为什么要私有化？阿根廷省级公有银行的例子

LAIPSq1 POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1972 W hy Privatize? Argentina's experience suggests that bank privatization may succeed The Case of Argentina's only when accompanied by a Public Provincial Banks sound, incentive-compatible system of prudential regulation. George R. G. Clarke Robert Cull The World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy and Finance H September 1998  |POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1972 Summary findings Argentina has been a leader among developing countries supervision combined with privatization. The provincial in restructuring its banking sector. Clarke and Cull banks that remained in the public sector did not analyze the performance of those banks before and after demonstrate the same performance gains as privatized privatization and estimate fiscal savings associated with provincial banks. The decision to maintain a public privatizing Argentina's banks rather than keeping them provincial bank is a costly one. public and later recapitalizing them. Policymakers should expect privatization to pass The authors describe the process of privatization, through some or all of the following steps: including the creation of residual entities for the assets * With respect to preprivatization audits, expect losses and liabilities of public provincial banks that private hidden in these banks to be larger than those indicated in buyers found unattractive and the creation of a special prior audits. fund (the Fondo Fiduciario) to convert the short-term * If residual entities are created, expect them to hold a liabilities of the residual entities into longer-term large share of the assets and liabilities of the old public obligations. provincial bank, if the quality of its loan portfolio was They argue that the Fondo, created through low. cooperation between the Argentine federal government * Do not expect the price paid for the privatized and the World Bank, was key in making privatization of entity (the so-called good bank) to be great, at least the banks politically feasible. Argentina privatized compared with assets and liabilities in the residual entity. roughly half of its public provincial banks. * If the residual entity is large, the province will be The Argentine experience suggests that bank confronted with substantial short-term liabilities. But privatization may succeed only when accompanied by a with assistance and an aggressive asset recovery strategy, sound, incentive-compatible system of prudential governments should be able to navigate their way regulation. The regulatory environment affects a bank's through short-term difficulty. solvency. * The costs of privatization are less than the costs of Improved regulation and supervision alone does not future recapitalization, even if the near-term deliver the same benefits as improved regulation and management of the residual entity does not go well. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, and Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the causes and consequences of bank privatization. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Paulina Sintim-Aboagye, room MC3 - 422, telephone 202-473-8526, fax 202-522-1155, Internet address psintimaboagye@worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at gclarke@worldbank.org or rcull@worldbank.org. September 1998. (36 pages) The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work In progress to encourage the exchaiige of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordisgly. The Dindings, interpretations, and conclsions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the autbors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center  WHY PRIVATIZE? THE CASE OF ARGENTINA'S PUBLIC PROVINCIAL BANKS by George R.G. Clarke and Robert Cull. Draft: Please do not quote without permission Keywords: Latin America, Argentina, Banking, Financial Policy, Privatization, Public Expenditures. JEL Classifications: E58, G21, G28. We thank Stefan Alber, Jerry Caprio, Luis Guasch, Paul Levy, Saul Lizando, Paul Meo and Mary Shirley for many helpful comments and suggestions. For providing data and many helpful discussions we are indebted to .lavier Bolzico, Andrew Powell, Gabriel Caracciolo, Maria Hernandez, Andrea Molinari, Laura D'Amato. luan Barale, Horacio Fernandez, and Jorge Lombardi of the Central Bank of Argentina; Rogelio Frigerio, Alejandro Caldarelli, and Enrique Scala of the Fondo Fiduciario; and Raul Benitez and David Rosenblatt of the World Bank.  I INTRODUCTION B1ankers' incentives matter. Banks are key institutions for attracting savings, in the form of short-term deposits, and converting them into longer-term investments, in the form of loans. When private capital is genuinely at risk, bankers have strong incentives to gather information about the credit-worthiness of potential borrowers, which they can then use to determine how, and on what terms, credit is allocated. This ensures that investment is directed towards the most productive purposes and imposes a hard-budget constraint on firms. i However, when political pressure distorts bankers' incentives, credit may be directed without due regard to commercial lending criteria. These pressures are likely to be especially pronounced for state-owned banks. In theory, bank privatization might, therefore, have a large effect on financial sector performance and, in turn, on aggregate long-term growth. 2 However, in practice, bank privatization has not always been successful. For example, Chile privatized many public banks in the early 1970s as part of its privatization program. In 1982, the financial distress of the industrial conglomerates caused by high interest rates and currency devaluation meant that many firms were unable to service their loans.3 This forced the governmenit to rescue, and re-nationalize, many of the recently privatized banks. World Bank (1989) suggests that an inadequate regulatory framework "allowed [the privatized banks] to be World Bank (1995) found a strong link between performance of state-owned enterprises and hard budget constraints. That report also summarizes the literature on hard budget constraints. Egypt's problems with overdrafts and government assumption of the liabilities of state-owned enterprises are described in Sherif (1992) and Sherif and Soos (1993); Poland's efforts to harden budget constraints in Baer and Gray (1994); and China's tendency to allocate state-owned bank credit and direct governmental subsidies to enterprises with relatively low productivity in Hwa (1992). 2 Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1994) show that a variety of indicators of financial development (including general measures of financial depth) are all closely aligned with income levels. Similarly, King and Levine (1993 a,b) and Levine and Zervos (1996) highlight the strong link between financial development and aggregate growth rates. Not only do King and Levine find a strong connection between real per capita growth rates and financial development, they also find a link between total productivity growth and finance -- which is, perhaps, a more direct indication that well-developed financial sectors allocate resources better than others. World Bank (1989, p. 123) notes that some estimates indicate that the non-performing assets of Chile's banks might have been as large as 79% of capital and reserves in 1982 and 150% in 1983.  acquired by industrial groups, which used them to make excessive loans to group firms" (p. 127). In a cross-country analysis, Cull (1997) finds that financial depth did not increase in countries that received World Bank loans with conditionalities tied to bank privatization, relative to countries that received other types of World Bank financial sector loans.5 These results emphasize that bank privatization might only be successful when accompanied by improved regulation. Unlike some other countries that undertook substantial bank privatization, Argentina tried to improve banking sector regulation and supervision. In thle 1990s, Argentina gradually raised capital adequacy ratios, adopted stricter loan classification and provisioninlg standards, improved the certification procedure for bank auditors, imposed minimum diversification standards for bank loan portfolios including lending limits to a single affiliate, maintained high reserve requirements, and re-created and strengthened the Superintendency of Banking.6 At the same time, Argentina took strides to loosen foreign entry restrictions and to privatize state- 7 owned banks, especially those owned by the provinces and municipalities. Thle substantial number of bank privatizations and the improvements in thie regulatory framework combine to make Argentina a unique case study -- the benefits of privatization slhould be especially noticeable given the attention paid to regulation and supervision. The data tihat follow indicate that state-owned banks allocated credit poorly and tlhus lost capital at a far greater pace thani Stallings and Brock (1993, p. 105) notes that although rules were in place to prevent this. that wvhen the groups found wvays around them the government made no effort to prevent this from happening. * uI'rther, Cull (1997) finds that subsequent changes in financial depth Nvere actually smaller in those coulntries that attcmpted privatization without regulatory reform. However, he notes that it is difficult to dmi1w strong conclusions regarding this because privatization without regulitory reform was attciipted in only one case ( E'gypt). [:or further details see Ministry of Economics and Central Bank of the Republic of Arggentina. Ixpc'rice anud Lessons lroni Financial Market Instability: The Argentina Experience. ( 10 Working Party onl EIlCmerging Market Instability. December. 1996. 7 At the beginning of this decade. each Argentine province had at least onie governmcnt-owvned haink. Of'tthe nearly thirty public provincial banks, almost half had been privatized as of December. 1996. 2  privatized banks; that privatization will likely reduce the fiscai burden associated with re- capitalizing struggling state-owned banks; and that privatized banks have substantially improved their loan portfolio quality and operational efficiency. Although thie post-privatization period has not been long, many of the privatized banks appear to be functioning as well as tile largest private banks in Argentina, a number of which are foreign-owned. The paper begins by estimating the fiscal impact of privatizing Argentina's public provincial banks. In Section II, using the estimated loss rates, we calculate the future costs of re- capitalization. The results indicate that the present value of future re-capitalization far exceeds the costs associated with privatization, and is large compared to either provincial deficits or provincial expenditures.8 Section III describes how assets and liabilities were apportioned between the privatized provincial bank and a "residual" entity, and discusses the fiscal implications of this strategy. The privatized bank that was created contained performing assets from the old public provincial bank which were matched with a nearly equal amount of the old bank's (mostly private) liabilities.9 Non-performing assets, and the remaining liabilities, were retained as a "residual entity" by the province.10 In addition, most provinces agreed to jointly capitalize the privatized provincial bank with the winning bidder.11 The sum of these The fiscal benefits of privatization may even be slightly greater than those estimated here because we ignore any additional tax revenue that will be collected from the privatized provincial banks. 9 As a result, the sales prices of the privatized entities were quite small, especially in comparison with the size of the residual entity. '