Niger - National Agricultural Research Project

Document of THE WORLD BANK FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: 19496 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT NIGER NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (Credit 2122 NIR) June 28, 1999 Rural Development It Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not not be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY AND EQUIVALENTS UNITS Currency Unit CFA Franc (CFAF) 1990: US$ = CFAF 285 1991: US$ = CFAF 283 1992: US$ = CFAF 265 1994: US$ = CFAF 555 1995: US$ = CFAF 520 1996: US$ = CFAF 520 1997: US$ = CFAF 540 1998: US$ = CFAF 550 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR January I to December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AMRT Atelier Mensuel de Revue de Technologie (Monthly Technology Review Meeting) CORRA Comites Regionaux de la Recherche Agronomique (Regional Agricultural Research-Development Committees) DCA Development Credit Agreement DEPSEF Division des Etudes, Programmes, Suivi-Evaluation et Formation FSR Fanning Systems Research FSTT Farming System Technology Transfer GDP Gross Domestic Product ICRISAT International Crop Research Institute for the Semi Arid Tropics INTSORMIL International Sorghum and Millet Collaborative Research Program ISNAR Institute for Support to National Agricultural Research IITA International Institute of Tropical Agriculture INRAN Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (National Agricultural Research Institute) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NRM Natural Resource Management PRAN Projet de Recherche Agronomique du Niger SAR Staff Appraisal Report TDT Technology Development and Transfer UNDP United Nations Development Program USAID United States Agency for International Development WARDA West Africa Rice Development Association Vice President : Jean-Louis Sarbib Director Theodore Ahlers Sector Manager Joseph Baah-Dwomoh Task Managers : Daniel Moreau (Aug 90 - June 92) Chandra Pattanayak (June 92 -March 94) Madicke Niang (March 94 - May 95) Shiv Singh (May 95 - September 97) Yves-Coffi Prudencio (Sept 97 - Dec 98)  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (Cr. 2122-NIR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface Evaluation Summary ................................................. ...................i Part 1. Project Implementation Assessment .I A. Introduction ..................................................................I B. Project Objectives . .....................1........................................... I Description of Objectives . .................................................................. I Evaluation of Objectives and Risks ................................................................... 2 C. Achievement of Objectives .......................... ........................................ 3 D. Project Cost and Financing ................................ ................................... 9 E. Major Factors Affecting the Project ...................................... ............................ 10 F. Project Sustainabilitv .................................................................. 10 G. Bank Performance .................................................................. 10 H. Borrower Performance ................... ........................ ........................ 11 I. Implementation Agencv . .................................................................. 11 J. Assessment of Outcome .................................................................. 12 K. Future Operations ................................................................... 12 L. Key Lessons Leamed . ......................... ................................... 12 Part II. Statistical Tables ........................... 15 Table 1. Summary of Assessments ...................................... 15 Table 2. Related Bank Credits ...................................... 17 Table 3. Project Timetable ...................................... 18 Table 4. Audit Disbursement: Cumulative Estimated and Actual ...................................... 18 Table 5. Key Indicators for Project tnplementation ...................................... 18 Table 6. Key Indicators for Project Operation ...................................... 18 Table 7. Studies Included in the Project ...................................... 19 Table 8A. Project Costs ........................... 21 Table 8B. Project Financing ........................... 21 Table 9. Economic Costs and Benefits ........................... 21 Table 10. Status of Legal Covenants ........................... 22 Table 11. Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ........................... 26 Table 12. Bank Resources: Missions ........................... 27 Attachments: A. Aide-Memoire of the ICR Mission B. Borrower Contribution C. Map IBRD No. 21774 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (Cr. 2122-NIR) Preface This is the Implementation Completion Report for the National Agricultural Research Project (PNRA) for which Credit 2122-NIR in the amount of SDR 15 million (equivalent to about US$20 million) was approved on July 18, 1990, and made effective in July 1991. The credit was closed on December 31, 1998. The last disbursement took place on June 17, 1999. About 99 percent of the credit was disbursed. The completion report was prepared by Yves-Coffi Prudencio, AFTR3, with assistance of Soulemane Fofana and Salifou Mahaman, AFTR2. It was reviewed by Joseph Baah-Dwomoh, Sector Manager, AFTR2, and by Irene Xenakis, Implementation Specialist, AFTS2. Preparation of this report began during an ICR mission in Niger in April 1999. The implementation report is based on the results of the ICR mission, on the project documents, correspondence, supervision reports, appraisal reports, and Credit Agreement. The Borrower's comments have been received and have been incorporated in the ICR. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by preparing its own evaluation of the project, which is attached to this report.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (Cr. 2122-NIR) Evaluation Summary Introduction 1. This Implementation Completion Report evaluates the National Agricultural Research Project in Niger, which was executed by the National Agricultural Research Institute (INRAN), under the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. Project Objectives 2. The basic objective of the first five-year phase of the project was to strengthen the national capacity for agricultural research planning and implementation by: (a) improving priority-setting and resource allocation methodology, taking into account farmers' needs and resource conservation; (b) improving coordination in the formulation and execution of national and international agricultural research programs; (c) improving research programming, budgeting and financial management; (d) improving staff planning, training, recruitment and career development in research; (e) strengthening linkages between research, extension services and farmers with on-farm adaptive research and participatory research programs. 3. For the last two years of the actual project implementation period (which lasted eight years) the objective was adjusted during supervision, with the focus instead on development and transfer of improved technologies to raise farm productivity and incomes. Implementation Experience and Results 4. The project partially achieved the objective of improving priority-setting and resource allocation methodology by revising the statutes of INRAN to establish governance bodies to carry out the objective. These included the board of INRAN, which had one farmer representative out of six members. Other governance bodies included the Scientific Council, which advises the board, and the National Council for Agricultural Research, which designs national agricultural research policy. These were established but never functioned effectively. Regional research development councils (CORRAs) were set up to meet once every year in each province to listen to farmers and take their needs into account, but they only functioned for one year (1992-1993). A natural resource management (NRM) program was set up with diagnostic teams to take into account resource conservation needs in the priority setting process.  ii 5. The project substantially achieved the objective of improving coordination in the formulation and execution of national and international research programs by appointing a Scientific Director to coordinate all research activities, creating five multidisciplinary research programs to encourage coordination and cooperation between thematic research departments, holding program review and planning meetings with participation of external partners, and by decentralizing the scientific directorate across the regional research centers. 6. The project partially achieved the objective of improving research planning, budgeting and financial management. Long- and medium-term strategic plans were designed and revised, research planning services were provided by ISNAR, and an administrative and fmancial directorate was created and decentralized across the research centers with adequate accounting and financial management tools and personnel. A financial controller was appointed by the government and a special procurement commission was put in place during the final year of the project to speed up procurement. However, mechanisms for donor coordination and for associated programs with the university were not established as planned. Furthermore, full achievement of the objective was constrained by a lack of adequate budget lines for research projects and sub-projects. 7. The objective of improving staff planning, training, recruitment and career development in research was also partially achieved, through the creation within INRAN of a human resource management unit to plan staff recruitment, and the creation of a human resource development unit to plan and monitor staff training. Both units used staff recruitment and training needs identified in the strategic plans. The training program resulted in a substantial increase in the proportion of scientists with advanced degrees (at least M.Sc equivalent) from 40 percent in 1993 to 76 percent in 1998. USAID and collaborative research programs significantly contributed to the implementation of the training plan. The main impediment to the full achievement of the objective was the non-adoption by the government of the autonomous statute of the personnel of the Institute which would have allowed the Institute to manage its staff more efficiently. It was in fact a condition of effectiveness of the project which was seemingly fulfilled with an inadequate legal text which could not be implemented. More adequate personnel statutes were proposed during project implementation but were never adopted by the government. 8. The objective of strengthening linkages between research, extension services, and farmers was substantially achieved with the creation and adequate staffing of a farming systems and technology transfer program with two regional multidisciplinary teams. Other mechanisms established to complete the objective included the CORRAs, the monthly technology reviews workshops (AMRTs), and the on-farm tests in collaboration with extension services. In addition to farmers reached through extension services, individual research programs also had their own contact farmers for on-farm research and seed production activities. 9. The research output objectives set by supervision since 1997 were overall substantially achieved. The Institute developed in collaboration with INTSORMIL the first hybrid sorghum for the Sahel (NAD1). The latter was adopted by research contact farmers who spread it to a total of 600 farmers in 1998. Forty-three of these were trained in 1998 by the Institute to produce and sell the hybrid seeds, 13,000 kg of which was produced in that year. Improved varieties were also developed or screened for rice, millet, maize, and cassava. Improved breeds of sheep were also developed as well as improved nutrition technologies for animal production.  iii However, soil and water management technology development for improved dry land farming was limited. 10. The rate of completion of civil works and of procurement of equipment to support the above objectives was over 80 percent, in terms of projected costs. 11. Overall, the project had modest to substantial achievements in the areas of research planning, research coordination, financial management, staff training, research-extension linkage, and civil works, but the project failed to clearly define and establish an efficient agricultural research institution with autonomous management of its staff, as well as of its funds, with effective statutes/bylaws and well functioning governance and funding bodies. 12. The Agricultural Research Institution established by the project is unlikely to be financially sustainable. The government was unable to pay more than one fourth of the counterpart funds during project implementation and is therefore most unlikely to be able to support recurrent costs which have increased as a result of the project. No truly sustainable funding mechanism was built in to the project design. However, elements of institutional sustainability were introduced through institutional reforms and training 13. Bank performance was unsatisfactory. The Bank during preparation failed to clearly indicate what type of research institution was to be built by the project, specified no minimum research output, provided no monitoring and evaluation component, no sets of performance indicators, and implemented the project without one of its conditions of effectiveness (personnel statute) being fulfilled. The Bank failed to get the government to comply during implementation, made no formal threat of suspension, yet extended the project implementation period by three years. Supervision was insufficient and inconsistent with five task managers in eight years. The mid-term review occurred late during the initially planned project completion year (1995). 14. Borrower performance was unsatisfactory, with a thirteen month delay between board approval and effectiveness, failure to adopt and implement adequate statutes for the research Institute, including activation of the governance bodies of the institution, failure to disburse counterpart funds, procurement delays due to bureaucratic bottlenecks in the national procurement system, and inappropriate political interventions in procurement. Project management was inconsistent, inadequate at times and insufficiently pro-active. Summary of Findings, Future Operations and key Lessons Learned 15. Overall, the project outcome is rated marginally unsatisfactory. 16. As a result of the difficulties encountered by the project and the longer time it took to achieve its objectives, no follow-up operation was prepared, yet this is badly needed to preserve the positive achievements of the project. Follow-up is expected to occur in future following a careful assessment of the lessons learned and following the design of an adequate rural development strategy. 17. The positive and negative experiences of similar first-generation type of agricultural research project confirm most of the lessons learned from such type of projects in the past and that are being applied in the new generation type of agricultural services projects funded by the  iv Bank, that is: the need to have integrated research and extension projects, the need to establish mechanisms for real farmers' participation in the development of the research agenda and in the allocation of research funds; the need to use lending instruments such as the adaptable program lending (APL) instrument to pursue capacity building in a short early phase of the project and research output objectives in the following phases, the need to introduce cost sharing or cost- recovery mechanisms, etc. Additional specific lessons that one may draw from the implementation of this project include the following: (a) It is essential to include legal advisers in the design of projects whose success depends heavily on legal texts or statutes that are to be adopted before or during project implementation. This will help to ensure proper identification, proper design and effective implementation of such legal texts. (b) A special procurement commission, as experienced in the last year of this project, chaired by the chairman of the board of the research Institute implementing the research project, can help speed up procurement and disbursement, and can thereby improve project implementation, provided that the research Institute has a sufficiently efficient administrative and financial management system. (c) Conditions for effectiveness, if not properly fulfilled before project implementation are unlikely to be during project implementation. (d) Farmers participation in the research process, significantly improves the relevance of research to farmers' needs as well as the quantity and quality of research results. (e) Adequate bylaws for autonomous management of research staff by research institutions and sustainable financing mechanisms are necessary to provide minimum incentives and an enabling environment for fruitful research. (f) Collaboration with research institutions and research networks at regional and international levels significantly improves the quantity and quality of research output and should ideally be built into research projects or be facilitated by them. (g) It is necessary to include in the design of projects a mechanism to insure across time and across project managers within the Bank and within the borrowing country, a common understanding of project objectives and performance indicators, including project sustainability indicators. (h) Recruitment systems, results agreements and incentive systems that attract and maintain good project management capability, at the Bank level and at the Borrower's level, are essential for good and consistent project management. (i) Decentralization of research by providing more autonomy to the regional research centers, and by allowing them to have their own governance and funding bodies, with the involvement of farmers organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector in such bodies, is likely to be more effective than the establishment of governance bodies at the national level.  v (j) Project supervision tends to be less holistic than the mid-term review and the ICR in reviewing the accomplishments of projects against their development objectives and components, as identified in the SAR and follow-up amendments. Supervision tends to focus on eliminating major project weaknesses at a given time through action plans. As a result supervision ratings of a project may significantly differ from the ICR rating as in the present case. In order to insure consistency, there is a need to emphasize the SAR (or PAD) as a major supervision instrument, especially when there are frequent changes in project managers on the Bank side as well as on the Borrower's side.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (Cr. 2122-NIR) PART I: Project Implementation Assessment A. INTRODUCTION 1. At the time of project preparation (1988/90) Niger was and remains one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita GNP of US$280 in 1987 and an average population growth rate of about 3.2 percent per year. It was estimated that 80 to 90 percent of the population was dependent on the agricultural sector for its livelihood and that agriculture was feasible mostly on 10 percent of the land which received an average rainfall of 300-600 mm per year. Agriculture in Niger was also known to be highly vulnerable to drought and it was felt that its long-term development would depend largely on technological improvements that could make the country's limited resource base more productive. 2. It was also felt that while prospects for a significant technological breakthrough were not bright, progress could nevertheless be achieved in improving farming systems by cautiously adapting some modem techniques to local systems, by making inexpensive improvements in traditional agricultural techniques, and by focussing adaptive research on the technical and economic constraints to the intensification and integration of crop/forest/livestock production systems. The national agricultural research project was designed and launched in 1990 to provide Niger with the necessary institutional and human resource capacity to develop relevant agricultural technologies. A complementary agricultural services support project (Cr.2355-NIR) was also planned and launched later in 1993 to transfer the relevant technologies to farmers. B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES Description of Objectives 3. The basic objective of the project, expected to be a first five-year phase, was to strengthen the national capacity for agricultural research planning and implementation by: (a) improving priority-setting and resource allocation methodology, taking into account farmers' needs and resource conservation; (b) improving coordination in the formulation and execution of national and international agricultural research programs; (c) improving research programming, budgeting and financial management;  2 (d) improving staff planning, training, recruitment and career development in research; (e) strengthening linkages between research, extension services and farmers with on-farm adaptive research and participatory research programs. Evaluation of Objectives and Risks 4. Given the economic situation of Niger at the time of project preparation, an operation to support the national agricultural research system to develop improved agricultural technologies was fully justified. The focus of the project on institutional capacity building objectives during this first phase was appropriate, particularly with respect to capacity building for adequate research planning and management, financial management, human resources development and strengthening of research-extension-farmers linkages. However, given the emphasis on capacity building, the design failed to consider alternative types of research institutions and to indicate clearly, as part of the objectives, what type of research institution was expected out of the project. Furthermore, given the relatively long five year duration of the first phase, a minimum level of achievements in technology development and transfer should have been targeted during the first phase, potential research areas were discussed in the SAR but no target was set. The development objective as stated failed to link capacity building and research output to economic development. No sets of performance indicators were specified for capacity building nor for research output. 5. These deficiencies were somewhat corrected later in 1997 during supervision. The basic development objective was then re-stated as: To strengthen INRAN's capacity for the development of improved technologies that would raise farm productivity and increase the income offarmers on a sustainable basis. Performance indicators (for the entire project period) were then proposed and included: (a) an increase in the number of crop varieties developed by the regional research centers; (b) a 50 percent increase in the number of on-farm adaptive trials by the regional research centers and research stations; (c) a 5 percent increase in productivity in dry land farming and 50 percent increase in productivity in irrigated farning systems; (d) rehabilitation of research centers and research stations to support priority research and breeder seed production; (e) increased collaboration with CGIAR centers and national programs in the region; (f) at least 60 percent of the research staff trained in advance degrees. Consequently, from 1997 to 1998 the project development objectives switched their emphasis to research output, rather than capacity building. 6. The greatest project risk identified during preparation, as mentioned in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), was the potential difficulty of developing feasible economic solutions to the degradation of the environment and technical recommendations for increased crop and livestock productivity in the context of the particularly difficult agricultural conditions in Niger. Soil fertility degradation was viewed as a major non-project risk to be controlled by research on soil fertility maintenance. Another risk envisaged was the relevance of priority research programs in taking into account the needs of farmers and resource conservation. The reorganization of  3 INRAN with new statutes, the involvement of extension agents and the various research- extension-farmer linkage mechanisms were expected to help control such a risk. The risks assessed were, however, mainly related to the research problem and overlooked procurement, administrative, managerial, economic and political instability risks which in retrospect were the main risks that affected the project. C. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 7. Overall, the project capacity building objectives were partially achieved. Improvement of priority setting and resource allocation methodology, taking into account farmers' needs and resource conservation 8. This objective was partially achieved. The revision of INRAN's statutes, which was a condition of effectiveness, was undertaken in 1991 and established several governance bodies to ensure adequate priority setting and resource allocation, taking into account farmers' needs and resource conservation. 9. However, most of the governance bodies established by the statutes did not function effectively for various reasons: (a) farmers representation on the management council or board of INRAN was relatively weak (one out of six) and was not seriously considered during preparation; (b) the Scientific Council, whose role was to advise the board on relevance and quality of research proposals, never had a meeting despite a clear definition of its modus operandi and nomination of its twelve members. One reason was the absence of evaluation and classification of the research staff which would have enabled the council to do its job properly; (c) the National Council for Agricultural Research, mostly made up of Ministers, whose role was to provide research policy guidance, also never met because its chairman, the Minister of Agriculture, changed ten times during the eight-year project period, as a result of political instability. 10. Nevertheless, the Regional Research/Development Councils or Comits Regionaux de la Recherche Agronomique (CORRAs) were established as one of the conditions of effectiveness, but functioned effectively only for a short period from 1992 to 1993. The CORRA was a forum for meeting and consultation between research extension and farmers in each region (Departement) to discuss each year the production constraints and their solutions. The regional research centers were in charge of organizing the CORRA meetings in collaboration with the local government representations (Prefectures), but the latter tended to have a non-transparent management of the funds made available to them for organizing the meetings. As a result, INRAN stopped funding the CORRAs since 1995, following an unsuccessful attempt to resume their activities in that year. 11. To include resource conservation needs in priority setting, a natural resource management (NRM) program was effectively established as planned with two multidisciplinary diagnostic teams, one for the Niger river basin region and the other for the eastern plains along the border with Nigeria. In addition a farming systems research (FSR) program was also set up and intervened in on-farm testing of technologies, in collaboration with extension services.  4 Improvement of coordination in the formulation and execution of national and international research programs 12. This objective was substantially achieved through the following actions: (a) a Scientific Directorate was created within INRAN to coordinate the formulation and implementation of research programs and was headed by a Scientific Director democratically elected by the research scientists; (b) five multidisciplinary research programs (rain-fed systems, irrigated systems, livestock systems, farming systems and technology transfers, natural resources management) were created by pooling staff from the existing five thematic departments so as to ensure interdisciplinary team-work and better coordination of research programs across departments; (c) program committees were set up each year within each multidisciplinary research program to formulate the annual research proposals; (d) annual program review and planning meetings were organized with the participation of external partners such as international research Institutes and development agencies, to discuss the results of the past year and proposals for the coming year; (e) research activities within programs and departments were coordinated by the Scientific Director; (f) the Scientific Directorate was decentralized across the regional research centers with the deputy director of the regional centers playing the role of Scientific Director at that level. The Scientific Directorate was also in charge of contracting and managing collaborative research program conventions with national and international research institutions and research networks. Improvement of research planning, budgeting and financial management 13. This objective was partially achieved as follows: (a) the long term strategic plan (1988 - 2003) was revised and one medium-term strategic plan was designed and updated; (b) technical assistance was provided as planned by a consultant from ISNAR to improve research planning within the Institute; (c) an administrative and financial directorate was established and its director was given necessary training; (d) a private enterprise type of accounting and financial management system was put in place with all necessary manuals of procedure, computer software and hardware; (e) accountants were recruited and accounting consultants were hired to make good use of the accounting system; (f) administrative and financial management was decentralized toward the regional research centers with creation in each center of a management committee headed by the director of the regional center assisted by a chief of administrative and fmancial services who managed a secondary bank account of the Institute; (g) the appointment by the Ministry of Finance, following a Bank supervision mission in 1994, of a Financial Controller also in charge of monitoring the budgeting process; (h) the creation of a special procurement commission headed by the chairman of the board of the Institute to speed up procurement during the last year of project implementation. 14. However, not all institutional arrangements planned for achieving the objective were completed. The consultative group of donors planned for discussing budgetary and financial management issues yearly was not set up because only IDA and the government ended up financing the project, as other potential donors declined their direct participation in the project. Nevertheless, some of them such as USAID and other donors assisted the Institute through bilateral projects. No forum was set up to coordinate such donor interventions as proposed in the SAR. The "protocole d'accordc' for associated programs with the university was not signed  S because of weak administrative and financial management capability at the university, and no action was taken to correct the situation. No special fund was set up as planned for research- extension linkage interventions, because they were funded satisfactorily from the overall research fund of the Institute. 15. Proper achievement of the above objective was constrained by a lack of budget line per research project and sub-project, which would have enabled scientists to better monitor resource use within their projects and to improve their budgeting and financial management skills. Long delays for procurement through the ministerial channels due to the slow reactions of government services seriously challenged the ability of the administrative and financial service of the Institute to efficiently complete its work program and maintain good working relationships with suppliers and contractors. Improvement of staff planning, training, recruitment and career development in research 16. This objective was partially achieved as follows: (a) a human resource management unit headed by a personnel manager was created under the Administrative and Financial Directorate, which was in charge of staff planning, recruitment and evaluation, staff transfers, management of contracts, salaries and benefits; (b) a human resource development (training) unit was also created under the Scientific Directorate and was in charge of planning and monitoring staff training programs; (c) staff recruitment and training needs were identified in the long- and medium-term strategic plans. 17. The training program resulted in an increase in the number of scientists with at least a DEA (Diplome d'Etude Approfondie) or a Masters degree-- from 29 in 1993 to 60 in 1998-- thereby raising the proportion of scientists with advanced degrees from 40 percent to 76 percent. However, the number of technicians per scientist did not reach 2 as planned but instead declined below 1, its previous level, because many of the technicians went on training to become scientists and because civil service recruitment was halted as part of structural adjustment measures. Long term training was funded at 63 percent by the project, at 18 percent by collaborative research programs, 10 percent by USAID, and 9 percent by the government. Short- term training was funded at 33 percent by the project, 58 percent by collaborative research programs and 9 percent by USAID. 18. The main constraint to the full achievement of the objective was the non-adoption by the government of the autonomous statute of the staff of the Institute which would have allowed INRAN to hire, reward and fire its staff independently, and no longer have to depend on the public civil service staff management system. 19. Adoption of this personnel statute within the statutes of INRAN was a condition of effectiveness of the project (SAR, paragraphs 3.06a and 6.2a; DCA section 6.01a.). To satisfy the condition, a statute for the staff of INRAN with a career plan was adopted in 1991 by the government but did not allow the Institute to undertake autonomous management of its staff. For this to happen an adhoc commission was to carry out the evaluation of the staff, but this was not done. In addition, the adopted statute could not be implemented because it was adopted by a ministerial decision or "arrete" and not by a decree of the council of ministers which would have  6 allowed the implementation of its financial implications. Fears that many staff of the Institute would lose their jobs (because not qualified to be scientists) if the staff evaluation was carried out before completion of the training plan, were most likely the origin of resistance to adopt the statute. The project thus became effective with the government seemingly but not really fulfilling one of its conditions of effectiveness. 20. Despite several reminders by INRAN and by supervision missions, but with no formal threat of suspension, the government resisted the adoption of an adequate statute for INIRAN's personnel. New and corrected versions of the statute, one for scientists and one for technicians, were drafted and were commented upon by all relevant ministries. They were submitted to the council of ministers in 1996, but were still not adopted at the end of the project despite the extension of project completion date by three years. Strengthening linkages between research, extension services and farmers 21. This objective was substantially achieved with: (a) a farming systems and technology transfer (FSTT) program established in 1994; (b) the strengthening of the FSTT program's human resources with the appointment of an international consultant and seven high level staff from the Ministry of Agriculture in 1996; (c) the establishment of two multidisciplinary teams, including research scientists and extension staff, for diagnostic and technology transfer, with one team for the western river basin (based at the Niamey and Kollo centers), and the other team for the south eastern plains (based at the Maradi center); (d) a positive evaluation of the multidisciplinary team experiment which led to further decentralization of the approach with creation of diagnostic and technology transfer teams at the district ("arrondissemenf') level in collaboration with the agricultural services project (Cr. 235 5-NIR). 22. Mechanisms for strengthening linkages between research, extension services, and farmers were formally established and included the CORRAs, the monthly technology review workshops (AMRTs), and on-farm tests of technologies. As previously mentioned, the CORRAS were effective during a short part (1992-93) of the project implementation period, and did not operate in the last five years as funding by the Institute was stopped. However, INRAN made a proposal that would allow the CORRAs to resume their activities by being held in a cyclical manner in fewer provinces per year so as to reduce the burden on scientists. The government failed to react to the suggestion in the name of the local governments involved in the CORRA process and the Institute also failed to pursue the matter. The AMRTs allowed contacts between scientists and subject matter specialists of the extension services. A total of 252 AMRTs were organized across the country between 1993 and 1997. Several on-farm and farmer-managed tests were also carried out jointly with extension services since 1993. The research staff participated in 338 of such on-farm tests in 1997 out of 863 planned, and in 357 of such tests in 1998, out of 618 planned. 23. In addition to the on-farm tests in collaboration with extension services, each research program of INRAN had contact farmers for conducting on-farm researcher-managed and farmer- managed trials. The rain-fed crops program had in 1997 and 1998 about 500 contact farmers for the production of seeds (sorghum, millet cowpea), covering over 219 hectares. During the same period the irrigated crops program worked with farmers in 12 irrigation schemes and on one  7 modem farm. The animal production program worked with 200 livestock herds. The natural resources management program intervened in 11 villages for soil fertility management research and in 8 villages for forest and fisheries management research. The farming systems and technology transfer program had on-farm trials in 28 villages. Civil works and equipment 24. The project also included the rehabilitation and construction of INRAN's research infrastructure to support the above mentioned objectives. Eighty percent of the civil works planned at appraisal, in terms of expected costs, were completed. These included the rehabilitation of the research centers of Niamey, Kollo, Maradi; the construction of the research center of Tahoua; the construction of the research stations of Konni, Bengou, and Agadez; the rehabilitation of the research stations of Tillabery, Ouallam, Magaria, Diffa, Kalapate; and the rehabilitation of the building of the department of rural economics at Niamey. Works not completed include the construction of the research center of Zinder, the INRAN/University collaborative laboratories, and the training and conference center of INRAN at Niamey. About ninety percent of the equipment and vehicles planned under the project, in terms of expected total costs, were also acquired. Technology Development and Transfer (TDT) 25. The research output objectives were substantially achieved. 26. The most striking achievement of INRAN was the development in collaboration with INTSORMIL of NADI, the first high yielding hybrid sorghum for the Sahel, with a potential yield of 3 to 4 tonnes per hectare under an average annual rainfall of 400 mm. The variety was widely adopted by contact farmers, with the number of farmers growing the hybrid increasing from 40 in 1996 to 600 in 1998. Some contact farmers (mostly vegetable gardeners) were actively involved in the production of the hybrid seed under the guidance of the Institute. The number of contact seed growers increased from 2 in 1995 with a production of 750 kg of seeds to 43 in 1998 with a production of 13,000 kg of seeds. An intemational INTSORMIL workshop was held in Niamey in 1998 to recognize INRAN's achievement in the development and production of hybrid sorghum seeds and to share its experience with other countries in the region. 27. In addition to the hybrid sorghum, three irrigated rice varieties (high yielding and yellow molt virus disease resistant) and two improved rain-fed rice varieties were also developed by INRAN in collaboration with WARDA, and were extended to farmers. Other improved crop varieties, mostly high yielding and drought tolerant varieties, developed by INRAN under the project and which were subject to pre-extension or extension to farmers included: one millet variety, two wheat varieties, four maize varieties, two green pepper varieties, two tomato varieties, and five cassava varieties. A germplasm bank was also set up for fruit crops. Natural resource management techniques, in particular for the management of soil fertility, water, forest and fisheries were also developed and extended through the contact farmers of the Institute. With respect to animal production, three highly productive breeds of sheep were screened for  8 their high meat and wool quality, epidemic maps of ruminants in Niger were also established, and a mechanical hay/forage grinder was also developed to increase livestock feed digestibility. 28. However, soil and water management technology development within the NRM program was very limited and quite inconsistent with the fact that poor soil and water management are the major biophysical constraints to agricultural productivity growth in Niger. Unlike other program, the project failed to acquire the necessary international expertise to develop the NRM program as needed with sufficient emphasis on dry land farming. 29. With respect to other TDT performance indicators proposed by the 1997 supervision, there was a significant increase in on-farm adaptive trials in all areas of research through the contact farmers. The technologies that were developed, in particular the improved varieties, allow for over a 5 percent increase in the productivity of dry land farming and for a 50 to 100 percent increase in the productivity of irrigated farming as suggested by on-farm research results. Nationwide, during the project period, less than one fourth of technologies proposed by extension services were significantly adopted by 8 to 30 percent of contact farmers. More details are provided in the ICR of the agricultural services project (Cr. 2355-NIR). 30. International collaboration in TDT was significant through the project period as demonstrated by the development of the sorghum hybrid NAD I in collaboration with INTSORMIL, the screening of cassava varieties in collaboration with IITA, the development of millet and sorghum varieties in collaboration with ICRISAT, rice with WARDA, and other examples. As previously mentioned, international institutions and research networks also contributed significantly to the training of INRAN's scientists. Monitoring and Evaluation 31. Monitoring and evaluation of the project was poorly planned and poorly implemented. There was no external monitoring and evaluation system planned and put in place at the ministerial level or at the board level to regularly assess and guide project implementation. With respect to internal M&E, a division for study, program monitoring and evaluation and training (DEPSEF) was planned under the Scientific Directorate but was not established as expected. The Scientific Director was directly in charge of monitoring and evaluation of research activities and had a training division under his authority. M&E of civil works was done by the civil engineering unit under the Director of Administration and Finance. M&E by the above- mentioned entities was rather informal with no tracking records or M&E data, mainly as a result of the lack of clearly specified performance indicators in the initial design of the project. Financial and administrative management 32. The project administrative and financial management was often rated as satisfactory by supervision missions, but was in fact questionable due to poor procurement performance. Management was relatively stable with a single head of administrative and financial affairs present throughout the life of the project, compared with three Directors General during the lifetime of the project. Audit reports were generally not seriously qualified. However, some  9 management errors, mostly related to stocks management, were pointed out by the audits and were subsequently corrected. There were no serious ineligible expenses to be reimbursed by the government. The appointment of a Financial Controller helped improve financial management. Procurement was generally slow and unsatisfactory, particularly during the first three years of the project, and led to the three-year extension of the project. Procurement speed improved, but not without some errors, during the last year of the project, with the creation of a special project procurement commission headed by the chairman of the board of the Institute. D. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING 33. Total project cost for the initial five year implementation period (1990-1995) was expected, according to the appraisal report, to be US$ 28 million. Thle government was expected to contribute US$3.5 million, bilateral donors US$4.6 million and IDA US$19.9 million. However, only the government's and IDA's contributions materialized, but with the Government providing only about US$1.7 million. IDA finally contributed US$20.4 million, given exchange rate fluctuations. The project actual total cost was about US$22 million. USAID contributed to the project by funding the training component through a separate US$1.37 million bilateral project (PRAN). E. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 34. MIvanageniewt (Cap)ahi/ily Can1d Isitahi/lit. Overall management of the project by INRAN was weak during the first four years. By the end of 1994, less than 20 percent of the credit was disbursed. The nomination of a more visionary and capable Director in 1995 speeded up project implementation and resulted in about 60 percent of the credit being disbursed by the end of 1997 after a two-year extension of the completion date. The nomination of a new Director General in 1998 and the temporary suspension of the Director of administration and finance together with a temporary suspension of the civil engineering staff by a new Minister of Agriculture slowed down the momentum in project implementation for a while before recovery to normal implementation speed occurred by mid 1998. However, overall stability in the staffing of the administrative and financial directorate helped to minimize disruptions to the project. 35. Procuiremenit Delays. Delays in procurement through ministerial and national procurement commissions, particularly for the procurement of civil works, vehicles and equipment, slowed down project implementation during the first seven years of project irnplementation. Such delays were sometimes due to resistance by INRAN to political pressures to compromise on the procurement process. The creation of a special procurement commission headed by the chairman of the board of INRAN helped speed up procurement and project implementation during the last year. 36. Trainintg antd Int.ertnation7al Co7nsul/tanv. The massive training of scientists since the early years (1993) from funds provided by the project, by international collaborative research programs and by USAID enabled INRAN to upgrade the quality, the coordination and the achievements of the research programs. The appointment of three international consultants (irrigation, technology transfer, and livestock specialists) to help INRAN plan its activities, shape up the research programs and mentor the incoming junior scientists was a major  10 determinant of the success of the research activities. The consultants were particularly useful in connecting INRAN with the international research community. 37. Counterpart Funclds Waiver. Difficulties in getting counterpart funds from the government slowed down the implementation of the training program and the recruitment of consultants. The amendment of the credit agreement in 1995 following the mid-term review, to waive the 14 percent of counterpart fund initially required for training and consultant expenses improved the implementation of the training and Consultants component, and consequently also improved disbursement. 38. Stfatutes/hy-/aivs. The non-adoption of the statutes or bylaws related to autonomous management of the staff of the Institute prevented the implementation of an adequate incentive system to keep trained scientists within the Institute and increase their productivity. Many of the trained scientists, particularly the Scientific Directors, left the Institute to get more secure and more rewarding jobs in international institutions in Niger and in the West African region, partly because of the absence of an incentive system. Political instability resulting in constant change of the ministers with whom the statutes were discussed and negotiated was also an important factor that explains the non-adoption of the statutes. 39. Instability in Research Coordination. The Scientific Director changed seven times during the eight years of project implementation, with consequent instability in research coordination approach and capability. 40. Initernationial Research CLollahoration. The intervention of regional and international scientists in the research activities of INRAN, through collaborative research programs and networks was a major determinant of the improvement in the quantity and quality of research output. F. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 41. Financial sustainability of the project was and remains unlikely for the following reasons: (a) The Government was unable to pay the counterpart funds of the project, out of a total of about 400 million CFA only one fourth was disbursed over the project period; (b) the procurement of new buildings, vehicles and equipment increased the recurrent costs of INRAN, and the government was not even paying basic salaries on a regular basis; (c) the donor coordination mechanism which was to help mitigate the shortfalls of government funds, was not established; (d) there was no sustainable funding mechanism included in the project design that would have enabled the Institute to generate revenues and to recover at least part of its costs. Attempt to identify opportunities for partial cost recovery began too late, with a feasibility study in 1998. The institutional reforms and the human resources development achievements did, however, positively contribute to the institutional sustainability of the project. G. BANK PERFORMANCE 42. Although tne Bank satisfactorily identified investment in agricultural research as a means for promoting rural development in Niger, its overall performance was unsatisfactory for various  11 reasons. At preparation, attention was focussed only on reinforcing the existing public institutional capacity, and particularly on inputs and processes, with no clear definition of the type of research institution expected out of the project, and with no mention of expected minimum research output. The monitoring and evaluation component and performance indicators were neglected. There was no attempt to initiate a sustainable funding or cost recovery mechanism. The statutes or bylaws expected as a condition for effectiveness were not properly defined, and this led to inadequate statutes being adopted with the projectsbecoming effective with one of its condition for effectiveness (INRAN statutes) unfulfilled. 43. Bank formal supervision was insufficient; it occurred only nine times during the eight years of project implementation. The mid-termn review was done late, in the initial year of project completion (1995) and failed to correct the initial deficiencies in project design. Supervision from headquarters was unstable with five task managers over the eight years of project implementation. Local supervision from the Resident Mission was, however, stable. Although supervision led to a greater emphasis on research output and to related performance indicators in 1997, these were insufficiently discussed and documented within INRAN. The Bank failed to get the government to adopt effective statutes/by-laws for INRAN and to disburse the bulk of counterpart funds. There was no formal threat of suspension and the project completion date was extended twice--first for two years in 1995 and then for one year in 1997 with no significant progress in compliance with conditions. Bank supervision was, however, instrumental in improving the research content and research output of the project, and in speeding procurement and disbursement at times. The Bank helped the Borrower by increasing the fund level of the special account from 200 million CFAF to 350 million CFAF, following the 1994 CFAF devaluation, but failed often to provide timely response to requests for non-objection (procurement) and for disbursement. Delays were however also often due to the poor quality of bidding documents. H. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 44. The Borrower's performance was unsatisfactory, particularly as the result of a thirteen- month delay from Board approval to effectiveness, the failure to adopt and implement adequate and effective statutes for INRAN, and the failure to disburse the counterpart funds. Delays in project implementation were also caused by the bureaucratic bottlenecks in the national procurement system. Several ministerial decisions on procurement and staff suspension disrupted project implementation. The government failed to comply with most agreements reached prior to extension of project completion date and has had a general tendency not to hold promises mainly because of the frequent changes of Minister of Agriculture. 1. IMPLEMENTING AGENCY 45. Project management was overall unsatisfactory. It was weak during the first four years, then improved and declined again afterwards. Financial management was relatively acceptable up to the credit closing date, as suggested by the absence of serious audit issues. However, the project management was insufficiently pro-active in getting the governance bodies of the Institute to hold meetings and to function as planned. Procurement was globally unsatisfactory. It was slow with some errors that resulted in conflicts with suppliers and contractors.  12 J. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 46. With respect to the initial capacity building objective, the project outcome was unsatisfactory. There were modest to substantial achievements in the areas of research planning, research coordination, financial management, staff training, research-extension linkage, and civil works, but the project failed to establish an efficient agricultural research institution with autonomous management of its staff, as well as of its funds, with effective statutes/bylaws and well functioning governance bodies. As a consequence, the Institute has been losing part of its (expensively) trained staff. The project took eight years to accomplish what was planned for five years and could have been accomplished in five years if adequate management capabilities and procurement systems were put in place on time. The research institution resulting from the project is also unsustainable and most of the positive capacity building accomplishments of the project are likely to fall apart in absence of adequate statutes, well-functioning governance bodies and a sustainable financing system. 47. Prior to 1997, supervision rated the project unsatisfactory or satisfactory with respect to development objectives mainly on the basis of implementation progress with respect to civil works, procurement of vehicles and equipment, rather than with respect to the fundamental institution building elements (statutes, governance, etc.). Following the shift of emphasis from capacity building to research output by supervision in 1997, the development objective rating of the project became mostly satisfactory more under the influence of the quality and quantity of the research output. The latter was satisfactory but was mainly due to international collaborative research programs and may not be sustained within an unsustainable research institution. 48. Overall the project outcome was marginally unsatisfactory. K. FUTURE OPERATIONS 49. As a result of difficulties in completing the first phase of the project, no future operation was prepared. However studies were undertaken during project implementation to feed into the design of a rural development strategy which will serve as a basis for future operations. A proposal for an integrated agricultural research and extension program has been drafted by the government and will be discussed along with the government's rural development strategy when completed. Meanwhile, the Bank is planning to undertake, in collaboration with the Borrower, feasibility studies of alternative agricultural research and extension services in Niger, such as decentralized agricultural services. L. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 50. The positive and negative experiences of similar first-generation type of agricultural research project confirm most of the lessons learned from such type of projects in the past and that are being applied in the new generation type of agricultural services projects funded by the Bank, that is: the need to have integrated research and extension projects, the need to establish mechanisms for real farmers' participation in the development of the research agenda and in the allocation of research funds; the need to use lending instruments such as the adaptable program lending (APL) instrument to pursue capacity building in a short early phase of the project and  13 research output objectives in the following phases, the need to introduce cost sharing or cost- recovery mechanisms, etc. Additional specific lessons that one may draw from the implementation of this project include the following: (a) It is essential to include legal advisers in the design of projects whose success depends heavily on legal texts or statutes that are to be adopted before or during project implementation. This will help to ensure proper identification, proper designi and effective implementation of such legal texts. (b) A special procurement commission, as experienced in the last year of this project, chaired by the chairman of the board of the research Institute implementing the research project, can help speed up procurement and disbursement, and can thereby improve project implementation, provided that the research Institute has a sufficiently efficient administrative and financial management system. (c) Conditions for effectiveness, if not properly fulfilled before project implementation are unlikely to be during project implementation. (d) Farmers participation in the research process, significantly improves the relevance of research to farmers' needs as well as the quantity and quality of research results. (e) Adequate bylaws for autonomous management of research staff by research institutions and sustainable financin- mechanisms are necessary to provide minimum incentives and an enabling environment for fruitful research.. (f) Collaboration with research institutions and research networks at regional and international levels significantly improves the quantity and quality of research output and should ideally be built into research projects or be facilitated by them. (g) It is necessary to include in the design of projects a mechanism to insure across time and across project managers within the Bank and within the borrowing country, a common understanding of project objectives and performance indicators, including project sustainability indicators. (h) Recruitment systems, results agreements and incentive systems that attract and maintain good project management capability, at the Bank level and at the Borrower's level, are essential for good and consistent project management. (i) Decentralization of research by providing more autonomy to the regional research centers, and by allowing them to have their own governance and funding bodies, with the involvement of farmers organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector in such bodies, is likely to be more effective than the establishment of governance bodies at the national level. (j) Project supervision tends to be less holistic than the mid-term review and the ICR in reviewing the accomplishments of projects against their development objectives and  14 components, as identified in the SAR and follow-up amendments. Supervision tends to focus on eliminating major project weaknesses at a given time through action plans. As a result supervision ratings of a project may significantly differ from the ICR rating as in the present case. In order to insure consistency, there is a need to emphasize the SAR (or PAD) as a major supervision instrument, especially when there are frequent changes in project managers on the Bank side as well as on the Borrower's side.  15 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (Cr. 2122-NIR) PART II: Statistical Tables Table 1: Summary of Assessments Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable A. Achievement of objectives (X) (X) (X) (X) Macroeconomic policies X Sector policies Xl Financial objectives X Institutional development X Physical objectives X Poverty reduction X Gender issues X Other social objectives X Environmental objectives X Public sector management X Private sector development X l Other (specify) X Likely Unlikely Uncertain B. Project sustainability (X) (X) (X) Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient C. Bank performance (X) (X) (X) Identification _-x Preparation assistance X Appraisal L_______X Supervision X  16 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient D. Borrower performance (X) (X) (X) Preparation X Implementation X X Covenant compliance __ __ x Operation (if applicable) . X Highly Highly E. Assessment of outcome satisfactorv Satisfactorv Unsatisfactorv Unsatisfactorv (X) (X) (X) (X) x  17 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/ IDA Credits Credit title Purpose Year of Status approval Preceding operation Dosso RDP The project aimed to increase agricultural production 1979 Completed (Cr. 0967) and reinforce capacity building at a local level. The Projcct Completion Report concluded that the impact of Dosso project on production increase was marginial and that the adoption of insufficiently proven technical messages by famers w.as limited. The project closed in June 1985 witih only' 16% of fund disbursed out of the total credit of US$20 million Maradi RDP 11 The proiect aimed to: (a) encourage famier's initiative 1980 Completed (Cr. 1026) and participation and to make them more responsible for development activities: (b) develop village-based extension system: and (c) gradually reduce techniical assistance and cut operating cost. The project was confronted with impleimentation problems auid failed to achieve the expected increase in crop production and a real responsabilisation of farmers in development activities. Small Rural The project aimed at helping the Government to 1988 Completed Operations develop institutional capability in preparation and (Cr. 1890) execution of small rural operations by (a) providing support to provincial anid district techniical services. (b) improving extension services, and (c) training beneficiary groups in literacy and management. In addition, the project financed investments in grant fomi for (a) bottomland improvements. (b) development of small-irrigated perimcters. (c) establishment of fruit tree nurseries. and (d) various operations in natural resource management. Foliowing operations Agr. Services The project aimed at strengthening agricultural. 1992 Completed Support Project (Cr. livestock and environmental protection extension with 2355) a view to generate increased production and sustained growth of farm incomes. Pilot Private The project assesses and applies irrigation technologies 1995 Active Irrigation adapted to small-scale agriculture as practiced by (Cr. 2707) individual farmers. Natural Resources The project is intended to slow and arrest 1995 Active Mgt. environmental deterioration. and eventually improve (Cr. 2796) environmental conditions. It is the first part of a long- term project aimed at improving agricultural productivity.  18 Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Date Actual Identification October 1987 October 1987 Preparation June 1988 June 1988 Appraisal February 1990 Februarv 1990 Negotiations Februarv 1990 Febnlanr 1990 Board Presentation March 1990 March 1990 Signing __ July 1990 Effectiveness __July 1991 Mid-term review March 1995 Project Completion _ _ December 1995 Credit Closing December 1998 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ million) FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 Appraisal Estimate - 5.0 7.9 11.3 15.2 17.4 18.6 19.3 19.7 19.9 Actual - 0 1.0 1.8 4.1 5.3 j 7.9 11.5 16.3 20.4 Actual as % of Estimate - 0 12.65 15.92 26.97 30.45 42.47 59.58 82.74 102.51 Date of Final Disbursement June 17. 1999 Table 5 : Key Indicators for project Implementation Not available Table 6: Key Indicators for project Operation Not available  19 Table 7: Studies proposed and carried out during project implementation. Study Objective as defined at Status Study's impact appraisal I . Socio-economic An effective and realistic Implemented Adequate types of study of Agricultural research program is set research programs have Research in Niger up been established 2. Study on INRAN A training plan for staff Implemented Researchers trained training plan with skill gap analysis is according to identified established needs 3.Study on INRAN Preparation of Implemented Statute not yet adopted autonomous statute autonomous by the Government and statute/bylaws for not yet implemented researchers 4. Initial evaluation of To plan human resources TORs developed but None INRAN researchers develoment and Not Implemented adequately staff research programs. 5. Medium and long Medium and long term Implemented Improvement of term plans for programming of coordination and agronomic research in research activities implementation of Niger agricultural research activities 6.Study for To computerize the Implemented Improvement of the computerization of financial managementof management system of INRAN activities INRAN iNRAN with a new management software 7. Market survey and Increase 1NRAN's Implemented No impact for the analysis of the demand capacity to generate its moment, for INRAN's services own income recommendations are and products (sustainability) being examinined 8. Inventory of main Improve knowledge on Implemented Insects known. Adequate insects harmful to fruit insects that are harmful research program are trees in Niger to fruit trees being designed to find ways of protecting fruit trees against insects attacks 9. Inventory of main Improve knowledge on Implemented Insects known and insects harmful to main insects harmful to e Research programs being tuber and root crops in tuber and root crops designed to protect tiber Niger and root crops. 10. Inventory of main Improve knowledge of Implemented Better knowledge of diseases of tuber and tuber and root crop tuber and root crop root cropst in Niger diseases diseases and design of relevant research programs  20 11. Analysis of To develop tilapia Implemented Feeding strategies for methods and feeding feeding systems Tilapia have been strategies of tilapia developed. fishes in Niger 12. Diagnosis study on Study of sesame seeds Implemented Better knowledge of sesame seeds in Niger production in Tillabery, sesame farming in Niger Maradi et Gaya area for the design of a sesame research program 13. Study of improved Identification of Implemented Identification and seed multiplication and institutions, technologies Training of seeds distribution systems and policy framework growers. Increased (fili&res) in Niger needed to develop a production of improved private seeds industry seeds. Regional seeds workshop in Niger in 1998. 14. Baseline study of Identification of soilo Implemented National and regional the Soil fertility fertility management soil fertility management initiative in Niger problems and related action plans are under technical solutions on the preparation shelf in Niger 15. Study of the Improvement of the Implemented Recommendations for administrative and administrative and improving INRAN's financial management financial management Financial and of the project. system administrative Management 16. Preparation of << To develop a proposal Implemented Proposal completed and avantprojef natrionacl for an integrated distributed. inogre de recherche- research-extension vulgarisation follow-up operation. (PNIRV) >>  21 Table 8-A: Allocation and Disbursement of IDA Credit (in US$M) Project Components Appraisal Estimate Actual 1. Civil Works 4.24 3.8 2. Vehicles and Equipment 5.00 5.8 3. Operating Costs 3.57 4.5 4. Consultants' Services Training 2.13 2.6 5. Reserve Research Fund 2.30 3.2 6. Refunding of Project Preparation 0.75 0.5 Advance 7. Unallocated 2.00 (0.0 Total 19.99 20.4 Table 8-B: Project Financing Source Appraisal Estimate (US$M) Actual/Latest Estimate (US$M) Govemment 3.5 1.68 Bilateral Donors 4.6 (.00 IDA 19.9 20.4 TOTAL 28.0 22.08 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits Not Applicable  22 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Credit Agreement Covenant Present Description of Covenant Comments Section Type Status Text Reference: 3.01 (a) 05 c As we set forth in schedule 2 to DCA, the borrower shall carry out Complied with. the project through INRAN with due diligence and efficiency. l Text Reference: 3.01 (b) 03 The borrower shall make the proceeds of the credit available to Complied with INRAN under a financing agreement between the Borrower and INRAN. Text Reference: 3.02 (c) 05 C Under the financing agreement, the Borrower shall exercise its Complied with. rights to protect its interests and IDAJ[s and to accomplish the purposes of the Credit. l Text Reference: 3.03 10 C Pursuant to section 2.03 of the Project Agreement. INRAN shall Complied wvith carry out sections 9.03, 9.04, 9.05, 9.06, 9.07, and 9.08 of the General Conditions (Insurance, use of goods & services, plans & schedules, records & reports, maintenance & land acquisitions). Text Reference: 3.04 (a) 05 CP The borrower shall ensure that any increase in their research and Complicd with indirectly through administrative staff of INRAN shall be: (i) justified in terms of a the strategic plans Manpower Development Plan which shall be prepared during the first year of project implementation: (u) entirely funded from the Borrower's national budget. Text Reference: 3.04 (b) 05 C The Borrower shall insure that there shall be no increase in the Complied with number of research programs of INRAN unless such increase is A new research strategy has been deemed to be appropriate and requires no additional staff. adopted with emphasis on On-Farm Adaptive Research. Text Reference: 3.04 (c) 05 C The Borrower shall insure that not later than 4 months after date of Complied with DCA: (i) IDA shall have received written confirmation that all key positions provided for in the revised Statuses of INRAN have been Scientific Director, Project duIy filled (ii) INRAN has taken steps to recruit a Research Admninistrator and Chief Accountant Management Consultant satisfactory to IDA. have been appointed. Text Reference: 3.04 (d) 09 CD The Borrower shall insure that no later than nine months after date Not complied with of DCA, the national Committee (see section 6.01(b) of DCA) has held its first meeting. Committee formed in August 1995. Fist meeting held in November 1995.  23 Text Reference: 3.05 09 NC The Borrower shall, not later than December 31, 1990, submit to Not complied with, IDA for review a livestock production research program, giving details of its investment and recurrent cost proposals. but, the Livestock improvement is one of the research priorities in the new strategy. A long-term consultant was appointed and a livestock research agenda w as developed . Text Reference: 3.06 05 NC Throughout implementation, the Borrower shall convene IDA & Not complied with other major donors involved to regular consultative meetings, not later than May 31 in each year. to review the results of research programs carried out by INRAN during the previous vear and to discuss w ork plans. research programs and related costs and financing plans for the following year. Text Reference: 3.07 05 NC In conjunction with the Donors consultative meeting to be held Not complied with not later than May 31. 1993. the Borrower shall organize a mid- term review of NARP. Its findings and recommendations shall be MTR held hi March 1995: findings transmitted to the National Committee. and then to IDA for its and recommendations transmitted to review and comments. National Comnmittee. Text Reference: 4.0 1(a)(i) 01 C For all expenditures made on the basis of SOEs. the Borrower shall Complied wiidi maintain and account of such expenditures. Records were maintained: financial management system was set up in June 1995. Text Reference: 01 C Ensure that all records evidencing such expendituSs are kept at Complied with 4.01(a)(ii) least I year after IDA has received the audit for the FY in * hich the last withdrawal was made. Records were maintained. Text Reference: 05 C Enable IDA to examine such records. Complied with. 4.01(a)(iii) Text Reference: 4.02(b)(i) 01 C The borrower shall: furnish the records and accounts referred to the Complied with in Section 4.01 (a) (i) and those Jor the Special Account for each Since 1992. accounts were audited, FY audited bv independent auditors. for every FY. reports are transmitted l ______________ to the Bank. Text Reference: 01 C Furnish to IDA, not later than 6 months after the end of each FY. Complied with. 4.02(b)(ii) the said audit report. including a separate opinion on reliability of SOEs. Text Reference: 05 C Furnish to IDA other information concerning records, accounts and Complied w ith. 4.02(b)(iii) the audit at IDA's request. .  24 Text Reference:2.01(a) 09 C As set forth in Schedule 2 of DCA. INRAN shall carry out the Complied with. project with due diligence and efficiencv. Text Reference: 2.02(b) 09 CP Without limitation upon the provisions of (a) above. INRAN shall Partly complied with the project carry out the project in accordance with the Implementation implementation was slow during the Program set forth in Schedule 2 to Project Agreement. first four years. However, since March 1995. continued good progrcss has accelerated pro,ect implementation. To achieve the development objcctives. the project was extended by two yvears and additional one ycar. up to the end of Dcember 1998.. Text Reference: 2.02 i() C Procurement of the goods. works aund consultants' services shall be Complied with. governed by Schedulc I of Project Agreement Text Reference: 2.03 09 C INRAN shall cam. out Sections 9.03.9.04. 9.05. 9.06. 9.07 & 9.08 Complied with. of the General Conditions (insurnance. usc of goods & services. plans & schedules. records & reports. maintenance & land acquisition) Text Reference: 2.05 (a) (9 C INRAN shall. at IDA's rcquest. exchange views witih IDA with In compliancc. regards to the progress of the project. under this agreemcnt and the Financing Agreement. Text Reference: 2.05 (b) 09 C INRAN shall promptly inform IDA of any condition which In compliance. intcrferes with the progress of the project. the accomplishment of the purposes of thc Credit. or the performance by INRAN of its obligations under this Agreement and the Financing Agreement Text Reference: 3.01 (a) (9 CP INRAN shall carry on its operations under the supervision of Partly complied with qualified and expericnced management assisted by competent staff Management was weak during first in adequate numbers. four years Text Reference: 3.01 (b) 09 C INRAN shall take necessary measures. not later than 9 months after Complied with Late. date to DCA. to implement all organizational and staffing proposals under the project. and to consult IDA on any further change in There was 13 month delay from INRAN. board approval to effectiveness  25 Text Reference: 3.02 09 C INRAN shall at all times operate and maintain its plant, machinery, In compliance. equipment and other property, all in accordance with sound engineering, financial and scientific practices. Text Reference: 3.03 09 C INRAN shall take out and maintain with responsible insurers In compliance. against such risks and in such amounts consistent with appropriate _practice. l Text Reference: 4.01 (a) 01 C INRAN shall maintain records and accounts adequate to reflect its Complied with. operations and financial condition. Text Reference: 4.01 (b) 01 C INRAN shall have its records, accounts and financial statements for Complied with. (i) each FY audited by independent auditors. l Text Reference: 01 C INRAN shall furnish to IDA. not later than 6 months after the end Complied with. 4.01(b)(ii) of each FY: (a) certified copies of its financial statements for such year; and (b) the audit report. Text Reference: 01 C INRAN shall furnish to IDA other information concening said Complied w ith. 4.01(b)(iii) record, accounts & financial statements as well as the audit at IDA s request. Status: Covenant Class: C: Complied with I: Accounts/audit CD: Complied after delay 2: Financial performance/gencrate revenue from beneficiaries NC: Not Complied with 3: Flow and utilization of Project funds Soon: Compliance expected in Reasonably Short Time 4: Counterpart funding CP: Complied with Partially, 5: Management aspects of the Pro3ect or of its executing agency NYD: Not Yet Due 6: Environmental covenants 7: Involuntary resettlement 8: Indigenous people 9: Monitoring, review and reporting 10: Implementation I1: Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetarv or other resource allocation 12: Sectoral or cross-sectoral regulatory/institutional action 13: Other  26 Table 11: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of Actual Project Cycle Weeks US$ ______ _________________________ ($000) Through Appraisal 103.7 250.8 Negotiation-Board 13.3 37.0 Supervision 223.9 588.6 Completion 21.0 42.1 TOTAL 361.9 918.5  27 Table 12: Bank Resources: Missions Performance Rating Project phase Month/Year Number of Persons Days in Field Specialized Staff Implementation Status Development Objectivc, Types of problens ills Represented Identification October 1987 Preparation June 1988 8 Appraisal February 1990 3 A;G EC, AR. Supervision I March 1991 1 12 AG U I M. l Supervision 11 December 1991 1 12 AG S S Supervision Ill May 1993 2 12 A(;. AE LJU N. I' Supervision IV October 1995 3 12 AG. A(G. 00 S Supervision V March 1996 4 12 EX. EC. (X). AG S S Supervision VI Septemhber 1996 3 12 EX. 00. A(i S Supetvision VIl March 1997 2 3 AR. EX S S Supervision VIII October 1997 2 15 AG. (X) S S Supervision IX October 1998 15 AG. (X) S S (ICR mission) April 1999 2 15 AG. (X) U N.B. The above refers only to supcrvision by headquarters staff. Local staff supervision is not included Types of problems: Subject specialty: AG: Agronomist MS: Management Specialist D: Slow Disbursement AE: Agricultural Economist TR: Training Specialist F: Availability of counterpart funds AS: Agricultural Services Specialist 00: Operations Officer FP: Financial problems EC: Economist OA: Operations Analyst L: Adherence to legal clauses EX: Extension Specialist NRM: Natural Resources Mgt. Specialist M: Project management FA: Financial Analyst RR: Resident Representative P: Progress with procurement LS: Livestock Specialist NGO: NGO Specialist TA: Progress with technical assistance PS: Procurement Specialist TR: Training SE: Social Economist RF: Rural Finance Specialist  28 REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER BANQUE MONDIALE MISSION D'ACHEVEMENT DU PROJET NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE AGRICOLE (PNRA) DU 7 AU 16 AVRIL 1999 AIDE MEMOIRE Deroulement de la Mission 1. Une mission de la Banque mondiale conduite par M. Yves-Coffi Prudencio, Task Manager du PNRA a sejourne au Niger du 7 au 16 Avril 1999 pour collecter les informations necessaires A la redaction du rapport d'achevement du PNRA. M. Prudencio etait accompagn6 de M. Mahaman Salifou, charge du projet A la mission residente de la Banque A Niamey et M. le Secretaire General Adjoint du Ministere de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage. La mission a travaille avec les cadres de l'Institut National de la Recherche Agricole (INRAN) au cours d'un atelier tenu les 9 et 12 Avril 1999 a Niamey pour discuter des realisations du projet comparativement aux previsions du rapport d'evaluation initiale du projet. Cet atelier a ete precde et suivi d'autres reunions entre la mission et l'administration de l'INRAN pour obtenir les informations necessaires a la redaction du rapport. Le premier draft du rapport national d'achevement deja pr8t a la date de la mission a egalement servi de base aux discussions. RKsultats de la Mission 2. Les discussions ont ete focalisbes sur la r6alisation des cinq principaux objectifs du projet tel que figurant dans le rapport d'evaluation initial et la rehabilitation des infrastructures et equipements de l'INRAN, A savoir: 1. L'amelioration de la methodologie pour la definition des priorites et de l'allocation des ressources, prenant en compte les besoins des agriculteurs et la conservation des ressources naturelles. 2. l'arnelioration de la coordination dans la formulation et l'execution des programmes de recherche nationaux et internationaux. 3. I'amelioration de la programmation de la recherche, de sa budgetisation et de sa gestion financiere. 4. l'amelioration de la gestion du personnel, programmation, formation. Recrutement et plan de carriere dans la recherche.  29 5. le renforcement des liens entre la recherche, les services de vulgarisation et les producteurs par des programmes de recherche participative et adaptative en milieu paysan. 6. Rehabilitation des infrastructures et equipement de l'INRAN. Les constats principaux suivants ont et faits par rapport a ces objectifs Premier Objectif 3. Cet objectif a ete partiellement atteint. Le statut de l'INRAN requis comme condition de mise en vigueur et qui cree les organes de programmation necessaires pour atteindre cet objectif a ete adopte en 1991, mais la plupart des organes crees n'ont pas fonctionne comme prevu. Les constats suivants ont ete faits: * La representation des producteurs est minoritaire dans le conseil d'administration (un sur six) et n'est pas mentionne dans le rapport d'evaluation initiale du projet. - Le Conseil Scientifique (CS) aupres du Conseil d'Administration (CA). Sa composition et ses modalites de fonctionnement ont ete definis tardivement en 1996. Les 12 membres avaient ete nommes mais le conseil ne s'est jamais reuni. La Direction Generale de I INRAN ayant estime qu'un tel exercice serait caduque parce que le statut des chercheurs n'avait pas ete adopte, que les chercheurs n'avaient pas Wtd evalues et positionnes dans leur qualite de chercheur. * Le Conseil National de la Recherche Agronomique (CNRA) charge de definir la politique nationale en matiere de recherche agronomique a 6te cree par decret le 26 juin 1991, et se compose essentiellement de Ministres. II n'a jamais ete fonctionnel parce que le Ministre de l'Agriculture qui en est le President ne l'a pas convoque. - Les Comites Regionaux de la Recherche Agronomique (CORRA) oii se rencontraient chercheurs, producteurs et vulgarisateurs ont ete effectivement fonctionnels jusqu'en 1996. Leur arret est dui au fait que la frequence annuelle de ces CORRA qui devaient se tenir dans sept departements par an prenait trop le temps des chercheurs et les detournait de leur activites de recherche. L'autorite administrative ne se serait pas prononcee sur la proposition de l'INRAN visant a reduire cette frequence a une fois tous les trois ans par departement. D'autre part, pour ce qui concerne la tenue des CORRA prevus dans les autres departements (Zinder et Diffa), malgre les fonds mis a la disposition des presidents, ceux-ci n'ont pas et realise a raison de la lourdeur administrative. * Un programme de gestion des ressources naturelles (GRN) a effectivement et mis en place avec deux equipes pluridisciplinaires de caracterisation, une pour la region du fleuve, et une pour les plaines de l'est. * II a ete egalement mis en place un programme de systemes de production et de transfert de technologies qui effectue des tests en milieu paysan.  30 Deuxieme Objectif 4. Cet objectif a et6 atteint de maniere substantielle, grace aux dispositions suivantes: * La creation de la Direction Scientifique avec nomination d'un Directeur Scientifique apres election par ses pairs. * La creation de programmes multidisciplinaires, en plus des cinq (05) d6partements thematiques preexistants, et la nomination de chefs de programmes. * La formulation des programmes A travers les comites de programme qui sont des reunions intemes de programmation au sein des programmes.