Uganda - Agricultural Extension Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 20591 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (CREDIT 2424-UG) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$15.79 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA FOR AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION PROJECT June 8,2000 Rural Development Operations Eastern and Southern Africa Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Ugandan Shilling (UShs.) At Appraisal: US$ = UShs. 1,000 At Completion: US$ = UShs. 1,356 FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER July 1 -June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AEP Agricultural Extension Project ARTP Agricultural Research and Training Project ASAC Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit CAS Country Assistance Strategy CSDP Cotton Sub-Sector Development Project DFI District Farm Institute EFMP Economic and Financial Management Project FAO/CP Food and Agriculture Organization Cooperative Program with the World Bank FEW Field Extension Worker GDP Gross Domestic Product ICR Implementation Completion Report IRR Internal Rate of Return MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries MTAC Management Training and Advisory Center NAADS National Agricultural Advisory Services Program NARO National Agricultural Research Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization NURP Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Project PPF Project Preparation Facility QAG Quality Assurance Group SAC Structural Adjustment Credit SAR Staff Appraisal Report SCRP Smallholders Cotton Rehabilitation Project SMS Subject Matter Specialist SWRAP South West Region Agricultural Project T&V Training and Visit UES Unified Extension Service Vice President: Callisto Madavo Country Manager/Director: James W. Adams Sector Manager/Director: Sushma Ganguly Task Team Leader/Task Manager: David Nielson  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONTENTS 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 11 6. Sustainability 12 7. Bank and Borrower's Performance 14 8. Lessons Learned 16 9. Partner Comments 17 ANNEXES Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators 19 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 20 Annex 3. Cost Benefit Analysis 22 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 23 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs by Component 24 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 25 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Annex 7a Borrower's Contribution to the ICR 26 Annex 7b Economic Benefits 34 Annex 7c ICR Mission's Aide Memoire 45 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization.   1. PROJECT DATA Report Date: June 8, 2000 Name: Agricultural Extension Project Country/Department Uganda/AFTRI Credit 2424-UG Number: Sector/Subsector: Agriculture Region: Africa Key Dates Original Revised/Actual Identification Not Available January 1990 Preparation Mid-1991 April 1992 Appraisal April 1992 May 1992 Approval September 1992 September 29, 1992 Effectiveness December 1992 June 18, 1993 Mid-Term Review March 31, 1992 September/October 1995 Closing June 30, 1998 December 31, 1998 Borrower Government of Uganda Implementing Agency Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries Other Partners None Staff Current AtAppraisal Vice President C.Madavo E.Jaycox Country Director J.Adams Sector Manager S.Ganguly J.Shivakumar Team Leader of ICR D.Nielson ICR Primary Author FAO/CP Team Leader of Appraisal - V.Mackrandilal 2. PRINCIPAL PERFORMANCE RATINGS Outcome Unsatisfactory Sustainability Unlikely Institutional Development Modest Impact Bank Performance Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance Unsatisfactory QAG ICR Quality at entry Not available Marginally Satisfactory Project at Risk at any time Not available Yes  3. ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE AND OF QUALITY AT ENTRY 3.1 Objective: The broad objectives of the project were to address urgent needs for disease control and yield improvements in agricultural production and to build public sector capacity to deliver and support effective extension services. To this end the project aimed to improve: a) efficiency in the delivery of extension services in 16 out of 38 districts in the country; b) training capacity and skills of extension agents and farners; c) adoption of improved techniques by farmers; and d) efficiency in management services in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAIFF) in order to support the delivery of extension and ensure its sustainability. In addition to the stated objectives, it was foreseen that the lessons and experiences gained through implementation of the project in the 16 originally- targeted Districts would provide the basis for the design of an extension service which would eventually achieve national coverage. The original objectives were clear and continue to be important to the country. Project preparation began on the heals of years of civil strife and economic mismanagement which had devastated the economy. Agriculture was the most important sector in the economy. From 1986, with the return of political stability, agriculture had begun to recover, mainly through expansion of the area under cultivation. By the early 1990s, however, agricultural production was still slightly below that of 1970, while the rural population had increased by two thirds, and rural incomes and productivity of land and labor had declined below levels achieved in the late 1 960s. To address the deterioration and fragmentation of public agricultural research and extension services, the two ministries responsible for crops, livestock, and fisheries were amalgamated in 1991 to form MAAIF, and in 1992 the research programs were merged to form the National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO). The Agricultural Extension Project (AEP) and the Agricultural Research and Training Project (ARTP) were intended to support MAAIF and NARO respectively, and thereby disseminate and develop improved technologies aimed at increasing productivity and returns to agriculture. In this respect, the AEP's focus on institution building was appropriate, and responded to government's agricultural sector priorities and its overall objective of promoting broad-based economic growth. Similarly, the AEP's objective was consistent with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of supporting efforts to improve the climate for private investment and production. 3.2 Components: The project objective was to be achieved through four components: (a) Strengthening the delivery of extension services (US$9.55 million) through provision of transport, equipment, rehabilitation of facilities, and incremental operating costs; (b) Improvement in training capacity and skills (US$6. 10 million) through i) provision of equipment, supplies, facilities and transport for regular in-service training of extension staff and periodic farmer training at the District Farmer Institutes (DFIs), with the involvement of research staff, ii) rehabilitation, curriculum development and upgrading of staff capabilities at Bukalasa 2  Agricultural College; and iii) demonstrations at the DFIs and fanner-managed trials in their own fields; (c) Strengthening of management systems (US$1.81 million) through i) training in management and team building for MLAAIF staff at headquarters and in the project districts; ii) staff training and consultancy services to improve financial management, procurement, and budgetary procedures; iii) operational support for monitoring and evaluation; and iv) improved office equipment and facilities; (d) Studies (US$0.28 million) on i) rationalization of the Training Institutes and Colleges of MAAIF; ii) efficiency and impact of alternative technology transfer mechanisms; iii) a Mid-Term Review and assessment; and iv) design of a follow- on project. In September 1994, roughly two years after the start of the project, the Development Credit Agreement was amended to expand project coverage to 20 districts and to include Arapai Agricultural College under the training component. Taken together, the array of components formed a plan of investments and activities reasonably consistent with achieving the project objective, including improving the management and implementation capacity of MAAIF at its headquarters as well as at lower levels. Operationally, the project supported a consolidation of several parallel programs of publicly provided extension. Prior to 1992, agricultural extension was being carried out by several ministries including the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Animal Industry, the Ministry of Fisheries, the Ministry of Energy, Minerals, Water, and Environmental Protection, and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Cooperatives, and Marketing. With the support of the Project, the Ministry of Agriculture was merged with the Ministry of Animal Industries and Fisheries in 1992 to form the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries, and Fisheries (MAAIF). With this merger, the overall responsibility for agricultural extension, like that for agricultural research, was consolidated into a single unified system within the new MAAIF.i The consolidation of the parallel ministerial programs into a unified national system was motivated by the desire to increase the efficiency as well as the effectiveness of public extension programs by eliminating duplication of effort between the parallel services while taking advantage of possible economies of scale by consolidation into one larger program. A further reason for the consolidation of the parallel programs was the recognition that fractured programs were not producing technologies and advice which were geared toward whole-farm management. At times, the technical messages which were being broadcast by the parallel programs were even contradictory in content. Underneath the umbrella of the unified extension service, a Training and Visit (T&V) system of management was instituted. A few months before appraisal, pilots of the new extension program were launched in eight counties of four districts. Partly on the basis of the progress observed under these (still, at the time, relatively short pilots), it was decided early on and reported in the SAR that over time the new system would be introduced and supported in all project districts. This merger of public sector extension services into a single institutional entity led to the use of the title "Unified Extension System" (UES). 3  As outlined above, it could be argued that the design of the program addressed a number of the central concerns which were held with regard to the public sector agricultural extension program at the time. Even so, both the ideas of the Unified Extension Service (UES) and of the Training and Visit system of management were, from the beginning and throughout the duration of the project, contentious design issues. This was particularly the case outside the Bank, where skepticism with regard to the approach (based upon experiences elsewhere) was widespread from the outset. Critics from among the ranks of Government, development partners, and farmers themselves were increasing vocal in their concerns about the approach as the program unfolded. Inside the Bank, the approaches chosen reflected the mainstream thinking at the time and were being widely supported and applied across Africa. The conclusion of this report is that sought after results on the ground were elusive. The program never managed meaningfully to escape either the supply-driven top-down character of the methodology nor the bureaucratic problems (such as ultimately unaccountable financial management) which critics had feared. Over time, both critics and supporters of the original program design began to converge in their thinking around ideas of how the extension program could place more emphasis on empowering communities and farmers to analyze and find their own solutions with assistance from outside facilitators. At the same time, there has been a growing trend towards funding and delivery of extension (and research) in a mix of public and private arrangements, decentralization of management, and ensuring that service providers are more demand driven. The emerging consensus among stakeholders on these issues has guided the design of the proposed follow-on program - the National Agricultural Advisory Services Program (NAADS). In retrospect, it seems clear that the design of the AEP was optimistic in expecting that constraints to implementation of prior projects in Uganda such as inadequate and tardy counterpart funding, poor salaries, and weak management and financial systems would be addressed by measures under other Bank supported projects (SAC, ASAC, and EFMP2). Still, to minimize institutional and financial risks, the AEP provided considerable support for human resource development and the strengthening of management capacity and processes, and for incremental recurrent costs. Nevertheless, the capacity of government to meet even a small counterpart contribution proved to have been optimistic. To reduce complexity, the design focused on extension, and rightly planned phased implementation thus allowing for adjustments based on experience and resource availability. In practice, the project was scaled- up much more rapidly than had been planned originally. This stretched resources and limited management capacity - perhaps beyond what they could reasonably have been expected to sustain. 3.3 Quality at Entry: An assessment by the Bank's Quality Assurance Group is not available. The ICR rates the quality at entry marginally satisfactory. The project objective was and remains compatible with government priorities and the Bank's CAS. Preparation of the chosen program design was in many respects fully satisfactory. As indicated above, the chosen program design was in-line with the mainstream thinking of the Bank at the time. However, as was argued from the outset by many observers, project design reflected a degree of 2 Structural Adjustment Credit, Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit, Economic and Financial Management Project 4  centralization in its institutional structure which, in hindsight and with the benefit of wider experience, proved to be overly bureaucratic and insufficiently responsive or accountable to the needs of farmers. In addition, it can be argued that critical institutional and counterpart funding constraints which had already plagued the performance of other Bank-supported projects were not sufficiently dealt with in the project design. As a result, these issues, too, haunted the project's performance throughout its period of implementation. Given the (even then) mounting criticism from outside observers and the (even then) accumulating evidence of frustrating results in the field, it remains unclear why, the program design chosen for this program was and continued to be a mainstream approach to agricultural extension. 4. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVE AND OUTPUTS 4.1 Outcome/Achievement of Objective: The outcome of the project is rated unsatisfactory. Neither the desired improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of the extension program, nor the desired impact of the extension program in terms of higher on-farm productivity and profitability were satisfactorily achieved relative to what might have been hoped for. While some improvement in the efficiency of extension delivery was achieved in the project districts, the extent of this gain was significantly constrained by concentration of vehicles at the central level, late payment of operating budgets and staff allowances, the non-linking of incentives to staff performance, inadequate supervision, and the impact of government's public sector reform and decentralization initiatives. Those efficiency gains that were achieved have not been sustained post project. Further, despite significant investment in full time technical assistance at the Headquarters level, very limited improvement in the efficiency of management services in MAA1F was achieved as indicated by the poor project management and financial control systems, tardy disbursement of project funds, late procurement of goods and services, delayed civil works, establishment of inadequate monitoring and evaluation systems, and eventual abolition of the Directorate of Agriculture Extension and transfer of responsibility for coordinating extension to NARO. While targets for training of central and district level agricultural staff were exceeded and resulted in improved technical capacity, a high proportion of the beneficiaries left public service, and achievements for training of FEWs and farmers fell well below target. Despite all these shortcomings, training combined with the project provision of transport, operating budgets and travel allowances for extension staff did contribute to some increase in awareness and adoption of technologies. However, farmer contact and adoption of improved technologies was markedly lower than planned in the SAR. An analysis of available data indicates that the AEP did not have a significant impact on productivity and that the aggregate increase in production and returns was insufficient to justify the project investment. 4.2 Output by Components: a) Strengthening the Delivery of Extension Services (US$9.55 million, 54% of costs) This component provided for establishment and implementation of the new extension system for crops, livestock, and fisheries in 16 districts or 67 counties. Mass media was to be used to reinforce direct contacts between FEWs and farmers. Project coverage was to be phased in over three years. Pilot operations had been started in eight counties of four districts in the first season of 1992 with funding from ongoing projects and were to be expanded with 5  PPF funding in the second season. To implement this component, the project provided for transport (vehicles for HQ and district officers, motorcycles for county officers, bicycles for FEWs), equipment, and incremental operating costs, and long-term international technical assistance. Implementation of the component was unsatisfactory. The project became effective in June 1993. All 16 districts were phased in by January 1994, well ahead of schedule. The pace of the expansion of the program may have precluded the possibility of adequately adjusting program design in response to problems which developed and probably outpaced the development of experience and management capacity within the extension institution at every level. In mid-1994, AEP assumed responsibility for financing extension in three more districts formerly supported by the SWRAP, and in mid-1995 a further district was included bringing the total to 20 districts with 87 counties, though one district was later absorbed by the CSDP3. In effect the accelerated phasing and expansion of project coverage diluted the resources available for the districts and severely challenged the program's still weak financial and technical management capacity. While FEWs who had been specialists in crops, livestock or fisheries now took on a polyvalent role, concerns were widely raised as to the effectiveness of technology transfer when FEWs dealt with topics outside their original expertise. Training was employed to help to deal with this problem. However, only two thirds of FEWs were sent on short courses to enable them to operate as generalists. Those who did get such training often received it well after the functional unification had been launched. Organizational unification of agricultural extension and technical services under a single authority was never fully institutionalized. Initially, functional unification was achieved through designation of a district extension coordinator from among the department heads, but FEWs remained staff of the various MAIFF directorates. Heads of district departments performed as SMSs, although their administrative functions and other duties assigned by their respective directorates in MAIFF limited their availability to technically backstop the FEWs. Beginning in 1993, all district staff became employees of the district governments. Their salaries and operational costs were financed through unconditional block grants from central government. In each district a District Production Department was established along commodity and disciplinary lines. A large number of FEWs, mainly certificate holders, were retrenched reducing the intensity of extension in many areas to as low as one FEW to 3000 farmers. Some districts immediately abandoned functional integration and reverted to using specialized FEWs. By 1998 few districts, if any, had institutionalized or were operating a UES effectively. Procurement and distribution of transport to the 20 AEP districts was delayed and inadequate relative to the number of staff and the area to be covered: only 14 vehicles, 197 motorcycles, and 536 bicycles for around 1100 field staff, SMSs and district managers. Of these, 820 of these were FEWs. This meant that the ratio of field extensionists to farm households was of the order of 1:2155. During the period when functional integration of the program lasted and operating budgets and allowances were available, the FEWs did increase contact with farmers, undertaking on-farm demonstrations, field days and seed multiplication activities, including 3The UES/T&V approach was also introduced in nine other districts, eight of which were financed by the Bank under the CSDP/SCRP and NURP operations and the ninth by DANIDA. 6  formation of mixed gender, women's and youth groups. A beneficiary assessment conducted in 1997 indicated that each FEW regularly met with only 4 to 8 groups averaging 10 to 15 households. These figures were much lower than had been planned. Given these numbers, it is estimated that about 40,000 to 100,000 farmers had regular contact with FEWs, about 2 to 5% of farmers in the project area. The project's coverage was further limited relative to plans in that it made less use of mass media than had been envisaged at appraisal. For those farmers with whom they did have contact, FEWs conveyed a range of technologies and technical/management messages (improved seed, pest and disease control, simple crop practices, improved livestock husbandry, aquaculture) and at least some farmers adopted4. Collaboration with other projects and NGOs, particularly in supply and multiplication of planting material, contributed to adoption. Adopting farmers reported yield increases but over the project life national production data did not indicate any aggregate increase in productivity. From 1995, the third year of operation, late provision of counterpart funds and late and non-payment of staff allowances adversely affected project activities including levels of supervision, staff performance and morale. hnproved efficiency and cost effectiveness could have been achieved if payment of staff allowances and salary support had been linked to performance indicators. In 1997/98, a Village Level Participation Approach (VLPA) was launched in eight districts aimed at increasing farmer participation and capacity in the identification of priorities and the formulation of action plans. VLPA was widely appreciated as a tool for encouraging and nurturing community level planning processes. However, for many it was a disappointing experience in that, on its own, it provided only passive guidance as to how communities might access resources with which to carry out the plans generated by the VLPA process. As a result, introduction of this broad based approach within the context of an agricultural extension project, which had only one year of implementation remaining, resulted in unmet expectations. These observations emerged in a post-project beneficiary assessment of the VLPA experience. b) Improvement in Training Capacity and Skills (US$6.10 million, 34% of costs) In general, implementation of this component was marginally satisfactory. There was over-achievement of targets in terms of postgraduate training, study tours, and demonstrations, resulting in over-expenditure against the training category. On the other hand, much of the training was theoretical and there was under-achievement with FEW retraining, farmer training, in rehabilitation of the District Farm Institutes and Agricultural Colleges, and in improving the relevance of training provided. While a locally contracted Training Specialist was employed throughout the project period, no counterpart was provided, a training needs assessment was not carried out until mid-1997 (too late for project purposes), and no evaluation of training impact was carried out. Rehabilitation of the Arapai and Bukalasa Agricultural Colleges was not done. This is largely due to the failure to employ a suitable civil engineer until near the end of the project 4 AEP contributed to adoption of a range of simple and more complex technologies. The 1997 beneficiary assessment indicates that among the 2-5% of farmers who received regular contact from extensionists, adoption averaged 60% for simple practices (timely planting, weed control and harvesting) and from 2545% for improved seeds and planting material (in particular for maize and cassava), pest and disease control and proper storage. Other less widely adopted technologies included fishpond development, and improved livestock feeding and management. 7  and inadequate availability of counterpart funds. The curriculum of Bukalasa Agricultural College was revised with the assistance of Makerere University and also adopted by Arapai Agriculture College. The Bank questioned the appropriateness of the new curriculum in that it offered four diplomas in various disciplines instead of one diploma for polyvalent technicians. Notwithstanding these concerns, the colleges proceeded to implement the four options. The target of upgrading 30 college staff was partially achieved: 18 lecturers were sponsored on masters programs and on other training courses and study tours. Rehabilitation of six District Farm Institutes (DFIs) was programmed including provision of equipment and operational costs for staff and farmer training and to provide audio-visual support. However only two of the DFIs were rehabilitated and procurement and supply of equipment was delayed, adversely affecting their capacity to provide adequate staff and farmer training. For example less than half of the courses targeted for farmers was achieved. Despite these problems, the AEP reported implementation of over 800 demonstrations, about three times the target, of proven techniques (including animal traction and agricultural processing equipment) on the farms attached to the DFIs. The AEP also reported implementation of about 300,000 on-farm demonstrations over the life of the project. A breakdown by type of demonstration is not available. Effective supervision of FEWs was impeded by mobility constraints and late and non-payment of allowances, and independent monitoring and evaluation of demonstrations was not undertaken. Therefore, the high number of reported demonstrations and impact should be treated with caution. About 60% of the planned orientation and reorientation courses on the extension approach were implemented. Pre-season planning workshops for relevant staff were held more or less as planned. Retraining of all FEWs in 5-week courses at the Agricultural Colleges, to better equip the FEWs with the knowledge and skills required to operate as generalists, was under-achieved, and the balance between theory and practice was considered unsatisfactory by the Bank: 16 courses were implemented out of the 35 targeted. Implementation of the retraining courses began long after functional integration of extension had been established, and was suspended in 1997 due to inadequate funds. As a result only 5 10 out of some 820 FEWs were retrained. The intention to sponsor 80 Field Assistants (certificate holders) through Agricultural Colleges for one year on specially designed diploma courses was not implemented, reportedly because this category of staff was abolished. Monthly planning and review meetings for FEWs and monthly training days conducted by SMSs were reportedly held on a regular basis. FEWs considered this training inadequate, but no other evaluation of this training is available. Only a third of the planned bi-monthly technical workshops for SMSs to interact with researchers were held, mainly due to shortage of funds. It was planned to sponsor at least 15 district level SMSs on masters programs at Makerere University, and six SMSs on overseas degree training in specialized interdisciplinary areas for which there was no program at Makere. In practice, 47 SMSs (plus the 18 lecturers noted above) were sponsored on masters degrees, of which nine went abroad. In addition, 7 FEWs were sponsored on first-degree programs and another six FEWs were sponsored on six- to eight-month postgraduate diploma courses abroad. Public sector restructuring resulted in retrenchment of over 50% of the staff who undertook postgraduate training with project assistance. Compared to the 30 targeted at appraisal, 49 internal and external study tours were organized involving staff, civic leaders, and farners. Towards the end of the project a number 8  of training courses and workshops, for project staff, civic leaders and farmers, were organized in order to implement the Village Level Participatory Approach in eight districts. c) Strengthening of Management Systems (US$1.81 million, 10% of costs) Implementation of this component was unsatisfactory. Project management allocation of resources was concentrated at the national rather than the district/local level, in terms of the number of vehicles (21 out of 36 vehicles procured were assigned to the headquarters level), over achievement of national level training targets and under achievement of district/farmer targets, and the four-fold increase in non-field recurrent expenditure. This imbalance in resource allocation reduced project effectiveness and impact. A locally contracted finance officer was recruited from 1993 to 1996, but an effective counterpart was not assigned until 1996. The number and capacity of support staff was inadequate and implementation of training for AEP and district accounts staff delayed5 As a result, for most of the project period financial procedures, accounting systems, and controls were inadequate, and caused a bottleneck. Besides poor budget monitoring and control, asset management was almost non- existent, and control of payments and advances was weak and serious cause for concern. In particular, lack of supporting documentation for expenditure was common, especially for field staff allowances. A locally contracted procurement specialist was employed from 1993 to 1998, without a counterpart. It took three years to complete most of the procurement. Provision for management training seminars for senior and district level management staff was under-achieved: 24 seminars were organized by MTAC compared to the 33 targeted. A short-term international management-training specialist was not recruited as planned, to avoid duplication of similar assistance expected from, but never provided by, the Agricultural Sector Management Support. Planned construction of new offices and rehabilitation of existing ones was not undertaken due to the long delay in recruiting a civil engineer, changes in priorities and the higher levels of counterpart funding required. Provision was made to support the design and implementation of an improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. An M&E unit comprised of two senior officers and two support staff was established in MAIFF under the Commissioner for Agricultural Planning. A local consultant was employed for six months in 1993 to design the M&E system. The SAR provided a list of progress and impact indicators and these were more or less adhered to in AEP reporting. Rather general and vague definition of the impact indicators, however, led to difficulties in meaningfully quantifying and measuring project impact. Reporting by FEWs and consolidation by each level of management provided the basis for developing the management information system. The number of studies to assess effectiveness and impact was less than planned, especially in relation to quantitative assessment. A baseline survey for 1992 was not undertaken until 1994, resulting in probable recall bias. In 1995, district extension staff carried out a farmers follow up survey, and zonal officers implemented an extension staff survey. Some questioned the credibility of those reports which were generated systematically. For example, the high level of reported contact with farmers, and of farmer awareness and adoption of recommendations was an issue. Sampling procedures and biased reporting by FEWs and of enumeration by district staff were criticized. The beneficiary assessment conducted by a local consulting company in 1997 and other independent surveys indicated lower levels of farmer contact. An international recruited financial management specialist was recruited for six months to streamline the accounting system and train accounts staff. 9  d) Studies (US$0.28 million, 1.6% of costs) Implementation of this component was unsatisfactory. Government's ICR for the AEP reports that the required study on rationalization of the roles of the Training Institutes and MAAIF was partly covered by the Training Needs Assessment carried out by MTAC in 1997. While the MTAC assessment provided a basis, albeit rather late, for the preparation of training programs it fell far short of the required output. The study on efficiency and impact of alternative technology transfer mechanisms was not carried out. As a result of the failure to complete both of these studies, opportunities were missed to ensure more cost-effective use of public resources. The mid-term review (MTR) was completed in October 1995, six months later than scheduled. A proposal for design of a follow on project was completed in October 1997, Both the MTR and the proposal for a second phase failed to anticipate the current vision for support to extension which puts the sub-county level of government and farmers in the driving seat and allows outsourcing and a plurality of service providers and methodologies. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic and Financial Rates of Return: As was the case for many similar projects, the SAR did not provide a calculation of the Net Present Value of the project. It provided an economic justification for the AEP by comparing plausible outcomes to the minimum incremental agricultural GDP which would have been required in order to have achieved an internal rate of return (IRR) of 15%. The figure 15% was, somewhat arbitrarily, treated as the break-even rate. The key assumptions were that in the project area 55% of farmers would be contacted and 60% of these farmers would adopt improved technologies, giving an adoption rate for all farmers of 33%. Based on these parameters, as little as a 1.2% increase in project area productivity would be sufficient to generate an incremental return of US$8 per adopting household and an aggregate 15% IRR for the project. This level of increase was judged feasible. For the ICR, an expost analysis of the same sort has been carried out using data from AEP surveys6, other related study findings, and secondary data sources. Allowing for a multiplier effect, it was assumed for the purposes of the economic analysis here that directly- contacted farmers (around 2-4% of all farmers) spread the information they received to their neighbors so that an estimated total of 8% of all farmers gained awareness of the messages being disseminated by the AEP extension staff (an assumption consistent with the beneficiary assessments of the program. The 8% of farmers regularly becoming acquainted with FEWs' messages was much lower than planned, and the adoption of improved technologies at 40% was also lower. At these levels a productivity increase of 14.5%, equating to an incremental return of US$97 per adopting farm household, would have been required to achieve an overall IRR of 15% for the project. The feasibility of achieving the incremental production and increased farm household returns has been assessed using indicative enterprise budgets and farn household returns based on regional farming system models incorporating the improved technologies and practices extended by AEP. The models indicate that with farmers adopting four to six of the improved technologies for annual crops and bananas, the incremental return per household for the different regions ranged from US$23 to US$4 1. These levels of household incremental return are inadequate for the project to generate an IRR of 15%. At 8% extension coverage and 40% adoption, farmers would have had to adopt a number of 6 AEP studies to assess project effectiveness and impact were much less comprehensive than had been planned, especially in relation to quantitative assessment. Consequently, data from these sources do not provide a sufficient basis for the evaluation. For this reason, estimates of project benefits have been prepared here using secondary data sources. 10  additional improved practices for perennial crops to generate the required incremental return of US$97 for the project to break even7. The probability that this occurred is very low as these improved practices involve significantly higher input costs, and farmers' inability to access credit is a major constraint to adoption. On this basis, it can be judged with near certainty that the incremental farm household returns generated by the project were inadequate to result in an overall IRR of 15% for the project, and, further, it is clear that the AEP had a very limited impact on overall productivity. This conclusion is supported by national agricultural production statistics, which do not indicate any improvement in productivity over the life of the project. 4.4 Institutional Development Impact: Institutional Development Impact was modest. Significant investment in training has improved the capacity of a large number of professionals that will benefit government, other projects and the private sector. However, as noted earlier the UES was not institutionalized and functional integration of extension is no longer practised. The modest efficiency gains in the delivery and management of extension achieved by the project have not been sustained post project. Central government's transfer of responsibility for financing and implementing extension to the Local Government Councils in 1994, the retrenchment of a large number of agricultural staff at both the central and district levels, the abolition of the Directorate of Agricultural Extension in 1998 and the transfer of responsibility for coordinating.extension at the national level to NARO are potentially positive institutional changes but were not instigated by AEP. 5. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME 5.1 Factors outside control of government or implementing agency: Factors outside control of govemment or implementing agency which influenced implementation of project activities included: * limited private sector involvement in agricultural sector service delivery and marketing; * low commodity returns. 5.2 Factors subject to government control: Factors subject to government control which influenced implementation of project activities included: * limited farmer access to input supplies (including improved seed, fertilizer, and credit) and markets; * poor rural infrastructure; * insufficient sensitisation and awareness raising of district governments, prior to and during project implementation resulted in limited project ownership and reduced commitment; * public sector restructuring and decentralization reduced the number of FEWs in project areas and resulted in retrenchment of many staff who had benefited from postgraduate training under the project; 7 Sensitivity analysis indicates that if extension coverage is increased to 20%, which is optimistic, and adoption reduced to 25%, incremental retums of US$65 per adopter are needed to reach the break-even point For the same extension coverage and adoption at 40% an incremental return of US$38/adopter is required. 11  * inadequate and delayed counterpart funding particularly affected civil works and incremental operating expenses, which in turn negatively affected performance and staff morale; * organizational restructuring at MAAIF and the transfer of extension responsibility to NARO in 1998 disrupted project implementation and financing. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Factors generally subject to implementing agency control which influenced implementation of project activities included: * staff salary supplements and allowances were not performance based; * deficient financial management; * weak project management; * centralised implementation and concentration of resources at the headquarters level, reduced project impact at the district and field levels; * the positive bias in monitoring and evaluation reporting misled project management, the government, and the Bank; * increased linkages with other extension service and technology providers (NGOs, education institutions, research institutions, and local governments) contributed to technology adoption. 5.4 Costs and Financing: The cost of the project at appraisal was estimated at US$17.75 million over 5 years. The Bank's commitment amounted to US$15.79 million or 90% of overall costs, for civil works, vehicles and equipment, technical assistance, training, demonstrations and field trials, and incremental recurrent costs. Government's commitment amounted to US$1.96 million. During the project significant changes were made in expenditure ceilings and financing percentages under particular categories, such that the Bank ended up financing 95% of total project costs. In part this reflected increases in the scale and scope of some activities, which occurred with the addition of the four extra districts, increases in levels of training and operating expenses, and changes in priorities in terms of civil works and other activities that required higher levels of counterpart funding. Significant transfers (over US$2.2 million) were made from civil works and consultant services (US$0.35 million), and used to fund incremental expenditure on training (additional US$1.5 million), field operations (additional US$1.3 million) and non-field operations (additional US$1.2 million, or 4 times the original provision). As a result, at project closure field and non-field operating costs accounted for 48% of total Bank costs, and training 25%. Overall Bank disbursements amounted to US$15.7 million (98.8% the original target), with only US$116,000 cancelled. 6. SUSTAINABILITY 6.1 Rationale for Sustainability Rating: Sustainability is rated unlikely. The project focused strongly on institutional capacity building through human resource development and the strengthening of extension service delivery by providing financial support for operating expenses and staff allowances. The improved capacity in human resources is sustainable in the short term. However, the extension delivery system as supported by the project is not. The extension delivery system adopted was relatively high cost, and required large recurrent expenditures to maintain it. Its 12  bureaucratic structure was heavily criticized and lost political and popular support. The project did not assess alternative more cost-effective approaches, or establish performance- based mechanisms that would have improved accountability, or introduce mechanisms that would increasingly leverage cost sharing by different levels of government, the private sector and beneficiaries. Government and donors continue to place high priority on agricultural extension and show a willingness to invest substantial amounts of money in an effective program - but not a program structured along the lines put in place under AEP. On the positive side, farmers who adopted the technologies and improved their returns are likely to continue utilizing these techniques. At design, it was estimated in project documents that a 10- to 15-year period would be required before government itself would be able to absorb the recurrent costs of agricultural extension. In the five years of AEP, public sector reform and decentralization resulted in reduced staffing levels and the transfer of extension staff to district government, restructuring and downsizing of MAAIF at the central level and transfer of responsibility for coordinating extension to NARO. One outcome of the transfer of administrative and financial responsibility to district government during and after the project has been a tendency in most, if not all, districts to change back from the UES to a technical line department FEW approach. In general, this has been accompanied by further reductions in recurrent budget allocation to extension. District governments are provided with unconditional block grants but they have shown little commitment to meeting the costs of the agricultural extension system established by AEP. Since project completion, district agricultural offices have been given only very limited funds and extension activities have been severely curtailed. Funds to maintain and upgrade the technical skill levels developed during the project are also likely to remain very limited. At the national level the rationalization of MAAIF has resulted in a large number of project trained staff moving outside the ministry. The existing MAAIF budget is inadequate to sustain the level of technical support provided to district offices during the project. A new more sustainable approach will be adopted under the follow-on project (National Agricultural Advisory Services program) under which funds will channeled directly to the Districts and Sub-counties on a matching conditional grant basis. 6.2 Transition Arrangements to Regular Operation: In 1998, Government approved a presidential initiative to recruit, under permanent and pensionable conditions of service, university graduates in agriculture, veterinary services and fisheries to serve at each sub-county in the country. As there are 888 sub-counties this implies recruitmnent of 2,664 graduates. The salary and operational costs associated with the graduate scheme are being met by conditional grants out of the Poverty Action Fund from the center to the districts. By November 1999, 43 out of 45 districts had recruited a total of 444 graduates and a tender had been launched to purchase motorcycles for the graduates. The recently approved ARTP-II provides bridging finance for design of the Bank's follow-up support including pilot activities to test modalities to improve technical support for the decentralized extension services. In August 1999, under the auspices of government's Modernization Plan for Agriculture, a Task Force on Agricultural Extension presented a report entitled "Strategic Framework for Agricultural Extension in Uganda". Subsequently a group of donors have agreed to work with the Task Force in the design of a National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) program. The program will be based on the following principles: further decentralization of responsibilities for extension to the sub- county level and possibly beyond using conditional matching grants, separation of public 13  funding from public implementation of extension in the field to be accomplished through contracting out of extension services, cost-sharing between levels of government and clients, greater interface with the agricultural research community to be achieved by giving extensionsists and farners and local governments more control over research activities through giving them a budget to hire in research activities, and through giving them more voice at research planning and priority setting meetings; strong emphasis from extension on (among other things) the management of the farm as a business enterprise and improving farner's capacity and skills at accessing and using input and output markets. Donors have indicated that they are interested in joint financing the NAADS. Ajoint donor pre-appraisal mission to review progress is planned for May 2000. 7. BANK AND BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE Bank 7.1 Lending: The Bank played a key role in the design of a program which, in retrospect, was overly centralized and bureaucratic. It did not help to establish an incentive and institutional framework that would motivate and support staff performance and enhance accountability to their clients, or increase cost-sharing by public and private sector stakeholders. All of these factors hindered extension's effectiveness and its ultimate sustainability. Further, the design did not adequately take into account or address other major constraints (access to credit, weak market systems, limited private sector provision of supporting services, poor infrastructure) that affect farmers' adoption of technologies. It also over-estimated government implementation and financing capacity and did not give sufficient priority to establishment of sound financial management and monitoring and evaluation systems. 7.2 Supervision: Twenty-three supervision missions were undertaken during project implementation over the period, 1992 to 1999. The supervision reports seem on the whole unjustifiably positive about results being achieved on the ground. This led to often contradictory conclusions. On the one hand most reports noted serious project management and financial problems, poor auditing, delays in operating funding and allowances adversely impacting staff performance, the lack of an operational financial management system, weak mnonitoring and evaluation systems, lack of proper management of the training program, lack of counterparts for contracted technical assistance staff. On the other hand the reports consistently indicated important training achievements, impressive progress with FEW-farmer contact, widespread farner adoption of improved technologies and practices, and steady improvement in the quality of M&E reporting. The unsatisfactory performance of three out of four project components, and the low level of FEW-farmer group contact and lower than targeted adoption rates call into question the reliability of the assessments conveyed in the field reports which were prepared for supervision missions. In general, where supervision missions left recommendations, there seemed to be little effective follow-up and most of the major issues were long-standing with key issues which had been discussed during numerous supervision missions remaining unresolved over the life of the project. While a number of assessments of the effectiveness of the program were carried out, they were not put to use during the mid-term review in a manner which might 14  have effected a reform in the design of the program along the lines being pursued during the follow-on project. Nor did they lead to effective solutions to the persistent problems with the programs financial management. Nor did they lead to reforms which might have shifted the pattern of expenditures under the program so that a greater share of program funds might have been channeled away from headquarters and into the field where extension agents were frequently left without funds with which to operate. One area where Bank supervision was responsive to the issues emerging in project implementation was in the development of the VLPA initiative. This was clearly an attempt to instill more meaningful client participation into the direction of the program. While the ultimate results of the VLPA experience were mixed, important lessons were learned (these are now being articulated through the analysis of a beneficiary assessment undertaken subsequently to the close of the project). 7.3 OverallBankPerformance: Overall Bank Performance is rated unsatisfactory. In hindsight, it is clear that neither the design nor the supervision of the project was fully satisfactory in leading to the development of an extension institution which could ultimately be either effective or sustainable. The failure to begin dealing with the problems in the program's design at the mid-term review stage prolonged the emerging problems. However, lessons have been learned and are playing a central role in the articulation of the approach which will form the basis of the follow on project. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The design of the extension institution was overly bureaucratic and centrally controlled. 7.5 Government Implementation Performance: The establishment of a substantial institutional structure with which to carry out extension was an impressive achievement. However, it was far too inflexible in nature and it was never satisfactorily operated or maintained. Lack of adequate counterpart staffing for the technical assistance, delayed counterpart funding, poor financial control, and the failure to formally institutionalize the UES system were major issues during implementation. The mid- project decentralization of the extension services to Districts was a good decision, but not enough was done to prepare and support this fundamental change in the structure of the extension services. 7.6 Implementing Agency: The decision to speed up the phasing in of districts and expand project area coverage spread resources more thinly and stretched the limited management and technical backstopping capacity. Throughout the project period, administration was weak. Financial management and disbursement systems were inefficient delaying fund allocation and distribution to the districts. This impacted significantly on the level and effectiveness of project activities. Poor auditing practices delayed presentation of audited accounts. While technical assistance support in terms of long-term staff was provided with an extension adviser, financial, procurement and training staff, the effectiveness of this support must be questioned given the lack of operational systems and procurement delays. Inadequate monitoring and evaluation systems were established, and a number of planned studies to 15  assess quantitative performance and impact, and the effectiveness of alternative extension systems were not undertaken, and were a major constraint in assessing the project performance and providing a basis for adjustments. This led to concerns as to the reliability of survey data and findings. 7.7 Overall Borrower Performance: Taking into account the weaknesses in project preparation, delayed and inadequate government funding, and poor implementation of the project, overall borrower performance is rated unsatisfactory. 8. LESSONS LEARNED Market Linkages Liberalizing input and output markets, together with public sector financing of technology development and dissemination, are on their own insufficient conditions for rapid and widespread adoption of technologies. Other interventions in support of market linkage development are required: road network improvements; development of farmer organizations to help increase farmers' bargaining power and reduce transaction costs for suppliers and buyers; development of savings and credit associations and linkages with financing institutions; supporting rural stockists/buying agents by facilitating links to wholesalers and access to credit and by providing training in stock management and input use. Working with farmers to help them to become more capable and effective in dealing with these issues should be a more central part of the job description for extensionists in their work with farmers. Project Management and Capacity Building Priority should be given to the establishment of sound financial management, internal auditing and progress monitoring systems at all levels, and to closely monitor and backstop operation of the systems throughout the project period. Greater efforts are required to ensure reporting is more objective and that it provides management with the information required to make adjustments necessary to improve performance and cost-effectiveness. Potential conflict of interest in impact assessments could be reduced by outsourcing to local organizations but with supervision and critical review provided by independent external consultants. Provision for training should ensure a proper balance between theory and practical skills and should be more demand-driven. Systematic assessment of training needs, effectiveness and impact is required. A strong training emphasis should be given to enabling extensionists to become more effective at participatory techniques of problem identification and action planning. 16  Approach to Extension Effectiveness and sustainability of any publicly financed extension service, regardless of the methodologies used, will be difficult to achieve if mechanisms are not put in place to ensure that extensionists (and researchers) are more accountable to their clients and financiers. Given the range and diversity of client needs and requirements, and the variety of extension approaches available, the institutional structure of the program should support pluralism in approach depending upon the need. Different extension approaches and delivery systems (public, private, NGO) which respond to these pluralistic requirements should be considered including empowerment of farmer organizations and lower levels of government to pull in specialists in accordance with their priorities. Evaluations and comparisons of approaches should be one of the important roles of the central level extension office. The various extension providers - government, farmer organizations, and NGOs - tended to focus independently on the same farmers. However, where it took place, collaboration and cost sharing between these various programs contributed to technology adoption. A great deal of attention should be devoted to establishing ways to encourage joint working and financing. Supervision and assessment of impact of a large number of FEWs delivering a wide variety of simple messages and supporting a large number of small on-farm demonstrations is costly and difficult. Maintaining farmer group cohesion is difficult unless the FEW is perceived as having something to offer either in knowledge or material terms. The quality of dialogue and the multiplier effect may be higher with fewer, better-trained and well-supported extensionists. Similarly, focusing on a smaller number of high impact, strategically located, and verifiable demonstrations of technology options may be more cost effective. Incentives for extensionists should be linked to verifiable performance. 9. PARTNER COMMENTS (a) Borrower/Implementing Agency: In November 1999, the Permanent Secretary to MAIFF presented a policy paper on agricultural extension to a National Forum on Decentralization. In the assessment of experience with extension to date the paper states "Efforts to revive the Agricultural Extension Services since 1986 have made very little impact particularly in respect to food production. These efforts have been criticized for lack of ownership by the major beneficiaries, the farmers, thus making the interventions non-responsive to farmers' needs and concerns but rather supply driven by the center, largely offering unviable and unsustainable packages. The research-extension-market linkages and the delivery systems have also been inadequate. Extension agents reach less than 10% of the farmers, technology adoption rates are estimated at less than 35% while on-farm technology production levels are below one third of the research station performance levels. The agricultural sector remains a low-input, low-output activity with high levels of transaction costs, post harvest losses and therefore, low levels of agricultural enterprise profitability." In contrast the contribution to the ICR prepared in December 1998 by the out-going management of the AEP claims that "The project has successfully contributed toward institution building, capacity building, capacity utilization and above all in improving production and the socio-economic status of the farmers. The 17  project facilitated the development and organization of an integrated system, which is being implemented in 33 districts of Uganda. This has resulted in improved extension service delivery as 75% of the farmers reported contacts with extension staff, ...the diffusion of improved technologies under the project generated substantial increases in agricultural production, awareness of recommended crop practices increased for 60% of farmers and of these 75% adopted the recommendations". The findings of this ICR strongly support the statement made by the Permanent Secretary to MAIFF and seriously question the reporting by the AEP. (b) Other partners (donors/NG(Os/private sector): In June 1998, a memorandum from the Bank's Country Director for Uganda to the Task Manager for AEP stated "For all of its achievements in establishing a national service, the current project has received a great deal of criticism within Uganda". The ICR mission's meetings with numerous major donors and NGOs confirmed that other partners considered the AEP unsatisfactory and that it had had little development impact. 18  Annex 1 Key Performance Indicators Outcome/Impact Indicators: Adopting farm families 392,000 80,000 No. of adopting women and young farmers 60,000 NA % of readopting families 90% NA % of adopting families practicing agro-forestry 15% NA % of families practicing agro-pastoral systems 25% NA Average % increase in yields from baseline crops 50% NA livestock 35% NA no. of fishponds established 2,000 3683 (2860 stocked) Average increase in family income (current US$) 10 30 * Latest estimates provided by the project were considered inflated and therefore have not been listed. The only estimates given are based on comparison and assessment of various AEP surveys and other related studies. NA indicates that reliable data were available neither from the implementing agency. Output Indicators: Vehicles procured __________ 100% Counties covered 6787 Fanning families contacted 710____ 000_ 200,000 Improvement in Skills of Extensionists and Farmers Rehabilitation of Bukalasa College % completed 0% Lecturers trained 18 Retraining of FEWs _ 510 No. of SMSs trained 15 55 Person days spent on training by researchers 256 1,380 Demonstrations of Improved Techniques l_100%_____ No. of demos at DFIs 290 862 No. of demos on farmers' plots 1850 305,127 Strengthening of Management Systems Person days of training 685 720 Person days of training for district staff 533 480 Studies Rationalization of Ag. Training not done Institutes/Colleges atDFIs29 Efficiency of various extension methods not done, Preparation of follow-on project sta0completed 1 9  Annex 2a Project Costs and Financing Project Costs by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Delivery of Extension |8.09 NA Extension Training 5.14 NA Management Systems 1.54 NA Studies 0.24 |NA|| Total Base Costs 15.01 NA Physical Contingencies 1.63 NA Price Contingencies 1.11 NA TOTAL Project Costs 17.75 NA NA=Not Available. IDA Disbursements by Expenditure Category (in US$ million equivalent) lCivil Works 2.38 0.12 5.1% {Vehicles and Equipment |1.86 |1.90 102.1% Technical Assac .011 54 Training 2.48 3.96 159.8% Demonstrations and Field Trials 00.64 101.8% Incremental Recurrent Costs: Field Operations 4.58 5.88 128.3% Incremental Recurrent Costs: Non-Field 0.36 1.56 432.9% Operations __|_ __I Refund of PPF Advance 0.5 0.41 82.0% Sub-total 14.29 0.0% Unallocated 1.50 0.0% TOTAL 15.79 15.60 98.8% 20  Annex 2b Project Costs and Financing Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (in US$ million equivalent) 11 E E | l | l g g g .901 0.251 3.151 1E || | I || I | .881 0.21 2.181 | | | | || | | | 1|1 1 1 5.531 15531 | | 0 | 1|1 lg | 1~6.89 i6.89 i I | |1E g| g 1! 4.781 0.351 12.621 17.751 Note: NBF= Not Bank Financed (includes elements provided under parallel cofinancing procedures, consultants imder trust funds, any reserved procurement and any other miscellaneous items). The procurement arrangements for items listed under "Other" and details of the items listed as NBF need to be explained in footnotes to the table. 1/ Actual disbursement data by procurement method not available. 21  Annex 2c Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) 1/ Management Systems 1.63 0.18 Studies ~0.28 0.01 Total Project Costs 15.79 1 96 1/ Note: Actual disbursement by component not available. Annex 3 Cost Benefit Analysis 15%. Less than l15%1 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Note The SAR did not include a traditional cost benefit analysis. The methodology used was based on a sector program approach, and involved estimating the incremental GDP required from adopting farmers in the project for it to generate an IRR of 15%, which was used as the break-even rate. As no baseline without project or with project economic data was collected during AEP, the ICR has used a similar methodology, and in addition has assessed whether the incremental retums were feasible at the household level using regional fami models that incorporate improved technologies. The results indicate that AEP was not viable as the IRR is less than 15%. See main text and the Annex 7b on Economic Benefits for additional information. 22  Annex 4a Bank Inputs: Site Visits . l | i _ J a~~~Jn 90 - Apr 92 | n.a. |n.a . l | | N May-S~ay-ep, 92 |Ag.Ec.Ex.FA.ln.Pr . ' | _Noov 13-25, 92 AS.EX __1_ _ _ | l | M ar2;~~ar 11,93 EC rT 1/Key to typesJul of23,expert2xise: | l | S e~~~Sp 4-8, 93 TEX.I_ Ag Agriculturalist Ja n 19-Feb 4, 94 nEC FAn ge.men AS = griclturl Sevice MEg Moniorin and9 Evaluatio i Diursemen OctGOspecia24-27,94 TEX. . l l | _ J a~~~Jn 12-20, 95 |EX. _ s Ec EconomistNRMp 16 Natur, Anes c.2Ex.Tr.20p Mana i | i F e~~~Fb 1-14, 96 6 Ag.Di.Ex ME O sI Ex Extension Opr 2 O peratin,6 OgMEr FAv-22 Fiania |An.AlS. i 2xTPr S Prcuemn FM=FinancialManagement Tr 19Educat,i97 |Ag.FMnTr aU iS H Hgluaiaty ui 12 U7 S TSa .Eti XFA-OPaNGOtU oS 23.EX.OP.NGO _ J a n~~~~~~~a 21-29, 97 |AS I 0 _ J u n~~~~~~u 30-Jul 17, 98 Ec_+8 others s _>n~~~~~~~~a 23-Feb 5, 99 12EC.EX.OP