisal, in May/June 1992, the main changes were to cut out the hydro-power and credit components, introduce the drinking water component and increase the proportion of total project funding to - 13 - be spent on rural roads. The proportion of funding for agricultural development remained small due largely to the capital intensive nature of the rural roads, irrigation and drinking water components. 7.1.2 Although the problems with earlier IDA assisted projects and the correctly identified risks of weak management of government departments and poor budgetary support were known at appraisal, it was planned to be minimized by the project being designed to be managed with minimal government involvement. This appears to have pre-supposed that there were already active social groups that would be strong enough to take on the task of project implementation, while in fact, the community groups and NGOs were weak and poorly developed. Moreover the tradition, fully understood and widely accepted as the normal situation, was that implementation of development projects was the responsibility of the government line departments and agencies. Further, the Bank did not include a financial analyst or procurement specialist in the appraisal mission which resulted in a deficient project accounting and auditing, and financial reporting system. There were also significant delays in seeking reimbursement from the Bank. Other mitigatory measures mentioned in the SAR were the advanced state of preparation of the project, the scheduling of a mid-term review and an extensive monitoring and feedback system built into the project. The preparation report made it clear that considerable further work was required to adequately prepare the project in this area, but the monitoring and feedback system was never well developed. 7.1.3 While much of the project design placed the project at risk to suffer the same problems as earlier IDA projects in Bihar, it did well to include technical assistance to be provided through consultants for design and supervision of construction of rural roads. Arrangements for project staffing and coordination of government agencies were also not well set up. Project implementation depended heavily on the Project Director (PD), who though in rank higher than heads of departments was either at the same, or lower, level than the District Collectors (DCs), and therefore not best equipped to ensure good support for the project from the district administrations. Similarly, the State Steering Committee and the Project Executive Committee only included representatives from those departments and agencies included in project implementation. Membership should have been widened to also include departments and agencies affected by the project, in particular the Forest Department (FD). Very slow startup and weak borrower commitment also suggest that the Bank could have done more to establish project readiness. Bank performance in lending is therefore rated Unsatisfactory. 7.2 Supervision: 7.2.1 No provision was made for a project start-up workshop, although the initial supervision mission had orientation and subsequent meetings with GOB covering provision of adequate budget support, delegation of full administrative and financial powers to the RDC, assignment of staff, and recruitment of consultants. Supervision missions in the early years of the project were sensitive and sympathetic to project management's difficulties, but could perhaps have been more forceful in encouraging GOB to take the steps necessary for project implementation, including provision of check drawing authority to appropriate senior project staff, timely recruitment of consultants and NGOs, and desisting from the disruptive transfer of project staff. The arrangement for a MTR report to be prepared by independent consultants financed by the project was a good and helpful idea. IDA was sensitive and correct in agreeing the two one year extensions of the credit closing date. This allowed the project to be brought to a reasonably orderly closing with the bulk of the works completed and most of the original targets achieved. Project supervision missions were regular and appropriately staffed (except during the first four years of implementation when no financial analyst was included in the mission; this was rectified from 1997 onwards), reported implementation progress adequately, and were realistic in their review ratings. An important contribution by the review missions was to create an awareness in the project irnplementing agency about the focus on achievement of development objectives and sustainability. Supervision mission members had a very - 14 - positive impact in provision of technical guidance and assisting in good collaboration between GOB, project management and the technical implementing agencies. Overall, supervision performance is rated Satisfactory. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: 7.3.1 The design deficiencies noted earlier and the over-patient approach of early supervision have been overcome by appropriate action at MTR and subsequent aggressive supervision. The project has also been able to achieve its main development objectives. The Banks overall performance can be assessed as satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: 7.4.1 Judging from the Interim Preparation Mission report, GOB was less than fully active and committed in project preparation. GOB made no formal comments on the Identification Mission report and few of the background studies requested by the Identification Mission were satisfactorily completed. Greater involvement of GOB staff in project preparation, particularly in design of project implementation, staffing, flow of funds and coordination arrangements could have resulted in a better and more appropriate project design. Survey information and data provided to the roads and bridges design engineer were of poor quality and unreliable, and were a major reason for the subsequent difficulties and frequent need for redesign. Borrower performance in preparation is therefore rated unsatisfactory. 7.5 Government implementation performance: 7.5.1 GOB performance in project implementation suffered from regularly late and inadequate release of budget in earlier years of the project, late recruitment of consultants (at startup) and NGOs, delays in filling project staff posts and over-frequent staff transfers. Despite these serious shortcomings, it has to be recognized that with the two year extension of the credit closing date the project has more or less reached its original development and physical objectives. This was possible due to significantly improved commitment from the government during the last three years of the project, including making substantial fund allotments for the project activities, placing the Additional Regional Development Commissioner as the head of the PIU, and regular follow-up at the Development Commissioner level. Government performance in project implementation is therefore rated as satisfactory. 7.6 Implementing Agency: 7.6.1 The implementing agencies were largely at the mercy of the State Government in regard to project finances and all important decisions regarding project implementation - including recruitment of consultants and NGOs. At appraisal it was planned that REO should second some of its staff to work with the supervising engineering consultants, but this never happened. A chance for valuable direct transfer of knowledge and increased competence of staff was therefore lost. Delays in effective project start-up resulted in much of the construction being compressed into the later part of the implementation period, including the two year credit extension. As a result it was not always possible to adhere to adequate quality standards of construction, as is evident from inspection of some of the minor irrigation schemes. Despite these odds, it is to the credit of the implementing agencies that by the end of the extended implementation period, more or less all the physical works planned had been built. This was possible due to close monitoring by the PIU staff, effectively functioning divisions in the roads, irrigation and drinking water departments, good support from, and interaction with, the technical consultants, a considerably high level - 15 - of commitment from the agriculture university, and good support from the contractor community. The performance of the implementing agencies is therefore rated as satisfactory. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: 7.7.1 Based on the assessments presented above, the overall borrower performance is considered as satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned 8.1.1 Based on the review of the project implementation experience, the list of lessons learned are as follows: * Readiness for implementation is crucial to completion of the project on schedule and achievement of its development objectives. Aspects such as preparation of sub-projects for initial year implementation, appointment of consultants, assessment of NGO capacity and their formal contracting, dissemination of project information, and voluntary formation of user groups (at least from first year sub-projects) should precede credit/loan effectiveness, where possible. * Infrastructure projects such as for the provision of drinking water to families, which have a high priority for local communities are ideal for encouraging responsibility for user group operation and upkeep. Such group formation often develops beyond purely O&M concems to embrace self-help or other much wider objectives. * Where projects leave choice of individual items to be financed to be made during implementation (as in the case of roads packages) there needs to be a very careful system for screening their suitability and ranking them so that they can be fully justified as priority needs. * Particularly in the case of projects that are innovative in their organization/institutional arrangements great care is required: (a) in the membership of project coordinating committees, (b) project staffing structure, and (c) flow of funds, in order to enable smooth and successful implementation. * Close involvement of beneficiaries from project design through implementation is required for easy implementation and improved sustainability. * Close attention to development of sound plans for O&M from preparation onwards is necessary in order to have confidence in subsequent project sustainability. * Project staff should receive more substantial training in contract management, ICB and WB procurement procedures at or before project commencement if a project is to make a good start and delays in implementation are to be minimized. * Adequate attention and funding has to be given for monitoring and evaluation if project management is to have good information for project operation. * As soon as minor irrigation schemes are ready to start operation, the govermnent support services to farmers should intensify their efforts so that full advantage can be taken from the improved water availability. * Appraisal and supervision missions should pay due attention to the Bank's fiduciary requirements and include a financial management specialist and procurement specialist at the time of appraisal and periodically during supervision. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: - 16 - GOB has been involved in the ICR review exercise. Their comments, received from time to time, were considered for incorporation in the ICR. No comments have been received from the Government of India on the ICR. The Borrower's evaluation is attached as Annex 8 to the ICR. This evaluation was provided to the ICR mission of June 15-22, 2000 as a draft. The Bank was informed subsequently to consider this as GOB's final submission. (b) Cofinanciers: There were no co-financiers. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): 10. Additional Information The June 15-22, 2000 ICR Mission Aide Memoire and the Report on Financial and Economic Analysis (with the attachments) are available on project files. - 17 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome/Impact Indicators Indicator Appraisal Actual/Latest Esdmate Estiuste 1. Increased agricultural production - Increased cropping intensity (%) 130 137 - Increased cultivable command area (CCA) 24,000 36,600 (ha) - Increased crop production tons: 19,000 12,700 - Paddy 14,000 22,300 - Wheat 2,800 1,300 - Maize 56,000 137,000 - Vegetables 2. Improved market access/employment - Improved market access Not specified Quantified PIU data on number of villagers benefited of 4.2 million includes villages benefited by several road packages. - Increased employment at full development 2.25 2.3 (million man days) 3. Introduction of community participation - Water users' associations (WUAs) Not specified WUAs were formed for all 424 schemes; of the 417 gravity & lift schemes, 292 have been tumed over to WUAs for O&M. - Water and sanitation associations Not specified 11,800 drinking water schemes handed over to (WATSAN) WATSANs by credit closing and balance of around 1,900 expected by end December 2000; 17,560 caretakers and 4,824 mechanics trained. 4. Improved access to potable water - Rural population per well/pump (No.) 1.50 1.50 - Rural population expected to benefit 2.0 2.2 (million) 5. Strengthen tribal area development Not specified As a result of the project, administration has been administration model significantly strengthened particularly the implementing agencies (Rural Engineering Organization, Minor Irrigation Department and Public Health Engineering Department) working in tribal areas. -18 - Output Indicators: Indicator Appraisal (MITR Estimate) Actuall(Latest Estimate) 1. Agricultural Development Component - Seed processing facility capacity (tonlhour for Not specified 3.5 paddy seed) - Production of foundation seed (1999/2000 kharif Not specified 216 seasons (tons)) - Training: - Farmers (No.) Not specified 19,540 - Field staff (No.) Not specified 1,248 - Training of extension staff outside Bihar Not specified 73 (No.) 2. Minor Irrigation Component - Rehabilitation of gravity schemes (No.) 12,000 hectares (245 nos.) 240 (245) - Rehabilitation of lift irrigation schemes (No.) 3,000 hectares (179 nos.) 177 (179) Sub-Total (No.) 15,000 hectares (424 nos.) 417 (424) a/ - Dugwells (No.) 4,000 hectares/4,000 nos. (4,564 nos.) 3,521 b/ - WHT (No.) 3,500 hectares/690 nos. (612 nos.) 487 b/ - Other schemes (No.) 1,500 hectares (315 nos.) 181 b/ - Culturable command area (ha) 24,000 (36,600) c/ 36,600 3. Rural Roads Component - Length of rural roads (kin) 1,200 (1,290) 1,005 (1,069) - Length of bridges (meters) 4,780 (10,280) 8,213 (9,310) Of which: - Missing link bridges (meters) 5,500 4,980 4. Drinking Water Component - Wells sunk and fitted with handpumps 13,060 (15,092 to be drilled) 15,542 drilled; 13,336 successful bores a/ Remaining seven schemes are expected to be completed by November 30, 2000 b/ Latest estimate not available c/ At appraisal, 24,000 hectares CCA was targeted - 19 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Costs by Components (in US$ million equivalent) Annex 2a Projecl Component %pprai%al F.stimate l ActualiLatest Estimate l Percentage of _______________________ ________ ___E __. . / A ppraisal Agriculture Development 6.10 3.60 59 Minor Irrigation 35.40 29.94 85 Rural Roads 54.70 72.01 131 Drinking Water 13.20 14.97 114 Project Implementation 1.70 0.82 48 Total Base Cost 111.10 121.40 109 Physical Contingencies 10.90 0.00 0 Price Contingencies 10.20 0.00 0 Total Project Cost 132.20 121.40 92 1/Using year-by-year exchange rates: 27.06 (92/93); 30.71 (93/94); 31.64(94/95); 33.18 (95/96); 35.65 (96/97); 37.55 (97/98); 41.71 (98/99); 43.18 (99/00); and 44.00 (4-6/00). Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (in US$ million equivalent) 11 Annex 2b E%penditure Categories I Procurement %lethod Procurement Mfethod App raisal Estimate _ Actual/Latest Estimaic . . . . _ _ ICB NCB Other NBF Total ICB NCB Other NBF Total 1. Civil works - 96.00 5.00 101.00 - 102.92 3.00 - 105.92 2. Watershed treatment and - - 1.60 1.60 - - 0.18 - 0.18 agricultural materials _ _ 3. Machinery equipment, 3.10 - 0.20 3.30 1.30 - 1.20 - 2.50 materials and vehicles 4. TA, Studies, NGOs and - 22.20 22.20 - 11.80 - 11.80 training _ . 5. Incremental operating - - 4.10 4.10 - 1.00 - 1.00 costs Total 3.10 96.00 33.10 132.20 1.30 102.92 17.18 - 121.40 1/ Note: NBF = Not Bank Financed (includes elements provided under parallel co-financing procedures, consultants under trust funds, any reserved procurement and any other miscellaneous items). The procurement arrangements for items listed under "Other" and details of the items listed as NBF need to be explained in footnote to the table. - 20 - Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Annex 2c Component %ppraisal Estilate Actual/Latest Estimate Percenrage of Appraisal Bank Go%ernment Co- Bank Go%ernment Co- Bank i Go%ernmen Cc- I __________ ______ _ ________ j- _ Elnancier _ financier t financier Agriculture 4.8 1.3 3.0 0.b 63 46 - development Minor irrigation 32.0 3.4 26.8 3.1 84 91 _ Rural roads 50.1 4.6 49.0 23.0 98 500 - Drinking water 11.7 1.5 13.2 1.8 . 112 120 - Project 1.5 0.2 0.7 0.2 - 41 100 - implementation _ Total Base Cost 100.1 11.0 92.7 28.7 - 93 260 Physical 8.5 2.4 0.0 0.0 - - - contingencies Price contingencies 8.4 1.8 . 0.0 0.0 - - - Total Project Cost 117.0 15.2 92.7 28.7 - 79 189 - 21 - Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits Cost Benefit Analysis (Indicate currency, units and base year) I/ ____________________ _ lPresent Value of Flows l___________________________ l Economic Analysis Financial Analysis Appraisal Latest Estimates Appraisal Latest _ Estimates Area under irrigation (ha) 24,000 36,600 Cropping intensities (%) 130 137 130 137 Rural roads (km) 1,200 1005 Watershed treatrnent (ha) 10,000 negligible Drinking water (No.) 13,000 13,336 Missing link bridges (m) n.a. 4,980 Incremental labour from irrigation 2.25 2.30 2.25 2.30 (mandays - million/year) Increase in farm income (%) 70 more than 100 ERR/minor irrigation (%) 1 3 29 ERR/rural roads (%) 2 1 23 ERR/watershed (%) 13 n.a. ERR/drinking water (%) n.a. 17 ERRlmissing link bridges (%) n.a. 16 ERR whole project/ scenario I (%) 17 27 ERR whole project/ scenario 2 (%) 24 1/ Calculated in June 2000 constant price. - 22 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: iStage of Project Cycle No of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating - J c.g. 2 Economists. I FMS. eic. _ Implementation Development MIonih, Year o(unt Spcciallt Progress O Objectivc Identification/Preparation December 1990 1 Economist I Agriculturist 1 Livestock specialist June/July 1991 2 Economist I Roads Engineer I Water Engineer I Credit & Cooperative Specialist I Agriculture Extension Specialist I Social Anthropologist Appraisal/Negotiation May 1992 2 Economist 2 Agriculturist 2 Roads Engineer I Irrigation Engineer 2 Social Development October 1992 Negotiations Supervision August 1993 4 Agriculturist (1), Road S S Engineer (1), Drinking Water Specialist (1), Procurement Specialist (1) February 1994 5 Agriculturist (1), Road Engineer S S (1), Drinking Water Specialist (1), Minor Irrigation Specialist (1), Procurement Specialist (1) August 1994 4 Agriculturist (1), Road Engineer S S (1), Irrigation/Drinking Water Specialist (1), Procurement Specialist (1) February 1995 6 Agriculturist (2), Drinking S S Water Specialist (1), Irrigation/ Drinking Water Specialist (1), Procurement Specialist (1), Financial Analyst (1) July 1995 4 Economist (1), Agriculturist (1), S S Irrigation Engineer (1), Procurement Specialist (1) November 1995 3 Economist (2), Agriculturist (1) S S February 1996 3 Economist (1), Agriculturist (1), S S Roads Engineer (I) June 1996 3 Economist (1), Agriculturist (1), S S Roads Engineer (1) - 23 - April/May 1997 5 Financial Analyst (1), U U Agriculturist (1), Roads Engineer (1), Irrigation Engineer (1), Procurement Specialist (1) November 1997 4 Financial Analyst (1), S S Agriculturist (1), Roads Engineer (1), Irrigation Engineer (1) November 1998 5 Financial Analyst (1), S S Agriculturist (1), Roads Engineer (I), Irrigation Engineer (I), Social Development Specialist (1) February 1999 4 Financial Analyst (1), Roads S S Engineer (1), Irrigation Engineer (1), Watershed Management Specialist (1) November 1999 6 Financial Analyst (1), S S Agriculturist (l), Roads Engineer (1), Irrigation Engineer (1), Social Development Specialist ((1), Procurement Specialist (1) February 2000 4 Financial Analyst (1), S S Agriculturist (1), Roads Engineer (I), Irrigation Engineer (1). ICR June 2000 5 Financial Analyst (1), S S Economist (2), Roads Engineer (1), Irrigation/ Drinking Water Specialist (1) (Including FAO/CPteam of 4 persons for the ICR) (b) Staff: Stagc of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks USS (,000) Identification/Preparation 102.5 25.4 Appraisal/Negotiation 215.7 93.8 Supervision 139.86 202.6 ICR 11 35 Total 469.06 356.8 - 24 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Neg]igib]e, NA=Not Applicable) Rating O Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA O Sector Policies O H OSUOM O N O NA O Physical O H *SUOM O N O NA O Financial O H *SUOM O N O NA El Institutional Development 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N 0 NA El Environmental O H OSU*M O N O NA Social M Poverty Reduction O H *SUOM O N O NA F Gender O H OSU*M O N O NA LI Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA El Private sector development O H O SU O M O N * NA El Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N * NA El Other (Pleasespecify) OH OSUOM ON * NA - 25 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating E Lending OHS Os *U OHU [Z Supervision OHS OS OU OHU N Overall OHS OS O U O HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating * Preparation OHS OS * U O HU * Government implementation performance O HS O s 0 U 0 HU * Implementation agency performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU * Overall OHS OS O u O HU Government Implementation Performance was "U" in the pre-MTR period. Implementing Agency perforTnance was "U" in the pre-MTR period. - 26 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Two supporting documents have been placed in the project files: ICR Mission Aide Memoire - June 15-22, 2000 Report of the Financial and Economic Analysis - 27 - Annex 8. Borrower Evaluation of the Project (unedited) BORROWER'S EVALUATION REPORT INDIA BIHAR PLATEAU DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (IDA CREDIT 2439-IN) A. Statement/Evaluation of Objectives 1. Country and Sector Context: Major objective of assistance of World Bank in a particular region is to encourage economic growth and alleviate poverty in the context of macro-economic framework. An important element of this objective is to develop and promote sustainable program specially in the domain of agriculture and bring the people above poverty line in the tribal dominated backward area of the Plateau Region of South Bihar. 2. Project Objectives: As per SAR the main objective of the Project was to " increase rural incomes and alleviate poverty of tribal people in the underdeveloped southem plateau of the Bihar State." 3. This was sought to be achieved through: * making investments in critical areas of infrastructure for improved delivery of agricultural services for increasing production and easing marketing problems, * strenghtening the planning, coordination and monitoring of the local administration, * significantly expanding the involvement of beneficiaries and introducing an integrated approach to planning and implementation of multi-sectoral activities, and * promoting environmentally sustainable activities. . 4. More specifically the project provided for construction of 1200km of roads and 4780 m(later increased to 9091 m) of bridges for providing easy access to markets for agricultural produce and also facilitating access to agricultural inputs besides proving links to institutions like schools, hospitals etc. It sought to create irrigation for 24000 ha of additional Culturable Conunand area. It also provided assistance for large scale development and propagation of improved variety of seeds in cereals and vegetables to boost agricultural production, and also for development and multiplication of improved livestock like pigs, goats and poultry. It sought to improve the health of the population by provision of safe drinking water by providing a handpump for every 150 population. Specifically,1 3060 handpumps were envisaged to be drilled. An emphasis was put on developing the capability of beneficiaries to enable them to manage the assets and thus ensure sustainability. In addition the project included service support( houses, offices, vehicles, information systems etc.) and providing institutional support to the BAU. The mid term review made some adjustments to the physical targets but did not change the overall basic design. 5. Evaluation of Objectives - Context and Complexity: The Project Area of 67 blocks was chosen specifically for it's high composition of tribal and Scheduled caste population (above 80%) which were predominantly poor( 60 % were living below the poverty line) and constituted the potential beneficiaries. Thus, by providing a multi pronged strategy to improve the productivity of the beneficiaries and emphasizing the capacity building of both, the beneficiaries and institutions for ensuring greater sustainability, the Project was conceived well. Sectors with direct impact on productivity like agriculture, however, could have been given more emphasis. It is felt that the synergy effect could have been much more had there been greater direct emphasis on shifting of cropping pattem and multiplication of improved livestock and also on investments in post production infrastructure. Due to the comprehensive, integrated - 28 - nature of the project design, the project was complex, with investments in four different sectors and involvement of seven different executing agencies, working over a large geographical spread. The project objectives were realistic and were within the capacity of the implementing agencies. B. Achievement of Objectives 6. Minor irrigation sector: The project exceeded the appraisal estimates. Whereas the SAR envisaged creation of Culturable Command Area of 24000 ha, a command area of 20000 ha has already been achieved and by the time of closure of the project the total command area created shall be 30600 ha which is 150% of appraisal estimates. The capability of the beneficiaries has also been strengthened by creation of water user associations (WUA). 7. Preliminary training of these WUAs has been given by the Department. Comprehensive training of 308 WUAs for a one year period through reputed NGOs has been taken up . This shall instill a sense of community ownership among the WUAs and shall enable them to manage the assets created more effectively. 8. The cropping intensity of command area created has been found to be around 137%. As against an ERR (Economic rate of return) of 13% envisaged in the SAR the actual ERR of this component comes to 24%. 9. Drinking water component: The project exceeded appraisal estimates. As against provision of 13060 DTWs(Drilled tube wells) which was increased by 2032 in the Mid Term Review, a total of 15542 DTWs were drilled out of which 13336 have been successful. A failure rate of 14.2 % in the project compares very favorably with failure rate of tube wells drilled by the Department from other GOI funds. 10. Capacity building of beneficiaries groups in shape of Water and Sanitation Committees (WATSANs) has proceeded satisfactorily. Targets relating to formation of Water and Sanitation Committees (WATSANs), training of Caretakers and Mechanics and conducting of chemical and bacteriological tests of water samples have been achieved. Program of distribution of toolkits to caretakers and mechanics is well on course to achieve full distribution by June 30, 2000. 11. Department's capability of chemical and bacteriological testing of water samples has been augmented by setting up of new laboratories in Dumka and strengthening of laboratories at Hatia, Jamshedpur, Sahebganj & Daltanganj. Biggest impact of this program can be seen in form of drastic reduction in water borne disease in the villages where drilled Tube Wells have been taken up. 12. Road Component: The Project achieved appraisal estimates and also the amendments made during the Mid Term Review to a substantial extent. As per SAR 1200 Km of hard Crust Murrum Roads and 4780 mtrs. of bridges were to be taken up. The Mid Term Review suggested taking up of missing link bridges to improve connectivity. Thus a total of 1069.4 Km. of road and 9554 mtrs. of bridges were taken up. As against this 970 Km. of roads and 8083.66 mtrs. of bridges have been completed so far. The traffic intensity on the constructed bridges and roads suggests that the assumptions made in this regard in the SAR have held true. 13. The project has succeeded in Institutional Strengthening of the Rural Engineering Organization. The Engineers assisted with the project but the first hand experience of the latest technology in high way engineering and project management. - 29 - 14. Agricultural Component: The project exceeded appraisal estimate in almost all the sub-components of this sector. Crop improvement program: The Project's intervention in form of provision of High Yielding variety of seeds, crop demonstrations, training of farmers and popularizing of improved agricultural practices through fairs and exhibitions led to a decisive increase in cropping intensity, increase in area under High Yield Variety (HYV) crops and significantly increase a consumption of fertilizer by the farmers. While the cropping intensity in the Project area increased from 106% in 1992-93 to 118.5% in 99-2000, the increase in area under HYV of Paddy increased by 16% and in Maize by 49% respectively. The consumption of Nitrogenous fertilizers increased by 67% and of Phosphatic fertilizers by 22%. 15. Livestock improvement program. The pilot project of introduction and multiplication of improve varieties of Pigs and Goats was also completed satisfactorily and exceeded appraisal estimates. 104 second layer of breeders were developed incase of pigs and 16 second layer of breeders developed in goats. 16. Fruit cultivation: More than 5.5 lakh fruit plants of fruits like Mango, Lichi Papaya, Guava etc were distributed. Good response was received from farmers for raising orchards of mixed fruit plants with inter cropping of vegetable. 17. Floriculture: For the first time floriculture was introduced among the farmers in one of the blocks (Namkum in Ranchi). Farmers in around five villages in this block successfully market the flowers produced. 18. Watershed Development: Work could be successfully carried out in seven of the twelve watersheds taken up but desired standard of execution could not be achieved. 19. Institutional development: Research stations and farms of the Birsa Agricultural University has been improved considerably. The BAU now has the capacity to produce 600 quintals of breeder seeds annually. A state of art Biotechnology center has been established at the BAU. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) has started a course in M. Sc.(Biotechnology) at BAU recognizing the capacity built at the University. Infrastructure of the seed multiplication farmns of the Department of Agriculture and Horticulture has also been augmented. C. Social Impact 20. The project made significant progress in ensuring people's participation in the development process and encouraging them to operate and maintain assets created for their benefit. The WATSAN Committees are effectively managing the handpumps handed over to them. The Water User Associations (WUAs) are also taking up managing of the Minor irrigation schemes though it may be said that strengthening of the WUAs may need their training and constant monitoring by the Department over a longer period of time. D. Major Factors Affecting the Project 21. Factors subject to State Government control included delays in providing for allotment to the project in each tinancial year. In each of the years except 2000-2001 fund to the project was provided during the month of August, September . This way the peak working period from April to June, that is, the period before the monsoon could not be utilized properly. The State Government did not vest the Regional Development Conmmissioner, the Chief Executive Officer of the project with full financial powers as envisaged in the SAR. The SAR also envisaged that no officer in the Project be transferred without the - 30 - concurrence of the RDC. This was not done. Thus the Project saw a tenure of six Project Directors, seven Chief Engineers of REO and almost the same number of Chief Engineers of Minor Irrigation. The question of the competent authority for giving administrative approval in packages which have gone beyond 15% of the agreemental value has not been resolved for a long period. This adversely affected the packages which have gone beyond 15% of the agreemental value. At times, for example in the year 1999-2000, the full allotment as per the action plan cleared by the Steering Committee, was not provided which adversely affected progress. 22. Factors not nzenerally subject to State Government control: Many of the packages, specially those in the Road Sector were affected by the Extremist problem which could not be fully sorted out in spite of action taken by Government for providing security. The Project period witnessed six Elections, four for the Lok Sabha and two for the Assembly. During each elections Project staff was drafted for election duty and vehicles seized thus adversely affecting the work. 23. Factors generally subiect to control of Implernenting Agency: Due to the multiplicity of agencies executing various components of the project equal attention could not be paid to work by each of the agencies. This can be held true in case of work taken up in the watershed program which left scope for improvement. Cost and Schedule changes(Actual versus Appraisal): Total Project costs shall equal US$127 million compared to appraisal estimate of US$132 million. The actual costs in the Rural Roads component and Drinking water component exceeded the appraisal estimates primarily because of increase in the scope of work in these two sectors as per the recommendations of the Mid Term Review. Physical and price contingencies were within the appraisal estimates. The period of the Project was extended twice by one year each. This was necessitated as desired progress could not be made in the initial few years. E. Sustainability 24. The sustainability of the activities in most of the sectors is quite high. The WATSAN Committees have already taken up the maintenance of handpumps handed over to them. After an initial training by the Department, training of WUAs of a majority of schemes have been taken up. This shall enable them to effectively maintain and operate the minor irrigation schemes. The Department would however associate itself with this capacity building process for a longer period of time. The crop production program shall be sustained through profits generated by the seed processing plants. The Department of Agriculture has already agreed to this. Profits of the seed processing plants shall be used to finance the BAU to produce breeder seeds and the Department of Agriculture to produce foundation. The BAU has developed second layer of breeders in pigs and goats. Large stocks of both pigs and goats have been created by BAU at its farms to sustain the activity. The ICAR has already recognized the biotechnology center as a center for learning and has started a course in M.Sc. Biotechnology. This center shall be able to continue its activities with support of ICAR. Rural road maintenance policy has been framed by the GOB for maintenance of the roads constructed under the Project. The REO shall takeover the roads and shall be responsible for it's maintenance as per the policy. The Policy also envisages gradual upgradation of these roads to bituminous roads. Availability of funds for this purpose shall be crucial for implementing the maintenance policy. F. World Bank Performance 25. Identification and preparation: Satisfactory. The objectives of the Project fitted well with the concerns of GOB to alleviate poverty among the weakest sections of population. The Project selected those blocks specifically which had a high percentage (80%) of tribal and Scheduled Caste population. More emphasis could however been given to direct investment in production processes than on creation of infrastructure. Thus, though the project had an integrated structure the "synergy effect" is somehow - 31 - missing which could have been more visible had there been direct investment in production processes at a higher scale. 26. Appraisal: Satisfactory. Generally the technical and financial aspects of the design were adequate. A greater study of organizational structures of various Departments in GOB could have helped to improve the structure of implementing agencies. For example, a separate CE for the BPDP divisions of the REO would have enabled the CE to devote his full attention on BPDP work which the present CE cannot do as he is the head of regular REO divisions too. Fund to all other agencies in the agricultural sector is routed through the Director, Agriculture which could have been avoided. Greater emphasis could have been placed on first enhancing the Implementation capacity of the Department of Soil Conservation before starting the actual work in the Watershed prograrn. 27. Supervision: Satisfactory. However, the point of capacity building of WUAs could have been emphasized to a greater extent when the schemes were in the initial stages of execution. A sense of ownership of the assets created in that case could have been higher. Time period needed to implement the recommendations of the Mid Term Review could have been assessed more realistically. This would have avoided the sense of uncertainty which accompanied two successive extensions. More guidance could have been provided regarding testing processes of such large number of pumpsets procured in the Minor irrigation sector. 28. Deviation from World Bank Policies and Procedures: There have been no significant deviations from Bank policies and procedures. G. Borrower Performance 29. Implementation: Satisfactory. However, more continuity in senior management positions and allocation of a full time team of staff dedicated to project coordination would have improved project performance and demonstrated more ownership. The constitution of the Steering Committee at the State level could have included a representative from the Forest Department to help expedite the Forest clearance required in road sector. Emphasis on training of officers in the World Bank procedures specially in the beginning of the Project could have helped in expediting work in the initial years. 30. Compliance with legal covenants: Except the fact that there is lack of clarity of the full financial powers of the RDC though during negotiations it was agreed that full financial powers shall be delegated to the RDC, there has been full compliance with the legal covenants. H. Assessment Of Outcome 31. The overall outcome of the Project is satisfactory with most of the appraisal targets having been exceeded or substantially achieved. There is high likelihood of the activities taken up being sustained. I. Plan for Future Operation 32. Future Performance Indicators: Activities of the WATSAN Committees shall have to be monitored by the Department over a period of time. The training of WUAs shall have to continue till at least March 2001. Data regarding change in cropping intensity in the Minor Irrigation sector and traffic intensity in the road sector shall have to be monitored to assess if the assumptions made in this regard in calculating ERR hold true or not. This shall be helpful in future projects. - 32 - 33. Recommended follow-up: This Project has created a capability which can give very high returns with an incremental investment in productive activities in agriculture and though an investment in post production infrastructure . Besides the above, experience gained and lessons learnt in this Project can be utilized effectively in any future Projects. A future Project could also tackle outstanding issues of this Project thus increasing the likelihood of sustainability of this Project even more. J. Key Lessons Learned * Comprehensive training of staff in any project involving new procedures shall greatly help in smooth execution and prevent procedural delays. * Suitable institutional arrangements like creation of a corpus fund etc. must be ensured which would allow uninterrupted flow of funds to the project in the period of April to July of each financial year. * All points regarding exact financial powers of each authority in various organizations must be explicitly laid down before taking up of such projects. * Beneficiary groups need to be involved right from the stage of formulation of scheme for them to develop a sense of ownership and responsibility of irrigation schemes. * Land Acquisitions and Forest clearance required in any scheme must be completed before any project is started. * Project design and implementation should focus more explicitly on measures to ensure sustainability. In fact, for each activity measures to ensure sustainability should be part of design of the activity itself. - 33 -

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