Senegal - Industrial Sector Restructuring Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 19227 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR RESTRUCTURING PROJECT (Credit 1868-SN) April 30, 1999 Private Sector Finance Country Department 14 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (at appraisal; November 25, 1987) Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)' US$1.00 = CFAF314 CFAF 1 million = US$3,185 SDR 1 = US$1.32109 US$1.00 = CFAF628 (after devaluation in January 1994) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES AND EQUIVALENTS Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER January 1-December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ASACE Agence Senegalaise d'Assurance Credit a l'Exportation (Export Credit Insurance Agency) BCG Boston Consulting Group CICES Centre International du Commerce Extdrieur du Senegal (Senegal Center for External Trade) ICR Implementation Completion Report MDIA Ministere de l 'Industrie et de l 'Artisanat (Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts) NPI Nouvelle Politique Industrielle (New Industrial Policy) ONFP Office National de Formation Professionnelle (National Office for Professional Training) SAR Staff Appraisal Report SDR Special Drawing Rights SGBS Societe Generale de Banque au Senegal SOFISEDIT Societe Financiare S&negalaise pour le Developpement de l'Industrie et du Tourisme (Development Bank for Industry and Tourism) SSE Small-Scale Enterprise Vice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib, AFR Country Director: MahmoodA. Ayub, AFC14 Sector Manager: David Cook, AFTP 1 Task Team Leader: Cherif M. Azi, AFTP I 'During the appraisal, the CFA Franc (CFAF) was tied to French Franc (FF) in the ratio of FF 1 to CFAF 50. In January 1994, after the devaluation of CFAF, the ratio became FF 1 to CFAF 100.  TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY Page No. Preface ........................................................................................................................................... Evaluation Summary ........................................................ i-iv PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ......................................................1 A. Background .........................................................1 B. Statement/Evaluation of Objectives .........................................................1 C. Achievement of Project Objectives .........................................................2 D. Major Factors Affecting the Project .........................................................4 E. Sustainability .........................................................5 F. Bank Performance ........................................................5 G. Borrower Performance ........................................................5 H. Assessment of Outcome ........................................................6 I. Future Operations .........................................................7 J. Key Lessons Learned .........................................................7 PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES .........................................................9 Table 1: Summary of Assessments ..................... ....................................9 Table 2: Related Loans and Credits ........................................................ 10 Table 3: Project Timetable ........................................................ 11 Table 4: Credit disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual ........................ 11 Table 5: Project Implementation (APEX Sub-Projects) ......................................... 12 Table 6: Studies Included in Project ........................................................ 12 Table 7A: Project Costs (US$ Million) ........................................................ 13 Table 7B: Project Financing ........................................................ 13 Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants ........................................................ 14 Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ........................................................ 14 Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions ........................................................ 15 APPENDICES ........................................................ 16 A. APEX Sub-Projects (Before and After Devaluation) ................................................... 16 B 1. APEX Sub-Projects (by Financial Institution) ..................................... 17 B2. APEX Sub-Projects (Characteristics) ........................................................ 18 B3. APEX Sub-Projeects (Economic and Financial Criteria) . .......................................... 19 B4. Economic Characteristics of the APEX Sub-Projects Financed by SGBS ... .............. 20 B5. Financial Characteristics of the APEX Sub-Projects Financed by SGBS .. 21 C. Repayment of Credit by Sub-Projects ........................................................ 22 D. ICR Mission's Aide-Memoire ..................... 23 MAP E. Borrower's Contribution to the ICR ................................ 28 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR RESTRUCTURING PROJECT CREDIT No. 1868-SN PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Industrial Sector Restructuring Project in the Republic of Senegal, for which a credit in the amount of SDR 25.0 million (US$33 million equivalent) was approved on December 22, 1987, and became effective on October 31, 1988. The total project cost was US$40.8, of which US$31.3 million was for financing industrial investments, US$6.2 million for retraining laid-off workers and helping them start new businesses, and US$3.3 million for technical assistance. IDA financed about 80% of project costs; the Government about 3%, and the private sector about 17%. During implementation, the credit was restructured twice, in October 1990 and November 1995, the latter after the CFAF devaluation in January 1994. The credit was closed on June 30, 1998 but for certain committed expenses, the payment period was extended to October 31, 1998. The credit was fully disbursed by the end of October 1998. The ICR was prepared by Cherif M. Azi (Sr. Operations Officer) and Mustafa Soykan (Consultant), and was reviewed by David Cook (Acting Sector Manager, AFTP1) and Mahmood A. Ayub (Country Director, AFC 14). Pushpa N. Schwartz edited the ICR. Preparation of this ICR was begun during the Bank's final supervision/completion mission during June 12-22, 1998. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by preparing its own evaluation of the project's implementation (Appendix E). Comments from the Senegal Country Team and Task Managers, who had appraised or supervised the project, were incorporated into this ICR.  i IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR RESTRUCTURING PROJECT (Credit No. 1868-SN) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. Since Independence, Senegal has been one of the most politically stable countries in West Africa. Its industrial sector was also one of the most advanced in the region. In the early 1 980s, it comprised some 300 enterprises, mostly privately owned. Agro-industries, which included the export-oriented groundnut- and fish-processing industries as well as the import-substituting sugar industry, accounted for nearly half of the sector's employment and value added in the economy. The industrial sector was, however, characterized by minimal diversification and integration, and its recent performance had been disappointing. 2. The poor performance of the sector was partly attributable to inappropriate sector policies, which included high tariff barriers and numerous quantitative restrictions. The incentive system was inefficient and favored privileged individual enterprises. The export-promotion instruments were ineffective and the regulatory framework was cumbersome. IDA financed SALs II and III whose objectives were to remove these constraints and liberalize the economy. The Industrial Sector Restructuring Project was conceived to support and complement Government's efforts to encourage private sector development. Project Objectives 3. The main objectives of the project were to: (i) provide financing to restructure existing industrial enterprises as well as for viable new investments; (ii) support programs of assistance for laid-off industrial workers to alleviate the social cost of the reform; and (iii) strengthen the institutions involved in the industrial sector's adjustment process. The Project was restructured twice, first, in October 1990 to allow the financing by participating banks of feasibility studies as well as of working capital. The second restructuring, in November 1995, after the CFA devaluation, was needed to modify the conditions of the Apex line of credit, to cancel the components and activities that had no chance to succeed and reallocate the undisbursed amount to the Apex line of credit. 4. The objectives of the project were clearly defined, consistent with the Bank strategy in Senegal and with the needs expressed by the Government i.e., to provide long term resources to finance investment projects and to support assistance program to mitigate the negative impact of the reforms on the workforce. Each of the objectives was supported by specific project component. However, the second objective, although laudable, was too ambitious and unrealistic. No retrenchment program or social plan was prepared by the Government or the enterprises to alleviate the negative social impact of the reform. In November 1995, it was agreed to canceled this component.  ii Implementation Experience and Results 5. The overall outcome of the project is rated satisfactory. The APEX line of credit for financing industrial enterprises had a difficult and slow start but, at project closing, its sub-project portfolio performance was impressive. During the project's last three years, the line of credit financed 25 sub-projects, all of which were problem-free. Only four small sub-projects in the 40 sub-project portfolio had repayment problems, representing less than 2% of the line of credit. The experience helped to build the confidence of the local banking system and financial markets. It had a catalytic effect on the participating banks, giving them incentive to extend longer-term credit to the industrial sector. Information from the commercial banks and the sub-projects financed revealed that potential demand for the APEX type of credit certainly does exist and that medium-term private savings can be mobilized for the development of Senegal's industrial sector. 6. The initial slow disbursement of the line of credit was due to: (i) the absence of demand because of the lack of competitiveness in the industrial sector before the devaluation in January 1994; (ii) new and complicated credit application and evaluation procedures in a country where this project was the first of its kind; (iii) restrictive requirements and financial-eligibility criteria for sub- loans; (iv) the loan-application process, transparency, and advantages of the APEX line of credit which were not well understood by some banks or they made too little effort to comprehend and apply them. After the devaluation and the second project restructuring - that simplified the conditions of the line of credit - it was disbursed very quickly. 7. The components for helping laid-off workers and TA to the export credit insurance agency and the export promotion agency either were not implemented or their results were negligible. The TA for the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEMI) was not realized because of procurement problems, but the TA for the Ministry of Commerce, Industrialization, and Handicrafts (MCAI) achieved its objectives. 8. The project results are likely to be sustained: sub-projects financed with the APEX line of credit are repaying their debts and continue to produce and export. Their contribution and success is promising for the development of the private sector in the country. The banking system has gained valuable experience through its technical input into the design and supervision of sub-projects. The experience with the APEX line of credit, assessing the viability of sub-projects, and enforcing the financial criteria have built up the confidence of commercial banks and they are better equipped now to mobilize financial resources to invest in and promote private sector development. 9. Bank performance in the identification and preparation of the project was satisfactory. Project appraisal was marginally satisfactory. The foreign exchange risk and its impact on potential sub-projects were not properly assessed and as a result implementation was almost at a standstill in the early years of the project. Bank supervision was highly satisfactory. Problems were clearly identified and as a result, the project was restructured twice. The Borrower performance during project preparation was deficient. Some of the components were not in line with the existing level of implementation capacity. Furthermore some components were not designed at all; the program to assist the laid-off employees, is a case in point. Borrower performance during implementation was satisfactory.  iii Summary of Findings and Key Lessons Learned 10. In the early years of the project, the difficult macroeconomic conditions and the unfavorable environment for private investment have had a negative impact on project implementation. It is only after the devaluation - which directly contributed to improving the economic and business environment - and after the swift implementation of a vigorous reform program supported by IDA under the Private Sector Adjustment Project that the project really achieved its objective of providing resources to finance investment projects. The project created, modernized, or expanded 37 productive industrial enterprises and contributed substantially to industrial growth. The contribution and impact of the industrial sub-projects on the economy need to be carefully studied and their sustainability monitored to help design future programs and policies. The responsibility for doing so rests with the Government, although assistance from the donor community would be welcome. 11. The key lessons learned from implementation of this project are: (i) Project objectives should be in harmony with the global business environment. One of the first steps in the preparation of projects whose objective is to provide resources to finance productive investment should be to ascertain that the macroeconomic conditions are favorable to private investment. If the conditions are not favorable, project objectives should be modified to reflect the need to create a favorable macroeconomic, legal, institutional environment before establishing any fnancing scheme. (ii) All project objectives should be simple, realistic, and readily achievable, and when several institutions are involved in project implementation, adequate mechanisms should be established to ensure proper coordination between them. The project sub-components not implemented or implemented unsatisfactorily dealt with the identification and training of laid-off workers, and helping them find jobs or start new businesses. These sub-components, which represented a small part of the project costs, were neither clearly identified nor well designed and the institutional structure for their implementation was lacking. (iii) Both the supply and demand sides of "the products" offered by the project, as well the interest of the intermediary institutions to deliver them should be carefully assessed during appraisal. The SAR did not assess the demand side of APEX line of credit appropriately. The demand for credit among the existing entrepreneurs was unknown and the willingness and ability of the commercial banking system to disburse the APEX line of credit was also not known. Before devaluation, the demand for credit was low. The softening of the sub-loan conditions after project restructuring helped to increase demand and contributed to project success. (iv) When the design of a project includes intermediaries whose contribution is critical to the success of the project (in this case, the commercial banks were he intermediaries between the Government and the Beneficiaries), the project should provide strong incentives to theses intermediaries. It is only after the devaluation, that the commercial banks discovered the advantages of the attractive spread and repayment terms that the APEX line of credit offered, and they became  iv more familiar with IDA procedures and requirements. They overcame the processing and administrative difficulties in the preparation and application of sub-project loans. The attractive credit loan incentives and the improved economic environment created a strong motivation among the commercial banks as well as the private entrepreneurs to mobilize and invest medium-term resources for productive investments. (v) To encourage industrial development, frequent consultation needs to be undertaken with the private sector and its creative and practical suggestions considered seriously. The Government should hold a continuing dialogue with the financial and industrial sectors to identify the remaining constraints to industrial growth and take measures to eliminate them. Enterprises, for example, want a simplification of administrative procedures, such as those dealing with customs duties, which lack transparency and discourage them from importing products and creating new enterprises. They should have also receive friendly, favorable, and non-discriminatory treatment from the authorities.  - 1 - IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR RESTRUCTURING PROJECT CREDIT No. 1868-SN PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. BACKGROUND 1. Senegal has been one of the most politically stable countries in West Africa. Its industrial sector was also one of the most advanced in the region. It comprised some 300 enterprises, mostly privately owned. Agro-industries, which included the export-oriented groundnut- and fish- processing industries as well as the import-substituting sugar industry, accounted for nearly half of the sector's employment and value added in the economy. The sector was, however, characterized by minimal diversification and integration, and its recent performance was disappointing. 2. The poor performance of the sector was partly attributable to inappropriate sector policies, which included high tariff barriers and numerous quantitative restrictions. To address theses constraints, the Government initiated, in the early 80s, a comprehensive program of reforms supported by SALs II and III, The reforms were expected to affect the structure of the industrial sector and force individual enterprises to restructure. To help industrial enterprises to seize new growth opportunities and encourage private sector development more directly as well to support and complement Government's efforts, the Industrial Sector Restructuring Project was conceived. Unfortunately, soon after the project was approved most of the reforms adopted by the Government were either suspended or reversed because of social pressures. 3. Since the CFAF devaluation in January 1994, the economic environment has improved. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth accelerated from 2% in 1994 to an average of 5% over the next four years, while the inflation rate fell from 34% in 1994 to 3% in 1997. The private sector's share of GDP grew to 82%, representing almost all the value added in the primary sector and 80% in the rest of the economy. B. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 4. The objectives of the Industrial Sector Restructuring Project were to: (a) provide financing to restructure existing industrial enterprises as well as viable new industrial investments; (b) support programs of assistance for laid-off workers in order to help alleviate the negative social impact of the reforms; and (c) strengthen the institutions supporting the adjustment process. 5. The project's three major components were:  2 * An APEX line of credit (US$25 million) located at the Central Bank to finance, through the banking system, fixed investments and working capital requirements of existing and new enterprises; * a retraining and small-scale enterprise (SSE) program for laid-off employees of the industrial sector (US$5 million); and * a technical assistance (TA) component (US$3 million) to strengthen the Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts (MDIA), restructure two export-promotion institutions--CICES (Centre International du Commerce Exterieur) and ASACE (Agence Senegalaise d'Assurance Credit a l'Exportation), and assist the Central Bank in operating the line of credit, as well as other institutions involved in administering the laid-off worker retraining and SSE lending programs. 6. The project followed two IDA-financed Structural Adjustment Credits (SAC II and III) that had supported implementation of an adjustment program initiated in 1987 and 1988. This new program, the Nouvelle Politique Industrielle (NPI), aimed to promote industrial exports, rationalize the incentive system, and reduce rigidities in industrial and trade regulations. It included harmonization of the tariff structure and removal of quantitative restrictions. The project was designed to help the industrial sector adjust to this new policy environment. Its objectives were appropriate, but they were not all realistic, and some were too ambitious and risky, given the institutional weaknesses in the implementing agencies. 7. The APEX line of credit was designed on the basis of a study conducted in 1986-87 by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), a firm, which assessed the impact of policy reforms on the industrial sector. It found that to become competitive, industrial enterprises had to rationalize their operations and streamline their personnel and estimated that this objective would require US$33-49 million in long-term investment credit. As the local banks had been unable to provide longer-term credit, IDA participation in supplying such financing through the APEX line of credit was appropriate. 8. The objective of providing worker retraining and credit financing for SSEs, while laudatory was too ambitious and unrealistic, and the implementation steps to achieve it were not spelled out in advance. The component to achieve this objective was designed on the basis of the BCG study, which estimated that between 3,500 to 5,000 workers would lose their jobs due to industrial enterprise restructuring. A recent report by the Groupe de Travail economique indicates that 10,000 workers were laid-off in the industrial sector between 1980 and 1990. 9. The objective of providing TA to strengthen MDIA so it could effectively prepare and implement industrial policy reforms, and to restructure ASACE and CICES, the institutions engaged in export-promotion activities, was appropriate but risky, given the institutional weaknesses in the Government and lack of borrower commitment. C. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 10. The Project was restructured twice, first, in October 1990 to allow the financing by participating banks of feasibility studies as well as of working capital. The second restructuring, in  3 November 1995, after the CFA devaluation, was needed to modify the conditions of the Apex line of credit, to cancel the components and activities that had no chance to succeed and reallocate the undisbursed amount to the Apex line of credit which was progressively implemented, despite numerous difficulties. Modifications are explained hereafter under each of the components. 11. The APEX line of credit to provide financing to restr-_zture existing industrial enterprises and viable new investments was successfully implemented and the project objective was substantially achieved, though only after two project restructuring. It took time for the commercial banks to become familiar with the new and relatively complicated procedures for the use of the credit line and to recognize its advantages in terms of the margin (a 4.5% spread) they would earn on their sub-project loans and the fairly lengthy repayment period (up to 13 years, with a grace period of 1-2 years). Besides, the foreign exchange risk was bome by the Government. As demand for credit picked up with the improved economic conditions following the devaluation, the credit line was disbursed quickly. The softening of the financial eligibility criteria for sub-project loans also helped. Some 36 productive industrial enterprises were created, modernized, or expanded and they have contributed substantially to industrial growth. 12. Because of its extensive involvement in regulating the financial sector, the Central Bank was assigned responsibility to administer the APEX line of credit and review the sub-projects submitted by the participating banks. The review of sub-projects proved difficult to implement by the Central Bank and raised concerns on the part of the participating banks. This arrangement could have delayed approval of on lending for sub-projects, but IDA showed flexibility in implementation of the on-lending procedures. It was therefore agreed that the commercial banks would transmit the project documents directly to IDA, for review and approval, with copy to the Central Bank. 13. The original US$25 million APEX line of credit was reduced to US$20.3 million after the first project restructuring, but increased to US$30.9 million after the second restructuring, following which the line of credit was disbursed rapidly. At least 25 sub-projects, out of the 40 total, were financed during the project's last three years. One branch of the commercial bank SGBS (Societe Gbnirale de Banque au Setnegal in Dakar), with its very able branch manager alone financed 28 of the sub-projects, amounting to 72% of the APEX line of credit. 14. Achievement of the objective for worker retraining and lending for SSEs was negligible. The institutional mechanism to identify the laid-off industrial workers did not exist. Designing appropriate vocational training and finding suitable jobs for the retrained workers proved difficult. The BCG study estimated that about 4,000, or 16% of the formal manufacturing sector work force, would be laid-off over time (the actual number exceeded 10,000). The project component to assist these workers was designed to retrain 1,000 employees with a US$2 million budget. After retraining about 300 workers with the help of ONFP (Organisation Nationale de Formation Professionelle), at a cost of US$634,000, it proved virtually impossible to find appropriate jobs for the retrained workers; only 10 retrained workers were known to have found jobs. The remaining budget for the worker retraining sub-component was reallocated to the APEX line of credit after the second project restructuring. 15. The SSE lending program (US$3 million) was a failure as the participating banks did not show any interest in extending loans to SSEs because (i) the sub-projects were poorly prepared; (ii) their sponsors lacked business experience and collateral; and (iii) the administrative costs to process  4 small and risky loans were too high compared with the banks' other lending operations. This sub- component's budget was also reallocated to the APEX line of credit. 16. The TA/capacity building component (US$3 million) achieved its objective partially. In 1994, MDIA was split into two ministries: Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEMI) and Ministry of Commerce, Industrialization, and Haridicrafts (MCAI) and only the TA for the latter achieved its objective, as procurement problems prevented use of TA for strengthening MEMI. Even in the case of MCAI, organizational changes in the ministry and delays, in the preparation of procurement documents, studies, and consultant contracts, posed problems. In the absence of a realistic action plan and timetable to restructure ASACE and CICES, these institutions did not use the TA. ASACE was privatized in 1997; CICES continues to function at less than an optimal level. D. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 17. Factors subject to Government control. The lack of an institutional structure to assist laid- off workers with retraining and the difficulties in obtaining financing to establish SSEs was because the Government had not taken the steps to create effective institutions. It should have anticipated the need for such institutions once it embarked on the NPI and began implementing reform programs. As a result, the project component, which provided for retraining and financing of SSEs had little success and it was canceled as there was little to show for the resources that had been used. 18. The Government did not show much interest in or commitment to the restructuring of ASACE and CICES, which could have helped to promote an expansion in exports and as well as the capacity of the Senegalese industrial sector. 19. Factors not subject to Government control. Senegal was afflicted with macroeconomic imbalances and its economic difficulties had been intensified by the CFAF overvaluation, which was corrected in January 1994. Before the devaluation it proved difficult to find investment sub-projects that would be successful, so that both the approval and implementation of sub-projects were much slower than anticipated. The four, non-performing, problem sub-projects had all been financed before the devaluation. After the devaluation and restructuring of the project, the APEX line of credit experienced a rapid rise in demand because economic conditions had improved. Confidence returned to the financial markets and entrepreneurship was rewarded. All sub-projects financed after the devaluation were successful and had no repayment problems. 20. SOFISEDIT (Societt Financiere Sendgalaise pour le Developpement de l'Industrie et du Tourisme--Development Bank for Industry and Tourism), which was to be a key participant in disbursing the APEX line of credit, developed serious financial problems and was liquidated in 1989. Its demise contributed to a slowdown in credit disbursements for sub-projects. At the same time, the commercial banks had little knowledge and experience in disbursing the APEX line of credit or had done little to leam how to make use of it. IDA's strict financial and economic eligibility criteria as well as the administrative requirements and procedures for the preparation of sub-projects and loan applications were the cause of common complaints among the participating commercial banks and potential entrepreneurs.  5 E. SUSTAINABILITY 21. The sub-projects financed with the APEX line of credit are repaying their debts and continue to produce and export. Their contribution and success is promising for the development of the private sector in the country and the project results are likely to be sustained. The banking system has gained valuable experience through its technical input into the design and supervision of sub- projects. The experience with the APEX line of credit, assessing the viability of sub-projects, and enforcing the financial criteria have built up the confidence of commercial banks and they are better equipped now to mobilize financial resources to invest in and promote private sector development. F. BANK PERFORMANCE 22. Identification and Preparation. The Bank's performance in the identification and preparation of the project was satisfactory. The project was designed to support the NPI and the ongoing structural reform programs. But, the BCG study, which provided the basis for the design and size of several project components, was deficient in several respects, especially in its estimate of the NPI's impact on the industrial sector labor force. A macroeconomic framework of the Senegalese economy was missing and the studies, undertaken before project appraisal, had not analyzed accurately the interest among potential participant banks to disburse the APEX line of credit. An analysis of the demand for sub-project loans had also not been done. As was the practice at the time, the process of identification was not altogether carried out in a participatory manner. 23. AppraisaL During appraisal, Senegal's macroeconomic conditions were difficult and the environment for private sector investment was unfavorable. The impact of the NPI on the industrial sector was not yet known. Bank staff were aware that the CFAF was overvalued, but the foreign exchange risk and its impact on potential sub-projects were not properly assessed at appraisal. No institutional mechanism was in place for retraining and finding appropriate jobs for laid-off workers and no provision was made for coordination among the different project sub-components. As a result, project implementation was almost at a standstill in the early years of the life of the project. Bank staff performance during appraisal was marginally satisfactory. 24. Supervision. The Bank conducted 11 on-site supervision missions; the frequency of supervision was more intensive after the devaluation because of an increased demand for sub-project loans. Bank supervision was highly satisfactory. The missions properly identified the problems, proposed appropriate remedies, and followed them up effectively. This was especially apparent in their identification of obstacles to implementation before and after the devaluation. Bank staff responded quickly in their analysis and approval of the sub-project loan applications. They showed flexibility in altering the financial-eligibility criteria and sub-project loan limits and, in general, in helping the Government to restructure the project twice. G. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 25. The Borrower's performance during project preparation was deficient. Although, the project objectives were appropriate, some of the project components were complex and were not likely to be implemented. The Borrower should have been able to recognize these difficulties, including its lack of implementation tools and a weak institutional structure. This was especially true with respect to  6 the identification of laid-off workers and finding new employment for them and the lack of provision for coordination among project components. 26. Borrower performance during project implementation was satisfactory. After a slow start, the pace of implementation picked up with the devaluation and improved macroeconomic conditions. Demand for sub-project loans increased substantially and the Borrower contributed in full measure to the restructuring of the project. The Borrower's performance in implementing the TA component for MCAI was also satisfactory, although some problems were caused by frequent staff changes. But what the Borrower needed to do, possibly with some donor assistance, was to gather data on the performance of the industrial sub-projects financed through the APEX line of credit and evaluate the successes and failures. It did not take the initiative to do this and thus missed the opportunity to assess the economic and environmental impact of the industrialization process and to identify supportive measures and policy regulations to promote future industrial growth. 27. The Borrower, with a few exceptions in the early years, complied with the legal covenants of the credit agreement and followed IDA procurement procedures. The credit audits were delivered in a timely manner. H. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 28. The overall outcome of the project is rated satisfactory. Most of the sub-projects, 36 of the 40 financed through the APEX line of credit (accounting for 90% of the project costs), are productive and repaying their debts regularly. Only four small sub-projects experienced repayment problems, accounting for less than 2% of the APEX line of credit. The table below shows the distribution of the APEX line of credit by industry sector, total investmnents, and credit arnounts extended for sub-projects. Distribution of APEX Line of Credit by Industry Sectors Number of Number of Total Investment APEX Projects Enterprises (CFAF million) Contribution (CFAF million) Fish & Conserve. Indus. 6 5 4,578 2,582 Agro-Industry 2 2 512 414 Textile 2 2 678 439 Paper-Carton 4 3 1,736 1,349 Wood 2 2 180 150 Mechanical Industry 4 4 3,292 2,207 Sea Transport 1 1 578 236 Gasoline-Gas 3 3 16,369 2,533 Mech.-Pipe 2 . 1,104 883 Manufacturing Industry 1 _ 343 171 Quarry Exploitation I I 2,096 1,000 Chemical Industry I I_ __ _4,417 2,613 TOTAL 37 35 35,883 14,577 Note: As of 11/30198, CFAF 545=US$1. 29. The APEX line of credit played an important catalytic role in stimulating additional investments from commercial banks and the private sector for industry. Some 37 sub-projects attracted investments of about US$66 million, of which US$27 million or 40% was from the APEX  7 line of credit. For reliable clients, the commercial banks began to lend more of their own medium- and long-term resources than the amounts available from the APEX line of credit. For example; one sub-project, SOSETRA, visited during the ICR preparation mission, was a new factory under construction, which had obtained a loan from SGBS, of which only 25% of the loan was from APEX line of credit. SOSETRA planned to employ the latest production technology to produce rod iron for construction. It was intending to use scrap metal as raw material, which would help to clean the environment by recycling waste. 30. Implementation of other project components, retraining and credit for laid-off workers and TA for ASACE and CICES, was either negligible or these components were canceled during project restructuring. TA for MCAI was successful, but the TA for MEMI was not implemented because of procurement problems. 31. The successful experience with the APEX line of credit has increased the confidence of the banking system and built up its capacity to evaluate proposals and provide credit for worthy enterprises. It also encouraged banks to extend medium- and long-term credit to the industrial sector from their own resources and through equity participation. The project has helped to sustain the interest of the Government, the private banks, and individual entrepreneurs to look favorably on a similar type of credit in the future. 1. FUTURE OPERATIONS 32. There has been numerous requests from the commercial banks as well as from the Government to IDA for the financing of another similar project. Despite its remarkable success the Project did not address the basic issues i.e. the absence of long term resources to finance investments projects. Today, there still exists a shortage of resources to finance long term (private) investments projects. IDA is commited to provide it support to the Government. The challenge for the Country is to accelerate the pace of economic, financial and legal reforms to rapidly channel additional me4ium and long term financial resources to productive investments. To assist the Government in the widening and deepening of its reform program, IDA has provided financing for the Private Sector Capacity Building Project (FY96) which finances studies on the constraints and opportunities for private sector development in Senegal. These studies and those conducted by the MCAI on industrial clusters under this project, will serve as key elements in the preparation of the forthcoming Private Sector Development Project (FY00). Finally, a Financial Sector Assessment (FY00) will provide information and recommendations and how to address the key problems in the financial sector. J. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 33. The key lessons learned from implementation of this project are: (i) Project objectives should be in harmony with the global business environment. One of the first steps in the preparation of projects whose objective is to provide resources to finance productive investment should be to ascertain that the macroeconomic conditions are favorable to private investment. If the conditions are not favorable, project objectives should be modified to reflect the need to create a favorable macroeconomic, legal, institutional environment before establishing any financing scheme.  8 (ii) All project objectives should be simple, realistic, and readily achievable, and when several institutions are involved in project implementation, adequate mechanisms should be established to ensure proper coordination between them. The project sub-components not implemented or implemented unsatisfactorily dealt with the identification and training of laid-off workers, and helping them find jobs or start new businesses. These sub-components, which represented a small part of the project costs, were neither clearly identified nor well designed and the institLtional structure for their implementation was lacking. (iii) Both the supply and demand sides of "the products" offered by the project, as well the interest of the intermediary institutions to deliver them should be carefully assessed during appraisal. The SAR did not assess the demand side of APEX line of credit appropriately. The demand for credit among the existing entrepreneurs was unknown and the willingness and ability of the commercial banking system to disburse the APEX line of credit was also not known. Before devaluation, the demand for credit was low. The softening of the sub-loan conditions after project restructuring helped to increase demand and contributed to project success. (iv) When the design of a project includes intermediaries whose contribution is critical to the success of the project (in this case, the commercial banks were he intermediaries between the Government and the Beneficiaries), the project should provide strong incentives to theses intermediaries. It is only after the devaluation, that the commercial banks discovered the advantages of the attractive spread and repayment terms that the APEX line of credit offered, and they became more familiar with IDA procedures and requirements. They overcame the processing and administrative difficulties in the preparation and application of sub-project loans. The attractive credit loan incentives and the improved economic environment created a strong motivation among the commercial banks as well as the private entrepreneurs to mobilize and invest medium-term resources for productive investments. (v) To encourage industrial development, frequent consultation needs to be undertaken with the private sector and its creative and practical suggestions considered seriously. The Government should hold a continuing dialogue with the fiancial and industrial sectors to identify the remaining constraints to industrial growth and take measures to eliminate them. Enterprises, for example, want a simplification of administrative procedures, such as those dealing with customs duties, which lack transparency and discourage them from importing products and creating new enterprises. They should have also receive friendly, favorable, and non-discriminatory treatment from the authorities.  9 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR RESTRUCTURING PROJECT CREDIT No. 1868-SN PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable Macro policies X Sector policies Financial objectives X Institutional development X Physical objectives_X____ Poverty reduction x Gender issues X Other social objectives X Environmental objectives x Public sector management Private sector development X Other X B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain X C. Bank Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification I _ - __X Preparation assistance j m a __X_______---- Appraisal X (marginal) Supervision X D. Borrower performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation X Implementation _ X _ Covenant Compliance _ X E. Assessment of Outcome Highly satisfactory Safisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly Unsatisfactory _ _ _ _ ~~~~~~ x'=  10 Table 2: Related Loans and Credits 1 r ~~~~~~~~Year of Loan/Credit Title | Purpose Approval | Status Preceding operabonsu Financial Sector IDA's credit supported the efforts of November Closed Adjustment Project GOS to restructure its banking system 1989 Rept. No.P-5183-SE and laid the groundwork for the _______ __ financial and capital markets;' Structural Adjustment Credit aimed the macroeconomics April 1990 Closed IV reforms by consolidating progress under CR.2090-SN previous SAL operations. The main objectives were to eliminate barriers to private sector development and to improve the efficiency of the public sector management through rationalization. Economic Recovery The credit's main objective was to help July 1994 Closed Credit expand the adjustment program taken CR.2582-SN since 1993. It supported: (i) CFAF devaluation; (ii) increase in key producer prices; (iii) social measures in order to attenuate the impact of the devaluation; (iv) reduction and simplification of tariffs and domestic taxation; and (v) rationalization and protection of social sector expenditures. Private Sector Credit aimed to support policy February Closed Adjustment and measures to stimulate supply response 1995 Competitiveness of the private sector to the devaluation Credit of CFAF. Reform program included: (i) CR2681-SN complete the liberalization of domestic and external trade; (ii) improve the export and investment incentive regimes; (iii) eliminate rigidities in the labor market; and (iv) reduce maritime transportation costs. Ongoing Operalons. Private Sector The overall development objective of August 1995 Mid-term review completed; Capacity Building the project is to accelerate the growth of Supervisions continue.. Project: the private sector. Specific development PR.2759-SN objectives are to: (i) increase enterprises competitiveness; (ii) deepen the policy reform process; (iii) improve enterprises legal framework; (iv) accelerate the privatization process; and (v) carry out a Government communication program. Agriculture Export The project aims to diversify the export 1999 Board recently signed the credit agreement; Promotion Credit; potential of Senegal and increase its CR30170-SN income through agriculture products; Following Operaeons _ Transport Sector II Preparation of transport sector master 1999 Appraisal stage Operation plan and overall rationalization of the sector. Private Sector Continue to support the development of 1999 Identification / Appraisal stage. Development core private sector and industrialization. Energy Sector H The main objectives: (i)Reduce the cost 2002-03 Study and preparation stage. Operation of power; (ii) Increase the efficiency and reliability of the power systems; (iii) Mitigate enviromental problems caused by dams.  11 Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Date actual/latest estimate Identification n/a April-May 1986 Preparation nla June 1986- October 1987 Appraisal August 1987 November 1987 Negotiations November-December 1987 December 1987 Board Presentation December 1987 December 22, 1987 Signing n/a February 02, 1988 Effectiveness April-May 1988 October 31, 1988 Midterm Review March, 1995 March 24 - April 7, 1995 Restructuring of the Project Not Planned December 20, 1995 Supplementat Credit nla n/a Project Completion December 31, 1998 December 31, 1998 Loan Closing/latest disbursement June 30, 1998 Closing June 30, 1998; Last disbursement November 25, 1998 Table 4: Credit disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (USSmillion) FY 1988 1989 199 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Original Appraisal 0.3 2.5 6.6 11-6 16-8 21.6 259 29.0 31.2 32.7 33.0 Estimnate l L ll Revised Estimate 0.0 2.1 4.3 5.8 8.8 12.9 15.1 15.8 23.0 32.0 34.5 Actual 0.0 3.2 3.4 7.0 11.1 14.5 15.2 16.6 19.8 29.0 34.5 Actual as % of 0.0% 128% 51.5% 60.0% 66.1% 67.1% 58.7% 57.2 63.5 88.7 100% original estimate % % % Actual as % of 0.0% 152% 79.1% 120% 126% 112% 100% o 105% 86.1 90.1 100%o revised estimate % % Date of final November 06, 1998 disbursement SENEGAL* CR1868-SE - ESTIMATED, REVISED AND ACTUAL DISBURSENENTS (CUILJLATIVE} 35.0 --WSedes2 1 2 3 4 5 8 7 8 9 10 11 Yeafm mx 19811tlo 19W$  12 Table 5: Project Implementation (APEX Sub-Projects) Planned and Actual Disbursements In SDRs "000" Disbursement Disbursement Final Actual % of Category Nrs. Categories Initial Reallocation Allocation Disbursement Actual Allocation Disburst. Category l(a) APEX line 15,325 +4,675 20,000 23,178 92.7% Category l(b) Feasibility 825 -775 50 18 0.1% Category l(c) Working capital 2,750 0 2,750 77 03% 1 Category 2 Loans, Displ.w. 2,300 -2,300 0 0 - Category 3 Banks training 225 -125 100 88 0.4% Category 4 Vocational Tra. 1,500 -1,250 250 227 0.9%/0 Category 5 Technical assist. 540 +510 1,050 598 2.4% Category 6 Train.Cons.ser. 2 -2 0 0 Category 7 Consultant serv. 150 -150 0 0 Category 8 Consultant serv. 140 -140 0 0 Category 9 Consultant serv. 340 -340 0 0 Category 10 Office equipmt. 75 +125 200 256 1.0% Category 11 PPF refund 703 -103 600 558 2.2% Category 12 Unallocated 125 -125 0 0 TOTAL 25,000 0 25,000 25,000 100% Table 6: Studies Included in Project Study Purpose as defined at Appraisal or Status Impact of Redefined Study Study of the Impact of Industrial Policy Reforms on the Quantification of the impact of the Done Useful; but Sector; By Boston Consultant Group; January 87 policy refonns on the sector as well as partially on the economy. unsatisfactor Study on the Senegalese Banking System; In-depth study on existng Senegalese Done Useful; Prepared by CIFPB; April 1987 banking system and its restructuring possibilities. Demand for Export Insurance in Senegal; Importance of the export insurance Done Useful JPG Consultants; February 1987 demand in Senegal and its quantification Study / "Etude IM & DU" Study on how to support the private Done Partially sector in Senegal useful Etude Sur Emballage (Packaging Study) Study on packaging industry and its Done Useful Idevelopment trend in Senegal  13 Table 7A: Project Costs (US$ Million) (Actual as of October 30, 1998) Item SAR Estimate Actual Costs (last disbursement 10/06/98) SDR USS SDR USS Industrial Investnents 23.7 31.3 22.3 30.9 Retraining and SSE Landing Program 4.7 6.2 0.2 0.3 Technical Assistance; of which: 2.5 3.3 2.5 3.3 Ministry of Industry (a) 1.55 2.18 2.87 ASACE 0.24 0.00 0.00 CICES . 0.45 0.00 0.00 Line of Credit TA 0.35 0.09 0.11 SSE Scheme 0.31 0.23 0.32 Contingencies 0.10 0.00 0.00 TOTAL 30.9 40.8 25.0 34.5 P.&: SDR I = US S 1.32109 (a): Exclusive of localpersonnel and other supportprovided by the Government Table 7B: Project Financing (As of October 30, 1998) Source Appraisal Estimate Actual (last disbursement 10/06/98) USSmillion USSmillion Currency IDA 33.00 34.48 DTS 24.95 million Govermment 1.20 n/a n/a Internal Financing / Sub- 6.30 n/a n/a project Sponsors (APEX Line of Credit) Sub-project Sponsors (SSE 0.30 0.0 0.0 Landing Scheme) . TOTAL 40.80 (IDA only USS) 34.48 (IDA only DTS) 24.95  14 Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants Cr. 1868-SN - DCA (Development Credit Agreement) Agreement Cove- Status Original Revised Description of covenant Comments Text nant Fulfill. Fulfill. Reference Class Date Date Section 1 C 06/30/95 The Borrower shall maintain, or cause to Complied 4.01 (a) be maintained, records and accounts with. adequate to reflect in accordance with sound accounting practices the operations, resources and expenditures in respect to the Project of the departments or agencies of the Borrower responsible for carrying out the project or any part thereof. The Borrower shall: Section I C 06/30/95 06/10/96 Have the records & accounts referred to in Complied 4.01(b) (i) param (a) of this section, including those with. for the Special Accounts, for each FY audited, in accordance with appropriate auditing principles consistently applied, by independent auditors acceptable to IDA Section I C 06/30/95 06/10/96 Furnish to IDA, as soon as available, but Complied 4.01(b)(ii) in any case not later than 6 months after with. the end of each such year, a certified copy of the report of such audit by said auditors, of such scope & in such detail as IDA shall have reasonably requested; and Section I C 06/30/95 Furnish to IDA such other information Complied 4.01(b)(iii) concerning said records, account & the with. audit thereof as IDA shall from time to time reasonably request. Status: C : Complied With CD : Complied With Delay NC : Not Complied With PC : Partially Complied With SOON : Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time NYD : Not Yet Due Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of Project Cyde Planned Revised Actual" Weeks* USS* Weeks* USS* Weeks US$ Preparation to appraisal n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Appraisal n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Negotiations through Board approval n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Supervision 160.00 325.00 196.10 394.18 218.03 433 440 Completion 10.0 25 000 12.0 30 000 12.0 30 000 TOTAL 170.00 350.00 208.10 424.18 218.0323 463 440 ___ ___ ___ __ ___ ___ __ ___ ___ __ __ ___ __ __0.03 Planned and revised figures are for FY96, FY97 and FY98 only. ** Actuals are as of October 31, 1998. Actual cost figures include consultant fees and travel expenses for staff and consultants.  15 Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions Stage of project Monthl Number Days in Specialized staff Performance ratings*" Types of cycle year of skills problems Persons Field represented* Implementati Developmen on status t objectives Preparation 1986- n/a n/a SOO, 00, EC, n/a n/a n/a 1987 FA, SC, CON Appraisal 1987 - n/a n/a SPO, 00, EC, n/a n/a n/a through Board 12/22/ FA, IC, SC, approval 1987 CON Supervision I Nov. 88 1 10 days SOO 2 2 Starting problems Supervision 2 Nov. 89 1 5 days SOO 3 3 Project in standstill Supervision 3 March 1 13 days SOO 3 3 Project still 90 standstill. Amendment _______ _ __________ ________ _____________ ____________ proposed Supervision 4 June 91 1 8 days SOO 2 2 Approval of Amendmt. Supervision S Nov. 93 2 10 days SOO, 00 2 2 Line of Cr. is partially OK; Other compont. problems. Supervision 6 April 95 1 14 days SOO U U Mid-term (Mid-term Rev) review and restructuring.. Supervision 7 July 95 1 5 days SOO U U Pending approval of .______________ ________ ______ __ ___________ _ _______restructuring.. Supervision 8 Oct. 96 2 6 days SOO, 00 S S After restructur. APEX line of Cr. is well functioning.. Supervision 9 Mar 97 4 15 days SOO, SPS, CON, S S APEX line of CON Cr. is fully committed. Mining Direct is problem Supervision 10 Oct 97 3 5 days SOO, SPS, CON S S APEX line of Cr. disbursed 80%. TA for MCAI is OK. Supervision 11 & June 98 3 7 days SOO, SPS, CON S S APEX line of ICR preparation credit achieved mission its objectives. Performance of sub-projects is I__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ also satisfactory * Key to Specializations ** Key to Performance Ratings SOO = Senior Projects Officer 1 = Problem Free; 2 = Some problems; 3 = Implementation problems 00 = Operations Officer HS = Highly Satisfactory EC = Economist S = Satisfactory FA - Financial Analyst U = Unsatisfactory IS = Institutional Specialist HU = Highly Unsatisfactory SC = Senior Counsel NR =Not Rated SPS - Senior Public Enterprise Specialist CON= Consultant  -16- APPENDICES A. APEX SUB-PROJECTS (BEFORE AND AFTER DEVALUATION) APEX SUB-PROJECTS; CR.1868-SN (Before and After Devaluation) (OCTOBER 1998) DISBURSED FINANCING Approved CFAF DISBURSED DISBURSED CATEGORY SUB-PROJECTS INSTITUTION Date Million -SDR 000Os. US$ "000"s. Al !S.A.I.l. I (UPPER) BIAO 5/26/89 340.00 _ 822.97, 1,018.50 A2 MOULIN SENTENAC BICIS t 2/21/90 300.001 798.65 1,123.4 A3 CCIS SGBS 1214/90 300.00 1 752.60 1,000.39 A4 LA ROCHETTE - DAKAR = __SGBS _ 12/28/90 168.00 445.38 625.50 A5 COLGATE-PALMOLIVE BICIS 1/14/91 600.00, 1323.28 1,854.22 A6 ESPI BICIS | 1/31/91 1 50.00 132.55 186.16 A7 SOTRAMAP _ _ SG8S 9/4/91 132.001 345.74 472.31 AS 'SAHEL GAZ SGBS 10/18/91 300.00 789.74 1,092.67 A9 SOCIETE DIMATEC SGBS t 1/29/92 50.00 137.03 196.25 AIO SOCIETE SIPLAST 1 SGBS 1/29/92 1 80.00 212.30 296.43 All iMAERKS LINE SGBS . 4/9/92 236.00' 658.14: 950.73 A12 SNCDS BIAO-BICIS 4/9192 789.227 1240.33: 1,763.26 A13 DIMES SGBS 1 7/22192 100.00 264.46 - 370.47 A14 S.A.I.I. 2 (SOC.AFR.IMPR.) BIAO 8/4192 100.00 257.79' 366.21 AIS CANDELIA SGBS 9/15/92 100.00 257.79, 366.21 A16 SOSEFIL SGBS 9/29/92 94.70 i 244.22 346.94 A17 SHYDRAPA SGBS 8/27/93 121.01 163.93 238.41 SUB-TOTAL I (Before Devaluation) , _______.93 8,846.88 12,268.11 Alg PROMEL CBAO 9/14/95 250.00 332.48 491 .45 A19 AFRIGEL BST t 5110/95 57.90 ! 79.17 118.83 A20 SIPLAST 2 SGBS 10/17/95 350.00 - 469.62 679.24 A21 SHELL _ SGBS 12120/95 1,200.00 1,529.22 2.109.11 A22 SOABOIS _ SGBS 2/5/96 120.00 160.17 230.91 A23 NATTES INDUSTRIES _ SGBS 2/5/96 200.00 1 267.46 386.10 A24 SIMPA SGBS 2/26/96 500.00' 642.65 - _ 895.66 A25 SERT __ _ CBAO 2/26/96 720.00 886.07 1,235.25 A26 COTONNIERE D. CV __ SGBS 5/10/96 - 215.00 270.37 369.08 A27 COFISAC SGBS 5/21/96 400.00 5 516.82 718.08 A28 CCIS 2 _ SGBS 5/23/96 580.00 712.04 961.30 A29 SENEVISA __ SGBS 5/24/96 800.00 1,045.73 1,470.49 A30 S_SETRA _ SGBS 7/2/96 1,200.00 1,459.30 1,963.29 A31 .DIPROM SGBS _7/12/96 1 855.001 1,065.38 1,463.33 A32 SIPS 1SGBS 7/12/96 700.00 851.26 1,145.25 A33 ELF OIL SENEGAL SGBS 9/25/96 1 1,000.00 1,274.35 1,757.59 A34 _ COGECA SGBS 4/6/97 i 927.00 1,158.83 -1549.1 A35 COOLTEX SGBS 7/27/98 |100.00 125.04 166.32 A36 SOC.SENEG.D'INVEST -. - SGBS 1011/98 122.381 157.19 216.65 A37 SOPASEN SGBS i 9118/98 i 382.04 492.16 671.35 SUB-TOTAL 2 (After Devaluation) 10,679.32 13,495.30 18,598.39 TOTAL GENERAL 14,540.25 22,342.18 30,866.49  -1 7- APPENDICES Bi. APEX SUB-PROJECTS (BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTION) SENEGAL: APEX SUB-PROJECTS AND CR.1868-SN (By Financial Institution) (31 October 1998) FINANCING Date CFAF SDR USS CATEGORY SUB-PROJECTS SECTORS INSTITUTION Approved - Million 00Os. 000s. A1 IS.A.. I (SOC.AFR.IMPR.) PRINTING ' BAt 5126189A 340.00 822.97 101850 A14 All2 (SOC.AFR.IMPR.) I PRINTING BIAO 8/4192 1 100.00 i 257.79 36621 0 v v t TOTAL BIAO 440.00 1,080.75 1 1384.71 A18 ,PROMEL FISHING ' CBAO 250.00 |332.48 491 45 A25 jSERT FISHING CBAO 2/26/96 1 720.00 | 886.07 i 1,235.25 - _________________ I sTOTAL CBAO 970.00' 1218.54 1 726.69 TOTA BIAO.CBA- '6 - ._ .-7141*BAO B A ' --1.+ A12 !SNCDS FISHINGt 91AO-BCIS 4/9/92 789.22 _ 1,240.33 1,763.26 A2 .MOULINSENTENAC FOOD e 212tl90 300.00 798.65 1,123.44 AS _ COLGATE-PALMOLIVE | CHEMICAL 91CIS _ 1/14/91 ' 600.00' 1,323.28 1,854.22 AS 'ESPI i CHEMICAL BICIS 1131/91 i 50.00 132.55 186.16 TOTAL BICIS 950.00 0 3,163.83 A13 _ DIMES EQUIPEMENT SGBS-BICIS 7/22/92 100.00 264.46 370A7 A19 AFRIGEL FISHING BST 5/10/95 57.90 79.17 118.83 -3ecCIs I CHEMICAL _