Ghana - Country assistance strategy

Document of The World Bank Report No. 20185-GH MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP FOR THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA June 29, 2000 Country Department 10 Africa Region  DATE OF LAST CAS August 13, 1997 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Cedi (%) US$1.00 = p3750 (as of February 20, 2000) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB African Development Bank AFD French Agency for Development APL Adaptable Program Loan CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDF Comprehensive Development Framework CG Consultative Group CIDAV Canadian International Development Agency CIVISOC Civil Society Coordinating Council CWIQ Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire DANIDA Danish International Development Agency DflD Department for International Development ERSO II Second Economic Reform Support Operation ESW Economic Sector Work EU European Union FAO Food and Agricultural Organization FDI Foreign Direct Investment GDP Gross Domestic Product GLSS Ghana Living Standard Survey GTZ German Development Agency HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries IDA Intemational Development Association IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFC International Finance Corporation IMF International Monetary Fund JICA Japan Intemational Cooperation Agency KfW Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau LAR Lending Allocation Review LIL Learning and Innovation Loan MDAs Ministries, Departnents and Agencies MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework Vice President Callisto Madavo/Jemal-ud-din Kassum Country Director Peter Harrold/Cesare Calari Task Team Leader Theresa Jones/James Emery  NGO Non-Governmental Organization OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund OED Operations Evaluation Department PHRD Policy and Human Resources Development PRGF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PUFMARP Public Financial Management Reform Program SAPRI Structural Adjustment Participatory Reform Initiative SDR Special Drawing Rights SME Small and Medium Enterprise SPGs Sectoral Partner Groups TA Technical Assistance UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UNU United Nations University VAT Value-Added Tax WBI World Bank Institute WHO World Health Organization   GHANA COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY Table Of Contents Page No. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....................................................i INTRODUCTION .....................................................1 A. STAFF ASSESSMENT OF CAS PART 1: "Development Strategy for Poverty Reduction" ..................................................... 2 B. PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVES IN PREVIOUS CAS ...................................3 What Worked Well .....................................................4 What Did Not Work Well ..........4.......................................... 4 C. INSTRUMENTS OF BANK GROUP ASSISTANCE ..................................................5 D. PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT .....................................................7 E. SUPPORT TO GHANA'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA .............................................7 Proposed Country Assistance Strategy .....................................................7 Increasing Growth .................................................... 7 Redefining the Role of the State .................................................... 12 Implementing the Strategy More Effectively .................................................... 14 F. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF BANK GROUP PROGRAIL .................................. 15 G. COLLABORATION WITH OTHER PARTNERS (CDF Process) ............................ 1 7 H. MONITORING OUTCOMES .................................................... 18 I. RISKS .................................................... 19   GHANA COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY Table Of Contents TEXT TABLES: Table 1: Selected Indicators of Portfolio Management Table 2: Triggers for Lending Program Table 3: Proposed CAS Core Benchmarks TEXT BOXES: Box 1: The CAS Preparation Process Box 2: Main Results of Client Survey, Consultations with Civil Society, and Country Assistance Evaluation Box 3: Private Sector Views ANNEXES: Annex A2: Ghana at a Glance Annex B 1: Ghana: Summary of Proposed IDA Program, FY200 1-2003, by Case Annex B2: Ghana: Selected Indicators of Bank Portfolio Performance and Management Annex B3: Ghana: Bank Group Program Summary Ghana: IFC and MIGA Program, FY97-00 Annex B4: Ghana: Summary of Nonlending Services Annex B5: Ghana: Social Indicators Annex B6: Ghana: Key Economic Indicators Annex B7: Ghana: Key Exposure Indicators Annex B8: Ghana: Status of Bank Group Operations (Operations Portfolio) Ghana: Statement of IFC's Held and Disbursed Portfolio Annex B9: Ghana: Country Assistance Strategy Matrix FY1998-2000 Annex B1O: Ghana: CAS Summary of Development Priorities Annex C: Comprehensive Development Framework: Ghana - Second Updating Note   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The second part of the Country Assistance Strategy for Ghana presents the business strategy for the World Bank Group. It was prepared on the basis of CDF principles. It is not solely a response to Ghana's development agenda because it was formulated in the light of better knowledge about the activities of all partners. Part I of this CAS was prepared by the Government of Ghana. The strategy outlined by the Government balances growth with human development and empowerment in a way that should enable Ghana to continue to reduce poverty in the coming years. While the strategy as a whole is considered sound, there are several elements of concern to staff. Both recent performance of the economy and the external environment raise doubts about the ambitious 8 percent medium-term growth target. Macro- economic instability is a major risk facing the Government's strategy. Doubts remain about the commitment to speedy and transparent processes of divestiture. Management of the program in education is weak. The Government is perhaps over-cautious in the speed at which it wishes to move in decentralization. In the roads sector, there are issues with the overhang of arrears, as well as a proposed program which appears to be beyond current financial capacity. 2. The FY98 CAS emphasized four objectives: restoring and sustaining macroeconomic stability; ensuring a breakthrough in private investment; promoting broad-based social and rural development; and implementing direct poverty-alleviation measures. Considerable progress was made under the first objective during 1997-98, but budget performance deteriorated in 1999, largely because of a worsening in the terms of trade. Ghana is far from a "breakthrough" in private investment, although non-traditional exports have expanded four-fold since 1994. The record is mixed on the third objective. Health status has improved and poverty has declined modestly. However, agricultural growth has not accelerated enough to raise consumption levels for some regions (North) and groups (food crop farmers). With Bank support, the Government is implementing direct poverty alleviation measures. 3. Two aspects of the approach during the previous CAS period went especially well: the strong effort in the context of the CDF to improve and deepen donor coordination, and the decentralization to the Ghana Office. 4. In spite of the progress in restoring macroeconomic stability and implementing structural reforms, problems remain. Without additional efforts to resolve them, it will be difficult for Ghana to achieve its goal of becoming a low middle-income country. The domestic debt burden is high. The Government is in a vicious circle of borrowing to cover domestic debt service - an untenable situation which crowds out private borrowing and puts upward pressure on interest rates. Private participation in infrastructure remains limited. It is the Bank staff s views that more than a decade after starting to divest, relatively little has been achieved. The private sector doubts the commitment of the Government to private sector-led growth. Reflecting these problems, IFC's portfolio has decreased. 5 . During the upcoming CAS period, several changes in approach are envisaged: * First, the proposed program is more oriented to the poor and to reducing poverty by focusing on the areas critical for poor Ghanaians (food crops, land titling) and on increasing their access to basic services. * Second, the program's analytical base needs to be recapitalized.  ii * Third, there should be more effective collaboration with partners outside the Government. * Fourth, the program continues to support reforns in public sector management, using it as a vehicle to make progress on legal reform, governance/corruption and financial management. * Fifth, IDA would reduce direct lending for private sector development, while maintaining a focus on improving the legal and regulatory framework. Assuming progress on the enabling environment and on private sector participation in infrastructure, IFC and MIGA expect to expand activities. 6. The portfolio was streamlined during the previous CAS period. In the future, portfolio management would emphasize: better project monitoring, led by the implementation team in the Ghana Office; increasing the proactivity of our Ghanaian partners; and moving to more programmatic lending. 7. The overriding goal of the Government of Ghana's Development Strategy for Poverty Reduction and the support of the World Bank Group is to eliminate hard core poverty. Within that broad goal, the proposed business strategy of the Bank Group would help the Government to: (i) raise the growth rate of the economy; (ii) redefine the role of the State; and (iii) implement their strategy more effectively on the ground. Lending of US$490 million over FYO 1-03 is proposed in the base case, consistent with the indicative IDA allocation for Ghana. The proposed base case is slightly higher than actual lending (US$454 million) in the previous CAS period. In the high case, proposed lending (US$640 million) would be about 40 percent higher than the past. In the low case, which would apply if fiscal performance deteriorates significantly, lending would be a third below the previous level. 8. The proposed core benchmarks are: growth rate, the headcount and gap for extreme poverty; the infant mortality rate; under-five child malnutrition (rural), and the literacy rate (female). The CAS matrix includes 10 additional indicators that are more sector specific. These indicators have been chosen partly to permit Ghana's progress towards the international development targets to be monitored. They are the same as those Government listed in Part I to monitor its poverty reduction strategy. 9. The main short-run risk is the possible inability of the Government to maintain acceptable fiscal performance and macroeconomic stability in the face of the deterioration in the terms of trade and pre-election pressures. In the medium term, the main risk is the continued "under-performance" of the economy relative to the rates of growth and poverty reduction that could be achieved with the right enabling environment, stronger fiscal performance, and more attention by the Government to the task of ensuring equitable development.  PART II GHANA - BANK GROUP DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP INTRODUCTION 1. The goal set out in Ghana- Vision 2020 is for Ghana to increase growth in order to become a low middle-income country (threshold of US$760 per capita) by the turn of this decade. The vision calls for a transformation of the economy and society, in order to improve the quality of life for all Ghanaians, including through equitable distribution of the benefits of development, so as to achieve fairly balanced regional development and to eliminate gross deprivation and hard-core poverty. Ghana's development agenda and the Government's current priorities are covered in Part I of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). In addition to the benefits that would come to the population from higher growth, the Government has outlined several specific objectives related to poverty reduction which are to: * Reduce the incidence of poverty in both urban and rural areas; * Strengthen capabilities of the poor and vulnerable to earn income; * Reduce gender and geographical disparities; and * Improve the health and education levels and productivity of the population. 2. The second part of the Country Assistance Strategy for Ghana presents the business strategy for the World Bank Group. This was envisaged when the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) for Ghana was launched in the Spring of 1999. We realized that it was not consistent with CDF principles for Bank staff to present the Government's strategy to the Executive Directors. Rather, it was agreed that the Government would present its strategy, and that staff would present to the Executive Directors their business strategy for how the World Bank Group would assist the Government to implement its program. The Executive Directors endorsed this approach when they discussed the Ghana CDF on May 27, 1999, on the basis of IDA/SecM99-286, "Comprehensive Development Framework: Ghana Pilot - Updating Note." Other development partners, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, have indicated that they will take a similar approach to their country strategy processes, reflecting their involvement in and commitment to the CDF in Ghana. Box 1: The CAS Preparation Process * In June. the Washington-based Country Team and several people from outside the region "brainstormed" to define issues for the Upstream Review. * The Bank asked an umbrella organization for civil society (CIVISOC). who organized the consultations sponsored by the Structural Adjustment Participatory Reforrn Initiative (SAPRI), to arrange consultations between the Bank and civil society. Meetings in six regions took place in November. About 35 persons participated in each two-day meeting. Participants included people from non-governmental organizations. professional associations, local governments and small businesses. * The documents prepared by the Government tor the Consultative Group meeting held on November 23-24.1999, including a First Draft Comprehensive Development Framework Towards (ihana Vision 2020, updated thc devclopment strategy expressed in Vision 2020, discussed extemal conditions, and laid out the country's priorities. panicularly for poverty reduction. Sector papers presented in the CDF volume had been prepared by Joint CGovemment-Donor working groups. Donors discussed the Government's priorities and outlined their plans for assistance, Further strengthening the base for coordination. * Country Team meetings in January in both Aecra and Washington (including a joint video conferenee) worked on the details of the issues to be raised in the CAS and the corresponding Bank Group instruments. * Consultations with the Government took place in mid-February at which time we agreed on Parts I and 11 wid reviewed the portfolio. The Bank Group also consulted with the private sector. * IFC staff participated in the Country Team meetings. Both IFC and MIGA took part in the discussions with the Government and the consultations with the private soctor in mid-February.  2 3. The CAS was prepared in a highly consultative way (see Box ]) and on the basis of CDF principles. It is not solely a response to Ghana's development agenda. It is a business strategy fornulated in the light of better knowledge about the activities of all partners. The "CDF pay-off' is that greater selectivity is possible without concern for leaving gaps in support. The strategy of greater selectivity has influenced the proposed program in several ways. First, in order to support the private sector more effectively, the role of IDA is differentiated to focus on the legal and regulatory framework, while IFC and MIGA intend to expand direct lending and guarantee facilities for private investors. Their role will be complemented by other donors, for example, the African Development Bank (agribusiness) and USAID (trade and investment promotion). Second, the proposed program reflects a decision to move out of those infrastructure activities in which either private investors are becoming involved (electricity) or other donors are taking the lead (West Africa Gas Pipeline). Third, the shift to sector-wide programs continues. In these programs - for 2xample, in the health and roads sectors - donors share responsibilities. The coordinated group has the ability and resources to provide better policy advice than would be the case if IDA were "going it alone." The table in Annex C contains the partner group arrangements for the CDF and shows that the Bank is not the lead donor in every area in which it is involved in Ghana. Fourth, the C2DF enables the Bank to see more clearly where the role of other donors may permit it to focus less (basic education) and, conversely, where the lack of donors implies a need for IDA (urban infrastructure). A. Staff Assessment of CAS Part .r: "Development Strategy for Poverty Reduction" 4. The strategy appears to staff to be appropriate to Ghana's circumstances and the document provides a sound basis on which to discuss the Bank's business strategy.! It balances growth with human development and empowerrnent in a way that should enable Ghana to continue to reduce poverty in the coming years. It correctly identifies the sources of poverty, and its strongest feature is the way that poverty is mainstreamed into sectoral strategies. In particular, there is the notion of the "poverty sieve": the idea that all sectoral strategies and programs should be judged explicitly by the extent to which they contribute to poverty reduction. There is a strong emphasis on rural development and the need for balanced growth if the plight of the rural poor is to be addressed effectively. Given Ghana's limited financial capacity, there are no extensive programs of social protection. There are small-scale pilot activities supported by development partners. The poverty program, in terms of expenditure, appears to be feasible, if subject to the qualifications in paragraph 6 below.. 5. The process of preparing Ghana- Vision 2020: Second Step is under way, and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is fully integrated into this. Bank support is being provided to assist this process. It is a sound and broad approach to participation that can be expected to result in a PRSP that is supported by the population. 6. While the strategy as a whole is considered sound, there are several elements of concern to staff, and which are the topic of ongoing dialogue with the authorities. Several of these are discussed in detail later in this document, but are highlighted here: * Macroeconomic Performance and Framework. In 1999 economic performance began well but the effects of the adverse terms of trade were compounded by the fact that external budgetary support was well below expected levels. Also, it is the Bank staff 's view that the authorities were slow to react to changing circumstances. Although, as of today, there is not yet a final agreement on the macroeconomic framework for 2000-2002, the direction which The Interim PRSP for Ghana will be based on this document and will be submitted to the Executive Directors of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It is expected that the Interim PRSP will provide the basis for a discussion of a second-year PRGF arrangement with the IMF, once the final dimensions of the macroeconomic framework for 2000-2002 have been agreed.  3 policies should take has been established, and the Government has completed many of the steps needed to effect such policies, such as adjustment of taxes. Nevertheless, with the large external shocks of changes in the prices of cocoa, gold and oil, and with the inevitable fiscal pressures in an election year, macroeconomic instability is a rnajor risk facing the Government's strategy. It has been explicitly agreed that key poverty-oriented expenditures, such as in the social sectors, would receive the highest priority in the final fiscal program. Both recent performance and the external environment raise doubts about the ambitious 8 percent medium-term growth target. Achievement of the target would require a sharp reduction in the fiscal deficit to lower real interest rates and stimulate a higher level of private activity. * Privatization. In these difficult economic times, accelerating privatization would seem to be one potential source of revenue enhancement, especially if such revenues could be used to reduce domestic debt. However, it is Bank staff's view that doubts remain about the commitment to speedy and transparent processes of divestiture, and a major effort in the dialogue with the Bank and the IMF will be continued. In particular, we hope to be able to draw clear links between poverty reduction and privatization, and to ensure that more open processes of privatization are adopted. * Education Capacity. The strategy document places appropriate emphasis on education as key to poverty reduction. There is no disagreement on the core strategies, nor on the resource allocation. The issue is the effectiveness of expenditures, deriving from weak sector management. This is agreed by both sides and we are working together to address it. But the weak capacity remains a risk for the strategy. * Decentralization. It is encouraging to note the importance that the Government attaches to governance issues, especially anti-corruption and decentralization. Yet, the pace of decentralization has been slow, and the Government is perhaps over-cautious in the speed at which it wishes to move. This will continue to be a primary dialogue issue, but also calls for a major effort in capacity building. It is weak capacity, especially in financial management, that is the Government's greatest fear in decentralization. * Roads. This is a sector where notable achievements have been made with respect to funding, management and maintenance. Two key issues remain. First, there is a hangover of payment arrears from earlier road contracts. Second, the program of expansion presented in the Government's strategy appears to be beyond current financial capacity. Therefore, it will be vital for the Government to prepare a priority program of road construction and maintenance at a level well below that proposed in the strategy document, both to avoid a recurrence of arrears, and to ensure that construction can be carried out effectively and rapidly, and without the stop-start patterns that have often been observed in the past. This will be the key issue addressed in the Bank's proposed new Roads Sector Program. B. Progress Towards Objectives in Previous CAS 7. When the FY98 CAS was formulated, Ghana was emerging from several years of macroeconomic instability. It emphasized four objectives: restoring and sustaining macroeconomic stability; ensuring a breakthrough in private investment, especially exports; promoting broad-based social and rural development; and implementing direct poverty- alleviation measures. Progress was made under the first objective as fiscal performance improved substantially in 1997-98. However, budget performance deteriorated in 1999, and continues to be under pressure because of the sharp deterioration in the terms of trade and shortfalls in program assistance. In reference to the second objective, we are far from a "breakthrough" in private investment, although non-traditional exports have expanded four-fold since 1994. Recent data indicate a mixed record on the third objective: broad-based social and rural development. Health status has improved and poverty rates have declined modestly. However, agricultural growth has  4 not accelerated enough to raise consumption appreciably in some regions (North) and groups (food crop farmers). The Bank is helping the Government to implement direct poverty alleviation measures through a LIL, which includes targeted interventions for child nutrition and street children. What Worked Well 8. The Bank's adjustment operations (a one tranche Economic Reform Support Credit in FY98, followed by a three-tranche ERSO II in FY99) worked effectively to support Ghana's improvement in fiscal performance, as well as structural reforms - higher electricity tariffs, reintroduction of the VAT, demonopolization of external marketing for cocoa, and strengthening of the banking system. Support to reforms in public spending also worked fairly well. The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework was established. Support to the expansion of access to safe water and sanitation in rural areas was effective; the share of the rural poor with access to safe water increased by nearly 50 percent in the 1990s. 9. Two aspects of the Bank's approach have gone especially well. First, there has been a strong effort in the context of the CDF to improve and deepen donor coordination, notably through the creation of the "Mini-CG." The recent in-country Consultative Group Meeting recognized that considerable improvements have been achieved in the last two years. This is a key focus of Ghana's CDF, and is also reflected in the extent to which Ghana's development partners have been able to move towards programmatic approaches to assistance in health and roads. Second, during the period, the Bank rapidly decentralized operations to the Ghana Office, which elicited a strong positive response in the 1999 Client Survey. What Did Not Work Well 10. In spite of better fiscal performance, the domestic debt burden remains a serious problem. Efforts to reduce expenditure and improve tax administration were not sufficient to reach the primary surplus target set out in the last CAS (5 percent) and interest rates did not decline as projected, leaving the Government: in a vicious circle of borrowing in order to cover domestic debt service. This is an untenable situation which crowds out private borrowing and puts upward pressure on interest rates. The Bank erred by financing directed credit despite this poor policy environment. The Government established the Public Utilities Regulatory and the Energy Commissions, but the regulatory framework for telecommunications is inadequate, in spite of Bank support. Private participation in infrastructure remains limited. More than a decade after starting to divest, only 25 percent of public enterprises (by value) have been privatized. Long- standing Bank support to the process of privatization has not been successful in improving either the quality or the quantity of its achievements. It is the Bank staff's view that the private sector doubts the commitment of the Government to private sector-led growth. 11. IFC's portfolio decreased during the previous CAS period, due to a lack of large-scale investments requiring international project finance, notably in infrastructure. IFC's involvement in other areas, such as finance, was, limited by the sluggish pace of reforms and low levels of investment. IFC's SME investments and support facilities, however, expanded and were a source of innovation. In spite of progress on the policy front, in recent years annual FDI inflows to Ghana averaged only about US$70 million, low even by African standards. MIGA's perspective suggests that the reason is not lack of interest (several inquiries and preliminary applications have been received) but because investors finally decided not to pursue projects. Only three guarantees are outstanding - all related to one mining equipment company. Insights from MIGA technical assistance activities suggest that regulatory obstacles are a problem. 2 Domestic marketing of cocoa is already liberalized.  5 12. The Government has begun to reform public statutory agencies, but the size of the public service is still bloated. Reforms supported by earlier Bank lending were not sustained. They were too narrowly focused and did not address problems in sufficient depth. More work is needed to improve public services by refocusing the operational objectives of government institutions and subvented organizations, including by commercializing (fully or partially) some agencies. Our efforts in education have not worked well. A tertiary education project closed with an unsatisfactory rating because of little progress on reforms. Poor quality is a problem and the public sector could do more to close gaps in school attendance rates between the poor and non-poor, the North and other regions, the city and the countryside, and boys and girls. C. Instruments of Bank Group Assistance 13. During the upcoming CAS period, Sector Investment Credits and Adaptable Program Loans would continue to be used in all areas where capacity, as well as the agreement on objectives and the future program, support such lending. Proposed program lending (i.e., quick disbursing budget support) represents about a third of total lending. The following changes in approach and instruments are envisaged. * First, the proposed program is more oriented to the poor and to reducing poverty. In practical termns, this means a focus on areas critical to poor Ghanaians (food crops, land titling) and on increasing their access to basic services (education, health, water and sanitation) which are crucial to expanding economic opportunities for them. Within "national" programs, project design would ensure that underserved, poor areas (the Northern Region and rural areas) receive priority. In discussions with the Government, the National Development Planning Commission describes this as using a "poverty sieve" for each activity in order to enhance the links with poverty reduction. Poor communities will be more involved in project implementation. Increasing the explicit priority on poverty reduction was a strong recommendation received in the Client Survey. Also, a more consistent and effective strategy to promote decentralization needs to be developed, which focuses on the efficient delivery of key social services. In that context, there is room to simplify and rationalize the design of projects being implemented in a decentralized framework. * Second, the analytical basis of the program needs to be recapitalized, and economic work would focus more on the potential for non-traditional exports, as well as on decentralization. The objective of the FY98 CAS to move in this direction was not possible, not least since the budget for the Ghana program fell by over 25 percent in this period. The considerably rationalized portfolio (see paragraph 14) should now facilitate this shift. * Third, an objective of the program is to work more, and more effectively, with partners outside the Government, especially civil society and the private sector, and continue to deepen collaboration with other development partners through the CDF institutional mechanisms. This is particularly important for governance issues. * Fourth, the program continues to stress the importance of supporting reforms in public sector management, using it as a vehicle to make progress on important issues such as legal reform, governance/corruption, and financial management, including the consistent use of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). * Fifth, the IDA program would reduce direct lending for private sector development, while maintaining a focus on improving the legal and regulatory framework. IDA would reduce direct financing of infrastructure that the private sector could finance (e.g., electricity and urban  6 B 2:. Main Results of Client Su vey, Consultations with Civil Society ai CountrytAssisnce baluatioD I. Client Survey * Director's move to Accra * World Bank works in partnership with Government Low RtatingsS 00 0 Q fi Country Conditions * Respectfor local knowledge and expertise Al biity to adat our knowledge to Ghana's needs * Policy advice.' respecting Ghna's social priorities Poverty Reduction * Giving appropriate priority to pvet redtion Projet Designhmplementation * G Setting the projetthro im plementation qickly enoughfor Ghana'ls needs * Hdelpig restructure projects that are nat doing well * Flexi00bilit i ajstoi~ngff to0 changing::: coun;; ;;try c;ircmsane * World; Bankirealism givenGhana's situation and constraints * ;V0Flexiilty in applyng procrement irulesT0d0i ff f fiTu00 aSt Suporting project mang lipemenii qtationprlems Long-Term Issues * Establishing conditions fr long-term sustainability * Helping to safeguard the envoment C,ommunications * Disseminaftioniof the results to the people in Ghana who need therm mos t 0Loweffectivenessratings from Cs and organized interest groups Lower levels of authority (local government, district assemblies, co i shoudb m respoible forusing resources, dcision-making and Monitorngrsults. Concern on resource allocation. terarea of concern: Agriculture/Environment: Food crop perforance crop diverii sge d processing faclities, fare r organizations. infrastructure, technology, extension, lnd tenuen gtion. * Education: Girls' edueation, pre-school services,teacconditios, ipmtioof icy, lk of consultations, quality, and services in ruril areas. *0 Health Disparities in access; cash/carrsystem d s. ex ystemandserfesheat isae, * Rad: Neeid for imorpeinvestmne;t 0 s.:t;;: ; ;(XXt * jFinance/Credit: Lack ofaccess to crediltis major problem, particulairy for farmers. ;IL Country Aosstnce