Senegal - Second Agricultural Research Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 16610 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL SECOND AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (CREDIT 2107-SN) MAY 27, 1997 Agriculture 3 Country Department 14 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) US$1 = 324 CFAF (at appraisal Feb. 1990) SDR 1 = 569 CFAF (as of Feb. 1997) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS National Committee for Cooperation of Rural People Debt and Investment Directorate CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research CIRAD Centre franqais pour la cooperation internationale en agriculture CNCR Comite National de Cooperation et de Concertation des Ruraux CORAF Confirence des responsables de la recherche agronomique Africaine DDI Direction de la Dette et des Investissements EPIC Etablissement Public a caractere Industriel et Commercial EPST Etablissement Public a caractere Scientifique et Technique FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GIS Geographic Information System ICRISAT International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics IDA International Development Association IDRC International Development Research Centre ILCA International Livestock Centre for Africa ISNAR International Service for National Agricultural Research ISRA Institut Senegalais de Recherches Agricoles ITA Institut de Technologie Alimentaire M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MOP Memorandum of the President NGO Non-Governmental Organization NRBAR Natural Resource-Based Agricultural Research ORSTOM Office de recherche scientifique et technique d'outre-mer PNVA Programme National de Vulgarisation Agricole National Agricultural Extension Program R&D Research and Development SAGNO Systeme d'Amelioration Genetique a Noyau Ouvert SAR Staff Appraisal Report USAID United States Agency for International Development WAFSRN West Africa Farmning Systems Research Network WARDA West African Rice Development Association GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR January 1 = December 31 Vice President : Jean-Louis Sarbib Country Director : Mahmood A. Ayub Technical Manager : Jean-Paul Chausse Task Team Leader : Marie-Helene Collion  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE. EVALUATION SUMMARY. PART 1: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .I B. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES. 1 C. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 3 C. IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT ..........10 D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY .1 2 E. BANK PERFORMANCE .12 F. BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE .1 4 G. ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT OUTCOME I5 H. FUTURE OPERATIONS .1 5 l. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 16 PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES ............................. 18 TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS I8 TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANS/CREDITS .20 TABLE 3: PROJECTTIMETABLE 21 TABLE 4: DISBURSEMENTS: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL .21 TABLE: 5 KEY INDICATOR FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION .22 TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION .................................... 26 TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN THE PROJECT.26 TABLE8 A7: PROJECT.COSTS 32 TABLE 9: ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS .33 TABLEI10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS.33 TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS .35 TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS 35 TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS .35 TABLE 14: GOVEERMENTTCONTRIBUTION.36 TABLE 15: REALLOCATION OF FUNDS DURING THE PROJECT .37 PART III: APPENDICES APPENDIX A: MISSION AIDE MEMOIRE APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF BORROWERS' EVALUATION APPENDIX C: USAID/NRBAR EVALUATION This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL SECOND AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (CREDIT 2107 - SN) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Second Agricultural Research Project in Senegal, for which Credit 2107-SN in the amount of SDR 14.0 million (US$ 18.5 million equivalent) was approved on April 24, 1990 and made effective in January 1991. The ICR was prepared by Marie-Helene Collion (AFTA3), of the Africa Region with help from Leopold Sarr - Agricultural Services Specialist; Pierre Rondot - Agricultural Economist; and Hannibal Muhtar - Infrastructure Research Specialist, and reviewed by Mr. Jean-Paul Chausse, Technical Manager, AFTA3. The borrower and cofinanciers provided comments that are included as appendixes to the ICR. The Credit closed on December 31, 1996, one year after the original closing date of December 31, 1995. In May 1997, cumulative disbursements were SDR 13.96 million (US$20.1 million equivalent). Parallel financing has been provided by USAID, the French Cooperation, and the International Development Research Center. A number of small grants from various sources have also been obtained by individual researchers. Preparation of this ICR began during the Bank's final supervision/project completion mission, January 7-17, 1997. It is based on material in the project file and findings of the completion mission. The borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by participating in the final supervision/project completion mission and providing comments on the mission's aide-memoire - Appendix A. The Borrower also prepared their own evaluation report - Appendix B. Appendix C is an evaluation by the Chief-of-Party of the USAID/National Resource-Based Agricultural Research Project, one of the major parallel sources of funding for ISRA. Finally, the Borrower made comments on the ICR report which were taken into consideration in the final version.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL SECOND AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (CREDIT 2107 - SN) EVALUATION SUMMARY STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 1. The project objective was to generate appropriate lower risk technology to improve farmers' and herders' incomes in a sustainable manner. It was consistent with the borrower's strategy stated in the Five-year Plan developed by ISRA, in line with the Government's new agricultural policy (Nouvelle Politique Agricole). 2. The project components and activities consisted of: (a) adapting material and technologies already developed and focusing aplied research on major technical problems already identified for each agroecological zone; (b) undertaking natural resource management in the principal agricultural zones and testing fertilizer recommendations in farmers' fields; (c) strengthening: (i) the linkages between research, extension, development agencies and farming community; (ii) research planning and programming; (iii) administrative and financial management; (d) establishing a commercial production company; (e)' setting up an unallocated research fund; and (f) providing local training and technical assistance. 3. The project was to provide funds for civil works (mainly ISRA headquarters), vehicles, equipment, local training, technical assistance to ISRA's administration, and financial management and incremental operating cost. At appraisal, the total cost of the project was estimated at US$38.9 million with a foreign exchange component of US$11.4 million. The Bank was to finance 47 percent total project cost and 92 percent of foreign cost.  - ii - ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES 4. Most of the applied and adaptive research objectives were achieved under regional programs combining laboratory tests (applied research) with field tests (adaptive research). Linkages between research, extension, development agencies and farming community were strengthened. Research planning and programming procedures were improved without ISNAR's technical assistance initially envisioned. Annual work programs are now more focused and reflect more adequately clients' needs. Significant results were obtained in plant breeding, cultural practices and natural management techniques. The reserve research fund was never used as such, and was therefore reallocated to other credit categories. However, with support from NRBAR , a USAID funded project, ISRA set up a competitive research grants system which performed essentially the same function. 5. ISRA's administrative and financial management improved only marginally. After nearly seven years of continuous support, ISRA's financial statements are still qualified by its auditor. Management and cost accounting data is still not available on a regular basis in a format compatible with efficient resource management and utilization. 6. The objective of creating a commercial company for the production and sale of seeds and vaccines was found unrealistic. However, production activities were separated from research activities through the creation of a unit with financial and administrative autonomy. Technical assistance and training to improve human resources management had negligible impact: the Institute did not adopt the procedures developed, nor did it make use of the tools taught. 7. ISRA's headquarters were built but poorly designed. Major rehabilitation works were achieved. Although plans to rehabilitate the station experimental plots were designed, the work did not start. 8. The overall technical assistance provided to ISRA amounted to 140 short term missions, equivalent to 537 person-weeks, mainly for institutional support. It includes 250 person-weeks for administrative and financial management support. Most of the funding came from NRBAR. 9. The total estimated expenditure at project completion (December 31, 1996) was 17, 813 million F.CFA equivalent to US$46.3 million. This is higher than the appraisal estimate due to an increase in Government contribution as well as to the change in US$/SDR parity. The IDA credit was almost completely disbursed in May 1997. Most was disbursed during the last three years of the project. Two reallocations were necessary to compensate for higher than expected expenditures on civil works and operating costs. 'NRBAR= Natural Resource-Based Agricultural Research.  - jjj_- IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 10. The Second Agricultural Research Project was identified in July 1987 on the basis of a preparatory document presented by ISRA. Technical and financial issues were clearly identified and brought to the attention of the Govermnent during a pre-appraisal mission in May 1988. The project was appraised in November 1988 and post-appraised in February 1989. Negotiations took place in January 1990, but credit effectiveness was delayed until January 1991 because of Government processes in adopting ISRA's organizational decree. The project closing date was postponed from December 1995 to December 1996. 11. A review of the major factors affecting the project points to the fact that while the relevance of objectives is not questioned, the Government and the implementing agency's capacity to achieve them may have been over-estimated at project appraisal. Factors generally subject to Government control. 12. ISRA's legal statute, Etablissement Public a caractere Industriel et Commercial (EPIC) is not appropriate for a research institute. The status of Etablissement Public ai caractere Scientifique et Technique (EPST) has been proposed instead. The draft EPST law and decree have been under review by Government since 1994. The absence of an adequate institutional framework makes it difficult for ISRA to further implement institutional reform in line with project objectives. 13. Disbursements were very slow at the beginning of the project, in part due to the intermediation of the Directorate of the Debt and Investments of the Ministry of Finance. The situation improved once ISRA was authorized to manage the special account directly and when ISRA's accountant became solely responsible for managing the IDA credit. Factors generally subject to Implementing Agency. 14. Despite continuous support from both USAID and IDA, ISRA's administrative and financial management remains weak. One of the reasons is the lack of overall accountability for ISRA's financial management and the lack of suitably qualified accounting personnel. Every year, the audit reports were qualified largely because the accounts were not properly reconciled to support fixed assets and payables in the financial statements. Because of weaknesses in financial and accounting management, regional centers did not always receive funding in time or in sufficient amounts to allow for adequate research implementation. The impact of this was limited because other sources of funding (USAID, French Cooperation and IDRC), were available, thus enabling research experiments to continue. 15. Short-term technical assistance and training to improve human resources management had negligible impact on ISRA's human resources management because of its place in the organization and poor qualification of personnel in charge.  - iv - 16. The lack of infrastructure and equipment maintenance, the partial result of two downsizings during the First Agricultural Research Project, had a detrimental impact on the quality and replicability of experiments. Due to delays in procurement and lack of technical capabilities to prepare tender documents, although buildings and basic infrastructure have been rehabilitated, station experimental plots have not. Equipment was received only towards the end of the project. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 17. The current level of government financial support will not allow ISRA to adequately maintain its present network of infrastructure (even consolidated as being considered) nor implement all the activities proposed for the next phase. An important contribution from donors would still be needed. Two additional conditions are necessary for ISRA to sustain its achievements: (a) the adoption of the proposed legal statute of EPST; and (b) improvement of its administrative and financial management capacity. BANK PERFORMANCE 18. Bank performance in all phases of the project was generally satisfactory. The project benefited from a high degree of qualified expertise during supervision and, in particular, during the in-depth mid-term review. During preparation, insufficient attention was given to infrastructure and equipment management and to station rehabilitation needs. Government and ISRA implementing capability may have been over estimated. Perhaps the Bank should have reacted more strongly to the repeatedly qualified audits that were reported, regardless of the fact that ISRA benefited from intensive financial and accounting management support. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 19. Government provided more funding than the level initially agreed upon in the Credit Agreement. Compliance with legal covenants was mixed. Agreed recommendations were not always implemented although ISRA's staff actively participated in Bank supervision missions. ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT OUTCOME 20. The overall assessment of the project is marginally satisfactory. Despite ISRA's weak institutional capacity, important research results were obtained. Had the project been more successful in strengthening financial, and human resources management, it is likely that more research results could have been obtained. It is disappointing, however, that despite all the investments made in strengthening financial and administrative management in terms of equipment and technical assistance, performance in this area is still unsatisfactory. FUTURE OPERATIONS 21. A follow-up project using a four-pronged approach is under preparation: research, extension services, producer organizations and Ministry restructuring. The objective is to  - v - promote a partnership between agricultural services and producer organizations, with producers jointly defining the research and extension programs with the agricultural services, allocating resources and evaluating results. The new project will also include the Food Research Institute (ITA: Institut de Technologie Alimentaire). It will build on the recently adopted decentralization laws that devolve responsibilities to local and regional collectivities. 22. For ISRA in particular, preparation of the new project focuses on: * the legal context (EPST law, a new Reglement d'Etablissement that ISRA can identify with and a new organizational decree that institutionalizes research regionalization); * an improved and decentralized financial management system, including cost- accounting; * the Strategic Plan, with priority-setting and establishing regional research teams; . downsizing and consolidating the network of infrastructure to achieve ISRA's sustainability by the end of the third phase; . collaboration with ITA on selected agroprocessing and post-harvest technology programs and with other institutes and University in such areas as publications, and documentation; and * improved station management. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 23. Scope of research institutes. During the preparation of the second phase, the Bank requested ISRA's management to set priorities among the activities identified under the Five- year Plan as a condition for negotiations, but did not squarely address the issue of infrastructure network and fixed costs. Consolidation and downsizing of infrastructure and staff to a level sustainable by Government should be a major concern for the government and a prerequisite for the Bank at the onset of involvement with research institutes to avoid promoting research institutes that are unsustainable. 24. Human resources management and capacity building. ISRA's difficulties in improving its financial and administrative management can be traced, by and large, to insufficiently qualified and motivated staff. Even though ISRA's staff is contractual, management was not able to replace unqualified personnel with better qualified staff. ISRA's management also shied away from implementing a merit-based review system. This situation is not specific to ISRA and Senegal. It shows the limits of a strategy of institutional development for agricultural research without a supporting overall Government policy.  - vi - 25. Financial management. Effective financial management of research institutes is a prerequisite for the success of research objectives. Qualified financial Bank staff should be more involved with the team responsible for project preparation and implementation. However, ensuring cost-efficiency and financial discipline in research institutions remains the responsibility of the government. 26. Importance of agroprocessing research. Any analysis of potential agricultural sector development in Senegal, and in many other African countries, shows that the opportunities for added-value and growth in processing may be relatively important compared with productivity gains in production. Though it would complicate projects when more than one research institution and ministry are involved, such as in the case of Senegal, the Bank should not consider investing in production research without investing simultaneously in post-harvest research. 27. Adapting or generating technologies? Rather than a purely technology generation strategy, a strategy of adaptive research should be pursued. International scientific collaboration should also be promoted to maintain a research institute's access to advanced technology. 28. Bank technical support for infrastructure development. The Bank should ensure that the Borrower's capacity to review technical and engineering plans is adequate and that such plans have been carefully evaluated by the Borrower prior to giving its no objection. 29. Research station management and development. Research stations demand a high level of management skills and careful planning of use of resources, activities, and staff. Research project preparation must therefore give adequate attention to station management and ensure that support services expenditures are properly budgeted.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL SECOND AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (CREDIT 2107-SN) PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. INTRODUCTION 1. The Second Agricultural Research Project, with a credit amount of US$18.5 million, was intended to consolidate achievements made under the First Agricultural Research Project (Cr. 1176-SN), completed in June 1989. The first project aimed at a broad reorganization and rationalization of the Senegalese Agricultural Research Institute (ISRA), which has a national mandate for research on crop and livestock production as well as for forestry and fisheries. It financed the rehabilitation and construction of ISRA's research infrastructure and staff housing, the procurement of station and laboratory equipment and vehicles, and the recruitment of scientists and other personnel. The project helped ISRA to increase its number of trained national scientists, nationalize its management, and produce a number of valuable technologies. Staff skill gaps and redundancies were dealt with. However, relatively little attention was paid to the linkages with extension services. Additionally, research was not sufficiently focused on real farmers' needs. ISRA's financial management remained weak throughout the first project. As a result, funds for research inputs were not generally available on time and in sufficient amounts, except for the last year of the project, thus significantly affecting the effectiveness of research programs. B. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 2. Project Objectives. The broad objective of the Second Agricultural Research Project was to increase the generation of lower risk technology to improve farmers' and herders' incomes in a sustainable manner. The specific objectives were to: (i) undertake priority research programs identified in ISRA's Five-year Research Program; (ii) continue to improve ISRA's programming and budgeting systems and personnel and financial management; and (iii) get researchers out of their stations and into farmers' fields. In support of these objectives, the project, to be implemented over five years, included the following activities: (a) financial support to ISRA for implementing selected research programs of the five-year Research Plan; (b) strengthening of ISRA's administrative and financial management; (c) implementation of adaptive research activities to test, in real farm situation, the technologies developed during the first project;  -2- (d) applied research targeted at major technical problems in the priority agricultural zones; (e) development of an applied research program in natural resources management; (f) strengthening of the linkages between research, extension, development agencies and the farming community; (g) training in research planning and programming for ISRA's management and research staff; (h) provision of financial support for ISRA's support services and for the establishment of a commercial company to manage revenue-eaming activities; and (i) establishment of a Research Reserve Fund to support urgent research work not identified in the five-year Research Plan. 3. At appraisal, the total cost of the project was estimated at US$38.9 million with a foreign exchange component of US$11.4 million. The Bank was to finance US$18.5 million (47 percent of total project costs) and the Government of Senegal US$20.4 million (53 percent). USAID, the French Cooperation and the Intemational Development Research Center provided additional financing which was not secured at the time of project appraisal. 4. Evaluation of objectives. The project's broad objectives were in line with Govermnent's strategy for agricultural development. Government's new agricultural policy (Nouvelle politique agricole) sought to combine increased agricultural production with social benefits and increased natural resources protection. ISRA's five-year Research Plan reflected this policy. The plan was based on a rigorous analysis of geographical and thematic priorities that provided the basis for regional applied research programs. The project was to finance priority research programs identified in the five-year Plan together with the Government and two other major donors, USAID and the French bilateral assistance. ISRA's five-year Plan did not have separate programs for natural resources management and fertilization, nor did it make a distinction between adaptive and applied research, whereas the SAR did. It was not until the last year of the project that a reorganization of the research programs took place and a distinction was made between adaptive and applied research. The ICR, therefore, reviews these programs jointly rather than independently as was done in the SAR. The institutional strengthening component of the project was to assist the Government in consolidating its research efforts, building upon the important infrastructure and human resource investment of the first project. While the objectives were relevant, the capacity of the Government and the implementing agency to achieve them may have been over estimated at project appraisal.  -3- C. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES Financial Support to ISRA 5. Activities under this component were poorly laid out in the SAR, with significant duplication with other components. The provision of funds for research programs, the Research Fund and support to ISRA's administrative and financial management were listed both as activities under this component and as separate components. The only other activities listed were related to civil works (new headquarters for ISRA and minor station rehabilitation). The headquarters building was completed, albeit with delays and at significantly higher costs (US$ actual versus US$ estimated). The quality of the architectural design suffered from insufficient capacity at ISRA to supervise large civil works and a reluctance to use contract services for this type of work. The cost of rehabilitation was higher than anticipated for the same reason. Administrative and Financial Management 6. ISRA's administrative and financial management was supposed to have been significantly improved under the First Agriculture Research Project. The objective of the second phase project was to further strengthen it. Services and equipment provided under the project were designed to complement USAID-financed assistance to ISRA in this domain. IDA financing included computer equipment to replace the aging main-frame computer. USAID financed a management consultancy firm (187 person-weeks) and long-term expatriate assistance (15.5 person-months) to advise ISRA on the choice of new accounting and financial management systems and to facilitate their start-up and implementation. The objective was to enable ISRA to produce reliable and timely financial and cost management accounting data, to allow the cost efficiency of its activities to be properly monitored by ISRA's management and to optimize resource utilization. 7. After nearly seven years of support, it is not obvious, what, if anything, this assistance has achieved: * ISRA's audit reports are still qualified (those for 1995 have been the subject of a disclaimer of opinion by the newly appointed auditors); * management and cost accounting data is still not available on a regular basis in a format compatible with efficient monitoring and management of ISRA's scarce financial resources. Implementation of Regional Applied and Adaptive Research 8. The technology development objectives set in the context of the Second Agricultural Research Project largely corresponded to the priorities identified in ISRA's five-year Research Plan (1989-1993). An exception is fisheries research, which was not included in the project. The initial objectives were relevant. However, not all of the objectives were fully reached,  -4- essentially because of lack of scientists or specialized expertise. ISRA implemented the research activities under regionalized, global regional programs which lumped together adaptive and applied research as well as fertilization and natural resource management. 9. Weaknesses in financial management contributed to cash-flow problems: regional centers did not always receive funding in time and in sufficient amounts to allow for effective research implementation. Research activities budgeted under the IDA credit were consequently sustained with other funding. 10. On a regional basis, ISRA researchers generated or adapted technologies that can be used as a useful proxy of project outcome. In spite of financial and administrative management problems, research results were substantial, particularly in the area of natural resources management, reflecting an increased commitment to this priority area. The following paragraphs summarize the research findings presented in Table 5 a. These results were the subject of a number of publications (See Table 7). 11. Senegal River valley. Few concrete results were obtained in the areas of water and soil management and agroforestry (Table 5 a: Technology 35, 36, 37), principally because of the lack of qualified staff. Breeding material for rice and maize, however, was tested by farmers and officially approved as improved varieties (22, 23, 24). Models to aid in decision-making were also designed to help producers choose agricultural equipment or fertilization methods (32, 33, 34). 12. Silvo-pastoral zone. Regarding natural resource management, results were obtained in the management of arabic gum trees and the development of agroforestry techniques (39 to 46), as well as in the area of animal feed (47, 48, 49) and adapting agricultural machinery (50 to 54). 13. Lower and Mid Casamance. Water and soil management models were prepared to prevent salinization in dams and dikes (95). Formulas were developed for organic-mineral fertilizer for different types of rice cropping. For rice-based production systems, agricultural equipment was adapted to local conditions (89 to 94); varieties were produced (81 to 88); production systems were characterized, and agricultural prices were monitored. However, five researchers left for training at approximately the same time, which disrupted experimentation work and the validation of results on-farm, hence a poor diffusion rate for the technologies generated. 14. Sine-Saloum. Simple, locally-adapted technologies have been developed for soil preparation (radou baling and tillage techniques) to improve water infiltration (73,74). Results in plant breeding (55 to 62, 67 to 72), agroforestry (80), and soil fertility management of degraded land (63, 64, 78, 79) were also obtained, taking into account agro-ecological constraints. Technologies were adapted for fodder storage and for groundnut seed storage under controlled atmosphere to prevent aflatoxin (75). Techniques to improve fodder quality with urea were developed (76,77).  -5- 15. On-farm and village studies made it possible to draw up plans for integrated watershed management, and models for managing water and fertility at the terroir and fann level. These results were used in soil fertility restoration and conservation programns conducted by the National Agricultural Extension Program (PNVA). 16. Eastern Senegal and Upper Casamance. Results were obtained in cotton fertilization (97,98). In the areas of crop diversification and agroforestry, no results were obtained because several scientists on the team had left. A comprehensive analysis of the livestock-based subsystem was completed, innovations were introduced (barn models) improving fertilizer quality and rationalizing the use of feed supplements (99,100). 17. Niayes. Significant results were obtained to answer the needs of horticulturist farmers in the following domains: plant production (2,3), plant breeding (8 to 12), postharvest technology (1), animal production (4 to 7) and agronomy practices (sod nurseries or onion seedlings). 18. Fishery resources research. This area was not financed under the IDA credit. Results were obtained for small-scale fishing equipment, conservation, and processing for fish products. Linkages between Research, Extension, Development Agencies and the Farming Community 19. Most of the sub-objectives have been implemented. At the beginning, researchers were using the regional research-extension committees to validate their technologies, rather than obtain feedback on constraints. Towards the end of the project, these committees began to function as a two-way communication process and to be an effective tool. The committees, however, still need to be institutionalized within ISRA's programming process. ISRA also organizes training for extension agents but not on a regular basis as was expected under the monthly technical review meetings of the extension services. Many researchers have been trained in on-farm research methodologies. The USAID supported Natural Resources Based Agricultural Research Project (NRBAR) also provided strong and effective incentives for researchers to design and implement research activities in collaboration with producer organizations and NGOs. 20. The creation of a Research and Development (R&D) Unit comprising the heads of: research of ISRA, the Food Technology Institute (ITA, lnstitut de Technologie Alimentaire), the National Committee for Cooperation of Farmers (CNCR, Comite National de Cooperation et de Concertation des Ruraux) and the National Agricultural Extension Program, has been an important achievement to improve linkages with users. The Unit's mandate is to ensure progress of a participatory system for the generation and transfer of technology and agreed upon joint R&D activities. The R&D Unit has been active in the preparation of the Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project currently under preparation by Government. In summary, at project completion, client-orientation has significantly improved, with direct implication of clients in ISRA strategic planning exercise, the regionalization of research, and more systematic linkages and contracts with partners.  -6- Research Planning and Programming 21. The International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) was to provide short-term technical assistance and short-term training courses to strengthen ISRA's capacity to plan and program research. ISRA felt that external technical assistance and training were not necessary. Recommendations to improve programming procedures were adopted, except for ex- ante technology evaluation (made during Bank supervisions). ISRA management and Bank staff finally agreed that this was not a priority given the need for other, more urgent institutional reforms. With the reorganization of the Institute and research regionalization, programming now begins with multidisciplinary regional committees involving direct and indirect research users. Programming ends with the Scientific and Technical Commission, an advisory body to the Board of Governors, with a mandate to ensure scientific quality of research programs. Annual work programs are now more focused (fewer research activities) and more adequately reflect clients' needs and available resources. 22. Though not planned under the project, ISRA introduced external program reviews, aimed at improving research quality similar to those undertaken by the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research,. Five (out of 23) programs were reviewed in 1993 and 1994. In addition, in 1995, as part of the mid-term review and as a basis for preparing ISRA's 1998- 2010 Strategic Plan, all programs were reviewed. However, mechanisms to ensure that recommendations made by the external program review teams are implemented are lacking. 23. ISRA still does not have a formalized monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. It is critical that ISRA develops the tools needed to systematically monitor research activities to ensure their scientific quality and relevance. ISRA is aware of the importance of institutionalizing an M&E process. The Institute is planning to address this issue as part of the implementation of its 1998-2010 Strategic Plan. 24. ISRA's international contacts were also strengthened, contributing to improved scientific quality and scientists' knowledge. Researchers are now participating in numerous regional networks (CORAF, WAFSRN etc.), which is indispensable for the smooth exchange of information. Collaboration with CGIAR institutes (WARDA, ILCA, ICRISAT) and with advanced research institutes, especially in France (CIRAD, ORSTOM), has helped ISRA to achieve some of the research objectives of the project. Research Support Services and Establishment of a Commercial Production Company 25. Improving station management soon appeared essential if research activities were not to suffer. From mid-1993 on, with strong support from the Bank and USAID, ISRA began to improve its station support services. In 1995 and 1996, station managers were trained or recruited and station operating expenditures and indirect research costs began to be adequately budgeted. At project completion, seven station managers had received short-term courses on various aspects of station management. Six managers were trained abroad in station management and the use of Geographic Information System (GIS) as a tool for station management.  -7- 26. One of the objectives of the project, supported with a dated covenant, was the spin-off of commercial activities related to the production and sale of seeds and vaccines. It took ISRA over three years to complete a feasibility study, which concluded that this objective was unrealistic. As a result, the mid-term review recommended dropping this objective, focusing instead on clearly separating revenue-earning and research activities, thereby ensuring their financial and administrative autonomy within ISRA. This recommendation was subsequently carried out. 27. Research Fund for Unidentified Research Activities. The Research Fund for research activities, unidentified at the time of project appraisal, was not used. The funds were reallocated to other activities. A supervision mission suggested that producer organizations tap into the Research Fund to contract for research activities of interest to them but not included in regular ISRA programs. ISRA management did not follow up on this recommendation. The reason evoked was that the social environment, within and outside the Institute, was not ready for such an innovation. With the creation of the R&D Unit and the strengthening of producer organizations, this idea is being considered for the next project. However, with support from the NRBAR project, ISRA did implement a competitive research grants system which, essentially, performed the same function. Short-term Training and Technical Assistance 28. This component involved two related activities: the strengthening of human resources management, including the evaluation of the ISRA's training needs, and training. Local training was to be financed under the credit, while training abroad was to be financed by donors and international research institutes on a grant basis. 29. As planned, ISNAR provided short-term technical assistance and training to improve human resources management. In particular the objective was to: (a) formulate a policy and strategy for human resources development; (b) elaborate a manual for personnel management; and (c) introduce a performance review system. This assistance, however, had negligible impact, on ISRA's human resources management. The personnel in charge of human resources management had poor qualifications and had little authority because of their organizational location within ISRA. As a result, the procedures developed and skills taught were not adopted. 30. From 1991 to 1996, the overall technical assistance to ISRA amounted to an impressive 140 short-term missions, equivalent to 537 person-weeks (134 person-months) mainly for institutional support, including 250 person-weeks for administrative and financial management support. Graphs A and B present the short-term assistance donations and the sources of funding. Most funding came from the NRBAR project. Some short-term technical assistance and training was provided for biometry with a limited effect since ISRA did not have a specialized resource- person in this domain to follow up after training completion.  -8- Graph A: Consultancy missions under Agriculture Research 11 in staff/week 450 404 400 404 350+ 53001 ,250- 0 200-; A 1504 _ E z 100-~ ' 84 _0 -28 21 O Institutional Monitoring Technical Impact support and studies studies evaluation Graph B: Consultancy missions by donors total: 537 staff/weeks, Japanese IDRC 5%ISNAR Frenchl % 3% 4% O IDA 14% NRBAR 73%  -9- Financial Objectives 31. The appraisal estimate of the project's total costs was F.CFA 12,6 million or US$38.9 million. At project completion, due to an increase in Government contribution (see Table 14) and to the change in US$/SDR parity, the estimated total expenditure was F.CFA17.8 million, equivalent to US$46.3 million. In May 1997, the IDA credit was almost completely disbursed (see Table 15). Disbursements were uneven and very slow during the first three years of the project (See Graph C below). Graph C: Second Agricultural Research Project Disbursements F. CFA 3000 ESpecial Account 2500 - replenishment . Direct withdrawal * 2000 request 1 500 U- 500 0- CD 0 0) 0 32. Until mid- 1993, the special account was managed by the Debt and Investment Directorate of the Ministry of Finances (DDI). Disbursements rarely reached research stations on time and in sufficient amounts to carry out research activities adequately. (The situation improved somewhat in 1993 when the amount of ISRA's account was increased.) Disbursements improved substantially when, in June 1994, management of the special account was transferred to ISRA. Expenditures did not conform to appraisal estimates. Two reallocations were necessary. Expenditures on civil works, equipment and operating costs were under estimated. The reserve research fund was never used (See Table 15). 33. Despite uncertainty in 1993, Government's funding of ISRA was regular. The total Government contribution of F.CFA 9.5 billion, (an annual average of approximately F.CFA 1.6 billion), was more than the F.CFA 6.6 billion estimated at appraisal. It included a fixed transfer of F.CFA 500 million/year for equipment and a variable transfer for operating costs, mainly salaries (see Table B). The transfer for operating costs was, however, never sufficient to cover ISRA salaries. The Institute thus ended up using the equipment transfer to pay salaries.  -10- C. IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 34. The major factors that affected the achievement of project objectives were under Government and implementing agency control (ISRA). Factors generally under Government control. 35. ISRA's legal status, that of an EPIC (Establissement Public a caractere Industriel et Commercial) is not suitable for a research institute, as it requires the organization to finance 70 percent of its budget out of revenue-earning activities. The EPST (Etablissement Public a caractere Scientifique et Technique) was found more appropriate. The draft EPST law and decree have been under review by Government since 1994. At project completion, a decision is still pending. The lack of adequate institutional framework has prevented ISRA to introduce necessary reforms and adopt a Rtglement d'Etablissement (conditions of service) more adapted to research activities and to the Institute's resources. This shortfall has limited ISRA's ability to further implement project objectives. 36. DDI, which controls all external funding, has been the main reason for delays in forwarding special account replenishment and direct withdrawal requests, as well as official requests for credit management (credit reallocations, extension of closing date, etc.). Use of the special account improved when: (i) ISRA was finally authorized to manage it directly; and (ii) the roles of the Secretary General of ISRA, the chief accountant, and the internal auditor were clarified The chief accountant was made responsible for IDA credit management when ISRA began to manage the special account directly. 37. Delays in procurement considerably affected project implementation. The delays were due in part to cumbersome procedures and slow processing of the dossiers by the Commission Nationale des Contrats Administratifs. 38. The last Director general, who had been very effective in taking steps to improve financial management, was dismissed on January 15, 1997. It is not clear whether the new Director general will be able to continue these reforms. Factors generally under Implementing Agency Control 39. Financial Management. The most important impediment to project implementation was ISRA's weak financial and administrative management. Despite substantial support during both first and second phase projects (187 person-weeks of short-term external consultants and 15.5 person-months of expatriate assistance during the second phase alone), little improvement has been achieved in this domain. Recurrent qualifications of the audit reports have been partly due to the absence of properly reconciled accounts to support fixed assets, receivables and payables in the financial statements. Two major reasons for this are: (i) the lack of accountability for financial management; and (ii) the lack of qualified accounting personnel (due in part to ISRA's inability to recruit and motivate such staff due to its pay scales). This situation has been  -11- compounded by numerous and varied -- sometimes even contradictory -- recommendations received from external consultants. The advice received consultants has alternated from a decentralized structure to a centralized one and back to a decentralized system; recommendations for supporting equipment shifted from a mainframe computer to a network of personal computers. 40. In the last eighteen months of project implementation, after the appointment of a new Director general and the recruitment of two highly qualified and motivated financial staff, internal audit and budgetary control began to improve. At project completion, the financial accounting unit was in a position to work together with an accounting firm recruited to put in place an improved financial management system. Unfortunately, both the Director General and one of the two financial staff have subsequently left ISRA. 41. Human resources management. Short-term technical assistance and training to improve human resources management had a negligible impact. The human resource unit was under the Secretary General, which meant it could not influence scientific staff management (under the Scientific Directorate). Because of this position in the organigram and the poor qualifications of its personnel, the human resource management unit had no authority within the Institute. 42. In 1992, scientists were evaluated to be classified under the new personnel categories of the Reglement d 'Etablissement (conditions of service, adopted by decree in 1983). Nevertheless, the Institute did not implement the results. ISRA's resources were not sufficient to implement the Reglement d'Etablissement while at the same time maintaining the level of activities and scope of the Institute (personnel and infrastructure). ISRA's management chose to maintain the Institute scope. Non-scientific staff were not evaluated, in spite of repeated Bank requests, especially for financial and accounting staff. 43. Because of inadequate human resource management research teams were depleted as scientists were allowed to leave concurrently for long-term training financed by other donors. Moreover, some of the Five-year Plan research objectives required specialists that ISRA did not have and that should have been either recruited or provided by external assistance. This was not always done. Finally, systematic procedures and tools to ensure scientific quality and relevance, and monitor research activity implementation did not exist and were not developed. 44. Research infrastructure maintenance. During the First Agricultural Research Project, ISRA reduced its personnel by dismissing station support staff without proportionately reducing the research activities or number of sites. The function of support services was virtually eliminated. Consequently, lack of station and laboratory maintenance resulted in degraded conditions for researchers to conduct their experiments. On the third year of the project, having realized the severity of the situation, ISRA's management took actions to improve research infrastructure maintenance with the support of IDA and USAID. Due to delays in procurement, only buildings and basic infrastructure have been rehabilitated. Experimental plots have not been rehabilitated, though the plans have been completed for all research stations except Kolda and Djibelor.  -12- D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 45. The actual government contribution of about US$3.0 million a year (at 1996 exchange rates) covers only salaries. To adequately maintain the consolidated network of infrastructure (including minor investments) and the level of activities proposed for the next phase, ISRA requires an additional US$2.0 million/year approximately. This means that ISRA will not be able to operate, even with the proposed consolidated infrastructure network, without major donor support. If Government's contribution cannot be increased, ISRA's ability to maintain its present levels of staff and activities will be threatened. 46. ISRA's sustainability also depends largely on its financial management capability. ISRA remains unable to produce reliable and timely financial and cost management accounting data. Cost effectiveness of its activities cannot therefore be properly monitored. 47. Supporting regional applied and adaptive research and getting the researchers out of their stations has been successful. ISRA has been regionalized. On-farm research has been developed and ISRA strategic plan has been elaborated region by region with farmers and extension staff. These reforms were conducted in line with project objectives. Their sustainability, however, is directly linked to: (a) the Government's adoption of ISRA's new legal status (EPST); (b) ISRA's capacity to improve its financial and administrative management; and (c) ISRA's willingness to reduce its scope of activities or the Government's intention to increase its contribution. E. BANK PERFORMANCE 48. Identification. Project identification took place in July 1987 on the basis of a document prepared by ISRA. Research programs and general orientations of the project were designed to support the implementation of ISRA's Five-year Plan. Institutional issues were identified as major weaknesses that needed to be addressed before project appraisal. The Bank's performance in this phase of the project cycle was satisfactory. 49. Preparation. A pre-appraisal mission (May 1988) reviewed the Five-year Plan and made technical and financial recommendations. As far as institutional reforms were concerned, the mission received assurances from Government that action would be taken regarding government financial commitment and ISRA's organizational decree, and that decisions would be communicated to the Bank within three months. This did not happen, but project preparation continued. 50. Appraisal. In spite of two appraisal missions (November 1988 and February 1989), the Government did not meet the requirements. The Bank decided to continue with the project and changed the requirements to conditions of negotiations. Government's financial commitment was only partially solved a week before negotiations. ISRA's organizational decree was made a condition of credit effectiveness during negotiations. Credit effectiveness was one year delayed, while waiting for the Government to adopt ISRA organizational decree. During implementation, the organizational decree was found to be inconsistent with the project's  -13- objectives because it organized research in national sectorial departments which were not appropriate to the stated goal of promoting regional research programs. At project completion, the adoption of a new legal status that would allow to revise the organizational decree is still pending. 51. In between the two appraisal missions, an apparent lack of coordination among different task managers created confusion regarding the requested level of Government's contribution to ISRA. Under the Structural Adjustment Program, the Government and IDA had agreed that Government's contribution to ISRA would be reduced by 50 per cent within five years. Under the Second Agricultural Research Project, IDA requested the Government to maintain its contribution to ISRA at the same level as before, for the duration of the project. 52. During project preparation, the World Bank team had agreed with ISRA management that it would reduce the number of its sites. This requirement was dropped at appraisal. At project completion, the level of ISRA infrastructure remains a problem. In addition, not enough attention was given to the need for station rehabilitation and improving station management. 53. Supervision. A total of 15 supervision missions visited project sites with ISRA staff to monitor project implementation progress. The project benefited from a high degree of qualified expertise during supervision (see Table 13). In general, Bank supervision missions clearly identified outstanding issues and produced precise recommendations helpful to both ISRA management and the Government. The USAID-funded NRBAR project provided physical resource management and development expertise to assist Bank missions. 54. The mid-term review was conducted jointly by ISRA, the Bank and other donors (French Cooperation, IDRC, USAID, and FAO). It resulted in a comprehensive analysis of ISRA and detailed recommendations on the necessary institutional reforms, research programs content, and methodology, as well as linkages between research, extension, and farmers' organizations. 55. One important discipline lacking in supervision was financial management. The Project Completion Report of the First Agricultural Research Project states: "Perhaps the single most important constraint to the operational effectiveness of ISRA was its limited capacity to manage its financial resources." The fact that this statement remains valid at the conclusion of the second project is a regretful indictment of the donors' and ISRA's ability to correct this situation, despite the heavy involvement of consultants. On the Bank side, it is not evident that any properly qualified financial management specialist had been involved in implementation prior to September 1992; by then many of the major decisions relating to ISRA's accounting systems and supporting equipment had already been taken. 56. Another important factor is the limited development of accounting and auditing in Senegal (which is nevertheless one of the best developed countries in this domain in Francophone Africa). This may partly account for the questionable recommendation by ISRA's auditor for a centralized accounting system. The Bank did not react to the recommendation (when the general trend was already towards decentralization and PC-based networks) probably  -14- because this activity was funded under the USAID/NRBAR project and Bank staff did not want to create donor-induced conflicts within the Institute. 57. One may also wonder why the Bank did not react more strongly to ISRA's repeatedly qualified audits. In the Bank staff's defense, it should be noted that major qualifications were unrelated to ISRA's internal management (such as the issue of the reconciliation between the accounts of the Government Accountant and the ones of ISRA's Chief Accountant). For other problems such as fixed assets, the Institute gave the assurance that the problem was being taken care of. The fact that ISRA had a heavy financial management consulting presence also reassured Bank staff. Finally, until 1994 the auditor's opinion did not reveal the depth of ISRA's financial management problems, supported by the fact that the newly recruited auditors issued a disclaimer of opinion for the 1995 accounts. Serious delays in the submission of audit reports did not help correct, in a timely fashion, the weaknesses reported by the auditor. F. BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE 58. Implementation. The project was implemented by ISRA. Government provided more funding than the level initially agreed upon in the Development Credit Agreement. In 1993, however, the Ministry of Finances wanted to decrease ISRA's budget by 14 percent and the Bank had to remind the Government of its financial commitment. The agreed upon contribution was subsequently reinstated. 59. Compliance with legal covenants was mixed: (i) ISRA submitted its work program and budget. However, the October 31 deadline, as set forth in the dated covenant was never honored; (ii) bi-annual progress reports were not sent systematically; (iii) as mentioned earlier, physical infrastructure was not properly maintained; (iv) the commercial company for revenue earning activities was never established for reasons already analyzed; however, the unit was finally made financially and administratively autonomous; and (v) financial management was poor. Other dated covenants were complied with. 60. ISRA officials participated actively in Bank supervision missions and in the write-up of the missions' aide memoires. However, agreed recommendations were not always implemented. This was particularly the case with regard to the legal framework, human resources management, financial and administrative management and infrastructure maintenance. 61. Institutional issues. The Government has been extremely slow (since mid-1994) in processing the documentation for the new institutional framework. At project completion, it remains pending. 62. Financial management was poor. Audits reports were repeatedly qualified. Operating expenses increased considerably in real terms during 1994 and 1995. Starting 1996, the newly appointed Director General imposed severe measures to control the use of operating funds. Because adequate procedures for the acquisition and use of routine consumables (especially vehicle management and maintenance) did not exist or were not followed, and because fixed  -15- assets and stock accounting were weak, the reasons for the increase have not been clearly identified. A detailed analysis will be carried out by the external auditor in order to determine the exact origin of these increases. In 1996, ISRA appointed an inventory accountant with USAID support to carry out a complete infrastructure and equipment inventory and produce a manual of procedures. This work was not completed at the time of the implementation completion mission. 63. Supervision of civil works, by the "Bureau d'appui Technique" of ISRA was weak, which may explain some of the deficiencies in civil works program implementation. Research infrastructure and equipment were not properly maintained. G. ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT OUTCOME 64. The project is rated marginally satisfactory. Project objectives were relevant. In terms of efficacy, results are mixed. Regarding institutional development objectives, the impact has been negligible on human resources and financial and administrative management. However, the organization and management of research programs, and linkages with users have improved substantially. Regarding research results, despite ISRA's weak institutional capacity, achievements have also been substantial. Had the project been more successful in strengthening ISRA's overall management, it is likely that more research results could have been obtained. Therefore, the project is rated poorly regarding the efficiency criteria. H. FUTURE OPERATIONS 65. In June 1995, the government requested the Bank to support a follow-up project based on a four-pronged approach: research, extension services, producer organizations, and Ministry restructuring. The objective is to promote a stronger partnership between agricultural services (research and extension) and producer organizations, with producers jointly defining the research and extension programs with the agricultural services, allocating resources, and evaluating results. The new design should make agricultural services more accountable to users. On the research side, the new project will also include ITA: post-harvest and agroprocessing research are crucial complements to production research and were not included in the first two projects. The new project will build upon the recently adopted laws for decentralization that devolve responsibilities to local and regional collectivities. The reorganization of the Ministry services, including extension, will allow decentralization by involving regional/local collectivities in the programming and management of agricultural services. 66. For ISRA, taking into account the experiences and lessons leamed, the preparation of the new operation focuses on: * the legal context (EPST law, a new Reglement d'Etablissement for ISRA and a new organizational decree that institutionalizes research regionalization); * new financial management system, including cost-accounting;  -16- * the 1998-2010 Strategic Plan, with priority-setting and establishing regional research teams; * downsizing and consolidating the network of infrastructure with a view to achieve ISRA's sustainability by the end of the third phase; * collaboration with ITA on agroprocessing and post-harvest technology programs and with other Institutes and the National University in such domains as publications and documentation; and * improved station management. I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 67. Scope of research institutes. After two phases of IDA investments, ISRA is not yet an institution sustainable on government funding alone, at its present level of activities, personnel and network of infrastructure. During the preparation of the second phase, the Bank requested that ISRA management set stringent priorities among the activities identified under the Five-year Plan as a condition for negotiations, however, it did not squarely address the issue of infrastructure network and fixed costs. The question of adequacy between the Institute's scope and available financial resources which should have been a concern from the commencement of the first project, is being directly addressed within the context of the preparation of the third phase. Consolidation and downsizing of infrastructure and staff to a level sustainable by Government should be a priority concern for the government and a prerequisite for the Bank at the onset of involvement with research institutes to avoid promoting research institutes that are unsustainable. 68. Human resources management and capacity building. ISRA's difficulties in improving its financial and administrative management can be traced, by and large, to insufficiently qualified and motivated staff. There can be no institutional development without qualified personnel. Even though ISRA's staff is contractual, ISRA management was not able or not willing to replace unqualified personnel with better qualified staff. ISRA's management also shied away from implementing a merit-based personnel review system. This situation is not specific to ISRA or to Senegal. It shows the limits of a strategy of institutional development and capacity building for agricultural research without the support of an overall Government policy. 69. Financial management. The continuing failure of its supervisory bodies to enforce a strict accountability for ISRA's financial management and the lack of suitably qualified accounting personnel are the root cause of ISRA's inefficient and unreliable financial management. Effective financial management of research institutes is a prerequisite for the success of research objectives. Qualified financial Bank staff should be directly involved at all stages of project preparation and implementation. However, it is primarily, the government's responsibility to ensure cost effectiveness and financial discipline in research institutions.  -17- 70. Importance of agroprocessing research. Agroprocessing and post-harvest technology research were not included in the first two phases of Bank involvement. And yet, any analysis of potential agricultural sector development in Senegal shows that the opportunities for added-value and growth in that sub-sector may be relatively important compared with productivity gains in production. Though it would complicate projects when more than one research institution and ministry are involved, such as in the case of Senegal, the Bank should consider investing simultaneously in postharvest and production research. 71. Adapting or generating technologies The IDA project underlined, rightly so, the importance of adapting already existing technologies to the specific circumstances of various production systems (agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions), rather than focusing solely on technology generation. International scientific collaboration should also be promoted to maintain a research institute's access to advanced technology. Such a strategy of adaptive research should be pursued as a joint venture with extension services and producer organizations, wherever they are strong enough to be research partners. 72. Bank technical support for infrastructure development. The Bank should ensure that the Borrower's capacity to review technical and engineering plans is adequate and that such plans have been carefully evaluated prior to giving its no objection. 73. Research station management and development. Research stations demand a high level of management skills and careful planning of use of resources, activities, and staff. Research project preparation must therefore give adequate attention to station management and ensure that support services are properly budgeted.  -18- IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL SECOND NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (CREDIT 2107-SE) Part H: Statistical Tables Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of Objectives Substantia Partial Negligible Not licable Macro Policies 1= a=E Sector Policies [] a El Financial Objectives = I E0 Institutional Development l = la E Physical Objectives El 1 i:i Poverty Reduction E la a E Gender Issues 1 = [=1 Other Social Objectives [ E E Environmental Objectives [] E El Public Sector Management a E El Private Sector Development El l El Other (specify) E E E I3 (Continued) B. Project Sustaiabilitv Likely Unlikely Uncertain (V) (/) (/) El1 El  -19- H ghly C. Bank Perfonnance satisfar Satisfacorv Deficient (/) (1) (/) Identification a 1=a Preparation Assistance E 0 cl Appraisal 0 El Supervision E0 Higl D. Borrower Performance satisfactoU SatisfaZ=x Deficient (/) (e) (/) Preparation E 0 Implementation Covenant Compliance n El Operation (if applicable) EC Highl HghlY E. Assessment of Outcome satisfactory Satisfactorv Unaif&QUuy unsatisfactor El El El El Marginally satisfactory  -20- Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Principal Fiscal Loan/credit title Purpose in US S Million Year of Status Approval Preceding operation Agricultural Research Strengthening of agricultural research 19.5 1982 Completed (Cr. 11760-SEN) capability December 31, 1989 Eastern Senegal Rural Support to agricultural diversification from 16.1 1984 Completed (Cr. 14060-SEN) groundnuts to cotton June 30, 1991. Irrigation TA Support to the financial and institutional 4.9 1986 Completed (Cr. 16320-SEN) strengthening of the Senegal River Valley December 31, 1988 Authority Irrigation IV Support to rehabilitation and improved 33.6 1988 Completed (Cr. 18550-SEN) management of smallholder perimeters December 31, 1995 Small rural Operations Support to groups of farmers with an array 16.1 1989 Ongoing I1 (Cr. 19920-SEN) of productive activities Following operation Agricultural services Promotion of effective crop and livestock 17.1 1990 Ongoing (Cr. 2 1080-SEN) extension services based on results from 1988 and 1989 pilot activities Ag SECAL Support to deepening of structural 45 1995 Ongoing (Cr. 27380-SEN) adjustment and institutional strengthening. Ibid, additional funds to compensate for Ag SECAL currency depreciation of the US$ 2.8 1996 Ongoing (Cr. 27381-SEN) Ag SECAL Ibid 1.8 1997 Ongoing (Cr. 27382-SEN) I_ _ .. ..... .  -21- Table 3: Project Timetable Actual date Steps in project cycle Date planned latest estimate Identification N/A. February 1988 Preparation May, 1988 Appraisal October/ November 1988 October/November 88, February 89 Negotiations January 1990 January 1990 Board presentation March 13, 1990 March 22, 1990 Signing April 24, 1990 April 24, 1990 Effectiveness July 24, 1990 January 23 1991 Mid-term review January 1994, January 1995 First re-allocation of funds March 1995 Second re-allocation of funds August 1996 Project completion June 1995 June 1996 Credit closing December 1995 | December 31, 1996 The first identification mission recorded in project files is July 1987. However, in the MOP, the first mission recorded is May 1998 The mid-term review was done in two phases Table 4: Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ millions) FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 Appraisal estimate 3.0 7.0 12.0 15.0 17.0 18.5 Actual 1.5 2.7 6.0 11.2 16.1 20.1 Actual as % of estimate 50 39 50 75 95 109 Date of final disbursement Final disbursement yet to be made. On March 23, 1997, the undisbursed balance of the credit was US $ 48,548.  -22- Table 5: Key indicator for Project Implementation Key implementation indicators in SAR/ Unit Estimated Actual President's Report 1. Civil Works New ISRA Headquarters in Dakar headquarters 1 I Rehabilitation research sitesz research site none 7 2. Vehicles: Double cabin Mitsubishi car - 23 Renault 21 break car - 10 Renault 19 liaison car - 7 4. Office equipment PC Desk unit - 66 PC portable unit - 10 Central AS 400 unit - 2 Onudlateur unit - 30 Printer unit - 92 scanner unit -I accessories unit -I screen unit - 1 5. Training Ph.D. * 8 Ms * 10 Short term 10 4. Technical Assistance A. Foreign stafflweek - 371 (a) B. Local staff/week - 156 (a) * financed by USAID and French aid 2 Although site's plan and tender documents were prepared, no work of rehabilitation station plots was done at project completion  -23- Table SA. AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGIES DEVELOPED BY ISRA DURING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH DOMAIN TCHNOLOGDEVELOPED ZONE DES NIAYES Technologie aprts recolte 1. Abri-sechoir A oignon Pratiques Culturales 2. Technique des bulbilles; 3. Techniques de p6piniere en mottes Production Animale 4. Rations alimentaires pour la production de viande; 5. Rations alimentaires pour la production de lait de vache; 6. Rations alimentaires pour la production de lait de chtvre; 7. Plans indicatifs pour la construction d'etables Developpement varietal > Manioc 8. Kombo 2; 9. Cocoli I => Patate douce 10. Clone 29 au "Jaboot"; 11. Ndargu => Tomate 12. XINA 8-4-1-11 ZONE MARITIME Equipement et engins de peches 13. Pirogue amelioree type ATEPAS; 14. Pirogue ameliorde type SOSACHIM 15. Pirogue amelioree type FAO; 16. Filet dormant mono-filament a sole 17. Filet tremail Conservation et transformation des produits de la peche 18. Fumage A froid; 19. Tente solaire; 20. Four Chorkor; 21. Four Parpaing ZONE DU FLEUVE Creation varietale 22. IR1529 (cycle moyen); 23. ITA306 (Cycle moyen); 24. BW293-2 (cycle moyen) Defense des cultures 25. D6sherbage au Rundup 5 I/ha sur 2001 d'eau; 26. 81/ha de propanil +2-4-D Elevage 27. Ration A base de paille de brousse + fane d'arachide ou de nied + son fm de riz + poudre d'os A raison de 4kglbovin 28. Ration a base de paille de brousse + fane d'arachide ou de niebe + son fm de riz + poudre d'os embouche ovine 29. Fane d'arachide et concentre pour embouche 30. Transfert de la technique de d6paratisatage i I'Exhelm, l'Ivomec, la Cydectine 31. Stockage des eaux de ruissellement par amenagement des mares Outils d'aide A la decision 32. Programme de calcul pour la determination de doses de fumures minerales compatibles avec la tresorerie des producteurs 33. Programme de calcul pour aide au choix d'equipements 34. Fiches techniques pour la gestion de materiels motorises Gestion de 1'eau 35. Determination de doses d'irrigation 36. D6termination des frequences d'irrigation economique 37. Determination des besoins d'irrigation par aspersion sur sol )>Dieri >> pour riz, mars, mil, tomate, oignon, pomme de terre Machinisme agricole 38. Adaptation d'une batteuse a poste fixe de fabrication locale  -24- ZONE SYLVOPASTORALE Technologies foresti6res et 39. Pare-feu nu, 40. Banque fourragere agroforestieres 41. Identification de la p6riode optimale de saign6e d'Acacia senegal 42. Sdlection de gommiers a haut rendement 43. Outils d'optimisation des saign6es des gommiers 44. Selection d'especes ligneuses performantes en haies vives 45. Technique de r6colte des semences forestibres 46. Technique de conservation des semences forestieres Sante et productions animales 47. Deparasitage des animaux (Exhelm, Ivomec, Cydectine) 48. Compl6mentation avec de la graine de coton A raison de I kg/UBT/jour 49. Blocs melasse/urde Materiel agricole 50. Faucheuse a traction animale/adaptation Gestion des sols 51. Etables fumiOres Defense des cultures 52. Lutte contre la teigne de choux 53. Lutte contre la teigne de la pomme de terre Production veg6tale 54. Semis de mil avec disques a quatre trous (Semis manuel en poquet ou disque A 8 trous genere par les producteurs) ZONE CENTRE NORD. BASSIN ARACHIDIER Creation varietale =: mil: 55. SOSAP S58; 56. GB 8735; 57. ITCP 8201\ =* arachide: 58. Fleur I 1; 59. GC 8-35 => ni6b6: 60. Mouride; 61. Melakh; 62. Diongoma et vari6t6s fourrageres Matieres organiques: 63. Compost + fumier A la dose de 4 tonnes/ha pour mil et sorgho 64. Utilisation de faibles doses de matiere organique Production vegetale 65. Modele pour la prdvision des recoltes d'arachide (ARABHY) Gestion de 1'eau 66. M6thode de conduite de l'irrigation de l'arachide ZONE Sup BASsIN ARACHIDIER Cr6ation varidtale > Sorgho 67. F 220 > MaYs: 68. CP 75 = arachide: 69. Fleur 11 '> coton: 70. IRMA 96; 71. IRMA 97; 72. IRMA 124 Travail du sol 73. Techniques de travail du sol (radou baling) 74. Travail du sol A la dent en traction bovine Stockage et conservation 75. Stockage des semences d'arachide sous atmosphere contr6lde  -25- Productions animales > Reserves fourrageres 76. Traitement a l'uree des fourrages pauvres; 77. Ensilage Gestion des ressources 78. Schema d'amenagement integre des bassins versants naturelles 79. Modele de gestion de 1'eau et de la fertilite a differentes echelles Agroforesterie 80. Haies de lutte anti-erosive ZONE BASSE ET MOYENNE CASAMANCE Creation varietale =: rizdebas-fondAcycle 81. BW248-1; 82BW348-1; 83. BG90-2 moyen: = riz de bas-fond A cycle 84. ITA 123; 85. ITA 212 court: =' riz de nappe: 86. Tox 728-1 => sorgho: 87. Malisor 84-1; 88. F2-20 Machinisme agricole 89. Semoir monorang A traction manuelles DJ-Eco sur billon 90. Semoir A 4 rangs a traction animale 91. Disque distribution pour semoir Eco pour riz, mil, mals 92. Decortiqueur A Nere (Parkia biglobosa) ; technologie generee dans le cadre d'une collaboration ISRA/CADEF 93. Sarcleuse manuelle Travail du sol 94. Adaptation du roliculteur a la preparation du lit de semences de riz Gestion de l'eau 95. Modele de gestion des ouvrages anti-sel (digues et barrages) ZONE SENEGAL ORIENTAL HAUTE CASAMANCE Coton 96. Guide sur les methodes et applications pratiques de l'evaluation de l'impact de la recherche agricole Gestion de la fertilit6 des sols 97. Rotation quadriennale (( cereale-arachide-coton-c6reale o 98. Modulation de la dose de fertilisation min6rale en fonction des dates de semis Productions animales 99. Amelioration genetique par un systeme de selection dit A (( noyau ouverto (SAGNO) 100. Modeles d'6tables fumieres permettant l'am6lioration du fumier et l'utilisation des aliments distribues.  -26- Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation Key implementation indicators in SAR/ Unit Estimated Actual President's Report Not included in SAR Table 7: Studies included in the project A large number of research papers and studies have been completed during the project. These include: SOIL AND WATER MANAGMENT * BADIANE, A., JACQUIN, F. GANRRY, F. et GALMALOPEZ D. 1994. The fate of nitrogen fertilizers in some soils types. In Soil productivity and nutrient cycling in relation to Low Input Sustainable Agriculture. 15 t World Congress of Soil Science, Mexico Commission In vol Sb pp 40-41. * BADIANE, A. et GUEYE, F. 1992. Measuring nitrogen fixed by groundnut varieties in Senegal using 1 SN techniques. In Biological nitrogen fixation and sustainability of tropical agriculture. Vulongoy, K. et al (eds). * BARRY, B. 1991. Groundwater flow and quality behind an anti-salt dam in lower Cacabante, Senegal (West Africa). Agricultural Engineering Department MSU. * BOIVIN, P., BRUNET D., GASUEL C, ZANTE, P. et NDIAYE, J .P. 1995. Les sols argileux de la region de Nianga-Podor : repartition, caracteristiques, aptitudes et risques de degradation sous irrigation. In Nianga: Laboratoire de l'agriculture irriguee en moyenne vallIe du Sen6gal ORSTOM. Coll. Colloques et Seminaires, pp 67- 81. * GANRY, F. et BADIANE A. 1991. Utilisation efficace des engrais pour accroitre la productivite vegetale: efficience de l'uree apportee sur le maTs. In Mokwunye A.U. (ed). Alleviating soil fertility constraints to increased crop production in West Africa. pp 227-234. * GARIN, P. et al. 1990. Evolution du r6le du betail dans la gestion de la fertilite des terroirs sereer au Senegal. Cahiers de la Recherche-Developpement n