Ghana - Transport Rehabilitation Project

 Transport rehabilitation project Report No: ; Type: Report/Evaluation Memorandum ; Country: Ghana; Region: Africa; Sector: Transportation Adjustment; Major Sector: Transportation; ProjectID: P000886 The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) on the Ghana Transport Rehabilitation project (Credit 1858-GH, approved in FY88), prepared by the Africa Regional Office with an Appendix contributed by the Borrower, was reviewed by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). The credit, in the amount of US$60 million equivalent, was approved on December 10, 1987, and closed on December 31, 1995, two years behind schedule. The credit was fully disbursed. The credit was cofinanced by bilateral assistance from Italy, France and Japan, but no comments were received from these bilateral organizations. The project was intended to complement and reinforce Ghana's Economic Recovery Program, which had been launched with considerable support from the International Development Association (IDA) and other donors. The project's objectives were: (a) to remove physical bottlenecks in the transport system; (b) to raise the efficiency of the system; and, (c) to promote low-cost rural transport technology. Project components comprised: (i) road maintenance and rehabilitation, including a bridge rehabilitation program; (ii) railway rehabilitation, including improvements to the track and provision of rolling stock; (iii) a pilot program for rural road transport, including development of low cost non-motorized vehicles such as small farm carts and bicycle-trailers suitable for rural areas; and, (iv) technical assistance and training. The physical objectives were partially achieved. The ICR notes that some 1,500 km of trunk roads were either rehabilitated or underwent periodic maintenance under the project; by comparison, at appraisal it was expected that some 2,700 km of trunk roads would be improved. The railway component was restructured to give more emphasis to track repairs; the revised program was carried out, although some subcomponents were delayed up to five years beyond the original schedule. As a result, targets on railway operating performance were not met. The ICR singles out shortfalls in cofinancing and in counterpart funding as the main factors behind implementation delays and lower than expected volume of physical works. The project introduced simple yet appropriate non-motorized transport technology for rural conditions (farm carts and bicycle-trailers) which benefited women especially by easing their farm work and domestic chores activities. However, a line of credit for establishing a terminal, workshops, and vehicle production facilities was not utilized by the potential beneficiaries. Institutional development objectives were mostly achieved. Eighteen studies covering a wide scope (including highway sector management, bus company restructuring, reorganization of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and road safety) were carried out, and many of their recommendations are being implemented. A training program for road, railways and civil aviation staff was successfully carried out. In addition, although not a specific project objective, the government took action to strengthen funding for the road system by improving road user charges and establishing a road fund. The reestimated rate of return for the road component (about 70 percent of project costs) is 42 percent, compared to 62 at appraisal. The ICR did not reestimate the return on the railway investments. OED rates the project’s outcome as satisfactory and institutional development impact as substantial, in line with the ICR ratings. OED rates sustainability as uncertain, compared to likely in the ICR, due to the declining availability of funding for road maintenance despite the operation of the road fund. OED further rates Bank performance as satisfactory, compared to highly satisfactory in the ICR, as the Bank could have been more forceful in encouraging the participation of other donors (as pointed out in the ICR).  The key lessons from this project are two: (i) the project complexity and innovativeness was well served by the comprehensive program of technical assistance, the parternship with NGO’s on non-motorized vehicles and the Bank’s frequent supervision; (ii) the project’s shortcomings emphasize the importance of securing conterpart funding at the outset for essential components such as railway rehabilitation. The ICR is unsatisfactory. While it contains good statistical data, the analysis in the text is inconsistent, overly synthetic, overly optimistic and contradicts data in the annexes. No audit is planned at this time.