The local level institutions study : local institutions and service delivery in Burkina Faso

" 9 ~22812 Local Level Institutions Working Paper No. 8 Local Level Institutions THE LOCAL LEVEL INSTITUTIONS STUDY: LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN BURKINA FASO Anand Swamy, Christiaan Grootaert, and Gi-Taik Oh The World Bank Social Development Family Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network September 1999  LOCAL LEVEL INSTITUTIONS WORKING PAPER SERIES #1 The Local Level Institutions Study: Overview and Program Description (also available in Spanish and French) #2 The Local Level Institutions Study: Program Description and Prototype Questionnaires #3 Estudio Sobre Las Instituciones Locales En Bolivia: Panorama General Y Descripcion, Muestreo Y Recoleccion De Datos, Y Encuestas (by Godofredo Sand6val, Julio Cordova, Beatriz Ascarrunz, Alfredo Balboa, Griselda Gonzales, and Gloria Velasques) (only available in Spanish) #4 Grassroots Organizations and Local Development in Bolivia: A Study of the Municipalities of Tiahuanacu, Mizque, Villa Serrano, and Charagua (by Godofredo Sand6val, Julio Cordova, Beatriz Ascarrunz, Alfredo Balboa, Griselda Gonzales, and Gloria Velasques) (also available in Spanish) #5 Local Institutions and Service Delivery in Indonesia (by Christiaan Grootaert) #6 Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia (by Christiaan Grootaert) #7 Social Capital and Development Outcomes in Burkina Faso (by Christiaan Grootaert, Gi-Taik Oh, and Anand Swamy) #8 Local Institutions and Service Delivery in Burkina Faso (by Anand Swamy, Christiaan Grootaert, and Gi-Taik Oh) #9 Local Institutions, Poverty and Household Welfare in Bolivia (by Christiaan Grootaert and Deepa Narayan) #10 Does Social Capital Help The Poor? A Synthesis of Findings from the Local Level Institutions Studies in Bolivia, Burkina Faso and Indonesia (by Christiaan Grootaert) Working papers can be viewed at _tt14p:l.worldbagkpousoc ialdevelopment, or obtained from: The World Bank Social Development Department Social Capital Working Paper Series Attention Ms. Gracie M. Ochieng 1818 H Street, NW, Room MC 5-410 Washington, DC 20433, USA Tel: (202) 473-1123 Fax: (202) 522-3247 Email: gochieng( dorldbank.org or: The World Bank Social Development Department Publications 1818 H Street, NW, Room MC 5-232 Washington, DC 20433, USA Fax: (202) 522-3247 Email: sd p ns(vworldbank.org Papers in the Local Level Institutions Working Paper Series are not formal publications of the World Bank. They are published informally and circulated to encourage discussion and comment within the development community. The findings, interpretations, judgements, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of the Board of Executive Directors or the governments they represent.  LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN BURKINA FASO TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT ................................................ ii 1. INTRODUCTION: LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL . 1 2. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN BURKINA FASO: THE EXISTING LITERATURE . 3 3. THE DATA SET .5 4. THE MAP OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS .14 5. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ASSOCIATIONS .23 6. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POVERTY .26 7. WHO PROVIDES SERVICES? .28 8. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND TRUST .31 9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .36 ANNEX: TABLES BY PROVINCE .39 REFERENCES .41 i  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The authors would like to thank Anthony Bebbington and Paula Donnelly-Roark for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The Local Level Institutions (LLI) study was conducted under the leadership of Gloria Davis, Director, Social Development Department. In the initial phases, task Managers were Anthony Bebbington (July 1995-June 1996) and Christiaan Grootaert (July 1996- December 1997). The final phase of the study was undertaken as a joint venture between the ESSD and PREM Networks and co-managed by Christiaan Grootaert and Deepa Narayan. The study received financial support from the Government of Norway. The Bolivia country-study was undertaken by a team from the consulting firm Sinergia. Coordinator was Godofredo Sand6val and the research team consisted of Julio Cordova, Beatriz Ascarrunz, Afredo Balboa, Griselda Gonzales, and Gloria Velasquez. The Burkina Faso country-study was coordinated by Paula Donnelly-Roark. The field work was undertaken under the auspices of the Commission Nationale pour la D6centralisation. The Indonesia country-study was coordinated by Scott Guggenheim and the research team consisted of Kamala Chandrakirana, Pieter Evers, Sjari Manaf and Silvia Werner. The processing and management of the data files was the responsibility of Gi-Taik Oh and Kalpana Mehra. General research assistance was provided by Susan Assaf. Staff assistants for the study were Gracie Ochieng and Anju Sachdeva. ii  I. INTRODUCTION: LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL As the world's technological possibilities continue to expand, the problem of underdevelopment becomes even more of a puzzle. Given available techniques and resources, we have the capacity to, at the minimum, eliminate hunger and other extreme manifestations of poverty. Why are opportunities being missed? The proximate causes are easy to see: low productivity, over-population, low levels of education, etc. However, though these are all valid explanations in at least some contexts, economists are increasingly seeking to go beyond them. While there are no "ultimate" causes to be found, many economists now believe the problem of underdevelopment is to a significant extent a problem of underdeveloped institutions (Olson, 1982; North, 1990). Some examples may clarify the point. Consider the problem of low productivity in agriculture. The immediate cause may be that the technology is obsolete and unproductive. But why doesn't the farner introduce a better technology? One reason could be that s/he lacks the necessary funds. Why doesn't s/he borrow them? Possibly because banks lend only against collateral, which s/he does not have. The solution to the problem of low productivity then lies, at least in part, in the development of lending institutions which do not rely on collateral for loan recovery. Alternatively, the farmer may lack the skills necessary to use new techniques. The absence of these skills may be related to the availability and quality of education provided in the (typically) government-run schools, or the absence of appropriate "extension" programs to spread knowledge of new techniques. The solution may lie in improving the performance of these government institutions. As the two examples provided above indicate, economic development requires not only the presence of appropriate institutions, but also their effective functioning. Following the work of Putnam (1993) many now use the term "social capital" to describe development- enhancing institutions as well as the norms and values that sustain them. There are many debates around the precise definitions of "institutions" and "social capital" and the extent to which these ideas overlap. We are interested in both and, at least for the purposes of this paper, will not attempt to disentangle them conceptually'. Our task is to document local institutional development/social capital in the rural areas of Burkina Faso, and examine their relationship with economic and social outcomes. We use survey data collected as part of the World Bank's Local Level Institutions (LLI) Study. We have divided our work into two parts. In this paper our goal is mainly to describe the characteristics of households, their performance or outcomes in various economic and social dimensions, and their participation in associational activity. Our second paper is more ambitious: it investigates the causal relationships between associational activity/social capital and economic and social outcomes, using multivariate regression analysis (Grootaert, Oh, and Swamy, 1999). See Grootaert (1997) for a discussion. 1  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first briefly discuss what we have learned about social capital in Burkina Faso from the existing literature (Section 2). The third section describes the data sources and summarizes the current situation in Burkina Faso with regard to various social and economic outcomes that are of interest to us. In this section, the variables we will look at, such as per capita expenditure, poverty, etc., have long been of interest to economists, and pose no special difficulties. The measurement of social capital, however, is a much more difficult task. Our goal is to measure a community's ability to cooperate for mutual benefit: this is surely a difficult characteristic to quantify. Following Putnam's pioneering work (1993), however, one approach has appealed to many researchers. A community's ability to cooperate should be reflected in the formation of associations which, directly or indirectly, promote the common good of their members. These associations can cover a range of activities, from groups of people coming together to pray, to play cards, to discuss agricultural practices, to share credit, etc. The fourth section of this paper, therefore, provides a "map," a description of the number and types of organizations that exist. The fifth section discusses the characteristics of the most important associations in greater detail. In the sixth section, we provide descriptive statistics on the relationship between social capital and poverty/income. The seventh and eighth sections look at the provision of social services and collective action/trust, respectively. The final section summarizes and concludes the paper. 2  2. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN BURKINA FASO: THE EXISTING LITERATURE There is, so far as we know, no existing literature (prior to the LLI study) that specifically addresses the issue of social capital in Burkina Faso. Several authors, however, have commented on aspects of social relations that are relevant. The following facts or claims stand out in this literature: highly developed traditions of cooperation within ethnic groups, harmonious relations among ethnic groups, and a disjunction or gap between the state and civil (especially rural) society. We briefly discuss each theme below. The most numerous and best documented ethnic group in Burkina Faso, the Mossi, are said to place a very high value on sharing and mutual support. In his book Structures of Social Life, anthropologist Alan Fiske (1991) describes extensive cooperation among the Mossi with regard to allocation of land, water, mutual insurance2, and pooling of labor3. He emphasizes that common good, rather than individual benefit, is affirmed in such activities [p. 268]: The Moose [Mossi4] preference for Communal Sharing does not seem to be driven by technological and utility-maximization constraints.. .That the Moose pool their labor collectively, and share their food, often in the face of incentives to do otherwise, demonstrates that their primary motivational orientation is toward corporate participation and belonging, and that their paramount goals concern mutual solidarity, a sense of common identity and belonging, unity and kindness. Harmonious relations between ethnic groups in Burkina Faso have also been attributed, at least in part, to Mossi norms. Englebert (1996, 125) argues that Burkina Faso's "relative uniqueness" in the African context (in that there is little conflict among ethnic groups) is in part due to the "assimilationist nature" of the Mossi, and their tendency to de- emphasize ethnic differences. He also suggests that the state has distanced itself from ethnic authority and thereby reduced ethnic competition for "ownership" of the state. Finally, the paucity of economic resources at the disposal of the state itself means there is less to compete over. The relative lack of ethnic conflict and other factors favorable to development are also discussed by Kevane and Englebert (1997). However, the distance between the state and ethnic authority, which is cited approvingly by Englebert, may be partly responsible for the complaints voiced by Maclure 2 Given the variability of incomes in Burkina Faso (Reardon, Matlon, and Delgado, 1992), much can be gained from mutual assistance. This has been demonstrated by Carter (1997), using a detailed household level data set. Carter finds that a typical household, if it is entirely dependent on self-insurance, will in a given year face a subsistence crisis with probability 0.21. However, if 10 households form a network and agree to donate (if necessary) all of their above-subsistence income to a household which is falling below subsistence, this probability falls to 0.16. 3 For a discussion of crisis-support within "compounds" or extended families, see Veirech (1986). 4 Mossi is the more common spelling; Fiske is following the recommendation of a language commnission. 3  (1994) and Spiers (1991) to the effect that rural communities are cut-off from the decision- making of governmental institutions. Maclure's argument (1994) is developed in the context of decentralization of education in Burkina Faso, which has involved an effort to include communities in the management of primary schools (World Bank, 1991). He argues that this is a very difficult task in Burkina Faso's rural communities which "all too frequently are impoverished and politically marginalized." He suggests that governmental institutions and resources tend to be dominated by elites and that "the majority of the rural populace in Burkina Faso is restricted from participating actively in decision-making." (p. 249). Our reading of the existing literature suggests that the picture with regard to social capital may be mixed. Social capital within communities may be at a high level; on the other hand, there may be a lack of social capital as embodied in relations between communities and state institutions. In this context it is important to note that a major new initiative of the government of Burkina Faso addresses precisely this issue. Burkina Faso has recently embarked on a wide-ranging program of decentralization with the specific objective of involving rural indigenous institutions, so that the majority of the rural population can be engaged in the task of economic development. The purpose is to combine the strengths of formal state agencies and indigenous institutions that are deeply rooted in communities. In one sense the decentralization can be viewed as an attempt to bridge the gap between the state and communities, which was referred to above5. The LLI Study was conceived as a broad survey of social capital, not specifically meant to address the three themes discussed above; still, we will comment below, to the extent possible, on how much the survey data are consistent with anthropologists' claims. The reader will notice that the literature's claims about co-operative behavior among the Mossi are only partly borne out. Our analysis does not reveal a clear pattern; the Mossi seem to be more co-operative than other ethnic groups in some dimensions and less so in other dimensions. We now turn to a description of the survey data. 5 The new Decentralization Law, passed in August 1998, was based on the recormnendations of the Commission Nationale de la D6centralisation (CND). It allows groups of villages to come together and request Commune Rurale status from the government. It also allows any group, such as a Parent-Teachers' Association, for exarnple, to obtain legal recognition, and enter into contracts with other legal entities. Our description is based on Donnelly-Roark et al. (1999), which provides a more detailed account of the decentralization law. 4  3. THE DATA SET The data set for this paper comes from the Local Level Institutions (LLI) Study, a comparative study of three countries (Bolivia, Burkina Faso and Indonesia), which aims to investigate the role of local institutions in providing service delivery and in affecting welfare and poverty outcomes.6 Data were collected at the level of the community, the district, and the household. At the level of the community, interviews with focus groups of households and with community leaders were held to establish a map of functioning institutions in the community. Three instruments were used: * Information on community services was obtained through interviews with key informants such as the village chief, teacher, health provider, etc. This was supplemented with information on the local economy (infrastructure and distance to markets), local society (ethnic/religious composition) and local institutions. * The community services were also discussed with groups of households, with the objective of learning the community's perspective on the quality of service, its experience with collective action, and its views on local institutions and development projects. * For the most important local institutions, interviews were held with leaders and members, as well as non-members, in order to get a balanced view of the role of the institutions in the village, their development over time, their main activities, relations with other institutions and government, and their main strengths and weaknesses. At the district level (defined as the administrative level above the village or community), data were collected about the extent of service coverage and the institutional arrangements for the provision of services. Information was also obtained about the general functioning of the district administration and its relation with civic organizations, through interviews with general and sectoral managers at the district level. The third and critical part of the data collection was a household survey which aimed to capture households' actual participation in local institutions, their use of services, and information that identifies the welfare level of households and their coping strategies. The questionnaire consisted of six sections: 6 The objectives of the Local Level Institutions study and the questionnaires are discussed further in World Bank (1998). 5  * demographic information on household members * participation in local institutions * characteristics of the most important groups * service provision profiles * perceptions of community trust and collaboration * household economy and coping strategies. The limited resources available did not make possible a sampling framework such that the studies would be representative of the countries at the national level. Instead, three or four areas were selected in each country (municipios in Bolivia, provinces in Burkina Faso and Indonesia), which represent different economic, social and institutional environments. In the case of Burkina Faso, the data collection covered the rural areas of four provinces: Yatenga, Sanmatenga, Houet and Sissili (Table 1). These four provinces were selected to represent different regions of the country and different social, economic and institutional settings (CND, 1998). The next three paragraphs provide brief descriptions of each province. 7 Yatenga and Sanmatenga provinces are situated in the North of Burkina Faso, are predominantly populated by the Mossi, and are largely Muslim. Yatenga is the traditional seat of the Mossi Kingdom. Both provinces have relatively high population density. Both provinces suffer from low rainfall, which makes for low productivity agriculture. Livestock raising however is prominent. Mossi social organization is quite hierarchical in a formal sense, but relatively flexible in terms of daily practice. Houet, which lies to the West, is culturally and ethnically diverse. The dominant ethnic groups have non-hierarchical and flexible elders councils. Houet is a high rainfall area and is often called the granary of Burkina Faso. Human development is at a relatively high level. Houet draws immigrants, both farmers and herdsmen, from the North. Farmer-herder relations can involve conflict, with disputes arising over land and water. Sissili, which lies to the south-east, is the home of the Gourounsi. Like in Houet, non-hierarchical and flexible elders' councils are active; in Sissili these councils have promoted various development initiatives. Due to high levels of rainfall, Sissili is able to grow a variety of agricultural products, and attracts Mossi from Yatenga and Sanmatenga who are in search of arable land. 7 These are based on CND, 1998 and Donnelly-Roark et al., 1999, which contain extensive descriptions of each province. 6  Table 1: Selected Socio-economic Indicators of the Four Study Areas Yatenga Houet Sissili Sanmatenga All Population 443,935 883,320 153,627 469,684 11,000,000 % Urbanized 12% 46% 12% 10% 30% Literacy rate 16% n. av. n. av. 10% 9% % of Heads of Household who are 91 76 85 94 86 Farmers Household Expenditure per Capita 58,712 69,768 71,686 60,886 65,265 " ('000 CFAfr/year) Gini-coefficient 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.26 0.32 1/ Based on the four study areas only. Sources: Donnelly-Roark et al. (1999) for first three rows of provincial figures; World Development Report (1997) for first three figures in All column; remainder computed from survey data. Within each province, one administrative department was selected for the data collection (in Houet, two departments were selected). In each province, twelve villages were chosen purposively based on four criteria: organizational level, economic situation, cultural diversity, and proximity of services. Within each village, 20 households were selected randomly to participate in the survey, leading to a total sample of 960 households (CND, 1998) (Table 2). Table 2: The Local Level Institutions Study Sample for Burkina Faso Province District Number of _Households Yatenga Oula 237 Houet Toussiana 60 Peni 179 Sissili To 240 Sanmatenga Korsimoro 243 Total 959 Table 3 shows selected characteristics of the respondents to the LLI survey. The vast majority of respondents are men and household heads. There are as many as 60 distinct ethnic and language groups in Burkina Faso (Englebert, 1996); the Mossi are by far the largest, being close to half of the population. In the LLI survey sample, the Mossi constitute 60% of respondents. Yatenga and Sanmatenga are overwhelmingly Mossi, whereas Houet and Sissili are ethnically diverse. Muslims are by far the largest religious group; Catholics and animists are also significantly represented, except in Yatenga. 7  Table 3: Selected Characteristics of Respondents (in %) Yaten a Houet Sissili Sanmatenga All Gender of Respondent 95.4 97.1 99.2 73.7 91.2 - Male 4.6 2.9 0.8 26.3 8.8 - Female Position in Household 98.3 100.0 100.0 95.9 98.5 -Head 1.7 - - 4.1 1.5 - Spouse . Language -Moore 93.7 1.7 45.9 97.5 59.7 -Dioula 0.8 28.0 0.4 - 7.3 - Fulfunde 5.5 9.6 0.8 2.1 4.5 - Gourounsi - 52.5 0.4 13.2 -Bobo 5.0 0.4 - 1.3 -Other - 55.7 - 14.0 Religion -Muslim 96.2 51.0 58.8 48.1 63.4 -Catholic 3.4 11.7 10.8 13.2 9.8 -Protestant 1.3 2.1 2.1 1.4 -Aniniist 0.4 36.0 28.3 36.6 25.4 Average Years Lived 53.9 44.3 31.9 49.3 44.8 in CoMmunity_. Table 4 provides a broad breakdown of some of the key economic characteristics of the households in the sample8. Approximately 12% of the respondents describe themselves as "inactive." The figure is exceptionally high for Houet (22.3%). Among those who report occupations, the vast majority are farmers/fisherman/cattle raisers. Almost all the respondents describe themselves as self-employed or unpaid family workers, with virtually no wage labor. The vast majority have no education at all, and differences among provinces along this dimension are small. It should be noted that Table 4 is calculated over all adult individuals in the sample while Table 3 pertained only to the respondents. 8  Table 4: Employment and Education Characteristics of the Adults (aged 15 and above) in the Sample (percentage) Yatenga Houet Sissili Sanmatenga All Main Occupation - Farmer/Fisherman/Cattle 88.0 73.8 92.9 92.9 86.3 Raiser 0.2 1.7 0.2 - 0.6 - Trade 0.7 2.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 - Other Private Sector 0.0 0.2 - - 0.1 -Public Sector 11.1 22.3 6.7 6.9 12.2 - Inactive 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 All Employment Status of Economically Active People -Wage Earner 0.7 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.7 - Self-employed/Unpaid Family 99.3 98.1 99.9 99.8 99.3 Worker All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Education -None 83.5 82.4 86.0 83.5 83.9 -Primary Incomplete 4.0 7.1 4.1 2.5 4.6 -Primary Complete 0.6 2.0 1.5 0.7 1.3 - Secondary Incomplete 0.9 4.8 1.1 1.9 2.3 - Secondary Complete 0.1 0.2 - 0.3 0.1 - Vocational School 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -University 0.1 0.2 - - 0.0 -Other 10.8 3.1 7.1 11.0 7.7 All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Table 5 provides summary statistics on the level and composition of per capita expenditures. These are significantly lower in Yatenga and Sanmatenga than in the other two provinces. In addition, the level of inequality is relatively high in Yatenga (a gini-coefficient of 0.4). Consistent with this, the proportion of the population below the poverty line, and the expenditure gap, are relatively high in Yatenga9. For the sample as a whole the Gini- coefficient is 0.32. On average 67% of household consumption expenditure is on food, and the food shares are relatively high in the provinces with lower per capita income; they are 69.5% and 77.8% in Yatenga and Sanmatenga, respectively, compared to 57.2% and 65.5% for Houet and Sissili, respectively. The proportion of household expenditure on housing is very low in all provinces, varying between 1.9% and 3.1%. This is as expected, since housing is very modest and is self-constructed. The proportion of expenditure on education is relatively low in Yatenga and Sanmatenga, as compared to Houet and Sissili. Consistent with this, the percentages of children aged 5-14 attending school in Yatenga and Sanmatenga are 22.4% and 20.6% 9 The poverty line is set at two-thirds of median per capita consumption expenditure. 9  respectively, compared to 38.3% and 35.6% for Houet and Sissili. Overall, the proportion of household expenditure on education is quite high in Burkina Faso, 11.1%. Table 5: The Level and Composition of Household Expenditure Yatenga Houet Sissili Sanmatenga All Composition of Household Expenditure (%) Purchased Food 41.3 25.7 28.0 34.5 31.9 Home Produced Food 28.2 31.5 37.5 43.3 35.2 Education 7.7 15.2 14.2 6.2 11.1 Health 2.7 4.4 3.9 1.5 3.2 Housing 2.5 3.1 1.9 2.2 2.5 Private Transfers 0.6 1.5 1.4 0.4 1.0 Other 17.0 18.6 13.1 11.9 15.1 All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Household Expenditure per 58,712 69,768 71,686 60,886 65,265 Capita (CFAfr per year) Coefficient of Variation 76.42 61.79 54.14 49.98 61.25 Gini-coefficient 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.26 0.32 Ratio of Richest Over 4.6 2.5 1.7 1.8 5.2 Poorest Village Poverty Incidence - Poverty Head Count* 40.0 26.7 13.9 23.4 26.0 - Expenditure Gap** 42.2 31.2 22.7 22.4 32.7 * Percentage of population which is poor. This is based on a relative poverty line of two-thirds of the median of household expenditure per capita in the four provinces. ** The expenditure gap equals the shortfall, relative to the poverty line, of expenditure per capita of the average poor person, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. Table 6a presents several non-monetary indicators of household welfare. Twenty-five percent of households report that they often go hungry. It is striking to note that the percentage is as high as 13.5 even in the richest quintile. As many as 55% of the households report that they have had to sell assets in order to buy necessities. The percentage is lowest among the poorest, presumably because they do not have assets to sell. In 89.8% of households, at least one child in the age-group 5-14 does not go to school, which highlights the importance of expanding education in Burkina Fasol