Uganda - Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project

Document of THE WORLD BANK FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 19224 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF UGANDA NORTHERN UGANDA RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (Cr. 2362-UG) April 30, 1999 Water and Urban Unit 1 Eastern and Southern Africa Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Uganda Shillings (USh) US$1.00 = 1139 Ush. Jan. 1992 US$ 1.00 = 1196 Ush. Jan. 1993 US$1.00 = 1196 Ush. Jan. 1994 US$1.00 = 910 Ush. Jan. 1995 US$1.00 = 1000 Ush. Jan. 1996 US$1.00 = 1060 Ush. Jan. 1997 US$1.00= 1135 Ush. Jan. 1998 US$1.00 = 1350 Ush. Jan. 1999 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADP Agriculture Development Project CAP Community Action Program CMEU Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit DFI District Farm Institute Gulu DNO District NURO Officer DWD Directorate of Water Development GOU Government of Uganda IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The Bank) IDA International Development Association MIAAIF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry, and Fisheries MES Ministry of Education and Sports MLG Ministry of Local Government MOF Ministry of Finance MOLHUD Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development MOW Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications NURP Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project NURP II Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project II NITEP Northern Integrated Teacher Education Program OPM Office of the Prime Minister PIU Project hnplementation Unit (in line ministries) PAPSCA Poverty and Social Cost of Adjustment Project UPE Universal Primary Education UPTC Uganda Post and Telecommunications Corporation Vice President Callisto Madavo Country Director James W. Adams Sector Manager Jeffrey Racki Task Manager Sabine Cornelius/Iraj Talai  UGANDA FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY NORTHERN UGANDA RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT [Credit 2362-UG] IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT Page P R E F A C E ............................................................................................................................................i EVALUATION SUMMARY ... ii PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Statement/Evaluation of Project Objectives ........................................................1.............. B. Achievement of Objectives ............................ ............................. .........3.....3 C. Major Factors Affecting the Project ........................ . .......................................................... D. Project Sustainability . . . ....................................................................................................... l 1 E. IDA Performance ................... ........................... 12 F. Borrower Perfonnance ................. ...............................................................1......... ............ 12 G. Assessment of Outcome . . . . 13 H. Future Operations ....14 I. Key Lessons Leamed ......................................................... ... 15 PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES Table 1: Sumnmary of Assessments Table 2: Related IDA Credits Table 3: Project Timetable Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual Table 5: Key Indicators for Physical Achievements Table 6: Key Indicators for Development Impact Table 7A: Project Costs Table 7B: Analysis of Five Major IDA-financed Civil Works Contacts Table 7C: Project Financing Table 8: Economic and Financial Evaluation Table 9: Status of Legal Covenants Table 10: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs in staff/weeks Table 11: Bank Resources: Missions Annex 1: Closing Mission's Aide Memoire Annex 2: Borrower contribution to the ICR Annex 3: Economic Analysis of Highways Rehabilitation Component Map IBRD No. 23506 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  i IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA NORTHERN UGANDA RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT [Credit 2362-UG] PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project, Republic of Uganda, for which a Credit 2362-UG, in the amount of SDR 51.9 million (US$ million 71.2 equivalent) was approved by on May 5, 1992, the Development Credit Agreement was signed on June 12, 1992, and the Credit was made effective on December 9, 1992. The Credit was closed on September 30, 1998 as scheduled. Final disbursement took place on March 5, 1999 at which time the Credit proceeds were fully disbursed. Co-financing for the Project was provided by the Government of the Netherlands, DANIDA and the Government of Belgium. The ICR was prepared by Ms. Sabine Cornelius, Economist, AFTU1, and it was reviewed by Messrs. Jeffrey Racki, Manager AFTU I and James W. Adams, Director AFC04. Preparation of this ICR was begun in conjunction with IDA's final supervision/completion mission of September 1998. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by providing pertinent information and commenting on the draft ICR. The Borrower also prepared a separate evaluation of the Project's preparation and execution, which is attached to the ICR.  ii UGANDA NORTHERN UGANDA RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT [Credit 2362-UG] IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Background. After 15 years of civil war, the National Resistance Movement came into power in 1986 under President Museveni, and peace and security were gradually restored in the central and southern parts of the war torn country. However, the North continued to be plagued by waves of civil strife which resulted in a further deterioration of basic and social infrastructure. The security situation started to improve markedly in 1988, and IDA agreed to support the Government of Uganda's (GOU) in its rehabilitation efforts through the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program which became effective in 1992. The project area covered about one third of the country with a about 20% of Uganda's population. The North was and continues to be disproportionately affected by poverty. 2. Project Objectives. As stated in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) No. 1041 1-UG, the project's main objective was the short and medium-tern reconstruction of the essential economic and social infrastructure in less insecure areas of the North. The investments were expected to: (i) restore economic productivity; (ii) start to redress historical disparity between the conflict affected and chronically underdeveloped North and the south of the country, (iii) increase the potential for sustained security and a reduction in defense expenditures; (iv) contribute to poverty alleviation and address concerns of women; (v) strengthen the capacity of local government agencies to plan and manage the reconstruction and rehabilitation program and maintain the investments; (vi) attract the participation of other donors in the financing of future projects in the North. NURP was consistent with the GOU's Economic Recovery Program launched in 1987, aimed at promoting economic rehabilitation and growth. 3. Project Components. NURP was a regionally targeted, multi-sectoral and multi-district operation, and assistance was provided to 10 districts in the North (and former West Nile Region) in seven sectors. The project comprised the following components and the cost estimates at the time of appraisal (including contingencies): (1) a highways rehabilitation component ($ 25.6 million); (2) a telecommunications component ($ 11.8 million); (3) an education component ($ 10.2 million); (4) a feeder roads component ($ 8.7 million); (5) an urban development component ($ 6.9 million); (6) a community action program ($ 6.3 million); (7) a water supply and sanitation component ($ 5.6 million); (8) an agriculture component ($ 5.1 million); and (9) support to the Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (CMEU) ($ 2.3 million). During implementation, several activities were added to the original project scope such as a sub-projects component, additional activities under the primary education, urban water, urban development, agriculture components, and support to the internally displaced population in the North through the provision of seeds and hand hoes. 4. Evaluation of Objectives. The project objectives were overly ambitious, and the focus should have been on emergency rehabilitation of infrastructure affected by the war, rather than aiming at medium term reconstruction and capacity building. While the project objectives appear very complex, it was understood that the special situation in the North required a multi-track effort. The challenge was not only to rebuild infrastructure but to increase the potential for sustained security in an area which had become socially and economically isolated. Insecurity was an issue at appraisal, and remained a problem throughout implementation. Coordinating, monitoring and evaluation implementation in 7 sectors, in a project area which covered half of the country, proved to be a challenge. The task became even more  iii formidable when the security situation impeded project implementation -- but not the project objectives. The GOU launched its local government reform program in the mid-1990s which made the original implementation arrangements somewhat inconsistent with decentralization. This only affected the project objectives in so far as the changing role of the local governments would have required an adjustment of capacity building activities. Implementation Experience and Results 5. Achievement of Objectives. The project has substantially achieved its physical objectives and has realized most of the anticipated benefits. The following are the main achievements under the eight (physical) project components and project administration. The physical objectives of the highways component were substantially achieved. Four out of five highways were completed, and substantial increases in traffic volumes and reductions in vehicle operating costs have been achieved. The rehabilitation of the Atiak-Moyo road had to be suspended in February 1996 due to insecurity, and the Gulu-Acholibur road was and still is frequently closed due to insecurity. The ERR changed from 24% at appraisal to 12% at project completion. However, the conventional quantitative approach does not appear appropriate in the case of NURP. In addition to the quantitative benefits there are considerable qualitative benefits attributable to the investments. The traffic based measures of benefits do not take into account the substantial volume of suppressed traffic, both prior to the project and during implementation, due to insecurity and poor road conditions. In addition, the rehabilitation of main highways, notably the resealing of Kafu Karuma road, has significantly improved access to the project area and increased the value of production. 6. Achievements under the telecommunications component have been minimal to date, since the Belgian Grant Agreement was only signed in November 1998. However, the objectives of this component are expected to be fully achieved by the year 2000. The objectives of the education and training component, comprising the rehabilitation of primary schools, teachers' training and technical training, were substantially achieved. The objectives of thefeeder roads component were partly achieved. Due to insecurity and a reduction in grant funding, DANIDA reduced the scope of its originally intended activities; parts of the dropped activities were financed by IDA. Overall, the project strengthened the road maintenance capacity in four districts, provided road maintenance equipment, technical training; and 966 km of feeder roads were maintained and improved. The objectives of the urban development component were substantially achieved. The urban streets and markets were successfully rehabilitated; the capacity building component was reduced to training activities, and most strategic town planning activities were completed. 7. The objectives of the Community Action Program (financed by the Netherlands' Government) were substantially achieved, in particular with a view to capacity building, and to a lesser extent in terms of the provision of social infrastructure. The objectives of the water component were partially achieved. While the accomplishments under the rural water component were remarkable, especially in light of the persisting rebel activities, the achievements under the urban water component were less significant. Although all civil works were completed, the systems are not fully functional in several towns, partly due to factors beyond the project scope. The objectives of the agriculture component were partly achieved. The objectives of the agricultural inputs sub-component were substantially achieved, the extension and training services provided did not achieve their objectives, and the objectives of the rural credit scheme were partially achieved. It is worth noting, though, that additional activities were successfully undertaken such as the construction of the Gulu district farm institute, and support to the Internally Displaced Population. The objectives of the sub-projects component were fully achieved. About 30 sub-projects;  iv for the most part primary school rehabilitation and, to a lesser extent, construction of shallow wells and rainwater harvesting systems, were completed. 8. Major FactorsAffecting the Project. The implementation of the project was substantially affected by several factors beyond the Govemment's control such as (i) disruptions caused by intensified rebel activities; (ii) centralized administrative procedures designed prior to the onset of decentralization; (iii) poor performance of contractors; and (iv) delays in effectiveness of grants extended by cofinanciers. In addition, implementation was adversely affected by several factors subject to the Government's control such as: (i) inadequate and untimely release of counterpart funds; and (ii) retrenchment of line ministries' staff responsible for supervision of project activities, in the context of decentralization. The most common problem regarding the line ministries' Project Implementation Units (PIUs) were: (i) inadequate contract management and "on site" monitoring which contributed to cost overruns and substantial delays; (ii) additional works undertaken, and thus costs incurred, without seeking the Bank's prior approval, and (iii) late submission of often incomplete work plans. The main factors subject to the Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (CMEU) were: (i) poor performance of several NURP District Offices; (ii) the location of the Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (CMEU) outside the project area; (iii) untimely submission of audit reports and financial management prior to the installation of accounting software in March 1996; and (iv) governance issues. 9. Project Sustainability. The potential for sustainability of the project varies among the components. The sustainability of highways is probable, assuming adequate release of road maintenance funds and the Ministry of Works' commitment to undertaking routine maintenance; the sustainability of primary schools is probable, given that UPE is one of the Government's highest priorities; due to its participatory nature, the chances of investments being maintained under the sub-projects component are high; the sustainability of feeder roads and urban streets is probable, subject to the districts' commitment and availability of maintenance funds; the sustainability of the boreholes is probable since, for the most part, adequate water source management arrangements are in place; the sustainability of at least four of the seven urban water schemes is unlikely; and the maintenance of the District Farm Institute in Gulu is probable, given that maintenance arrangements are in place. 10. Bank Performance. Bank performance during project identification, preparation and appraisal was satisfactory, with the exception of one component. Considering the persisting insecurity, the project was prepared expeditiously and effectively. Bank performance during supervision was satisfactory, however, the quality of supervision by the individual component managers varied. The support provided by resident mission staff was at times unsatisfactory. The quality of supervision improved after mid-term review when the number of sectoral component managers was reduced and more responsibility transferred to the core task team. The Bank supervised the project at least twice a year, focusing mostly on technical, financial and, to a much lesser extent, institutional aspects. No deviations from Bank policies or procedures were noticed during implementation. The Bank was vigilant on procurement and disbursement issues. The Bank maintained good relations with other cofinanciers, i.e. the Dutch and Belgian Governments and DANIDA, throughout implementation. 11. Borrower Performance. GOU performance was not fully satisfactory, as evidenced by a project which incurred significant cost overruns and faced a range of governance issues. Although the project substantially achieved its main objectives, the line ministries' project staff did not appear consistently concerned aboutthe timely and cost effective implementation ofthe project. Poor contractmanagement by the line ministries resulted in substantial cost overruns. Borrower performance improved somewhat as a result of the changes made during mid term review but submission of accountability from the districts remained a problem.  v 12. Project Outcome. Overall, the project's outcome is satisfactory, and it achieved most of its physical and development objectives. Exceptions are the telecommunications and feeder roads components, which were significantly delayed by the cofinanciers' performance. The project contributed to the restoration of economic productivity and the improvement of livelihoods in the North. Despite its complexity, initial start-up problems, coordination and communication problems, insecurity and the "remote control" of activities in the project area from Kampala, the project was implemented with remarkable consistency to original targets and in time. This is an impressive achievement, given the disruptive effect of the ongoing rebel activities. For the most part, sustainability of investments is probable. The centralized implementation arrangements were a major shortcoming, and the institutional development activities, which were unrealistic to start with, were largely neglected during implementation. Future Operations 13. The GOU has requested IDA's support to the follow on operation, for the following reasons: (i) continued unrest and conflict in some parts of the North, coupled with the widespread persistence of poverty, threaten to undo overall development gains; (ii) although NURP met, for the most part, its physical implementation and developmental objectives, the needs in the North by far exceed the scope of the operation; and (iii) to provide support to the displaced population in the North of Uganda. The GOU's National Action Plan for Poverty Eradication has identified 14 districts in Northern Uganda as the country's poorest region. The anti-poverty strategy is also the central feature of the April 1997 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). At present, NURP II, a follow-up operation to the first NURP, is under preparation and aims to provide continued support to the Government's reconstruction efforts in the North. The project will take into account the lessons learned under NURP and continue to address the twin problem of poverty and post conflict reconstruction. Essentially, it is envisaged that the new project will include the same sectors as NURP and, in addition, it is expected to support specifically the war to peace transition process. Unlike NURP, the implementation arrangements will be much more decentralized, with project facilitation and monitoring functions located in the project area. NURP II is, for the most part, being designed as a demand responsive project and with the active involvement of the stakeholders on the ground and other extemal assistance agencies. Key Lessons Learned 14. The following lessons have been learned from the NURP experience: * Implementation arrangements need to be more decentralized, in accordance with the local govenument reform process; * It is crucial for the GOU - in consultation with other stakeholders - to agree on a strategic framework for supporting the North. * Meaningful stakeholder participation in project design and implementation is crucial for sustainability. * The target groups, vehicles, envisaged outcome, and indicators to measure the outcome of capacity building initiatives need to be more clearly defined. * The new operation needs to include more war to peace transition activities such as recognition of traditional ways of conflict resolution; counseling for the war affected population, especially children and adolescents; and reintegration of abducted children, female headed households, former rebels and child soldiers. * Clearly defined monitoring and evaluation indicators and continuous data collection are crucial for the new operation.  DRAFT IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA NORTHERN UGANDA RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (Credit 2362-UG) PART I. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Statement/Evaluation of Objectives 1. Background. From 1972-1986, Uganda was tormented by a civil war, with a short-lived attempt at peace and reconstruction during the second Obote administration (1980-1985), following the overthrow of the Amin regime. When the National Resistance Movement came into power in 1986 under President Museveni, peace and security were gradually restored in the central and southern parts of the war torn country, permitting a resurgence of economic activities. However, the North continued to be plagued by waves of civil strife which resulted in a further deterioration of basic infrastructure (roads, markets, water supplies, administrative centers) and social infrastructure (schools, clinics). In addition, cattle stealing and internal displacement severely affected the livelihood of small farmers in the North. The large population of widows and orphans, living in poverty and deprivation, increased number of births outside wedlock, and an upsurge in the incidence of AIDS indicated a severely torn social fabric. The security situation started to improve markedly in 1988, and IDA agreed to support the Government of Uganda (GOU) in its rehabilitation efforts through the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program which became effective in 1992. The project area covered about one third of the country with a population of about four million people at the time of appraisal (about five million at present) or about 20% of Uganda's population. 2. The disproportionate degree of poverty in the North is reflected in the following indicators (1991 census data): in Gulu and Kitgum, the population per doctor was about 38,900 (Gulu) and 42,300 (Kitgum), compared to the national average of about 27,100 persons; the literacy rate for women in the North was about 27% (in Karamoja as low as 6%) while the national average was 45%; 75% out of all girls aged 6-12 had not attended school, compared to the national average of 45%; effective latrine coverage in Karamoja was below 11%. More recent statistics show a slightly improving poverty trend: between 1992-96, the percentage of the poor in the North was reduced from 71% to 65% (compared to a reduction from 56% to 46% nationwide), and the incidence of hard core poverty declined from 25% to 12%. Nationwide, hard core poverty fell from about 35% to 26%. While these figures depict a positive trend, poverty remains high, and the North (and the East) have experienced the smallest improvement. 3. Project Objectives. As stated in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) No. 1041 1-UG, the project's main objective was the short and medium-term reconstruction of the essential economic and social infrastructure in less insecure areas of the North. The project area comprised the districts of Apac, Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Pallisa, Kumi and Soroti; in addition, select activities were envisaged to be undertaken in Arua, Moyo and Nebbi (formerly West Nile Region). The investments were expected to: (i) restore economic productivity; (ii) start to redress historical disparity between the conflict affected and chronically underdeveloped North and the south of the country, (iii) increase the potential for sustained security and a reduction in defense expenditures; (iv) contribute to poverty alleviation and address concerns of women; (v) strengthen the capacity of local government agencies to plan and manage the reconstruction and rehabilitation program and maintain the investments; (vi) attract the participation of other donors in the financing of future projects in the North. NURP was consistent with the GOU' s Economic Recovery Program launched in 1987, aimed at promoting economic rehabilitation and growth.  2 4. Project Components. NURP was a regionally targeted, multi-sectoral and multi-district operation, and assistance was provided to 10 districts in the North (and former West Nile Region) in seven sectors. The project comprised the following components and the cost estimates at the time of appraisal (including contingencies): (1) a highways component ($ 25.6 million) to rehabilitate about 460 km of the national highway network; (2) a telecommunications component ($ 11.8 million) to provide a microwave link from Kampala to Gulu and, a telephone exchange, cable networks, other equipment, and technical assistance; (3) an education component ($ 10.2 million) which included integrated education (NITEP) of about 3,000 primary school teachers, improvement of technical training through acquisition of basic equipment, tools and teaching materials for six technical schools and four technical institutes, including the rehabilitation of six workshops and construction of four new workshops; and the rehabilitation/replacement of 266 primary schools (equal to 1,860 class rooms), including furniture, teaching materials as well as water supply and sanitation; (4) afeeder roads component ($ 8.7 million) to rehabilitate 270 km of priority feeder roads and 600 of other feeder roads in the project area, including the provision of additional workshops, road equipment and tools for mobile rehabilitation units as well as local authorities (mostly funded by DANIDA); (5) anurban development component ($ 6.9 million) to rehabilitate urban streets, drains and markets; improvement of urban services through acquisition of maintenance equipment and materials for local councils; undertake strategic town planning and a study to identify institutional constraints on the development of small-scale enterprises in urban centers; and training of local council staff; (6) acommunity action program ($ 6.3 million) to strengthen local institutions and to support community based micro-projects through a social fund (funded by the Netherlands); (7) a water supply and sanitation component ($ 5.6 million) to drill and equip about 360 boreholes with handpumps; health and hygiene education; rehabilitation of urban water and sewerage systems in 6 towns, and institutional strengthening of the Directorate of Water Development (DWD); (8) an agriculturecomponent ($ 5.1 million) which included agricultural inputs, research and extension, assistance to the livestock sector, a rural credit fund, and strengthening of agricultural inputs management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation; and (9) institutional support and administration through the Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (CMEl) ($ 2.3 million). A health component was initially considered; however, at appraisal, it was decided that health activities would not be included in the project since a health sector investment loan (Health II) was under preparation, which was envisaged to include the North. Therefore, health related activities under NURP were limited to health and hygiene education and the provision of access to safe water. 5. During implementation, several activities were added to the original project scope such as: (i) a sub-projects component (after project restructuring in June 1996) to support community based sub-projects in primary education, rural water and periurban access roads; (ii) 86 additional classrooms under the education component; (iii) additional activities under the urban water component; (iv) topographical maps and boundary surveys under the urban development component; (v) the construction of the Gulu District Farm Institute (DFI) initiated under the Agriculture Development Project; and (vi) support to the intemally displaced population in the North through the provision of seeds and hand hoes. On the other hand, after reassessing the envisaged activities under the feeder roads component, DANIDA reduced the scope of its originally intended activities as well as the grant funding. In light of the delayed effectiveness of the grant funds, the Bank agreed at mid-term review, in October 1994, to finance parts of the activities not financed by DANIDA. DANIDA funding became effective in August 1996. In addition, during project restructuring the Government of Belgium agreed to finance the telecommunications component; however, the (significantly reduced) grant was only signed in December 1998. The grant is still not effective, due to delays in the preparation of the legal agreement between the Bank and the GOU.  3 6. Evaluation of Objectives. The project objectives were overly ambitious and somewhat unrealistic, given that the resource requirements for the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program were estimated at about US$ 350 million (in 1991 prices), of which NURP financed less than one third. The focus should, thus, have been on emergency reconstruction, rather than aiming at medium term reconstruction and capacity building; it would have been more realistic to assume that the project would only address the most urgent needs for reconstruction in less insecure areas. In addition, the Bank's (and the Borrower's) knowledge of the area in terms of the specific socio-economic conditions and needs in the 10 districts was very limited. Furthermore, insecurity was an issue at appraisal, and remained a problem throughout implementation. While the objectives - and the project design for that matter - appear very complex, it was understood that the special situation in the North required a multi-track effort. The challenge was not only to rebuild infrastructure but to increase the potential for sustained security in an area which had become socially and economically isolated. This explains the focus on communication (through highways, feeder roads and telecommunications investments), social infrastructure (schools, water), and income generating activities (agriculture, technical training). NURP as a multisectoral project justifiably intended to be responsive to the demonstrated multiple demands, with a view to beginning to redress the disparity between the North and South. 7. In any event, coordinating, monitoring and evaluation implementation in 7 sectors -- and in a project area which covered half of the country - proved to be a challenge. The task became even more formidable when the borrower circumstances changed considerably due to intensified rebel activities in the North; the deteriorating security situation impeded project implementation but not the project objectives. When the GOU launched its local government reform program in the mid-1990s, the original implementation arrangements became somewhat inconsistent with decentralization. This only affected the project objectives in so far as the changing role of the local governments would have required an adjustment of capacity building activities. It is also worth noting that NURP was designed, for the most part, as a multisectoral infrastructure intervention, focussing on rehabilitation of infrastructure affected by the war. Due to the insecurity prevailing at the time of preparation, it was impossible to collect household specific data. Household surveys conducted between 1992-96 emphasize the fundamental importance of agriculture in the North and the need for supporting this key engine of growth on a larger scale. However, the project design was based on the limited information available at the time. B. Achievement of Objectives 8. Overall Assessment The project has substantially achieved its physical objectives and has realized most of the anticipated benefits, with some exceptions. According to the statistics, the incidence of poverty in the North was reduced from 71% to 65% between 1992-96, and it is reasonable to assume that NURP contributed to this trend. Below is a more detailed assessment of the achievements under the eight (physical) project components and project administration. Table 1. NURP - Main Achievements component/item SAR actual rural credits disbursed (Ush) 1,400,000,000* 997,572,000 rural credits (principal) recovered (Ush) ._,_, _548,425,000 cassava planted (acres) 3,360 1069 seeds planted (acres) 960 245 District Farm Institute n.a. 1 primary school classrooms substantially completed** 1,866 1,962 primary school classrooms equipped with furniture ** 1,866 1,749  4 teachers enrolled in NITEP 3,000 3,128 technical workshops completed 10 9 km of highways rehabilitated 457 366 km of urban streets rehabilitated 30 34 urban markets rehabilitated 7 7 urban water systems improved 7 7 successful boreholes drilled 325 338 sub-projects completed under sub-projects component n.a. 29 Note: * After mid-term review, this amount was reduced to USD 1 million (equivalent to about Ush billion) to contribute towards funding of the District Farm Institute in Gulu. ** These figures do not include primary schools rehabilitated/completed under the sub-projects component Table 2. NURP - Development Impact Indicators component/item 1991 actual SAR 1998 actual beneficiaries rural credit scheme (farmers) 13,200 7,475 % women beneficiaries 58 cassava beneficiaries (farmers) 1,812 seed multiplicationbenefic. (farmers) n.a. 6,240 students enrolled in rehab. prim. sch. 74,480 147,470 students successfully completed NITEP 3,000 1,873 vehicles per day on Kafu-Karuma Road 116 448 travel time Kafu-Kamma (hours) 3.0 1.5 vehicles per day Soroti-Lira Road 8 240 travel time Soroti-Lira (hours) 3 1.5 water source committees formed and trained 337 440 water users per borehole 300 new market vendors in rehabilitated markets _________ n.a. 1,585 km of urban streets maintained/year _________ n.a. 25 tons of refuse colected/month _________ n.a. 432 number of beneficiaries from sub-projects _____ 54,176 9. Highways. The physical objectives of the component were substantially achieved. Four out of five highways were completed, as the rehabilitation of the Atiak-Moyo road had to be suspended in February 1996 due to insecurity. However, major "cost overruns" were incurred, mainly due to underestimation of costs because of reliance on visual inspection at appraisal (due to insecurity) and unpaid claims. (To date, despite repeated attempts to resolve this issue, the Government has not provided an acceptable justification and calculation of the claims under the highways component, notably the Kafu Karuma road contract.) Other factors were persisting insecurity, late mobilization of contractors, and late release of funds. Except for the Atiak-Moyo road, which could not be completed due to insecurity, and the Gulu-Acholibur road, which is frequently closed due to insecurity, the impact of the investments is substantital. Travel times and traffic counts show substantial improvements: the travel time between Soroti and Lira was halved from 3 to 1.5 hours, and traffic increased from less than 20 vehicles to 240 per day (the Soroti-Lira road now requires upgrading); the travel time between Kafu and Karuma was reduced from 3 to 1.5 hours, and traffic volumes increased from about 115 to about 450 vehicles per day. Due to improved road quality, vehicle operating costs savings are substantial. 10. According to the results of a conventional economic analysis, the ERR for the highways investments changed from 24% at appraisal to 12% at project completion. However, the conventional quantitative approach does not appear appropriate in the case of NURP. In addition  5 to the quantitative benefits there are considerable qualitative benefits attributable to the investments. Because of the special situation in the North, in particular the Kumi-Serere-Soroti road was in such a poor state that it was virtually impassable prior to the project. In addition, the traffic based measures of benefits do not take into account the substantial suppressed traffic prior to and during the rehabilitation activities, due to persisting insecurity in the project area. In addition, the rehabilitation of main highways, notably the resealing of Kafu Karuma road, has significantly improved access to the project area and increased the value of production. However, those intangible benefits are not captured in the conventional quantitative cost-benefit-analysis. 11. Telecommunications. Since the Belgian Grant Agreement was only signed in November 1998, achievements under this component have been minimal. However, since financing is now available, the objectives under this component are expected to be fully achieved by the year 2000. 12. Education and Training. The objectives of this component were substantially achieved. Under the primary school rehabilitation program, 1,962 classrooms (96 above target) were completed and 1,750 furnished (teaching materials had largely been provided under other externally supported operations); and enrolment figures have increased substantially. Since the completion of the schools coincided with the GOU's introduction of the Universal Primary Education Program it is difficult to determine to what extent the dramatic increase in enrolment at the rehabilitated schools was attributable to NURP. Unless boreholdes already existed nearby, schools were, for the most part, provided with water and sanitation facilities, except for schools completed under the sub-projects component. The sub-project component focused primarily on the completion of unfinished PAPSCA schools, and water and sanitation facilities had not been part of the original design. One major shortcoming under the component was the failure to provide the sub-project schools with water and sanitation facilities. The teachers' training program was partially successful. About 60% of the 3,128 enrolled students have graduated from the teachers' training program (NITEP). NITEP is considered a high quality, yet not cost- effective or replicable, training program. The implementation of the technical training program was substantially completed. The construction of the technical workshops and classroom blocks was substantially delayed, partly because the students participated in the construction as part of their training; by project closing the physical works had been completed. 13. Feeder Roads. The objectives of the feeder roads component were partly achieved. Due to security concerns and after reassessing the envisaged activities under the feeder roads component, DANIDA reduced the grant funding and, thus, the scope of its originally intended activities. The grant fund became effective only in August 1996. The focus of the feeder roads component, thus, shifted to strengthening road planning/maintenance capacity in Apac, Gulu, and Kitgum, and Lira districts. Instead of engaging contractors to undertake major feeder road rehabilitation in seven districts, it was agreed to grade/improve feeder roads in four districts to lower standards through mobile units, which had been deployed by MLG by mid-term review in October 1994. With DANIDA financing, maintenance and improvement activities were carried out by the four MLG mobile units on a total of 966 km of roads in the four districts. In light of the delayed effectiveness of the grant funds, the Bank agreed at mid-term review to finance parts of the activities not financed by DANIDA. More specifically, IDA agreed to provide support from reallocated credit proceeds for procuring supplementary road maintenance equipment for the mobile units, and to repair existing equipment. The IDA-funded component was successfully completed, except for the deployment of local TA to the units. However, district technical staff was trained instead at the labor-based training school. The road maintenance activities have significantly contributed to the considerable increase in traffic volumes on the improved roads. In 1998, traffic counts in the DANIDA-supported districts average daily traffic volumes of 1040 vehicles (a high of 140 on one road), and about 350-859 bicycles per day (with a high of 1,975 on one road per day).  6 14. Urban Development. The objectives of the urban development component were substantially achieved. Essentially, the civil works were successfully implemented, while the capacity building objectives have, for the most part, not been achieved. The urban streets and markets were successfully rehabilitated, although at a much higher cost than originally anticipated. In addition to poor contract management, higher quantities after measurement of works under urban streets resulted in substantial cost overruns. Especially during rainy season, the benefits of improved roads and drains as well as markets become very visible. The capacity building sub-component was not very clearly defined and, for the most part, limited to training activities. While modules had been prepared, the actual training activities were postponed due to the uncertainties associated with the onset of the decentralization process in 1993. Since the urban councils were dissolved prior to the 1996 election, it was decided to further postpone the training activities until after the elections. As a consequence of cost overruns under the civil works, the training for local council staff was reduced to one course for urban engineers. Under the maintenance of urban services sub-component, maintenance equipment was, as envisaged, provided to the town councils. Since then, collection of refuse, street cleaning and street maintenance have improved. Under the strategic town planning/regulatory studies component, draft structural plans were completed as well as aerial photography; boundary surveys (another added activity) were completed; but topographical mapping (added to original project scope) has only been completed for Gulu. 15. Community Action Program (CAP). The objectives of the CAP (financed by the Government of the Netherlands) were substantially achieved. CAP successfully introduced a new development approach in West Nile, a region which had just emerged from civil war, with over 75% of the population being returnees from Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire). The component's capacity building objective was quite successful and in that it helped empower local communities and established an implementation structure consistent with decentralization. In addition, the capacity of local contractors and fundis was strengthened. Despite initial weaknesses in the methodology and tools, communities became more self confident and increasingly demanded accountability from their leaders. The CAP achieved a relatively high level of participation, especially of women; however, only 15% of the population actively participated in all stages of the facilitation process. The social infrastructure achievements have been less significant; the CAP approach required much more time and overhead costs than originally foreseen, and less than expected technical and logistical support was available within the region to sustain investments on a large scale. However, considering the circumstances under which CAP operated, the results of this truly demand responsive approach are positive. A total of 157 schools, 67 water and sanitation facilities, 17 health centers and 15 bridges were completed by the end of 1988, benefiting a total of 500,000 beneficiaries, equivalent to about one third of the West Nile population, including school children. 16. Water Supply and Sanitation. The objectives of the water component were partially achieved. 338 boreholes were successfully drilled under the rural water program, supplying about 101,400 people with safe water. This is a major accomplishment, considering how adversely the drilling crews were affected by the rebel activities. While it is difficult to assess to what extent the marked reduction in the incidence of guinea worms and water borne diseases is attributable to NURP, it is safe to assume that the borehole program effectively complemented other activities (such as the cloth water filter campaign by AVSI in Kitgum). Under the urban water sub-component, all civil works were completed; however, in three out of seven towns, the systems are not fillly functional, and in two towns no water is flowing at all. The underlying causes are partly attributable to factors beyond the project scope. The problems vary from required civil works on main trunk lines and the reticulation system in Soroti, power outages in Arua, low yielding boreholes feeding the distribution system in Kumi, management problems in Pallisa, to mismanagement of funds in Moyo (funds for repairs of the reticulation system were  7 diverted by district officials). Overall, the quality of the works is disappointing, particularly the force account activities. With a view to institutional strengthening, NURP provided office equipment for the PIU in the Directorate of Water Development, and after the onset on decentralization, also to the district water offices in Gulu and Kitgum. 17. The NGO activities were somewhat disappointing; while NGOs certified the completion of successful boreholes, the health and hygiene education was only partially completed. Similarly, the institutional strengthening activities (maintenance training and capacity building of district staff) have only been partially completed. On the other hand, under a contractual arrangement, CARE successfully completed the borehole drilling program after DWD had suspended drilling due to insecurity. The institutional strengthening of DWD was only partially implemented, due to the uncertainties involved in the restructuring of the Ministry of Water in the context of decentralization and the resulting civil service reform. Essentially, in addition to the support provided to the PIU, the project financed the rehabilitation of building and laboratorieg in several districts and provided water testing equipment. 18. Agriculture. The objectives of the agriculture component were partly achieved. Under the agricultural inputs sub-component, the objectives were substantially achieved. More than 6,000 farmers benefited from mosaic resistant Cassava multiplication (mosaic is no longer a problem in the North), and about 1,600 from seed multiplication. The intention was to distribute the inputs through co-operative stores, women's groups, sub-county administrations and selected retailers, with a view to achieving a "revolving input pool" and, thus, a multiplier effect. As it appears, due to insufficient planning and follow-up, the multiplication has not yet gone beyond the "first round"; at present, there is no evidence whether the objective is likely to be achieved. The extension and training services provided did not achieve their objectives, the strengthening of agricultural inputs management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation remained weak, and the livestock component was not implemented; it was agreed that, rather than involving MAAIF in the procurement of livestock, farmers should be assisted in generating income to enable them to purchase livestock. 19. Under the rural credit scheme, the objectives were partially achieved. The total amount earmarked for rural credits was reduced to USD 1.0 million, in order to reallocate USD 0.4 million (plus USD 0.6 million from other agriculture activities) to the construction of the district farm institute in Gulu. While benefits are visible on the ground -- about 7,500 farmers, nearly 60% of whom women, are benefiting from the rural credit scheme -- the recovery of rural credits was slow. The slow recovery of the credit proceeds was mainly due to the lack of an accredited and viable recovery mechanism -- which also prevented the continuation of a (revolving) rural credit scheme beyond the project closing date. At credit closing, less than 50% of the principal had been collected. It is worth noting that, despite insecurity, Gulu and Kitgum achieved the highest rate of recovery of rural credits. In addition, the construction of the Gulu districtfarm institute, taken over from the Agriculture Development Project, was completed under NURP; and nearly US$ 200,000 in seeds and hand hoes were provided to the Internally Displaced Population, as part of a multi-agency relief effort. 20. Sub-projects Component. The objectives of the sub-project component were fully achieved. The component was designed during the 1996 restructuring to test the districts' and communities' abilities to formulate and implement small scale infrastructure investments. About 30 sub-projects, for the most part primary school rehabilitation and, to a lesser extent, construction of shallow wells and rainwater harvesting systems, were completed. Simplified procurement procedures, in place at project restructuring, have greatly facilitated the acquisition of building material for primary schools. The results available to date are rather encouraging as they demonstrate that many communities have a clear sense of their priorities, willingness to  8 contribute in cash and/or kind, are able to organize themselves as well as mobilize resources, and tend to be very capable of participating in a meaningful way in the delivery of services. The weaknesses of the component (accountability issues, disbursement delays, delays in mobilization of community counterpart contribution, low quality of several consultants) offers useful lessons for NURP II. In addition, most of the sub-projects entailed the completion of schools which had not been finished under the Bank-supported PAPSCA project. C. Major Factors Affecting the Project Factors Beyond Government Control 21. IntensifiedRebelActivities. Due to insecurity during project preparation, cost estimates were, for the most part, based on visual inspection, i.e. on rough estimation of quantities. The underestimation of quantities, notably under the highways and urban streets components, contributed significantly to the cost overruns. At the time of project appraisal, the situation in the North was relatively stable and deemed "in transition" to post conflict. One of the basic assumptions underlying the SAR was, thus, a lasting improvement in the security situation in the North. The project was somewhat slow in getting off the ground, and when the project was under full fledged implementation, security deteriorated markedly in November 1995. The disturbances adversely affected project implementation, in particular the rehabilitation of highways, several feeder roads in Gulu, primary school rehabilitation, teacher training, and borehole drilling activities. In October 1997, a drilling crew was ambushed, leaving two members of the drilling crew dead; another drilling rig was blown up by a landmine. The rehabilitation of the Atiak Moyo road had to be interrupted and later suspended due to insecurity. 22. Administrative Procedures. One of the main shortcomings of the project stems from the fact that it was designed prior to the onset of decentralization, in accordance with the then highly centralized provision of infrastructure. Project implementation was already well underway when the Government embarked on the decentralization process, and alternative implementation mechanisms were not tested until much later. One major impeding factor attributable to project design was the fact that project implementation was the shared responsibility of three sets of actors: a Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (CMEU) located in the Prime Minister's Office (with branches in the project districts) which was also responsible for the project's financial management, the Project Implementation Units (PLUs) in the line ministries responsible for implementation, and district officials who were responsible for facilitation and mobilization of beneficiaries. After midterm review, the role of the line ministries' PIUs was reduced and more responsibilities were transferred to the districts, in line with the decentralization process. In addition, the CMEU was restructured to improve the effectiveness of monitoring and disbursement; however, monitoring remained weak. 23. Given that the project covered seven different sectors, effective coordination among the various implementing agencies was quite a challenge. The "remote controlled" coordination, monitoring and evaluation from Kampala was exacerbated through the geographic isolation of the project area, due to seriously dilapidated transportation (and communication) infrastructure. Secondly, the centralized procurement (and disbursement) procedures proved to be an obstacle. It became evident that ICB procurement was not an effective or economical way of procuring construction materials, in particular since cement and timber became readily available in most districts and comparable with ICB bids in terms of price and quality. In addition, project performance allowances were, in fact, not performance related and, thus, a disincentive to speeding up implementation. After mid-term review, quarterly work plans and progress reports were used as a basis for payment, in order to increase accountability.  9 24. Poor Performance of Contractors and Suppliers. The poor performance of contractors due to lack of capacity, liquidity problems and lack of professionalism caused significant delays under the urban streets and markets and highways components. Delays in the delivery of ICB/LCB procured cement, iron sheets, and timber slowed down the completion of the primary education component. This problem was, however, resolved with the introduction of more flexible arrangements and local procurement under the sub-project component created after the midterm review. 25. Cofinanciers. In addition to start up problems due to UPTC's delayed compliance with the covenants, the telecommunications component was held up for several years by delays in the signing of the Belgian Grant Agreement. The (reduced) Grant was finally signed in November 1998. Since it was not certain whether the Belgian Grant would be available to fund the phase I investments, it also delayed a Nordic Development Fund (NDF) loan which became available in 1997. Under the feeder roads component, DANIDA substantially reduced its originally pledged funds which were partially substituted for by IDA credit proceeds. 26. Others. Other factors beyond Government control were: (i) the Kafu-Karuma road deteriorated, due to usage by heavy relief and army trucks, since the completion of the design in 1992 -- which necessitated a change in scope and extent of the works and, thus, resulted in cost overruns; (ii) once primary schools were roofed, parents were reluctant to mobilize resources (labor and materials) for plastering and flooring of schools, thus delaying the schools' full completion; (iii) since the agriculture component was supposed to dovetail into the Agriculture Development Project (ADP), the extension of ADP resulted in a delayed startup of the NURP agriculture activities; (iv) the rise in timber (for school furniture) and cement prices increased the cost of schools; (v) unavailability of communities and/or districts full contribution at start of implementation; and (vi) unsatisfactory NGO performance impeded the health and hygiene education activities. Factors Subject to Government Control 27. Central Government. Inadequate and untimely release of counterpart funds was a frequent cause of delays, notably under the highways component. Several activities were held up by the delay in payment of custom duties by MOF. The introduction of 17% VAT in September 1996 increased the costs of sub-projects. 28. Local Government. Decentralization had an important impact on the institutional setting. In the centralized setting prior to decentralization, the line ministries maintained branch offices in the districts which were responsible for monitoring and supervising the works. In the context of civil service reform, a large number of the various line ministries' district based staff was retrenched, which resulted in reduced supervision activities. With the local government reform districts gained more autonomy, and the retrenched staff was partially hired by the district authorities. However, local govermments generally were faced with a lack of capacity, both in terms of human resources, transportation, office facilities etc. When formerly centrally employed staff were recruited by the districts, due to the change in employers, those officers became accountable to the district administrations, which often led to a change in loyalty and, thus, a lack of objectivity for monitoring and quality assurance. In addition, since supervision undertaken from Kampala was not effective, the CMEU relied on district certification of works. In two instances, the reliance on certification by district staff resulted in overpayment of a school furniture supplier and in furniture delivery in discordance with the contract, respectively. It should be noted, though, that these incidents occurred at a late implementation stage when CMEU staff had already been reduced.  10 29, In some districts, project resources were diverted to other non-project activities (and subsequently recovered). Under the sub-projects component, it became evident that the pre- decentralization mentality still prevailed which became most visible under the sub-projects component. While district officials and communities cooperated well in some instances, district staff frequently attempted to railroad the process. However, it seems that a mind shift is slowly manifesting itself, and that meaningful community participation in the formulation, implementation and maintenance of investments is increasingly considered a win win strategy. On a positive note, district staff has demonstrated professionalism in the procurement of cement and other construction materials for primary schools, management of local contractors and supervision of works. Factors Subject to Implementing Agencies' Control 30. As mentioned above, three different sets of actors were involved in project implementation: the CMEU which served both as the secretariat to the Steering Committee and the primary coordination, facilitation and monitoring agency, the line ministries' PlUs, and district officials. One of the main problems was poor communication between CMEU, line ministries and the districts. 31. CMEU and District NURP Officers (DNOs). Up to mid-term review, the above triangular arrangement had not worked at all. CMEU had neither played a dynamic role in moving the proj ect nor had it monitored implementation. The situation improved after a clear separation of the CMEU's functions into an operations, M&E and finance unit after the mid-term review. However, the location of the CMEU outside project area made coordination and monitoring difficult and costly. CMEU maintained branch offices (District NURP Offices) in each project district, run by District NURP Officers (DNOs); however, for the most part, the value added of these offices was minimal due to the fact that qualified, dynamic and integer DNOs were the exception. DNOs were frequently subject to pressure from district officials since they were perceived as the "men with the money", and they occasionally condoned a diversion of resources (including use of tractors) for purposes outside the project scope. In addition, the timely submission of accounts by several districts remained an issue; and several cases of diversions and unauthorized payments were investigated. 32. Timely submission of audit reports and financial management were an issue; after repeated qualifications of the project accounts by the auditors, a project accounting software was installed in March 1996, and the computerization of accounts helped strengthen the control. In addition, a workshop was held on accountability, disbursement and reconciliation of accounts to build the CMEU-FU's capacity. Another problem area with CMEU was disbursement. Since the PS-OPM was the accounting officer of the project, project funds therefore flowed through CMEU (on behalf of PS-OPM), with the line ministries having to account for funds received. Late transfer of funds, which remained an issue during implementation, contributed to the delays during the project's startup phase; unauthorized (advance) payments occurred occasionally; prior approval had not been sought for certain expenditures (such as increase in CMEU staff's salaries and recruitment of additional staff), resulting in cost overruns. Furthermore, in response to shortfalls in the counterpart funds released by the Ministry of Finance, compared to allocated counterpart fund budgets, the Prime Minister's Office borrowed funds by overdrawing the counterpart fund account. This proved to be an expensive and unauthorized way of bridging the shortfalls of funds received from the Treasury. In addition, a copy of an anonymous letter addressed to the Investigating Department, Office of the IGG, was recently sent to the Bank. The letter contains allegations of irregularities and fraud in connection with a certain contract for the supply of goods and services under the project. If the allegations are confirmed by the investigators, this would constitute a serious governance issue.  I1 33. Line Ministries' PIUs. Although the Prime Minister's Office bore the overall responsibility for implementation and accountability, the line ministries' Project Implementation Units (PIUs) were fully responsible for the implementation of their responsive components, including procurement, management and supervision of their respective contracts. The perfonmance of the PIUs in the Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Industry, and Fisheries (MAAIF), Education and Sports (MES); Local Government (MLG); Works, Transport and Communications (MWTC); the Directorate of Water Development (DWD), and the Uganda Post and Telecommunications Corporation was, in general, disappointing. The most common problem was inadequate contract management and "on site" monitoring which contributed to cost overruns and substantial delays, notably under the urban water, urban streets and markets, highways, agriculture and education components. In addition, the quality of works was disappointing under the urban water component, particularly for the force account works. Under several components, additional works were undertaken without seeking the Bank's prior approval, thus, increasing implementation cost. Notably under the highways and urban streets contracts, the Ministries of Work and Local Government had issued variation orders without seeking prior approval from the Bank. Following the analysis of claims under the urban streets and markets contracts, it was concluded that the cost overruns were mainly attributable to an underestimation of the bill of quantities as well as unauthorized variation orders. The eligible portion of the claims was paid out of credit proceeds, the settlement of the balance is being discussed with Ministry of Finance. In the case of the claims pertaining to the Kafu Karuma road works contract, the contractor and Ministry of Works have not been able to substantiate the claims; their legitimacy has, therefore, not been established. 34. One other common problem was the late submission of often incomplete work plans and other documents by the PIUs, which delayed the transfer of funds by CMEU. It also increased the work load of both the CMEU and Bank supervision missions. In addition, DWD's late mobilization of a third drilling rig slowed down the start up of the borehole drilling activities; late planning for the teacher training component resulted in a late start of the NITEP activities; the design of primary schools was, at the Government's request, changed from PAPSCA design after credit effectiveness; UPTC's delays in meeting disbursement conditions delayed the start up of the telecommunications component; and insufficient collection of community and/or district counterpart contributions held up disbursements. In general, it was difficult to get accurate progress reports from the PIUs. D. Project Sustainability 35. The potential for sustainability of the project varies among the components. Maintaining the highways rehabilitated under NURP is the responsibility of the Ministry of Works. The annual national budget contains maintenance provisions for the those highways; the sustainability of the highways, thus, depends on the actual release of those funds and the Ministry of Works' commitment to undertaking routine maintenance. Under the primary education sub-component, prior to UPE, a fraction of the school fees was deposited into the maintenance funds. Although parents may be contributing less to O&M costs than before UPE, it is reasonable to assume that maintenance funds will be made available by GOU, given that UPE is one of the Government's highest priorities. The chances of investments being maintained under the sub-projects component are high, due to its participatory and demand-driven nature which fosters ownership. The sustainability of feeder roads and urban streets is subject to the districts' seriousness of purpose, and the financial resources earmarked for maintenance out of locally generated funds as well conditional grants provided by the central Government. It is expected that the Bank and DANIDA financed support to road maintenance initiatives will increase the likelihood of sustainability since the districts are already applying the DANIDA maintenance strategy.  12 36. The sustainability of the boreholes is probable. Water source management committees were set up and, in general, seem to be functional; water consumers are contributing to maintenance funds; attendants were trained by NGOs to undertake minor repairs; and spare parts are available in the district capitals. Under the urban water component, sustainability of at least four out of seven systems is unlikely. Management committees were established in all towns and are functioning well in Dokolo and Kitgum. Except for the system in Pallisa, which experiences management problems, the systems in four towns are dysfunctional, largely due to factors beyond the project scope. In general, the issue of ownership of land and assets as well as maintenance responsibilities, i.e inconsistencies between the 1997 Local Govemment Act and the Water Act, remains to be resolved. It seems unlikely, though, that consumers in the four towns with malfunctioning systems will be willing to pay much for water, given the low quality of service they receive. The maintenance of the District Farm Institute in Gulu is probable; funds are being generated through training courses, and maintenance arrangements are in place. E. Bank Performance 37. Bank performance during project identification, prparation and appraisal was satisfactory, with the exception of one component. The appraisal team tried to put together a comprehensive package of interventions deemed necessary to revive the conflict stricken North. In light of the anticipated lasting peace in the region at the time of appraisal, the project design was sound. Considering the problems with insecurity throughout preparation, the project was prepared expeditiously and effectively. However, given the nature of the operation, the project objectives were somewhat overoptimistic and unrealistic, and the costs were underestimated. In addition, it was a formidable challenge to implement a project which covered seven sectors through six GOU agencies, the CMEU in Kampala and 7 District NURP offices (there were no project offices in the 3 West Nile districts). 38. Each project component was envisaged to be supervised by a sector specialist who would take on the role of a component manager, with the overall supervision responsibility lying with the task manager. Bank performance during supervision was satisfactory, however, the quality of supervision by the individual component managers varied. After mid-term review, the number of sectoral component managers was reduced and, thus, more responsibility transferred to the overall task manager and task team. Further support was provided by resident mission staff, the quality of which was at times unsatisfactory. The Bank supervised the project at least twice a year. Since mid-term review, the Bank carried out joint supervision with the Government which strengthened Bank-GOU collaboration and mutual understanding. It also helped build the client's capacity. The supervision missions focused mostly on technical, financial and, to a much lesser extent, institutional aspects. No deviations from Bank policies or procedures were noticed during implementation. The Bank was vigilant on procurement and disbursement issues and paid close attention to resettlement issues. The Bank maintained good relations with other cofinanciers, i.e. the Dutch and Belgian Governments and DANIDA, throughout implementation. F. Borrower Performance 39. GOU performance was not fully satisfactory, as evidenced by a project which incurred major cost overruns and faced a range of governance issues. Although the project substantially achieved its main objectives, the line ministries' project staff did not appear consistently concerned about the timely and cost effective implementation of the project. The start up of the project was very slow since a lot of time was spent on recruitment of staff, setting up NURP offices in the project area, and procuring vehicles and equipment. This attitude was exacerbated by the fact that allowances were paid, irrespective of the staff's performance, measured against quarterly work plans. In general, work plans were submitted late and incomplete to CMEU; line  13 ministries were not forthcoming with data on monitoring indicators, and obtaining accountability was a struggle. While the quality of most physical works was satisfactory, the quality of (particularly force account) works under the urban water sub-component was disappointing. Poor contract management by the line ministries, notably under urban streets and markets, resulted in substantial cost overruns. 40. Borrower performance improved somewhat as a result of the changes made during mid term review. Essentially, more responsibilities were transferred to the districts, including District NURP officers. While it helped the situation - implementation picked up - submission of accountability from the districts remained a problem. In addition, there were incidents of misappropriation of funds by district officials such as the diversion of funds designated for repairs of the reticulation system in Moyo. G. Assessment of Outcome 41. Overall, the project's outcome is satisfactory. Considering that security concerns were a main issue throughout design and implementation, the project's accomplishments are significant. As the increased traffic volumes on the rehabilitated roads, the large number of children, and particularly girls, attending NURP schools, and the improved access to safe drinking water indicate, the project's impacts are visible. Furthermore, incomes have improved, and it is reasonable to assume that the situation would be worse without the project. The results also indicate that, in addition to physical targets, social, gender and poverty objectives were addressed. Despite its complexity, initial start-up problems, coordination and communication problems, insecurity and the "remote control" of activities in the project area from Kampala, the project was implemented with remarkable consistency to original targets. In accordance with the SAR estimate, most project components were substantially completed by September 1997. Except for the telecommunications and feeder roads components, which were significantly delayed by the cofinanciers' performance, the project achieved most of its physical and development objectives. This is an impressive achievement, especially considering the disruptive effect of the ongoing rebel activities. 42. However, with less centralized implementation arrangements, the project would probably have been implemented more cost effectively. Moreover, the sustainability of investments is uncertain under several sub-components. In addition, the institutional development activities, which were overambitious to start with and possibly premature, were somewhat neglected during implementation. Nevertheless, NURP contributed to the restoration of economic productivity through improved road access to and within the area; rehabilitated markets; vocational training (both formally under the technical training component and informally provided through "impromptu" training of masons for the construction of primary schools); provision of agricultural inputs; and access to rural credits. The provision of basic social services such as primary education and water have improved the livelihoods of the local population and especially the situation of girls and women. The central and local government staff's capacity was enhanced "on the job", particularly under the sub-projects component. 43. At first sight, in light of the ongoing civil disturbances, NURP does not appear to have contributed to sustained security in the region. It is also difficult to measure the impact of NURP on poverty alleviation since the latest figures available go back to the 1991 census. However, it is difficult to say what would have happened if NURP had not supported social and economic infrastructure in the North. While the project did not substantially redress the historical disparity between the North and the South, it managed to engage the various government agencies in a strategic discussion, with a view to developing a framework for developing the North. It appears  14 that, at present, there is a lot more interest on the part of the external assistance community in joining forces to support the North than at the time of NURP appraisal. H. Future Operations 44. In accordance with the 1997 Local Government Act, the central Government is responsible for maintaining highways, and local governments are responsible for (providing and ) maintaining schedule 2 services; with backstopping and technical assistance to be provided by the line ministries. Sufficient funds should be budgeted for (and released) by the local governments for the maintenance of urban streets; the management of the rehabilitated markets should be contracted out to a private operators who would finance O&M out of user fees collected from the vendors; the outputs of the aerial mapping, boundary surveys and mapping exercise are considered crucial planning tools for local governments but backstopping may be required from Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development - which has shown great interest in continued town planning activities. Additional support to town planning may be provided under the follow-on project. The water officers are expected to provide technical assistance to water user committees to make sure the collected water user charges cover water source O&M costs; and under the urban water sub-component, the issue of ownership and maintenance responsibilities need to be resolved. The district education officers will help PTAs to maintain the primary schools, however, since the onset of UPE, a mechanism other than (Government set) school fees needs to be sought to ensure proper maintenance funding. The district staff has been actively involved in project implementation as well as monitoring activities and should, therefore, be in a good position to follow up. 45. As a follow-up operation to the first NURP, NURP II intends to provide continued support to the Government's reconstruction efforts in the North. The GOU has requested IDA's support to the follow on operation, for the following reasons: (i) continued unrest and conflict in some parts of the North, coupled with the widespread persistence of poverty, threaten to undo overall development gains; (ii) although NURP met, for the most part, its physical implementation and developmental objectives, the needs in the North by far exceed the scope of the operation (the original estimated needs in the North totaled about US$350 million in 1991 prices); and (iii) to provide support to the displaced population in the North of Uganda. The GOU's National Action Plan for Poverty Eradication has identified 14 districts in Northern, Northwestem (West Nile) and Northeastem Uganda (including the Karamoja region). The North remains the country's poorest region and, thus, in particular need for targeted multi-sectoral intervention. The anti-poverty strategy is also the central feature of the April 1997 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). 46. The project, which is currently under preparation, will take into account the lessons leamed under NURP and will continue to address the twin problem of poverty and post conflict reconstruction. Essentially, it is envisaged that the new project will include the same sectors as NURP and, in addition, it is expected to support the war to peace transition process through: assistance to the internally displaced population, helping clear landmines, providing counseling for war-affected children and young adults, female headed household; helping to reintegrate the internally displaced, former rebels and abducted persons into community life; and providing "hands on" vocational training, particularly for adolescents. Unlike NURP, the implementation arrangements will be much more decentralized, with project facilitation and monitoring functions located in the project area. NURP II is, for the most part, being designed as a demand responsive project and with the active involvement of the stakeholders on the ground and other external assistance agencies.  15 I. Key Lessons Learned 47. The following lessons have been learned from the NURP experience: * Consistency with decentralization process: Implementation arrangements need to be more decentralized, in accordance with the local govemment reform process; local governments, the local private sector, NGOs and communities need to be more actively involved in the planning, preparation and implementation process, while the role of line ministries in the project needs to be limited to policy and regulatory functions; coordination, monitoring and evaluation activities need to be based in the field to make it less costly and more effective; disbursement and procurement procedures need to be simplified and more flexible. District based implementation, particularly M&E would help to avoid the governance issues which arose under the project. * Need for strategic framework for support to the North. To date, for a variety of reasons, the Northern Uganda reconstruction efforts have not been unanimously supported by the key GOU players. Although the interministerial cooperation is functioning well at the working level, greater commitment is required at a higher level. With a view to achieving broad based support within Government, it is crucial for the GOU - in consultation with other stakeholders -- to agree on a strategic framework for supporting the North. It would provide a game plan for external assistance agencies to buy into; increase the probability of (sufficient) counterpart funds being released in a timely fashion under NURP II; and make sustainability of the trunk infrastructure investments more likely. * Meaningful stakeholder participation is crucial for sustainability. Greater involvement of key stakeholder groups in project design is crucial, in order to achieve synergy and coordination. Communities are resourceful and aware of their needs; meaningful community participation, social intermediation, and especially empowerment of women, and increased demand for accountability of district officials are essential for achieving ownership, and, thus, sustainability of investments. * Need for clearly defined capacity building component. The target groups, vehicles, envisaged outcome, and indicators to measure the outcome of capacity building initiatives need to be more clearly defined; technical training and vocational training should be hands-on and offered to the informal sector; the training mechanism should be reasonably priced and, thus, easier replicable. Given the limited capacity in the districts, it is important that some capacity building activities will be implemented up-front, preferably during preparation of NURP II. * More focus on war to peace transition. The new operation should include more war to peace transition activities such as recognition of traditional ways of conflict resolution; counseling for the war affected population, especially children and adolescents; and reintegration of abducted children, female headed households, former rebels and child soldiers. Such initiatives would help repair the tom social fabric and should be based on the population's specific needs and an in depth assessment of the conflict and its causes (politically sensitive but necessary). * Need for sound monitoring and evaluation mechanism. Clearly defined monitoring indicators are crucial for the new operation. Given that the design of NURP II will, for the most part, be based on demand responsive, it is essential that the end users have a voice in assessing the quality and impact of the services delivered. In addition, it is crucial that monitoring and evaluation is carried out continuously and by locally based entities.   17 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETON REPORT UGANDA NORTHERN RECONSTRUCTION I (Credit 2362) PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES STATISTICAL TABLES Table 1. Summary of Assessment A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable Macro policies x Sector policies x Financial objectives x Institutional development x Physical objectives x Poverty reduction x Gender issues x Other social objectives x Envirommental objectives x Public sector management x Private sector development x B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain x C. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification x Preparation assistance x Appraisal x Supervision x D. Borrower Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation x Implementation x Covenant compliance x Operation (if applicable) E. Assessment of Outcome Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient x  18 Table 2. Related Bank Loans/Credits Preceding/Concurrent Operations* Agricultural Development To increase food production and family income in 1985 Closed (Credit No. 1539-UG)) the in Eastern and Northern Uganda through: (i) provision of agricultural, livestock, and fisheries inputs; (ii) the strengthening of extension services, and (iii) the provision of support for research and surveys. Highways In To rehabilitate and maintain road network. 1984 Closed (Credit No. 1445-UG) Highways IV To rehabilitate and maintain road network. (Credit No. 1803-UG) Telecommunications II To rehabilitate telecommunications system. 1989 Closed (Credit No. 199 1-UG) Education IV To rehabilitate schools and social infrastructure. 1988 Closed (Credit No. 1965-UG) First Health To support fast disbursing rehabilitation of facilities, 1988 Closed (Credit No. 1934-UG) equipment, and supplies; preventative health programs; and health care planning and management Alleviation of Poverty and To alleviate poverty and the social costs of 1990 Closed the Social Costs of adjustment, through addressing most urgent short- Adjustment term social development concerns, with particular (Credit No. 2088-UG) emphasis on most vulnerable population groups. Water Supply II To extend water supply and sewerage facilities in 1990 Closed (Credit No. 2124-UG)) Kampala, Jinja, Entebbe, Tororo, Mbale, Masaka and Mbarara; and strengthen the national water and sewerage corporation. El Nino Emergency Road To reduce infrastructure-related market and 1998 Active Repair distribution costs countrywide; to secure the timely (Credit No. 3064-UG) delivery of social services to the affected population; to facilitate the productive settlement of war refugees in Northern Uganda; and to stabilize the eco-system near the affected roads. Following Operations _ NURP II To provide continued support to the Govemnment's Prep. reconstruction efforts in the North. Local Govenmment To develop and pilot a process for demand Prep. Development Project responsive delivery of infrastructure services * NURP was the Bank's first effort to assist the Government in its reconstruction efforts in the North  19 Table 3. Project Timetable Identification (IEP S) 12/06/90 12/06/90 Preparaton 05/15/91 05/15/91 Preappraisal 06/10/91 06/10/91 Appraisal 09/16/91 09/16/91 Negotiations 03/16/92 03/16/92 Board Presentation 05/05/92 05/05/92 Signing 06/12/92 06/12/92 Effectiveness 12/09/92 12/09/92 Project Completion 09/30/97 09/30/97 Loan Closing 09/30/98 09/30/98 Table 4. Loan Disbursements - Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ million) 'go-o' 10111=2080_ = 1 Appraisal estimate 2.3 9.1 18.2 39.4 57.5 69.6 71.2 Actual 3.9 6.6 21.9 39.1 59.03 72.1 72.9 Date of final disburse. 1/31/99 Table 5. Key Indicators for Physical Achievements Component T Physical Progress Indicator Value SAR Target Actual Sept. 1 1998 Agriculture (a) Rural Credit Scheme Total amount of Ushs disbursed 639,0001 997,572 Total amount of Ushs recovered 548,425 (b) Cassava Multiplication Acres planted with clean cuttings 3,360 1,069 Cassava produced (c) Seed Multiplication Acres planted 960 245 Seeds produced Education (a) Primary Education number of classrooms started 1,866 1,962 % of target 105% number of classrooms roofed 1,912 % of target 102% number of classrooms completed 1,609 % of target 86% number of classrooms equipped w. funiture 1,749 % of target 94% (b) NITEP (Teacher number of students enrolled 3,000 3,128 training) % of target 104% (c) Technical Jnstitutes completion of workshops 10 9 % of targetl 90%  20 Component Physical Progress Indicator Value SAR Target Actual Sept. 1998 Highways (a) Kafu - Karmma Road km of highway rehabilitated 93 93 % completed 100% (b) Atiak - Moyo Road km of highway rehabilitated 92 Contract cancelled % completed 55% (c) Soroti - Lira Road km of highway rehabilitated 112 112 % completed 100% (d) Kumi - Serere - Soroti km of highway rehabilitated 78 78 Road % completed 100% (e) Gulu - Acholibur km of highway rehabilitated 83 83 % completed 100% Feeder roads (a) Danida Funded km of roads rehabilitated/maintained 800 (b) IDA funded Bulldozers 2 2 Motorcycles 6 6 Porker vibrators 6 6 Concrete mixtures 6 6 Tool box and greasing guns (sets) 6 6 Water bousers 6 6 Culvert mounds 14 14 Water (a) Urban water Towns covered 7 7 % completion 95% (b) Rural water number of successful boreholes drilled 337 338 %of target 100% Urban Development (a) Urban Streets and km of streets/drains rehabilitated 30 34 Markets % of target 113% % completion of market construction 100% (b) Maintenance of Urban equipment supplied by type Services - tractor and accessories n.a 7 - pedestal rollers n.a 7 - bitumen boilers n.a 7 - cesspool emptier n.a 1 - hand tools (sets) n.a 7 (c) Traming number of staff trained n.a 4 (d) Strategic Town Planning % completion of aerials photography 100% % completion of structural plans 100% Sub-Projects number of sub -projects approved n.a 29 number o f sub-projects completed n.a 29 of which community sub-projects n.a 17  21 Table 6. Key Indicators for Developmental Impact Component Dev. Ihnpact Indicator Value SAR Target Actual Sept. 1998 Agriculture (a) Rural Credit Scheme total number of beneficiaries 13,200 7,475 of whom women 7,100 4,294 (b) Cassava Multiplication number of beneficiaries n.a 6,240 (c) Seed Multiplication number of beneficiaries n.a 1,617 Education _ (a) Primary Education number of students enrolled 74,480 147,470 % of target 198% average enrolment/school year 210 527 (b) NTITEP (Teacher number successfully completed 3,000 1,873 training) % of target 62% (c) Technical Institutes Grades in student examinations n.a n.a Highways Before After rehabilitation rehabilitatlion (a) Kafu - Karuima Road vehicles per day 116 448 travel time (hours) 3 1.5 (b) Atiak - Moyo Road vehicles per day 10 45 travel time (hours) 3 1.5 (c) Soroti - Lira Road vehicles per day 18 240 travel time (hours) 3 1.5 (d) Kumi - Serere - Soroti vehicles per day 14 60 Road travel time (hours) 3 1.5 (e) Gulu - Acholibur vehicles per day 5 Closed due to insec. travel time (hours) 2 1.0 Feeder roads (a) DANIDA Funded (b) IDA funded traffic count n.a n.a Water (a) Urban water estimated no. of consumers (excluding Moyo and Kumi) n.a 91,000 Monthly revenue collected (Ush) 2,957,200 (Kitgum only) n.a Monthly expenditure (USh) 1,585,130 (Kitgum only) n.a (b) Rural water Water source committees formed 337 440 & trained % coverage 5% persons perborehole 300 Urban Development (a) Urban Streets & Markets km of streets maintained/year 30 no of new market vendors n.a 1,585 Changes in revenue from market n. 7,925,000 dues (b) Maintenance of Urban km of streets maintained/year n.a n.a Services tons of refuse collected/month n.a. 432 open ground slashed/month (kin2) n.a 25.2 (c) Training performance of trained staff not yet assessed Sub-Projects number of beneficiaries 43,410 54,176  22 Table 7A: Project Costs (USS million) A. Agriculture 1. Agricultural Inputs 000 1.80 1 80 0.54 0.10 0.64 2. Rural Credit Scheme 0.70 0.70 1.40 1.09 0.00 1.09 3. Equipment/Supplies/vehicles/spare parts 0.00 0.68 0.68 0.11 0.22 0.33 4. Training 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.06 4. Trainig 5. Admin./Increm. Recurrent Expenditure 1.02 0.00 1.02 1.72 0.00 1.72 6. Civil Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.53 1.10 7. Consultancy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 SUB TOTAL 1.74 3.30 5.04 4.15 0.85 5.00 B. Community Action Program Netherlands 2.13 4.12 6.25 5.87 0.66 6.53 C. Education and Training 1. Integrated Teacher Training 0.97 1.78 2.75 4.54 2.41 6.95 2. Technical Training 0.12 0.78 0.90 0.01 0.97 0.98 3. Primary Schools 2.66 3.90 6.56 9.44 1.82 11.26 SUB TOTAL 3.75 6.46 10.21 13.99 5.20 19.19 D. Feeder Roads 1. Maintenance Equipment & Repair of Existing Equip. IDA 0.19 0.49 0.68 2. Capacity Building DANIDA 0.40 1.68 2.08 SUB TOTAL 2.76 5.94 8.70 0.59 2.17 2.76 E. Highways 1. Atiak-Moyo Road 0.64 2.91 3.55 0.67 1.77 2.44 2. Gulu-Acholibur Road 0.53 2.80 3.33 1.21 2.09 3.30 3. Soroti-Lira Road 0.89 5.16 6.05 1.87 3.97 5.84 4. Kumi-Serere-Soroti Road 0.55 2.80 3.35 0.92 3.57 4.49 5. KaI'u-Karuma Road 2.33 5.74 8.07 4.03 9.69 13.72 5. Kafu-Karuma Road 5. Construction Supervision: (i) Contract 01; Kafu-Karuma 0.24 0.98 1.22 0.09 0.83 0.92 (ii) Contracts NRP/HW/02 - 05 0.25 1.10 1.35 SUB TOTAL 5.18 20.39 25.57 9.04 23.02 32.06 F. Telecommunications 1. Gulu-Kampala microwave link 0.59 5.31 5.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 2. Gulu Exchange, equipment etc. 0.95 4.25 5.20 0.00 0.09 0.09 3. Consulting Services 0.07 0.65 0.72 0.00 0.25 0.25 SUB TOTAL 1.61 10.21 11.82 0.00 0.34 0.34  23 1. Rehabilitation of Streets and Drains 1.01 3.37 4.38 1.24 7.32 8.56 2. Upgrading of Town Markets 0.26 1.11 1.37 0.21 0.66 0.87 3. Maintenance of Urban Services 0.03 0.30 0.33 1.95 0.66 2.61 4. Strategic Town Planning Studies 0.24 0.27 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.51 5. Regulatory Study 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 6. Training of Local Council Staff 0.13 0.12 0.25 0.05 0.00 0.05 7. Design and Supervision of Streets and Markets 0.00 0.74 0.74 8. Supervision of Urban Services 0.01 0.13 0.14 SUBTOTAL 1.72 5.17 6.89 3.46 10.02 13.48 H. Water Supply and Sanitation 1. Urban Water 1.17 2.12 3.29 2. Rural Water 1.10 1.02 2.12 3. Consultancy 0.33 0.01 0.34 4. Technical Assistance 0.00 0.15 0.15 5. Training 0.08 0.07 0.15 6. Equipment, Vehicles and Admin Costs 2.04 1.48 3.52 SUBTOTAL 1.35 4.21 5.56 4.72 4.85 9.57 I. Sub-projects Component (introduced 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.60 0.67 in 1996) J. Project Administration (CMEU) 1.63 0.67 2.30 6.81 1.65 8.46 K. Project Preparation Facility 0.42 1.08 1.50 0.33 0.52 0.85 TOTAL BASE COST 22.29 61.55 83.84 L. Contingencies Physical 1.47 4.91 6.38 Price 2.24 5.72 7.96 TOTAL PROJECT COST 26.00 72.18 98.18 49.03 49.88 98.91  24 Table 7B: Analysis of Five Major IDA-rinanced Civil Works Contracts (Costs in US$ million) , d l r 1 gn. . ... .......... 1 HW/01 Kafu-Karuma 8.07 8.44 12.01 14 1343 2 HW/04 Sorot-ia60 5.69 0.99 5.85 3 Urban Street ris43 7.28 1.43 0.50 9.21 4 Urban TownMres13 0.95 0.=O87 5 MAAIF GuluF 0.984 1.10 _ ~~~~~~TOTAL 19.88 23.344 12.01 1.43 2.91 30.46 Table 7C: Project Financing : E aBf .?.B ... ... . , -f;;;; ; ........f ?:E .. >::S ::::..... .:.*..f..; ...v ..... ...:-.f...?::::-:.:. . . ....: BBfgftlg/g ~ ~ A! aaa.i>st (US? $l M)Ba .' |YIF33l~ { - m.te B B 3 a -2 i ga B c . < .B B aa B ; igigiBBB 'a BB?igaB 3 ?B a ?? Bar a .................... aii ??:BiB a ag?ig?i:?igB6-a:R:?i?ia?a??.. ............ .. ....... |IDA |Credit 10.40 60.77 71.17 26.91 47.54 74.45 WGOU I K 10.0 7 8 10.06 15.85 15.85 WGov. ofthe -Grant 2.22 . 6 5.87 0.66 6.53 Netherlands | rDA nNIDA &Grant 3.34 7.18 10.52 0.40 1.68 2.08 Gov, of Grant 013 0 0 Belgium TOTAL *26.02 72.17 *9819 49.58 49.03 98.91 * includes taxes estimated at $2.26 million equivalent Table 8. Economic and Financial Evaluation Economic Rate of Return Estimates at Appraisal Estimates at Completion Highways Component 24% 12% Table 9. Status of Legal Covenants Agreement Section Covenant -Present | Description of Covenant Comnments type Status| Credit 4.01 (a) C |The Borrower shall ensure sound |Complied with. |accounting practices and keep records in accordance with those ___ __ ___ __ __ __ ___ __ _ j __ ___ __ practices 4.01 (b) (i) C |Borrower shall ensure yearly |Complied with. L ff|independent audit of project and ____________ ~ ~ ~ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ special accounts.  25 Agreement Section Covenant Present Description of Covenant Comments type Status 4.01 (b) (ii) Soon Borrower shall furnish the For FY95, not Association with audited accounts complied with. not later than 9 months after the end of the year 4.01 (b) (iii) C Borrower shall furnish to the Complied with. Association accounts and other information upon request. 4.01 (c) (i) Borrower shall maintain sound Complied with. expenditure records with respect to funds from credit account 4.01 (c) (ii) C Borrower shall maintain all Complied with. expenditure records for one year after submission of audit report 4.01 (c) (iui) C Borrower shall enable Association Compliedwith. to examine expenditure records. 4.01 (c) (iv) C Borrower shall ensure that Complied with. independent auditors' reports state reliability of account information with respect to withdrawals from credit account. Schedule 1 C Conditions for disbursement on Complied with. (3.0) categories (1), (2) (3), (6), (7) and (8). 3.04 C UPTC shall establish a management Complied with. team responsible for miplementation of the telecommunications component of the project 4.01 (a) C UPTC shall maintain adequate Complied with. accounts and records of those accounts. 4.01 (b) (i) C UPTC shall have financial accounts Complied with. audited yearly by independent auditors. 4.01 (b) (ii) C UPTC shall furnish the Association Complied with. certified financial statements and auditors' reports. 4.01 (b) (iii) C UPTC shall furnish to Association Complied with. fmancial and other records upon request. Present Status: Covenant Type: C = Covenant complied with I = Account/Audits CD = Complied with after delay 2 = Financial performance/revenue generation from beneficiaries CP = Complied with partially 3 = Flow and utilization of project funds NC = Not complied with 4 = Counterpart funding 5 = Management aspects of project or executing agency 6 = Enviromnental covenants 7 = Involuntary resettlement S = Indigenous people 9 = Monitoring, review, and reporting 10 = Project implementation not covered by categories 1-9 11 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource allocation 12 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/regulatory/institutional action 13 = Other  26 Table 10. Bank Resources - Staff Inputs Staff-week Amount Stages of Project Cycle Actual US$('000) Through pre-appraisal 71.3 138.1 Appraisal-effectiveness 45.3 89.2 Supervision 238.8 478.4 Completion 3.3 7.3 TOTAL 358.7 713.0 Table 11. Bank Resources - Mission Stages of Month/ No. of SW Specialties Performance Types of problems project cycle Year persons in represented ratings field IS DO Through Appraisal Appraisal through Board approval Supervision I Aug. 92 7 FA, HE, IS, ME, S S _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ _ _ _ _ _SE, U P Supervision 2 Apr. 93 7 OA, EE, HE, UP, S S _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _E d Supervision 3 Jan. 94 1 0 U U Supervision 4 Oct. 94 5 Ec, OA, O, PS U U Supervision 5 June 95 2 0 (2) S S Supervision 6 Nov. 95 3 Ec, O, S S Supervision 7 Mar. 96 4 1 Ec, HE (2), O S S S Supervision 8 Oct 96 4 Ec, FA, HE (2) S S Supervision 9 Mar. 97 5 13 HE(2), Ec, IT S HS Supervision 10 Oct 97 4 5 Ec, HE(2),