Philippines - Highway Management Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 20907-PH IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (34300; 3430A; 27534) ONA LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$150 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR HIGHWAY MANAGEMENT PROJECT DECEMBER 15, 2000 Transport Sector Unit East Asia and Pacific Region This document has a restricted distrbution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective July 1991) Currency Unit = Philippines Peso (P) P1 = US$ 0.0357 US$ 1 = P28 As of July 1, 2000 P1 = US$0.0232 US$1 = P43.13 FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB - Asian Development Bank BOM - Bureau of Maintenance BRP - Better Roads Philippines CIAP - Construction Industry Authority of Philippines DBM - Department of Budget and Management DENR - Department of Environment and Natural Resources DOF - Department of Finance DOTC - Department of Transportation and Communication DPWH - Departnent of Public Works and Highways EIRR - Economic Internal Rates of Return EMK - Equivalent Maintenance Kilometer GOP - Government of Philippines HMP - Highway Management Project NEDA - National Economic Development Authority PMO - Project Management Office RMS - Road Management System RIMSS - Road Information Management Support Systems NRIMP - National Roads Inprovement and Management Project Vice President: Jemal-ud-din Kassum Country Director Vinay K. Bhargava Sector Director: Jintendra N. Bajpai Task Team Leader: Denis Robitaille  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PHILIPPINES Highway Management Project CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 9 6. Sustainability 10 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 11 8. Lessons Learned 12 9. Partner Comments 13 10. Additional Information 13 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 14 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 16 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 18 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 19 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 21 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 22 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 23 Annex 8. Original and Actual Implementation Schedule 24 Annex 9. DPWH Enterprise Model 25 Annex 9A: Key Accomplishments of RIMSS 1 26 Annex 10. Map of Implemented Road Rehabilitation Projects 28 Annex 11. Cost Comparison of Estimates and Bid Prices 29 Annex 12. Borrower's Contribution to ICR 30 Map IBRD 22787 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization.   PHILIPPINES Highway Management Project (Loan 3430-PH) Implementation Completion Report Preface This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Highway Management Project (Loan 3430-PH) to the Philippines for which a loan of US$150 million equivalent was made on December 20, 1991 and made effective on June 1, 1992. The Loan was closed on June 30, 2000 after one extension of 12 months. The final disbursement was made on December 18, 2000. The ICR was prepared by Mr. Daud Ahmad, Consultant. It was reviewed by Messrs. Denis Robitaille (Task Team Leader) and Jitendra N. Bajpai (Sector Director, Transport Sector Unit). This ICR is based on materials in the project files and an ICR mission which took place in April/May 2000. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by stating its views as reflected in Mission's Aide-Memoire (May 2000), and by preparing its own evaluation of the project execution (see Annex 12).   Project ID: P004597 Project Name: HIGHWAY MANAGEMENT P Team Leader: Denis Robitaille TL Unit: EASTR ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 20, 2000 1. Project Data Name: HIGHWAY MANAGEMENT P L/C/TF Number: 34300; 3430A; 27534 Country/Department: PHILIPPINES Region: East Asia and Pacific Region Sector/subsector: TH - Highways KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 03/31/88 Effective: 06/01/92 06/01/92 Appraisal: 11/16/90 MTR: 09/15/97 Approval: 12/20/91 Closing: 06/30/99 06/30/2000 Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOP/DPWH Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Jemal-ud-din Kassum Attila Karaosmanoglu Country Manager: Vinay K. Bhargava Gautam Kaji Sector Manager: Jitendra N. Bajpai Jeffrey Gutman Team Leader at ICR: Denis Robitaille Peter Long ICR Primary Author: Daud Ahmad; Denis Robitaille; Boonsri Prasertwaree Kim 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes  3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The proposed project would support the Govemment's infrastructure related policy reforms to improve the quality and timeliness of road works and ongoing measures to develop a sustainable institutional capability to manage the network. The project's main objective was to improve the quality of the vitally important arterial highway network and thereby to reduce transport costs and increase the country's economic competitiveness. Toward this goal, the project would: a) support selected sub-projects included in the arterial highway investment plan for 1990-96; b) institute a nationwide road management system to improve the planning, budgeting and implementation of works, particularly resurfacing, strengthening, and maintenance, on a continuing basis; c) encourage increasing private ,sector participation in road maintenance; d) strengthen the capabilities of sub-sector staff through technical assistance and training; and e) improve the effectiveness of the Philippine construction industry by, among other things, introducing modem procedures. 3.2 Revised Objective: The project objectives were never formally revised during project implementation. However, the scope of technical assistance to DPWH for the development and implementation of road management systems underwent major enhancements/ broadening during the early stages of implementation. The main objective of the original component was to focus on developing integrated management tools for multi-year programming, budgeting, monitoring, and data management. During the process of terms of reference preparation for this study, it was felt that the introduction of computerized management tools for those key processes was insufficient. Instead, a more comprehensive approach for the whole department, including development of an enterprise system, was proposed. This meant looking at all of DPWH's core and support business processes to improve and rationalize them and to develop computerized tools for their implementation. While there were some initial reservations on the part of Bank staff in regard to the institutional capacity for achieving this more comprehensive objective within the Project, the Bank agreed to the DPWH proposal. 3.3 Original Components: The following components, as defined in the Staff Appraisal Report, were originally proposed for implementation over a seven-year period, 1992-98: a) Technical assistance for the development and implementation of road management systems for annual and multi-year programming and budgeting of road and bridge works, including procurement of specialized equipment for monitoring and evaluating the condition and structural capacity of pavement and bridge structure to provide essential data for technical management of the system. Specifically, it was proposed that five modules of the road management systems should be developed and implemented by June 1995. The selected modules related to: database/reporting system, road monitoring/data acquisition, 5-year investment programming, rolling work program for investment and maintenance, and regional pavement rehabilitation program; b) Civil works sub-projects to rehabilitate, upgrade, strengthen or resurface some 1,400 km of deteriorated or damaged arterial highways and substandard bridges, including consulting services for the related engineering and construction supervision. The selected sub-projects were part of DPWH's arterial highway investment program, 1992-96. The first year program included nine of the 10 sub-projects of the DPWH program for 1992-93. These were selected on the basis of economic and technical criteria, regional development considerations as well as readiness for implementation. Subsequent civil works components were to be selected through an annual updating and review process of DPWH investment program; -2 -  c) Consulting Services to assist DPWH to: i) coordinate project activities; ii) implement procedures to improve pavement design and construction quality; iii) initiate remedial measures at high-accident locations, to be developed under a recently-defined road safety program; iv) develop and implement a human resources planning and training program oriented toward the Department's changing responsibilities due to decentralization and implementation of maintenance by contract; and v) increase DPWH's capacity to manage the preparation of environmental impact statements for its projects. d) Consulting services to assist the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines (CIAP) to carry out studies and implement measures to strengthen the construction industry. Policy Improvement. In addition, it was agreed that the project would also support the following policy reforms: a) Increase private sector participation in highway maintenance under a phased program resulting in the allocation of abut 60% of the total maintenance budget to contracted works in 1992, 70% in 1993, and about 80% in 1994; b) Improve DPWH cost-effectiveness through a reduction in maintenance staff under a phased program (44% reduction by 1992, 60% by 1993 and 75% by 1994); and c) Annual adjustment of the Equivalent Maintenance Kilometer (EMK) allocation to maintain in real term the 1991 routine maintenance budget for national roads during the project period. 3.4 Revised Components: The following changes took place in the scope of the project components during its implementation: a) The scope of the civil works was revised within a year of loan approval; before start of project implementation. An amended civil works program was recommended by DPWH in December 1992 and approved by the Bank in October 1993. The revised program included only major rehabilitation works leaving out less expansive road upgrading, strengthening and resurfacing works. As a result, the total length of road to be rehabilitated under the project was established at 717 km compared to the original 1,400 km proposed in the Staff Appraisal Report for a mix of rehabilitation, upgrading, strengthening or resurfacing works; b) The scope of the technical assistance component for development of selected management tools for DPWH was expanded to convert it into a long-term exercise to develop a new enterprise system for the DPWH (re-engineering process); and c) After the 1997 Mid Term Review of the project, the terms of reference for the consulting services to assist CIAP were revised to cope with the budget and implementation constraints. This activity was later eliminated due to lack of serious interest on part of CIAP management and to difficulty in transferring related budget to CIAP. 3.5 Quality at Entry: Overall, the quality of the project as appraised is rated as "unsatisfactory". The project was prepared and approved at a time when the Philippines was going through a difficult budgetary situation. As a result, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) approval of the project was hanpered by a number of postponements. At that time, availability of Govemment of Philippines (GOP) counterpart funding was a main source of concem, which persisted as a problem during the life of the project. The main focus of the Bank team was to seek agreements on the institutional and reform objectives of the project, which may have diverted attention from routine detailed preparation works. As it turned out, the - 3 -  project was neither ready for immediate implementation after loan approval, nor its scope defined well enough to be implemented as appraised. The significant early on revisions to the scope of civil works and the technical assistance programs, suggest that the project, as appraised, was not ready for implementation. The Staff Appraisal Report stated that final engineering had been completed for 7 out of 10 road sub-projects selected for the first year program. However, updating of detailed engineering designs was deemed necessary for all sub-components; completion of designs and bidding documents for the first package of sub-projects took nearly two years after loan approval. Subsequent flexibility shown by the GOP and Bank in re-defining the scope of the key components and better supervision on both side after the 1997 Mid-Term Review helped salvage the project and led, in the end, to a satisfactory outcome. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The project did reasonably well in achieving its two main objectives: supporting Govemment's infrastructure related policy reforms and improving quality of important arterial highway network. It turned out to be the main vehicle supporting GOP/DPWH efforts to address a vast range of institutional/policy issues as well as physical implementation constraints. In terms of achieving specific short-term objectives spelled out in the Staff Appraisal Report, the project did not do that well. Instead it contributed handsomely to initiate and sustain a long-term process of institutional and policy reforms and improvement measures for planning/design and implementation of physical works. The broad agenda is now clearly accepted and included in the ongoing Medium Term Public Investment Program of the Government. The issue in the Philippines is no longer "what to do" in the roads sector, but "how to do" it. The various studies and workshops supported by the project to undertake necessary analytical work and strategy development made significant contributions to this end. 4.2 Outputs by components: Annex 8 shows a comparison of planned and actual implementation by project components; start-up delays are prominent in this analysis. Project outcomes by components are summarized below: a) Technical Assistance for Road Management System. HMP started with some specific objectives to develop and implement selected road management system modules by June 1995. This did not happen as planned. Instead, a much broader and longer-term exercise of DPWH enterprise reform was initiated during the start up stages, which is ongoing and has produced a wide range of recommendations for implementation. This major change in focus and strategy that was agreed between DPWH and the Bank should be viewed as a positive development. The scope of TA for road management underwent major revisions/enhancement to undertake more relevant objectives. The original scope was itself innovative, covering the development of decision support and a modular computerized system for key aspects of road planning, programming, budgeting and design - the core business of DPWH. This integrated approach aimed to overcome the ineffective operation of existing stand-alone systems and obsolete information technology. However, during preparation of the terms of reference for this exercise, DPWH staff started to realize that this objective of technology application in itself was limited and not going to be enough or effective. The need to review and revise all of DPWH's business processes along with development of related computerized tools was identified as the new priority. Discussions with various consultants during the preparation stages contributed to this change in strategy. The Bank staff initially had reservations on adopting this long-term comprehensive approach, mainly on grounds of institutional capacity and implementation constraints, but later agreed to it at DPWH's urging. Revised terms of reference for a Road Information and Management Support System (RIMSS), including a first phase on full business process re-engineering and a small second phase limited to the system development for pavement management as the first priority, was launched in August 1995. However, the initiation of this revised component was delayed by a difficult and slow selection of consultants - it took 18 months after submission of consultant proposals for DPWH to sign the contract with the selected consultant. The consultants finally started work in April 1997. The project supported RIMSS-1, the first phase of RIMSS which has evolved into following two stages: - 4 -  * RIMSS-1, along with subsequent contract extensions (1A, 1 B, 1C) was supported by HMP through June 30, 2000. This mainly covered detailed analysis of the existing DPWH set-up (as-is situation), related problems, possible solutions and suggested recommendations. It also included two "quick success" system applications (executive information and contract document preparation), detailed specifications for the subsequent system development activities and a study entitled "Better Roads Philippines". * RIMSS-2, which is mainly the first phase implementation of the highest priority recommendations, being supported under the Bank-financed First National Roads Improvement and Management Project (NRIMP-1) for a 3-year period. NRIMP-1 is the first of a three phase Adaptable Program Loan that was declared effective in July 2000. An overview of the RIMSS recommendations is shown in Annex 9 along with a list of key accomplishment of RIMSS-1. In summary, the first phase involved review of the "as is" situation of DPWH and formulation of a wide range of recommendations to reform all aspects of DPWH's work activities. A set of 154 changes was recommended by RIMSS, which have been grouped into 60 Business Improvement Implementation Projects (BlIPs). Of these, 37 BlIPs have been identified as 'high priority" ones. Pilot implementation of two proposed changes; an Executive Management Information System and a Contract Preparation System is taking place in DPWH. The project also started the installation of a new communications network in the DPWH headquarters and selected regional offices to provide the necessary infrastructure for modem information technology including RIMSS applications. The overall RIMSS program, which is now at the early implementation stages, would be gradually implemented under NRIMP-1. Sixteen highest priority BlIPs are included in NRIMP-1. In addition, a study entitled 'Better Roads Philippines" was undertaken as a supplement to RIMSS to evaluate and recommend options for the institutional reform of road management and financing, following the initiative of a Bank- supported national workshop convened in 1997. This study contributed to the enactment in June 2000 of a new legislation (RA 8794) that establishes special road funds and oversights for road maintenance, safety and pollution control and raising road user charges. It became effective in September 2000. Further support for the implementation of the road funds and institutional changes to improve service delivery and private sector participation is provided under NRIMP-1. b) Civil Works. The civil works component under HMP ended up supporting only major rehabilitation of national roads whereas the original program called also for less expansive upgrading, strengthening and resurfacing works. Thus, when a better identification of the works to be carried out and the provision of more accurate cost estimates became available soon after the loan approval, the initial target of 1400 km of national roads to be included in the program was immediately scaled down to 777 km. Thereafter, minor modifications reduced the program to 759 km. At project closing date, about 600 km of national roads had been rehabilitated under the project or 80% of the revised program. B riefly, out of the 17 civil works contract packages procured to deliver the revised program, three (3) contracts (89 km) had been terminated due to deficient performance of the contractors, 11 had been completed (518 km), and three (3) contracts (151.8 km) had been partially completed at the Project Closing Date. These contracts are being completed under the recently approved WB-financed NRIMP-1. Hindsight reviews confirm that it would not have been possible to undertake only major rehabilitation of 1400 km of national roads with the funds available under this project. This original program was ambitious and not well defined. The roads sub-projects completed under HMP are shown on the Map under Annex 10. The unit costs per km of roads rehabilitated under this project are in line with other DPWH projects, including those financed by ADB and World Bank under NRIMP-1. The civil works projects faced a whole array of implementation problems which are common in the Philippines: * Poor quality of detailed design leading to frequent and substantial variation orders. * Slow procurement approval process. * Weak construction supervision. * Difficult and slow land acquisition process. - 5-  * Weak prequalification process leading to selection of less capable contractors resulting in (i) low and unrealistic bid prices, (ii) slow implementation progress, (iii) expansive supervision and management, (iv) frequent termination or repackaging of contracts, (v) litigation, and (vi) sub-standards quality. * GOP counterpart funding shortages resulting in payment delays to the contractors. * A complicated set-up of supervision consultant services which diffused responsibility and contributed to intemal bickering * Undue external influence and pressure It is not difficult to understand why these problems occurred or persisted. All of the original civil works contracts were awarded at prices well below (mostly 20% +) the Engineers' estimates (Annex 11). Most of the contractors proved to lack necessary technical and financial capabilities -- a reflection of a poor pre-qualification process. A cumbersome judicial process, compounded by client's inability to cash in on contractor's performance bonds rendered DPWH totally ineffective in pursuing remedial measures provided for in the contract documents. The consulting services for road rehabilitation design and construction supervision turned out to be a dominating and expansive activity under this project, which included: * 13 contracts with as many local firms to undertake detailed engineering of the road rehabilitation sub-projects. Total expenditure under this category amounted to $0.92 million. * An expatriate Advisor worked with the IBRD-Project Monitoring Office (PMO) during February 1992 - June 1996, for a cost of $0.385 million. * An expatriate consulting company, supported by two local firms, was retained during June 1993 - June 2000 to monitor progress and to coordinate the work of other consultants; total cost $5.25 million. * Two separate expatriate consulting companies, each supported by three local firms, were hired for design reviews and construction supervision of the civil works project in separate geographic zone; total cost $20.39 million. * Feasibility/detailed design of Halsema Highway (a new sub-project proposed by GOP which attained urgency after the 1990 earthquake); total cost $4.0 million. The requirements for consultant services were spelled out in the Staff Appraisal Report and agreed during negotiations. The total cost of design and supervision services (excluding detailed engineering designs for the Halsema Highway) amounted to $23.6 million compared to the original Staff Appraisal Report estimate of $16.4 million. In the end, design and supervision costs under the Loan amounted to 16.7% of the civil works costs, which are high by any standard. An elaborate/excessive supervision set-up as well as start up and implementation delays contributed to these high costs. DPWH staff/management maintain that the above consultant requirements were proposed/required by the Bank. The September 1997 Mid-Term Review of the project identified significant cost overruns in consultant supervision activity as a major concem. The Bank and DPWH worked effectively to control/curtail these cost during the last three years of implementation. c) Consultant Services to Assist DPWH. Following is a summary of activities that transpired: i) As mentioned above, to coordinate the project activities, DPWH first hired an individual advisor to assist the IBRD-PMO in preparation and implementation of the project. The advisor worked in the PMO during February 1992-June 96. This position was terminated in June 1996 after the appointment of the "coordinating" consultants which, as per provisions of the Loan, was appointed in June 1993 to monitor and coordinate project progress, coordinate work of other consultants, establish quality assurance procedures and technical and administrative standards, and organize annual reviews of project accomplishments and discussions of following years work program with the Bank. The outcome of this intervention was mixed. The consultants did maintain a good progress reporting system; monthly progress reports issued were comprehensive and informative. The consultants also prepared documents relating to Project Computerized System and Standard Procurement Documents which were used by the PMO for this - 6 -  project. Nevertheless, the main role of project coordination turned out to be difficult and controversial. ii) Remedial Measures at High Accident Location. This component was included in the services under the coordinating consultants contract. The assistance started in May 1994 and continued intermittently until March 1997 for a total of 9 person-month input. The main objective of the technical assistance provided to the Accident Investigation Unit was to establish an accident blackspot program and accident data system. The actual achievements of this program are generally rated as "satisfactory". The major factor which has inhibited the total success, has been the slow return of completed accident forms from the Philippines National Police, which is not associated with the Loan arrangements. iii) Human Resource Planning and Training Program. This program supported two main training initiatives: quality assurance and road construction and maintenance techniques. The first activity was delivered through the coordinating consultants contract (ref.: section c.i above). Training, material testing equipment and vehicles were provided to the newly created Quality Assurance Unit and to the Bureau of Research and Standards. Overall, this initiative contributed significantly in improving the quality control performance of the Quality Assurance Unit. The second activity consisted of implementing a nationwide comprehensive training program for DPWH resident and field engineers to improve their skills with regards to road construction, maintenance and management techniques. As a result a total of 2,459 engineers were accredited as project engineers/inspectors. Positive feedback with regards to the effectiveness and appropriateness of the training activities was provided by the Human Resource Planning Division of DPWH and engineers that were trained. Two specific sub-activities were not carried out, CADD application in infrastructure project design and advanced audiovisual production, because the procurement of the needed equipment was a failure. iv) Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Capacity: a five-year training program was successfully implemented which aimed at developing DPWH staff to manage preparation of ElAs and to monitor construction and maintenance works for compliance with environmental legislation within its central operations. DPWH now has a well functioning EIA Project Office with 18 trained staff whom prepare/review ElAs, and assists in training of regional staff. This TA component is clearly recognized as a substantial success. Institutional capacity for ElAs has been created and now widely used within DPWH. The program was carried out by a joint venture of foreign and local consultant, the key accomplishments of which are: * Training of a core EIA team within DPWH. * Training seminars for DPWH senior staff and regional managers. * Signing in May 1999 of a Memorandum of Agreement between Department of Environment and Natural Resources and DPWH on EIA requirements/procedures. * EIA home page of DPWH. d) Assistance to the Construction Industry (CMAP). The loan provided about $2.0 m for assistance to CIAP to undertake studies/programs in such areas as: pre-construction activities, construction industry data bank, technology information and dissemination and training of government supervisors and field officials. The funding for this component was to be channeled to CIAP through DPWH budgetary allocations. The GOP budget procedures made it impossible for these allocations to materialize; only PHP 1.02 million was released to CIAP out of the original PHP 52 million allocation. Serious efforts were made by the Bank staff to modify and revive this component during the Mid-Term Review mission but without success, partly due to lack of serious interest on part of CIAP management and to difficulty in transferring related budget to CIAP. However, the project did its share to improve the quality of the works performed by the local industry. First, under the RIMSS component, DPWH reviewed, designed and implemented a comprehensive pre- and post- qualification system that should - 7 -  eliminate poor performers. In addition, the Better Roads Philippines (BRP) study actively involved representatives of the local contracting industry. As a result, the management of the recently established road fund will include representatives of the industry. e) Maintenance Policy Improvements: Given the external constraints including the complex political arena, overall accomplishments in the proposed policy improvements should be viewed as a sustainable success as summarized below: i) Maintenance Budget Allocation. DPWH managed to obtain substantial increase of funds for the maintenance of the 26,000 km network of the national roads and bridges during 1994-97. The unit allocation of EMK increased from P20,500 in 1991 to P66,835 in 1997. Annual increases are now limited by the Congress to 5.5%. In addition to this hefty increase, GOP has recently established a Special Road Support Fund which is dedicated to the maintenance of the national roads. ii) Private Sector Participation. To a large extent, DPWH succeeded in increasing private sector participation in the maintenance activities. The original target of contracting 80% of maintenance works to private contractors by 1995 was over-ridden by the Congress in 1995 when it fixed this ratio to 50% maximum. However, the Congress came back on its decision in 1999 and fixed the ratio to 70% maximum which is currently achieved by DPWH. iii) Maintenance Work Force. Even though DPWH managed to increase private sector participation in maintenance works, DPWH could not reduce its' maintenance staffing accordingly. At the time of the 1997 MTR, DPWH indicated that it would reduce its work force from 8,000 to about 6,900 staff by 2000. However, the Government launched a labor-intensive program in 1998 to counteract impacts of the major financial crisis that affected Asia at that time. The figure is now at about 7,800 and has declined by 6.24% over the last two years. As a follow up of the Better Roads Philippines (BRP) study financed under HMP, DPWH has undertaken a major revision of its role. As a follow up of the BRP study financed under HMP, GOP and DPWH have undertaken to commercialize (i.e.: business-like management) the road sector. As a first major achievement, GOP has established a Special Road Support Fund which is dedicated to the maintenance of the national roads. Based on cost recovery principles, this fund generates its revenues from vehicle registration charges. The fund is managed by a board comprising representatives of road users. The related legislabton and implementation rules and regulations agree with the main recommendation of the BRP study. As a second achievement, DPWH has undertaken to redesign the role of existing road sector agencies with the overall goal to separate policies/regulations from operations. This should lead to an increase role for the private sector and a reduction of the govemment size. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: Annex 3 provides a summary comparison of IRR for the civil works project components for the original (SAR), amended (1992) and "as implemented" programs. A one-to-one comparison of the original and final components is not meaningful as the civil components went through many changes because of program revisions and contract modifications/termination. The methodology used for post evaluation is based on a conventional road cost-benefit analysis that quantifies benefits mainly from savings in vehicle operating costs and travel time costs for both normal and generated traffic. The software used (ECOVAL) was developed by DPWH and found satisfactory by the Bank. Despite implementation delays and cost over-runs, the IRRs for most sub-projects are in the 20-40% range and generally higher than the original forecasts. This is mainly due to the level of traffic being higher than anticipated. The TA component was not subject to an economic evaluation in the original Staff Appraisal Report. However, a detailed analysis of the RIMSS component was canied out under the recently appraised Bank-financed NRIMP-1. This analysis estimates the associated Benefit Cost Ratio at 32. -8 -  4.4 Financial rate of return: N.A. 4.5 Institutional development impact: The impact of the institutional development/policy reforms supported by HMP is rated as "significant". As mentioned earlier, the project started with some limited goals of implementing RIMSS tools. This approach was aborted soon after loan approval and a longer-term and much more comprehensive approach to undertake enterprise reform of DPWH was initiated. Thanks in large part to the commitment and continuity of senior DPWH management, the new approach is well underway and showing potential for significant benefits. DPWH is unique in that its top management did not change much even with the change of the national Government in 1999. The Secretary of DPWH, who has been in this position for the last six years, is personally committed to DPWH reforms and is providing the leadership and motivation for the necessary changes. While the original limited institutional objectives of the projects were not met per se, the accomplishments to date and the created potential for future changes more than compensates for what was not achieved. As mentioned in para. 4.2a, RIMSS and the Better Roads Philippines initiative have provided the necessary analytical framework and basis for some major policy decisions which have already been taken and institutionalized. Implementation of the highest priority actions is being supported by the ongoing NRIMP Program. These include major revisions to the DPWH business processes and a revamped organizational/financing system for maintenance of the national road network. These should weigh heavily in the overall evaluation of this project. In addition, the establishment of an EIA Unit within DPWH and its ongoing activities are resulting in wider institutional benefits. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: The following factor impeded project implementation: * Counterpart funding shortages prevailed throughout the project life and the 1997 Asian financial crisis made things more difficult towards the end. The following factor had a positive factor of project outcome: * Road users representatives involved in the Better Roads Philippines study requested reforms to commercialize the road sector. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: The following factors had negative impact on project implementation: * Political intervention in sub-project selection, contract disputes and share of private sector in maintenance works. * Lack of mechanism to transfer budget to CIAP which resulted in abandonment of the component. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: The following factors which were within DPWH control, affected project implementation negatively: -9-  * Frequent changes in PMO Director (8 directors during 1990-2000) did not help in addressing implementation issues. The longest duration for one PMO Director (May 1997 - January 2000) coincided with the period when efforts the rescue the project from serious implementation difficulties were successful. * The internal procurement approval process for civil works and consulting contracts is lengthy and cumbersome. * Right of way land acquisition was slow and cumbersome. * Weak performance of the PMO in handling pre-qualification and acceptance of conditional performance bonds and subsequent handling of contract disputes contributed heavily to the implementation problems. * The design and management of supervision consultant arrangements could have been better handled by the PMO. The following factor had a positive impact on the outcome: * Involvement and commitment of highest level-of DPWH management towards the business re-engineering process initiated under the RIMSS component. 5.4 Costs and financing: Annex 2 provides a summary comparison of estimated and actual costs and financing sources by sub-components. While the overall final project cost in dollar terms are very close to the original estimate, a meaningful comparison of the original estimate and final cost is difficult to make given the significant variations in project scope of the civil works component. For this category, a total of about 600 km of national roads were rehabilitated within the original budget, against the original program of 1,400 km. The original program, however, envisaged some minor road works like resurfacing and strengthening works, which were not undertaken. In the end, the project only focused on the more expensive rehabilitation works of the selected national road sections. It must be noted that the final unit costs ($0.25 million/km) of the roads upgraded under this project compare favorably with other DPWH projects and other similar projects undertaken in the region. On this basis, we can conclude that DPWH obtained reasonable assets for the funds available. This certainly is not the case for the Technical Assistance category, which registered substantial cost overruns of 30% overall due to a overblown road rehabilitation supervision set up. The Equipment category had an under-run, mainly due to budgetary constraints and procurement difficulties. However, the non delivery of planned equipment did not affect the outcome of the project and its sustainability 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Overall, the prospects for project sustainability are reasonably good. Whereas, the project faced serious implementation difficulties and delays, it did manage to put in place systems/mechanisms to start addressing the financing and institutional issues and implementation problems faced by DPWH for a long time. The ongoing RIMSS and BRP initiatives, which have gone past some extremely difficult decision making stages and which are fully supported by GOP top management are currently being implemented under NRIMP, provide a sustainable framework for the project. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: A follow-up operation financed by the Bank (NRIMP-1) is already approved and under implementation. The project aims to address the systemic implementation problems and provides a mechanism for addressing longer-term institutional policy reforms. - 10-  7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7. 1 Lending: Overall, the Bank staff performance in project preparation and appraisal has to be rated as mixed. The Bank staff succeeded in including in the project a starting agenda for long-term reforms of the road sector. However, the project itself was poorly defined in terms of scope and was not ready for immediate implementation. This resulted in major changes in project scope even before start of implementation of the physical works. Also there were major start-up delays (few activities were implemented in the first 3 years) and major cost overruns in the category of consulting services. 7.2 Supervision: Overall, the Bank performance in supervision of the project is rated as satisfactory despite many hiccups along the way. The project faced major start up delays and serious contractual problems throughout its implementation. It was rated as a "problem project", within the Bank system, during 1996-98. There were major staff changes in PMO management and also some on the Bank side. During 1996-1997, when the project was facing serious problems and was rated as "problematic" the project had 3 different PMO Directors, on the Bank's side, it was managed by a long-term consultant with an economic background, who could not establish the necessary rapport and credibility with the clients to address the problems faced by the project. A change of Bank team with a highway engineer with works experience as leader at the time of the Mid-Term Review (September 1997) and a new and efficient PMO Director provided a basis for a fresh start to resolve the pending problems and put the project back on track. Another positive development was the broadening of the TA for RIMSS which facilitated the initiation of a major institutional reform effort. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Rated as satisfactory, based on the final outcomes. A reasonable civil works program has been completed at a reasonable cost. In addition, the Bank supported major promising initiatives with regards to financing arrangements (e.g.: road fund) and institutional reforms (e.g.: DPWH business re-engineering) that should ensure the sustainable development and preservation of the national road network. Borrower 7.4 Preparation. The Borrower's performance for project preparation is rated "pooe' for the same reasons as given for Bank's performance in this category. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Satisfactory; senior DPWH Management demonstrated continued commitment and support to the policy and institutional reform initiatives. Other core agencies--DOF, DBM, NEDA--also supported DPWH in this area, resulting in institutionalization of RIMSS and BRP programs. On the other hand, central government departments could have contributed further towards smoother project implementation in such areas as: land acquisition procedures; counterpart funds availability and necessary budget allocation to CIAP for the constnuction industry component. 7.6 Implementing Agency: Mixed: poor during early implementation years; satisfactory after the 1997 Mid-Term Review. - 11 -  7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Satisfactory 8. Lessons Learned Contrary to the OED's general assessment that Bank's transport operations better achieve the physical objectives than the institutional ones, the Highway Management Project promoted substantial reform in the Philippines highway sector. While the road upgrading component faced several difficulties despite an extensive and costly supervision set-up, the contribution of the project toward defining a consensus based reform agenda for the road sector and initiating its implementation is commendable. The project helped design and initiate a comprehensive business re-engineering process within DPWH and a commercialization process including the establishment of a road fund dedicated to the maintenance of national roads. The key factors contributing to the above achievements are: * the flexibility shown by the GOP and Bank in redefining the scope of the TA to meet clients needs; * a sustained commitment of the DPWH senior management to pursue a consensus based long-term reform agenda with Bank's support; * use of an internal participatory process to build strong ownership for the design and implementation of the road management systems component of the project; and * use of local specialists and consultants to assist with the processing of politically complex reform initiatives. On the civil works side, the project implementation faced persistent technical, financial, managerial and political intervention problems, which are common in the Philippines. Despite these problems and due to a very close follow up by both the Bank and DPWH team in the remaining three years of the project life, the project managed to deliver a reasonable road rehabilitation program at an acceptable cost with the exception of the supervision activities. Some specific lessons that can be learned from this project in this area are: * the scope and size of the civil works program should be fully appraised before project negotiations; * bidding documents for civil works and TORs for technical assistance studies to be implemented in the first year program should be ready at the time of project approval; * the pre-qualification process for major civil works should be tightened to prevent sub-standard contractors from being selected - the evaluation criterion as well as the evaluation process needs to be improved (this has already been addressed by DPWH with the complete reform of the prequalification system under the RIMSS initiative); * mechanisms need to be put in place that discourages contractors from submitting low/ unrealistic bids - one way to do this is to stipulate in the contract documents provisions for increasing the performance bond amount, whenever submitted bid amount is below the Engineer's estimate by a large and specific percentage; * the performance security to be posted by the contractors should be in such a form (e.g. unconditional Bank Guarantee) that in case of poor performance, DPWH is able to cash-in easily (this is now common practice with DPWH); * the engineering designs should be reviewed and vetted by the supervision consultants up-front to establish the required ownership of the designs; - 12-  * the perception that construction supervision contracts would be extended if delays occur in contract implementation must be dispelled - construction supervision contracts, somehow, should be linked to satisfactory performance on the ground. Currently, delays in completion of civil works contracts result in "automatic" extension of supervision contract; * a quality-cost based selection procurement method for road construction supervising consultant should be favored with a minimum of 30% for the financial weight (in order to get competitive bid price-wise); * the variation order approval process for civil works contracts shall be reviewed and simplified before loan negotiations; * appointment of supervising consultant teams in the field shall take place concomitantly with contractors' mobilization; * experienced and qualified staff shall be appointed to manage the day-to-day operation of the project - such staff shall be maintained in place as much as possible during project implementation; * technical and managerial skills of Banks' Task Team Leader remain a critical factor for successful project implementation and supervision; and * before negotiating the project, guarantees that required budget allocations for the project shall be obtained from the Government. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: The borrower's own assessment of the Project is given in Annex 12. In addition, DPWH commented the Bank's ICR. Under its letter dated December 6, 2000, DPWH indicated that it had reviewed the draft ICR prepared by the Bank and found it in order and fair. Specifics comments were not provided. (b) Cofinanciers: N.A. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): N.A. 10. Additional Information N.A. - 13 -  Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: 1) Investment Program 766 600 Satisfactory (procurement, time, quality, fund, ERR>1 2%) execution of civil works (rehabilitation of about 766 km of arterial roads). 2) Road Management Systems One system Partially achieved. Objectives and scope Design of Road Information of this component revised/enhanced Management Support System to undertake a comprehensive (RIMSS) for maintenance Information Roads Management planning purposes. Support System. Background studies completed under this project; implementation being supported by NRIMP. 3) Part of RIMSS, development of Two systems Two systems designed and installed. Executive Management System In addition, a registraton system and Contract Preparation combined with a post-qualification System. for NCB civil works have been designed and implemented. 4) Review of road maintenance Review Partially achieved; being addressed procedures and recommen- under RIMSS. dations for simplification of these procedures. 5) Study on feasibility and modalities for Study Study completed; recommendations the establishment of a National Road approved, implementation Authority and Fund. underway after enactement of a legislation by the Congress. 6) Annual increase of Maintenance budget NPV of 91 maintained Achieved (91 EKM allocation equivalent maintained). 7) Private Sector Participation 50% 70% Increase percentage of maintenance works executed by contract (to 50%). 8) Reduced size of DPWH maintenance 6,800 7,800 workforce (7,600 in 98 and 6.860 in 99). 9) Institutional strengthening Procedures/staff training Achieved Development of environmental procedures for DPWH. 10) Integration of EIA team's work in Integration Achieved regular DPWH activities. 11) Training of 50% of DPWH staff at the 50% Achieved central level on environmental issues. 12) Increase awareness on safety issue. - Partially achieved - 14 -  Outcome / Impact Indicators: IndlcatorlMatlx Projctd Ih last PSR ActuaULatest Estimate 13) Development of an accident data _ Not achieved system and black spot program. 14) Implementation of the Human 66 sessions Achieved Resources Development and Training Program (66 sessions). 15) Implementation of a Quality System + training Achieved Assurance Program. 16) Construction Industry Development of construction Two studies industry data bank and Canceled contractor prequalification system Output Indicators: NA NA NA End of project -15 -  Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Poect Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) 3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~p Civil Works-Road Upgrading 125.20 165.57 102 Construction Supervision and Engineering Designs 12.50 27.61 170 Project Coordination and Quality Assurance 4.70 8.51 140 Road Safety 0.30 0.21 55 Human Ressources Development and Training 2.50 0.23 7 Environment 0.70 1.48 164 Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines 1.90 0.03 1 Road Management System 6.20 9.23 115 Total Baseline Cost 154.00 212.87 Physical Contingencies 15.40 Price Contingencies 29.30 Total Project Costs 198.70 212.87 Total Financing Required 198,70 212.87 Percentage at appraisal consider are calculated after allocating the contingencies to appraisal estimate of each component Project Costs b Procurement Arran ements (A raisal Estimate) (US$ million e uivalent) 1. Works 131.10 30.80 0.00 0.00 161.90 (91.80) (21.50) (0.00) (0.00) (113.30) 2. Goods 2.40 0.40 3.70 0.00 6.50 (2.40) (03)(3.70) (00)(6.40) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 30.30 0.00 30.30 (0.00) (0.00) (30.30) (0.00) (30.30) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (.0 Total 133.50 31.20 34.00 0.00 198.70 (94.20) (21.80) (34.00) (0.00) (150.00) - 16 -  Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) ~~~~ __ i~~~~NBF lb Cst 1. Works 165.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 165.57 (105.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (105.28) 2. Goods 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 (1.04) (0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (1.04) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 46.26 0.00 46.26 (0.00) (0.00) (43.68) (0.00) (43.68) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00 0.00) Total 166.61 0.00 46.26 0.00 212.87 (106.32) (0.00) (43.68) (0.00) (150.00) 1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Cormponent (in US$ million equiilent i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ar C , Civil Works-Road 113.00 48.50 105.28 60.29 93.2 124.3 Upgrading Construction Supervison 16.14 26.84 0.63 166.3 and Engineering Designs Project Coordination and 6.06 6.96 1.55 114.9 Quality Asurance Road Safety 0.40 0.21 52.5 Human ressources 3.25 0.04 0.18 1.2 planning and training program Environment 0.90 1.45 0.03 161.1 Construction Industry 2.45 0.03 1.2 Authority of the Philippines Road Management System 8.00 9.19 0.04 114.9 - 17 -  Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits Comparison of Project Road Listings and IERR Based on Staff Appraisal, Amended Civil Works Sub-Projects Component and As Implemented Staff Appraisal Report,1991 al Amended Civil Works Sub-projects As implemented Post-Evaluadon Report c/ IComponent, 1911 tl I rojeot Roads Vr IRR I,proe Projet Road. Lwh IRR Impn Con e No LrVth IM keProanuet Rarafk (Sr di.ons hks (% m3rs (Saction(k) 0 (%) & Cosl Prcus Roodd (5oib) udrtoddun (% & cost (P M) (P M) (P M) IkmPM) 1. Santiago- Tugurgar3o 122.9 18.6 AC: 534.8 Sawlago-Tug-ogarso 122.9 16.6 PCC: 950.0 CP402 Sanrewo-Tuggsrwo 121A 34.8 PCC: Comoled Road 3 47C 3 (abo-Sol J3.) 1121A41 1,019.7 2. Rosarioe Pugo Road 13.0 84.7 AC: 108.3 _ _me,.ed under OECF 3. U=pA-Sto amas (wilh 19.0 126.9 AC: 23.2 _elt 4. Cebu North Reed 62.4 23.9 PCC/AC: 100.9 Cabu Nort Road 102.1 95.1 PCC44ANE: CP412: Mandau.ooseloo 8.5 1032 PCC: 121.2 Completed 95.2 (5.5 38.9 PCC 4-LANE: CP405: ConsoleornrSrn 86.7 22.4 PCC: 845.5 Compled ___________________________________________ 95.2 Reafare,jgl S. Va11enrmloo,La 51.4 20.5 035T/AC: 140.2 Valeheroeo.la Castielran 19.0 15.1 AC: 125.0 CPdi04 Va8 rang-Se 282 3989 AC: 164.1 Compld. Castellra (Valtsanno-Caron)a. E rtque (Vblluaer.oC.on [25.2] 8 MamsaD- 100.B 76.6 DB6T: 129.7 Maraysiqb4e,se-Kebecn 60.0 16.0 AC: 350.0 CP#11-AB Mirarennsob 60 Temitaed due to Yhbae-tK.ab-an (Mra-ProVI Bory.) Provl Bdry [131 oor ior poor CPl-111A-: renWige gofstof [14] 33.9 AC: 419.8 30% oorrpleed at CP 1/A r l47tkm (80-13) proed oosng date. To be o.Vamtetd oeder laRIMP-1 7. Zanmoanga- Pagadlan 51.6 25.6 AC: 252.3 PfgadlianrZsmbosngi 52.0 19.4 PCC: 380.0 (PB7: PagedlKriZmboanga 43.0 Tern..e..d re to lBoIAa-ttl'"an) laBoedtbaeal) (Brat Ktbeass.4n (3.01 -ooeetr poor To be oompleted und. P6MPl1 8. Badan Cr-Afaeoontal 32.7 26.6 AC 133.7 Deleted Road (Isabela-Maluso) 9. Dav-Co CiOt-go Road 51.9 41.1 AC: 197.6 Davao Ciy4-lgo Road 51.8 71.4 AC: CFSIO: Drvao Cty-Ioew 47.6 41.2 PCCIAC: 338.9 Completad __________ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~300.0 Road [41. 81 _ _ __ _ _ 10.HghwayseD-muagdby TBD TBD 3446 Deleted MtL Pwirrtubo _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Rosabat-l-r-Son. Jao 30.0 46.8 PCC: 200.0 CP011A. .01/A-1 -011A-2: 29.8 20.9 PCC: Cmplaeedundrer Ro rateApe-Sn. Joa" Ciy [29.8) 291.1 3 pWrla8eo Dav-r3ddonRoad 140.1 21.0 AC: 908.9 CPt LetA -ClCnan 34.9 29.8 AC: 301.3 Comprad CP49B1: CrfiFBuo 1~~3416.810 CP881 CaBlht-Bude, 46.0 Tamrrnatad 8dwto [01 contractor potw Perlenoase. To be omopleta CP388B8d% mowerTn 58.0 22.8 AC: 794.2 45% complAd at (20.81 Poardoje t g" dale. To be TOe5ltd _____________ _______ _______________ ardar NRIW-1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~u tle NR W - _ (Crbu antran-B ss.s 8.7 78.0 21.1 AC: 400c0 W a74.8 29.5 AC: 473.2 Coplnted. ________ _ _ ____ ub,boeto-Srty )___ 777.2o+toaa _Se2 z Tct n ion [Sbt.1 _- Si Cabe Tanere Reed 38.0 23.7 PCC: 260.0 CP Caeb Ttaaehrta 32.8 37 CC: 90% Oompleted at _/ Based ron Economic Re-Evaluation Report dated August 1993. For Cebu North Road, the figures in brackets represent the rerommernded lengths. The vvhole road analysis for Davao-Bubidnon is roontained in a separate reprort dated October 1994. The IRRs for Pagadian-;ambr anga and Digos-Gen. Santos are the rcorreced version as discussed in the project road profi(e. Ed As implemented under HMP. For CP#11Ithe 59.8 km represents the total incluc rkg as built as resdnded, loral funds as well as the balance oJf works being implemented Linder HMP up to June 2000, and the continuing works under NRCMP. For CP#7only 3.0 km vvas implemented as esinded, a noew contract Rill be finaced und3r NRIMP. CP#9B1 was also resdnded and the balanc8 of works vFill be financed under NRIMP. - 18 -  Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions; ___ Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development MontwYear Count Spialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation Prior to FY 1991 NA NA U FY 1991 2 Highway Engineers U I Road Mgt. Specialist 2 Transport Economists I Procurement 1 Training Expert 1 Environmental Specialist Appraisal/Negotiation FY 1991 2 Highway Engineers U I Road Mgt. Specialist 2 Transport Economist I Procurement Specialist I Training Expert FY 1992 1 Highway Engineers U 1 Road Mgt. Specialist 1 Transport Economist I Procurement Specialist Supervision FY 1993 1 Highway Engineer S 1 Road Mgt. Specialist I Procurement Specialist FY 1994 4 Highway Engineers S I Road Mgt. Specialist I Transport Economist I Procurement Specialist FY 1995 2 Highway Engineers S 1 Road Mgt. Specialist I Transport Economist I Procurement Specialist FY 1996 2 Highway Engineers U I Road Mgt. Specialist I Transport Economist 2 Procurement Specialist FY 1997 2 Highway Engineers U I Transport Economist 2 Procurement Specialist FY 1998 1 Highway Engineers S I Senior Operations Officer 3 Procurement Specialist 1 Financial Mgt. Specialist Disbursement Officer . - 19 -  (a) Missions: Perform.e_Rating Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Supervision FY 1999 2 Highway Engineers S S I Road Mgt. Specialist 2 Procurement Specialist I Financial Mgt. Specialist FY 2000 2 Highway Engineers S S I Road Mgt. Specialist I Procurement Specialist ICR FY 2000 1 Highway Engineer S I Senior Operations Officer FY 2001 1 Highway Engineer S I Senior Operations Officer I Road Mgt. Specialist Notes: I - Development objective rating started only in FY 1999 2 - Rating of preparation/lending phase is based on current ICR findings. (b) Staff. Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate l ________________________ No. Staff weeks US$ (,000) Identification/Preparation 59.30 119.20 Appraisal/Negotiation 52.00 129.10 Supervision 198.79 462.90 ICR 5.85 21.26 Total 315.94 732.46 -20 -  Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating a Macro policies O H OSUOM ON * NA 0 Sector Policies O H OSU*M ON O NA Z Physical O H OSU*M ON O NA E Financial O H O SU * M O N O NA Z Institutional Development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA Environmental OH *SUOM ON ONA Social F Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N * NA M Gender OH OSUOM ON *NA M Other (Please specify) OH OSUOM ON * NA X Private sector development 0 H O SU *M 0 N 0 NA E Public sector management 0 H O SU 0 M 0 N 0 NA MOther (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA - 21 -  Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating ? Lending OHS OS *U OHU E Supervision OHS OS Ou OHU Z Overall OHS S s O u O HU 6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating F Preparation OHS OS * u O HU I Government implementation performance O HS 0 S 0 U 0 HU 2 Implementation agency performance O HS O s 0 U 0 HU Z Overall OHS OS O u O HU - 22 -  Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 1. Staff Appraisal Report (9439-PH), Highway Management Project dated October 4, 1991. 2. Aide Memoire (dated October 28, 1997) of the Mid Term Review Mission (September 1997) of the Highway Management Project. 3. Monthly Progress Reports of the Coordinating Consultants (Renadet S.A); last report reviewed: #81, June 2000. 4. RIMSS Phase 1A, Final Report, dated April 1999: Conclusions and Recommendations by consultants Scott Wilson and associates. 5. Better Roads Philippines, Final Report dated April 1999 by Scott Wilson and associates. 6. Aide Memoire, Implementation Completion Report Mission, May 2000. 7. Staff Appraisal Report (19754- PH), First National Roads Improvement and Management Program (NRIMP), January 21, 2000. - 23 -  PHILIPPINES HIGHWAY MANAGEMENT PROJECT 1.1 -PARTO 0IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE AU IIVI IY .- -I T 3 ________ 3 T T * TTW A aY 4 T *T1 ~ BANK LOAN- Slgnature/StartlClose PI A. CIVIL WORKS (ROAD PRQGR6 2nd Year Pivroga a. Prequalificatlon XXx YO( b. Bid Period S xxyxxxxxx C. ExeCution xxxi. x y.xxxxxy xxjox~i v .XKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXjo cxxxxxxxxx a.Prequallficatlon A -1210/7 1/129 b. Bid Period A 4 XX4 a4/95X c. ExecutIon A r B. TECHINICAL ASSISTANCE 2&D a. Appoint Consultants S Xxx 3/24/92 5/5/93 A b. ExecutIon s )xJUxxJiZxxxmXlX 1XXXXXJUXXXXXJ(XX YXJXXXKXXXX J(XX XXXXXX)OOXXXXXXXXXi )Uxxxx .iXY(x XJX XXxxuo xxxx)(XXXX~ xxxx,xxxxxxxxxM 2. Advisor to PMO-IBRD 1/31/92 a. Appoint Consultant A0 2/27/92 6/30/96- b. Execution A ~' 3. Design and Supervision f a. AppointConsultants S xxxx"xxxxxx 5/17/93 9/7/94 r A b. Execution S XYJ X)((XXXXXXXXXXf lXXXXXXXXXXXJX ~XXXXXXXXXXXX.LKXXXJ AXXJ(XXXXXXXXXXX )(XXXXXXO( XXXY)D XKXXKXXX.XXXXXXXX A 12/1/i 9 4. RIMSS a. Appoint Consultants S )XYX. A b. Execution S XXXXXXX, jXXXXXuxxxxxxxxxxi ix)xxxxxxxxxxxo(xxK (Juxxxxxjocxxxcxxxx A .5. Envirmnmentel Assessment4/69 a. Appoint Consultants S xxl.X.XX.XX)(XXXxX A f b. Execution 1119 A 6. Trainting Program (OPWH) S xxxxxxxxx XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXK A 7. Accident Reduction 8. Quality Assurance 9. Assistance to CIAP a. Appoint Consultants s XXXXX A b. Execution 5 x.KXX xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx XXXX Ore * IchLcb in toe Coordnleii Comiuftiar CoiisLmncy wt Y EtOde bIan ciosIl