Senegal - Municipal and Housing Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 17198 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL MUNICIPAL AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1884-SE) November 25, 1997 Water and Urban II Country Department 14 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = CFAF (CFA franc) 1989: 1 US dollar = 336 CFAF 1990: 1 US dollar = 285 CFAF 1991: 1 US dollar = 283 CFAF 1992: 1 US dollar = 265 CFAF 1993: 1 US dollar = 280 CFAF 1994: 1 US dollar = 555 CFAF 1995: 1 US dollar = 520 CFAF 1996: 1 US dollar = 520 CFAF 1997: 1 US dollar = 540 CFAF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CIDA Canadian International Development Agency AGETIP Agence de Gestion de Travaux d'lnteret Public pour l'Emploi (Public Works and Employment Agency) BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Central Bank of Western Africa States) BHS Banque de l'Habitat du Senegal (Housing Bank of Senegal) CFAF CFA franc CUD Communaute Urbaine de Dakar (Greater Dakar Intermunicipal Organization) DGI Direction Generale des Impots (Tax Department) FECL Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivites Locales (Grant Funds for Local Governments) GOS Government of Senegal IDA International Development Agency MCF Municipal Credit Fund MEFP Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan (Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning) PAC Programme d'Appui aux Communes (Urban Development and Decentralization Program (UDDP)) PGDU Projet de Gestion et de Developpement Urbains (Municipal and Housing Development Project) PPF Project Preparation Facility SAR Staff Appraisal Report SCAT-URBAM Societe Centrale dAmenagement de Terrains Urbains (Land Development Corporation) TOM Taxe d'Ordures Menageres (Garbage Tax) UDDP Urban Development and Decentralization Program Vice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib, AFRVP Diretor: Mahmood A. Ayub, AFC14 Sector Manager: Letitia A. Obeng, AFTU2 Team Leader: Catherine Farvacque-Vitkovic, AFTU2  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE EVALUATION SUMMARY i PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Introduction 1 B. Project Objectives 2 C. Project Implementation and Major Factors Affecting the Project 3 D. Project Results and Achievement of Objectives 6 E. Project's Sustainability 11 F. Bank Performance 11 G. Borrower Performance 12 H. Assessment of Project's Outcome 12 I. Future Operations 12 J. Key Lessons Learned 13 PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES 14 Table 1: Summary of Assessments 15 Table 2: Related IDA Credits 16 Table 3: Project Timetable 16 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual 17 Disbursement Graph Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation 19 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation 19 Table 7: Studies included in Project 19 Table 8A: Project Costs 20 Table 8B: Project Financing 21 Table 8C: Credit Allocations by Category 21 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits 21 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants 22 Table 11: Compliance with Operational M.-.al Statements 25 Table 12a: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs (staff/weeks) 25 Table 12b: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs (US$) 25 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions 26 Appendixes: A. Mission aide-memoire Map This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   SENEGAL MUNICIPAL AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Credit 1884-SE IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE 1. This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) of the Municipal and Housing Development Project (PGDU) of Senegal, for which Credit 1884-SE in the amount of SDR 32.5 million (US$46.0 million equivalent) was approved on March 15, 1988, signed on May 27, 1988, and declared effective on November 3, 1988. 2. Credit 1884-SE was closed on January 31, 1997, twenty-two months after the original closing date of March 31, 1995. There were three extensions of 12 months, 6 months and finally 4 months. The total disbursement for the project was SDR 30.5 million. 3. The ICR was prepared by Mr. Gerard Tenaille, Consultant, and Ms. Catherine Farvacque-Vitkovic, Senior Urban Planner, AFTU2, task manager for the project. Preparation of the report was begun during a final supervision/completion mission to Senegal in November 1996. The ICR is based on project files, correspondence, the Staff Appraisal Report, the Credit Agreement and the Project Agreement and discussions with individuals involved at various stages of the project cycle. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by preparing its own evaluation of the project's execution, in May 1997. The complete text of the Borrowers report is available in French.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL MUNICIPAL AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CREDIT 1884-SE EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. This Implementation Completion Report evaluates the Municipal and Housing Development Project of Senegal, implemented by the Urban Project Unit, created within the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning. Project Objectives 2. The major objectives of the project were to: (i) develop the organizational, technical and financial capacities of the local governments of the Greater Dakar area; and (ii) expand the efficiency of the housing sector by removing financial and institutional constraints to the Housing Bank of Senegal (BHS), and improving the operation of the urban land market through annual supply of a significant number of serviced and titled plots (page 2, para. 4). These objectives were clear and realistic. Experience and Results 3. The project achieved most of its objectives, in terms of financial and institutional progress, as well as physical realizations (page 6, para. 18). (a) Municipal Credit Fund (MCE). The MCF was created to allow local governments to borrow for income generating investments, at an interest rate of about 6 per cent per year, with a repayment period of seven years. This component started very slowly because, in the past, the municipalities had always used grants from the "Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivites Locales" (FECL). In addition, the AGETIP project, which provided municipalities with grants, made MCF not competitive. It did not achieve its objectives, and will not continue to operate according to the present arrangements (page 7, para. 23). (b) Strengthening of CUD's Technical Department. The project financed technical assistance, public works equipment and the rehabilitation of a number of public facilities (schools, latrines, administrative centers, etc.). In spite of considerable delays, due to cumbersome procurement procedures, this component achieved its objectives very satisfactorily (page 8, para. 28).  ii (c) Traffic and Public Transport Improvement. The project provided the Traffic Bureau with long-term technical assistance and financed the rehabilitation or widening of numerous avenues and streets of Dakar, which improved traffic and the road system. This component was delayed by the Government's incapacity to regularly supply counterpart funds to the project. Nonetheless, this component achieved its objectives (page 8, para. 30). (d) Municipal Resource Mobilization. The project financed technical assistance, training and equipment for the implementation of a fiscal cadastre, in order to increase the municipal fiscal revenues. Results are satisfactory with regard to the increase of the identified tax base, but unsatisfactory because tax collection did not improve. The objectives were therefore partially achieved (page 9, para. 35). (e) Land Development Program. A Land Development Corporation, SCAT- URBAM, was established to supply an annual average of 1,800 serviced plots. It played a financial role by receiving down payments and savings from applicants for the acquisition of plots. SCAT-URBAM's financial position forced the BHS, which was supposed to provide the financing of SCAT- URBAM's projects, to refuse to finance the Grand Yoff operation (page 10, para. 37). Using only the savings of its customers, SCAT-URBAM completed 350 plots per year from 1990 to 1996, and therefore did not achieve its objective of 1,800 per year. (f) Housing Loans. The project financed housing sub-loans, with a repayment period of 15 years, through a CFAF 4 billion loan from the Government to BHS, at the interest rate of 6 per cent per year, with a repayment period of 25 years. BHS granted up to 1,402 loans per year, less than the objective of 1,500 per year, but the majority of loans financed very low cost housing. In particular, 23.5% of the loans were awarded to self-help builders. This component achieved its objectives (page 11, para. 41). 4. The implementation schedule was over run by 22 months. This delay is mainly due to the project preparation which had been too short to complete the final design studies for all the components. This was done after Credit effectiveness. In addition, the availability and timeliness of counterpart funds was a cause of delay (page 7, para. 30); the Bank having decided to not give non-objections as long as counterpart funds had not been mobilized. Finally, except for AGETIP, the procurement procedures are so cumbersome in Senegal that they caused important delays, some contracts having been signed two years after the invitation to bid (page 5, para. 13). 5. Major Factors affecting the Project. The only important external factor affecting the project was the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50%, in January 1994. The project unit had to recalculate the costs of all the current contracts to compensate the  iii contractors which delayed some contracts by six months. On the other hand, the devaluation led to a work volume increase (page 6, para. 17). Project Sustainability 6. The project had a partial impact on municipal institutions and especially on municipal finance, key to project's sustainability. The CUD's Technical Department has been strengthened, in capacity and equipment, which should enable them to efficiently manage the CUD's infrastructure. The fiscal cadastre provided the CUD and the Treasury with an efficient tool which, if these institutions make an effort to improve the tax collection, should considerably increase the tax revenues. Since this is the condition of sustainability for the works financed by the project, one can conclude that the project's sustainability is likely (page 11, para. 42). Bank Performance 7. Staff time for the project preparation was too short, which delayed the start-up of the project, because the final design studies were not ready at Credit effectiveness. The supervision of the project by the Bank was satisfactory, with a good staff continuity. In particular, the Bank was able to restructure the project at the approach of the initial Credit closing date. On the whole, the Bank's performance is satisfactory (page 11, para. 43-44). Borrower Performance 8. The Borrower's performance was mnixed. The Government was responsible for delays in implementation, because necessary counterpart funds were not made available on time. On the other hand, the project unit performed very satisfactorily. This is partly partially due to the fact that the project's director stayed in office from 1990 to 1997 (page 12, para. 46). Conclusions, Future Operations and Major Lessons 9. The project can be deemed satisfactory (page 12, para. 48). 10. The project's good results justified pursuing the experience with a fourth urban project, the Urban Development and Decentralization Program (UDDP) (page 12, para. 49). 11. This project was too complicated and therefore difficult to implement and supervise. Components such as the fiscal cadastre were too complex and costly. Both costs and complexities are often driven by suppliers eager to sell their high tech products. For a project to be manageable, it is crucial to keep it as simple as possible.  iv 12. The Bank has a strong responsibility in enhancing coherence of approaches in the same country. The initial failure of the MCF is partially due to the competition with AGETIP which was not foreseen when the Agetip operation began. (page 13, para. 50)  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SENEGAL MUNICIPAL AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CREDIT 1884-SE PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT Name of the Project: Municipal and Housing Development Project Credit Number: 1884-SE Credit Amount: SDR 32.5 million (US$46.0 million equivalent) Vice-Presidency: Africa Region Country: Senegal Sector: Urban Sub-Sector: Urban Development A. INTRODUCTION 1. Between 1960, date of its independence, and 1994, Senegal faced a high population growth rate of 2.7 per cent annually, the population increasing from 3.5 to 8.7 million. A strong migration from the rural areas towards the cities brought an urban growth rate of about 5 per cent per year in Dakar from 1970 to 1980 and 4.2 per cent since 1990. The urban population already represents 42 per cent of the total population of Senegal and should represent, at the end of the century, 50 per cent of a global population of about 9 million inhabitants. 2. By 1988, 70 per cent of modern employment and 90 per cent of industrial firms of the country were located in metropolitan Dakar, which represented 58 per cent of the GNP. Based on population estimates, Senegal's GNP per capita was estimated at US$600 in 1995. Population over concentration in Greater Dakar would be counterproductive in the long term and measures need to be taken to foster a more balanced distribution of urban population throughout the country. 3. The first urban project financed by the Bank was the Sites and Services Project of Senegal (Credit 336-SE, US$8 million), approved in 1972 and closed on December 31, 1981. This project focused on housing and delivered 15,200 serviced plots in Dakar and Thies. In 1980, the Government requested Bank participation in a sector review, which led to a second project, the Technical Assistance Project for Urban Management and Rehabilitation (Credit 1458-SE/SF13-SE, US$6 million). This Credit was approved on April 17, 1984 and closed on December 31, 1989. The  -2 - objective of the project was to reinforce Dakar's urban institutions. Through studies, technical assistance and selective investments, the project aimed at improving planning and programming capacities, rationalizing the housing policy and maintaining the level of urban services. In September 1985, the Government and the Bank concluded that the recommendations of these studies could be the basis of a third urban project. In December 1985, the Government requested an identification mission, which took place in January 1986. B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 4. The project had two major objectives: (a) strengthening local governments, particularly in metropolitan Dakar, to improve policy making, service delivery, urban investment and resource mobilization; and (b) expanding the economic impact and efficiency of the housing sector by: (i) removing financial and institutional constraints to the Housing Bank of Senegal (BHS); and (ii) improving the operation of the urban land market through annual supply of a significant number of serviced and titled plots while promoting progressive privatization of the delivery of housing. Project Description 5. To achieve these objectives, the project included six components, four related to municipal management and two related to housing. These six components were: (a) Municipal Management (i) A Municipal Credit Fund (MCF), administered by the Housing Bank of Senegal (BHS), would be created for lending to local governments, at BCEAO's discount rate plus two points, for municipal income generating projects, such as market rehabilitation and construction. Initial financing of this fund would be provided by IDA for US$3.3 million and by the Government through a share of the Grant Fund for Local Governments (FECL) which was to reach US$11.3 million over the period of the project execution. (ii) The Technical Department of the Urban Community of Dakar (CUD) would be strengthened through the financing of: (a) civil works equipment; (b) extension of technical facilities; (c) 72 man/months of technical assistance; (d) a training program; and (e) the remodeling and equipment of selected community facilities. (iii)The Traffic and Transport component would improve public transport operation through: (a) financing of 96 man/months of technical assistance to the Traffic Bureau; (b) rehabilitation of CUD's main collector roads (68 krm); (c) implementation of a traffic management plan in the central Dakar area  -3 - (plateau); and (d) improvement of key junctions and selected sections of the road network in Dakar. (iv)The Municipal Resource Mobilization component would provide the basis for improved collection of municipal taxes through the implementation of a fiscal cadastre in the Dakar metropolitan area, aimed at improving tax billing and collection by: (a) organizing and unifying property and business registry and valuation; and (b) modernizing computerized processing of tax bills. (b) Housing (v) Establishment of a Land Development Corporation (SCAT-URBAM), and financing the starting period of a program of land development, of about 1,800 serviced plots per year. (vi)Financing of a loan of CFAF 4 billion from the Government to BHS, to help remove bottlenecks preventing BHS from increasing its share of housing financing, and increase its annual lending from 1,000 to 1,500 fifteen year loans per year. C. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT Project Preparation 6. The preparation of the project was based on the studies carried out under the Technical Assistance Project for Urban Management and Rehabilitation, particularly: (a) the investment program; (b) the urban policy; (c) the transport policy; and (d) the municipal policy. 7. After the identification mission of January 1986, the preparation of the project focused on the finalization of the above studies, which recommended the creation of two new institutions: (i) a Municipal Credit Fund (MCF) allowing local governments to borrow for income generating investments, in addition to the grants of FECL. The management of MCF would be entrusted to an existing financial institution, the BHS, which performed relatively well. (ii) a land Development Corporation (SCAT-URBAM), answering a need identified since 1983, for which the financial study was not finalized. 8. A solid waste management component was included at the beginning, but was later canceled. The program of physical realizations was well defined, but because of the  -4 - short period of preparation, from January 1986 to April 1987, the final design had not been prepared for any of the components before Credit effectiveness: rehabilitation of the CUD's public facilities, rehabilitation of the CUD's main collector roads, traffic management plan and design of the fiscal cadastre. This resulted in a two year delay in the project's implementation, with the first significant disbursements in the fall of 1990. 9. The pre-appraisal mission took place in April 1987. Since the funds of Credit 1458-SE were exhausted, a Project Preparation Facility (PPF) to finance the preparation studies was requested on May 8, 1987, in the amount of US$750,000, and awarded on June 18, 1987, under the number P.434-SE. The appraisal mission took place from June 19 to July 7, 1987. The negotiations were held in Washington from January 25 to 28, 1988. Approved on March 15, 1988 by the IDA Board, the Credit was signed on May 27, 1988. 10. The conditions of effectiveness were: (a) establishment of MCF, through a decree; (b) creation of the land development corporation (SCAT-URBAM); (c) amendment of BHS statutes in order to authorize BHS to manage MCF; (d) modification of the 25/1/78 decree establishing FECL; and (e) execution of the Tripartite Agreement on behalf of the Borrower, BHS and SCAT-URBAM. These complex conditions delayed the Credit effectiveness: forecast for August 27, 1988, the effectiveness was extended twice, to October 15, 1988, then to December 15, 1988, and was finally declared on November 3, 1988. Project Management 11. The Technical Assistance Project for Urban Management and Rehabilitation (Credit 1458-SE) had been managed by a Project Unit established within the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning. Since the project implementation had been satisfactory, the same organization was kept for the present project. There were two project directors between 1987 and 1990, but the third one, appointed in August 1990, stayed in the same position until the Credit closed, on January 31, 1997. This continuity was one of the causes of the project's success. Project Implementation 12. Implementation of the project started very slowly because, as mentioned in para. 8 above, the final design studies were to be carried out, as well as the bidding documents. The bidding process used the normal procurement procedures of the Government and was therefore very long, both for studies and works procurement. It is worth noting that until 1992 there was no high level engineer involved in the project, neither in the project unit nor on the Bank's side, where the task manager was a financial analyst. The disbursements jumped when an engineer was associated to the project in 1992. The absence of Bank standard bidding documents, in French, brought about additional work for the task managers and considerable delays. Each bidding process gave rise to the same reminders and discussions, several correspondences were needed, until the end of  -5 - the project, before a non-objection was granted. It was the same thing for procurement of studies or technical assistance. 13. The cumbersome national procurement procedures and the slowness of administrative approvals prevented the project unit from making up for the initial delay. The most significant delays were the following: (a) rehabilitation of CUD's public facilities - bid opening: January 1991 and - contract award: March 1992 and (b) road of Niayes - invitation to bid: June 1991 and - contract approval: June 1993. 14. In April 1994, one year before the initial Credit closing date, less than 50 per cent of the credit was disbursed and only 62 per cent at the closing date, on March 31, 1995. For two important components, the works were started after the initial closing date: construction of the CUD's technical facilities and the traffic management plan in the central Dakar area. The Bank envisaged, at the end of 1994, cancelling the remaining funds of the project and closing the Credit unless a solution was found to speed up procurement. Finally, during a mission to Senegal in November 1994, a strict action plan was negotiated. This plan has been respected and activities and disbursements started again on a large scale after the extension of the closing date. It was then possible to implement the whole project, with three extensions of 12, 6 and 4 months, i.e. a total of 22 months. It would have been easier to grant two one year extensions. Cofmancing 15. From the beginning of the project preparation, the Bank and the Government searched for cofmancing. The Canadian Government manifested its interest and awarded a grant of US$2,732,340 to the project, through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and asked the Bank to administer this grant. Two agreements were signed on September 14, 1988, one between the Government of Canada and IDA and the other one between the Government of Senegal and IDA. This Canadian contribution was to finance the technical assistance to the CUD's Technical Services, to the Traffic Bureau and to the "Direction du Cadastre". 16. The Canadian contribution had a considerable impact on the fiscal cadastre component, which was designed by the engineering firm financed by this grant. This component, was called at the beginning a simplified fiscal cadastre, but became more and more sophisticated, and the cost of the studies increased extensively. In March 1991, the amount of the grant was extended to US$3,828,000. Its closing date also was extended from March 31, 1995 to March 31, 1996, then to September 30, 1996, and the disbursements continued until January 31, 1997. Major Factors affecting the Project 17. Other than project readiness, cumbersome public procurement and availability of free funds from AGETIP, the only other major factor affecting the project was the devaluation of the CFA franc, in January 1994. After this devaluation, a Bank mission  -6- went to Senegal. All the ongoing contracts were renegotiated with the contractors to compensate for the loss of profit due to the devaluation. These discussions were carried out without major problems but brought about a supplemental delay of about six months. On the other hand, the devaluation led to an increase in the volume of work because the IDA Credit expressed in SDR provided more CFA francs. D. PROJECT RESULTS AND ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 18. The project results were satisfactory, in terms of institutional improvement as well as physical realizations. We will examine the results of each component, following the project's description (para. 5). (a) Municipal Management (I) Municipal Credit Fund (MCF) 19. The Govermnent had established a grant system to help finance the local governments' capital investments, called "Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivites Locales" (FECL), created on July 4, 1977. Since its creation, FECL had only distributed grants. It was forecast that the funds allocated to FECL would reach CFAF 4 billion per year, but the average has been 2.5 billion. To alleviate the Government's financial burden, the project proposed the creation of a Municipal Credit Fund, which would be financed partly by FECL and partly by the IDA Credit 1884-SE. These funds would be on-lent to municipalities for income generating projects, such as public markets. 20. The nominal interest rate charged to the local governments would be calculated as the BCEAO's discount rate plus two points, i.e. 10.5 per cent at that time, with a repayment period of seven years including a grace period of one year (Article Il.b.ii of the Project Agreement IDA-BHS). However, FECL would also finance, on a temporary basis, a share of interest owed by borrowers in order to alleviate their debt service. In October 1989, following an increase of the prime rate, the beneficiary local governments requested a revision of the interest rates, and the following conditions were retained: Interest rate: 11 % Part borne by the local government: 6% "Bonification" provided by the State: 5% Exemption of TPS on interests. 21. To confirm this change, the Credit Agreement and the Project Agreement IDA- BHS were amended in November 1991. Nevertheless, as expected, there was no demand for this kind of financing. The FECL and the two Public Works and Employment Projects (Credits IDA 2075 and 2369-SE) managed by AGETIP financed all sub-projects on a non-refundable basis. Although MCF was supposed to only finance economically profitable local projects, the borderline with the AGETIP projects was not clear, the second AGETIP project also financed income generating projects. It should be noted that  -7 - when AGETIP funding expired, a greater demand from local governments to MCF funding resulted in a large number of sub-projects at the end of the credit. 22. The third difficulty faced by MCF was the complexity of procedures: the National Loan Committee seldom and irregularly met, and BHS also had its own appraisal commission. But as soon as AGETIP's non-reimbursable project funds had been exhausted, the mayors again turned to MCF: the first disbursement from the IDA Credit for MCF only took place in June 1996, during the second extension of the Credit closing. In the last months of the project, 14 loans were processed for a global amount of CFAF 2.9 billion. 23. In conclusion, MCF had the great merit to initiate municipalities into credit procedures and program evaluations, and to make local authorities aware of the need to borrow for municipal income generating projects. Unfortunately, its impact in terms of loans volume was limited, mainly because of the difficulties mentioned above. The lessons learned from the MCF experience will be taken into account in the Urban Development and Decentralization Program (UDDP), presented to the Board on November 20, 1997, which aims to simplify and rationalize the financing mechanisms of municipal investments, through the harmonization of the different credit lines. The CFAF 2.5 billion allocated by FECL to MCF, which has not been disbursed, will be transferred to the UDDP as a contribution to the municipal investment program. In conclusion, the Municipal Credit Fund did not achieve its objectives, and it will not continue to operate according to the present arrangements. (ii) Strengthening of CUD's Technical Department 24. This component included technical assistance, provision of civil works equipment, rehabilitation of selected community facilities and remodeling of technical facilities. The objectives of this component were achieved. 25. A contract for technical assistance was signed on November 13, 1991 (three years after Credit effectiveness), financed by the Canadian grant. It comprised three experts, advisers to the technical director, the works division chief and the equipment division chief. These experts had a very positive impact on the technical department's operations, but their intervention was too short (18 months for the two first ones and 2 years for the third one) to give enough training to their local counterpart. 26. The project provided to CUD an important quantity of public works equipment and vehicles which allowed CUD's technical department to maintain roads. Nevertheless, the question remains regarding whether it was reasonable to provide heavy equipment to CUD, which now has the capacity to carry out civil works on force account, instead of contracting them to private contractors, which would be better for everybody. CUD made a useful decision by leasing these materials to small private enterprises.  -8 - 27. The project financed rehabilitation and equipment of a number of public facilities: schools, dispensaries, pit-latrines, administrative centers, technical and training centers. Most of these works have been realized, with some delay. Table 5 of Part II gives the details of the works, compared to the appraisal estimate. The project rehabilitated 64 pit- latrines instead of 165. Three technical facilities had been forecast at appraisal, but it was deemed preferable to build only one central technical facility, in order to centralize the maintenance of CUD's infrastructure. To make up for the delay accumulated from the beginning of the project, the construction of this technical center was delegated to AGETIP, who performed well. 28. Finally, under the project, a transportation and traffic division was created within the technical department. This sub-component financed training sessions, in Canada, for several high level engineers who implemented an urban data system on the CUD's territory. The objectives of this component were largely achieved, because the institutional strengthening was satisfactory, and the physical realizations almost reached the appraisal estimates. (iii) Traffic and Public Transport Improvement 29. The project financed a four year technical assistance to the Traffic Bureau within the Transport Ministry, which was transferred to CUD during the project. The rehabilitation of CUD's main collector roads (68 Iam) was carried out satisfactorily, from August 1990 to April 1991. The average speed increased by 10 to 20 points, and the implementation of public lighting improved safety. The rehabilitation of the Niayes road and the widening of Avenue Blaise Diagne had also a considerable positive impact on traffic, as well as the Central Dakar's Traffic Management Plan, under which most of the streets of the business center, the "Plateau", were rehabilitated. 30. This component was delayed by the Government's inability to regularly supply counterpart funds to the project and to procure works efficiently. To make up for the delays, some of the contracts were delegated to AGETIP. The devaluation of the CFA franc, in January 1994, led to additional delays but increased the volume of work, expressed in CFAF. In conclusion, this component achieved its objectives, because it improved the road system and traffic. (iv) Municipal Resource Mobilization 31. The objective of this component was to provide the basis for improved issue and collection of municipal taxes, through the implementation of a fiscal cadastre, which allowed for a rapid and efficient identification of taxpayers and assessment of tax base. The objective, specified in the Credit Agreement, Section 3.07, was to increase, by June 30, 1992, the annual revenues of local taxes by at least 40 per cent as compared to the average annual local tax revenues of the years 1985 through 1987.  -9- 32. This component was managed by an Implementation and Monitoring Committee of the Fiscal Cadastre, established on September 12, 1988. Aerial photography was carried out in 1989, then photogrammetric restitutions and systematic field surveys started in June 1990, covering 95,000 plots. Unfortunately, the fiscal cadastre did not cover the whole greater Dakar area, but only residential areas: 50,264 properties were registered in a computerized land data base, used for tax billing. The main difficulties are related to tax collection: (a) the addressing system did not cover all the plots, and numerous bills were returned; and (b) the collection staff decreased from 1 agent for 3,493 taxpayers in 1991 to 1 for 5,321 in 1994. 33. The impact of this component is fundamental for the future of CUD, since project sustainability depends on the improvement of municipal tax collection. Unfortunately, the Treasury Directorate has not been able to provide reliable statistics on tax billing and collection from 1985 to 1996, data which is necessary to assess the impact of the fiscal cadastre. Information provided is partial, concerning only some taxes, or some years. Nonetheless, tax billing in 1992 for the land tax, the property tax and the garbage tax, is 47 per cent above tax billing for 1987 and 1988. A Bank supervision mission, in April 1994, estimated at 44.5 per cent the increase of tax collection for 1992, as compared to these of 1987 and 1988. 34. The following table gives the amounts of tax billing and collection from 1990 to 1994, for the municipalities of Dakar Center, Cerf-Volant, Pikine, Guediawaye and Rufisque, in CFAF billion: 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Property Tax 3.39 3.53 3.48 4.20 4.20 Poll Tax 8.67 8.55 8.48 10.13 9.75 Garbage Tax 1.34 2.19 3.05 2.03 2.22 Total: 13.4 14.3 15.0 16.4 16.2 Poll Tax + TOM only 10.0 10.7 11.5 12.2 12.0 Collection PT+TOM 5.09 5.29 5.08 11.2 for 2 years Collection rate 50.8% 49.2% 44.1 % 49.3% 35. The improvement is not important, but it is worth noting that these figures concern only 50,264 plots out of 95,000 plots surveyed. On all the plots, tax billing should increase by 50 per cent. As regards tax collection, a lot still has to be done. In conclusion, this component partially achieved its objective to give CUD the possibility to increase its tax revenues, because a great effort is done to improve tax collection. (b) Housing (v) Land Development Program 36. The Land Development Corporation, SCAT-URBAM, was created on May 22, 1988, as a condition of credit effectiveness. Its statutes specify, article 5 - Subject: "to  -10- achieve its objectives, the company collects and receives down payments and savings from individuals and legal entities applicants for the acquisition of plots developed by the company". SCAT-URBAMs actions were not only incompatible with the Senegalese legislation but also conflicted with project design. This was the main cause of failure of this component; a land development corporation should not play a financial role, when there is an efficient and experienced housing bank. It is a confusion in the responsibilities which led numerous development companies to bankruptcy. 37. Five sites had been identified, free from illegal settlements and owned mainly by the State at Grand Yoff, Patte d'Oie, M'Bao and Rufisque. BHS did not accept the financing terms for Grand Yoff because SCAT-URBAM required each applicant to pay 65 per cent of the cost of the plot thus preventing BHS from mobilizing these savings. Therefore, SCAT-URBAM completed, from 1990 to 1992, 1,300 plots on Grand Yoff, using only the savings of its customers. The development of the other sites was delayed by problems of land acquisition and illegal settlements. Since April 1994, SCAT- URBAM developed 3,500 plots on the Hann-Maristes site. The first phase of 1,050 plots is completed. The agency has therefore completed 2,350 plots in 7 years, i.e. 350 per year, as compared to the 1,800 forecast at appraisal. 38. As in the majority of land development projects, the standard of the plots is higher than forecast at the beginning. Therefore, the low income target population did not have access to these plots, and even middle income families faced difficulties. Because of the long delays in the completion of these operations, SCAT-URBAM was in a critical financial situation, and a recapitalization has been necessary. The strategic mistakes could have been avoided if the Steering Committee had efficiently monitored the SCAT-URBAM operations. 39. In conclusion, SCAT-URBAM did not achieve the objectives for which it had been established. Nevertheless, the creation of this corporation was needed. Its strategy should be redefined and its collaboration with BHS reinforced, the latter only carrying out the financial duties. (vi) Housing Loans of BHS 40. Proceeds of the IDA Credit financed housing sub-loans through a CFAF 4 billion loan from the Government to BHS, at the Central Bank privileged discount rate (6 per cent at that time), with a maturity of 25 years, including a 10 year grace period. BHS was to use these funds to grant housing loans to purchasers or self-help builders for the production of low cost and medium standard housing, with the accent on self-help builders. In 1988, BHS was financing, on the average, 1,000 housing units per year, and the objective was to increase its annual lending from 1,000 to 1,500 units. This objective was hindered by the restrictions, imposed by the Central Bank, in BHS's annual increase of outstanding loans. The IDA Credit providing external resources, the loans financed by the project were authorized beyond these limitations.  41. The number of loans increased but did not surpass 1,402 per year. This was due to the devaluation which increased the projects' costs, and to the rise of interest rates which brought down the households' solvability. Nevertheless, these loans were largely awarded to very low cost and low cost housing. In particular, 2,033 loans out of 8,653, i.e. 23.5 % were awarded to self-help builders, which is an excellent result. In conclusion, this component has achieved its objectives. E. PROJECT'S SUSTAINABILITY 42. The project had a partial impact on municipal institutions and especially on municipal finance, key to project's sustainability. The CUD's Technical Department has been strengthened, in capacity and equipment, which should enable them to efficiently manage the CUD's infrastructure. The fiscal cadastre provided the CUD and the Treasury with an efficient tool which, if these institutions make an effort to improve the tax collection, should considerably increase the tax revenues. Since this is the condition of sustainability for the works financed by the project, one can conclude that the project's sustainability is likely. F. BANK PERFORMANCE 43. The project's preparation was too short, from January 1986 to July 1987, which delayed the start up of the project, because the final design was not ready for any of the components. The conditions of disbursement for categories 1 and 2 of Schedule 1 of the Credit Agreement were unnecessarily complicated, which made the application very difficult. The supervision of the project by the Bank was satisfactory. There were two rmissions per year, except in 1991 and 1993 with only one. The start up of the project was difficult because, until 1992, there was no engineer, neither in the Bank team nor in the project unit. On the whole, there were fifteen supervision missions. Finally, three task managers were involved over a period of eleven years, which is very reasonable. 44. At the approach of the Credit closing date (with the threat of cancellation of 40% of the Credit amount), the Bank was able to sensitize the Government and to mobilize the Project Unit: a clear and precise identification of the Credit's extension conditions, and a rigorous action plan changed the course of the project. In addition, new work procedures were established: (a) regular preparation of quarterly action plans; (b) almost daily communications between the project director and the Bank; (c) missions of the project team to Washington, in addition to the Bank supervision missions; and (d) delegation to AGETIP for the implementation and monitoring of some public works sub-components.  - 12 - G. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 45. The Borrower's performance was mixed. The Government was responsible for delays in implementation, because counterpart funds were not made available in accordance with the Credit Agreement. All the projects faced this issue, at that time, because of the bad economic performances of Senegal. 46. The performance of the Project Unit, implementing agency, can be deemed satisfactory. As mentioned above (para. 44), for fear of wasting 40 per cent of the Credit amount at the initial closing date, the Project Unit was able to show a new dynamism and relaunch the project. In particular, the action plan, prepared in cooperation with the Bank, was rigorously respected. There were two project directors between 1987 and 1990, but the third one, appointed in August 1990, stayed in the same position until the Credit closing date, on January 31, 1997. This continuity was beneficial to the project. The absence of an engineer at the project unit was a cause of delay at the start-up of the project. The quarterly progress reports and weekly progress notes were submitted very regularly to the Bank until the end of the project. In accordance with the Credit Agreement, the project's accounts were audited each year by independent auditors, acceptable to IDA. The audit reports were regularly submitted to IDA, sometimes with some delay. They always certified the accounts of the project. 47. The initial delay of about two years could have been reduced if the Senegalese procurement procedures were not so cumbersome. It is not good practice to approve a contract two years after the invitation to bid, or to sign another contract 14 months after bid opening. H. ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT'S OUTCOME 48. The project achieved its objectives in the institutional and financial aspects, and the physical objectives were largely met. Therefore, the project's outcome can be rated satisfactory. I. FUTURE OPERATIONS 49. The good results obtained with this third urban project justified pursuing the fourth urban project, the Urban Development and Decentralization Program (UDDP), appraised in April 1997, negotiated in September 1997, and presented to the Board on November 20, 1997. This new project focuses on decentralization and proposes the creation of a Municipal Development Agency, which will be the government-delegated executing agency, but the physical components will be executed under delegated contract management. All municipalities of Senegal will be eligible for the funds of this fourth urban project.  - 13 - J. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 50. For a project to be manageable, it is crucial to keep it as simple as possible. This project was highly complicated and therefore difficult to implement and supervise. Components such as the fiscal cadastre are too complex and costly. Both costs and complexities are often driven by suppliers eager to sell their high tech products. 51. The Bank has a strong responsibility in enhancing coherence of approaches in the same country. The initial failure of the MCF is partially due to the competition with AGETIP (para. 50).  - 14- SENEGAL MUNICIPAL AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT PART II STATISTICAL TABLES Table 1: Summary of Assessments Table 2: Related IDA Credits Table 3:- Project Timetable Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursement Graph Table-5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation Table 7: Studies included in Project Table 8: Project Costs Table 9: Credit Allocations by Category Table 10: Economic Costs and Benefits Table 11: Status of Legal Covenants Table 12: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions  - 15 - Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of Substantial Partial Negligible Not Objectives Applicable Macro policies - X Sector policies X --- Financial Objectives X --- Institutional Development --- X --- --- Physical Objectives X --- --- --- Poverty Reduction --- --- X --- Gender Issues --- --- --- X Other Social Objectives --- X --- --- Environmental Objectives X --- --- --- Public Sector --- X --- --- Management Private Sector X --- --- --- Development B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain x -- C. Bank Performance Highly Satisfactory Deficient satisfactory Identification X --- --- Preparation Assistance --- --- X Appraisal --- X --- Supervision X --- --- D. Borrower Highly Satisfactory Deficient Performance satisfactory Preparation --- --- X Implementation --- X --- Covenant compliance X --- --- Operation --- --- n/a E. Assessment of Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly Outcome Satisfactory Unsatisfactory x  - 16 - Table 2: Related IDA Credits Credit Title Purpose Approval Status Preceding operations __ 1. Urban Management and Strengthening urban policy and 1984 Closed Rehabilitation Technical institutional framework for 12/88 for Assistance Project managing urban growth by 1458-SE Credit 1458/SF13-SE improving efficiency of key 12/89 for agencies SF13-SE 2. Public Works and To create substantial new 1989 Closed Employment Project employment in urban areas through 09/93 (AGETIP) labor intensive works without Credit 2075-SE increasing size of civil service 3. Second Public Works To continue and decentralize 1992 Closed and Employment Project AGETIP activities in secondary 06/97 Credit 2369-SE cities Future operations l 4. Urban Development and To improve financial and 1997 Not yet Decentralization Program organizational management of Approved municipalities, programming of priority investments and to rationalize and simplify the I financing_ of urban investments Table 3: Project Timetable Proiect Cycle Date planned Date revised Date actual Identification 01/86 Preparation 1986-87 Appraisal 12/86 07/87 Negotiations 01/25/88 Board presentation 03/15/88 Signing 05/27/88 Effectiveness 08/27/88 10/15/88 11/03/88 Project completion 06/30/94 06/30/95 01/31/97 Credit closing 03/31/95 03/31/96 09/30/96 01/31/97  17 - Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ millions) Fiscal Year Appraisal Estimate Actual Actual as % of Profile for Urban Estimate Projects in Africa FY 88 March31, 1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 June 30, 1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 FY 89 Sept. 30, 1988 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.38 Dec. 31, 1988 0.70 0.00 0.00 2.07 March 31, 1989 5.30 0.53 10.00 2.76 June 30, 1989 9.90 1.22 12.32 3.68 FY 90 Sept. 30, 1989 11.25 1.22 10.84 4.60 Dec. 31, 1989 12.60 1.24 9.84 5.52 March 31, 1990 15.65 2.28 14.57 6.44 June 30, 1990 18.70 2.37 12.67 8.28 FY 91 Sept. 30, 1990 20.55 8.93 43.45 10.12 Dec. 31, 1990 22.40 9.72 43.39 11.96 March31, 1991 24.45 11.04 45.15 13.80 June 30, 1991 26.50 12.23 46.15 15.64 FY 92 Sept. 30, 1991 28.30 13.24 46.78 17.48 Dec. 31, 1991 30.10 14.02 46.58 20.24 March 31, 1992 31.45 14.13 44.93 23.00 June 30, 1992 32.80 20.45 62.35 24.84 FY 93 Sept. 30, 1992 34.20 20.62 60.29 26.68 Dec. 31, 1992 35.60 20.86 58.60 29.44 March 31, 1993 36.60 21.55 58.88 32.20 June 30, 1993 37.60 22.69 60.35 34.04 FY 94 Sept. 30, 1993 38.70 23.66 61.14 35.88 Dec. 31, 1993 39.80 25.38 63.77 36.80 March 31, 1994 40.70 25.69 63.12 37.72 June 30, 1994 41.60 26.03 62.57 39.56 FY 95 Sept. 30, 1994 42.35 26.26 62.01 41.40 Dec. 31, 1994 43.10 26.58 61.67 42.32 March 31, 1995 43.65 27.04 61.95 43.24 June30, 1995 44.20 27.86 63.03 44.16 FY 6 Sept. 30, 1995 44.65 28.71 64.30 45.08 Dec. 31, 1995 45.10 31.52 69.89 45.54 March31, 1996 45.55 34.18 75.04 46.00 June 30, 1996 46.00 36.24 78.78 46.00 FY 97 Sept. 30, 1996 46.00 38.06 82.74 46.00 Dec. 31, 1996 46.00 40.38 87.78 46.00 March 31, 1997 46.00 41.61 90.46 46.00 June30, 1997 46.00 42.97 93.41 46.00  -18- DISBURSEMENTS . _- 50 40 35 __ 30 ------ 20 4f- 15 5 0 n LO r-- cn~ to t- a) c. to. ('4 (' '4) Cn LO) C' Quarters -+- Profile --4-Actual -hAppraisal  - 19- Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation I. Appraisal Indicators Estimated Actual Difference Sub-loans from MCF to local 2,350,000 SDR 1,603,704 SDR (746,296) governments CUD. Rehabilitation of buildings Schools 25 23 (2) Public latrines 165 64 (101) Health facilities 8 7 (1) Administrative offices 3 3 0 Technical workshop 1 1 0 Training center 1 1 0 CUD. Rehabilitation of roads Reconstruction of roads 68 km 68 km 0 Traffic Management Plan Executed Widening Blaise DIAGNE Not forecast Done Avenue SCAT-URBAM Land Development Plots developed per year 1800 350 (1,450) Housing credits: BHS Number of credits: 1988 800 1,235 435 Number of credits: 1989 900 1,402 502 Number of credits: 1990 1,000 1,152 152 Number of credits: 1991 1,000 1,384 384 Number of credits: 1992 1,200 1,321 121 Number of credits: 1993 1,500 1,146 (354) Number of credits: 1994 1,500 1,013 (487) Total: 7,900 8,653 753 Total financing utilized: 9,400,000 SDR 9,015,486 SDR (384,514) SDR Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation Not Applicable Table 7: Studies Included in Project There were no studies included in the project.  -20 - Table 8A: Project Costs (In CFAF Million) Appraisal ACDI IDA SENEGA TOTAL Difference L A. Municipal Credit - Fund 4,400.0 0.00 1,759.08 4,200.00 5,959.08 1,559.08 B. CUD technical ServiCeS 3,121.2 426.0 2,311.1 593.0 3,330.1 208.9 Technical Assistance 294.8 426.02 0.00 0.00 426.02 131.22 Training 56.4 0.00 46.90 40.70 87.60 31.20 Equipment 1,623.7 0.00 465.90 254.56 720.46 (903.24) Public Facilities 887.0 0 1,163.50 297.70 1,461.20 574.20 Technical Centers 259.3 0.00 634.80 0.00 634.80 375.50 C. Transport 4,618.0 539.50 6,057.93 2,114.59 8,712.02 4,094.02 Technical Assistance 393.1 539.50 0.00 0.00 539.50 146.40 PAP Traffic Management 846.0 0.00 3,872.90 878.00 4,750.90 3,904.90 Plan l l_l PAP Others 2,167.2 0.00 1,310.02 782.60 2,092.62 (74.58) CUD's Road Network 1,211.7 0.00 875.01 453.99 1,329.00 117.30 D. Fiscal Cadastre 1,982.8 279.7 1,837.3 558.9 2,676.0 693.2 Cadastre Implementation 964.1 0.00 141.71 0.00 141.71 (822.39) Operating Expenses 215.7 0.00 739.85 212.00 951.85 736.15 Data Processing Facilities 327.5 0.00 586.99 191.48 778.47 450.97 Equipment 346.8 0.00 276.20 109.16 385.36 38.56 Data Base Implementation 128.7 279.69 92.59 46.28 418.56 289.86 E. Housing 6,100.0 0.0 3,512.2 15,383.6 18,895.8 12,795.8 Land Development 2,100.0 0.00 0.00 1,504.82 1,504.82 (595.18) Housing Loans 4,000.0 0.00 3,512.17 13,878.80 17,390.97 13,390.97 F. Project Unit 665.3 0.00 1,063.98 369.21 1,433.19 767.89 Operating Cost 148.3 Feasibility Study Urban 4 117.0 PPF and Unallocated 400.0 Base Cost 20,887.3 1,245.2 16,541.6 23,219.3 41,006.1 20,118.81 Physical Contingencies 1,365.4 Price Contingencies 1,244.0 Total Cost: 23,496.7 1,245.2 16,541.6 23,219.3 41,006.1 17,509.41 NB: Excluding housing credits financed by BHS, the cost overrun would be reduced to: 3,630.61  -21 - Table 8B: Project Financing .___________________ _ (SDR million) Source Appraisal Estimate Actual / latest estimate Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Govermnent 17.9 3.4 21.3 BHS 5.4 2.9 8.3 IDA 25.3 20.7 46.0 30.5 CIDA 0.7 2.0 2.7 2.8 Total 49.3 29.0 78.3 Table 8C: Credit allocations per category (in SDR) Category Credit Actual Balance Agreement 1. Municipal Credit sub-loans 2,350,000 1,603,703.78 746,296.22 2. Housing loans through BHS 9,400,000 9,015,486.94 384,513.06 3. Consultants' services for 830,000 573,639.94 256,360.06 Resource Mobilization 4. Operating Cost for Resource 1,500,000 859,944.66 640,055.34 Mobilization 5. Training for CUD Staff 130,000 109,398.94 20,601.06 6. Works for CUD 2,500,000 2,767,626.94 (267,626.94) 7. Road works 9,500,000 9,196,626.44 303,373.56 8. Equipment, vehicles, furniture... 4,300,000 3,446,335.28 853,664.72 9. Project Unit expenses 680,000 1,885,107.83 (1,205,107.83) 10. Refunding of PPF 530,000 387,256.96 142,743.04 11. Unallocated 780,000 0.00 780,000.00 Special Account A 0 263,753.56 (263,753.56) Special Account B 0 414,512.70 (414,512.70) Total: 32,500,000 30,523,393.97 1,976,606.03 Table 9: Economic costs and benefits Not Applicable  - 22 - Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Section Type Description of Covenant Status Comments A. Development Credit Agreement 1884-SE I 3.01(a) 10 GOS carries out part C through C Traffic Bureau of Transport Min. & D through DGI Finance Min., under coordination of the Project Unit l 3.01(b) 10 GOS shall keep PU adequately C staffed 3.01(c) 10 GOS to cause BHS & CUD to C perform in accordance with their respective Project Agreement 3.01(d) 3 GOS shall relend category 1 C funds to BHS, administrator of MCF to regular discount rate of BCEAO, for 20 years, including grace period of 10 years. 3.01(e) 3 GOS shall relend category 2 C funds to BHS, to privileged discount rate of BCEAO, on 20 years plus 2% including grace period of 10 years 3.01(f) 10 GOS shall enter into agreement C with BHS & SCAT-URBAM for carrying out part El of the Project 3.01(g) 4 GOS to open & maintain NC GOS made a Caisse d'Avance at Treasury deposit of CFAF with initial deposit of CFAF 40 40 million, but million, for its contribution to did not regularly parts B through D of project replenish the account 3.02 10 Procurement shall be governed C by Schedule 3 of DCA 3.05 10 GOS to review by 06.30.92 the C Done with delay transfer Traffic Bureau from Transport Ministry to CUD 3.06 2 GOS to determine by 12.31.89 NC fiscal revenue effect of articles 246.9 & 247 of its General Tax Code 3.07 2 GOS to take by 06.30.92 C I  -23 - measures to increase by at least 40% annual tax revenues of local taxes, as compared to the average of years 1985 to 1987 4.01(a) 1 GOS to maintain records & C accounts adequate to reflect its ___op_ operations 4.01(b) 1 GOS shall have project C done with some accounts audited each year and delays furnish IDA with certified copies no later than six months _____ _ after the end of the fiscal year 4.01(c) 1 GOS to maintain records for C SOE expenditures for one year, and include auditor's opinion in audit report Section Type Descrption of Covenant Status Comments B. BHS Project Agreement r 2.01(b) 3 BHS to grant secondary loans C Project to municipalities to BCEAO's Agreement was normal discount rate plus 2%, amended to for 7 years with a grace period change these of one year conditions 2.01(c) 3 BHS to grant housing loans to C the privileged discount rate of BCEAO plus 3 % with repayment period of at least 15 y ears 2.06 9 BHS to review by January 31 C with some delays each year activities of MCF with IDA, Finance Ministry, Interior Ministry and Project Unit 3.01(a) 1 BHS to maintain separate C records & accounts for parts A __ __ _ and E.2 of the Project 3.01(b) 1 BHS to have its accounts, and C those of MCF, audited, and ifurnish to IDA certified copies, no later than four months after the end of the fiscal year 3.01(c) 1 BHS to maintain records for C SOE expenditures for one year, enable IDA representatives to examine such records, and include auditor's opinion in annual  -24- audit report C. CUD Project Agreement l l 2.02 10 Procurement shall be governed C I_by Schedule 3 of DCA 2.04(c) 9 CUD to prepare activity report C with delays & furnish to IDA by October _ 31 of each year Covenant Class 1 Accounts/Audit 2 Financial Performance 3 Flow and utilization of Project Funds 4 Counterpart Funding 5 Management aspects of the Project or of its Executing Agency 6 Environmental Covenants 7 Involuntary Resettlement 8 Indigenous people 9 Monitoring, Review and reporting 10 Implementation 1 1 Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource allocation 12 Sectoral or cross-sectoral regulatory/institutional action 13 Other Compliance status C - covenant complied with NC - covenant not complied with  - 25 - Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Fully complied with Table 12 a: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs (In staff/weeks) FY LENP LENA LENN SPN ICR Totals 1986 5.8 5.8 1987 29.1 4.1 33.2 1988 0.4 23.1 6.5 4.8 34.8 1989 12.4 12.4 1990 _ 20.5 20.5 1991 20.2 20.2 1992 24.0 24.0 1993 _ 30.8 30.8 1994 15.1 15.1 1995 22.6 22.6 1996 12.2 12.2 1997 _ 10.8 0.6 11.4 1998 4.0 4.0 Totals: 35.3 27.2 6.5 173.41 4.6 247.0 Table 12 b: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs (In US$ thousand) FY LENP LENA LENN SPN ICR Totals 1986 13.3 13.3 1987 68.3 10.0 78.3 1988 0.8 57.1 16.2 12.0 86.1 1989 27.8 27.8 1990 55.0 __ __ 55.0 1991 59.3 59.3 1992 74.6 74.6 1993 97.9 97.9 1994 50.8 50.8 1995 71.6 71.6 1996 45.3 I45.3 1997 _ 33.0 0.5 33.5 1998 10.0 10.0 Totals: 82.4 67.1 16.2 527.3 0.0 10.5 0.0 703.5  - 26 - Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions Project Cycle Month Number Days Specialization Performance rating Types of problems /year of in represented ___ ersons field ____________ __~Implem Development Identification 01/86 1 10 UP n/a n/a Preparation 05/86 2 7 UP, FA n/a n/a Preparation 02/87 1 9 FA n/a n/a Pre-appraisal 05/87 1 13 FA n/a n/a Appraisal 07/87 6 18 FA, UP, UP, n/a n/a EC, ME, FA Post-appraisal 04/88 1 7 UP n/a n/a Post-appraisal 07/88 3 12 FA, DC, UE n/a n/a Supervision 1 11/88 3 12 FA, UE, UE 1 1 None Supervision 2 09/89 1 10 MF 1 1 None Supervision 3 02/90 2 10 MF, UE 1 1 None Supervision 4 06/90 1 18 MF 1 1 None Supervision 5 10/90 1 7 MF 2 2 Financial Supervision 6 06/91 2 7 MF, UE 2 2 Financial Supervision 7 01/92 2 5 MF, UE 2 2 Financial Supervision 8 05/92 2 15 MF, UE 2 2 Fin./ Procurement Supervision 9 07/93 1 10 MF, UE 2 2 Fin./ Procurement Supervision 10 04/94 1 10 MF 2 2 Fin.! Procurement Supervision 11 11/94 3 10 UP, UE, RA U S Fin.! Procurement Supervision 12 03/95 2 9 UP, MS S S Fin./ Procurement Supervision 13 11/95 2 8 UP, UP S S Fin. Procurement Supervision 14 03/96 2 15 UP, RA S S Financial Supervision 15 07/96 1 11 UP s s Financial Completion 10/96 2 14 UP, UP s s None Key to specialized skills: DC. Division Chief EC. Economist FA. Financial Analyst MF. Municipal Finance Specialist UE. Municipal Engineer UP. Urban planner RA. Research Assistant  Annexe A Page 1/ 14 PROJBT DS GESTION ET DX DVWLOPPIMEIT URBAINS (Cr. 1884 - SE) Mission de Supervision de l'Association Internationale de D6veloppement (IDA) (du 21 Octobre au 04 Novembre 1996) AIDE-MEMOIRE 1. La Mission IDA, effectu6e par Mme Catherine Farvacque-Vitkovic (AFTUE2), accompagn6e de Mr Piet Nankman (Consultant) avait pour objectifs (a) de suivre lhtat d'avancement du projet depuis la derniere mission de supervision effectu6e du 23 Juillet au 03 Aoiat 1996 et (b) de pr6par-r la cloture du Projet y compris le Rapport d'Achavement. La Mission a particuli4remnnt revu les aspects suivants i - la gestion du Cr6dit Comunal ; ii - les travaux do R6habilitation du Patrimoine B&ti ; iii - 1'etat d'avancemnt de la Composanto Infrastructure ; iw - 1'avancement du Cadastre Fiscal ; v - 1'etat d'avancement de la Composante Habitat ; vi - la gestion du Projet. 2. La Mission a et6 recue par le Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan. Elle remercie l'ensemble des personnes rencontrdes (voir liste en annexe 1) pour leur accueil et leur coop6ration, et tout particulidrement le Directeur du Projet Urbain, M. Massar Sarr. A - CREDIT COMOUNAL (C.C.) Itat d'avancemnt 3. Les travaux du march6 de Tivaouane, annonce dans le dernier aide-m6moire, sont actuellement termins. Ils devraient faire l'objet d'une reception provisoire a organiser entre lentrepriso, la municipalit& et la BHS. Concernant la gare routibre de Mbour, la r6alisation so poursuit oncore et un financement compl6mentaire vient d'Otre accord6 par la BHS. Concernant les march6s de Dakar (Parcelles Assainies, Ngor, Grand Yoff/Arafat) ils n'ont toujours pas d&marr6, la BHS liant la mise on place des cr6dits A la disponibilit6 de 1 autofinancement qui devait Itre assur6o par le Maire de Dakar. La Commune de Louga, pour la construction de 25 souks suppl6mentaires, a obtenu lautorisation de la CNCA de passer un march6 par entente direct. avoc l'adjudicataire du march6 principal. Los formalit4s sont en cours. Pour la gare routiire de Joal, la proc6duro d'approbation de l'adjudication se poursuit aupr6s de la CNCA.  Annexe A Page 2 / 14 4. Le cumul des decaissements effectues se chiffre a 510 317 997 Francs CFA, le montant des bonifications our prata accord6s a 69 160 870. Le total des d6caissements (prets + Bonifications) s'6l1ve a 579 478 867 P.CFA. 5. * tat des Ingagements et des D6caissements Iar| OW L _UicD 3WaIQU a SUR D0114WR DUSCAIS9BEMS3 lIWSCUm | DES MARCM AU CCC CCC - MARCHE SIRILO DE KOLDA 104 888 332 104 888 332 104 8s8 332 0 - GAR ROUTIERE DE FATICK 82 667 500 82 667 500 80 093 306 2 574 194 - EXTEN8ION DU MARCHE NEMA 110 337 378 110 337 378 110 337 349 0 - MAJRCE DE TIVAOUANR 83 819 736 83 819 736 66 200 436 17 619 300 - GABE ROUTISRE DE MBOUR 184 652 000 146 000 000 100 447 397 45 552 603 - AMEYAGCKEMT MARCHE LOUGa 63 083 280 63 083 280 48 351 177 14 732 103 ET CONSTBUCTION DO 25 SOUKS SUPP?LZMZIAIE> -GAB ROUTIERE DE LOUGA 70 000 000 37 000 000 0 37 000 000 - MARCHE PARCELLEB AE8ANIES 849 975 512 463 489 263 0 463 489 263 - MACHE GRAND YOFF ARAFAT 523 112 309 248 364 753 0 248 364 753 - MARCH NOOR 181 485 331 181 485 331 0 181 485 331 - GARE ROUTXERB DE JOAL 123 143 744 107 316 744 0 107 316 744 - REFECTION MARC8E ST MAUR DES FOSSSS DE ZIGUINCHOR 423 041 840 416 902 020 0 416 982 020 - MARCEB ZINC PIRINE 117 986 850 115 852 880 0 115 852 880 - COOMLDMEWT ^ARE ROUTIEER DS MOUR 8434 386 8434 386 0 8 434 386 2 926 628 196 2 169 721 603 510 317 997 1 656 803 577 6. Situation Financibre du Cr6dit Comunal et Contributions F3C. * tessources 4 592 818 155 - 3 000 000 000 - Remboursement du Capital 16 299 297 - R6muneration du Capital 790 317 017 - Cr6dit IDA 786 201 841 * Engagements 2 377 165 122 - Prhts accord6o 2 169 721 603 - Bonification 207 443 519 * Cr&dits disponibles pour nouveaux pr ts 2 215 653 033 * D6caisunemnts our prbts accord6s 510 317 997 * Bonification our prets accord6e 69 160 870  Annexe A Page 3 / 14 * Disponible sur engagements 1 797 686 255 * Situation nette 4 013 339 288 * Situation des Remboursem_nts Ont pay4 - Kolda (Int6r&t de Diff6r6) 6 293 300 - Fatick (lere annuite) 15 407 285 - Ziguinchor (Interet de Differe) 6 620 241 - Louga (Int4rAt de Difftr6) 2 922 348 - Louga (lere annuit6) 8 774 361 N'ont pas payd - Kolda (lere annuite) 19 548 727 - Fatick (Int6ret de Diff6re) 4 960 050 - Tivaouane (Int6ret de Differ6) 4 647 343 (lere annuite) 13 953 913 - Ziguinchor (lere annuite) 19 877 635 Pour le remboursement, les Communes de Kolda et Tivaouane accusent toujours du retard. Louga, par contre, a reg1 la premiere annuite. Pour lea arri6r6es, en cas de defaillance de la Commune, le Ministre de l'Int6rieur prendra un arrete valant mandat pour un paiement force.