China - Shanghai Metropolitan Transport Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 22334 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-22960) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 44.4 MILLION (US$60.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO TBE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR A SHANGHAI METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT PROJECT JUNE 29, 2001 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their 7 official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2000) Currency Unit = Yuan (Y) Y 1.00 = US$ 0.120817 US$ 1 = Y 8.2770 FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ATC - Area Traffic Control BAA - Barton Aschiman Associates CBD - Central Business District CCTV - Close Circuit Television ETC - Electronic Toll Collection IRR - Inner Ring Road MV - Motor Vehicle NBF - Non Bank Funded NMV - Non-Motor Vehicle NSC - North-South Corridor NUTI - Northwestern University Traffic Institute PDR - Preliminary Design Report PGS - Parking Guidance System PT - Public Transport TA - Technical Assistance TMP - Traffic Management Program TMS - Traffic Management and Safety SMCC - Shanghai Municipal Construction Commission SMEAD - Shanghai Municipal Engineering Administration Department SMEC - Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation SMECC - Shanghai Municipal Engineering Construction Company SMG - Shanghai Municipal Government SMTAB - Shanghai Municipal Transport Administration Bureau SPSB - Shanghai Public Security Bureau Traffic Police Patrol and General Brigade STC - Shanghai Transit Company STERI - Shanghai Traffic Engineering Research Institute (STERI) of SPSB SUPDRI - Shanghai Urban Planning Design and Research Institute VMS - Variable Message Signs Vice President: Jemal-ud-din Kassum, EAPVP | Country Manager/Director: Yukon Huang, EACCF Sector Manager/Director: Jitendra N. Bajpai, EASTR Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Edward B. Dotson  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CHINA SHANGHAI METRO TRANSPORT PROJECT CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 6 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 10 6. Sustainability 12 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 12 8. Lessons Learned 14 9. Partner Comments 20 10. Additional Information 31 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 32 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 35 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 37 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 39 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 41 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 42 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 43 Annex 8. Beneficiary Survey Results 44 Annex 9. Stakeholder Workshop Results 45 Map: IBRD 31441 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   Project ID: P003565 Project Name: SHANGHAI METRO TRANS Team Leader: Edward B. Dotson TL Unit: EASTR ICR Type: Intensive Learning Model (ILM) of ICR Report Date: June 29, 2001 1. Project Data Name: SHANGHAI METRO TRANS LIC/TFNumber: IDA-22960 Country/Department: CHINA Region: East Asia and Pacific Region Sector/subsector: TU - Urban Transport KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 06/22/1988 Effective: 01/15/1992 01/15/1992 Appraisal: 05/29/1989 MTR. Approval: 09/10/1991 Closing: 06/30/1998 06/30/1999 Borrower/lImplementing Agency: People's Republic of China/Shanghai Municipal People's Government Other Partners: Inner Ring Road Construction Company, Traffic Management Division of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau, Shainghai Municpality Engineering Adminstration Department, Shanghai City Planning and Design Institute and Shanghai Urban Construction Design Institute. STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Jemal -ud-din Kassum Russel J. Cheetham Country Manager: Yukon Huang Shahid Javed Burki Sector Manager: Jitendra N. Bajpai Daud Ahmad Team Leader at ICR: Edward Dotson Ms. Carrolle Carr ICR Primary Author: Edward Dotson; Ephrem Asebe Asebe This project was the first of two metropolitan transport projects providing assistance to Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG), with similar objectives and design, overlapping implementation periods and the same implementing agency. The second project is the Second Shanghai Metropolitan Transport Project (SMTP II: ID-P003622). Given their similarities, a single assessment has been made covering the two projects, but separate reports have been printed. These contain the same text and annexes, except for sections 1 and 2, and Annexes 2, 4, 5 and 6. 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability. HL Institutional Development Impact: H Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: HS S Project at Risk at Any Time: No  3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The two metropolitan transport projects (SMTP I & II) providing assistance to Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG) had similar objectives. For SMTP I, the original objective was to provide the basis for developing an efficient transport system in the Shanghai Metropolitan Region by: (a) increasing capacity, reducing congestion, and improving efficiency in the Shanghai urban transport network, and (b) improve the planning, programming, financing, and management of the urban transport system in Shanghai. The project represented the first stage of a long-term program intended to upgrade and develop the urban transport infrastructure of Shanghai to meet the needs of a developing economy. For SMTP II, the original objectives of the project, in support of the economic and social development of Shanghai, were: (a) to enhance economic productivity by improving the operational and economic efficiency of the urban transport system; and (b) to strengthen public sector management capacity by improving the planning and management of the urban transport system. SMTP I was the first urban transport project undertaken by the Bank in China. In 1991 at the time of the appraisal update of SMTP I, roads occupied 5% of the land surface of Shanghai (compared to 15% in similar cities in other countries); average traffic speeds were 15 km/br with bus speeds at 8 km/hr; the vehicles fleet was 200,000 (53% trucks), the bicycle fleet 6.5 million and the bus fleet 5500. Five different entities were responsible for transport, and the ad hoc transport planning task force had just been turned into a pernanent transport planning institute. The SAR stated that the road network did not have sufficient capacity to accommodate existing, let alone future vehicle flows. Viewed against this background, the project objectives were clear and well related to the analysis of the issues in the sector. They represented a balanced emphasis on physical works and institutional capacity building in the sector. The SMTP II objectives represented a logical extension of the SMTP I objectives into economic development and city management, reflecting the broadening of the dialogue between the Bank and the Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG). In 1990, with Bank assistance, a process was begun to articulate Shanghai's comprehensive reform policies, establish detailed action plans for implementation of reforms, and link the future expenditure program and institutional development of Shanghai to the reform program. In 1991, SMG launched the Shanghai Economic Reform Action Program (SERAP), and it was agreed that future Bank lending to Shanghai should be linked to the implementation of the SERAP. Municipal infrastructure reform was one of the six activities in SERAP. Within this activity, the key areas of reform were: (a) price reform aimed ultimately at full cost recovery for urban services (b) strengthening autonomy of public utility agencies (including Shanghai Transit) (c) enabling the use of enterprises as contractors to provide services such as public transport (d) regulation and guidance by updating and strengthening spatial planning, integration of infrastructure investrnent with spatial planning, and strengthening of planning, programming and budgeting procedures. -2 -  SMG placed great emphasis in SERAP on the expansion of the city into the Pudong area, located on the east side of the Huangpu River. A key factor in developing Pudong was the improvement of the transport across the Huangpu River. The Inner Ring Road (IRR) proposed for the Puxi area west of the Huangpu River, was to be extended via the Nanpu and Yangpu bridges in Pudong. Besides providing arterial road access to Pudong, the function of the IRR was to divert through-traffic away from the established city center in Puxi, and provide a link with regional routes from the surrounding provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang to Shanghai Port. The Bank financed the IRR, while the Asian Development Bank provided some finance for the bridges. Apart from resettlement, environment, and the Project Implementation Unit, conditions in the implementation program of the project agreements related to transport investment plans, traffic management, reform of the transit company, motor vehicle emission control strategy, and technical assistance. The topics covered under project conditionality were appropriate and did not appear unrealistic at the time. 3.2 Revised Objective: The original project objectives were maintained throughout implementation. 3.3 Original Components: SMTP I Project Components: A. Major Road Investments (Inner Ring Road Stage 1, US$131.9 million or nearly 90% of total project cost of SMTP I). These investments were the core of the project and were designated for major road construction along the existing ZhongShan Inner-Ring Road, a high-volume bypass route encircling the old central city. The credit supported the construction of a 5.5 km viaduct over Zhongshan Road, with associated surface improvements. The viaduct was designed as a high speed arterial while the surface road was to be upgraded to four motor vehicle lanes with segregated NMV lanes. B. Traffic Safety and Management (US$ 11.7 million or nearly 8% of the total project costs). The credit would finance traffic management and safety measures including the introduction of a 1.1 km busway and 19 km of non-motorized vehicle roads. C. Technical Assistance (US$4.6 million or about 2% of the total project costs). TA was designed to strengthen the municipality's capabilities for planning and implementing urban transportation measures, effecting improvements in traffic and safety, and improving bus operations. SMTP II Project Components: A. Construction of the Inner Ring (IRR) Stage 2 (US$574.6 million or 87% of SAR project cost estimates). The loan would finance the construction of a further 22 km of Inner Ring Road on the west bank of the Huangpu River. B. Traffic Management and Safety (US$44.9 million or 6.5% of the total SMTP II SAR estimates). This component was to extend the traffic management plan started under SMTP I. C. Public Transport Investments (US$36.5 million or 5.5% of SMTP II SAR estimates). This is to construct and equip two bus depots and one bus interchange for Shanghai Transit. -3 -  D. Technical Assistance (US$1.1 million or 1% of the costs of SMTP estimates) The TA was to support project implementation and to give further support to transport planning institutions. 3.4 Revised Components: SMTP I. A Major Road Investments. (i) Inner Ring Road viaduct works in SMTP II of contract 2.7 and the corresponding ground level works of contract 1.13 and 1.14 were transferred to SMTP I. Ramps were added to the viaduct. This extended the length of Zhongshan Road works under SMTP I from 5.5 km to 7.4 km. Works included the refurbishing of #3 Bridge. (ii) Ramps at Zhoujiang Road and Jinshajiang Road were added after completion of the IRR viaduct to improve traffic flow. B. Traffic Management. The NS Corridor (NSC) Program was deleted from the TM component. C. Technical Assistance. Some minor modifications were made. The availability of funding from the French Government to support strategic planning and feasibility studies permitted a reallocation of SMTP 1 project finds for expansion of Institutional Development of transport planning capabilities. SMTP II. A. Construction of the Inner Ring (IRR) Stage 2. The share of IBRD contribution in Category I, Civil Work Schedule I, in the original Loan Agreement was amended as of January 1994, from 38% to 53% to accommodate change in exchange rate of 5.7 to 8.2 RMB to USD. B. Traffic Management Various detailed changes were made to the schemes included in this component. C. Public Transport. Construction of the new depot at Yinhang was replaced by construction of a multi-story garage and routine maintenance facility within the confines of the Siping road depot. 3.5 Quality at Entry: Neither project was ever selected for review by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG). Strategies. Both projects were presented to the Board before the first CAS was prepared for China. The World Bank urban transport policy prevailing at the time of preparation was published in 1986. This emphasized the importance of managing demand for road use, improving efficiency by traffic management and self supporting bus services to secure economically efficient urban movement, while acknowledging that expansion of road capacity may be unavoidable when the demand for urban transport grows rapidly. The Bank's urban sector lending strategy in China was to (a) assist the government in planning and prioritizing needs for urban services and to prepare cost effective projects (b) help strengthen institutions (responsible for planning, preparing, constructing and operating urban services) through support for organizational improvement and staff training (c) promote sound financial and cost recovery policies for urban services (d) help develop sector policies and strategies supportive of China's overall reform program. - 4 -  In the areas of urban planning, finance, and management, China was looking to the Bank for transfer of knowledge gained in other countries. The two projects were consistent with these strategies and the Shanghai Economic Reform Action Plan. Country and Sector Knowledge. The Bank started building a body of country and urban sector knowledge in China from 1981, coupled with a series of studies to provide information on the urban transport sector in Shanghai. These studies provided an adequate underpinning of the project. Lessons of Experience. SMTP 1 was the first Bank urban transport project in China, and so there was no China specific experience to draw on. Experience from a review of 15 PCR/PAR in other countries was used. The main relevant lessons related to * weak institutional capacity - which was addressed through TA * weak enforcement of traffic regulations - which was addressed by making traffic management schemes "self enforcing" and by involving the SPSB (traffic police) in their design * inefficient public transport operations - which were addressed through TA, and * lack of consideration of environmental impacts - which was acknowledged as a potential cause for concem as motorization increased, despite increased political awareness Appropriateness of Project Approach. When SMTP I was identified on May 1988, SMG presented three large infrastructure projects for possible Bank group funding. Given that the client was new to the Bank, the Bank team selected part of one of the projects (the IRR) for SMTP 1. Traffic management (in line with sector policy) and TA for capacity building and improving PT (in line with lessons learned) were added. When it became clear that the client had the institutional and engineering capacity to undertake major civil works, the remainder of the IRR was included in SMTP II. This approach was entirely appropriate in the circumstances. Borrower Ownership. The Borrower was highly committed to the IRR component of both projects which they saw as an essential elements in their strategy for the development of Pudong. There was Borrower ownership, but with a lesser priority attached, to the ATC system and the PT investments. Partnership Arrangements. The projects were prepared with assistance from funding provided by the French and US Govenmuents. SERAP was prepared by SMG with assistance from the Bank, UNDP and the Ford Foundation. The Nangpu and Yangpu Bridges at either end of the Bank financed sections of the IRR, were part financed by the ADB. Technical Aspects. In depth planning, feasibility, and technical studies and economic analyses, funded by SMG or bilateral donors were undertaken at the request of the Bank during the preparation of both projects. These covered urban development, finance, public transport, traffic management, road safety, road maintenance and the design of the ring road. The extent of the studies reflected in part the uncertainties of doing business with China as a new Bank client. While the key issue of the fuctional design parameters (including the number of lanes) of the IRR was discussed between the Bank and SMG during preparation missions, analysis is inadequately presented in the two SARs. It was generally assumed that land cost and availability limited the IRR to 2 x 2 lanes and that traffic demand in excess of this capacity would be met by other new roads, specifically the Second/Outer Ring Road. However inadequate capacity was seen as a risk. Greater discussion of IRR functional design options in the SAR was a weakness in the technical analysis. The PAD structure facilitates the discussion of such issues in a way that the SAR structure did not. Economic Evaluation. This followed standard methodology of estimating benefits from the IRR as vehicle operating cost (VOC) and time savings with and without the project. At the time the evaluation was considered an example of good practice. FinancialAnalysis. This analysis verified the financial capacity of SMG to provide counterpart funds and repay the credit and loan. There was discussion of operating cost recovery from user fees (not just public transport fares). No attempt to calculate the coverage of project costs or of the SMG transport program from user fees. -5 -  Poverty and Social Aspects. The project was not intended to address directly poverty reduction or gender issues. Preparation for resettlement was carried out in accordance with Bank guidelines on involuntary resettlement by dedicated staff within a legal framework, well organized institutional network, and well defined compensation policies. The quality of the RAP was quite good since the scope of impacts and the amount of entitlement changed little during implementation. The only resettlement drawback foreseen was the increased commuting distance for most resettled residents. Environmental Aspects. In general, the EA addressed adequately the environmental impacts, but did require strengthening in some areas. Measures to mitigate impacts adjacent to the IRR including noise barriers were adequate, as were proposals to reduce the pollution at source through a Motor Vehicle Emission Control Strategy (including cleaner engines and fuels), which was included as a project condition. The third mitigation measure proposed - land use changes along the IRR through redevelopment - appeared realistic. Environmental policies and institutional capacity were adequately assessed, which resulted in TA being proposed to support the preparation of a MVECS. There was little if any consultation or disclosure, as was current Bank practice at the time. The projects also predated the assignment of environmental category. Due to the environmental impacts and resettlement, the projects would have been classified as Category 'A'. Financial Management. No assessment was made of Financial Management Systems. Procurement. The procurement arrangements for the projects took into account experience from previous Bank financed projects and used model bidding documents developed for China. Intemational procurement was to be undertaken by Intemational Tendering Companies (ITC) experienced in Bank ICB. Policy and Institutional Aspects. As discussed earlier, as these were the first two urban transport projects undertaken in China, extensive analysis was undertaken of these aspects. The only weaknesses foreseen were in technical areas that were relatively new to SMG, and for which TA was included in the projects. Implementation Arrangements. No project implementation plan was prepared, but the Borrower did provide realistic implementation schedules for both projects. The first year program was ready for implementation. Project management arrangements were clear, with a Project Implementation Unit having overall responsibility for project management, and sub-PIU dealing with each component. TA was provided to assist the PIU in the initial years. RiskAssessment and Management. The risks identified were purely technical. They included delays in demolition, resettlement and construction, inadequate IRR capacity, inadequate traffic engineering at viaduct interchanges, inadequate or delayed traffic management measures. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: While the two projects shared two sirnilar key objectives, each had specific objectives, which are discussed separately. Increasing capacity in the urban transport network The construction of the elevated ring road and the associated improvements to the ground level roads increased the physical capacity of the road system by up to 90,000 vehicles/day on the most heavily used sections. Other roads built during the time period of the projects, notably the N-S Chengdu Road viaduct and the E-W Henan Road viaduct also added road capacity. The traffic management schemes increased the practical capacity of the existing road network, but to a lesser extent than envisaged, due to a reduction in the numbers of schemes implemented. The bus depots facilitated increase in public transport capacity (bus numbers and route length increased by over 250%) and operating efficiency, and elimnination of the operating subsidy. Reducing congestion. Overall congestion along the ring road corridor and within the Central Business District in Puxi has been reduced. Despite an almost ninefold increase in vehicle trips to/from/within the CBD, the network volume/capacity ratio has fallen (from 0.8 to 0.75). Cross town travel speeds have - 6 -  increased from 12 kmlhr to 24 km/hr on some trips, and from 18 kin/hr to 29 km/hr on others, resulting in time savings of up to 50 minutes on 20 km trips. However, the 2 x 2 lane (without emergency lanes) configuration adopted for the elevated road has proved insufficient for the travel demand. Year 2000 flows are double those predicted in 1991 and the design capacity is being exceeded in some sections. Thus congestion is starting to re-emerge at peak times on some sections and some ramps of the ring road. This is being addressed operationally through monitoring, ramp control and more effective traffic management where the ramps meet the ground level roads. Enhance Economic Productivity. Economic productivity, measured by Gross Regional Product increased dramatically during the project from 8.94 Billion in 1991 to 40 Billion RMB in 1999. The extent to which the IRR and other investments contributed to this increase, or that the overall investment in transport contributed, is difficult to quantify. Improvements were realized in the operational efficiency of the various elements of the urban transport system - the overall road network (as measured by the sort of increases in operating speeds and throughput indicated above). For the bus network, staff per bus were reduced to 5: 1, operating subsidies were elimninated, while service was expanded. Improvements were also realized in economic efficiency as trips/head increased by 25% while average trip time increased by only 10%. Improve planning, programming, financing and management of the urban transport system. There are two ways to judge the achievement of this objective - by looking at the individual components of the system, and then the system as a whole. In terns of transport planning, the results are highly satisfactory. The Shanghai City Comprehensive Transport Planning Institute (SCCTPI) received TA support in both projects. SCCTPI has grown in capacity and stature to the point where it is now providing consulting services (with limited Bank guidance) on recently prepared Bank urban transport projects in China (Urumri and Shijiazhuang). It recently completed the 2020 Transport Strategy for Shanghai. The methodology included separate studies on the highway and rail networks (modeled on the Hong Kong approach), as well as consideration of multiple options. SMG is in the process of developing detailed transport policy for 2020, based on the Strategy, with the assistance of European consultants. Programming andfinancing - Programming of works is still undertaken based on the National five year plans. Financing is still from a variety of sources with no requirement for sectoral cost recovery. The results therefore in terms of these items are less than satisfactory. Transport System Management. The results are satisfactory. The traffic management components and TA achieved the principal objective of providing the basis for developing an efficient urban transport system. Evidence of a change of attitudes towards traffic management is clear together with its enhanced status. An understanding of the broader range of activities which come under the umbrella of traffic management was gained. The flexibility of traffic management was recognized and fully exploited. The traffic management strategy developed under the component and endorsed by SMG was incorporated into the latest Shanghai Master Plan. There has been a significant change in status and image of traffic management. There is more awareness of the scope of traffic management planning and design - and not just the police remits of operations and enforcement. The TA was particularly successful with regard to the traffic police (SPSB). Not only did staff become exposed to traffic management planning and design issues, but their particular operational remits were enhanced by overseas training. Many of the ideas put forward in the project were subsequently applied elsewhere in Shanghai. There is now better temporary traffic management during construction. The use of Area Traffic Control to improve the efficiency of the road system was very successful. - 7 -  However to date there appears to be limited awareness of the need for travel demand management, starting with parking policy. However, it is understood that this is one of the topics to be addressed in the transport policy studies recently commissioned by SMG from international consultants. For Public Transport, the results are highly satisfactory. In early 1996, the Shanghai Public Transport Company (SPTC) was reorganized into Shanghai Public Transport General Company, an umbrella company, and 13 operating companies, all of which were to be financially and operationally independent. A Shanghai Public Transport Limited Joint-Stock Company was established to hold the state-owned assets for all 13 companies. The city's municipal finance bureau then contracted with each of the 13 companies on an area basis, including provisions for subsidies. These allowed subsidies to be given on a declining basis for losses incurred over the three year period (1996 to 1998). The savings from operating subsidies were redirected to increased capital investment. A passenger transport management division was established under Shanghai Public Utility Bureau in order to regulate the passenger transport sector and manage the tendering of all new bus routes to the 13 companies and 100 or so other eligible public transport companies. In other words, the 13 operating companies compete amongst themselves and with other operators for the operating rights to new routes. More recently this division has been separated out from the Public Utilities Bureau and a Public Transport Management Office has been created. VehicularAir Quality Management. The results are highly satisfactory. A leading group for emissions control was established. The Chair is the Deputy Director of SEPB. A action plan was developed and Shanghai is five years ahead of other cities in China in this field. Specific actions that have been taken include introduction of unleaded fuel in October 1, 1997, and the introduction (in 1998 two years ahead of national standards) emission standards for new light duty vehicles. Competitive bidding is underway for a demonstration project for the implementation of a centralized Inspection and Maintenance (I/M) system for light duty vehicles. Emission standards for diesel vehicles are at an advanced stage of preparation. Strengthen public sector management capacity. Overall the results look satisfactory. However, management of the street and elevated highway networks is under separate agencies. It is acknowledged by SMG that better management and traffic control system integration is needed, particularly for incident management. Improving efficiency. The works and equipment in the traffic management components directly improved the operating efficiency of the street network, as the falls in cross-town travel times show. However the efficiency gains were less than would have been expected as the extent of traffic management was less than planned. In particular, measures for non-motor vehicles (bicycles) that were implemented generally resulted in efficiency gains for MV traffic only. Works and equipment in the public transport components improved the efficiency of operation of the bus system. However as few on street bus priority measures were implemented, the improvements were less than anticipated at appraisal. The creation of a primary road network (comprising the ring road and the N-S and E-W viaducts) catering for longer distance intra-urban movements further raised the overall operating efficiency of the road network by segregating longer distance traffic from shorter distance access and local traffic and bus traffic, permitting each type of network to performn the functions for which it was intended. TA for STC reform and the development of pavement management systems improved the efficiency of bus operations and road maintenance. Resettlement. Based on a recent survey, most resettled households were generally satisfied. Most agreed that the resettlement had helped them to increase their living space and housing quality, and improve their living environment. The time for commuting (which was the main concern at appraisal) had reduced with the improvement of services by Shanghai Transit. For most resettled people the objective of restoring their living conditions and livelihood had been achieved. - 8 -  4.2 Outputs by components: Shanghai Inner Ring Road Civil Works were satisfactorily completed in two stages and open to traffic ahead of schedule and within overall budget, although some contracts of sub-components experienced cost overruns exceeding 15%. The quality of the civil works was generally of a high standard. The completed IRR civil works has met the physical targets set under SMTP I and II. A total of 29 km of elevated road and associated ground road, 41 ramps, and 4 interchanges were completed. The elevated road is a four-lane dual carriageway with a design speed of 80 km per hour and a traffic capacity of 3,005 vehicles per hour inI each direction. The ground level road, ranging in width from 40 to 50 meters, is a four lane dual carriageway with a design speed of 40 km per hour and a design capacity of 1,650 vehicles per hour in each direction. The ground road has non-motorized vehicle lanes and foot paths in both directions. The ramps are two lanes. Gonghexin road interchange and Luban road interchange connect the elevated IRR and north-south elevated road. The westem Yanan interchange connects the Inner Ring Raod viaduct and theYanan Road viaduct. The IRR is equipped with monitoring and traffic accident rescue systems. SMTP I & II. Traffic Management and Safety Components. In terms of resource allocation (with US$56.7 or 7% of the total cost) it is second only after IRR cost. In terms of implementation this was the most complex part of the project. Implementation require the creation of traffic management coordination team which sought to bring together members from different agencies. The component which was in both SMTFP I & II was satisfactorily completed but after a protracted delays and substantial modifications. The delays in implementation of this component was a key factor in the extension of SMTP I and II closing dates. As the same problem has arisen in other projects in China, it would be prudent to include loan conditions on the implementation schedule for traffic management works in future projects. Non-Motor Vehicle Programs. The delays and accidents caused by motor vehicles conflicting with non-motor vehicles (NMV) were major problem throughout Shanghai's urban area. In accordance with NMV action program two way NMV only routes have been established but their performnance remained less than satisfactory due to lack of lane discipline, lack of respect for traffic signals at junctions, uncontrolled parking of vehicles conflicts with pedestrian and diverted traffic from major construction works, pedestrian jay walking at traffic light junctions, etc. Lack of channelization was a major problem. On the whole the NMV program has helped mitigate these conflicts by creating an exclusive non-motorized vehicle route passing in and around CBD, approximately 19.4 km in length. Technical Assistance of SMTP Iand II The technical assistance components of SMTP I & II were complementary. They were completed successfully and generally as specified in the SAR. The availability of funding from the French Govemment to support strategic planning and feasibility studies, permitted a reallocation of SMTP 1 project funds for expansion of Institutional Development of transport planning capabilities. These TAs have served an important means of transfer of technology. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: The post construction economic appraisal of the Inner Ring Road was undertaken following the same methodology used at appraisal. The main differences were an overall cost increase of 21%, a shorter construction period (three years instead of four), and the possibility to include network benefits. The principal benefits in the "with project" case compared to the "without project" case included (a) savings in vehicle operating cost of traffic on the ring road and (b) savings in passenger time of traffic using the ring road, and (c) vehicle operating cost savings and time savings on the central city network (within the ring road) and on the rest of the network. At appraisal benefits in stream (c) were omitted from the calculation as a traffic model robust enough to give reliable estimates was not available at the time. The recalculated -9-  Economic Intemal Rate of Return (EIRR) estimated to be 27.6% taking both stages of the IRR in SMTP I & II together. The NPV @ 12% discount rate is 61 Million RMB, and the Benefit Cost Ratio is 2.6. At appraisal, the EIRR estimates for the Inner Ring Road for Stage I and Stage II respectively were 18% and 15%, which would drop to 16.5% and 14% with a 15% cost increase. Removing the network benefits brings the recalculted EIRR down to 14%, close to the appraisal estimates with a 15% cost increase. 4.4 Financial rate of return: Not applicable 4.5 Institutional development impact: One objective of each project was concerned with institutional development. As noted above, the achievement of these objectives was satisfactory. In the nine years spanned by the implementation of the two projects, institutional development has been substantial. Competitive bidding for both NCB and ICB procurement by SMG agencies is now standard practice. Foreign consultant services are used to provide advice on policy. The regulator and operator functions of the public transport system have been separated. The vertically integrated monopoly bus operator has been split into a total of 13 separate commnercialized operators, capable of competitive tendering for service provision without operating subsidy. Institutions capable of undertaking transport modeling and traffic management exist. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: The Chinese economy grew in the 90's faster than envisaged. The Government exerted substantial management influence on the economy, but was not able to completely control it. As a result the vehicle fleet and travel demand increased more than envisaged. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: The key factor subject to central government control was the change in exchange rate. The economic growth in Shanghai produced a pressure for redevelopment which in theory was within SMG ability to control. In practice, the institutional framework to manage such redevelopment was not developed. This made it very difficult to design and implement TM schemes. Land acquisition for Yinhang Depot. The sub-component was not implemented because of difficulties in land acquisition and resettlement. The site was changed from the one identified in SAR to the current Spring Depot of Shanghai No. 1 Bus Company. Construction schedules for the IRR were accelerated from those originally established at appraisal, with some cost increases as a result. Bankfunding ratio at 15% for TM was lower than the 24% used for the IRR and PT components. Combined with the importance attached to the construction of the IRR, this provided less encouragement to the TM team than to the IRR team to solve the problems that arose. Role of the Leading Group. This group provided high level policy support for the project, and had a responsibility for implementation policy and issues. Even so, it does not appear to have been used during project implementation to resolve specific project design or project management issues that could not be resolved by the PIU. This applied particularly to the differences of view in the traffic management component on the priorities to be accorded to different categories of traffic (MV, bus, NMV, and pedestrians), which were one of the factors slowing implementation. - 10 -  5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Focus on the IRR construction. The objectives of the Shanghai Municipal Engineering Construction Company (SMECC) was to complete the IRR. There was a lack of consideration about how the IRR would operate. This was evident in the early lack of concern about the interface of the IRR with the ground level road network, particularly the at-grade junctions where on- and off-ramps connected. Several Bank missions raised this issue throughout the project and expressed concern about junction designs. Ultimately, innovative traffic management measures focusing on multi-phase lane-control signalling solved these problems. Ownership of the TM component. TA was provided before and during the projects to assist the Shanghai agencies prepare and implement the schemes. The consultants had to try to form a partnership with Shanghai team but this was hard to achieve since local expertise was lacking initially. While the counterpart working relationships were very close, there was probably not a true partnership established. This may have resulted in undue consultant influence on the content of the proposals. In retrospect, Shanghai agencies may never have fully owned the proposals. Output of TA for STC. The output from this TA was considered by STC not to have been of great value in detailing their reform proposals. In theory agencies should be able to ensure that outputs are of value. In practice this is difficult in policy areas, and where agencies have limited experience of dealing with consultants, particularly foreign consultants. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: Total Appraised and Actual Costs of SMTP I and II Projects by Component (in miDlion US Dollar) SMTP I & II Component Appraisal Actual/latest Estimates % of Appraisal total SMTP I SMTP II Total SMTP I SMTP Total to Actual total II of SMTP I &1I A. Inner-Ring Roads of Stage I & 2 131.93 574.67 706.6 146.38 524.65 671.03 95% B. Traffic management and Safety 11.74 44.89 56.63 14.13 25.29 39.42 70% C. Public Transport Investments 0.00 36.46 36.46 0.00 30.44 30.44 83%c D. Technical Assistance 4.58 1.1 5.68 4.28 1.66 5.94 105% Total 148.25 657.12 805.37 164.79 582.04 746.83 93% Total Appraised and Actual Costs of SMTP I and II Projects by Component (in million of Chinese Yuan) SMTP I & II Component Appraisal Actual/latest Estimates % of Appraisal total SMTP I SMTP 11 Total SMTP I SMTP II Total to Actual total of SMTP I A. Inner-Ring Roads of Stage I & 2 688.68 3,275.6 3,964.28 1.138.97 3,641.89 4,780.86 121% B. Traffic management and Safety 61.30 255.9 317.2 87.41 207.52 294.93 93% C. Public Transport Investmnents 0.00 207.8 207.8 0.00 250.90 250.9 121% D. Technical Assistance 23.94 6.5 30.44 34.27 13.90 48.17 158%- Total 773.92 3,745.7 4,519.62 j 1,260.65 4,114.21 5 119% Ratio between costs in Y to US$ 5.22 5.70 5.65 J 7.65 7.68 7.196 The tables provide a comparison of the appraisal estimates of SMTP I and SMTP II costs with Bank Staff actual/latest estimates. - 11 -  Project Financing. IDA credit financed 40% of SMTP I total project cost of US$148.3 million equivalent. The total amount of SDR credit was US$44.4 million or US$60.00 million equivalent at appraisal. Due to the appreciation of the SDR relative to US Dollar, the total credit became US$ 62.99 million. A total of US$61.27 million was disbursed and the balance US$1.72 (SDRI.25 million) was cancelled. IBRD loan financed 20.3% of the total SMTP II cost of loan was US$150 million. The total disbursed is about US$148.0 million. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: All components are likely to be physically sustainable. The capacity and efficiency gains through road construction, traffic management and public transport reform are also sustainable. So too are the public sector management capacities. The major question mark is whether the overall road conditions are sustainable. Given that congestion is already apparent at certain locations and certain times on the ring road the answer is clearly that without other measures, the gains in travel times over the past ten years will be eroded over the next ten. More sophisticated management of the road system and redistribution of traffic by further construction (as was envisaged in both SAR) will certainly help. Continued increases in the capacity and quality of public transport will also decelerate the rate of increase of demand. But demand management will become necessary, starting with parking management and in the not too distant future, some form of area pricing scheme within the ring road. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: With the exception of the Inner Ring Road, the facilities and equipment funded under the project were designed and implemented by the SMG agency with corresponding operations and maintenance responsibility. The Shanghai Viaduct and Bridge Maintenance Company was set up especially for the operation and management of the IRR, the N-S viaduct and the Yanan Road viaduct. The Traffic and Patrol Police General Brigade of the Shanghai public Security Bureau is responsible for traffic management of the IRR viaducts and the ground level roads, as well as the various traffic management schemes. The Shanghai Public Transport Holding Company owns the new two depots which it leases to the operating companies. The Environmental Protection Bureau is responsible for the implementation and firther development of the MVECS. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: The Bank performance during preparation can be considered highly satisfactory. Both projects were comprehensively prepared by highly experienced teams. SMTP I was identified in May 1988 and appraised in October 1989. Work was interrupted by events in China in mid 1990, and so the appraisal findings were updated in February 1991. The first project was approved by the Board in November 1991. The second project was formally identified in July 1991 and appraised in February 1993. While a number of team members were common to both projects, the task managers were different, due to circumstances beyond management control. The first project was prepared at a time when the Bank was just starting urban transport work in China, and during a period when China was starting to embark on major reforms and to really open up to the rest of the world. The economic, sector and technical work undertaken was thorough and comprehensive. For the initial stages of a dialogue with a city these analyses perhaps attempted to cover too many sector issues. - 12 -  The preparation of the second project used the same analyses. These were supplemented by technical studies in transport modeling and TM supported by TA funded under SMTP I. 7.2 Supervision: Bank performance during supervision can be rated as satisfactory, although in terms of mission spacing, irregular. There were three task managers, all specialists in urban transport. The first, who was the task manager at appraisal of SMTP II, died in mid 1996. He was replaced quickly by the second task manager who had participated in the appraisal of both projects. After two missions the second task manager could no longer travel for medical reasons. The third task manager (who participated at the appraisal of SMTP II) took over in late 1997. SMECC commented that communication with the Bank suffered during this period, and problems were caused by lack of timely feedback. Mission spacing from late 1997 was adequate to review progress on the outstanding activities, largely related to the traffic management. No supervision plan was prepared for SMTP I.. A supervision plan was prepared for the SMTP II project which called for 8 missions (two per year) starting in March 94. The Bank conducted 14 missions for the SMTP-I and 15 missions for SMTP-II. This larger number of missions was called for by the duration of the project which was longer than planned. The project supervision took a total of 130 staff-weeks which appears to be reasonable compared to other similar projects in Asia. (The average for the East Asia Region is 8 staff weeks/year and 12 staff weeks for an ICR. Adopting these averages would have resulted in a total of 144 weeks of supervision). The quality of the dialogue between the Bank staff and the Chinese Project staff, as well as the guidance given by the Bank staff was well appreciated by the Chinese counterpart. However the changes of Bank task manager during the year 1996-97, made communication and problem solving more difficult. This was most evident for the TMS component which was not being implemented as fast nor as effectively as planned. 7.3 OverallBank-performance: Based on the above comments, the IDA/Bank performance is rated as satisfactory. Despite changes in task managers, supervision was comprehensive in coverage and focused on achievement of development objectives. The Bank was responsive to Borrower requests for changes in project components, although sometimes the response time was perhaps not as speedy as it should have been. Early advice was given to the Borrower on the scope of the ICR, and the definition and measurement of performance indicators linked to the objectives. The one failing was in the irregular spacing of supervision missions after the completion of the IRR. It is felt that this irregularity had an adverse impact on the nature of the traffic management schemes implemented. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The Borrowers performance during preparation was highly satisfactory. SMTP I was the first project SMG had undertaken with the Bank, at an early stage in the Bank dialogue with the Government of China. Thus the Borrower was not only having to come to grips with Bank requirements, but more generally with the details of the western business model and westem approach to policy formulation, planning, scheme design and project management. The learning required was broadened and deepened with the increased scope and complexity of SMTP II. The Borrowers primary interest was in building the IRR by a given date, but this did not prevent consideration and after discussion, acceptance of other components. The need for Bank review of designs and discussion of design parameters was not clearly understood. There was an understandable reluctance - 13 -  to have discussions that were meaningful to the Bank team on matters that had already been endorsed by SMG. This meant that discussions on technical matters (such as for the IRR on the number of lanes or the ramp locations) did not fully address concerns expressed by the Bank team on the design of project sub-components. In the public transport components the SMG team was reluctant for the Bank team to become to involved in reform at the start of the design of the reform measures. 7.5 Government implementation perfornance: The Government in this instance means the Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG), since the Government of China had little involvement in the project, beyond on-lending the loan to SMG. The SMG Leading Group was responsible for the overall direction of the project, including project implementation policy and issues. However, once the IRR was completed, the leading group did not appear to have been much involved. Despite its mandate, the leading group was not used to provide guidance to resolve the continuing differences of view of different agencies within the traffic management component. This suggests that the leading group did not see its role as being to take decisions on matters that involved several agencies, or project management decisions that were outside the powers of the PJU. Overall Rating is satisfactory. 7.6 Implementing Agency: The implementing agency performance was satisfactory. The same SMECC unit was responsible for the preparation and implementation of both projects. This ensured that knowledge gained at each stage was retained and expanded upon. It would have been rated as highly satisfactory but for a number of small dips in performnance, viz: intermittent quarterly reporting, and in later years, not sufficiently proactive management of remaining funds to ensure they were all properly used. There was one incidence of procurement not following Bank guidelines, due to staff being unfamiliar with them, but not sufficient for misprocurement to be declared. SMECC was also not as proactive as it could have been in project managing and in sending to the leading group for a decision matters deemed beyond its responsibility. The performance in preparing the SMG contribution to the ICR went beyond highly satisfactory into the realms of best practice. A detailed, insightful and well written 91 page document (plus annexes) was prepared. It is unfortunate that Bank requirements do not pennit more than a summary of the key sections to be presented in Section 9. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Overall performance is satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned Lessons were learned at all stages of the project, and have been incorporated into the preparation of subsequent Bank urban transport projects in China. These lessons have helped shape the recently prepared Urumqi and Shijiazhuang projects. Clients who prepared these projects also visited Shanghai to leam for themselves, and participated in the stakeholder workshop. The lessons cover the main project components, as well as engineering design, construction and procurement, monitoring and evaluation, Bank/Borrower interaction, the role of the Leading Group, and project management. They incorporate the key conclusions of the workshop. 8.1 Road Network (i) Road space management and network planning. From the time of identification of SMTP I through the appraisal of SMTP II, SMG focused heavily on the proposed major investments in road infrastructure. The Bank team discussed at length and in depth the value of complementing the Ring Road - 14 -  investment with traffic management, facilities for cyclists and pedestrians, and public transport. The Bank team was concerned that the N-S and E-W (Yanan) viaducts would encourage car traffic into the central area, within the IRR, overload the street network, and would be too destructive of the urban fabric and unaffordable, and so argued against them. With hindsight, the Bank would probably have had greater impact if it had accepted the basic SMG concept of a "ring and cross" viaduct network and then worked with the city agencies to produce a more efficient network design and to integrate it with a more effective traffic management strategy. (ii) Primary Road Capacity. Due to funding constraints and the amount of resettlement, the IRR viaduct was proposed as a 2 x 2 lane road with no emergency lanes. With hindsight, this is not wide enough for current requirements. Learning from this, SMG built later projects (N-S viaduct and E-W Yanan Viaduct) with 2 x 3 lanes. Assumptions about traffic growth, at appraisal, were deliberately conservalive, probably too conservative. The option of building a 2 x 3 lane IRR viaduct should have been given more consideration. However, it can also be argued (as it was at appraisal) that the proposed Outer Ring Road will relieve the IRR. Also, the rapid and efficient construction of a smaller road obviously brought some benefits to the city compared to the costs and delays which would have been associated with the construction of a larger facility. (iii) Better planning and design of roads. A better functional classification of roads is required and road design standards need to be revised so that they are based on appropriate functional classifications. Greater provision for pedestrians and cyclists should be made, with particular consideration for safety. (iv) Shanghai Central Area Network. Now that the 3 E-W and 3 N-S arterial routes are built in the central area within the ring road, there is a need to upgrade the rest of the network to provide a better grid, while taking account of historic buildings. There is also the need to irnprove the connections between the elevated road system and the ground level roads. 8.2 Engineering Design, Construction and Procurement (i) Quality of basic engineering design. Because Shanghai was a new client, the Bank teams were initially cautious about requiring engineering design reviews for the ring road. It quickly became apparent that the Shanghai Design Institutes had the highway and structural engineering design expertise to prepare the drawings and the technical parts of bidding documents to international standards. However, as SMECC notes, it was the first time the Shanghai Institutes had designed a large elevated road. Because of their lack of experience, and the tight construction schedule, there were some shortcomings in the design. For example: rubber joints were adopted for the viaduct surface which are now damnaged and create difficulties for maintenance, emergency lanes were not provided and, drainage is not adequate during heavy rainfall. In addition the monitoring equipment on the viaduct does only that, and does not control traffic flow. (ii) Functional Design shortcomings. Functional design skills were not as advanced. The lack of skills lacking negatively affected the location of ramps, and the design of the junctions under the ring r oad, particularly where ramps were located. Some of these skill have been acquired during the course of the project. SMECC notes that the additional ramps at Zhoujiazui Road and Jinshajiang Road were required because of insufficient planning before construction. Also, some ramps are too close to ground level cross streets. This results in serious weaving between the ends of the ramps and the ground level junctions. (This problem has been resolved in part by clever use of traffic signal phases). - 15 -  (iii) Speed and quality of construction. As with engineering designs, because Shanghai was a new client, the Bank teams were initially cautious when establishing the construction schedules for the ring road, and the supervision arrangements to ensure construction quality. The speed and quality of construction of the cable-stayed Nanpu bridge initially mitigated these concerns. Also, the speed of the construction of the IRR in SMTP I demonstrated that once an agency determined a schedule, they could adhere to it without sacrificing construction quality. The aesthetic quality of the structural finishes also improved with successive sub-components. (iv) Construction schedule and cost increase. After appraisal, SMG set a goal of finishing the IRR in 1994. In order to meet this objective, the design and construction times had to be reduced by SMECC from the already tight schedules agreed with the Bank. The net result was cost increases of the order of 15%. (v) Adoption of market based competitive bidding. The implementation of the SMTP illustrated to the SMG that market based methods can make a project more effective and efficient. The bidding process was very beneficial and stimulated the pace of reform of related design and construction companies. A fair and competitive construction market is emerging in Shanghai. Competitive bidding is now standard practice on SMG contracts. 8.3 Traffic management (i) There is a need to integrate the institutions dealing with traffic engineering and to develop a comprehensive approach to traffic management. - Advantage was not taken of the opportunity to develop innovative and appropriate design measures for NMVs, but the concept of separating MV and NMV flows is now accepted. Complete separation will take a long time. 3 The opportunity to develop bus priority measures was deferred because of the focus on road infrastructure for MVs. * Coordination between the TMS and the new road infrastructure needs to be stronger (for example, better design of the ground level junctions under the IRR; integration of IRR monitoring equipment and ATC). (ii) There is a need for two discrete traffic management activities within a project. The first is essentially a independent traffic engineering component, independent of any new infrastructure proposals. This can be implemented from the start of the project and independently of new road construction so that benefits are realized within a short timne frame and proposals are not rendered obsolete. The second activity should be integrated with the design of the new infrastructure components. (iii) Traffic Impact Analyses (TIA) should complement the design of Traffic Management Schemes. (TMS). TIA is required in addition to traffic management. The pace of development results in the traffic management schemes being rapidly superseded by new infrastructure, new land uses, growing traffic volumes and constantly changing traffic patterns. (iv) Financing traffic lights serves a purpose. Having a large identifiable investment in traffic signals and ATC at the heart of TMS component was justifiable to focus attention on traffic management. (v) Loan conditions may be helpful. The judicious use of more loan conditions may be worth considering to ensure the timely implementation of traffic management schemes. - 16-  (vi) Increasing the Bank's effectiveness. Bank staff need to present a very clear and consistent picture of the type of traffic management package, and specific measures, that would be acceptable. This was attempted in Shanghai, but the clarity eroded over the years. 8.4 Public Transport Reform. (i) Pace of reform. The project facilitated a great deal of reform, of pricing, and of the structure of the sector. However the pace of reform is govemed by local agencies and national political conditions. Thus Bank efforts (including investments) should be directed towards assistance with the formulation and implementation of reform. (ii) Private sector participation. Wholesale privatization of companies, cost based competitive tendering for service supply, reducing labor surplus to benchmarked operational requirements, and major private sector participation are not politically acceptable at the present time in China. Thus provision of public transport is likely to remain a largely a public sector activity for the foreseeable future. The initial thrust of Bank support should therefore be directed to the separation of the intrinsic public sector responsibilities of service specification and planning, from the cormnercial supply functions, which are likely to initially remain with the State Owned bus companies, but which can later be privatized. (iii) Use of foreign experience. Some foreign experience is relevant to the current reform programs in China. The key is to adapt this experience to local conditions, and to acknowledge that the initial conditions and stimulus for reform varies from place to place. This adaption requires knowledge sharing and teamwork between foreign experts and staff of local agencies, and locally generated solutions to reiform issues. (iv) Reform takes time. The process to date in Shanghai has taken 10 years. This compares with 15 years for complete reform of the system in London, a city of similar population and bus fleet. (v) Modal Integration. Greater coordination of modes is still needed, particularly the integration of rail and bus networks, with better interchanges between these modes. 8.5 Public transport priority: (i) Plan for Bus Priority. The project focused rightly on reform of STC (a government enterprise), which is a key to sustainable development of the role of bus services. However, the priority given to the MV in the road infrastructure translated into limited physical priority being given to buses. This in turn may have been a factor in the reduction in the modal share of buses. Future projects should consider more precise and realistic plans for public transport priority. (ii) Putting public transport first. This is the current SMG policy, but people do not know how to put this policy into practice. SMG should clarify what this policy means so that bus companies can better serve passengers and traffic management agencies will be encouraged to introduce bus lanes and signal priorities favoring buses. - 17 -  8.6 Transport Planning (i) Integrated Planning is critical. SMG recognizes that comprehensive transport planning in advance of construction is critical for city transportation. Transport plans should not be ends unto themselves, but should support economic development through integrated planning of transport and land use. The emphasis should be on moving people and goods, not infrastructure development. Plans should also be more closely related to the resources available. (ii) Modal Split forecasting. The overall number of daily trips grew more or less as anticipated. However, the traffic on the new road infrastructure grew much faster than anticipated. The modal share of car and motorcycle travel quadrupled between 1991 and 1998 from 3% to 12% of all trips. Over the same period, the modal share of public transport, even with the addition of the metro, decreased significantly from 26% in 1991 to 15% in 1998. The forecasts made in 1991 for the year 2000 were for 6% of all trips in cars and taxis and 30% on public transport. This evolution towards a lower share of public transport in favor of a bigger share of private means of transport, if it were to continue, could lead to a strong increase in road congestion and a loss of productivity (iii) Bicycle usage. Contrary to the 1991 forecasts which showed NMV usage remaining stable at 33%, NMV usage grew to 42% by 1998. Walking as a mode of transport remained stable at 30% of all trips. Coupled with the decline in public transport usage, this suggests that a clear choice is being made between the use of public transport and the use of bicycles, with a preference for use of bicycles. This trend needs to be researched, carefully modeled and the implications discussed. Bicycles will still be an important travel mode for Shanghai residents for some time. (iv) Use of a probability approach for future economic evaluations of large investments in urban transport infrastructure. The IRR viaduct proved to have insufficient capacity, and retrospectively it appears that it would have been better to build a larger facility. The motorization rate was faster than forecast. Assumptions at appraisal were deliberately conservative. To prevent under-design in the future, economic analysis of large investment projects should utilize a probability approach, to determnine the sensitivity of values and assumptions to the proposed capacity and benefits. 8.7 Monitoring and Evaluation. (i) The project did not plan nor budget for any evaluation study, or the collection of data which might have been used to evaluate the outcome of the project. The identification of key performance indicators, within a logical framework, was not yet mainstreamed at the time of project preparation. The studies undertaken for the preparation of the ICR partly filled this gap. (ii) SMECC noted that sufficient attention was not paid to data management. During the 10 year long project implementation period, relevant data was kept separately by various units and staff. Since there was not a central data system, it took a long time to pull together the information required for the ICR. - 18-  8.8 Bank/Borrower Interaction (i) Need for good communication. Communication is more than having good translators, although that helps. Good communication also requires the Bank to gain an understanding and respect of the culture and operating practices of the Boffower and implementing agencies. The key lesson in improving communication of ideas, knowledge and experience is to include in the project team local technical specialists who speak Chinese, and technical specialists with experience of China. (ii) Need for participation by all interested agencies. The experience in Shanghai is no different to the Bank's experience in every other country. To develop a sustainable project requires the active participation and ownership from all relevant institutions. Implementing agencies need to be fully involved with the design of each project component. Agencies also need guidance on how to work in partnership with international and local consultants for the transfer of knowledge and ownership of consultant generated proposals. (iii) Need to strengthen Bank supervision. The Bank should have provided a higher level of supervision to complement the large resources input to project preparation. This supervision has to be at regular intervals and with a consistency of approach if it is to support the work of the local agencies. 8.9 Project Management While project management was generally effective some improvements would have been possible. Most obviously, project components were planned and implemented by the different agencies and there was only limited coordination and communications between them. Also, the domestic formalities for the approval of all the sub-projects were managed by the relevant sector agencies over which the SMECC PIU had limited control. In addition, limited technical personnel and unclear responsibilities restricted the overall ability of SMECC to effectively manage the planning and implementation of sub-projects. 8.10 Leading Group (Project Steering Group) (i) The close attention of the municipal government was critical to the project's success. Continuous input and support from SMG in terms of policy, human resources and finance provided a sound basis for smooth preparation and implementation. (ii) A strong Leading Group, which is knowledgeable about the local transport situation and keen to learn from the best international practice (through cooperation with the Bank and foreign consultants) is critical for the smooth design and implementation of the project. (iii) As new projects are prepared, the Bank should try to ensure that the proposed institutional arrangements given the Leading Group the authority to make decisions affecting the progress and design of the project which are outside the limited role and responsibilities of the Project Office (i.e. decisions which require inter-agency cooperation). (iv) For all future projects, the Leading Group should have greater responsibility for the setting and implementation of transport planning and management policies. -19 -  8.11 Future Challenges (identified during the workshop). (i) Pace of Change. This makes planning particularly difficult, as the experience with the Ring Road has shown. It makes accurate forecasts more important but also more difficult. Also, it highlights the need for flexibility and continuous planning so that works are not rendered obsolete by increases in traffic. It also underlines the need for a good strategic plan when trying to assess the value of individual projects. (ii) Project Investment Approval Procedures used in China are generally satisfactory and simpler than Bank procedures. These Government procedures are being simplified even further, but more public participation is required and is being introduced. There is also a need for better integration between the activities of the municipal and districts governments. (iii) Environment and Sustainable Development. Sustainable development, environment and the quality of life are now important policy issues in all cities in China. Environmental considerations (costs and benefits) should therefore be given a higher profile in the evaluation of projects. However, there is a need to raise public awareness of environmental issues. The choice of the most appropriate mechanisms to reduce pollution from cars - emission control devices, tax policies, better control of certain types of vehicles, better traffic management, travel demand management is a challenge in itself 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: The implementing agency SMECC has written two sets of comments on behalf of the Shanghai Municipal Government. Below is their paper entitled "Implementation and Assessment" presented at the ICR Stakeholder Workshop by SMECC (with minor edits to reduce repetition of factual material presented elsewhere in the report). A more comprehensive and detailed set of comments of some 90 pages (excluding attachments) entitled "Implementation Completion Report" is available in the project files. 1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION The 90s on 20th century was a critical period for implementation of the national "Eighth and Ninth Five Year Plan", for promotion of further reform and opening and for the changes of strategic position of Shanghai. With the policy of developing Pudong from the Central Government in 1990, Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG) made the decision to take this opportunity to develop both sides of the Huangpu River. And Shanghai will be gradually built into the lead of Yangzi River valley and one of the international metropolises of world economy, finance and trade. In order to realize the great target, SMG decided to put a huge amount of investment to infrastructure construction so as to create favorable surroundings for more investment home and abroad and good conditions for economic development of Shanghai. To support the economic reform in Shanghai, the World Bank based on investigations by local and foreign experts and cooperation of SMG, confirmed as early as in the late 80s a program to assist Shanghai Metropolitan Transport Project (SMTP). - 20 -  1.1 Objectives The Project was implemented in two stages, and was intended to help Shanghai (a) raise the economic productivity through the improvement of operation and economic benefit of the urban transport system; (b) enhance the management capability of the public facilities through the improvement of the planning and management of urban transport system. 1.2 Elements of the Project a. To build the inner ring road, one of the urban backbone transportation infrastructures in Shanghai, so as to improve and mitigate the traffic pressure in central area of the city; b. Seeing from the angle of traffic engineering, traffic control measures and reducing hidden traffic accidents, to improve traffic management and safety from central business district (CBD) to central area of the city; c. To improve the operation of public transport by means of study on public transport reform and investment to the construction of some stops and depots; d. To strengthen the capabilities of urban transport planning, management and road maintenance institutions through providing consulting service of foreign experts and related equipment. 1.3 Duration of the Project From 1991 to the closing date of December 31, 2000, the Project lasted ten years. 2. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND ASSESSMENr During ten year's implementation of the Project, the foreign exchange in China changed from fixed rate to floating rate under control after 1994 so as to meet the further reform and opening. The exchange rate of RMB and US dollars was raised from $1 = Yuan 5.2 to $1 > Yuan 8.0, which resulted in a large remainig sum of funds under SMTP from the SAR estimate. Since 1991, SM started to prepare new general urban plan. And then comprehensive transport plans for Shanghai were in succession presented, which provided new bases for all-round implementing the objectives and components of SMTP. Facing the above mentioned changes, both Shanghai and the Bank agreed to make adjustment and modification to the Project so as to better use the loan surplus on principle of keeping objectives in SAR unchanged, enable the implementation of components under SMTP to reflect the strategy, comprehensiveness and reality of new general planning and strengthen the objectives of SMTP. The details are presented in the following paragraphs. 2.1 Inner Ring Road (IRR) In the new Shanghai urban plan, IRR is one of three important ring roads in Shanghai (the other two ring roads are Outer Ring and Suburb Ring Road). Circling the center of Pudong and Puxi, IRR goes through nine districts including Yangpu, Hongkou, Zhabei, Putuo, Xuhui, Luwan, Huangpu (former Nanshi) and Pudong New District, with the total length of 48 km. IRR covers Puxi section, Pudong section, Nanpu Bridge and Yangpu Bridge, which is the first all-round implemented express artery in Shanghai. - 21 -  Puxi section runs between Nanpu Bridge and Yangpu Bridge, with the total length of 29.2 km and including 40 m wide ground road (for standard section) and 18 m wide elevated road (for standard section). The elevated road is designed as two-way two-lane closed rapid road with the speed of 80 km/h. While the ground road is of two-way two-lane MV with the design speed of 40 km/h and two-way one-lane NMV road on both side. In addition, bus bay is provided for stops along the road. Four interchanges including Caoxi Rd, West Yanan Rd, Gonghexin Rd and Luban Rd are provided along the road and 41 up and down ramps are arranged for the main junctions. The construction of all 29.2 km long elevated and ground road in Puxi is included in SMTP. The implementation agency and Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is Shanghai Municipal Engineering Construction Company (SMECC). Based on a series of preparation, the first stage of IRR Puxi section under SMTP started in October 1991 and completed in December 1993. Stage 1, including 5.5 km long elevated road and ground road, opened to the traffic after 26 months construction and made the social efficiency yield well in time. Stage 2, covering 23.7 km elevated and ground road, started in February 1993 and finished at the beginning of December 1994, which went through 22 months construction and was put into operation on December 7, 1994. The total construction duration of IRR is 38 months, with the good quality rate of 100% for Stage 1 and 93.3% for Stage 2 respectively, which expressed the organization capability and working efficiency in large scale engineering construction in Shanghai.. The implementation of [RR has the following features: a. Construction management Two-level management was adopted. IRR was listed as No. I Project by the governrment at that time and the municipal engineering headquarter and 8 district sub-headquarters were set up. Under the leadership of municipal engineering headquarter, district sub-headquarters were responsible for land acquisition, demolition, resettlement, traffic organization during construction and coordination of affected residents in various districts along the route of IRR. Such a measure of joint efforts with individual responsibility was of great importance to speeding up the progress of construction, creating good environment of construction, promoting the district development and strengthening the idea of district's involvement in the project. bc. Procurement The implementation of works and procurement of main goods including bitumen, steel and equipment was executed via Intemational Competition Bidding (ICB) procedure and National Competition Bidding (NCB) procedure in accordance with the Guide of Procurement specified by the World Bank with the principle of open, fair and just. There are 65 contracts in total under Stage I and 2, of which 23 are ICB including 14 civil works and 9 goods contracts, and 42 are NCB covering 41 civil works and I goods contracts. 7 construction enterprises or joint venture between home and abroad with national first level certificate implemented the construction of viaduct and ground road under IRR through ICB bidding procedure. And 28 excellent medium-scale construction enterprises executed minor works via NCB bidding. The involvement of excellent enterprises ensured the contracts to meet the requirement of investment control, construction progress and quality specified in contracts. - 22 -  c. Construction supervision In accordance with the international custom, SMECC appointed Engineer to the construction site, which formed three-level site management of Employer (SMECC) -- Engineer -- Contractor. The comprehensive and whole process management of the project was executed by means of progress, quality and investment control and organization coordination. d. Quality control Under the unified control of Engineer authorized by SMECC, a three-level management network comprising contractor's self-control system, 10 public supervision companies selected through bidding and municipal quality supervision station (Shanghai Municipal Engineering Quality Supervision Station) carried out engineering quality supervision and evaluation. This network could control the quality and ensure the project implemented well. IRR has been operated for 6 years since the completion at the end of 1994, the social and economic effects could be summarized as follows: a. The construction of IRR introduced an urban expressway model, which fits the transportation in downtown area of Shanghai with high population density, tangled traffic and limited land for road. And it plays a lead role in the future road construction of "$` printing type like (a Chinese character used to describe the road net looking like a ring combined with a cross inside) elevated expressway system in downtown area. b. Enhanced the traffic capacity. The traffic capacity of IRR after operation is 9,400 pcu/h (two-way) of which elevated road is 6,100 pcu/h and ground road, 3,300 pcu/h respectively. While the traffic capacity of original 4-lane inner ring road was only 2,280 pcu/h. That means the traffic capacity increased by 3.12 times, or in the other word, the capacity of the current inner ring road equals 4 originals approximately. c. The operation of IRR remitted transportation inside and outside the IRR, especially the central area. SCCTPI sirnulated the traffic in 1995 and the result showed that the traffic on IRR elevated road and South-North Viaduct was 1,254,000 vehicle-km and 294,000 vehicle-km respectively. The traffic distribution is shown as follows. Area Traffic (1000 vehicle km) Proportion (%/o) Downtown area 848.7 54.8 Area outside the city center 203.8 13.2 Pudong 8.1 0.5 Zhongshan road at ground 368.7 23.8 Other 118.7 7.7 Total 1,548.0 100 As shown in the above table, the construction of elevated road enabled reducing the traffic on most roads within IRR and part roads outside IRR. Traffic on the roads further away from viadlucts could be indirectly reduced because IRR would attract the traffic on adjacent roads, and the adjacent road would attract the traffic on the roads adjacent to them. One by one, traffic of most ground road could be diverted. d. The operation of IRR expedited the land exploitation along and in the vicinity of IRR. Somne 488,000 m2 of buildings was demolished as 6,985 affected households and 841 units removed - 23 -  during the construction of IRR. Replaced are modem architectures. The adjustment of Shanghai Industry structure, the removal of lots factories causing serious pollution and the improvement of old residential area concentrated with poor and dangerous houses in the vicinity of IRR provided opportunities for land displacement and attracted real estate development. The fair trade street at North Zhongshan Road of Putuo District, the outstanding Zhujiawan, Panjiawan and Tanziwan tinpot residential areas, New South Bund of Nanshi District, Shanghai Stadium center of Xuhui District are all the typical cases. The former old, shady and tattered face on both sides of IRR is now replaced by new picture of modem commercial skyscrapers, office buildings, and high grade apartment buildings. e. The investment of the construction of IRR and the use of loan is under good control, which could be presented from the following data: the final cost of IRR is about 7.8% more than the estimate, within the nornal limnit; the rations between allocated and real used amount of loan is 97.7%. The cost of IRR makes up 88.95% of the total cost of SMTP and the loan used for IRR accounts for 85.87% of that for SMTP, which means that good use of funds and loan for IRR could make the whole SMTP good status. f. The economic benefit of Puxi section of IRR is good. According to the special analysis three economic indexes are as follows: * EIRR over 27%, 18% and 20% more than that in SAR of SMTP I and II; NPV more than 0; B/C more than 1.92 under various discount rate (DR). g. Environmental impact of IRR In accordance with the requirements specified in Technical Assistance (TA)-D5 the environmental action plan under SMTP II, comparison of vehicle emission exhaust, air quality, noise and vibration before and after construction of IRR was carried out through monitoring. The result showed that the traffic environment worsened because the traffic volume increased by 4.8 to 8 timnes. However vehicle emission exhaust didn't increased in an arithmetic progression due to the increase of speed and the change of vehicle type. The density of N02 and TSP increased but not too high for CO. Noise level of 20 - 50% monitoring points in the daytime exceeded the standard and the highest noise level was 4 - lOdB(A) over the standard requirement. 80 - 90% monitoring points at night exceeded the standard and highest noise level was 17 - 23dB(A) over the standard. Vibration monitored at most points didn't exceed the standard requirement. Totally 14,654 m long noise barrier was installed at the places where the residents are concentrated along IRR route, which reduced the noise interference with the residents living in 5th and 6th story even though it is not so ideal. Shanghai Government has made decision to take the environment treatment as the important policy and measure for construction during the further development of Shanghai so as to contribute to the improvement of transport environment. -24 -  2.2 Traffic Management and Safety Under this component 8 sub-projects were arranged. Shanghai Municipal Engineering Administration Department (SMEAD) and Shanghai Traffic/Patrol Police General Brigade (T/P PGB) (the former Shanghai Public Security Bureau, SPSB) are the main executive agents. The contents of this component include a. Construction of Non-Motor Vehicle (NMV) road and bridges in down town covering Central Business District (CBD) area inside IRR in Puxi so as to reduce congestion on some roads caused by conflicts between MV and NMV and increase the capacity of the transport network; b. Strengthening and improving traffic management by means of such measures as signal control, channelization, signs and marking and establishment of 1.1 km two-way exclusive bus way along the Waitan; c. Provision of 6 region traffic control centers and I road safety center. The scope of this component covers a very large area. In addition, during 1990s Shanghai was in the peak period of city improvement. The central area of the city was just like a big construction site. Affected by land sale and lease, demolition of old buildings and construction of new buildings due to land replacement, complicated ground and underground utilities renovation along urban road network, it was very difficu'lt to execute this component. The implementation period had to last for about 10 years from 1991 to 2000. With the effort of the executive agents, the following works were completed. a. 30.1 km long NMV road and 4 NMV bridges (Xinzha Rd Bridge will be completed in 2001), I1 km NMV road beneath the Project of Light Railway. The total length of newly established NMV lane is now 41.1 km, of which 25.7 kIn is parallel to IRR, 6.9 km parallel to Nanjing Road, 1.4 km parallel to East Yanan Road, 2.1 km parallel to South-North Viaduct and 2.7 km parallel to Lujiabang Road. The NMV route improved MV/NMV mixed traffic situation, increased the capacity of road network and accumulated experience for further NMV road construction. According to the plan of Shanghai Municipal Engineering Administration Bureau, additional 25 km NMV road will be built by year 2005. b. Complete expansion of urban road traffic management facilities. At present, signal was provided at 2000 junctions mainly in the center area of Shanghai, 3.2 time as much as 626 in 1991; 71,000 pieces of traffic signs, 3 times as that in 1991; 7300 km of markings, 4.3 times as in 1991 ancd 255,000 m2 of pedestrian crossing line, 1.8 times as in 1991. There are now 52 MV exclusive route, 518 MV single route, 2 public transport exclusive route and 48 NMV route in central area of Shanghai. The above mentioned traffic facilities and the construction of road during 90s impelled the death and injury rate to be reduced by 60% and 43% (in person/10,000 vehicles), which presents that the traffic management of Shanghai has stepped up to a new stage. c. 6 new district traffic control centers were set up under this component. With the original 2 centers, now there are 8 control centers in total, which could control road traffic within IRR and provided good bases for overall implementation of road traffic information management in Shanghai. Recently a batch of electronic police is used for traffic management, which represents that the urban transport management has gone into a modem process. - 25 -  d. One of the sub-project under this component, 1.1 -km two-way exclusive busway along the Waitan could not be implemented because a left-turn ramp of Yanan Rd Viaduct (East Section) Project was arranged at the same location. With the completion of three longitudinal and three horizontal backbone roads and the reconstruction of other roads, the policy of public transit priority will be carried out in new "Five Year Plan" and 120 km long bus-only route will be completed before 2005. 2.3 Support to Shanghai Public Transit (STC) The result of technical assistance on Public Transit Reform Study led to the overall implementation of public transit section reform during 1996 - 1998 by Shanghai Govemment. With the renovation in ticket system, management system and operation system carried out and then the loss turned into profit, public transit went to the way of market system. The comparison before and after renovation shows that the public transit running vehicles increased by 45.5% and the running routes and the length of routes increased by 15% and 32% respectively, which obviously represented the social and economic benefits. Under the component of Public Transit Investment, two depots and one interchange were completed on time with the efforts of Public Transit Company, which is beneficial to the operation management of the Company. 2.4 Technical Assistance Technical assistance includes foreign consultant service and equipment importation, which aims to strengthen the capacity of institutions concerning Shanghai urban transportation planning, traffic management and road maintenance as well as project management. This component has 15 sub-projects. 7 organizations responsible for respective sub-projects are Shanghai Municipal Engineering Construction Company, Shanghai Traffic/Patrol Public General Brigade, Shanghai Urban Planning, Designing and Research Institute, Shanghai Municipal Engineering Administration Division, Shanghai Comprehensive Transportation Planning and Research Institute, Shanghai Public Transit Company and Shanghai Academy of Environmental Sciences. Implementation of this component lasted about 10 years, from 1991 to 2000. Outcomes from this component are summarized as follows: a. Provision of good foundation work for project identification and implementation. The preparation of SMTP received grants from French, Australian, USA and Japan governments through World Bank management. With the assistance of foreign consultants and local experts from Shanghai Urban Planning, Designing and Research Institute, Shanghai Comprehensive Transportation Planning and Research Institute, and some other designing institutes in Shanghai, eight studies on Shanghai urban road and transportation system were conducted and framework for SMTP was identified. It provided a sound basis for the overall implementation of SMTP. b. Consultation and training provided by the foreign consultants enabled the local staff to absorb current advanced concept and technical approaches in term of transportation planning, traffic management, project management, public bus company management and road maintenance and etc. in the world. No doubt that the local counterparts and trainees will play an important role in their ow units in the future. - 26 -  c. The imported hardware and software have upgraded the transportation & traffic management capabilities in Shanghai. In some areas, such as computerized management, traffic software development, traffic analysis and traffic information collection, traffic monitoring and road maintenance, Shanghai is in the leading position in China. d. Through implementation of SMTP I-C6, Shanghai Transit Company Support, some intemational advanced concepts on public bus company management were leamed by Shanghai Public Transit Company. It provided useful ideas for the overall reform of Public Transit Sector started in 1996. The reform put the company into a market-based development cycle and released the company from huge deficit and the dependence on government subsidy. e. The implementation of SMTP II-D5, Environmental Action Plan, lasted for 4 years. The Plan made an overall assessment on the traffic-related environment within Inner Ring Road in Shanghai. Outcomes from this environmental action plan are summarized as follows. (l) Strengthened the concept of air pollution control. With the implementation of D5 sub-project, the environmental authorities recognized serious vehicle exhaust problem in Shanghai, particularly in downtown area. Vehicle emission has become the major contributor to air pollution in Shanghai. Enhancing the vehicle exhaust emission control has been put on the priorities. In early 1998, a leading group for vehicle exhaust control was established in Shanghai and carried out mitigation measures of vehicle exhaust emission. (2) Improved the technical capacity of Shanghai Academy of Environmental Sciences (SAES). Through the implementation of D5 and the cooperation among intemational and local experts, an environmental GIS (geographic information system) and vehicle exhaust model for Shanghai were developed. Now SAES can conduct some vehicle pollution predictions and basic measures of prevention. (3) Speed up the vehicle-related pollution control in Shanghai. Based on the predicted vehicle pollution trend in Shanghai, Shanghai Municipal Government adopted series measures to fight against the vehicle exhaust emission. Since September 1998, purification installations have been required for the using vehicles. In December 1998 and November 1999, Emission Standard for Light-Duty Vehicle and Emission Standard for Using Vehicle was issued. And from 2000, some vehicle emission testing centers were set up and some other measures were taken such as greenery, and etc. f. Improved the capacity of SCCTPI. With implementation of these projects, SCCTPI upgraded its capacity in the fields of concept, measures, methods and research capacities of transportation planning. Most professional staff from SCCTPI participated overseas training and study tour. And all the technicians joined the seminar and lectures presented by the foreign consultations in Shanghai. These were very helpful for the unit to improve its capacities. Meanwhile, equipment purchased under SMTP assisted SCCTPI to enter upon a new phase. For instance, imported traffic analysis and simulation software provided scientific tools for transportation planning and decision-making. Traffic information database has been extended and upgraded. GIS and Oracle have improved the calculation and infornation interpretation, which enabled Shanghai to setup a new database based on the traffic investigation in 1995. And it is also useful to develop and update the transportation planning model. All these areas have upgraded SCCTPI in the field of urban transportation planning. - 27 -  g. Shanghai Traffic/Patrol Police General Brigade, the former Traffic Management Division of Shanghai Public Security Bureau, is the authority responsible for traffic management in Shanghai. Its new institutional structure actually has been initiated from SMTP, which increased policemen from 4,346 in 1991 to 11,023 in 1999. SMTP provided the key persons in the unit an opportunity to leam the advanced traffic management concept through technical training and study tour. Traffic management in Shanghai has been improved and upgraded. h. Enhanced the capacity of Shanghai Municipal Engineering Administration Division (SMEAD), the unit responsible for urban road maintenance in Shanghai. With the technical assistance of SMTP I-C7 (a), Road Maintenance Monitoring Equipment, and SMTP II-D4, Pavement Management System Development, SMEAD set up a GIS for City Infrastructure Management and the construction management system in 1999 and 2000 respectively, which provided a sound basis for municipal engineering computerized management. And the road maintenance and monitoring equipment improved the road maintenance in Shanghai. The above mentioned results led SMEAD to transform from traditional experienced type to modem scientific and technologic type, which made the road comprehensive management to achieve advance level in China. 3. GENERAL ASSESSMENT 3.1 Completely Fulfillment of Project Components and Objectives There are totally 28 sub-projects under SMTP I and II. The composition of the project covers the construction of key points, lines and areas, and hardware and software as well, which is a comprehensive project contributing greatly to the development of Shanghai urban transportation and social economy. With ten-year implementation, all components under the project have completed and put into normal operation except some sub-projects such as Xinzha Rd Bridge. The total investment of SMTP is USD 648,000,000, of which the fund financed by the Bank is 217,000,000 accounting for 32.4% and the amount collected by Shanghai is 438,000,000 making up 67.6%. This is in compliance with the expectation of SMTP. The result of the project achieved the objective and will continuously make its social and economic benefits yield well. 3.2 Good Performance of both Shanghai and the Bank during the Implementation of the Project SMTP was implemented during 90s of the 20th century. At that time Shanghai was in face of the commencement of implementation of new urban general planning and the change of foreign exchange in China from fixed rate to floating rate under control. Both Shanghai and the Bank agreed to make adjustment and modification to the Project so as to enable the objectives of SMTP according with the new strategy of Shanghai urban development. The reason for the success of SMTP is because that Shanghai Government made overall arrangement for the organization, staff disposition, implementation, financing, supervision, loan paying of the project and for the macro-planning and policy implementation of the government, which created favorable, necessary and feasible conditions for the completion of SMTP. On the other side, the staff and experts of the World Bank Supervision Mission visited Shanghai two times per year during ten-year implementation of the - 28 -  project. They made site visit to understand situations and problems. And then they discussed with local staff, solved problem and gave full play to their guidance and supervision. The mutual understanding, linking up and cooperation ensured smoothly completion of the project. 3.3 Implementation of the Project introduced New Concept of Urban Transportation of International Modem Cities With ten-year mutual practice and cooperation, the Bank not only financed a lot of effective transport engineering project, but also introduced a complete set of intemational ideology of working procedure and scientific management. Local officials and technicians gained advanced concept of urban transportation, which enabled the project to be carried out at the intemational level and had the continuous development potentialities. For instance, all contracts under the project were implemented through open, fair and just tendering. The local staff realized that not only the construction of the project could benefit from the practice of such market mechanism but also the reform process of institutions conceming construction, design and contractor were promoted by the practice. The project started overall prosperity of construction market system in Shanghai. Another example is that the introduction of scientific management concept and measures initiated a good start for the institutions of planning, traffic management and road maintenance tuming from traditional experiential to modern scientific type and enabled the management capability of Shanghai Government in this field a qualitative leaps. 3.4 Contributions to Promotion of Shanghai Urban Transport Development a. The implementation of SMTP was a perfect start for realizing the target of putting urban infrastructure construction in the first place in the economic development of Shanghai. In accordance with the statistics, the investment of urban transportation in Shanghai until the end of 1999 is about USD 6,570,000,000 and the investment of SMTP is USD 650,000,000 (in cunrent exchange rate of USD$l1RMB8.3), making up 9.8% of the above mentioned amount, which presents SMTP's important contribution. b. The construction of Inner Ring Road under SMTP practiced a new experience of urban expressway suitable for Shanghai central area traffic, which led to the construction of the later South-North Viaduct and Yanan Rd Viaduct. Then the urban viaduct system shaped as "the ring with the cross inside" like "E" in Chinese was produced, which plays an important part in expanding the traffic volume and improving the transport conditions in Shanghai. c. During 90s, not only "$" shaped viaduct system was fonned, but also a serious transportation works were completed, such as urban express artery road network composed of three longitudinal and three horizontal backbone roads, the rail transport network covering No 1, No 2 and Mingzhu Line shaped as "cross" plus "west half ring" with the total length of 65 km and large passenger volume, and some bridges crossing Huangpu River. All these represent that the stereo transport networks in Shanghai centers area has been formed in embryo and needs correspondingly higher-level traffic management. With the completion of traffic management facilities and the implementation of technical assistance under SMTP, both concept and facilities of Shanghai urban transport management has become more modernization. The result of implementation of traffic management shows that the traffic speed on urban road was increased from 10 - 15 km/h in 1991 to 20 km/h in 1997 and 25 - 30 kmn/h in 1999 respectively. The death and injury rate was decreased by 60% and 43% in 1999 compared with that in 1991 respectively. - 29 -  d. With the implementation of technical assistance under SMTP, the capability of relevant institutions such as urban transport planning, traffic management, road maintenance and environmental research, etc. was strengthened. 3.5 A Helping Hand lent to Shanghai Economic Development in the 90s Just as the whole country during 90s, Shanghai experienced reform and opening, and the transition from planning economic system to social market economic system. GDP of Shanghai continuously increased in- two digits and reached RMB 455,100,000,000 at the end of 2000, 5.1 times as that in 1991. And GDP/person of Shanghai was USD 4,180, 1.82 times as 2,300 in 1995. Shanghai has gone from well-to-do comfortable level into middle development level. Such achievement is because that during 90s Shanghai Government did three important practical matters: 1) large scale urban infrastructure construction formed basically general form-work with central urban functions; 2) strategically adjustment of industrial structure formed basically new industrial structure suitable for further urban development; 3) large productivity layout adjustment formed new production form-work suitable for new productivity form-work for continuous development. The above mentioned three form-works provide a new and higher starting development point for Shanghai in new century, which means that the comprehensive competitive capacity of Shanghai should be strengthened when the economic structure is optimized. The implementation of SMTP was included in the first important matter, which directly helped Shanghai economic development during 90s. However there is a shortage in the implementation of SMTP. An insufficient prediction of urban vehicle possession volume (the forecast for vehicle possession of 2000 at the beginning of 1991 is 400,000, and the actual number in 1999 reached 706,000) caused insufficient lane arrangement for Inner Ring Road (4 lanes on viaduct and 6 lanes on ground road). After several year operations, a lot of sections approached or exceeded the design traffic capacity, which caused congestion at the peak hours. Such experiences were learnt by the later projects such as South-North Viaduct and Yanan Rd Viaduct. In order to mitigate the congestion on Inner Ring Road, Shanghai Govermnent considered the following measures: a. Speed up the construction of Outer Ring Road Project and improve the construction of road network between iner and Outer Ring Road. For instance, to speed up the construction of auxiliary ring road and upgrade the standard; widen and to open the surrounding roads such as Guangling Rd - Lingshi Rd - Daduhe Rd - Hongcao Rd so as to increase the road density outside Inner Ring Road and release the traffic pressure at the north section and west section of IRR. b. It is planned to divert the NMV on ground road beneath Inner Ring Road and to change it into MV exclusive road. So that the mixed MV and NMV at the junction of ground road could be avoided, MV capacity increased and the traffic volume on viaduct reduced by 4%. c. The saturation level on Inner Ring Road from Guangzhong Rd to South-North Viaduct has been over 1.20 and the congestion on the up ramp of Guangzhong Rd is serious. It is considered to reconstruct and widen Shuidian Rd and Liuying Rd. Then by means of traffic management measures such as controlling the traffic volume on up ramp at the peak hours, the traffic flow of up ramp of Guangzhong Rd could go to South-North Viaduct via Guangzhong Rd and Liuying Rd. And the traffic flow of Dabaishu could be led to South-North Viaduct through Shuidian Rd and Liuying Rd. It is expected that if the above mentioned measures could be implemented the traffic - 30 -  volune on hiner Ring Road viaduct from Guangzhong Rd to South-North Viaduct could be reduced by 12%, which is an obvious mitigation. d. Adjust and control the traffic volume by strengthening monitoring. Because of lack of experience, the functions of original monitoring equipment for Iner Ring Road are not sufficient. With the operation of "''shaped elevated road system in the city center, it is necessary to establish a traffic monitoring network for whole elevated road system, which is under the stage of program study. (b) Cofinanciers: None (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): None. 10. Additional Information None. - 31 -  Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: F tndlcatortmatrtx Projectd in last PSR' ActuaiLatest Estimato 1. Increased capacity: I (a) road capacity (in pcu's per hour): IRR Viaduct 2 x 3050 2 x 3050 IRR at grade 2 x 1650 1 (b) bus fleet of the Shanghai Transit 6600 (in 1991) 16900 (in 1999 2 Reduced congestion: travel speed during 80Km/lh nominal speed 42 to 75 Km/h peak hours for the project investment: (a) IRR viaduct 3. improved efficiency 3 (a) motorized traffic volume: average hourly traffic during peak period (7AM-7PM) Index = 100 Index = 181 to 285 IRR viadud Index= 100 Indext = 118 to 945 IRR at grade 3 (b) improvement to bus operation: ST bus ridership volume -63% (1991-96; +8% per year (1996-98) Farebox ratio 68% (in 1992) :3(c) Daily trips 31 070 000 28 260 000 3 (d) modal spit: pedestrain 30% 31% NMV 34% 42% publir transit 30% 15% cars and motorcycles 6% 12% Projected indicators were retrofitted - 32 -  Output Indicators: IndicatoriMatrix Projected in last PSR ActualtLatest Estimate Selected Physical Output Indicators Inner-Ring Road 29.367 km 30.95 km Stage l: North-westem Section (Panwanli-Hutai Rd) 5.470 km 7.40 km Stage II: North-eastem Section (Hutai Rd-Yangpu Bridge) 10.473 krm 10.13 km South-westem Section (Nanpu Bridge-Panwangli) 13.429 km Ground Rd of the Elevated Road 29.136 km 13.42 km Ramps (Number) 35 41 Interchanges ? 4 Timely Implementation SMTP I A. MajorArterial Road 1991-1994 1991-1993; Excludes Contract 2.7; Zhoujiazui & Jinshajiang Rd Ramps added later B. Traffic Management Component B1 Non-motor vehicle Roads 1991-1996 1991-1998; delayed B2 CBD Traffic Management 1991-1996 1991-1996 B3 NSC Network 1991-1993 1993; 1.1 km busway dropped B4 3rd Control Room Newly added 1992-1994 C. Technical Assistance and Training Cl Zhongshan IRR Supervision and Project 1991-1995 1991-1994; ahead of schedule Management C2 Traffic Management 1991-1993 1991-1994 C3 Support b SCCTPI 1991-1994 1992-1995 C4 Identfication of Investment priorities & 1991-1993 1992-1995 C5 Preliminary Feasibility Study 1991-1993 1992-1995 C6 Support to STC 1993-1993 1993-1994 C7 Equipment Procurement (a) Road Maintenance Monitoring 1992 1994-1996 Equipment (b) Project Management Computer 1992 1992 (c) Transport Analysis Computer 1992 1992 (d) Training Safety Monitoring Equipment 1992 eariy 1993 (e) Traffic Data Collection Vehides with Newly added 1994-1999 Equipment and Software (i) Transportation Information center Newly added 1995-1997 SMTP II A. Inner Ring Road 1993-1997 1993-1995; open to traffic Dec. 1994 B. Traffic Management and Safety B1 Area Traffic Control 1994-1996 1994-1998 B2 Road safety Research Center 1994-1995 1994-1997 B3 Traffic Management Program Works 1994-1997 1998-2000 B4 6th, 7th and 8th Control Room Added 1998-2000 C Pubic Transport Investments Cl Caobao Depot 1994-1996 1995-2000 C2 Road Safety Research Center 1994-1997 1997-2000 C3 Caoxi Interchange 1994-1996 1995-1996 - 33 -  D. Technical Assistance D1 Project Management Support 1994-1995 1994-1995 D2 Traffic Managenent Support 1994-1996 1996-1998 D3 Transport Planning Support 1994 1997-1998 D4 Pavement Managernent Design 1994 1994-1996 D5 Environmental Action Plan Support 1994-1997 1994-1998 D6 Traffic Police Training Newly added 1995-1996 D7 Trairing for PItU Staff Newly added 2000 D8 Consultant Service for Implementation Newly added 2000 Report End of project -34 -  Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal ActuallLatest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Proiect Cost By Component US$ million US$ million Major arterial roads 107.10 136.91 127.82 Traffic safety and management 9.40 10.51 111.81 Technical assistance 4.20 4.12 98.1 Total Baseline Cost 120.70 151.54 Physical Contingencies 11.70 0.00 Price Contingencies 15.80 0.00 Total Project Costs 148.20 151.54 Total Financing Required 148.20 151.54 Changes in the project components were made at the time of the appraisal of SMTP II. A total of US$ 1.72 million has been canceled Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements Apraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICa NCEt Other N.B.F. Total Cost 1. Works 54.10 18.30 5.40 0.00 77.80 (37.40) (12.60) (3.70) (0.00) (53.70) 2. Goods 0.00 1.00 0.90 0.00 1.90 (0.00) (0.70) 0.90 (0.00) (1.60) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 4.60 0.00 4.60 Technical assistance (0.00) (0.00) (4.60) (0.00) (4.60) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 56.20 0.00 0.00 56.20 Resettlement (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 7.80 0.00 7.80 Taxes and overheads (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 54.10 75.50 18.70 0.00 148.30 (37.40) (13.30) (9.20) (0.00) 59.90) 35 -  Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) Pirocurment Method' Exnur tr2 N.B.F. Total Cost 1. Works 67.39 11.01 0.00 0.00 78.40 (46.72) (8.33) (0.00) (0.00) (55.05) 2. Goods 0.00 3.36 0.00 0.00 3.36 (0.00 (3.36) (0.00) (0.00) (3.36) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 2.86 0.00 2.86 Technical assistance (0.00) (0.00) (2.86) (0.00) (2.86) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.09 45.09 Resettlement (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.23 21.23 Taxes and overheads (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.86 13.86 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 67.39 14.37 2.86 80.18 164.80 (46.72) (11.69) (2.86) (0.00) 61.27) A total of US$1.72 million has been cancelled " Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 21 Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) ,oniponeifl AppIt*IS; p XhaistEKI* Jnat0 3 ; A Late#st stmate0 0 Prrentage'of Appraisal ________ IDA00 00X:Gv00Xi00 t.;00001000000^ CF ; X,:0IA 00Gv CoF_ IDA Gpoy CoF. Major arterial works 50.80 81.13 0.00 54.05 92.34 0.00 106.4 113.8 0.0 Traffic management 4.62 7.12 0.00 2.94 11.20 0.00 63.6 157.3 0.0 Technical assistance and 4.58 0.00 0.00 4.28 0.00 0.00 93.4 0.0 0.0 training Total 60.00 88.25 0.00 61.27 103.54 0.00 102.1 117.3 0.0 - 36 -  Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL EVALUATIONS Introductions 1. The project economic analyses were re-evaluated by the Borrower with assistance from the Bank team. As at appraisal, the economic analysis focused on the Inner Ring Road, which comprised 90% of project costs and financing. A single re-evaluation was undertaken covering both Stages of the Ring Road. The reevaluation was undertaken using the same standard methodology adopted during both appraisals. 2. The benefits from the ring road were estimated as the savings in vehicle operating costs (VOC) and passenger time costs compared to the situation without the project. The major benefit streams include savings: (a) for the traffic originally on the IRR (b) for the increase in traffic on the IRR (c) for traffic on the central area road network within the ring road (d) for traffic on other parts of the network, outside the ring road In the economic evaluation undertaken at appraisal, items (c) and (d) were stated as benefits, but could not be calculated as the traffic model at the time was not able to produce robust enough estimates of speeds, and flows. 3 . The key assumptions and inputs made remained the same as at the appraisals, with these exceptions: (a) capital investmnent costs were revised to reflect "as built" costs (b) maintenance costs were based on actual maintenance expenditures during the initial years of operation (c) the actual construction periods were used (3 years instead of four) Capital costs were around 21% greater than the appraisal estimates, while the actual construction period was 3 years, instead of 4 years assumed at appraisal. Highway Corridor Traffic 4. Stage I of the elevated Inner Ring Road (funded under SMTP I) was opened to traffic in December 1993 and Stage 2 (funded under SMTP II) in December 1994. The table below provides a comparison of the traffic volumes before and after the elevated road construction. - 37 -  Comparison of Traffic Volume Before and After Viaduct Construction Elevated Ring Road Daily Traffic Volume Ground Road Daily Traffic Volume before the excluding ground road traffic elevated road was built (September 1, 1996) (January 30, 1991) Cross-section Outbound Inbound Total Cross-section Outbound Inbound Total Yangpu Bridge-Hejian Rd 21,000 21,000 4200 Zhoujiazui-Songhuajiang Rd 4255 4083 8338 Hejian-Zhoujiazui Rd 17300 18450 35750 Songhuajiang-Wujiaochang 4118 3937 8055 _______ ~Rd Zhoujiazui-Songhuajiang Rd 10500 13569 24068 Wujiaochang-Dabaishu Rd 5957 1326119 218 Songhuajiang-Siping Rd 18497 8760 27257 Dabaishu-Guangzhong Rd 8301 1045618 757 Siping-Zhongshanbeiyi Rd 18497 23148 41645 Guangzhong-Xibaoxing Rd 9845 9805 19650 Zhongshanbeiyi- 30232 30539 60771 Xibaoxing-Gonghexin Rd 10930 1064821 578 Guangzhong Rd Gaungzhong-Hetian Rd 45577 44897 90474 Gonghexin-Hutai Rd 11489 1144122 930 Hetian- Gonghexin Rd 40719 44897 85616 Hutai-Wuning Rd 9956 9070 19026 Gonghexin Hutai Rd 46444 43989 90433 Wuning-Wuyi Rd 10626 1026920 895 Hutai-Wuning Rd 40112 34427 80900 Wuyi-Yan'an Rd 10371 9740 20111 Wuning-Wuyi Rd 34639 29450 64089 Yan'an-Honggiao Rd 11318 1067221 990 Wuyi-Yan'an Rd 17829 12516 30345 Honggiao-Wuzhon Rd 9826 9186 19012 Yan'an-Xinhua Rd 17829 12516 30345 Wuzhong-Caoxi Rd 8264 7857 16121 Xinhua-Wuzhong Rd 32421 31140 63561 Caoxi-Tianyuegiao Rd 7418 1004717 465 Wuzhong-Caoxi Rd 40933 30795 78367 Tianyueqiao-Wanping Rd 7927 8916 16843 Caoxi-Tianyuqiao Wanping 36497 30642 67139 Wanping-Dapu Rd 6038 6986 13024 Rd Tianyueqiao-Wanping Rd 29201 24490 60843 Dapu-Luban Rd 3469 4266 7735 Wanping-Ruijin Rd 41491 40105 81596 Luban-Xinzhaozhou Rd 3220 3455 6675 Ruijin-LubanRd 33767 32352 66119 _X____ Luban Guohuo Rd 29149 26613 63756 Guohuo-Nanpu Bridge 16819 15613 32432 _ Benefits: 5. The differences in traffic counts on the elevated Ring Road (September 1996) and Ground road (January 1991) indicate strong growth of traffic. Thus, traffic growth expectation has significantly been met. In fact, the traffic growth on the IRR was even higher than anticipated. The rapid increase in traffic volume over the viaduct led to traffic saturation thereby limiting the potential speed gain. Overall, the construction of the Inner Ring Road system has not only attracted traffic, it has effectively improved the distribution of traffic, reduced a major bottleneck, made possible high speed travel and reduced travel time. This increase in traffic capacity reduced congestion in the rest of the network. However, the rapid increase in traffic volume relative to the enlarged road capacity led to a smaller speed increase than expected. Overall Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) 6. A post construction economic appraisal of the elevated system was undertaken. The principal benefits included: savings in vehicle operating cost, reduction in vehicle-kilometer, passenger time, and saving in travel time due to reduction in congestion. The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) estimated to be 27.6% taking both Stages together. At appraisal, the EIRR estimates for the Inner Ring Road (SAR, STMP I & II) was 18% and for Stage II was 15% respectively. Adjusting for the increase in IRR costs, these EIRR become 16.5% and 14% respectively. The overall post-construction EIRR estimate at ICR for the Inner Ring Road system (Stage I and Stage II combined) at 27.6% compares favorably with the appraisal estimates in SMTP I & II. - 38 -  Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: ( Stagc of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performa ceRating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation January 1988 3 Resettlement Specialist, Urban Planner, Transport Planner May 1988 5 Transport Economist, Economist, Urban Transport Specialist, Environmental /Sanitation Specialist, Transport Planner July, 1998 6 Transport Economis, Economist, Resettlement Specialist (2), Transport Planner (2), August 1988 1 Economist October 1988 7 Economist, Railway Engineer, Highway Engineer (2), Transport Economist (2), Environmental Specialist January 1989 1 Urban Transport Planner Appraisal/Negotiation October 1989 6 Economist (2), Urban Transport Planner, Urban Planner, Municipal Engineer, Civil Engineer, November 1989 1 Anthropologist February 1991 3 Transport economist, Transport Urban Planner, Municipal Engineer March 1991 1 Transport Specialist Supervision 11/16/91 6 Transport Specialist (2), HS HS Urban Transport Specialist (2), Municipal Engineer, 03/27/92? 4 Urban Transport Specialist, HS HS Traffic Engineer, Highway Engineer, Procurement Specialist 08/15/92 6 Transport Specialist, Urban HS HS Transport Specialist, Traffic Engineer, Highway Engineer, Procurement Specialist, Resettlement Specialist 11/28/92 6 Transport Specialist, Urban HS HS Transport Specialist, Traffic Engineer, Highway Engineer, Procurement Specialist, Resettlement Specialist - 39 -  03/20/93 6 Transport Specialist, Urban HS HS Transport Specialist, Traffic Engineer, Highway Engineer, Procurement Specialist, Resettlement Specialist 12/01/93 3 Transport Specialist, Traffic HS HS Engineer, Highway Engineer 07/30/94 3 Transport Specialist, Traffic S S Engineer, Public Transport Specialist 04/08/95 3 Transport Specialist, Traffic HS S Engineer, Civil Engineer 12/29/95 3 Transport Specialist, Traffic HS S Engineer, Transport Economist 10/17/96? 4 Urban Transport Specialist, HS S Environmentalist, Operation Officer,Transport Economist 07/11/97 2 Urban Transport Specialist, S S Operation Officer 01/25/97 Urban Transport Specialist, S S Operations Officer , Resettlement Specialist 05/14/98 2 Urban Transport Specialist, S S Procurement Officer 01/28/99 4 Urban Transport Specialist (2), Procurement specialist, Traffic Engineer ICR 08/21/99 1 Urban Transport Specialist, Operations Officer 02/29/00 1 Urban Transport Specialist 07/21/00 1 Transport Specialist (b) Staff Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks USS ('000) Identification/Preparation 118.5 332.8 Appraisal/Negotiation 110.9 282.6 Supervision 80.4 235.7) ICR 6.3 (March 2001) 23.3 Total - 40 -  Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating O Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA O SectorPolicies OH OSUOM ON * NA O Physical * H OSUOM O N O NA F Financial O H *SUOM O N O NA O Institutional Development O H * SU O M 0 N 0 NA Z Environmental O H *SUOM O N O NA Social El Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N * NA Eli Gender O H OSUOM O N * NA El Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA O Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N * NA 3 Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA El Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM ON * NA -41 -  Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating O Lending *HSOS OU OHU O Supervision OHS Os OU OHU O Overall OHS OS O u O HU 6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating O Preparation *HS OS O U O HU O Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU O Implementation agency performance OHS OS O U O HU a Overall OHS OS O U O HU - 42 -  Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents The World Bank, Shanghai Metropolitan Transport Project, Staff Appraisal Report (No. 8465--CHA), August 12, 1991. The World Bank, Second Shanghai Metropolitan Transport Project, Staff Appraisal Report (No. 11985-CHA), September 10, 1993. Shanghai Academy of Environmental Sciences, Environmental Reviewing Statement for Shanghai Inner Ring Road Project, November 1998. Shanghai City Comprehensive Transport Planning Institute, Transportation Development Impacts of Shanghai City (Modified Version) TaskNo. 97-31-30, July 1999. Corey Wong, Analysis of the ZhongShan Inner-Ring Road Construction, September 6, 1999. Andre Puong, Urban Travel Patterns and Traffic Conditions in Shanghai City, September 7, 2000. Tongji University, School of Economy and Management, Post-Appraisal of Economic and Social Benejfts for Shanghai Municipal Elevated Road System of Inner Ring Road (Abstract version), November, 2000. Shanghai Municipal Engineering Construction Company, Shanghai Metropolitan Transport Project, Project Implementation Unit, Implementation Completion Report (ICR), December 2000. Shanghai, Shanghai Metropolitan Transport Project (SMTP I & II) Implementation Completion Revieiw (ICR) Workshop Papers, April 2001. The World Bank, Shanghai Metropolitan Transport Project (SMTP I & II) Implementation Completion Review (ICR) Workshop Papers, April 2001. -43 -  Annex 8. Beneficiary Survey Results The beneficiaries of the project were the residents of Shanghai - as pedestrians, cyclists, public transport passengers and motorists, transport operators and business in general. The projects were undertaken at a time of rapid change in Shanghai, and in parallel with other investments and transport improvements being made by SMG without support from the World Bank. Under these circumstances, it was felt that a beneficiary survey would not have yielded useful or meaningful results for this report. Instead, greater effort was put into the Stakeholder Workshop, as described in Annex 9. - 44 -  Annex 9. Stakeholder Workshop Results The Stakeholder Workshop was held from April 25 to 27, 2001. Participants at the workshop included representatives from the following Shanghai Government Agencies: * Planning Conmmission, Construction Commission; * Audit Bureau, Environment Bureau, Finance Bureau, Municipal Engineering Administration Bureau, Planning Bureau, Public Security Bureau, Transport Bureau; * City Comprehensive Transport Planning Institute, Municipal Engineering Design Institute, Municipal Engineering Research Institute, Urban Construction Design Institute, Planning Institute; * City Investment Co., Public Transport Holding Co., Viaduct Maintenance Co., Bashi Taxi Co., Dazhong Taxi Co., Jinjiang Taxi Co., Qiangsheng Taxi Co.; * Academy of Environmental Sciences, Customs, Traffic/Patrol Police General Brigade; * Highway Department, Municipal Engineering Administration Department; Shanghai Metropolitan Transport Projects - Project Implementation Unit; Participants also attended from the cities of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shijiazhuang, and Wuhan, as well as Liaoning Province, all of which have Bank supported urban transport projects. The workshop agenda included a site visits, papers on the ICR and topics related to the objectives and scope of the projects, and group discussions, as follows: April 25 Morning - Site Visit to the Inner Ring Road (IRR), Hongku District Area Traffic Control Room, NMVr Route parallel to IRR, selected junction channelizations and the Caobao Bus Depot. Afternoon - Visit to the Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition April 26 Presentation of Papers, including question and answer sessions. Session I Opening remarks from Shanghai and the Bank Session 2 Summary of ICR report by Shanghai Session 3 Summary of ICR report by the Bank Session 4 Shanghai Urban Transport Development - past 10 years & future 20 years (Paper by Shanghai) Session 6 Reform of the Public Transport System in Shanghai (Paper by Shanghai) Session 5 Shanghai Looking at the World - Experiences of urban transport development planning and investment in other countries (Paper by the Bank.) Session 7 Putting People First (Paper by the Bank) April 27 Working Group Discussions For the discussions on the ICR. and the other papers, participants divided into two groups. The first group addressed "macro" issues relating to overall policy, planning and investments. Discussion in this group was led the Assistant Chief Engineer of the Shanghai City Planning Administration Bureau. The seconcl group addressed "micro" issues of traffic management, public transport and urban road design. Discussion - 45 -  in this group was led by the Chief of the Traffic Facilities Department of the Traffic Police Patrol/General Brigade of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau. Key Conclusions from the "Macro" - Planning, Policy and Investment - Working Group Discussions 1. Transport Planning and Policy. * Transport plans should not be ends unto themselves, but should support economic development through integrated planning of transport and land use. * The emphasis should be on moving people and goods, not infrastructure development. * Sustainable Development and the environment/quality of life are now important factors. * Greater coordination of different modes is needed, particularly the integration of rail with other modes * Planning should be related to the resources available. 2. Development of the Transport Network * Better classification of the fumction of roads is needed - i.e. functional road hierarchy and more provision for walking and NMV. * Better integration of rail and bus networks, with use of rail + bus for longer trips and walk/bicycle for short trips * Cycling to be encouraged with more appropriate facilities * Issues regarding the choice of modes (between car, NMV and walking) have to be dealt with at the planning stage. 3. Future Challenges * Pace of Change. This makes planning particularly difficult, as the experience with the Ring Road has shown. Makes good predictions more important and shows the need for flexibility and continuous planning or works will be rendered obsolete by increases in traffic. A good strategic plan is important when trying to assess individual projects. * Project Investment Approval Procedures used in China are generally satisfactory and simpler than WB procedures. These procedures are being further simplified, but more public participation is required and this is being introduced. There is also a need for better integration between SMG and districts. (Transport is 1/3 rd of the SMG investment budget. This is a non-commercial investment by SMG.) * Environment and Sustainable Development. Environmental considerations (costs and benefits) should be given a higher profile in the evaluation of projects - for example whether to put metro underground. There is a need to raise public awareness of environmental issues of environmental issues. Choice of the most appropriate mechanisms to reduce pollution from cars - emission control devices, tax policies, better control of certain types of vehicles, better traffic management, travel demand management. Key Conclusions from the "Micro" - Traffic Management, Public Transport and Urban Road Design Working Group Discussions 1. Traffic management - change of mindset after WB project: * Idea of separation of MV and NMV now accepted, but due to the differences of view between departments, the pace of implementation has been slow. * Bicycles will still be an important travel mode for Shanghai residents, but complete separation from motor vehicles will take a long time. -46 -  * Channelization now accepted, but congestion at junctions still has to be solved 2. Safety - have to put people first in the prevention of accidents and in designing a black spot program. Experts in analysis of traffic accidents have been engaged to measure accidents and design solutions. 3. Public Transport - great deal of reform, facilitated by the project. * Pricing change has reduced the financial burden on government. * Organization - monopoly of STC has been broken 4. Urban Road Design * Improvement of road standards has improved the quality of life of residents. * Putting people first is nIow taken seriously through environmental protection and beautification of road 5. Future Challenges * Improving the connections between elevated road system and ground level roads. In order to facilitate smooth traffic flow on the Inner Ring Road, there is a need to smooth the flow between the elevated road and the ground level roads. Currently there is congestion at the on/off ramps so manual ramnp control is used. * Traffic Management at Junctions. Planning, design and management of traffic at junctions; because of the mix of MV/NMV and pedestrians. The aim is to have no congestion but smooth, fast and safe movements for all modes. * Putting public transport first. People are chanting this slogan, but don't know what to do to practice this idea. SMG shoulcd give clarify the policy on "Public Transport for People" so that bus companies can better serve passengers and so that traffic management agencies can introduce bus lanes and signal priorities favoring buses. There is a need to not only change the rnindset, but to put it into practice, (to avoid repetition of the proce ss that led to the withdrawal of the Waitan busway). * IBetter Interchanges between modes. How to connect bus and rail lines? Inconvenient interchanges (like on the Pearl Line) does not help passengers. Better Planning and Design of Roads: (i) More consideration must be given to pedestrians and NMV, especially pedestrian safety. IRR quite safe but only because there are no pedestrians or bicycles. But roads in the suburbs are not safe as not enough consideration is given to pedestrians and cyclists. (ii) National road design code needs to be reviewed so that designs can be based more on road function - for example lane widths. How wide should they be? In the CBD they are actually 2.5 m. But the design code requires a 3.75 m width for a 40 kmlhr design speed. (iii) Now that the 3 E-W and 3 N-S arterial routes are built in the CBD within the ring road, there is a need to upgrade the rest of the network to provide a better grid, while taking account of historic buildings. -47 -   MAP SECTION   IBRD 31441 RU ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~R k( 2 sus JNIERC~~~~~~~~~O HANOeX4 1,--A*--* E:I \ --- t tX >50 '/GHA~~~~~~I M EWTWRKPLIA BUSINTERCHANE -ANK PROJECT- INNER RING WUN4 ; - ;:- t / ;WNCXL DEPRIAR ROADSt - % - MT l7imt) 0O + !( _ \ iJf iMt , 9 -- --- - , i { N>,ZWORKS _ = tMw @ _J JULYM~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-4