Senegal - Urban Transport Reform and Capacity Building Technical Assistance Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 23193 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IF-N0240; PPFI-Q0320) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$6.6 MILLION (SDR 4.9 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOR A URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT December 14, 2001 Water and Urban II Country Department 14 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective October 18, 2001) Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) CFAF 1 million = US$ 1,754.39 US$ 1 = 570 FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGETIP Public Works Executing Agency/Agence pour l'Execution de Travaux dInteret Public CAS Country Assistance Strategy CETUD Dakar Urban Transport Steering Committee/Conseil Executifdes Transports Urbains de Dakar FDTU Urban Transport Development FundlFonds de Developpement des Transports Urbains ICR Implementation Completion Report MOP Memorandum of the President PSR Project Status Report QAG Quality Assurance Group RATP French Urban Transport Company/Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens SOTRAC Bus Company/Societe des Transports en Commun du Cap Vert SSATP Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo, AFRVP Country Manager/Director: John McIntire, AFC14 Sector Manager/Director: Letitia A. Obeng, AFTU2 Task Team Leader: Patrick Bultynck  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENEGAL URBAN TRANS REF TA CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 3 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 6 6. Sustainability 7 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 7 8. Lessons Leamed 10 9. Partner Comments 10 10. Additional Information 13 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 14 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 15 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 17 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 18 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 19 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 20 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 21 Annex 8. Borrower's Implementation Completion Report 22 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   Project ID: P044383 Project Name: URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY BUILDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Team Leader: Patrick Bultynck TL Unit: AFTU2 ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 17, 2001 1. Project Data Name: URBAN TRANSPORT REFORM AND CAPACITY LICITF Number: IF-N0240; BUILDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT PPFI-Q0320 Country/Department. SENEGAL Region: Afiica Regional Office Sector/subsector: TU - Urban Transport KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 12/20/1995 Effective: 09/26/1997 09/15/1997 Appraisal: 01/10/1997 MTR: 03/01/1999 03/01/1999 Approval: 06/13/1997 Closing: 12/31/2000 06/30/2001 Borrower/Implementing Agency: REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL/CONSEIL EXECUTIF DES TRANSPORTS URBAINS AU DAKAR Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Callisto Madavo Jean-Louis Sarbib Country Manager: John Mc Intire Mahmood A. Ayub Sector Manager: Letitia A. Obeng Max Pulgar-Vidal Team Leader at ICR: Patrick Bultynck Patrick Bultynck ICR Primary Author: Jerome Chevallier 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S S Project at Risk at Any Time: No  3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: As stated in the memorandum of the President (MOP), the main objective of the operation was to assist in the provision of more affordable, reliable and safer public transport services in the Dakar metropolitan area through: (i) strengthening the institutional and regulatory framework and developing institutional coordination among national ministries, local govermment, operators, and the private sector industry; (ii) privatizating the public transport company (SOTRAC); (iii) stakeholders' involvement in decision-making and financing the sector; (iv) developing road safety action plans and traffic management measures; and (v) pilot investment targeted at the promotion of public transport services. The objective of the project was clear and was consistent with the Bank's country assistance strategy (CAS), which emphasized public enterprise reform and promotion of private initiatives. It was important for the continued growth of the Dakar metropolitan area, in which 86 percent of Senegal's industries was concentrated. When the project was initiated in the mid-90s, the urban transport sector was facing a major crisis, due to inefficient policies in coping with rapid population growth, unclear responsibilities, weak managerial capacities and an overcrowded transport corridor. In 1995-96, the Government prepared an urban transport policy, with broad participation from stakeholders. The objective of the policy was to rehabilitate the sector through a comprehensive approach, that would address institutional, regulatory, financial, managerial and social aspects of the crisis. The objective of the project was ambitious. Expecting that public transport services would be more affordable, reliable and safer as a result of a technical assistance project with limited investment was indeed a challenge. It was not an impossible task, however, as improving the institutional framework and establishing a sustainable financing mechanism under the project were essential conditions for the delivery of better public transport services to the population of the Dakar metropolitan area. 3.2 Revised Objective: N.A. 3.3 Original Components: The project included two components, institutional development and minor civil works. The first component included technical assistance, training, and public information for implementing four activities: (i) establishment and management of a coordinating body called CETUD; (ii) privatization of SOTRAC, including assistance to the development of a leasing scheme for urban transport operators and revision of the regulatory framework for the provision of urban transport services; (iii) establishment of a sustainable financing mechanism for the sector (in the form of a fund called FDTU), to which the national governments, the local governments and the private sector would each make an equal annual contribution; and (iv) the implementation of a traffic management scheme and a road safety action plan with users' participation. The minor civil works component was designed as a pilot scheme to test public transport enhancement activities using labor-based techniques. 3.4 Revised Components: N.A. 3.5 Quality at Entry: The quality at entry is rated satisfactory. The project was fully consistent with the CAS and supported the CAS objective of reducing the role of govermnent in the economy and promoting private sector development. The project was expected to extend access of urban transport services to the poor and -2 -  improve their employment and market opportunities. It was designed to support the government strategy in the urban transport sector, as formulated in the mid-1990s, with broad stakeholder participation and IDA support. The strategy was described in a sector development policy letter. The project team drew lessons from past experience in transport and urban projects in Senegal, including the need to take into account the aspirations and interests of beneficiaries, reinforcing local capacities, and establishing an appropriate and sustainable financing mechanism. Performance indicators were designed to measure outcomes and outputs; however, outcome indicators were optimistic for a technical assistance project. Project benefits were adequately assessed and the risk analysis was satisfactory. Two main risks were foreseen, delays in the privatization of SOTRAC and lack of private sector contribution to the new financing mechanism. The QAG reviewed the project in 1997 and gave it a satisfactory rating. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The project helped set up an institutional framework conducive to addressing urban transport issues in a cohesive way. On the other hand, it had a limited impact on improving the affordability, reliability and safety of public urban transport services. The establishment of an institution, with equal representation from the central government, the local governments and the private sector, to coordinate urban transport policies is a major breakthrough in sub-Saharan Africa. It has contributed to knowledge improvement in the sector and to the sensitization of each of the three partners to the concerns of the other two. The project helped in preparing a broad-based investment project, the Urban Mobility Improvement Project, designed as an Adaptable Program Lending (APL) and approved in June 2000. Affordability of urban transport services improved somewhat, as competition among mini-buses increased, leading to a lowering of the basic fare, which is now CFAF 100 (less than US$0.15). The quality of public transport services has deteriorated, however, as owners of mini-buses must jam-pack their vehicles to cover cost. Revenues from operations do not cover vehicles depreciation, making it extremely difficult for owners to replace them. As a result, the public transport fleet has remained over-aged and prone to breakdowns. Reliability of public transport services has not improved although average mnini-buses speed has marginally increased from 14.4 to 16 km/h. The number of accidents involving public transport has been marginally reduced. The project has implemented minor adjustments to six dangerous intersections in the Dakar metropolitan area to make them safer. It has also supported training courses for public transport drivers emphasizing security. The outcome of the project is marginally satisfactory. 4.2 Outputs by components: Establishment of CETUD. CETUD was created in 1997 as a coordinating body for urban transport, and also as the agency responsible for project implementation. The Plenary Assembly is the main decision-making body. It was originally composed of 26 members representing the Government, the municipalities concerned and sector enterprises. Only seven members represented the private sector, of which, three owners of mini-buses. CETUD's chairman was appointed by the Minister in charge of transports from a list of three persons selected by the assembly. The first chairman enjoyed strong support from the three groups represented in the assembly. He focused on building a consensus among them - 3 -  throughout the project implementation period. A permanent secretariat, including a secretary and three technical staff (an engineer, an economist and a lawyer), was selected on a competitive basis and was responsible for day-to-day operations. An accounting unit was also established. In July 2001, a decree increased the representation of private operators in CETUD's Plenary Assembly. CETUD has been instrumental in formulating the regulatory framework for the privatization of SOTRAC, the public bus company, and for the development of private sector initiatives in public transport services. In particular, it has defined eligibility conditions for the leasing scheme, which is to be supported under the follow-up project. It has prepared and implemented annual work and investment plans supported by the project. It has been actively involved in the preparation of the follow-up project, in close consultation with its constituencies. During the ICR mission, a meeting of the Plenary Assembly took place. (The minutes of the meeting in Annex 7). All members present at the meeting emphasized the importance of CETUD as a forum for policy dialogue. The representatives of private operators in the informal sector were particularly satisfied with the opportunities they had to air their concerns. CETUD is the first urban institution of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa. Senegal's experience is of interest to other African countries that are keen on addressing urban mobility issues with support from concerned public and private sector groups. CETUD's capacity, particularly in the areas of engineering, procurement and financial management, needs to be further strengthened for a much larger investment program supported by the follow-up project. Under the new project, the Government agreed that all technical positions would be open to competition. The secretary and technical personnel for CETUD are being recruited and existing staffs are being allowed to compete for their jobs. The CETUD component is rated satisfactory. Establishment of a sustainable financing mechanism for the sector. The urban transport development fund, FDTU, was established in 1997. The fund was designed to mobilize contributions from national and local budgets, as well as from sector enterprises for financing infrastructure improvements approved by CETUD. The government paid its annual share of CFAF 400 million (equivalent to US$550,000) during the period 1997-2000, but the other partners did not. It was unrealistic, however, to expect that local governments and the private sector would make voluntary contributions to FDTU in the absence of a mechanism that would define the expected contribution of each government and professional organization in an objective way. That issue was addressed during project implementation. Consultants were hired to define such a mechanism, following an assessment of each institution's capacity to contribute and extensive consultations with all concerned. The new mechanism is part of a draft legislation, which is expected to be enacted in early 2002. Draft standard agreements between CETUD and each category of contributor have also been prepared. An urban mobility charter has been developed by consultants and endorsed by CETUD. The charter defines the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders in urban transport. The FDTU component is rated unsatisfactory, even though a consensus has been reached on how to ensure that each stakeholder contributes to the fund according to an objective set of criteria. Privatization of SOTRAC. The component included the privatization of SOTRAC, the development of a leasing scheme for urban transport operators, and the revision of the regulatory framework for the provision of urban transport services. Genuine efforts were made to privatize SOTRAC. These efforts - 4 -  were not successful, however. Bus lines were separated into two networks. A first one, comprising 9 lines, was considered financially viable on the basis of the CFAF 170 fare. The second network included 4 lines in the suburbs of Dakar, which were not financially viable without a subsidy. In September 1998, the Government called for bids for concessioning of the main network. Only one bid was received from a group led by RATP, the public enterprise in charge of public transport in Paris, and included another French transport company, TRANSDEV, and four private Senegalese investors. After the bid was received, the Government decided to liquidate SOTRAC. In February 1999, however, RATP, under pressure from its supervisory authorities, decided to withdraw its offer. A new invitation to bid was issued. A Swiss consortium, Universal AG-Hess, expressed interest in taking over the main bus network and signed a memorandum of understanding with the Privatization Authority in August 1999. It proved unable, however, to bring along the Geneva public transport company, which was expected to manage the bus operations. After this new disappointment, the government decided to separate ownership of buses from their exploitation. In October 1999, the Government established a leasing company called SEPROT, which took over SOTRAC's buses for leasing to private operators. After competitive bidding, a local firm was selected to manage SEPROT. New discussions took place with RATP and TRANSDEV in late 1999, which led to the proposal of creating a new company, Dakarbus, which would manage the bus lines. Initially, the Government owned 51.5 percent of the shares of the new company, the private Senegalese investors, 28.5 percent and TRANSDEV, 20 percent. The government shares were to be sold to the public over time. The privatization of SOTRAC suffered a major setback in July 2000. Following elections in April 2000, the new Government decided to create a new bus company, Dakar Dem Dikk (DDD), which was established in December 2000 with a share capital of CFAF 1.5 million, in which the Government presently holds 90 percent of the shares. The Government bought 43 second-hand buses in January 2001 and received 10 buses from the municipality of Milan. It gave the buses to the new company, together with 125 SOTRAC buses. A leasing scheme has been prepared for the privatization of SOTRAC. In addition, a highly innovative leasing scheme has been developed for informal operators in urban transport. It provides for subsidized credit on the condition that mini-bus operators meet basic technical, operational and managerial requirements and be part of professional associations. Implementation of the scheme is supported under the follow-up project. By June 2001, 380 operators owning a total of 1300 mini-buses had established 12 associations for the purpose of benefiting from the scheme. The regulatory framework for the provision of urban transport services is part of the new leasing scheme. The sub-component on the leasing scheme and regulatory framework is highly satisfactory. Despite progress made on the leasing scheme and the regulatory framework, the privatization component of the project is rated unsatisfactory. Implementation of a traffic management scheme and a road safety action plan. A traffic management scheme was prepared and implemented through the minor works component of the project. A road safety action plan was implemented, including the training of about 6,000 bus drivers, a sensitization campaign for the population at large through a variety of media, and the introduction of road safety issues in the curriculum of primary schools. An assessment of the impact of the bus driver training program was carried out and indicated increased ownership of safety issues among beneficiaries. The road safety action plan is rated satisfactory. - 5 -  Minor civil works. The traffic management scheme identified a series of minor investments required to reduce congestion and accidents. Bus stations were improved in close consultation with users and the local population. Dangerous intersections were corrected through labor intensive methods. Red lights were installed and support given to municipalities for their upkeep. The minor civil works component is rated satisfactory. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: NA. Due to the fact that the Project was a Technical Assistance, no net present value was calculated. 4.4 Financial rate of return: N.A. Due to the fact that the Project was a Technical Assistance, no financial rate of return was calculated. 4.5 Institutional development impact: The major achievement of the project was the establishment of a framework for consultations over urban transport issues among all stakeholders. CETUD has provided a forum for representatives of the central government, the local governments concerned and the urban transport industry to review sector issues and reach a consensus on actions required to improve the performance and safety of the industry. The core CETUD team has provided the leadership required for improving the regulatory framework for the sector, and for preparing and implementing annual work plans to address pressing issues in road management and safety. A leasing scheme was developed for informal mini-bus operators, which prompted a drive for the establishment of professional organizations. The mechanism for mobilizing resources from local governments and the private sector was formulated in close consultation with all parties. The institutional development impact of the project is rated as substantial. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: A major factor in the SOTRAC privatization failure has been the decision made by RATP to withdraw its offer to take over the company, followed by the inability of another potential partner to meet basic conditions for satisfactory management of the bus company. After these setbacks, the Government worked hard to find a workable solution. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: The privatization of SOTRAC has not been fully supported by the previous Government, which contributed to delays. The decision taken by the new Government to re-create a public enterprise in charge of public urban transport may have broad consequences for the sector, particularly if the new company continues to be subsidized through free assets, import duty exemptions and exclusive itineraries. The new Government considered dismantling CETUD and entrusting the Ministry of Transport with the responsibility of coordinating urban transport policies. Eventually it became convinced of the usefulness of CETUD as an instrument for policy dialogue and agreed to keep it in place. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: CETUD, the project implementation agency, was slow in getting organized, with negative impact on the - 6 -  pace of project implementation. Eventually, its management became reasonably efficient. Its cost was kept at an acceptable level. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: Overall, actual costs are in line with estimates, with the exception of consulting services, training and seminars. The cost of the former category of expenditures is higher, but the cost of the latter is much lower than anticipated. After credit approval, the Belgian bilateral aid agency agreed to finance a large training program, which explains to a great extent the lower amount disbursed under this category of the credit. Disbursements were slow. An 1 8-month lag in disbursements was observed throughout project implementation. By end-October 1999, eight months before the initial credit closing date, the disbursement lag was 51 percent. Only 40 percent of the credit had been disbursed by that time. 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationalefor sustainability rating: The main achievement of the project, the establishment of CETUD as a coordinating body for urban transport bringing the central governnent, the local governments concerned and the private sector in the decision-making process, is likely to be sustained. After some hesitations, the new Government has realized the usefulness of this coordinating mechanism for urban transport. Past operating CETUD costs have been mostly financed by the credit In the newly approved project (Urban Mobility Improvement Project), there will be a decreasing role of IDA credit in the operating costs of CETUD. Professional organizations established by mini-bus operators for the purpose of benefiting from the lease scheme developed under the project are likely to survive and develop. Operators have expressed their interest in working together, even before benefiting from the scheme. Investment financed under the project by the credit and by FDTU must be maintained and replaced, if need be. The major problem encountered so far has been the replacement of red lights, destroyed either by accidents or vandalism. Municipalities are responsible for such replacements but have neglected addressing the problem, with the expectation that the central Government would step in. The urban mobility charter has been designed to overcome such problems by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each partner. To ensure sustainability of the bus stations built with project support, the Government is considering leasing them to the private sector. When the new legislation establishing the mechanism for contributions by local Governments and private sector organizations to FDTU is enacted, additional resources will be made available for funding annual investment and action programs for urban transport. A small portion of these resources will also be used to cover CETUD's operating costs. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: The project laid the foundation for a larger and broader investment in public transport. The institutional framework established under the project will be further developed under the follow-up project. Sustainability issues will be reviewed and addressed by CETUD through appropriate consultations and incentives. With the follow-up project coming on board, project achievements are likely to be sustained. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance -7 -  Bank 7.1 Lending: The Bank made a major effort to help the Government analyze and address a serious crisis in urban transport. It provided support to the establishment of a steering committee through the sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP). The steering committee prepared a draft urban transport policy, which was debated by internal and external stakeholders during a seminar in September 1995. The recommendations of the seminar provided the basis for project identification. The preparation of the project involved extensive consultations with all parties concemed, which led to the formulation of a letter of urban transport sector policy in September 1996. The project was well prepared. The Bank's performance in the identification and preparation of the project is rated as satisfactory. The project was thoroughly appraised. The skill mix of the appraisal mission was fully adequate. The Govemnment was strongly committed to the project. Transport operators, who had been closely involved during project preparation, had high expectations. CETUD, which was to serve as project implementation agency, was established prior to appraisal. Its secretariat had no prior experience of Bank-financed projects. To facilitate project implementation, a manual was prepared and agreed upon during credit negotiations. The privatization component was carefully designed. Five scenarios were developed. The status quo was not an option, because of the continued heavy drain on public finance, estimnated at US$20 million for the three years of project implementation. Full privatization of SOTRAC was deemed unrealistic because it was highly unlikely that a private operator would be willing to make a big investment in a high-risk business. The liquidation of SOTRAC was not a satisfactory solution because it would result in an increase in private transport with a highly negative impact on congestion. A management contract was excluded because it would be costly to the Government and would have a limited impact in the medium-term. Concession, combined with a leasing arrangement, was found to be the preferred solution. Mitigation measures were proposed to address the two issues identified, namely, the complexity of the scheme and the risk of weak competition. The benefits of the project were described in general terms. A set of performance indicators was provided. The project was expected to improve access of the poor to public transport services, strengthen the management of the sector and enhance the performance and competitiveness of the urban economy. Performance indicators were provided for project outputs and outcomes, as detailed in Annex 1. As already indicated, however, outcome indicators were not appropriate for an institutional development project, which could not deliver improved services to the population. Two risks were identified, including delays in the privatization of SOTRAC and the lack of private sector contribution to the FDTU. It was estimated, however, that the Government would have an incentive to complete the privatization of SOTRAC on time, as this would open access to funding by donors for urban infrastructure. Private sector participation in the decision-making and policy formulation process, through CETUD was considered as a mitigating factor for the second risk. Strangely, the lack of local government contribution to the FDTU was not mentioned as a risk. Both risks materialized. Lessons from past experience, including the need to strengthen institutional and regulatory expertise, to promote the participation of all shareholders, and to ensure sustainable funding for successful sector reform and development, were fully taken into account in designing the project. The Bank's performance during project appraisal is rated as satisfactory. - 8 -  7.2 Supervision: The Bank provided excellent support to the Government and CETUD during project implementation. Following a project launch workshop in September 1997, supervision missions visited Senegal twice a year. Aide-memoires were thoroughly prepared, supervision reports were issued on time, and follow-up letters emphasizing key issues were sent rapidly thereafter. The resources and the skill mix were fully adequate. There was a remarkable continuity in the staffing of supervision missions. The staff showed flexibility in adjusting to changes in the project environment. The mid-term review in January 1999 was helpful in assessing the project's achievement. Performance ratings given in PSRs were not appropriate, however. Implementation progress was consistently rated satisfactory in spite of disbursements lags exceeding 50 percent. The performance of the Bank in project supervision is rated as satisfactory. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: The performance of the Bank team during project preparation and implementation was remarkable. The team worked closely with a large number of stakeholders and helped the government set the stage for launching a broad investment program to address critical urban transport issues. Main partners in the development of the sector acknowledge the progress made in setting up an institutional framework conducive to change. The overall performance of the Bank would have been rated as highly satisfactory, had the project expectations been more realistically defined initially, or changed subsequently. The overall performance of the Bank is rated as satisfactory. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The project was well prepared in close consultation with all stakeholders. Such consultations were time consuming, however, as the three main partners had little experience in policy dialogue. The urban transport strategy prepared through these consultations was a sound one. The borrower agreed to focus initially on institutional development and sector reform, before launching a broad-based investment program. It established CETUD well before credit negotiations. The performance of the borrower in project preparation is rated as satisfactory. 7.5 Government implementation performance: The credit became effective on September 15, 1997, three months after approval. The technical staff of CETUD was recruited in July 1997. The detailed timetable for the privatization of SOTRAC was reviewed and agreed upon at the same time. The stage was set for a smooth implementation of the project. Problems were encountered soon thereafter, however. Procurement procedures imposed on CETUD were cumbersome and had to be adjusted. Delays were experienced in the preparatory work for the privatization of SOTRAC. Project implementation was back on track by June 1998. The privatization component was derailed in 1999, as already mentioned, and the physical infrastructure component was much delayed, in part because of slowness in finalizing the agreement with AGETIP, the agency in charge of implementing it. In the second half of 2000, implementation of the project suffered from uncertainties caused by changes the new Government wanted to introduce to the institutional framework for the project. The Government paid its contribution to project activities on time. It showed a willingness to adjust procedures to accelerate project implementation. It demonstrated flexibility in finding solutions to difficult issues. -9-  Despite the delays in disbursements, the performance of the Government is rated as satisfactory. 7.6 Implementing Agency: CETUD was an untested agency, with no prior experience with Bank-financed projects. It did a reasonably good job in coordinating project implementation. Its operating cost was kept at an acceptable level. It complied with credit covenants, including in the areas of procurement and financial management. Its technical staff was uneven, including two excellent performers and two staff with little drive. CETUD prepared good progress reports on time and kept a solid project database for the purpose of monitoring and evaluation. CETUD survived the changes in Government and is firmly established and reinforced for the implementation of the next project (Urban Mobility Improvement Project). The performance of CETUD is rated as satisfactory. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: The overall performance of the borrower is rated as satisfactory. 8. Lessons Learned The first lesson is that establishing a partnership between the Government, municipalities and the private sector for the purpose of developing appropriate solutions to public transport issues in a big metropolitan area is an excellent approach. Considerable efforts are required, however, to initiate and nurture such an innovative process. The second lesson is that it is important to promise only what can be effectively delivered. The project, as initially designed, included a substantial investment program. Performance indicators, which were appropriate for a larger project, should have been revised following the scaling down of the project. The third lesson is that it is optimistic to expect stakeholders to make voluntary contributions to the common good, if there is no tangible benefit in sight and no clear mechanism in place to ensure that everyone is treated fairly. Stakeholders are pleased to participate in policy discussions and are grateful when their opinions are heard. This is not enough, however, for making them willing to contribute to a development fund, even if they are part of the decision-making process. The fourth lesson is that privatization of a public bus company is an extremely difficult undertaking. It is a highly sensitive political issue. Potential investors are fully aware of the constraints on tariffs, and hence on revenues. Liquidation is not an option because of pressures from powerful groups and the problems resulting from a vastly increased urban congestion. The fifth lesson is that it makes a lot of sense to focus on establishing an adequate institutional framework before initiating a large investment program. On the other hand, by delaying much-needed investment, there is a risk that stakeholders may be demobilized. The physical investment component of the project was much appreciated, but was too small to meet the expectations of the population and their representatives. The investment program should have been a larger one or the expectations could have been better handled.. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: - 10-  REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL No CETUD/SE /ECO Dakar, le Le Secretaire Executif Objet: rapport de fin d'execution Monsieur le Charge de Projet, Nous accusons reception du projet de rapport de fin d'execution e1abore par vos services sur le Projet de Reforme et de Renforcement des Capacites d'Expertise en Matiere de Transports urbains. Je vous transmets, ci-joint, les commentaires de la commission constituee pour 1'etude de ce document. Vous trouverez egalement joint, le textes comprenant certaines modifications que nous vous proposons pour ameliorer la redaction. L. Sur la forme Sur la forme, nous notons, sur la fiche d'identification, que le projet dont il s'agit est bien le << Projet de reforme et de renforcement des Capacites d'expertise en matiere de Transports urbains >> et non le Projet d'Amelioration de la Mobilite urbaine (PAMU). Par ailleurs, nous notons que certains paragraphes annonces dans le document ne font pas l'objet de developpements: il convient soit de les supprimer du texte, soit de faires les developpements correspondants. II. Sur le fond - 11 -  Concernant le fond, nous constatons que l'appreciation globale que vous faites de l'execution et des resultats du projet ne differe pas fondamentalement de celles du gouvernement, contenues dans l'annexe 8 de votre document. Cependant, certains passages de ce document sortent du cadre normal d'appreciation de l'execution d'un projet, et meritent, par consequent, d'etre revus. 4.2 Resultats par composantes La mesure de restructuration du CETUD ne vise pas le << demantelement >> de la structure, mais sa reorganisation pour une meilleure efficacit6. Vous reconnaissez du reste, dans le meme paragraphe, in fine, que ces modifications sont positives. Par ailleurs, contrairement a ce qui est ecrit, le President du CETUD, meme s'il est nomme par decret presidentiel, est choisi, comme cela avait et convenu, sur une liste de trois (03) personnes, par l'Assemblee pleniere, sur concours. Concemant la personnalite a designer par le President de la Republique, il s'agit d'une personne independante dont la competence dans le secteur est averee. La meme formule, appliquee au Conseil des Routes, a e appreci6e positivement. En tout etat de cause, cette personnalite ne peut pas remettre en cause l'equilibre recherche dans la representation des trois (03) partenaires a l'Assemblee pleniere: du reste, par rapport a la premiere Assembl&e, la representation de l'Etat passe de 41% (11 sur 27) a 32% (6 sur 19) des sieges. Concemant la privatisation de la SOTRAC, on ne peut pas affinner que cette action n'a pas ete soutenue par le Gouvemement, quand on sait que celui-ci a proc6de, conformement aux engagements pris dans ce sens, a la liquidation de la societe des novembre 1998, au moment ou il a cru possible la reprise du reseau d'autobus par un operateur de ref6rence. La raison de l'echec dans la mise en place du schema initialement prevu doit plutot etre recherchee dans la mefiance des op6rateurs dans le systeme de transport tel qu'il est pratique a Dakar, d'oii l'interet de la reforme. Nous notons du reste une contradiction a ce propos entre les paragraphes 5.1 et 5.2 du document. 5. Principaux facteurs affectant le d&roulement et les r6sultats du proiet Les appreciations et commentaires faits sUr la vie politique senegalaise devraient etre sortis du document. Dans tous les cas, il n'est pas exact d'affirmer que le changement de regime intervenu en 2000 a et suivi d'un renoncement aux engagements pris par l'ancien Gouvernement: la lettre de politique sectorielle de septembre 1996 continue d'etre la reference en matiere de transports urbains ; les ajustements operes sont destines a rationaliser le systeme tel qu'il a e concu. Contrairement a ce qui est ecrit, la separation des fonctions d'investissements (propriete du - 12 -  materiel) et d'exploitation n'est pas une cons6quence des << deboires dans la privatisation de la SOTRAC ; elle a et plut6t preconisee par la lettre de politique sectorielle de septembre 1996. La creation de la SEPROT procedait de cette logique. 7.2 Organisme d'exe'cution L'appreciation que le document fait sur le personnel du CETUD merite d'etre relativisee: si certames actions n'ont pu etre menees a leur termes, ce n'est certainement pas du fait de l'incompetence des agents charges de leur conduite. Des facteurs non maitrisables par l'equipe ont grandement entrave l'action des experts pour la reussite de ce projet dont le caractere << pilote >> ajoute davantage a l'incertitude quant aux delais d'atteinte des resultats. NB: The comments made by the Borrower on the draft ICR have been taken into account in the final version. (b) Cofinanciers: N/A (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): N/A 10. Additional Information - 13 -  Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: tn00000 dlctrMti x770:0: 0;1 ? Prece dIn last iPSR' 0000 :00. Q0\0Actua/Lts Esimate;: 0 - Reduction of the percentage of number of 20% in 2000 4% accidents involving public transport. - Increase - percentage - of commercial 5% in 2000 11% (average speed increased from 14.4 speed of public transport on three main roads km/h in 1997 to 16 km/h in 2000) at peak hours. - Increase in the rate of satisfaction of public 50% in 2000 Customers expressed satisfaction with new transport users. bus stops and shelters. But other aspects of public transport, including overcrowding of buses, have not improved. - Increase of financial contrbution from the sector and municipalities: 50% to 100% - Increase in use of public transport as opposed to other means of transport: 10% to 20%. Output Indicators: Increase in the share of sector and local Annual contributon from local govemments Central govemment made annual govemment financing for public and sector is equal to that of the govemment contributions of CFAF 400 million to FDTU, transportaton (CFAF 400 million) but the other two partners did not contribute to it. Increase in market share of public transport 20% in 2000 (see below) The figures in the next two columns show market share 1997 2000 that the market share of mini-buses has increased to the detriment of SOTRAC and SOTRAC 9.2 0.7 prvate cars Mini buses 60.8 72.9 Taxis 7.3 8.3 private cars 22.7 18.1 End of project - 14 -  Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) "A .ftcuail. entageo E M - ~~~~~Aipprasal Project Cost By Component U$ $milot tJ$$ mih11-n Civil Works 4.65 2.89 Goods & Equipment 0.33 0.20 Consultants' Services 1.52 1.86 Training & Seminars 0.52 0.06 Operating costs of CETUD 0.73 0.97 PPF refinancing 0.55 0.12 Total Baseline Cost 8.30 6.10 Physical Contingencies 0.18 Price Contingencies 0.18 Total Project Costs 8.66 6.10_ Total Financing Required 8.66 6.10 Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) Expenditure Category | IB - unen - t - ;d Total-Cost 1. Works 0.00 2.67 0.00 2.18 4.85 (0.00) (2.34) (0.00) (0.00) (2.34) 2. Goods 0.00 0.32 0.03 0.00 0.35 (0.00) (0.32) (0.03) (0.00) (0.35) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 1.62 0.00 1.62 (0.00) (0.00) (1.62) (0.00) (1.62) 4. Training/Seminars 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.52 (0.00) (0.00) (0.52) (0.00) (0.52) 5. CETUD operating costs 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.78 (0.00) (0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (0.70) 6. PPF 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.55 (0.00) (0.00) (0.55) (0.00) (0.55) Total 0.00 2.99 3.50 2.18 8.67 ._______________________ (0.00) (2.66) (3.42) (0.00) (6.08) -15 -  Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) rCtoy W .B. . Tt VCost 1. Works 0.00 2.89 0.00 0.00 2.89 (0.00) (2.60) (0.00) (0.00) (2.60) 2. Goods 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20 (0.00) (0. 1 9) (0.00) (0.00) (0. I 9) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 1.86 0.00 1.86 (0.00) (0.00) (1.86) (0.00) (1.86) 4. Training/Seminars 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06) 5. CETUD operating costs 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.97 (0.00) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.87) 6. PPF 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.12) Total 0.00 3.09 3.01 0.00 6.10 (0.00) (2.79) (2.91) (0.00) (5.70) "Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2, Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) [ X __ \ 0 ;;(\\< --~~~~~~~*:-8M74! $3<Prce tg o Apprasall Component ~~~~~~~~Appr, t~~~~~~stiiuate ~ oF Civil Works 2.54 0.26 2.60 0.29 102.4 111.5 Goods 0.33 0.03 0.19 0.01 57.6 33.3 Consultants' services 1.52 0.00 1.86 0.00 122.4 0.0 Training & Seminars 0.52 0.00 0.06 0.00 11.5 0.0 Operatingcosts 0.73 0.08 0.87 0.10 119.2 125.0 Refunding of PPF 0.55 0.00 0.12 0.00 21.8 0.0 Unallocated 0.37 0.0 Total 6.56 5.70 0.40 86.9 -16 -  Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits NA. Due to the fact that the Project was a Technical Assistance, no Cost Benefit Analysis was carried out. - 17-  Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 03/15/1996 2 1 TL, I consultant 09/15/1996 2 1 TL, I consultant Appraisal/Negotiation 01/20/1997 7 lTL, I municipal finance specialist, I private sector specialist, I operations analyst, I engineer, 2 consultants Supervision 06/18/98 3 ITL, I private sector HS S specialist, I program assistant 12/18/98 4 ITL, I private sector specialist, I HS S program assistant, I urban specialist 03/19/1999 4 ITL, I private sector specialist, I S S economist, I program assistant 10/15/1999 3 ITL, I municipal finance S S specialist, I program assistant 06/08/2000 2 1 TL, I financial specialist S S 12/08/2000 2 1 TL, I private sector specialist S S 01/24/2001 3 1 TL, I private sector specialist, S S I program assistant ICR 07/16/2001 5 ITL, I private sector S S specialist, I municipal finance specialist, 1 program assistant, I consultant (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 14.4 30.6 Appraisal/Negotiation 10.5 23.6 Supervision 49.22 143.2 ICR 2.23 5.6 Total 76.35 203.0 - 18-  Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating O Macro policies O H OSUOM ON * NA O Sector Policies O H OSUOM * ON O NA O Physical OH OSUOM ON ONA El Financial O H OSU*M O N O NA El Institutional Development 0 H O SU * M 0 N 0 NA L Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA Social El Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM * N O NA ai Gender O H OSUOM * N O NA al Other (Please specify) O H O SU O M O N * NA CI Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA El Public sector management 0 H O SU * M 0 N 0 NA El Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA -19-  Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating 0 Lending OHS OS OU OHU Ol Supervision OHS Os OU OHU Oi Overall OHS OS O U O HU 6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating El Preparation OHS IDS O u O HU E Government implementation performance O HS OS 0 U 0 HU CJ Implementation agency performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU El Overall OHS OS 0 U O HU - 20 -  Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Rapport d'achevement du projet de reforme et de renforcement des capacites en matiere de transports urbains, Compte-rendu de la reunion de F'assemblee pleniere du CETUD tenue le 20 juin 2001. - 21 -  Additional Annex 8. Borrower's Implementation Completion Report I. PRESENTATION 1.1. Contexte Suite a la crise des transports urbains A Dakar et dans les metropoles des pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne connue depuis le debut des annees 80, et en raison de son importance, le sous secteur des transports urbains a fait l'objet d'une lettre de politique sectorielle A part, signee par le Gouvemement en septembre 1996. Cette reforme a connu un debut de mise en ceuvre, avec l'appui de la Banque Mondiale, A travers le "projet de reforme et de renforcement des capacitUs en matiere de Transports urbains". 1.2. Objectif et contenu du Projet La reforme du transport urbain vie A assainir le sous-secteur, en vue d'ameliorer son efficacite de facon durable. L'am6lioration de 1'expertise au niveau des structures ainsi qu'une meilleure connaissance du secteur, la professionnalisation de l'activite et le d6veloppement d'un partenariat entre les divers acteurs sont recherches. Dans cette perspective, le Projet a pour objectif de creer les conditions pour la fourniture de services de transport public de voyageurs moims cofiteux, plus fiables et plus surs dans l'agglomeration dakaroise. La mise en auvre du projet a cible les principaux axes ci-apres: a) une reforme au niveau du cadre institutionnel et reelementaire par: - I'appui a la creation d'une entite specifiquement chargee de la coordination institutionnelle et reglementaire des transports urbains a Dakar: il s'agit du Conseil Executif des Transports urbains de Dakar (CETUD) qui regroupe au sein de son organe de decisions et de deliberation (I'Assemblee pleniere) les principaux intervenants du secteur (Etat, collectivites et operateurs prives); - la restructuration des transports collectifs: il s'agit de redefinir les reseaux d'exploitation des divers exploitants dans une optique de complementaritn itennodale, avec la ligne de chemin de fer desservant la banlieue comme << epine dorsale >> du systeme; - l'appui au desengagement de I'Etat de 1'exploitation dans ce cadre, il est prevu la privatisation de la SOTRAC, par la creation d'une societe d'exploitation dont le capital sera majoritairement detenu par le secteur prive; b) une reforme du cadre financier se traduisant par: - la creafton d'un Fonds de Developpement des Transports Urbains (FDTU), charge - 22 -  d'assurer le financement des investissements dans le secteur ce fonds devrait &re alimente par des contributions des principaux intervenants sus-mentionnes; - la mise en place d'un mecanisme de leasing pour l'acquisition, i des conditions douces, de materiels de transport: dans ce cadre, il a e prevu, d'une part, la creation d'une societe de patrimoine chargee de fournir le materiel roulant necessaire A l'exploitation du reseau d'autobus et, d'autre part, le renouvellement du parc d'autocars (cars rapides); c) la conduite d'etudes et d'actions en vue d'une meilleure connaissance du secteur: ces etudes seront A la base de toutes les actions presentes et futures A mener dans le secteur. Au titre de ces actions, il convient de citer celles relatives a la formation et A la sensibilisation des acteurs et des usagers de la route ainsi qu'A la professionnalisation des intervenants; d) la mise en ceuvre d'investissements physicues vour ameliorer le fonctionnement du secteur: il s'agit d'infrastructures et de mobiliers urbains destines A la promotion des transports en commun de personnes (construction ou rehabilitation de stations, d'arrets et abris pour autobus et autocars, de voies reservees aux transports collectifs, d'encoches, de gares, etc). 1.3. Cout, financement et delai d'execution Le projet a e concu pour une duree de trois (03) ans, et pour un cofit 6value A F.CFA 3 747 094 000, dont 3 567 094 000 au titre de la contribution de l'IDA et 180 000 000 au titre de la contrepartie de l'Etat du Senegal, A raison de 60 000 000 par an, tire de sa participation au Fonds de Developpement des Transports urbains (FDTU). Cette derniere est fixee annuellement A F.CFA 400 000 000. La cl6ture du projet etait prevue au 31 decembre 2000. 1.4. Les structures d'execution du projet Le CETUD, etablissement public A caractere professionnel, crec dans le cadre de la mise en euvre de la r6forme par la loi n