Tajikistan - Post-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project

Document of The World Bank Report No. T-7215-TJ REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT TECHNICAL ANNEX January 8, 1998  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (as of August 29, 1997) Currency Unit Tajik Rubles TJR 1 US$ 0.0014 US$1 = TJR 735 AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATES The Tajik Ruble replaced the Russian Ruble on May 10, 1996, at an iiitial conversion rate of TJR 1 LRUR 100 RUR per US$ I TJR per US$ I 1993 932 1995 95 1994 2,192 1996 300 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AKF - Aga Khan Foundation CAS - Country:Assistance Strategy CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States CNR - Commission for National Reconciliation DC - Direct Contracting FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations GBAO _ Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Oblast IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA - International Development Association IS - International Shopping MOTRA - Ministry of Transportation and Road Administration NBF - Not-Bank-Financed NCB - National Competitive Bidding NGO - Non-Governmental Organization OED - Operations Evaluation Department NS - National Shopping PCERP - Post-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project PCU - Project Coordination Unit PCU/PCERP - Project Coordination Sub-Unit for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project PHRD - Japan Population and Human Resources Development Program PPAP - Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project SOE - Statement of Expenditures UJNCHR - United Nations High Commission for refugees UNDHA - United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs UNDP - United Nations Development Program UNMOT - United Nations Mission of Observers to Tajikistan UNOPS - United Nations Office for Project Services UTO - United Tajik Opposition WFP - World Food Program WHO - World Health Organization TAJIKISTAN'S FISCAL YEAR January I - December 31 Vice President: Johannes F. Linn, ECA Country Director: Ishrat Husain, ECCOI Sector Director: Ricardo A. Halperin, ECSIN Sector Leader: Margret Thalwitz, ECSIN Task Team Leader Felix A. Jakob, ECSIN  REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT TECHNICAL ANNEX Table of Contents I. BACKGROUND .......................................... I A. Civil War in Tajikistan .......................................... I B. June 1997 Peace Agreement .......................................... I C. War Damages in the Karategin-Tavildara Valley Area ..........................................2 II. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE ........................................3 III. BANK RESPONSE AND STRATEGY ..........................................4 A. World Bank Strategy and Programs in Tajikistan ......................................... 4 B. Lessons Leamed from previous Bank/IDA Experience ..........................................4 C. Rationale for Bank Involvement ..........................................5 D. Relationship with other Bank/IDA financed Projects ..........................................5 IV. PROJECT DESCRIPTION ..........................................6 A Project Preparation ..........................6 B. Project Objectives and Design ..........................6 C. Project Components ......................... 6 D. Project Cost and Financing Plan ..........................7 E. Economic Justification ..........................9 F. Environmental Impact ..........................9 V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ....................... 10 A. Project Organization and Management ......................... 10 B. Implementation Arrangements ......................... 10 C. Mid-Term Review ......................... 12 D. Procurement ......................... 12 E. Disbursements ......................... 14 F. Accounts and Auditing ......................... 15 G. Reporting, and Monitoring ......................... 15 VI. BENEFITS AND RISKS .................... 16 VII. AGREEMENTS REACHED .....................: : 16 ANNEXES 1. Karategin-Tavildara Valley Needs Assessment: Summary 2. Detailed Cost Tables 3. Institutional Arrangements 4. Eligibility Criteria for Small Community Works Component 5. Implementation Plan 6. Performance Monitoring Indicators MAP: IBRD 29171  /  L BACKGROUND A. Civil War in Tajikistan I. Tajikistan is the poorest CIS country, with a 1996 per capita income of US$ 330. Of the country's 5.8 million inhabitants about 70 percent live in rural areas. Only some seven percent of the country's 143,000 square kilometers are arable, while the rest consists of mountainous areas. Agriculture contributes to about 25 percent of GDP and 50 percent of employment. Tajikistan's main agricultural products are cotton, (which generates about 50 percent of total agricultural production), vegetables, grains and livestock. The industrial sector accounts for 35 percent of GDP but only for 15 percent of employment. It groups a total of approximately 7,000 state-owned enterprises. Under the Soviet regime, the easy availability of hydroelectric power greatly influenced the pattern and structure of this sector and led to the development of aluminum, chemicals and other energy-intensive industries. 2. Tajikistan became an independent country in 1991 as a result of the breakup of the Former Soviet Union. Civil war in started in May 1992 as different regional and political groups struggled for a redistribution of power after the collapse of the Soviet system. The armed conflict continued for the next four years with varying intensity, major fighting being concentrated between 1992 and 1993. An estimated 50,000 people lost their lives, 600,000 people were displaced inside the country and some 60,000 fled to neighboring Afghanistan. Probably as many as half a million people emigrated to other CIS countries for pnimarily economic reasons, among them a great number of professionals and skilled workers. While during the first two years the heaviest fighting and physical destruction took place in the south of the country (Khatlon region) and in areas that remained under the control of the Government, in subsequent years hostilities moved to the center-east of the country (Karategin and Tavildara valleys), an area controlled by the forces of United Tajik Opposition (UTO). 3. The war had a severe impact on the whole country as it compounded the effects of the breakup of the former Soviet Union (which resulted in cutting off trade links and stopping budget transfers that amounted to up to 40 percent of GDP), bringing most economic activities to a standstill plunging a large portion of the population into poverty. GDP is estimated to have declined by about 50 percent during the first half of the 1990s. Increases in military expenditures reduced resources for other more productive or social sectors. The years of the civil war in Tajikistan also saw the emergence of a number of armed gangs and paramilitary groups. These groups, which have repeatedly taken hostage Tajik personalities and personnel of international organizations, constitute a serious threat to security and political stability. B. The June 1997 Peace Agreement 4. A complex and protracted negotiation process between the Government of Tajikistan and UTO began in 1994 with the signing of a first cear-fire in Teheran and culminated in the signing, in Moscow on June 27, 1997, of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. The Peace Agreement lays the foundation for peace in the country and calls for a transitional period of twelve to eighteen months during which the provisions of the agreement are to be further defined and implemented. The principal authority for monitoring the implementation of the agreement is the Commission for National Reconciliation (CNR) chaired by Mr. Said Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the UTO, and is composed of twenty-six members, half of whom were nominated by the Government and half by the UTO.  -2 - 5. The Government's strategy for implementation of the Peace Agreement rests on action programs for the following areas: Political Reconciliation and Democratization: Political parties, outlawed in 1993 are being legalized and parliamentary elections are expected to be held in 1998. A Government reshuffling under which a number of ministerial positions would be given to the opposition is under discussion. Repatriation and Reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: With the assistance of the agencies of the UN system, a major effort is being made to complete the voluntary repatriation of all refugees at the earliest possible date. Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: An estimated 5,000 to 7,000 UTO ex- combatants are being demobilized and provided assistance to help them engage in civilian activities or being integrated into the Government army. Concurrently, the Tajikistan armed forces will be restructured and reduced by about thirty percent. Relief. Reconstruction and Development: Assisted by the donor community, the Government's relief and reconstruction efforts will focus on three phases: (a) a program of immediate relief and food aid to allow the most severely affected populations to go through the winter and resume agricultural activities in Spring 1998; (b) a short-term program of reconstruction of the most essential economic and social services; and (c) a medium- and longer-term reconstruction and economic redevelopment program that will support the Government's strive for macro-economic stability, structural reform and resumption of growth C. War Damages in the Karategin and Tavildara Valley Area 6. The Karategin and Tavildara valleys have together a total population of approximately 250,000 people and cover an area of approximately 200 square kilometers, 90% of which is mountainous. Administratively the area is divided into the five rayons of Darband, Gharm, Jirgital, Tavildara and Tojikobad. The valleys occupy a key strategic position as they effectively control the roads that link Dushanbe with the eastern part of the country, particularly the Autonomous Oblast of Gorno-Badakshan (GBAO), as well as with the Kyrgyz Republic. The area is fertile, has good agricultural potential and, during the Soviet era, was a net exporter of agricultural products (particularly potatoes, fruit and dairy products). 7. The Government and UTO fought for the control of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area since 1992. The last open fighting occurred in December 1996. As part of the peace negotiation process, (para 4), a cease fire agreement was signed in January 1997 but left the area under the military control of the UTO forces. Because it was controlled by the opposition, the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area remained cut off from the rest of the country for a several years and, unlike the other conflict areas in the south of the Tajikistan, received no support from the Government. It also obtained very little help from the international community with the exception of assistance provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), and a German NGO (German Agro Action). Even in the absence of open fighting, the continuing state of war and insecurity as well as the lack of monetary resources prevented any regular maintenance and repair work for infrastructure and community facilities. The deterioration of the transport conditions, in particular, effectively cut off the local communities from their traditional urban markets for vegetables, fruit and dairy products in other parts of the country and forced them to revert to subsistence farming.  -3 - 8. A preliminary assessment of reconstruction needs and an initial consultation with stakeholders was conducted in the five rayons in September/October 1997 by the World Bank and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), in collaboration with local authorities. A summary of this assessment in Annex 1. The damage to the Karategin Valley is as much in the radical decline in economic activity, especially in the growing and marketing of agricultural products, as it is in physical deterioration of infrastructure and the loss of social services. The assessment focused on identifying those needs that will have an important impact on peoples' lives during the next two years, rather than on a restoration of the complete physical and social infrastructure as it was before the civil war. On this basis, the assessment identified almost US$ 24 million in physical rehabilitation costs including US$ 5.3 million in transport infrastructure, US$ 7.2 million in shelter, US$ 5.3 million in power and telecommunications, US$ 3.6 million in education and health, US$ 1.6 million in agriculture and US$ 0.6 in industries. The assessment showed that reconstruction priorities are very different among the five rayons and even within the rayons, suggesting that project design should respond to very local requirements and be flexible. 9. The consultation process also revealed a number of important concerns. People at the local level want to be involved in the preparation and implementation of reconstruction programs and to have a transparent system of monitoring and evaluating their impact. The top priority for people is to create opportunities for income and employment generation, initially through agriculture and public works projects. Obtaining essential inputs for the 1998 agricultural year is especially important. In addition, rehabilitation and reconstruction of certain bridges and roads were identified as essential to breaking the isolation from markets, especially for marketing of crops and livestock, that the area suffered during the war period. The provision of basic health and education services was also identified by people as having high priority. The damage to shelter, although significant in terms of monetary loss, was seen as a lesser priority because it affects only a small proportion of the population (about six percent) who, in a majority of cases, have started repair and reconstruction work on their own. IH. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE 10. Since 1993 over US$ 180 million have been contributed by the international coinmunity to emergency aid for Tajikistan. The largest part of this assistance has consisted of food aid, which even today is distributed to over 10 percent of the popuilation. It has also covered medical support, in particular assistance to contain outbreaks of typhoid fever, as well as emergency reconstruction of shelter, and other needs. In addition to the major UN Agencies (UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, UNDHA, WHO, UNICEF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM and many international NGOs have been active in the country, including the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), Save-the-Children-US (SCF-US), Save-the-Children-UK (SCF-UK), Mercy Corps International (MCI), Relief International (RI), Shelter Now International (SNI), CARITAS, and others. 11. On November 14, 1997 the UN Security Council extended and expanded the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), which was established in December 1994. The main role of UNMOT is to assist the Government and the UTO in the implementation of the peace process and, in particular, to cooperate with the CNR in the preparation of elections, monitor the disarmement and demobilization of UTO fighters, investigate cease-fire violations and ensure an effective cooperation with CIS Peacekeeping Forces, the Russian Border Forces and the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  - 4 - 12. Both the World Bank and the IMF participated in a task force which, under the aegis of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, assisted the Government and the opposition in the preparation of the document International Support to Peace and Reconciliation in Tajikistan. This document, which identified an estimated US$ 65 million of priority financing requirements for the transition phase of the General Agreement, for the four areas of the Government's strategy for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, (para. 5), was the basis for discussion for a Donors Conference recently held in Vienna, Austria on November 24-25, 1997. The conference raised US$ 56.5 million in pledges. In addition to pledges of specific support to the peace process the Conference also raised numerous tentative pledges beyond the timeframe of the transition period as well as humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation. The Bank participated actively in the Conference and presented its post- conflict portfolio for Tajikistan. 13. A Post-Conflict Emergency Assistance operation has been prepared by the Fund presented to its Board on December 22, 1997. Further support by the international donors community will be provided through a Consultative Group (CG) meeting which is planned to be held Paris in May 1998 and will address the needs for Tajikistan's medium- and longer term reconstruction and economic redevelopment included in the Government's strategy for the implementation of the peace agreement. Hi. BANK RESPONSE AND STRATEGY A. World Bank Strategy and Programs in Tajikistan 13. At the request of the Government, a World Bank mission visited Tajikistan in September 1997 to identify the outline of a possible assistance program. In response to the Government's concerns, the World Bank decided to prepare two operations: (a) the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit of an amount of US$ 10 million equivalent which will help the Government address immediate general budgetary needs associated with the implementation of the peace agreement and was presented to the Board on December 16, 1997; and (b) the Post-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project (PCERP) which will address the specific reconstruction needs of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area in order to help with its reintegration into the national economy. 14. The Bank Group's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Tajikistan was discussed by the Board on May 16, 1996. Recognizing the risks associated with the political and economic instability in Tajikistan, the CAS calls for a flexible approach to the Bank Group's assistance program until. The CAS aims at arresting the intensification of poverty through measures designed to foster a supply response, based on employment intensive growth with direct steps to protect the most vulnerable groups. The broad elements of the strategy are to: (a) strengthen institutional capacity to plan and implement a medium-term program of structural reform; (b) support the Government's efforts to stabilize the economy; and (c) moderate the impact of the economic collapse on vulnerable groups. PCERP is consistent with the CAS and puts emphasis on a flexible approach to the conditions in Tajikistan. A new CAS is planned for Board discussion in June 1998 and will articulate the Bank's medium-term strategy in the new political environment. B. Lessons Learned from Previous Bank/IDA experience 15. The Bank's experience in working in Tajikistan is still relatively limited and too recent to allow to draw specific lessons that are relevant for an emergency operation. The Bank has, however, a large  experience with emergency reconstruction projects in other parts of the world, with a significant share of resources committed to post-conflict operations. A Policy Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Operations was prepared in 1997. OED is currently assessing the Bank's experience with post-conflict reconstruction. The study reviews the experience in the overall Bank portfolio and discusses lessons learned in nine countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti, Lebanon, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka.) Preliminary findings indicate that successful implementation of reconstruction projects include: (a) early bank involvement in defining a post-conflict reconstruction strategy; (b) a good assessment of damages and needs; (c) an active Bank role in post-conflict aid coordination; (d) flexible and expeditious programming, design and implementation processing; (e) a willingness to help local authorities with project preparation; (f) diversification of reconstruction programming into various sectors; and (f) the use of pilot projects in community-based activities and in programs to support local initiatives. Additional preliminary findings of the study are that effective assistance to post-conflict reconstruction is management and staff intensive and that it requires a proactive involvement of senior management in key decisions, a strong commitment by country directors and teams and resident missions with adequate staffing and delegation authority. C. Rationale for Bank Involvement 16. The most recent CAS for Tajikistan, which was discussed by the Board on May 16, 1996, recognizes the risks associated with operations in Tajikistan and urges a flexible response to the needs of the country. The Peace Agreement between the UTO and the Govermnent represents an important opportunity for establishing an environment that is conducive to macro-economic stabilization, structural reform and increased growth. Both the Government and the UTO have indicated the importance of beginning the reconciliation and reconstruction processes as quickly as possible. Not only are these processes important for their tangible results, but also for their psychological value to a war-weary population. The proposed operation, which is the second of two post-conflict IDA operations for Tajikistan in FY 98, is therefore an effort to respond to some of the immediate needs of the country and contribute to the successful implementation of the peace process. PCERP supports the reconstruction needs in area of the country severely affected by the war and most neglected by reconstruction efforts. Although other donors are active in Tajikistan and IDA's efforts are part of a broader program, no other major donors are involved in this specially important geographical area. The leadership provided by IDA is considered essential to the success of the peace process by both the Government and the donor community. D. Relationship with other Bank/IDA-financed Projects 17. PCERP complements IDA's support to the peace process in Tajikistan initiated by the Post- Conflict Rehabilitation Credit which will be presented to the Board on December 16, 1997, and which is designed to help the Government reduce arrears for the social safety net and finance expenditure for the immediate-term resettlement of refugees and the demobilization of ex-combatants which are critical elements in the Government's strategy for the implementation of the Peace Agreement. PCERP is also closely related with the Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project (PPAP), (Cr. 29640-TJ) which was presented to the Board in April 1997. PPAP finances, among other activities, various NGO-executed shelter reconstruction programs in the south of the country as well as an agricultural support program implemented by AKF in GBAO. PCERP draws extensively on the PPAP experience for the design of its implementation arrangements.  -6- IV. PROJECT DESCRIPTION A. Project Preparation 18. PCERP has been prepared as an emergency operation in accordance with the instructions of OP/BP 8.50 on the basis of the findings of an identification mission which visited Tajikistan in September 1997 and the results of the needs assessment undertaken by the Bank and UNOPS in September and October 1997, (pam. 8 and Annex I). Appraisal was carried out in November 1997. Negotiations were held in Washington on December 22, 1997 B. Project Objectives and Design 19. The primary objective of PCERP is to support the Government's strategy for the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement (para. 5) by facilitating the reintegration of the Karategin- Tavildara Valley area - which has remained under the control of the opposition longer than any other part of the country - into the national economy through a targeted program of short-term reconstruction of physical and social infrastructure, and emergency support to agricultural development. 20. To support the above objective the project has been prepared on the basis of a close consultation of the population of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley through a needs assessment carried out in September-October 1997. The project has also been prepared seeking a great simplicity and flexibility in its design in order to ensure, in a context of severe and extensive resource constraints, a fast and efficient implementation. The operation complements IDA's support to the peace process in Tajikistan initiated by the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit which has been presented to the Board on December 16, 1997, and will help the Government reduce arrears for the social safety net and finance expenditure for the immediate- term resettlement of refugees and the demobilization of ex-combatants which are critical elements in the Government's strategy for the implementation of the peace agreements. It also complements, and is closely coordinated with, the efforts undertaken by the donor community in other parts of Tajikistan. The project is expected to be completed by March 31, 2000 with a Credit Closing Date of September 30, 2000. C. Project Components 21. PCERP - the implementation of which will begin in Spring 1998 and last two years - will include the following: (a) Agicultual Support for the 1998 Spring planting season; (b) repair, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of Bridges and Roads; (c) repair and rehabilitation of schools, health care centers and other community facilities as well as implementation of other programs of Small Commumit Works benefiting local communities; and (d) Other snfratructure Works in the power and agriculture sectors. C.l Con ent 1: icultural Supp (6% of base cost) 22. The component will finance the purchase and distribution of wheat seeds (150 tons), potato seeds (650 tons), and fertilizer (660 tons) for the 1998 Spring planting season in the Darband, Gharm, Jirgital Tavildara, and Tojikobad rayons. The implementation of the component will be managed by the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), (pam. 36) and allow for the cultivation of a total of about 900 has during the Spring and Winter planting periods of 1998. The seeds to be provided consist of varieties hat have been tested in Tajikistan, have shown good performance, and are certified by the Ministry of Agriculture. Fertilizer will include amophos, seleter and potassium chloride. Inputs will be distributed exclusively to  -7- about 550 private farmers within the framework of land privatization agreements between AKF and the local authorities. C.2 Component 2: Bridges and Roads (51% of base cost) 23. The component will finance: (a) the rehabilitation, repair, or reconstruction of about fifteen bridges in the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area and the Kalayhumb rayon of the GBAO; and (b) the completion a new by-pass road for the town of Darband to replace the existing non functional road. Twelve of the fifteen bridges are on the main roads (M41 and A372) linking Dushanbe with the GBAO or the Kyrgyz Republic, respectively) while the other three link the main road to local communities. All bridges, which are of either single concrete slab or suspension type with total spans varying between 20 and 90 meters, and roads will be repaired or rebuilt by two State enterprises, which operate under the oversight of the Ministry of Transportation and Road Administration (MOTRA) and are specialized, one, in construction of bridges and the other one, in that of roads. Works will be implemented on the basis of standard MOTRA engineering designs, construction quality norms, and execution procedures, (para. 37). C.3 CoMpoen 3: Small Community Works (23% of base cost 24. The component will finance: (a) the rehabilitation or repair of schools, health care facilities, other community facilities as well as small-scale transport and agricultural infrastructure of local economic interest, all of which will be identified, and agreed upon by, the local communities concerned; and (b) the provision of essential equipment and supplies to allow facilities repaired or rehabilitated to resume normal operations. Under the oversight of an NGO hired as Implementation Manager, the works will be carried out by local small- and medium-size enterprises in close consultation and cooperation with the beneficiary local communities Specific selection criteria for works and implementation arrangements are outlined in para. 38 below and Annex 4. C.4 Component 4: Other Infrastructure works (20 % of base cost) 25. The component will finance a series of works in the agriculture sector (rehabilitation of rural roads, bridges, irrigation systems) and in the power sector (transmission lines, transformer stations) for which additional technical preparation studies are required prior to the implementation of these works. 26. Project Management: As a result of the civil war, the Tajildstan Government's capacity to effectively prepare and implernent projects which are of the magnitude of the proposed operation and involve external donors is extremly reduced. To allow for a rapid start up of project activities, maintain adequate control over quality of execution, and ensure timely delivery of works, goods, and services, technical assistance (about 60 person/month of foreign and 180 person/month of local consultants) for the two-year period of implementation is being sought, under parallel grant financing, from bilateral sources. Discussions to this effect with the Canadian International Development Agency (CEDA) and the Japan PHERD Fund for PNt-Conflict Operations are in progress. D. Project Cost ad Finandcg Plan D.1 EPrjectCosts: 27. The total estimated cost of PCERP is US$ 11.0 million equivalent. The estimated costs and foreign exchange by components are shown in Table I below. Detailed costs are shown in Annex 2.  -8 - Table 1: Project Costs (in US$ million) Component Cost Foreign % of Base IDA Govmt Exchange Cost Local Foreign Total % 1. Agriculture Support 0.3 0.3 0.6 50% 6% 0.6 0.0 2. Roads and Bridges 1.1 4.0 5.1 80% 51% 4.5 0.6 3. Small Conmunity Works 1.9 0.4 2.3 20% 23% 2.2 0.1 4. Other Infrastructure Works 0.4 1.5 1.9 80% 20% 1.6 0.3 Total Base Cost 3.7 6.2 9.9 63% 100% 8.9 1.0 Contingencies 0.4 0.7 1. I Total Project Cost 4.1 6.9 11.0 10.0 1.0 28. All costs have been estimated in US Dollars due to the difficulties in forecasting exchange rates for the local currency. Estimates for the civil works of both the 'Roads and Bridges' and the 'Small Community Works' components are based on detailed assessments of materials and labor requirements including transport cost to the sites and cost-comparisons with similar projects recently carried out in Tajikistan by IDA's Pilot Poverty Alleviation Project (Cr. 29460-TJ) or other aid agencies. Estimates for the 'Agricultural Support' component are based on a proposal submitted by AKF. 29. The foreign exchange component of US$ 6.9 million equivalent represents 63 % of total project cost. The foreign exchange component was estimated as follows: (a) goods for 'Agricultural Support' component: 50%; (b) civil works for 'Bridges and Roads' and 'Other Infrastructure Works': 80 %; (c) civil works for 'Small Community Works': 20%; (d) goods for 'Small Community Works' component: 90%. Given the short implementation period of about two years no financial contingencies have been applied. Physical contingencies have been estimated at 10%. Project costs include an estimated US$ 0.2 million equivalent in taxes and duties on civil works and locally procured goods. Goods specifically imported for the project will be exempted from custom duties and taxes. Labor and in-kind contributions by local communities have not been included. D.2 Project Financing: 30. The IDA Credit of US$ 10.0 million equivalent will finance 91% of total project cost (100% of the foreign exchange component and 76% of the local cost component). The Government contribution of US$ 1.0 million equivalent will finance taxes and duties (US$ 0.2 million equivalent), and salary costs for the State enterprises executing the works included in the 'Bridges and 'Roads' component, (US$ 0.8 million equivalent). The project will include retroactive financing of up to US$ 800,000 equivalent for the purchase of agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizer) and bridge repair materials prior to Credit Effectiveness, (para. 36 and 41).  -9 - Table 2: Project Financing (in US$ million) Local Costs Foreign exchange Total project costs % of Total Cost IDA 3.1 6.9 10.0 91% Government 1.0 0.0 1.0 9 % Total 4.1 6.9 11.0 100% E. Economic Justification 31. The main objective of the PCERP is to support the reintegration of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area into the national economy through repair and reconstruction of essential infrastructure and emergency assistance to agriculture. Aside from contributing to peace and future political stability of Tajikistan, the main economic benefit of the project will, through the restoration of satisfactory transport conditions, consist in providing the local farming communities renewed access to their traditional markets for agricultural products thereby helping these communities to extract themselves from the subsistence farming economy into which they were forced by the conflict. Introduction of new high quality seeds for wheat and potato will contribute to significant improvements in yields and therefore to rural household incomes. Restoration or improvement of operating conditions of schools and health care facilities will have significant positive effects on the efficiency of education and yield extensive public health benefits. Additionally, through the implementation of the small community works by local private small- and medium-size enterprises, the project will create a significant number of, albeit temporary, jobs and help stimulate the development of the local enterprise sector At this stage, however, given the absence of reliable statistical data on current conditions for all sectors in area emerging from a protracted war it is not possible nor meaningful to estimate an overall Economic Rate of Return for the proposed project. F. Environmental Impact 32. The project will have a limited environmental impact given the nature and size of the works funded by it and has been classified as "B" for the purposes of OD 4.01. The project will focus on the repair, rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of existing infrastructure or facilities. It will not raise any resettlement or property rights issues and will be executed within the premises of the existing facilities or the rights of way of the existing public roads network. Fertilizer under the 'Agriculture Support' component will be distributed and its use closely monitored by AKF following the procedures agreed with IDA for the PPAP project. AKF has a long-standing commitment to socially and environmentally sustainable development and has extensive experience in agricultural development in fragile mountain areas. Wheat and potato seeds imported under the 'Agricultural Support' component are of varieties that are used extensively in the region. These varieties have been thoroughly tested, have proved their adaptability, and are certified by the Tajikistan Ministry of Agriculture. All imports will be carried out in accordance with national and international phyto-sanitary standards. The possible impact of works or activities included in the 'Roads and Bridges', 'Small Community Works' and 'Other Infrastructure Works' components will be reviewed on a case by case basis and, if required, will be subject to prior environmental impact assessment as a condition for approval .  - 10- V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION A. Project Organization and Management 33. The project will be implemented by the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) which has been created in the Office of the Prime Minister for the management of both the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit (presented to the Board on December 16, 1997) and the PCERP . The Director of the PCU will report directly to the Prime Minister and has been appointed with the approval of the CNR. Maintenance of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) by December 31. 1997 was agreed during negotiations. (para. 57 (a). 34. Within the PCU, a specific Unit will be created for the management of the Post-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project (PCERP). The PCU/PCERP Unit will be managed by an Executive Director of Tajik nationality recruited on a competitive basis. He will be assisted by a team of foreign and local experts funded under bilateral grant funding currently under discussion, (para. 26). The PCU/PCRP Unit will be provided by the Government with an annual budget sufficient to cover regular operating costs such as rental of office space, utilities, salaries of auxiliary personnel and other miscellaneous expenses. Specific Terms of Reference and organizational arrangements for the PCU/PCERP are included in Annex 3. To facilitate the implementation of the project, the PCU/PCERP will, in consultation with IDA, prepare an Operations' Manual , which will provide the necessary guidelines for the management, including procurement, of the project. A tentative Implementation Plan is included in Annex 5. B. Implementation Arrangements 35. Under the oversight of the PCU Director, the PCU/PCRP Unit will be specifically responsible for: (a) overall management of the proposed project, including the coordination of project activities with ministries and other government agencies, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, and international donor agencies; (b) procurement of works and goods financed under the project; (c) supervision and quality control of execution of works and delivery of goods; (d) management of project accounts including credit withdrawals and disbursements from the Special Account; (e) monitoring of the implementation performance of contractors as well as seeking continuos feedback from beneficiaries on adequacy of project response to needs; and (f) assisting the Government as well as local authorities in adequately informing the population about the project and its different features, (para. 47 and 54; and Annexes 3a.3b,). Implementation arrangements for the different project components will be as follows: B.l CQ onent: Agricultural Support: 36. To ensure the availability and satisfactory distribution of seeds and fertilizer in the Karategin- Tavildara area for the Spring 1998 planting season, the implementation of this component will be contracted, under a sole source contract arrangement, by the PCU/PCERP to AKF. AKF, which since 1992 has been successfully implementing an agricultural reform program in GBAO and is implementing agency for part of IDA's PPAP project, has recently expanded its activities into the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area. Under its agricultural reform program it enters into agreements with local authorities, collective farms, and individual farmers of the five rayons. Under these agreements, land (between one and four has) belonging currently under control of collective farms is being handed over to individual farmers with an ownership guarantee given by the local authorities together with inputs and technical assistance (from its own resources) provided by AKF. Currently, AKF has cooperation agreements with  -11- about 240 farmers owning around 400 has, but expects to increase the number to about 550 in Spring 1998 with about 1,200 has under cultivation. Under its contract with the PCU/PCERP, AKF will purchase seeds and fertilizer, ensure appropriate and timely transport to the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area, and carry out distribution to beneficiaries. It would also provide subsequent technical assistance to the beneficiaries and closely monitor the adequate use of both seeds and fertilizer. Farmers benefiting from AKF assistance would reimburse the latter in kind, that is, primarily in seeds in accordance with a schedule included in the individual cooperation agreements with AKF. All seeds so collected will be redistributed to other farmers newly entering into cooperation agreements. B.2 Component: Roads and Bridges: 37. The works included in the 'Roads and Bridges' component will be executed under a contractual arrangement between the PCU/PCERP and the two State enterprises (MOST-STROI and DOR STROI), which operate under the oversight of MOTRA and are the only two existing enterprises in Tajikistan specialized, the first, in construction of bridges, and the second, in road construction. Under the proposed arrangement, PCU/PCERP will procure all materials required for the works and funded through the project on the basis of design studies (including environmental review) and bills of quantities approved by MOTRA and following procurement procedures specified in a PCU/PCERP Operations' Manual prepared in consultation with, and agreed upon by, IDA. MOST-STROI and DOR-STROI will provide the necessary specialized personnel from their workforce, ensure the transport of both personnel and materials from Dushanbe to the worksites, and execute the works in accordance with the quality standards, timetable, and payment schedule agreed on in the contract. B.3 Component: Small Community Works: 38. Since (a) the execution of these works requires a strong and continuous participation of local communities; and (b) the works are of small size and scattered location, a direct management of implementation by the PCU/PCERP would not be practical. Instead, the PCU/PCERP will contract, on a competitive basis, one or several NGO or other entities acceptable to the Bank to act, under the supervision of the PCU/PCERP and the relevant line ministries (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, etc..), as the local Implementation Managers in the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area. In this quality, the Implementation Managers will be responsible for: (a) identifying, in close consultation with the local authorities and the population of the communities concerned, the works to be executed or equipment and supplies to be purchased satisfying agreed selection criteria (Annex 4); (b) obtaining, if needed, approval from the PCU/PCERP on project management decisions in accordance with conditions stipulated in the contract; (c) preparing technical designs (including environmental review), bills of quantities, and tender documents; (d) organizing procurement among local small enterprises; (d) evaluating tenders and preparing contracts; (e) supervising the execution of works and/o delivery and/or installation of equipment and supplies; and (f) making payments to contractors and/or suppliers. All procurement of specific goods or services required for the component (other than in-situ available construction materials) will be carried out by the PCU/PCERP following the procedures specified in the PCU/PCERP Operations' Manual. B.4 Component: Other Infrastructure Works: 39. The implementation arrangements for this components will follow, depending on the nature and size of the works or goods to be provided, the arrangements for the 'Bridges and Roads' component or the 'Small Community Works' component and will be subject to prior review and approval by IDA.  - 12 - C. Mid-Term Review 40. In addition to intensive regular supervision by Bank staff and close follow up by the Bank Field Office in Tajikistan, IDA and the Government will carry out by end of November 1998 a mid-term review to (a) assess progress in project implementation achieved until then; (b) identify constraints and obstacles encountered; (c) discuss solutions and possibly required adjustments in the implementation of ongoing components; and (d) agree on the completion program for the rest of the project. Subsequent periodic reviews will take place according to a mutually agreed schedule but in no case no later than November 1999. Agreement on mid-term review and monitoring procedures was reached during negotiations. (para. 57(c)). D. Procurement 41. The project will include retroactive financing of goods. Credit proceeds up to US$ 800,000 (8% of project cost) will be applied to expenditures for such contracts concluded after December 1, 1997. Only those contracts which will meet the Bank's procurement requirements outlined in this section will be acceptable under retroactive financing. Procurement arrangements were discussed and agreed at negotiations. (para. 57(b)). 42. All goods and works to be financed from the credit proceeds will be procured in accordance with the IDA Guidelines for Procurement ('Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits' published in January 1995 and revised in January 1996), including amendments as of the credit signing date, using the Bank/IDA standard procurement documents. A procurement workshop will be held in Spring-1998. Table 3: Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (in US$ million equivalent) Expenditure Category Procurement Method Total Cost (including contingencies) ICB NCB Other N.B.F 1. Works 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 3.6 (0.0) (0.0) (2.9) (0.0) (2.9) 2. Good 0.0 3 1 4.3 0.0 7.4 (0--0) (3.0) (4.1) (0.0) (7.1) 0.0 3.1 7.9 0.0 11.0 (0.0) .(3.0) (7.0) (0.0) (10.0) Note: Cost estimates include taxes and duties. Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA credit Other include: Direct contracting for bridge and roads repair works US$ 1.5 million equivalent Minor Works Contracts for small community works US$ 2.0 million equivalent Direct Contracting for small community works US$ 0.1 million National Shopping for small community work supplies US$ 0.2 million International Shopping US$ 4.1 million  - 13 - 43. Works: Bridges and Roads Component: The persistence of security problems in Tajikistan and the scattered and remote location of the worksites requires an innovative approach to procurement. Due to the civil war in which the country was engulfed for the last six years no major infrastructure works have been carried out for several years. Therefore, ICB is not expected to be suitable. This is also necessary as the size of the contracts is small (below US$ 200,000 equivalent). Also, there are no private sector enterprises in the country that have the capacity to carry out the works required under the project and National Competitive Bidding (NCB) is, therefore, not feasible either. Currently, there are only two semi-autonomous State enterprises capable of carrying out the works, MOST-STROI and DOR- STROI, which are specialized, the first in bridge constructions, and the second, in road construction, and have the equipment and skilled personnel that is needed. Therefore, construction works with the help of those companies is the only possible approach. In order to have an optimal solution, under the proposed arrangement, all construction materials will be procured by the PCU/PCERP directly in accordance with procedures acceptable to IDA, (para. 44). PCU/PCERP will procure the execution of the works through up to about twelve individual Direct Contracts with MOST-STROI (of an average value of US$ 110,000) and one contract with DOR-STROI (of a value of US$ 450,000), on a sole-source basis for a total value of about US$ 1.5 million equivalent. Under these contracts MOST-STROI and DOR-STROI would provide the specialized personnel and equipment required to execute the works under the control of PCU/PCERP and technical supervision by MOTRA (if additional construction equipment is needed it would be leased by PCU/PCERP), (para. 37). Payments to MOST-STROI and DOR-STROI would be made according to a completion rates and time schedule included in their respective contracts with PCU/PCERP. 44. Small Works Component: The works included in this component are scattered in a region where there is no large-scale construction industry. Therefore, small community work projects of a maximum cost of US$ 50,000 equivalent will be procured under Minor Works Contracts awarded under lumpsum, fixed price contracts on the basis of quotations obtained from at least three qualified domestic contractors in response to written invitations. Awards will be made to the contractor who offers the lowest price quotation for the required work and who has the experience and resources available to complete the contract successfully. Approximately US$ 2.0 million will be procured in accordance with this procedure. The present approach shall be defined in the PCU/PCERP Operations' Manual. Given the relatively large number of minor works contracts, and for information dissemination purposes, the Implementation Manager will ensure that contracts opportunities are advertised for each six-month period on a rolling basis for contractors' expressions of interest. The advertisements will be placed in local newspapers or circulated through other media. The Implementation Manager will prepare and maintain a list of interested contractors and will invite all such contractors to submit quotations. The list will remain open so that any contractor expressing interest any time is added to the list. Direct Contracting (DC) will be used for small works contracts under US$ 10,000 equivalent up to total value of US$ 100,000 equivalent when because of the remoteness of the worksite, only one contractor is available. Contract costs will be established by the Implementation Manager, in consultation with PCU/PCERP, on the basis of cost comparisons with, and/or unit costs derived from, other similar contracts. 45. Goods: Considering the emergency situation in the country and the need to expedite project implementation, goods to be financed from the IDA credit consisting of construction materials readily available from local suppliers in the country such as sand, gravel, crush stone, etc.. will be procured for contracts valued at less than US$ 250,000 equivalent and an aggregate amount of up to US$ 3.1 million equivalent through National Competitive Bidding (NCB). Goods consisting of miscellaneous supplies included in the 'Small Community Works' component, and costing less than US$ 50,000 equivalent per contract, up to an aggregate amount of US$ 200,000 equivalent, will be procured through National Shippnig (NS) procedures on the basis of price quotations obtained from at least three suppliers.  - 14- nAol S png (IS) baswd on a companso of prce quotations oblained from at east three suppLiers from at kast two eligible coun will be used for the pourement of ctucib maials such as steel, timber, cement, etc.., seeds, fertilizer, fuel, vehicles, computers, and office equipm not available in Tajikun for contracts with a value not exceeding US$ 200,000 equivalent each and an aggregate amount of US$ 4.1 million equivalent. 46. Rak Prior Review. All contracts awarded under NCB and IS of a value in excess of USS 100,000 equivalent and contract awarded under DC of a value above US$ 10,000 equivalent will be subject to prior review by IDA. Additionally, the first two contracts for procurement under IS and NS will be submitted to prior review inTespective of their value. All other procurement documents and contract. will be subject to ex-post reviews by IDA supervision missions. Mechanisms for prior review of Minor Works contracts with a value not exceeding US$ 50,000 equivalent will be described in the PCU/PCERP Operations' Manual, (para. 34). 47. : Procurement will be carefully monitored by the PCU/PCERP which will set up to this effect a computerized monitoring system. All procurement documentation will be kept at the PCU/PCERP office in order to be available for review by Bank supervision missions and exten auditors. Quarterly reports will provide detailed information on procurement. E. Dsbursements 48. The IDA Credit is expected to be disbursed in two and a half years, including six months for the finalization of accounts and submission of final withdrawal applications and other reports. Table4.amm LdCedtsbushan Shd& (in USS million) Bank Fcal Year FY 98 FY 99 FY 2000 Anuwa 1.0 6.0 3.0 Cumnuladve 1.0 7.0 10.0 49. The proceeds of the Credit will be disbursed as follows: Table 5fliab.urmLcnClgwim (USS million) Caegoy Amom of Credit % of eedfite to be fiuanced Worh 2.6 90% Goods 6.4 100% of forei exiture 100% of ocal ependitur [ex- y cost] 90% of local pmutur for odor goods poured locly U _uxcted 1.0 Total 10.0  - 15 - 50. To facilitate timely project implementation the Government will establish, maintain, and operate under conditions acceptable to the Bank, a Special account in US Dollars with an authorized allocation of US$ 500,000 in a commercial bank that meets the requirements. During the early stages of project implementation, the initial allocation of the Special account will be limited to US$ 200,000. However, when the aggregate disbursements under the Credit will have reached the level of SDR 700,00 equivalent, the initial allocation may be increased to the authorized allocation of US$ 500,000 by submitting the relevant applications for withdrawal. Replenishment applications should be submitted every three months and must include reconciled bank statements as well as other appropriate supporting documents. 51. Disbursements for all contracts for works and goods of amounts of less than US$ 100,000 will be made on the basis of Statements of Expenditures (SOEs). Payment conditions and modalities for disbursements under the 'Small Community Works' component will be stated in the respective contractual agreements with the Implementation Managers for the component. Disbursements will be made on the basis of SOEs. Records of the Special Account proceeds and outlays will be available for review by Bank supervision missions and subject to annual audit. Modalities of Special Account management and disburse ent arements were discussed and agreed during negotiations, (pam. i-7(d)). F. Accounting and Auditing 52. The PCU will be responsible for the overall financial management of the project and will, to that effect, establish within PCU/PCERP an accounting system acceptable to the Bank, with technical assistance as required. The PCU will be subject to annual external audit by independent auditors acceptable to the Bank. Accounting and auditing arranents were agreed on during negotiations (nara. 57(a. G. Reporting and Monitoring 53. The PCU/PCERP will prepare quarterly progress reports for the Bank according to an agreed format. The reports will summarize the status of implementation of the different project components in terms of procurement, work execution, and disbursement. A final Implementation Completion Report (ICR) will be prepared by the Government no later than six months after the Closing Date of the Credit of September 30, 2000. 54. Performance monitoring indicators will be used to monitor the achievement of the project objectives, (para 57(g)). The indicators (Annex 6) reflect the concerns of the Government and IDA to that the project provide a fast and adequate response to the needs of the population of the Karategin- Tavildara Valley area. The monitoring of the indicators will also help to detect at an early stage possible shortcomings in the project design and implementation arrangements and allow to quickly take remedial action, if necessary. Agreement on reportiWng procedures was reached during negotiations. (para. 57(c)).  - 16- VI. BENEFITS AND RISKS 55. The major benefits of the project are: (a) the provision to the inhabitants of the Karategin- Tavildara Valley area of renewed and satisfactory access to the rest of the country thereby allowing the redevelopment of the local economy especially in the agricultural sector and contributing to the reduction of poverty; (b) the restoration and improvement of education and health services to acceptable quality levels; and (c) increased incomes for farmers as a result of expansion of land privatization and introduction of new quality seeds. Additionally, through the implementation of the small community works by local private small- and medium-size enterprises, the project will create a significant number of, albeit temporary, jobs and help stimulate the development of the local enterprise sector. 56. The project faces considerable risks, many of which cannot be avoided. These risks fall into two broad categories: (a) Political risks: Despite a promising start, the continuing successful implementation of the peace agreement remains a fragile enterprise. The demobilization of soldiers and their reintegration into civil life in the context of Tajikistan's economy constitutes a formidable challenge and its favorable completion could be jeopardized by a variety of factors. Political risks are difficult to manage, but the provision of budgetary support under the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit to help the Govemment bear some of the costs of the peace process can be expected to contribute to bolstering political stability. (b) Managerial and technical risks: Effective and timely implementation of the project requires the early creation of the PCUIPCERP, including the appointment of key staff. The capacity of the local contracting industry is not known at this point, and contracting bottlenecks could delay implementation. The diversion of credit resources to other uses is an additional risk. The risks are minimized by (a) the simplicity of the design of the project focusing on a few key components, (b) the relatively unsophisticated nature of the works to be carried out, (c) the provision of technical assistance as early as possible in the implementation process, and (d) the involvement of NGOs that already have experience in the management of this type of reconstruction and rehabilitation works in Tajikistan. Placing the project under the responsibility of the Prime Minister and having its implementation closely monitored by the CNR should help ensure the appropriate use of funds and minimize the risks of diversion. VII. AGREEMENTS REACHED 57. During Negotiations agreement on the following points was obtained: (a) Maintenance of Project Coordination Unit (PCU), (para. 33); (b) Procurement arrangements, (para. 41); (c) Mid-term review, monitoring and reporting procedures, ( para. 40 and 54); (d) Special Account and disbursement management arrangements, (para. 51); and (e) Accounting and auditing arrangements, (para. 52).  -17- ANNEX 1 page I of 5 REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT POST-CONFLICT NEEDS ASSESSMENT of KARATEGIN -TAVILDARA VALLEY, Summary INTRODUCTION 1. Tajikistan's civil war damaged agriculture, education, health institutions, power and telecommunications, housing, industry and administration, the economy, human resources and the fabric of civil society. The 1997 peace agreement provides a context for enhanced assistance to national recovery and reconstruction. Of the two main conflict areas, Khatlon (Vakhsh and Kofarnihon valleys) has been effectively under government control and received external relief and rehabilitation assistance. But the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area in the center of the country came under opposition control until the peace accord. The area is strategically situated astride roads linking Dushanbe with Gorno- Badakhshan (GBAO), and with Osh in Kyrgyzstan, along the Vakhsh river's major headwaters, the Surkhob and Obihingou rivers. It shares a long border with Kyrgyzstan. Its five rayons, Darband Gharm, Jirgital, Tojikobod, and Tavildara, contain almost 250,000 inhabitants. Of its 200 km2, 90 percent is mountainous. The Karategin-Tavildara Valley area is critical to post-conflict rehabilitation because of the damage it suffered, its relative neglect, and its strategic and political importance. 2. The Bank, with UNDP/ UNOPS, conducted an assessment of needs, priorities for reconstruction, including some stakeholder consultation in the five rayons over four weeks in September-October 1997. Six trained investigators assisted by individual district specialists, visited every community (jamoat), completed questionnaires with local leaders and commanders, who gave full cooperation. They inventoried war damage, interviewed key informants, established local rehabilitation priorities and compiled an extensive photographic record. This assessment seeks to be as comprehensive as possible. It covers, in particular, needs in the sectors of roads and bridges, agriculture, power and telecommunications, health, education and women, and indicates priorities for the local populations and local leadership. It includes a partial stakeholder and institutional analysis. 3. Most of the population lives in settlements along the main river banks. The Surkhob valley is broad, contoured and well populated, while the Obihingou is narrow, precipitous and sparsely inhabited. Before the war, the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area was a leading region in the production of potatoes, export quality fruit, honey, wool, animal skins, meat and dairy produce, focusing on national urban and export markets. It was a net importer of wheat. Mechanization was extensively used to maintain and rehabilitate irrigation and land-protection structures, to prepare land, harvest and transport crops. The main centers benefited from cheap internal air services, good roads, some local industry, and a good level of education and basic health. 4. Heavy fighting along the major roads and in the mountains, and aerial bombardment brought great suffering to civilians. The five rayons were differently affected by the war: (i) Gharm rayon (population 84,000) is the most developed, being effectively a regional center with an air strip and many facilities, but suffered only moderately from hostilities; (ii) Darband (Komsomolobad) (63,000) suffered  - 18- ANNEX 1 page 2 of 5 great infrastructural damage and prior neglect. Situated just upstream of the Rogun dam, and destined for partial submersion, government investment since 1971 has focused on an uncompletecd (and uninhabited) new regional capital; (iii) Jirgital (51,000) adjoining Kyrgyzstan, and being well behind the front lines, suffered little direct damage, but its pre-existing poverty was exacerbated by isolation, economic hardship and infrastructural deterioration and some destruction, and thus the district deserves inclusion in the reconstruction program, and its border location is important for future road communications. (iv) Tojikobod, (33,000) opposite Gharm, is a major agricultural district now in great decline; while (v) Tavildara, (14,000, 6 percent of the area's population), possesses the most difficult terrain, the Obihinkho Valley being narrow and steep. The war began here, and it suffered some of the heaviest fighting, and a disproportionately high level of damage. ASSESSMENT FINDINGS 5. Roads and Bridges. The main Dushanbe-Jirgital road (A372) through Darband and Gharm to Osh and Bishkek, connects the four main districts to markets, schools, enterprises, hospitals. The Tavildara road (M41) connects GBAO to this road near Darband. Both are in poor repair, being virtually impassable or dangerous in spots. Over a third of the 1,500 km of district and village roads are in bad shape, mostly in Tavildara, Darband and Gharm. Of 158 bridges, over 100 were destroyed or damaged, Darband and Tavildara being the worst affected. Several bridges are critical to communications, serving large communities, while others link small isolated communities to the larger network or are designed primarily for road protection and alignment. Bridges, being of strategic importance, suffered more than roads. Roads require constant maintenance owing to local conditions (rock falls, mud-slides, river-bank erosion), and most damage has been through lack of maintenance. All seven road management departments, responsible for repair and maintenance, were destroyed and their equipment stolen. The six asphalt-gravel mixing plants and gravel quarries are non-functional as is the precast concrete plant at Gharm, which fabricated culverts and other components. For most people, local authorities and specialists, the Dushanbe-Jirgital road is vital. They are less concerned with road quality, than with ensuring year-round movement of traffic and access to internal and external inputs and markets. A second priority is roads and bridges in Tavildara district, the only link from other parts of the country to GBAO. Two other priorities are: (i) the 45 km of the road in Kamarob-Nazar Aeiloq, to connect the main road to a major anthracite deposit, and enable small-scale artisanal extraction of coal for much- needed winter heating; and (ii) completion of the Yamgalik bridge across the Surkhob, to link some 30,000 people to the main road. 6. Agriculture. Agriculture suffered severe damage, through the loss of many factors: male labor; machinery and the capacity to repair it; productive land (to mud-slides, flooding and erosion); access to inputs and markets. While the state farming sector declined, private land was brought under wheat cultivation, usually at higher productivity. Wheat production increased by over half in five years, with almost three quarters of this coming from private land. By contrast, production of almost everything else fell far below previous levels: potatoes, livestock, fruit, vegetables, and honey. The seven percent of irrigated land accounted for most production. Irrigation system in every district were damaged; UNOPS has installed or rehabilitated small local irrigation systems. Much agricultural machinery was looted or deteriorated, and the Gharm central agricultural machinery repair workshop was destroyed. Local priorities for agricultural rehabilitation are: seeds (especially potato); rehabilitation of irrigation systems and destroyed agricultural machinery; rehabilitation of agricultural processing facilities; reconstruction of destroyed bridges and roads to facilitate the marketing of goods in other regions.  -19- ANNEX 1 page 3 of 5 7. Power and telecommunications. Extensive damage has been done to the main electricity supply network, which provided the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area with power from Nurek. Power lines and transformers, have been destroyed, looted or neglected with other transformers suffering from resultant overload. The highly irregular supply or complete lack of electric power has had widely felt impacts in all districts, and particularly in Darband and Tavildara. Economic and environmental consequences include the cutting and burning of trees for winter fuel, which have depleted productive orchards and forests. The telephone service also proved extremely vulnerable to war, looting and lack of maintenance, resulting in damage and destruction to about 60 percent of the system. Currently only three of five rayon exchanges and none of the local exchanges are in service, with the Darband and Tavildara systems completely out of operation. Priority areas for rehabilitation of are: repair of the Obigharm to Gharm high tension line; reconstruction of the Gharm and Darband substations; rehabilitation 80 km of the electricity line between Langar and Lodjurg in Tavildara; rehabilitation of the Darband central telephone exchange. 8. Health and sanitation. Health care was organized according to the standard Former Soviet Union hierarchy: 5 district hospitals (with the principal one in Gharm), 20 village hospitals, 17 rural clinics or dispensaries and 119 rural health posts, together with district pharmacies, sanitary/epidemiology stations, and 7 public bath houses. Health institutions were extensively damaged by attack and looting of equipment and vehicles. Hospitals now "function" with almost no equipment or supplies. Equally serious was the loss of professional staff, doctors and mid-level professionals, owing to emigration, low salaries or their non-payment. Staff remaining show a high sense of dedication to duty. Together with the deterioration of urban drinking water supplies and the destruction of public baths, these changes have increased the risk of infectious and water-borne diseases, with hundreds of cases being reported of typhoid, hepatitis, dysentery, scabies and malaria. Priorities locally identified amount, in effect, to the hope that the old system can be restored in entirety: rehabilitation and equipping of district central hospitals, especially Gharm, and of village hospitals, local health posts, central pharmacies, sanitary & epidemiological stations and public baths; provision of medicines and vaccines for prevalent diseases; rehabilitation of the only interregional tuberculosis hospital (Gharm); rehabilitation of the state psychiatric hospital in Navobod. A more focused response is discussed briefly below. 9. Education. The impact on education is similar to that on health, but affects more people on a daily basis. Almost half of the schools have been damaged and destroyed (mostly in Tavildara, Gharm and Darband). The learning environment sharply deteriorated. Classrooms lack heating, furniture, and textbooks. Many children lacked suitable clothes and shoes, or do not attend owing to prevailing insecurity. The number of teachers, the proportion of trained teachers, and the number and proportion of women teachers have all declined, for the same reasons as in health. Reconstruction of facilities is already being undertaken in some places with community support. Education priorities were identified as: rehabilitation of destroyed and damaged schools; provision of winter heating, supplies and textbooks, and school feeding and shoes and clothes to enable needy primary school pupils to attend. 10. Housing. During the war, over 2,200 houses were damaged of which a quarter were destroyed. This damage was mainly in Gharm and Tavildara, with Tavildara proportionately worst hit, and Gharm most affected in absolute terms. People have begun reconstruction, hampered by lack of construction  -20 - ANNEX 1 page 4 of 5 materials, and often forced to sell cattle, their only tradable assets and often their only source of income. Many houses have been patched up, often with thatch, mud, and recycled polyethylene sheeting. As a result internal heating is poor, a major problem during winter months. Priorities for housing are therefore, for the affected minority, a supply of building materials, including roofing materials, timber, nails, cement, lime and glass. Other local building materials are available 11. Social aspects: women, children, security and local government. Even before the civil war women in the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area were below the national average in secondary and higher education and least likely to work in the public service. With the war, the number of educated women fell to a negligible amount. Most women in the area are unemployed, particularly in Tojikobod, Darband and Tavildara. Families lost husbands, fathers, brothers, traditional bread-winners, leaving almost 4,500 female headed households and around 30,000 orphans (most informally cared for). Moreover, the emigration of young males for employment has left a pool of over 11,000 marriageable but unmarried girls, according to officials. Priorities for women are: organizing women's centers; micro-credit for petty trade and small businesses; assistance in small enterprise development; training in home economics including home births, sewing, processing of fruits and vegetables, traditional handicrafts. 12. Industry. Many industrial plants were destroyed, mostly in Gharm, including the Gharm central dairy processing factory, with a capacity of 24 tons per day; the pre-cast concrete factory, workshops for repair and maintenance of agricultural machinery and road building. 13. Relative priorities. A simple district ranking by proportionate damage to infrastructure resulted in: (1) Tavildara; (2) Darband; (3) Tojikobod; (4) Gharm and (5) Jirgital. A priority ranking of 14 commonly expressed needs across districts, resulted in five clusters: (1) Seeds and employment; (2) electricity, transport and fuel; (3) education, health and roads; (4) irrigation, drinking water, and bridges; (5) food and telecommunications. THE RESPONSE: PRINCIPLES, PRIORITIES AND PROCESS 14. A first principle is to treat the needs of the Karategin-Tavildara Valley area as an emergency situation, although it is not the poorest part of the country. This approach is justified by: the extent of damage; the collapse of the productive economy and of most educational, health and social protection services, together with the ineffectiveness of local government machinery; lack of effective relief and rehabilitation over the last three years; and the impoverishment and asset depletion of ordinary people. Fragile local institutions, widespread expectations of a peace dividend, and local willingness to participate in rehabilitation all point to an opportunity to consolidate peace, in which the next six months are critical so as to help people through the difficult winter and early spring months, and ensure the 1998 spring planting and harvest. 15. Secondly, the focus should be on functional rehabilitation, which bridges the gap between relief on one side and development on the other. Emergency investment is targeted so as to meet immediate priority needs, including those of the poor and vulnerable, while laying the basis for future development. This requires the rehabilitation of essential functions rather than the reconstruction of specific would not necessarily respond to the entire catalogue of needs identified in the survey, since it is natural, in presenting needs, that people would tend to wish to restore what had been there before. Local consultation on the best use of limited resources to ensure quick impact will therefore be necessary.  -21 - ANNEX 1 page S of 5 16. Thirdly, resource allocation must take account of the diverse needs of different rayons, communities and population elements. Each district is different, and has different priorities. In order to avert fears that some districts may receive less assistance than they deserve, the process of decision- making has to be inclusive, transparent and fair, with public information, open discussion, local consultation and confidence-building. Sufficiently broad local consultation would also help to ensure that benefits are widely spread. An implication for design is flexibility in the allocation of funds, which should not be too rigidly pre-programmed. A modest relief response is still required to address the urgent humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable, particularly in Tavildara. Tavildara should be treated as a special case, with a higher per capita investment, by virtue of its high level of destruction, its small population, and its limited economic potential. The rehabilitation needs of the other four districts in the Surkhob valley are similar and interconnected, and all jamoats should be eligible. 17. Investment priorities within sectors, as indicated by the needs assessment, should focus on: (i) Agriculture: ensure the preconditions for a sustained increase in production and family incomes, starting in the new year, through the provision of seeds and essential inputs, supplemented by rehabilitation of necessary infrastructure and local capacity: key road communications for storage, transport and processing and marketing of field crops and fruit; land protection and preparation; rehabilitation of machinery. The timing of agricultural inputs and land preparation is critical, (ii) Education and health: restore essential services, to avert the risk of a "lost generation" of children who had neither adequate education nor health care. The objective should be to ensure restored basic education functions during the first year and the operation of most schools through the 1998-9 winter, probably with a priority to secondary education; and to ensure essential immunization, maternal and child care services. (iii) a widely distributed and targeted program of local rehabilitation microprojects, to be implemented with full local government and community participation; with selection criteria based on local priorities. This will help to restore purchansing power and reduce poverty. There could also the completion of some works started before 1991 where this would be cost effective. and to complement any common interventions of small, local microprojects that respond to specific local priorities. Special issues in relation to specific districts are dealt with below under investment choices. 18. Process. It will be important to ensure close interagency coordination, as well as full partnership with local leadership, communities and government institutions. The area's ample human resource of educated and skilled people that should be tapped. The creation of parallel local government or implementation mechanisms should be avoided. Local government can develop expertise in preparing tenders; managing local contractors for the implementation of small works; of working in partnership with local community contributions; and handling some funds transparently. There should therefore be a process of phased devolution of responsibility to local government. In addition the local military forces should not be excluded from the consultative process, particularly in the early stages, although their role should not be allowed to usurp that of local authorities. The process of demobilization, and the reintegration of forces into the community, is part of building civil society, and it would be unwise to attempt to marginalize local military forces. Poverty monitoring using simple local mechanisms is required to track poverty indicators, to ensure the transparent and effective use of resources, the effective targeting of relief, and assess the effectiveness of the rehabilitation program.  IS  -22 - ANNEX 2 page 1 of 2 REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT DETAILED COST TABLE (in Us$ miillion) Project Component Local Foreign Total % of total cost 1. Agriculture Support Wheat seed 70 0 70 Potato seed 200 125 325 Fertilizer 0 160 160 Fuel 0 45 45 Subtotal 270 330 600 6% 2. Roads and Bridges Reconstruction 560 2,380 2,940 Repair 420 1,350 1,770 Completion of Darband by-pass 100 290 390 Subtotal 1,080 4,020 5,100 51% 3. Small Community Works School Repair 850 175 1,025 Health care facilities repair 450 75 525 Other Community Works 600 150 750 Subtotal 1,900 400 2,300 23% 4. Other Infrastructure Works 400 1,500 1,900 20% Total Base Cost 3,650 6,250 9,900 100% Physical Contingencies (10%) 400 700 1,100 Total Project Cost 4,050 6,950 11,000  -23 - ANNEX 211 page 2 of 2 REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN POST -CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT BRIDGES AND ROADS COMPONENT DETAILED COSTS A. BRIDGES H. OEOMCRIP1ION Im EX SPAN TOTAL MATERALS EOUPMENT LABOLR DRLLUJN DUSHANBE M cOsT COST COST COST SCOURPROTECToN tUD USD USD USD PART COMFLETEO 113 113 113 (ADJUSTWENTS) 1 Replacetemporary 129 24 329,025 89,575 89.675 89,675 60,000 Dndge : * 2 Re ace mporary 132 18 218,500 65.500 65.500 65.00 20,000 Dndge 3 Replace temporary 133 18 227,700 65,900 65,900 65,900 30,000 bDdge 4 Bombed bridge 150 61.5 630,450 200,150 200,150 200.150 30.000 Tavidara road 5 Bombed bdge 165 24 215,500 38,500 38,500 38,500 100.000 6 Incomplete bdge 170 31.5 340,500 93.500 93,500 93.500 60.000 7 AccetDSsouth ban* 178 54 238,740 79,580 79,580 79.58N destroyed 8 Neaty complete 185 24 62,650 47,550 47,550 47,550 (80,000) 9 Tobecompleted 183 24 90,400 41,800 41,800 41,80D (35.000) 10 Destroyed 196 31.5 373,800 111,200 111,200 111,200 40.000 11 Suspersion Brdge to Tavildara 202 90 447,800 162,600 162,600 162,600 (40.000) destroyed 12 New drift across laindslde area 207 DrIn 90 M 62,950 37,650 37,650 37,650 (50,000) 13 Brdge destroyed by flood 215 31.5 195,825 70,275 70,275 70,275 (15,000) 14 Destroyed 224 18 193,350 64,450 64,450 64,450 15 Hat repaired bxIdge 225 18 178.755 59,58 59.585 59,585 16 Destroyed. New Toqkobad twn Toikobad 16 180,000 Km 43 Ex. Ghbrm SUB-TOTAL 3,983,745 1,227.915 1,227,915 1,227,915 CONTINGENCIES 15% 597,562 TOTAL 4,581,307 .B. ROAD WORKS No LOCATION LENGTH 1 Daband by-pass from kmi 130 km 134.5 4.5 480,000 TOTAL 48W,000 GRAND TOTAL ROAD AND BRIDGES TOTAL 5,0ti1307  -24 - ANNEX 3A page 1 of 2 REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT INSTITTUTONAL ARRANGEMENTS PROJECT COORDINATION UNIT In support of the implementation of the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit the Government established in the Office of the Prime Minister a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) and appointed its Director. As agreed with IDA, the PCU will be responsible for both the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation Credit and the Post-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project (PCERP). The PCU Director, assisted by qualified personnel, will be responsible for the overall management of the Post-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project. Within the PCU, a Unit specifically in charge of the management of the Post-Conflict Emergency Reconstruction Project is created (PCU/PCERP) with the following responsibilities: - coordinating the activities carried out under the project with the concerned line-ministries and ensuring that they are consistent with their standards, priorities and criteria; - preparing, in consultation with IDA, an 'Operations Manual' specifying the procedures to be followed for the execution of the different components including procurement and disbursement procedures; * coordinating the execution of works carried out by implementing agencies and contractors, including periodic visits to work sites as required; * monitoring, in association with the corresponding line ministries, the technical quality of the works carried out and/or goods delivered by contractors and/or implementing agencies and, monitoring the general performance of contractors and/or implementing agencies; and taking remedial action, if required; * coordinating the activities carried out under the project with the local authorities of the communities concerned in order to ensure sustainability, ownership and effectiveness of the different operations; * reviewing and signing all contracts, payment orders and disbursement requests related to project execution; * providing necessary technical assistance to executing agencies; * monitoring progress in procuremnent, including the creation and operation of a computerized Procurement Management System; * preparing periodic progress reports for the Government and IDA;  -25 - ANNEX 3A page 2 of 2 * coordinating the implementation of preparatory technical studies (final designs, bills of quantities, etc.) by consultants or government agencies including obtaining necessary approvals, permits, etc. from relevant authorities; * arranging for annual external audits of project accounts; and * monitoring feedback from beneficiaries on the adequacy of the project response to the needs of the population concerned and, if needed, providing, in consultation with IDA, for adjustments in the project implementation arrangements, project content, or contractual arrangements with implementing agencies or contractors in accordance with the stipulations of their respective contracts; and * assisting the Government and the local authorities in informing the population about the features and other aspects of the project. Within the PCU/PCERP a separate department will be created to be specifically responsible for procurement and accounting, and, in particular, for: carrying out all project related procurement activities for goods and works and overseeing all procurement done by implementing agencies ensuring that IDA procurement procedures are consistently applied to all contracts for goods, works or services for which IDA funds will be used to disburse part or all of the contract amount; preparing tender documents, evaluating offers, preparing award proposals, negotiating and preparing contracts and/or, in the case of the Small Community Works component, review and approval of project proposals submitted by the Implementation Manager. * controlling the quality of goods delivered and providing, and arranging, if necessary, for temporary storage; * establishing payment orders and disbursement requests; and * keeping project accounts in accordance with international standards.  - 26 - ANNEX 3B REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PCU - a Prime Minister . - Project - Coordination Unit PCIU Post-ConflictReconstuction Project Unit Post-Conflict RP Rehabilitation Credit . Z Unit Director . Procurement| Accounting I It' 1i Bokges Communit Agricultural S z_ I I |Enepr | Manager| 'II LocaA Local Communite Farmers I~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~_ _  n  - 27 - ANNEX 4 page I of 2 REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR SMALL COMMUNITY WORKS COMPONENT Eligibility Screening: The eligibility screening for Small Community Works will consider the following elements: * whether the Project Proposal is presented in the right format and provides information on all elements required by the Application Form included in a set of specific 'Instructions' prepared jointly by the Implementation Manager and the PCU/PCERP; * whether the proposed project has been identified in collaboration with, and is supported by, the local authorities and the beneficiary community; * whether the proposed project falls within the acceptable typology of projects eligible for financing under the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project agreed upon by IDA; * whether the community is willing to contribute, if needed, with labor or in kind to the project and to which extent; Appraisal of Project Proposals Each project proposal, if considered eligible for financing, will be appraised by the Implementation Manager taking into account the following elements: * numbers of beneficiaries served; * cost per beneficiary; * sustainability of the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure, facility; or equipment to be financed; * technical and financial soundness of the proposal; * environmental soundness of the proposal; * gender balance of the proposal; * extent of community participation in project implementation; * whether proposed works are comprehensive where required; and * whether the project can be implemented by a private contractor;  -28 - ANNEX 4 page 2 of 2 Approval procedures: * Projects for works with an estimated value of less than US$ 20,000 equivalent will be approved by the Implementation Manager without prior approval by PCU/PCERP. Conformity of selection and appraisal will be subject to periodic ex-post review by PCU/PCERP. * Projects for works with an estimated value of between US$ 20,000 equivalent and US$ 100,000 equivalent will be approved by the PCU/PCERP based on the recommendations of the Implementation Manager. * Projects for works with a value in excess of US$ 100,000 equivalent will be approved by the PCU/PCERP upon review and non objection by IDA. * All projects involving the purchase of goods will require prior approval by PCU/PCERP and, in the case of contracts in excess of US$ 100,000 equivalent, to prior review and no objection by IDA.  -29 - ANNEX 5 REPUBLIC OF TAJTKISTAN POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCYRECONSTRUCTION PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN Target Date Activity Agency January 15 Procurement of seeds and fertilizer AKF January 31 Contracting of technical assistance PCU /IDA February 15 Credit Effectiveness IDA February 15 Appoint PCU/PCERP Director PCU February 28 PCU/PCERP operational PCU March 15 Supervision mission + procurement workshop IDA April 30 Preparation of complementary studies for 'Other Infrastructure Works' launched March 31 Tender for Implementation Manager for Small Community PCU/PCERP Works component launched March 31 Contract negotiations for Road and Bridges component PCUSPCERP initiated April 30 Contract negotiations for Road and Bridges component PCU/PCERP completed April 30 Distribution of seeds and fertilizer completed AKF May 15 Tender for Implementation Manager for Small Community PCU/PCERP Works component evaluated May 30 Begin works for Bridges and Roads component SEs June 15 Implementation Manager for Small Community Works PCU/PCERP component contracted June 30 Begin identification of works for Small Community Works NGO component July 31 First tenders for Small Community Works launched NGO August 31 Preparation of complementary studies for 'Other Infrastructure PCU/PCERP Works' completed September 15 Supervision Mission IDA October 31 Mid -Term Review documents completed PCU/PCERP November 30 Mid -Term Review IDA/PCU/PCERP   -30 - ANNEX 6 page 1 of 2 REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT PERFORMANCE MONITORING CRITERIA Agricultural Support Component: Quantities of seeds and fertilizer received by AKF * March 31, 1998 * April 30, 1998 Quantities of seeds and fertilizer distributed by AKF * March 31, 1998 * April 30, 1998 Number of farmers enrolled in AKF cooperation programs by * March 31, 1998 * September 30, 1998 * March 31, 1999 * September 30, 1999 * September 30, 2000 Average yield increase (by type of product) by * September 30, 1998 * September30, 1999 * September 30, 2000 Average household income increase by * December 31, 199 * December 31, 1999 * December 31, 2000 Roads and Bridges: Number of bridge repair / reconstruction contracts signed by * June 30, 1998 * December 31, 1998 * June 30, 1999 number of bridge repair / reconstruction contracts in execution by * June 30, 1998 * December 31, 1998 * June 30, 1999 * December 31, 1999 number of bridge repair I reconstruction contracts completed by * December 31, 1998 * June 30, 1999 * December 31, 1999 * March 31, 2000  -31 - ANNEX 6 page 2 of 2 Small Community Works Number of Small Works contracts identified by * June 30, 1998 * December31, 1998 * June 30, 1999 * December 31, 1999 Number of Small Works contracts under execution by * December 31, 1998 * June 30, 1999 * December 31, 1999 Number of Small Works contracts completed by * December 31, 1998 * June 30, 1999 * December 31, 1999 * March 31, 2000 Number of beneficiaries during six months period preceding * December 31, 1998 * June 30, 1999 * December 31, 1999 * March 31, 2000 Number of jobs created during six months period preceding * December 31, 1998 * June 30, 1999 * December 31, 1999 Amount of credit proceeds spent by rayon by (in total and per capita) * December 31, 1998 June 30, 1999 * December 31, 1999 * March 31, 2000  STAN 769/ "~^-S JTAJIKISTAN J Xj >~POST-CONFLICT EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT IV ,A 0 1 ZBE KISTUZBEKISTAN Conflict Areas Roads ZAFAROBODKHUJAND C \ * Selected Cities ------ Rural Districts ZAFAROBOD KONIBODOM ~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 Autonomous Oblast Centers__RuaDitcs * Co~~~~0~~~ J~~ @ Oblast Center ~~~~~~~Autonomous Oblast Boundaries T. DD-<- RA National Capital _Obast Boundariesr ) I~~~~~~hOLETAR no api ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~International Boundaries UZBEKISTA37 Area with no ablast-leel administrative divisions, where rayons are under direct republic jurisdiction. UZBEKISTAN >uieAn oblast is named only when its name differs from that of its administrative center. SHAHRISTON,F (yb/ KYRGYZ REP. 72T 75' ZU :{endhiAyni ~> ~ --,<. C C H I N A This mopvrasum 9dued by thu Z GITA ZBEKtSTANJ Msp Design Uniof rthe World '% > - 1_ I ~ L \~-'--- in h.Th besmiavondonussehrs 0 50 100 150KILOMETERS N ). .\;b TRMNSA .'KYGZE z Tursu ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~i URMNSA G1 intern sties shown son rh, mop ( - I N ns the Wsrtdm1v a Ssnh rsupen 0 50 1100 MILES . AKIST *\ >\Dsa ioojdgmeusean the lugel ststus afet ~ s e nymsrrer,ory arny endersemunt -r ISLAMIC lEP t. ""1 ,f : CHINA fi or eocepteoce ef such eoander,nss 69 /_ 2 OF IRAN *> ' AFGHANISTAN 1I_7, N _________________________________u __________________________________e________________