Uganda - Program for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 15726 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA PROGRAM FOR ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL COSTS OF ADJUSTMENT PROJECT (C-2088) June 7, 1996 Population and Human Resources Division Eastern Africa Department Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authori- tion. UGANDA PAPSCA Project CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS At the time of appraisal USh 150 = US$ 1.00 USh 1= US$ 0.0066 At the time of project completion mission USh 930 = US$ 1.00 USh 1 = US$ 0.0010 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CTB - Central Tender Board DCA - Development Credit Agreement DEO - District Education Officer ICB - International Competitive Bidding ICR - Implementation Completion Report MoES - Ministry of Education and Sports MoFEP - Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning NGO - Non-Governmental Organization ODA - Overseas Development Association PlU - Project Implementation Unit SDA - Social Dimensions of Adjustment SIDA - Swedish International Development Agency SAR - Staff Appraisal Report PAPSCA- Program for alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs Adjustment USAID - United States Agency for International Development VAP - Veterans' Assistance Program FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Table of Contents Page Preface ................................................................................................................................................i PART I: Evaluation Summary Project Description and Objectives................................................................................................... i Achievement of Objectives............................................................................................................... i Implementation Experience and Results........................................................................................... i F u tu re O p eration s ........................................................................................................................... ii K ey L e sso n s..................................................................................................................................... ii Part [: Project Implementation Assessment.................................................................................... B ack g rou nd...................................................................................................................................... P roject O bjectiv es............................................................................................................................. Achievement of Objectives............................................................................................................... 3 M ajor Factors Affecting the Project..................................................................................................4 B ank P erform an ce ............................................................................................................................ 6 Su stain ab ility................................................................................................................................ 8 Assessment of Outcome ................................................................................................................... 8 F u tu re O p eration .............................................................................................................................. 9 Key Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................................... 9 Part III: Tables Table 1: Summary of Assessments Table 2: Related Bank Credit Table 3: Project Timetable Table 4: Credit Disbursements, Estimate and Actual Table. 5: Detailed Sar Estimates and actual Costs Table 6: Key Implementation Indicators Table 7: Studies Conducted Under the SDA Component Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Input Table 10: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Appendices Appendix A: Project Completion Mission Aide-Memoire Appendix B: Borrower's Comments on ICR Appendix C: Borrower's Evaluation This documen9 has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their oflicial duties. its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wiLhout World Bank authorization. PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Program for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment Project in Uganda. The credit for an amount of SDR 22.0 million (US $ 28 million at the prevailing exchange rate), was approved on February 2, 1990, and made effective on June 29, 1990. It closed on September 30, 1995; the original closing date being September 30, 1994. The credit is 99.7% disbursed, with a remaining balance of about US $ 95,000 which will be canceled. The actual amount of disbursement increased by US $ 3 million to US $ 31 million because of the favorable exchange rate fluctuation between SDR and US Dollars. The ICR was prepared by Gita Gopal from the Population and Human Resources Division (Eastern Africa Department) of the Africa region and reviewed by Messrs. Jacob van Lutsenburg Maas (Division Chief) and Surendra Agarwal (Projects Advisor). The borrower contributed to the preparation of this ICR by rendering professional assistance to the ICR Mission. The main text of the aide-memoire of the Project Completion Mission is included in Appendix A. The Borrower's comments of May 31, 1996 has been incorporated as Appendix B. The Borrower has prepared its own ICR, the Executive Summary of which is included as Appendix C. Preparation of this ICR began in November 1994, during the Bank's final supervision mission and the ICR mission which took place in October 1995, comprising of Gita Gopal (Task Manger), Mr. Pat Walker, (Implementation Specialist and former Task Manager), Colin Lyle (Accounting and Auditing Specialist), Harriet Nannyonjo (Operations Officer), and Paul Ter Weijde (Development Economist). A beneficiary assessment, supported by Africa Region's Systematic Client Consultation Fund was also undertaken, results from which have been fed into the preparation of the ICR. The report is based on the mission's observations from the field trips, discussions with staff of the Project Monitoring and Coordination Unit, the Project Implementing Agencies, Non- governmental Organizations, other donors and, also with beneficiaries and local government officials. Evaluation Summary Page i of ii PART I: EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Project Description and Objectives. The Program for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment was a US $ 106 million program developed to respond to the concerns expressed at the 1988 Consultative Group meeting about the need to address the social costs of economic adjustment. The Bank-financed project (the Project) by the same name was a small part (US $ 37 million) of this large Program. The Project initially consisted of seven of the Program components selected in line with planned and ongoing Bank assistance to tganda. Five more components were added when SIDA financing of US $ 3.1 million was obtained in 1991. No other part of the Program was financed and, after the initial years the Program and the Project became synonymous. The Project had objectives identical to that of the Program: to address some of the urgent social concerns of Uganda's most vulnerable groups through collaborative and integrated development interventions between communities, NGOs and the Government. In the medium term, the Project aimed to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Government to identify and implement interventions for assisting vulnerable groups. To this end, the Project's components ranged from infrastructure rehabilitation to development of social policies. 2. Achievement of Objectives. Given that the Project consists of fairly different and independent tasks, it is difficult to evaluate the Project achievements as a whole. When the Project is disaggregated and evaluated on a component basis, based on indicators developed from the SAR, four components constituting US $ 13.35 million or 37.5 percent of the Project costs have substantially achieved their objectives. One Bank-financed component, comprising US $ 12.65 million or almost 35 percent of the total Project costs, has only partially achieved component objectives. Two Bank-financed components constituting US $ 6.56 million (17.6% of the total Project costs) have only negligibly achieved Project objectives. The five SIDA-financed components (US $ 3.1 million) have together only partially achieved their objectives. It is therefore concluded that the overall outcome of the Project is marginally satisfactory. 3. Implementation Experience and Results. A small PAPSCA Coordination and Monitoring Unit (PCMU) was established by the Project to carry out overall planning, intersectoral coordination and monitoring and evaluation of all Program components. The PCMU was not operational until almost six months after credit effectiveness, and initial implementation problems were exarcebated and delays accumulated. The Program managers who were appointed were unfamiliar with Project-related Bank policies and procedures. The Steering Committee, which was to guide Program implementation met twice during the Project term. During first two years, task management at the Bank changed six times and supervision assistance was, therefore, not stable or continuous during this period. The lack of a consolidated financial system effectively obscured accountability, and the lack of a monitoring system resulted in failure to identify and correct problems in a timely fashion. Together, the Project remains incomplete (despite credit extension by a year) and it encountered cost over-runs, even though the credit is almost fully disbursed. Evaluation Summary Page ii of ii 4. Despite the above limitations in Project management, since the Project was implemented by 7 different NGOs and 3 Project Implementation Units (PIUs), implementation at the grassroots level was by and large satisfactory. Significant community participation and contribution was generated, increasing ownership and commitment to activities at the community level. In addition, there has been considerable institutional strengthening of government agencies, NGOs, and community level groups to plan, implement, and operate development interventions. However, cumbersome procurement and disbursement procedures leading to untimely delivery of goods and replenishment of funds, and lack of support and assistance during implementation especially in the initial years, made implementation difficult. 5. Future Operations. All implementing agencies have agreed with the Government about the future operation of their components. In some cases, implementing agencies have obtained resources to continue some of the more successful development interventions. In order to facilitate continued operations, the Government has permitted the implementing agencies to retain vehicles and equipment purchased under the credit. 6. Key Lessons. The Project experience supports the view that involving beneficiaries and NGOs in project implementation can result in greater sustainability. The Project demonstrates that even economically and socially vulnerable beneficiaries can participate in developmental activities and, at least in the short term, this increases their commitment to and ownership of project activities. It also leads to a strengthening of the capacity at the grassroots to organize and initiate activities beneficial to the community as a whole. The involvement of NGOs has also been salutary, and in some cases, NGOs are continuing to support communities to sustain and follow-up activities. 7. The Project, however, clearly indicates the importance of rigorous upfront project preparation. It supports the early preparation of a project implementation plan and schedule with detailed implementation guidelines establishing transparent administrative and financial responsibilities. The development of performance and physical monitoring indicators is necessary for effective monitoring and evaluation. The Project also highlights the need for an effective project implementation workshop that brings together all implementing partners and stakeholders, familiarizes key staff to Bank procedures, and assists in the finalization of the implementation plan. Project staff should also be familiarized will key provisions in the DCA and particularly with the schedules to the DCA. This Project also supports the need for using flexible procurement arrangements in community-based projects, particularly when end-users contribute to the Project costs and have a stake in the successful outcome of the proposed activity. If centralized procurement is necessary, then procurement should be undertaken well in advance to assure supply of goods when communities are ready to participate. Costs of transport and storage must also be estimated and budgeted for, and accountability mechanisms must be incorporated. Implementation Completion Report Page 1 of 10 PART II: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT 1. Background. In 1988, the Consultative Group (CG) highlighted the need to address the social costs of adjustment resulting from the stringent Economic Recovery Program that was then being undertaken in Uganda. A Task Force, headed by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development with representatives from various Ministries, the World Bank, UNICEF, USAID, NGOs and Makerere University, was assigned the task of formulating the initiative and defining target groups. The Program for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment Project (the Program) was the product of the Task Force's work and deliberations. The Program consisted of nineteen components and was designed to benefit the most vulnerable groups in Uganda including women, orphans, disabled people, and victims of AIDS at a total estimated cost of US $ 106 million. In order to ensure ease of implementation, the components were to be administered by either "existing and proven project implementation units, or by NGOs who have a demonstrated capability for reaching the poor." 2. The Bank-financed Project assisted implementation of about 30% of the total Program. The Project initially financed six of the nineteen Program components in line with ongoing and planned IDA assistance, and sought to assist vulnerable groups. The Project was to be completed at a cost of US $ 37 million. IDA contribution amounted to US $ 28 million. Community contribution was estimated at 10% of the total Project costs at US $ 3.7 million.' In October 1991, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) provided about US $ 3 million to finance five more components. 3. The Project also funded a PAPSCA Coordination and Monitoring Unit (PCMU) to carry out overall planning, intersectoral coordination and monitoring and evaluation of Program components. The PCMU was to have two key staff. A Program Coordinator would monitor the Program, produce periodic reports on the Project for submission to IDA, and manage the Special Account. A Program Officer would "focus on the financial aspects of the Program and collect data from the different implementing agencies." 4. Project Objectives. The Project's main objectives was to address some of the urgent social concerns of Uganda's most vulnerable groups through collaborative and integrated development interventions between communities, NGOs and the Government. In the medium term, the Project aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the Government to identify, formulate and maintain interventions for assisting vulnerable groups. Within these objectives, each Project component had different objectives and these are provided below: The figures cited in this report are based on Bank disbursement summaries and the 1994 audited Project accounts. Implementation Completion Report Page 2 of 10 * Primary Education Rehabilitation: to improve the quality of primary education in 12 of the poorer districts by rehabilitating primary school classroom facilities (US $ 12.65 million - 35% of the total Project costs); * Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA): to create the basis for the refined targeting of vulnerable groups, and for the development of a comprehensive social policy consistent with efficient growth-oriented strategies (US $ 5.06 million - 13.6%). * Orphans in Rakai, Masaka and Gulu: to finance scholarships and limited rehabilitation of six vocational/rural training centers which would train 4,500 orphans in appropriate skills; and to establish a community-based health care program (US $ 4.95 - 13%); * Small Scale Infrastructure Rehabilitation: to improve the living standards and working conditions of some of the poorest communities by providing additional resources for the rehabilitation of the necessary infrastructure; (US $ 4.19 million - 13%); * Low Cost Sanitation Improvement: to improve the access of the urban residents living in hazardous environmental conditions to adequate water supply and sanitation facilities (US $ 2.88 million - 8%); * War Widows Rehabilitation Project: to establish a community-based health care program to enable provision of basic health care, and to teach widows trade skills (US $ 1.5 million - 4%); and * Masindi Primary Health Care: to test a community based health care scheme as a means of providing basic health care services to poor areas (US $ 1.33 million - 3.5 %)2 5. The objectives of the SIDA-financed components included increasing the income potential of women in agricultural development, improving the functioning of small-scale productive enterprises in four districts through provision of technical assistance and credit; improving the health status of orphans; creating increased job opportunities and to improve water and sanitary facilities in peri-urban areas of Kampala; and improving the status of war widows and orphans in Lira. In 1992, the Veteran's Assistance Program (VAP) was included as another Project component. 6. Project objectives were timely and relevant, but numerous and unprioritized. Some aimed at quick disbursements and others focused on sustainable development. Even though the components were relevant to achieving the stated Program objectives, so many different components covering such a wide spectrum of subjects under the same umbrella created excessive complexity. Some objectives were ambitious given that the components were testing a new integrated and participatory approach to grassroots development involving . Program administration and contingencies accounted for the rest. . Though the Project has closed, VAP is continuing to be administered under agreements signed with DANIDA, SIDA, USAID, ODA, and the Netherlands Government, and hence this component is not evaluated in this ICR. Implementation Completion Report Page 3 of 10 significant resource mobilization from poor communities. Also, failure to implement several other key components in the Program diminished the achievement of Project objectives.4 7. Achievement of Project Objectives. Given that the Project consisted of separate and different components, performance indicators have been developed for each component from Project documents (see Table 6). Each component was then separately weighted (based on costs) and evaluated to determine the overall achievement of the Project as a whole. This has resulted in an evaluation that the Project has partially achieved its development objectives and has resulted in a marginally satisfactory outcome. 8. The Small Scale Infrastructure Rehabilitation component and the Low-cost Sanitation Component (together constituting another 21% of the total Project costs) have substantially achieved their objectives. In the former component, a monitoring and evaluation system has also been established within the District Government. The Orphan's Program constituting 13% of the total Project costs has also satisfactorily achieved its objectives of training poor students and providing health care and counseling orphans. The Community-based Health Care component (3.5% of the total Project costs) has substantially achieved its objectives. 9. The largest component constituting 35% of the total Project costs - Education Rehabilitation Component has only partially achieved its objectives since 76% of the classrooms are partially incomplete (with the structure and the roofs in place)f. The Program for Widows, constituting 4% of the total Project costs, was expected to train 25,000 widows and their dependents. The objectives have been only negligibly achieved with only 3000 widows having been trained, and with almost 53% of the credit having been spent on field and operational expenses and vehicles. The SDA component, constituting another 13% of the credit, also did not meet its stated objectives. A household survey has been conducted, and data collected has been used in conjunction with other data to develop and refine some targeting processes. A number of other studies on different aspects of poverty reduction have also been conducted (Table 7). However, there is no evidence of the use of these studies by the Government in determining its policy or in the preparation of other programs, and as the Project closes, there is no evident progress towards the articulation of a social policy. 10. The SIDA-financed components, constituting US $ 3.1 million, have partially achieved their objectives. While the outcome of the Orphans Program in Rukungiri has 4 For example, the Program saw the Education Rehabilitation Component as consisting of two main sub-components - rehabilitation of classrooms and provision of educational supplies. While the Project picked up the former, it was expected that other donors would pick up the latter. This did not materialize, leaving the overall objective of improving educational quality only partially achieved. . However, it must be noted that this was designed as a rehabilitation component. During implementation, it was recognized that there were few or no classrooms to rehabilitate, and that classrooms would need to be constructed. So the component financed the construction of classrooms, without formally modifying objectives or restructuring the component, ultimately posing a greater administrative challenge and placing a larger financial burden on communities in particular. Implementation Completion Report Page 4 of 10 been highly satisfactory, the others constituting almost US $ 2.9 million have only partially achieved their objectives. Most of the SIDA funds financed credit components, and while the funds were disbursed quickly, as credit activities they were not sustainable. 11. Major Factors Affecting the Project. The Project was implemented during a period when Uganda was recovering from the civil war, and during the aftermath of the collapse of coffee prices in 1987-88. The continuing insecurity in the northern and eastern districts also affected effective implementation of the Education rehabilitation component in these districts. Consequently, Government revenues were adversely affected and this in turn, affected the timely provision of Government counterpart funds. The Government provided no counterpart funds during the first year of Project implementation, and only 5% during the second. The 1994 audited statements indicate that the counterpart funds provided up to June, 30, 1994 (original closing date), amounted to 46% (US $ 1.3 million) of the total commitment of US $ 2.81 million.6 When Government counterpart funding did not come through as expected, implementing agencies without alternate sources of funds were entirely dependent on IDA credit. Moreover local costs were higher than estimated during preparation. 12. Lack of beneficiary participation in Project design delayed start of implementation. Failure to conduct promotional activity and lack of information created tensions within the community due to misconceptions and fears. In one component, 23% of the parishes reported that some community members had migrated due to fear of "being put in cells for failure to contribute." Some men perceived the focus on women as an interference with their social norms. Artisans not selected for training felt that they had been disadvantaged by the training of few selected people. Increased school fees were attributed to training of teachers and better classrooms and, introduction of user charges for water and health services were seen as a further tax on poor communities. Community contribution, established without any consultation with communities, was burdensome and one of the reasons for the low rate of completion in the Education Rehabilitation component. In some cases, like in the construction of latrines, the availability of resources to meet the requirement of community contribution was a dominant criterion in the selection of beneficiaries. Therefore, the poorest were effectively excluded from participation. Access to common land was difficult, particularly in urban areas. When communal facilities were constructed on private land, landowners were found to have greater control and powers over the activity, reducing significantly the meaningful participation of others. 13. While the Project was to be implemented in a decentralized fashion by NGOs and other PIUs, Project management was in fact highly centralized. Control and decision making, especially those pertaining to the use of funds, were vested in the PCMU. Disbursement was centralized, with implementing agencies having no independent access to 6. However, in 1995, it is estimated that the Government has fully met the deficit and provided US S 1.8 million. Implementation Completion Report Page 5 of 10 funds, since the PCMU controlled the Special Account.7 Construction materials were packaged into larger contracts and procured through International Competitive Bidding, after contracts were approved by the Central Tender Board (CTB) and clearances were obtained from IDA. In some cases, it took eighteen months after credit effectiveness for communities to receive materials. When goods and materials did arrive, communities who had been prepared for action, had lost interest and needed to be re-motivated. This was also another major factor that delayed the implementation of the Education Rehabilitation component. 14. In 1991, when SIDA funds became available, five more components were added to the existing seven. In 1992, since Bank and SIDA-financed components were not disbursing, funds were re-allocated from existing components to finance a new component - Veterans Assistance Program (VAP). This complicated Project design even further. Some implementing agencies were also affected adversely by this reallocation of funds. However, because of the favorable fluctuation of the SDR, by Project closing all but one of the Bank- financed components obtained funds equal or greater than that initially agreed. But due to lack of financial information, the final evaluation reports by some implementing agencies attribute the incomplete status of their components to the transfer of funds to VAP. 15. The financial accounting system was clearly inadequate. The PCMU did not maintain consolidated accounts for the Project. Each implementing agency was expected to maintain its own accounts. Fourteen separate audit reports and financial statements for the Project were prepared by the auditors.' This was incompatible with a single special account controlled by the PCMU. Together, the system effectively obscured accountability, making financial monitoring very difficult, and at present, the Project does not have a consolidated statement of the total Project costs. 16. Disregard of disbursement procedures also complicated implementation. SOEs were submitted for reimbursement based on anticipated rather than real expenditures.9 Upon replenishment to the Special Account, the PCMU authorized payment to implementing agencies on a first-come first-served basis without adequate reference to the basis on which the funds were replenished. Thus IDA disbursement summaries do not tally with funds disbursed by the PCMU to different components, and this procedure also introduced subjectivity with some implementing agencies having quicker access to funds. 17. The SDA component, consisting of a household survey and a study fund, was ineffectively managed from the start. A Social Policy Advisor was appointed only a year after credit effectiveness, in May 1991. He remained in office until September 1991. It was . The PIU in the Education Rehabilitation Component had independent access, but such access was not coordinated with the PCMU, with neither knowing always what the other had claimed for under the same component. 8 Auditors consolidated Project accounts after fiscal year ending June 30, 1993. . Initially the Project had 33 disbursement categories, that increased to 38, with the incorporation of VAP. Implementation Completion Report Page 6 of 10 not until another year later in October 1992, that the next Social Policy Advisor was appointed. The precise work program for the Study Fund was to be set by the Steering Committee which was also expected to review the results of the studies and the analysis, but such guidance did not materialize after the first two years of Project implementation. A Policy Study Task Force was appointed which also quickly lost interest given the confusion in the management of the component. In retrospect, it was perhaps difficult for an independent entity situated outside the line ministries to have any meaningful impact on policy making. 18. Bank Performance. The strategy to involve communities and NGOs seems to have been a least-cost solution for the Government to jump-start the process of community- based development. Significant support and guidance founded in good analytical work was provided by the Bank in the development of the Program. However, in designing Project implementation mechanisms, Bank performance was not satisfactory in a key area. Project designers did not establish the basis for a sound or appropriate Project financial management system. Even with hindsight, features of the Project design remain unclear. What was the role of the PCMU? Was it primarily responsible for the Program as a whole of which the Project was expected to be a small part, or was the PCMU primarily responsible for in-depth coordination and management of the Project as a separate part? This lack of clarity complicated Project implementation and evaluation. Project monitoring and performance indicators were not defined in Project documents until after mid-term review, though this was both an advantage and a disadvantage. It made Project monitoring and evaluation difficult, but it permitted flexibility to implementing agencies to change course within the general objectives of the component once it was discovered that a particular feature/activity was not working. 19. Bank supervision of the Project was deficient during the initial years. The Bank did not conduct a Project Launch Workshop and procedures and systems were not established up-front. Task Management changed six times during the first two years after credit effectiveness. Agreements were signed with implementing agencies during this period, and the framework for implementation was established without any rigorous screening on the part of the Bank or the PCMU. The Bank also failed to insist on compliance with key legal covenants requiring the Steering Committee and the Health Committee to provide active guidance in Project implementation. 20. Bank task management stabilized after the first two years in May 1992. The need to modify Project design was reviewed but the supervision mission did not recommend modifications because it was feared that any change may retard the improved progress. During the mid-term review the Bank identified a number of weakness at the management and coordination level. The Bank highlighted the need to enhance the capacity of the PCMU. It stressed the need to establish a data base for collection of information necessary for effective targeting and evaluation. The mid-term aide-memoire threatened to recommend suspension of disbursements if the financial concerns were not addressed. The Bank indicated that withdrawal applications were not submitted properly (Para 16). The Bank also raised concerns about the implementation of the SDA component. However, the Bank made a judgment not to insist on full correction because any further disruption at the Implementation Completion Report Page 7 of 10 management level would have had an adverse impact on components which were slowly achieving results in the field and in particular, on poor communities who were finally starting to see the benefits of participation. 22. Borrower Performance. PlUs and NGOs demonstrated considerable skills in performing under rather trying socio-economic conditions as well as difficult and taxing Project arrangements. Except that a rather large percentage of the costs have been spent on NGO's own operational costs, they were successful in mobilizing and counseling deeply disheartened communities. Poor communities have also demonstrated willingness to participate and share costs, also under very difficult economic conditions, in order to improve their conditions. 23. Government commitment to the Project, however, is not clearly evident. The PCMU should have been fully operational by credit effectiveness, but it was not until four months after credit effectiveness that the Program Coordinator was in place and six months after that the Program Manager was appointed. A functioning Social Policy Advisor for the SDA component was appointed only in May 1992. 24. The PCMU was expected to carry out its coordinating responsibilities through a Steering Committee chaired by the Chief Government Planning Economist. The PCMU was "accountable" to the Steering Committee which was to meet regularly (initially once a month) to review the progress of the Program and determine the direction of the Social Dimensions of Adjustment component (SDA). In addition, a Health Committee was also to be constituted to provide regular guidance to the PCMU and the agencies implementing the Health component. The Steering Committee met only twice during the life of the Project and the Health Committee was not established. Project managers and implementers were consequently not provided the guidance or the supervision envisaged in Project documents. 25. Supervision aide-memoires after task management stabilized at the Bank have repeatedly highlighted issues including those of financial accountability, the progress of the SDA component, and the weakness in the disbursement procedures. But there concerns were not addressed by the Borrower with rigor or urgency. 26. The PCMU did not track costs incurred by implementing agencies. Operational costs incurred under the Project were much higher than estimated in the SAR and amounted to almost 45% of the total Project costs, increasing significantly the unit cost of delivery (Table 5C). Salaries and incentives paid under the Project were high with some of local staff appointed as international consultants. The Borrower's evaluation also indicates that local artisans hired in some of the components were paid "allowances" higher than the market rates. While implementing agencies argue that the operational costs were higher given the nature of the Project and the remote regions in which they had to operate, the lack of a monitoring system has left little or no means of ascertaining the justification for the high operational costs. In a limited number of cases, it appears that the credit has financed expenditures outside the scope of the component as described in Project documents. For example, in one component, the credit financed the construction by an implementing agency of its field offices and a health clinic on its private land although this was not within the Implementation Completion Report Page 8 of 10 scope of this component. o These expenditures were, however, within the scope of the understanding reached between the PCMU and the implementing agency. 27. Sustainability. As the Project was designed, sustainability does not appear to have been a concern, even though it was expected that the significant beneficiary participation and contribution in itself would increase commitment and ownership of activities. Following mid-term review, sustainabilty was introduced as a specific criterion and the Mission recommended that implementing agencies be given the flexibility to reallocate resources to more sustainable interventions. This led to the introduction of user-fees in health units and water supply facilities increasing the likelihood of sustainability. Free provision of goods, equipment, and school fees was replaced or supplemented with financial and technical assistance to establish income-generating activities. An initial evaluation indicates that some of these activities are likely to be sustainable. Also, in general, the likelihood of sustainability has increased due to the involvement of NGOs who will continue to support some activities. Increased capacity building at the grassroots level and the strengthened linkages between beneficiaries, NGOs, and districts has also enhanced sustainability, even in the incomplete Education Rehabilitation component. 28. Assessment of Outcome. Overall, the Project outcome is marginally satisfactory. Four components, constituting 37.5% of the total Project costs, have been evaluated to be highly satisfactory or satisfactory. The Education Rehabilitation Component, constituting another 35% of the total Project costs, has had an unsatisfactory outcome because of the low physical completion rate. But, even though this component is individually evaluated as having had an unsatisfactory outcome, the fact that it has nevertheless partially achieved its other social and financial objectives, has resulted in the overall assessment of Project outcome as marginally satisfactory. 29. In many areas, the general outcome has been satisfactory. Even in the incomplete component, the Project has succeeded in motivating dispirited communities to participate in grassroots development. Project activities have generated significant resources from communities, and demonstrated the potential of the Government, NGOs and communities working together towards common development objectives. The Project has increased the in-country capacity in designing and implementing community-based development interventions. A skilled pool of staff has been developed within the Government at different levels. NGOs and other implementing agencies have gained greater understanding of designing and implementing community-based development interventions. Communities themselves now understand the advantages of organized participation in development interventions, and the potential and benefits of using cost recovery mechanisms, at least to cover operation and maintenance of different facilities. 30 If it is assumed that the classrooms initiated under the Education Rehabilitation will be completed in the near future (see para 31), then together, the Project would have provided better physical facilities to 171,200 poor students. Separately, the Project has 10. The expenditures are reflected under the general category of "Equipment, Vehicles and Tools" (see Audit Reports). Implementation Completion Report Page 9 of 10 provided bursaries for 21,218 poor children to attend primary schools, and trained 1,190 orphans, 3,000 widows, and significant numbers of grassroots development workers resulting in increased sensitization and capacity building. A large number of trainees have been women ensuring the increased capacity building of women. The construction of 23,266 ventilated improved pits, each for a individual household in Rubaga with additional 202 in schools, and 25 in local markets will provide about 700,000 individuals with access to improved sanitary facilities. The improved health units along with the enhanced focus on maternal health through training activities has increased awareness on matters related to primary health . The protection of 94 natural springs, the installation of 106 standpipes and 12 borewells have ensured safer water and healthier conditions to a number of poor households and demonstrably relieved the workload for women. 31. Future Operation. Implementing agencies have reached understanding with the PCMU on the operation of individual components. In the Small-Scale Rehabilitation Infrastructure Component, the NGO has trained and handed over the management for the activity to the PIU. A monitoring system has also been developed and will now be used by the District Administration. In Rubaga, the Kampala City Council has already budgeted funds for expansion of component activities. In components related to orphans and widows, NGOs have agreed to continue the more successful operations and ensure that through continued support to the families, students who started schooling will complete at least their primary education. In the case of the community-based health care system, the rehabilitated clinics are under the management of broad community based committees. In all cases, vehicles and equipment purchased under the credit have been retained by the implementing agencies in order to facilitate their continuation of the activities. The Education Rehabilitation component is incomplete, but the Government, with assistance from the Bank, is seeking additional resources to finance the completion of all activities initiated under the component. The Government and the Bank will attempt to finance classroom completion in the northern districts through the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project, while in other districts the possibility of financing under the Primary Education and Teacher Development Project will be examined. 32. Key Lessons Learned. The Project reinforces the benefits of community-based development interventions for poverty reduction. It is clear that community participation not only increases ownership of and commitment to the development activity but also increases the chances of sustainability. Implementing agencies state that there is row increased appreciation of the potential for community participation within Government and political institutions. The Project experience demonstrates the utility of NGOs as effective facilitators in community-based development. However, it is also clear that projects which need to be prepared quickly to address emergency-type situations are perhaps not the best avenues for testing or piloting new approaches to sustainable and community-based development. Effective implementation of projects with community participation requires involvement of relevant stakeholders in project design, and this requires considerable groundwork, preparation and consensus building. To be transparent and equitable, implementation and institutional arrangements must be determined in consultation with beneficiaries. Mechanisms for community participation and beneficiary contribution must be designed in consultation with communities. Implementation must be preceded by an Implementation Completion Report Page 10 of 10 intensive phase of promotion and dissemination of information. Also, projects with significant community participation must have in-built monitoring systems to assess the views of these stakeholders on the efficiency of implementation, and flexible processes to make timely modifications to project design if necessary. 33. Projects with decentralized implementation arrangements need suitable project management structures and arrangements. Bank policies invariably require legal agreements signed and the Special Account established with an entity at the central level. The nature and responsibility of this entity must be reviewed carefully to ensure that it does not constrain decentralized implementation. The flow of funds from such entity to the implementing agencies, and the relative powers of the central and implementing agencies to determine the use of funds must be addressed up-front during project preparation. 34. The Project experience supports the preparation of an implementation plan/manual focusing on project management, financial and monitoring systems must be a condition of credit effectiveness, if not negotiations/Board Presentation. This manual should establish a clear and flexible framework within which the Project will be implemented. The establishment of an effective monitoring system providing the Borrower and the Bank critical feedback on project implementation, permitting timely identification and correction of problems. Also, often NGOs are not selected competitively on the grounds that the skills and experience are the key criteria. Selection of NGOs must be undertaken on a competitive basis. In order to ensure appropriate choices, it is important to define selection criteria and processes during preparation. 35. Effective and appropriate procurement arrangements are key to effective implementation of projects with community participation and NGOs. The Government must consider raising the threshold for procurement contracts that must be approved by the Central Tender Board (CTB), at least for projects involving community participation. The CTB reportedly has the authority to exempt activities from its own procedural requirements. To enhance effective implementation, it is also important to bring in all key participants involved in processing procurement - for example, in this case, the CTB and the Revenue/Tax Authorities - during project preparation to familiarize them with project objectives and seek their assistance and support for effective implementation. Part III Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA Table 1A: Summary of Assessments Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable A. Achievement of objectives macro-economic policies X sectoral policies X financial objectives X institutional development physical objectives X poverty reduction X other social objectives X environmental objectives X public sector management X private sector development X B. Project sustainability X (fgii atisfactory ............ C. Bank performance ________ identification X preparation assistance X________ appraisal ________X________ supervision X D. Borrower performance preparation X________ implementation ________X________ covenant compliance X operation X Highty Highly ara toSatisfactory Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Unaifatr E. Assessment of outcome Page 1 of 10 Part 1I1 Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA (Kamuli Smallscale Infrastructure Component) Table 1 B: Summary of Assessments (Continued) SubtantMa Partial Negiibe Not appticabIe A. Achievement of objectives ________ ________ macro-economic policies ________ ________ _________X sectoral policies_________ _________ __ ________ financial objectives X institutional development X physical objectives X __________________ poverty reduction X_________ other social objectives X X environmental objectives X X public sector management X __________________ private sector development _________ _________X B. Project sustainability X __________________ Highiv Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Hgl C. Assessment of outcome nalsatr Page 2 of 10 Part III Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA (Education Rehabilitation Component) Table 1 C: Summary of Assessments (Continued) Substantal Partial Neglgible Not applicable A. Achievement of objectives macro-economic policies X sectoral policies X financial objectives X institutional development X physical objectives X poverty reduction X other social objectives X X environmental objectives X public sector management X private sector development X B. Project sustainability X Highly Saisfactory Unsatisfactory yUnsatisfactory C.Assessment'of outcome X Page 3 of 10 Part III Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA (Rubaga Low-Cost Sanitation Component) Table ID: Summary of Assessments (Continued) .... . . . .. ...... ... A. Achievement of objectives macro-economic policies X sectoral policies X financial objectives X institutional development X physical objectives X poverty reduction X other social objectives X environmental objectives X public sector management X private sector development X B. Prjc sustainability XT C. Assessmen of.outcom. . . Page 4 of 10 Part Ill Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA (Orphans Program In Rakal, Masaka and Gulu) Table 1 E: Summary of Assessments ......... ........ A. Achievement of objectives macro-economic policies X sectoral policies X financial objectives X institutional development X physical objectives X poverty reduction X other social objectives X environmental objectives X public sector management private sector development X :U.1key.Unikely Uncertain B. Project sustainabllity X Saifatr .Unsatisfactory . Hghly Pa:.g.e 5 . tatisfactory Pege 5 of 10 Part 111 Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA (War Widows Sub-Component) Table 1F: Summary of Assessments (Continued) A. Achievement of objectives________ macro-economic policies _________X sectoral policies _________X financial objectives X institutional development X physical objectives X poverty reduction X other social objectives X environmental objectives X public sector management ________ ________ _________ privuat setrdveomn C,e ofesmn 1 fou0cm v .. . . ... . .. ..X PAgeve n of etie Part Ill Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA (SDA Component) Table 1G: Summary of Assessments (Continued) A. Achievement of objectves macro-economic policies ______ __ _________X sectoral policies ________ _ ________X financial objectives ________ ________ _________X institutional development _ _______X physical objectives _________ _________X poverty reduction X other social objectives X environmental objectives _________________ _________ public sector management X_______ __________________ . Prjc susainbilty. C, Acsevment of oetomes X Page 7 of 10 Part III Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA (SIDA Financed Credit Activities) Table 1 H: Summary of Assessments (Continued) A. Achievement of objectives macro-economic policies X sectoral policies X financial objectives X institutional development X physical objectives X poverty reduction X other social objectives X environmental objectives public sector management x private sector development X B. Project sustainability X .Wilghly Highly :Safactory Unsatisfactor U..Sat ty Unsatlsfactory x Page 8 of 10 Part I11 Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA (Orphans Program in Rukungirl) Table 11: Summary of Assessments (Continued) A. Achievement of objectives macro-economic policies X sectoral policies X financial objectives X institutional development X physical objectives X poverty reduction X other social objectives X environmental objectives X public sector management x private sector developmentX B, Project sustainability x C Assesment ofotcm X Page 9 of 10 Part II Table 1 UGANDA PAPSCA (Keep Kampala City Clean) Table 1J: Summary of Assessments (Continued) A. Achievement of objectives _______ ________ macro-economic policies ________ _________X sectoral policies ________ __________ __ ________X financial objectives _ _______X _________ institutional development _ ________X __________ physical objectives _ _______X _________ poverty reduction _ _______X _________ other social objectives _ _______X _________ environmental objectives _ _______X public sector management ________ _________X private sector development ___________________X B. Project sustainability _ _______X _________ Highly Highly C. Asasamen of oncams atiufotory Satisfaotory Unatisfacty Uat.st Page 10 of 10 Part HI Table 2 Uganda PAPSCA Project Table 2: Related Bank Credits * ~ 4~edItAchievement/Purpoie Past Operations Education III (Cr. The project assisted in rehabilitating primary, secondary 1983 1988 1329) technical schools and to a lesser extent, the University. The Completed US $ 32 million project provided educational materials such as textbooks, instructional materials and equipment for about 5,200 primary schools, about 177 secondary schools, and 33 teacher training and vocational institutions. The project also provided library books and professional journals to the university, in addition to the rehabilitation of a number of residence halls. The ICR for the project undertaken by the UNESCO Cooperative Program, noted that in spite of political instability and persistent security problems during the period of project implementation, much of the materials procured under the project reached the schools and provided an important, though temporary, uplift tot he education system. Education IV The momentum of the Government's educational rehabilitation 1988 1994 C1965 efforts was boosted. The project put the sector on a path to Completed US$ 22 million recovery. Textbooks and instructional materials were delivered to schools speedily and cost effectively, thus raising teacher morale and parental interest in children's education. The institutional capacity of the Ministry has been strengthened. Most important has been the redefining of the role of the National Curriculum Development Center, and the liberalization of the textbook sector. Page 1 of 2 Part III Table 2 Table 2: Related Bank Credits (continued) CreditA On-going Operations' Uganda First Health The proposed project had three main objectives: (a) to 1988 Closing C1934 rehabilitate a selected number located hospitals and health on US$ 65.5 million centers; (b) to promote health status by strengthening preventive 3-31-96 health programs; and (c) to ensure the long-term sustainability and viability of the health care delivery systems. Primary Education and This project will assist in (a) improving primary school teaching 1993 Closing Training C-2493 and management, and (b) strengthening strategic functions of on US $ 52 million MoES, e.g., analysis, management and implementation 6/30/03 Northern This project has a component which will help (a) integrate Reconstruction Project teacher education of 3000 primary school teachers, (b) improve 1992 Closing Cr. 2362 technical training, and (c) rehabilitate 1860 primary school on US$ 98.2 million classrooms. 9/30/98 Sexually Transmitted The objectives of the proposed project are: (a) To 1994 Closing Infections prevent sexual transmission of HIV by: Promotion of safer sexual on C2603 behavior; provision of condoms; promotion of STD care seeking 12/30/00 US $ 50 million behavior; and provision of effective STD care. (b) To mitigate the personal impact of AIDS by: Provision of support for community and home based health care and social support for people with AIDS; briefing of staff and provision of drugs for opportunistic infections and protective supplies for district health facilities (government and non government); and, provision of TB diagnosis and case management. (c) To support institutional development to manage HIV prevention and AIDS care by: Strengthening the Districts capacity to plan, coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate integrated AIDS related activities; and, strengthening the national capacity to provide adequate technical support on health issues related to AIDS. District Health The objective of this project is to pilot-test and demonstrate the 1995 Closing C2679 feasibility of delivering an essential health services package to on US $ 45 million district populations, within a prudent financial policy framework 12/31/02 for the sector. These objectives will be pursued through an integrated program of policy, institutional and financial improvements, with close monitoring. Accordingly, the proposed project would (a) pilot and test new sector policies and strategies which will facilitate the implementation of essential health services; (b) strengthen management and planning capacity at district levels so that they are prepared to provide essential health services; and (c) restructure the MOH so as to build its capacity to provide health policy leadership and to support the Government's decentralization policy. Page 2 of 2 Part III Table 3 Uganda PAPSCA PROJECT Table 3 Project Timetable Identification June 4, 1988 Appraisal May 1989 Negotiations 1989 Board Presentation February 1, 1990 Signing February 8, 1990 Effectiveness June 29, 1990 Establishment of a Special Account July 5, 1990 Changes to the Development Credit Agreement: - opening of a separate special account for VAP October 1991 - reallocation of funds in some categories May 1991 - reallocation of funds to some categories and increase in percentage of local costs financed January, 1993 - reallocation of funds to some categories April 27, 1993 - reallocation of US $ 1 million to Category March 1994 - reallocation of funds to some categories May 1994 - inclusion of categories 32-37(g) July 1994 - reallocation of categories March 1995 - amendment Part DI of Schedule 2 to add Rukungiri - reallocation of funds to some categories April 1995 Project Completion June 30, 1994 June 30, 1995 Closing September 30, 1994 September 30, 1995 Paft mI Talfle 4 Uganda PAPSCA Project Table 4: Credit Disbursements, Estimnated and Actual ..~L ~ ........... . ... ... ..... ............ ............. s e <ua**C.uhtv a *.t .Y9.Q.0/9.0.0 .0 0.0.2 .0 0 Q2 12/9 0.00.. 0.00........ ..%.0.15.0.17.1% Q3~~~~~ 039..0 .0 0 . 0.27... ...4 069 3.5 3.50 13%... ..7 0.9 .... ... % .. FY9l QS 09/91....0.5040.4.00 .83 Q6 1291 0.0 4.5 16% .71 1X9X6 FY0 Q81 0/9 2.00 8.00 29% 1.02 4.67 17% FY2 Q2 0/92 1.50 9.50 04% 2.89 7.56 27% Q3O 12/92 1.50 11.00 39% 2.11 9.27 15% Q41 03/93 1.50 12.50 15% 2.35 12.02 43% FY1 Q5 06/93 1.50 14.00 50% 1.5 13.53 48% FY9 Q120/93 2.00 16.00 16% 2.1 15.72 56% Q7 012 1.50 17.50 63% 2.6 18.35 66% Q85 03/94 2.00 19.50 70% 10 18.69 67% FY2 Q9 0/9 .00 21.50 77% 1.89 20.78 74% FY4 Q1O 12929 1.50 23.00 82% 2.04 22.62 35% Qli 0194 1.50 12.50 88% 2.75 12.57 41% Q12 03/95 1.50 26.00 93% 1.53 27.09 47% Q14069 1.027.50 9.15 27.30 63976% 1 .56 FY94 Q17 09/95 0.50 28.00 182% 04 27.64 99% Q22 12/95 0.10 27.74 99% Q23 03/96 1.89 29.63 106% Q24 06/96 FY96 Q25 09/96 Q26_12/95 ___________________ Part Ill Table 5A Detailed SAR Estimates and Actual Costs Mthdrawal of IDA Credits Surplus SAR Estimates Actual Allocated A Kamuli Infrastructure Project US $ US $ 1 Civil works 2.40 1.29 2 Equipment, tools, vehicles 0.55 0.87 3 Consultant Services 0.02 0.20 Sub-total 2.96 2.37 -0.59 B Primary Education Rehabilitation 4 Civil works 5.98 5.16 5 Equipment/ToolsNehicles/Fumiture 1.31 0.84 6 ConsultantServices 0.59 1.05 7 Operating 0.10 1.00 Sub-total 7.98 8.04 0.06 C Low-cost in Rubaga 8 Civil Works 1.47 2.51 9 Construction materials 0.37 0.57 10 Equipment, Tools, vehicles 0.61 0.24 11 Consultant Services 0.02 0.01 12 Operating 0.08 0.30 Sub-total 2.54 3.63 1.09 D1 Orphans in Rakai/Masaka/Gulu 13 Construction materials 0.58 0.21 14 Equipment/tools/Agricultural & Med. Supplies/Vehic 2.13 1.22 15 Training 0.31 1.09 16 Operating 0.25 0.96 Sub-total 3.27 3.48 0.21 D2 War Widows Project 17 Equipment/Tools and Vehicles 0.78 0.85 18 Consultant Services 0.25 0.21 19 Training 0.23 0.28 20 Operating 0.12 0.32 Sub-total 1.38 1.67 0.29 D3 Masindi Community Health Based Project 21 Civil Works 0.05 0.32 22 Equipment/tools/SuppliesNehicles 0.39 0.35 23 Consultant Services 0.31 0.13 24 Training 0.14 0.27 Sub-total 0.89 1.07 0.18 E SDA Component 25 Equipment, Fumiture & Vehicles 0.65 0.27 26 Consultant Services 1.76 4.23 27 Seminars & Training 0.35 0.18 28 Operating 1.79 0.35 Sub-total 4.55 5.03 0.48 F PAPSCA Adminsitration 29 Equipment and Vehicles 0.05 0.10 30 Consultant Services 0.60 0.64 31 Operating 0.04 0.58 0.69 1.32 0.63 32 Refund of PPF* 0.52 0.07 33 Unallocated 3.23 Sub-total 28.01 26.68 2.34 G VAP (as in OCA) 32 Construction Materials 1.91 - b Equipment/ToolsNehicles and Furniture 0.23 0.21 c Consulting Services 0.42 0.29 d Training and Counselling 0.17 - e Operating Expenses 0.26 3.21 Sub-total 2.99 3.71 0.72 Total 31.00 30.38 3.06 * partly cancelled Data from 1994 Audited Reports and Disbursement Summaries Page 1 of 3 Part I1 Table 5B US $ (milIlions) 1 Small-scale lnfr. Rehab 0.59 0.64 2.96 4.19 0.62 0.20 0.71 2.37 3.90 2 Primary Education - 4.37 8.28 12.65 - 0.16 2.98 8.28 11.41 3 Low Cost Sanitation - 0.23 2.65 2.88 - 0.18 3.63 3.81 4 Health-- 4A Orphans 1.29 0.40 3.26 4.95 1.90 0.06 3.48 5.44 4B Widows - 0.12 1.38 1.50 - 0.11 1.67 1.78 40 Health Development 0.33 0.11 0.89 1.33 0.35 0.43 1.07 1.86 5 SDA - 0.40 4.66 5.06 5.03 5.03 6 PAPSCA Administration - 0.06 0.69 0.75 - 0.05 1.32 1.37 7 VAP (Added on) 3.71 Contingencies - 0.46 3.32 3.78 2.62 2. 62 Total 2 .2 1 6.79 28.09 37.09 2.87 3.81 3.69 30.56 37.22 * incdudes community contribution **Rough calculation Page 2 of 3 Part III Table 5C (US $) Estimated Actual Costs for Vehicles Actual Disbursements DCA Reference Component Description Operational Costs ( & Equipment (Audit (from IDA Disb DCA) reports 94) Summaries, Part A Small-scale Rural Infrastructure - 215,651.00 599,970.00 Part B (Category 7) Education Rehabilitation 101,818.18 329,261.20 1,046,293.00 Salaries and allowances paid under Civil works Category 679,903.69 PartC (Category 12) Low-Cost Sanitation 89,090.91 78,286.00 292,800.00 Part D1 (Category 16) Orphans Program 241,818.18 867,634.50 970,299.00 Part D2 (Category 20) War Widows 127,272.73 94,264.00 335,734.00 War Widows (field expenses paid under "Equip, Vehicles, and Tools" and consultants costs) 303,757.20 Part D3 Community-Based Health 85,872.00 355,532.40 Part E (Category 28) Social Costs of Adjustment 1,794,545.45 1,031,680.00 345,311.25 Consultants (Category used for salaries and Category 26 op. copsts of hhid surveys) 3,634,919.00 Part F (Category 31) PCMU Operation 50,909.09 98,243.00 576,337.00 (Category 30) Consultants (but used to pay salaries) 500,000.00 Total Expenses 2,405,454.55 2,800,891.70 9,640,856.54 Operational Costs as % of total Credit % of credit approved by Board for operational costs 8.6 Recurrent operating costs 34.4 Recurrent and capital operating costs 44.4 Due to SDR changes Page 3 of 3 PART III TABLE 6 KEY IMPLEMENTATION INDICATORS (From the SAR) Kes impleaentalion Indicator in the SAR lnil Estimated Afrer Mid-ierm Actual _____________________________ I in SAR j Reviews Kamuli Smallseale Infrastructure Rehablitation Springs protection # - Construction of wells # - Rehabilitation of Primary Schools & Health Centers - 811 454 classrooms completed, 213 classrooms rehabilitated, 10 health units completed, 2 on-going; 7 secondary schools received construction materials Rehabilitation and maintenance ofminor commumity -10 kilometers of roads improved with culverts access roads Establish a coordination and monitoring system in -Installed DDC Education Rehabilitation Rehabilitation of classrooms # 4200 466 completed, 1378 roofed, 333 ready for roofing, 2,071 under construction Rubaga Low Cost Component Protection of springs # 50 55 Installation of standpipes # 100 100 Construction of new ventilated improved pits # 2500 2642 + (222 at schools) latrines (VIPs) + 76 latrines + 412 washing slabs Upgrading of VIPs # 1000 - Sullage disposal and surface water drainage 13,000 meters of drains desilted and stone pitched improvement Health education programs -- Radio health programs conducted every Friday (total of 176) 32 plays on health related issues; 36 workshops for communities and community trainers Page 1 of 2 PART Ill TABLE 6 KEY IMPLEMENTATION INDICATORS (From the SAR) Continued Health ORPHANS COMPONENT Training of orphans orphans 4500 - assist 2000-2500 foster families with 6000-8000 guardians have been assisted to increase agricultural inputs and improve income levels by provision of training -assist 10000-12,500 orphans with tuition and agricultural inputs; credit scheme has also been support started; -to establish and equip six rural vocational 1,190 orphans received training training centers and provide 1200 older 109,371 received school fees youths with skills 6 rural vocational training institutions have been built Training of local development workers person 180 -to train and equip 50-60 community-based 57 received counseling training Parish and Development workers to provide 349 community health workers and traditional birth counseling services attendants trained, equipped and deployed in the -to support and augment MOH programs by community; facilitating the training of 80-100 Community 6 health units are undergoing construction health workers and renovate five health clinics Shelter for community health workers persons 450 over 60 houses under shelter program are undergoing reconstruction Five schools are undergoing reconstruction WAR WIDOWS COMPONENT No of beneficiaries widows 25,000 and 3,054 widows and their families their families MAsINDI COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 50% of the non-hospital health - 2 health centers/dispensaries/aid posts will 5 health centers rehabilitated institutions in the district would be become fully functional rehabilitated and made functional All rehabilitated institutions would have 366 Traditional birth Attendants, 250 Community at least one person trained and equipped Health workers, 90 Health workers, and 103 to do general maintenance and simple committee members trained. repairs Pre-natal and under-five's clinics would -Established in four health units (average if 2255 be established at all dispensaries ante-natal clinics held and 12,750 mothers seen. 16,611 children growth monitored; 945 women attended ante-natal clinics. AIDs sensitization seminars held for 1,150 attendees) 70% of district health personnel would attend continuing education sessions 2-4 times Page 2 of 2 Part III Table 7 STUDIES CONDUCTED UNDER THE SDA COMPONENT Study/purpose of study Status Impact of study 1.Conversion factors and regional price report presented late no direct impact; indices may be updated 2.Establishment of a nutritiuon based report presented late no direct impact; absolute poverty line in Uganda may be updated 3.Poverty analysis/ report delayed by no direct impact; profile late availability of may be updated input data 4.Factors influencing access to primary report available follow-up given by Min.of education in Uganda (demand side) Education 5.Factors influencing access to primary study was not done n.a. education in Uganda (supply side 6.Factors affecting access to education for report available follow-up by UNICEF the marginalized groups in Uganda 7.An inquiry into disparities in the cost of final (improved) no direct impact; primary education in rural and urban areas report presented late may be updated 8.Effects of adult literacy on poverty report available No follow-up given by Min.of Education 9.Factors affecting access to income report available Follow-up by National Union of generating activities for disabled persons in Disabled Uganda 1 o.Contribution of children to family income report available Follow-up by UNICEF, National (problem to value Council for Children and relevant child labour) ministries 11 .Employment and income opportunities report available Follow-up by Min. of Gender & for low income women in rural/urban Community Development squatter settlements 12.Construction of a food balance sheet for report available follow-up by Min.of Fin.& Uganda Econ.Planning + Bank of Uganda (Agricultural Secretariat) Page 1 of 2 Part III Table 7 STUDIES CONDUCTED UNDER THE SDA COMPONENT(Continued) Study/purpose of study Status Impact of study 13.Effects of acces to land of the rural poor report available No follow-up expected on food production in Masindi District 14.The effects of price and market liberali poor quality report No follow-up expected sation on household food production and consumption 15.Impact of irrigated rice production on report to be finalized rural food security in Eastern Uganda 16.Profile of civil servants report presented late confidential report; follow-up by relevant ministries 17.Support strategy for laid-off civil servants report presented late confidential report; follow-up by relevant ministries 18.Absorptive capacity of the markets for report presented late confidential report; labour products and services follow-up by relevant ministries 19.Rehabilitation of Luwero Triangle report finalized follow-up by Ministry of State Page 2 of 2 Part III Table 8 UGANDA PAPSCA PROJECT Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants DCA Description of Covenant Covenant Present Original Actual Comments Reference cass(es) status date date Section 3.01 Credit effectiveness: The PAPSCA Monitoring unit would Management Complied June 19R9 December 1he condiion was waicd, and iI was about six months after credit be operational aspects of the 1989 effectiveness that the PCMU became fully operational project or of its executing agency Section 3.10 Condition of Disbursement: Government to enter into an Management Complied N/A 30/5/91 Condition of disbursement met. (a) agreement with Action Aid for SSIC aspects of the with projector of its executing agency Section The Government to have signed a contract for TA and Management Complied N/A 3.10(b) services for the education component Aspects of with the project or of its executing agency SECTION The Government to have signed a contract for TA and Accounts Complied N/A The PIU maintains copies of all SOEs as well as opinions of the auditors 3.10 (C) services for the Low cost sanitation component and audit with on the SOEs. Page 1 of 3 Part Ill Table 8 Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants (continued) DCA Description of Covenant Covenant Present Original Actual Comments -Theerence class(es) status date date Section 3.10 For each of the Health components. (i) entered into an Management Partially N/A N/A (i) complied with. (d) agreement with selected NGOs; and (ii) established and aspects of the complied (ii) committee was never established. staffed the Coordinating Committee. project or of with its executing agency Section 3.10 Employed the specialist services for the SDA Management Partially N/A N/A A functioning officer was appointed only by October 1992 (e) aspects of the Complied project or of with its executing agency Schedule 4 - The Borrower to establish the PCMU within the MPED to Management Complied N/A N/A Pars 1 (a) carry out overall planning of the various components aspects of the with project or of its executing agency Schedule 4 - PCMU to be accountable to the PAPSCA Steering Management Partially N/A N/A The Steering Committee met only twice during the first two years. Para 1 (b) Committee aspects of the Complied project or of with its executing agency Schedule 4 - PCMU to be staffed with a coordinator and assisted by a Management Delayed N/A N/A The coordinator and the program officer were to be appointed before Pars 2 program officer aspects of the credit effectiveness but this condition was waived and the PCMU was project or of staffed only after credit effectiveness. its executing agency Schedule 4, Kamuli District Development Committee to establish a sub- Management Complied N/A para. 3 committee to administer Part A of the project aspects of the with project or of its executing agency Page 2 of 3 Part M Table 8 Table 8: Status of Legal Covenants (continued) ..a Schedule 4 - Action Aid to assist resistance councils and develop their Management Complied N/A N/A Compliance Fulfilled Para 4 capacity aspects of the with project or of its executing agency Schedule 4, The PIU within MOE to be responsible for the Management Complied N/A N/A Compliance fulfilled. para. 5 implementation of Part B of the project aspects of the with project or of its executing agency Schedule 4, Management Complied N/A 10/1990 Compliance fulfilled para.6 The Kampala City Council PIU to be responsible for the aspects of the with implementation of Part C of the project project or of its executing agency Schedule 4, Parts DI and D3 of the project to be carried out by World Management Complied N/A 9/1990 Compliance fulfilled. para. 9 Vision and Part D2 by Uganda War Widows aspects of the with project or of its executing agency Schedule 4, MPED shall be responsible for the implementation of Part E Management Complied N/A N/A Compliance fulfilled. para. 10 (SDA Component) with assistance from the Department of aspects of the with Statistics project or of its executing agency Schedule 4, The PAPSCA Steering Committee to be responsible for Management Partially N/A N/A Compliance partially fulfilled. The Steering Committee met only twice parn. 11 reviewing semi-annual work program for Part E and the aspects of the Complied during the first two years. results of surveys, studies, and analyses, and determine project or of with appropriate studies for formulation of policies. its executing agency Page 3 of 3 Part III Table 9 Uganda PAPSCA Project Bank Resources: Staff Input Preparation to Appraisal - - - - 26.7 82.77 ppraisal - - - - 29.2 90.52 Negotations through Board - - - - 15.5 48.05 Approval Supervision 126.8 393.08 - - 73.2 226.92 Completion 7.3 22.63 - - 6.8 21.08 Memo: Assumes average cost of US $ 3,100 per staff week Part III Table 10 UGANDA PAPSCA PROJECT Table 10: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements OD 10.60 Paras. 26-27 of OD 10.60 state that as a minimum, financial reports should normally Accounting, comprise a statement of receipts and payments, as well as total project costs and sources of Financial financing, and that the supporting schedules of statements should disclose annual and Reporting, and supplemental budget allotments, actual expenditures under each budget category for which Auditing Bank financing is furnished, and the actual expenditures and amounts of Bank disbursements claimed. In short, financial reporting should cover all accounts pertaining to project expenditures, irrespective of sources of financing. OD 13.10 Audit Reports received have not complied with the financial covenants. Reports have not Borrower been received within schedules and have not been systematically included Special Account Compliance with and SOE audits. The poor accountability of the financial management structure has been Audit Covenants significantly undermined the value of the audits. Compliance with OD 10.60 and OD 13.10 has been only partiaL APPENDIX A UGANDA: PAPSCA PROJECT (CREDIT 2088-UG) October 30, 1995 Implementation Completion Mission Aide-Memoire Introduction I. An IDA project completion mission visited Uganda from October 15 - I. 1995. in order to prepare the Implementation Completion Report for the above-referenced Project. The mission consisted of Pat Walker (Consultant Implementation Specialist/Architect), Colin L'.le (Accounting and Auditing Specialist), Paul Ter Weijde (Consultant Development Economist), Harriet Nannyonjo (Operations Officer. Resident Mission), and Gita Gopal (Task Manager). Joe Muv.enge from World Vision Intemational also participated in the Completion Mission. SIDA. as a co-financier to the PAPSCA program was invited, but did not participate. . The mission met and discussed the project with various institutions including the PAPSCA Coordination and Monitoring Unit (PCU), Project Implementation Units (PlUs), Non-Govemmental Organizations (NGOs) local Government officials, beneficiaries, and officials from the Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) and Education and Sports (MOES) and Local Government (MOLG) (Attachment 1). The Mission also visited sites of ten out of the thirteen components of the project (Attachment [l). The Mission also relied on the draft evaluation reports prepared by the PCMU. 3. The Mission has also provided advice and support to the Government in preparing its own contribution to the [CR. The Mission explained that under Bank Operational Policies, the Govemment is expected to prepare and make available its own evaluation report on the project's execution and initial operation, costs and benefits, the Bank's and Government's performance of their respective obligations under the Credit and the extent to which the purposes of the Credit had been achieved. The Government would need to provide a summary of this report, if more that ten pages. which will be annexed, unedited, to the final ICR. The Mission explained that the Bank encourages the Government to adopt a plan for the operational phase of the project. The Mission also pointed out to the Government that additional information on project costs and achievements would be necessary to complete the Bank's final evaluation of the project in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR). 4. The mission wishes to thank Government, PCMU and PIU staff, and the Implementing Agencies for the excellent cooperation and assistance throughout this period in Uganda. The draft Aide-Memoire records the views of the Bank, Government, implementing agencies, co- financiers and beneficiaries on project implementation and operation, summarizes the mission's findings and recommendations, the agreements reached with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and also includes a plan developed by PCMU with Implementing Agencies for the on-going operation phase of the project (Attachment 1l). The Aide-Memoire is subject to endorsement by IDA management on the mission's return to Washington. I Projeci Background The project vas identified and prepared to complement the economic recovery program which included among other measures, the devaluation of currency by almost 77%. The credit agreement was signed on February 8. 1990. and became effective on June 29. 1990. The original closing date of the project was September 30. 1994 but was extended to September 30. 1995. Initial project funding was provided as follows: IDA :8.00 Go%ernment of 1U.anda 2.81 NGOs 2.1 Communities TOTAL 6. SIDA subsequently provided S 3.0 m and NORAID SO.2 m. bringing the total funding to S40.2 M. 7. The project's short-term objectives were to address some of the urgent social concerns of Uganda's most vulnerable groups through collaborative and integrated development interventions between communities. NGOs and the Government. In the medium term, the project aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the Government to identify, formulate and maintain interventions for assisting these vulnerable groups. The project objectives were to be pursued through implementation of a number of components. These included: (i) the provision of financing and technical resources to local communities of a selected district for the undertaking of small-scale infrastructure projects (US S 4.19 million) (Part A of Schedule 2 of the DCA); (ii) rehabilitation of primary school classrooms in 12 of the poorest districts (US S 12.65 million) (Part B); (iii) urban infrastructure improvements in water supply and sanitation (US S 2.88 million) (Part C); (iv) health and tiaining programs for orphans and widows and a pilot community-based health care system in a selected district (US S 7.88 million) (Part D); (v) strengthening the Governments capacity for improved social planning including the formulation and implementation of policies to alleviate the social costs of adjustment (US S 5.06 million) (Part E); and (vi) program administration (US S .75 million) (Part F). S. In October 1991, SIDA financing was obtained and additional components were included: (i) income-generating activities through provision of credit to women. in agricultural development (US S 0,4 million); (ii) development of small scale productive enterprises in four districts through provision of technical assistance and credit(US S 1.3 million) (iii) the Orphans Program in Rukungiri (US S 0.4 million); (iv) Keep Kampala City Clean (US S 0.7 million); and (v) assistance to war widows and orphans in Lir (US S 0.4 million). 9. In 1992 the Veteran's Assistance Program (VAP), was brought into the project and 2 US S 2.5 million was re-allocated from IDA and US S 0.5 million from SIDA to initiate this program, resulting in a down-sizing of some of the project components. 1o. The Project was to be implemented under the overall coordination and monitoring of a PCMU within the MOFEP and accountable to the PAPSCA Steering Committee. The PAPSCA Steering Committee was to be chaired by th., Permanent Secretary, MOFEP and comprising representatives of the Borrower's ministries, external donors and NGOs. The small-scale infrastructure component was to be administered by the Development Committee of Kamuli District under the Department of Community Development of vfLG. The PIU within the MOES was responsible for implementation of Primary School Classrooms Rehabilitation Component. The PIU in the Kampala City Council Was responsible for carrying out the urban structure improvements in water supply and sanitation. and the component for widows/orphans and the community-based health care system was to be coordinated by a committee to be established by MLG which were to include representatives of MOH, MOD, MOLG. World Vision. War Widows Association and district resistance committees. MOFEP was responsible for the implementation of Part E of the Project with the assistance of a socio-economist, who was to report to the Permanent Secretary. MOFEP. All other components which w6re incorporated after SIDA financing became available were implemented through agreements signed with the respective implementing agencies. Achievement of Objectives I. It is difficult to evaluate the achievement of project objectives as a whole, since project objectives were not specific and project performance and physical indicators were not established at appraisal. When the project is evaluated on a component by component basis, the Mission feels that achievement of component objectives was in general satisfactory. For most components, achievement of objectives has been partial. In the case of the low cost sanitation component in Rubaga Division of Kampala, achievement of project objectives has been over and above what was planned. Objectives have also been substantially achieved in the Small-Scale Infrastructure component in Kamuli and in the Community-based Health Care component in Masindi. In some components, the objectives stated in the DCA were not strictly followed. The objectives of the SIDA-financed credit activities were only partially achieved. Attachment 1l provides a tentative summary evaluation of achievements for all components as of June 1994, other than the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) component, which is in Attachment III. Implementation Record 12. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) was amended and/or the credit re-allocated six times during implementation: (i) to revise the percentages of local and foreign expenditures in the various budget categories to incorporate community services and training to be provided by Action Aid as essential aspects of part A of schedule 2; (ii) to adjust budgetary allocations for part 3; (iii) to provide more fnds for training and civil works; (iv) to shift funds from slow to fast moving components; (v) to remove SDR 2.78 million from PAPSCA to VAP; and (vi) to expand the IDA-funded orphans care component to Rukungiri District. VAP is continuing to be administered under agreements signed with DANIDA, SIDA, USAID, and the Dutch Government, and hence will not be evaluated during this mission. 3 13. Implementation Arrangements: The project was implemented through three Project Implementation Units and eight NGOs (together referred to as the Implementing Agencies) implementing it components in 24 districts.. The implementation record of most components has been satisfactory given the constraints discussed below and the trying conditions under which communities had to be mobilized. Implementation has been a learning process. Some components were not initiated until almost one year intu project implementation. Lack of construction materials and equipment during project start-up delayed the commencement of activities. Lack of timely disbursement and inability to advance funds from the Special Account to the implementing agencies for initiating activities further slowed down implementation. Other reasons for delays in implementation. include: Role of Implementing Agencies: The project design did not provide [As with autonomy or flexibility required for speedy implementation. * The agreements with Implementing Agencies were signed after commencement of project implementation and in some cases were signed almost a year into project implementation. SIDA-financed components were signed even later. * Implementing Agencies were dependent on the PCMU for procurement of essential materials and access to funds. Implementing Agencies corhplain that delay in timely receipt of materials and funds affected not only the pace of implementation but also their credibility with their beneficiaries. * Implementing Agencies were unfamiliar with Bank disbursement procedures and this led to further delays in replenishment of IDA funds. Training was provided only in 1992. * Implementing Agencies also felt that funds could not easily be allocated to other categories of expenditures without amendments to the DCA which took considerable effort and time. Centralized Procurement: The need to procure most construction materials through International Competitive Bidding resulted in delayed implementation which was not always consistent with the quick disbursement requirements of an emergency project. Also, a number of procurement contracts needed the approval of the Central Tender Board (CTB) and no-objec-.ons from IDA. Obtaining clearances from the CTB has sometimes taken almost a year, by which time the contract needed to be re-negotiated or re-tendered. Sometimes delayed procurement resulted in uneconomic procurement. In addition, PCMU had to obtain tax-exemptions for imported goods and materials which took considerable time. Another problem with centralized procurement was that Implementing Agencies received construction materials in bulk leading to logistical problems of delivery, storage and safe-guarding which were not addressed in project design or costs. Lack of Cosuterpar Fundr The lack of timely counterpart funds significantly affected project implementation. The Government provided no counterpart funds during the first year of project implementation and only 5% during the second year, leading to suspension of IDA disbursements during most of 1993. While Implementing Agencies with alternative sources of financing struggled through this period of project implementation, those entirely dependent on project funds were strapped for funds, and activities came to a complete halt. However, in 1994/95 provision of counterpart funds were satisfactory and outstanding commitments were fully met. 4 Transfer of US S 3 Million to Veteran's Assistance Program: The transfer of LS S3.0 million to the VAP program. in September 1992. had an impact on PCMU's obligations to its implementing agencies. SIDA-financed components were particularly affected. Reallocations among categories had to be made and the DCA amended to reflect the new reduced allocations. Additional Operational Costs: The extension of the closing date by one year increased operational costs of the project. Though the incremental costs of such extension Aere not estimated, the Government . guaranteed funds for such expenses. The Mission understands that the Government has allocated funds for the project and such funds will be made available to PCMU before March 31. 1996. Lack of Guidance for Implementing Agencies: The committee to be established by MLG (see para 10) and which was to be responsible, inter alia, for preparing and submitting annual implementation plans to IDA through the, PCMU was never established. The PAPSCA Steering Committee, responsible for the review of semi- annual work programs for the implementation of Part E of the project, did not operate after the first two years. 14. Project Management and Coordination. The PCMU was established to carry out overall planning. inter-sectoral coordination, and monitoring and evaluation of PAPSCA and the various components of the Project. However, the administrative and management requirements of the PCMU were under-estimated, resulting in lack of adequate staffing and inadequate skills in the PCMU. The PCMU was not operational until six months after credit effectiveness, when both the PAPSCA Coordinator and Program Officer were in place, even though the DCA required it to be "fully operational" before credit effectiveness. Most Implementing Agencies have generally expressed satisfaction at the general role played by the PCVU in supervision and monitoring after mid-term review when the PCMU was able to appoint additional staff and thus improve its performance. 15. During the second half of project implementation, as the PCMU gained experience and increased capacity. and as task management stabilized at the Bank. Implementing Agencies note that the PCMU conducted a number of workshops to encourage dialogue on working with communities, to harmonize monitoring and evaluation activities, and to strengthen the capacity of the Implementing Agencies in financial management. The following points are noted: * The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) made the PCMU accountable to a 'PAPSCA Steering Committee" to be set up before credit effectiveness. This Committee functioned only during the first two years of implementation. * The lack of consolidated financial management for the whole of the project prevented efficient and timely monitoring of the use of funds. * Projct monitoring indicators were not established as envisaged in the Staff Appraisal Report, and were established for each component, in 1993, with the support of additional staff.' 16. Community Partidcpation. Community (not just beneficiary) contribution and participation has been a key element in the implementation of all components and the implementation record indicates not only the potential, but also the actual advantages of such a strategy for poverty reduction activities. Government PIUs have provided positive feedback on their community-based programs, and are enthusiastic about the merits of such a strategy for poverty-reduction activities. However, they caution that capacity building is an important pre- requisite to effective and sustainable community involvement, and this is not consistent with an emergency project designed for speedy disbursements. or for a project with a three year time frame. Community contribution has also been higher than expected. particularly in the components involving infrastructure rehabilitation or construction. The exact cost to the communities is under calculation. 17. *The Mission members have individually or jointly visited all but three of the components under the project. While acknowledging that the visits to the districts were brief, and that the arrivities evaluated were few and selected by the respective Implementing Agencies the Mission would like to record that beneficiaries were positive in response to the achievements of PAPSCA. In general. beneficiaries expressed satisfaction at the overall outcome and seemed enthusiastic about their continued participation and contribution to the development activity. Cost recovery seems to have been accepted in health clinics and other infrastructure facilities where services are being provided. 18. NGO Participation. Collaboration between the Government, NGOs. and communities has also proved to be successful (Attachment IV and V). Involving NGOs in project implementation realized a number of benefits including: * greater likelihood of sustainability since the NGOs continue to operate and support communities; * strengthening the institutional capacity of NGOs; * encouraging dialogue between Government entities and NGOs; and * replication of the more successful mechanisms and activities by NGOs through other donor financing during the post-project period. 19. It is, however. noted that in some cases, the operational and administrative costs of the components have been fairly high (see Attachment VI). Implementing Agencies, however, state that the remote and scattered locations of activities as well as the time-consuming nature of mobilizing dispirited communities has increased the cost of implementation. Implementing . Agencies also point out that the costs are not high in relation to the unquantifiable benefits of community participation and increased sustainability of development intervention and also that the percentage of operational costs in relation to the total costs of the component would have been smaller had the project term been longer. 20. NGOs, in particular, have noted that lack of timely and promised funds has had an adverse impact on their activities. One, their credibility with the beneficiaries was affected when they did not perform as agreed due to lack of timely receipt of funds. Two, the failure to receive funds as agreed, adversely impacted the receipt of matching funds from other sources. 21. Bank Perfornmm Bank assistance during identification was satisfactory. However, given the complex institutional arrangements for project imolementation, the Government and . Implementing Agencies have expressed the opinion that Bank assistance during preparation and * supervision was not adequate, because: * the deficiencies in implementation arrangemonts were not identified and corrected in the initial years, perhaps due to the frequent changes in task managers; 6 * the Bank did not conduct a proper PAPSCA implementation launch to familiarize project staff to Bank procedural requirements. in particular as regards procurement and disbursement; * monitoring indicators for the project. as disclussed at appraisal. should have been established before credit effectiveness and supervised regularly; * some components in the more remote areas were never visited or supervised. Project Sustainability 22. Sustainability %as not a main concern in this three year emergency project. [ssues of sustainability were introduced during the mid-term review. Sustainability is. however. likely in a number of components because: * there has been considerable community participation in planning and implementing some of the components. in particular construction activities; * user fees have been instituted for health clinics, sanitation and water supply facilities; * NGOs are continuing to support communities with alternative financing; * increased capacity building has been undertaken at the grassroots level; and * additional linkages have been created between the beneficiaries and district administrations. 23. The micro-credit component was introduced in 1991 when SIDA funds became available. Sustainability as a credit activity is questionable since repayment rates have been generally low mainly due to disbursement pressure and, reportedly, a tendency to perceive PAPSCA funds as government subsidies. Financial Management Project Costs and Auditing. 24. The total project costs as of September 1995. are being finalized. The lack of a consolidated financial management for the whole of the project also impeded efficient and timely monitoring of the use of funds, and has resulted in a possible over-commitment of US S 1.3 million (Attachment VII).The Mission reiterated that except for the small amount remaining in the credit, the only sources of funding for the remaining commitments and outstanding obligations, could be the Government. the community or the local authorities. The Mission has requested the Government to examine whether this additional funding could be found from other donors or comparable IDA-funded projects to meet outstanding obligations. 25. The lack of funds is of particular importance in the Education Rehabilitation component where it is estimated that about 76% of the classrooms have been roofed but are without plastering, floors or thraiture (Attachment VIII). The Government has indicated that it is in the process of dialogue with the MOE and the district administrations in order to develop a plan and budget for completion of these activities. A similar problem exists in the financing of orphans fees in Rukungiri and Lirs districts. The Mission recommends that the Government explore mechanisms of support for an interim period until the components are able to achieve sustainability through programs that have been initiated since 1993. Almost 50% of the pupils in the Rukungiri district are reported to be orphans financed by the program, and the termination of the support program for orphans could have an adverse impact on the district educational system. 26. At mid-term review, the Bank recognized the systemic weakness in the financial management system and recommended that the PCMU be equipped with a proper accounting 7 e system and that a Financial Controller/ Adviser be appointed. An Assistant Program Manager (Accounts) was appointed after the mid-term review. which undoubtedly helped the situation: however, in retrospect it is felt that the responsibilities and the authority required for this post would have justified the recruitment of a qualified accountant. A study was undertaken to determine deficiencies in the accounting system. and although its recommendations were implemented, the deficiencies in the accounting system were not fully addressed. The inherent weakness also lay in the lack of accountability for IDA and other extemal funding, with the PlU in the MOE having the power to submit withdrawal applications for their own components. without referring to the PCMU. 27. Transfer of Arets The financing agreements signed between the PCMU and the Implementing Agencies includes provisions for dealing with assets generated under each component. The Government and the lmplementing Agencies are in the process of discussing the nature of the assets and the steps necessary to formalize the transfer. In the case of credit activities, PCMU will act according to the action plan stated in Attachment Two, including informing credit institutions of the need to assess the real value of outstanding loans. Lessons Learnt 28. A number of lessors have been learnt from the project which would be useful in designing future operations related to poverty alleviation: These include: (a) Government commitment to and ownership of the project and all its components is a key factor to effective implementation; (b) Complex projects like this must be prepared, appraised, and supervised by a multi-disciplinary team of experts and if this is not cost-effective, project design should be kept as simple as possible; (c) Invoiving NGOs and communities in the design and implementation of development interventions increases the sustainability of activities. PAPSCA- type initiatives must be part of poverty reduction interventions, provided: (i) all relevant stakeholders are involved in designing and implementing the project; (ii) implementation and institutional arrangements can be kept simple but efficient; and (iii) clear operational guidelines, including rules for procurement, disbursement, accounting and auditing, are prepared and finalized before credit effectiveiess. (d) Capacity building of communities and NGOs is essential, and often, may need to precede actual implementation; (e) In collaborative activities between Government, communities and NGOs, the share of administrative operational costs in relation to total project costs and the services to be rendered must be discussed and agreed; () " ex': possible. the continuous involvement of key staff throughout the _Al r :7 rNe pre4t cycle is very important for effective implementation; and 8 the Central Tender Board (CTB), at least for projects involving community participanon. (h) The Mission also understar.ds that CTB has the authority to exempt activities from its own procedural requirements. In preparing future projects with community participanon, the Mission reco mends that the Government bring in the CTB at an itial stage of project preparation to ensure adequate protection for use of public funds and then avail of this exemption. To enhance effective implementation, it is also important to bring in other peripheral participants - in this case, the Central Tender Board and the Excise Authorities - during project preparation to familianze them with project objectives and seek their assistance and support for effective unrplementation. Agreements 29 During the Mission it was agreed that: * the Government will take necessary steps for immediate payment of outstanding audit fees to ensure the timely production'of audited financial statements at September 30, 1995; * the Government will ensure all budgetary estimates for 19995/96 (UGSh 396 million) to cover obligations incurred by PAPSCA; * by November 30, 1995, the Government will provide the Bank with an action plan and budget by source for completiort of all schools initiated under the Primary Education Rehabilitation Component; * by November 30, 1995, the Government will provide a list of all outstanding payments and incurred obligations and identify priority payments to be made out of the balance remaining in the credit; * after receipt of the 1994-95 audited statements, the Government will advise the Bank whether a sum amounting to US S 302,000, paid by the Bank on or about May 10, 1994, pursuant to a withdrawal application submitted by the Government, under the Primary Education Rehabilitation Component, was for ineligible expenditures; * by December 31, 1995, the Government will provide the Bank with summarized financial statement of the project, pro formas of which have been provided to the PCMU; * by January 31, 1996, the PCMU will provide the Bank with the unit costs of constructing primary school classrooms under the different components in PAPSCA including the community input of local materials and labor, and * by January 31, 1996, the Government will account for all outstanding balances under the credit. 30. Upon return to Washington D.C., the mission will prepare a draft ICR for submission to the Government for comments by January 1., 1996, and for later submission to IDA by end of March, 1996. By January 31, 1996, the Government will provide the Bank with its own independent evaluation report. If the report is more than ten pages, the Government will include an executive summary, no longer than ten pages, which will be included, unedited, in the final ICR. 9 APPEIlX B ea miniStOF 34230AMinistry of Finance And TIO*e*hones" Miniaster Kampai 243054 & 232370 Economic Planning, Kampala 23470019 (10 Unes) P.O.Box 8147, Telax: e0 Kampala, Towgoram.: sFINSE Uganda. In any corapondence on ZD/C/IBRD/1/OmE,Rfimi IC OFUCANDA this subject please quote NO. 31st May 1996 Mr. Jack van Lutsenburg Maas Division chief Population and Human Resources Department Eastern Africa Department The World Bank 1818 H Street N.W. Washington D.C. 20433 Fax No. 202-473-8299 Dear Mr. van Lutsenburg Maas IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (ICR) FOR PAPSCA (CREDIT 2088-UG) With reference to your letter dated 26th February 1996 on the above subject, I regret the long delay in responding caused by the delays we have unfortunately experienced in the finalisation of the audit reports (July 3994-September 1995) and the consolidated accounts for the Project as a whole, which would provide answers to most of the issues raised in your letter. I am in receipt of the final ICR and I have noted with great interest the important lessons provided for Government and IDA by the experience under PAPSCA. I fully agree that thcee lessons should guide our future activities in preparing, designing and implementing projects of this nature. I am enclosing the PCU's lu page Cinal Project Evaluation Report for annexing to the .:CR. The staiiement of project costs will have to be inserted when we submit the audit reports and consolidated accounts and I expect that this will be possible within the next month. As regards financing the completion of PAPSCA initiated primary school classrooms in NURP project areas, I reiterate Government' s gratitude for IDA's offer and the priority put on this work under the new Sub-Project Component. A proposal for about US$1 mill. has already been submitted and Government is awaiting receipt of the amended DCA on NURP project, reflecting tho reallocation from the UPTC Component and the allocations to the different activities under the Sub-Project Component. I look forward to yoi.ur office's advice on this matter, as activities to firm up the i996/;7 iudget are quite advanced. 2 The issue of eligibility of an expenditure related to the payment in May 1994 to M/s Billion Corporation, for delivery of cement under the Education Rehabilitation Component, was put to the Solicitor General fcr his opinion and I am informed that this will be issued as soon as possible. In addition, the Education component's own audit yet to be completed will throw more light on the matter. I will follow up the issue of the audits and the case of eligibility of the 1994 payment to M/s Billion Corporation and inform you on progress as soon as possible. I take this opportunity to thank you and Ms. Gita Gopal for your interest and cooperation in ensuring smooth closure of this project. Yours sincerely .. KABSAM2 DIRECTOR(BUDGET c.c. The Resident Representative The World Bank KAMPALA The Permanent Secretary/Secretary to the Treasury Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning APPENDIX C IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA GOVERNMENT Programme to Alleviate Poverty and Social CosL% of Adjwent (PAPSC4) IDA Credit 2088-UG Executive Summary: Borrower's Proiect mplcmentation Assessment Introduction: I This 10-page cxecutivc summary presents the main conclusions of the Implementation Completion Report for PAPSCA produced by PAPSCA Coordination and Monitoring Unit (PCMU) and the PAPSCA Implementing Agencies. The full Implementation Completion Report consists of the final evalualion report prepared in September 1995, and covers activities up to the PAPSCA closing date of 30th September 1995; and a supplementary rcport which covered activities between Ist October 1995 and 31st March 1996, the PAPSCA completion date. The supplementary report benefitted from, and is based on, the findings and recommendations of the PAPSCA completion mission fielded by IDA from 15th - 31 st October 1995. The Project: 2. PAPSCA is a Uganda Governmnt project which was initiated in the aftermath of the 1987 Economic Recovery Programne. The project's overall objective was to mitigate the adverse impacts of the economic stabilization and structural adjustment measures on the vulnerabic groups. The medium term objective of the project was to strengthen Government's institutional capacity to identify, formulate and maintain interventions for promoting social development, and for assisting the country's most vulnerable groups during the process of adjustment and development. 3. The PAPSCA programme had two main components: (i) a social action type of intervention, consisting of projects designed to benofit targeted social groups such as children/orphans, women/widows, the urban and rural poor; and (ii) the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) component which in turn consisted of three sub-programmes: statistical surveys, policy studies, and institutional capacity building. PAPSCA Iolementation: 4. The implementation of PAPSCA was coordinated by the PAPSCA Coordination and Monitoring Unit (PCMU), an autonomous unit sct-up in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. PCMU's main functions were; disbursement of funds, procurement of goods and services, assisting the Implementing Agencies with budgeting and project planning, accounting for the use of funds, and monitoring and evaluating the impact of PAPSCA. The activities of PCMU were to be overseen and guided by an Inter-Ministerial Policy Steering Corniuee chaired by a senior official of the Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 5. Actual project implementation was entrusted to the Implementing Agencies which comprised of NGOs (both foreign and indigenous), Project Implementation Units (P11 Is) in line Ministries, LC system and the beneficiary communities. Several of the PAPSCA Projects benefitted from the services of external Consultants (see top page of the attached set of tables). Funding: 6. PAPSCA was funded from an IDA credit, Government counterpart funds, SIDA grant, contributions frai international NOOs, as well as in-kind contributions by the beneficiary communities. The following is the detail of the funding: IDA Credit USS 28.00 million SIDA grant US$ 3.00 million Government counterpart fund US$ 2.80 million Contribution by World Vision International USS 1.62 million Contribution by ActionAid Uganda USS 0.72 million Contribution by World Learning Inc. ISS 0.44 million Total USS 36.58 million 2 Fund Disbursement: 7. IDA Credit: The IDA agreement was signcd on 8th February 1990, and the credit became effectivc on 29th June 1990. The initial closing date for PAPSCA was 30th September 1994; but this was extended by one year to 30th September 1995, with a completion date of 31st March 1996. By completion date, a total of US$..... had been disbursed to PAPSCA, leaving an undisbursed balance of US$ ....... 8. SIA-Grant: The SIDA grant of Swedish Kronor 20 million, equivalent to USS3m. became effective in July 1991. However, disbursement did not commence until February 1992 because of the difficulty of identifying suitable NGOs to implement the SIDA funded projects, as well as delays in finalizing legal agreements governing the use of SIDA funds between Government and the NGOs. Once conmenced, disbursement progressed well until mid 1993 when SIDA diverted US$500,000 of the grant from PAPSCA to Uganda Veterans Assistance Programme. Had the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Swedish Kroner remained constant, the diversion would have left PAPSCA with USS2.5m. But the exchangc loss sustained by the Kroner left PAPSCA with only US$2,367,109. 9. Government Counterpart Fund: According to credit agreement, Government was to contribute an equivalent of 10% or USS2.8m. of the IDA credit of USS28m. By PAPSCA completion date, Government had contributed a total of USS3,806,653 in countcrpart fund for PAPSCA, i.e. slightly over US$1m. more than had been planned. 10. Community Contribution: The beneliciary communities were expected to, and actually did, contribute to the cost of implementing PAPSCA Projects. Their contributions consiste-d mainly of in-kind inputs such as locally available building materials, labour and transport. PAPSCA Implementing Agencies did not, howevcr, keep record of, or monetize, community contributions. During the PAPSCA completion mission of 15-31 October 1995, IDA and PCMU agreed to estimate the community contribution at 10% of the total project, which comes to about USS3.7m. 3 Achievement of Objectives: 11. The objectives of PAPSCA were by and large achieved to the extent that the designated target groups were reached and enabled to derive the intended benefit within the resource constraints. In several cases, such as Part A, Part C, Parts DI, D2 and D3 as wcli as the orphans care project in Rukungiri District, achievement was above satisfactory. The SDA component also performed well, judging by the number and quality of statistical surveys carried out, the number and range of policy studies done. and institutional support given. However, it is so far not evident that Government has taken serious note of the findings and recommendations of the various policy studies conducted by the Consultants. Perhaps Government would have associated itself better with these reports, and puid more attention to their recommendations if the unit responsible for the policy studies had been placed within the core Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, like the Survey component of the SDA was placed in the Statistics Department of the Ministry of Finane and Economic Planning. Part F, the PCMU, also performed reasonably well judging by the level of find disbursement and procurement of goods and services accomplished, the audited accounts and progress reports produced. Several other components, especially the SIDA-funded components had less than Satisactory performance due mainly to disruption of donor lund and failure to successfully establish revolving credit funds. A summary of performance of the various PAPSCA Projects, showing achievement in quantitative terms, is attached to this 10-page ICR summary. Major Factors Affecting the Proict 12. PAPSCA was a very complex programme in the sense that it involved operation in several diverse sectors such as school construction, water supply and sanitation, orphans care, hcalth, rural infrastructure and rural credit management It relied on the services of diverse Implementing Agencies such as foreign N0Ks, indigenous NGOs, Project Implementation Units in line Ministries, the LC system, and the beneficiary coMnunitics - all of which have different work method and management capacities. Another aspect of the programme complexity is in the source of funds and different methods of disbursement. In addition to donor linds (TDA credit and SIDA grant), PAPSCA also received funds from Government, international NGOs (World Vision International, ActionAid and World Learning Inc.), as well as in-kind contributions from the beneficiary communities. 4 13. Individual PAPSCA projects were not designed to the details necessary for quick and logical implementation. It was left to PCMil and individual Implementing Agencies to do detailed project planning and activity scheduling. The PCMII, did not have the necessary manpower; and some Implementing Agencies were not up to the requirements of these technical activities. 14. PAPSCA was not properly launched in the technical sense of an induction workshop in which all key role players arc initiated and primed in their respective roles. Because key staff in PCMIJ, Implementing Agencies and Government were not inducted in the fundamental tasks of fund disbursement, procurement of goods and services, and accounting for use of funds, they had to acquaint themselves with these complex issues through a prolonged process of learning by doing - a process which necessarily entailed loss of valuable implcmentation time. 15. PCMU was far too inadequately staffed for the complex range of activities expected of it. It was only two years after PAPSCA implementation started that PCMU was given additional technical staffto handle financial record keeping, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation. 16. The system of disbursing IDA credit to PAPSCA on an imprest basis, i.e. as a reimbursemcni (or expenditures previously incurred, was a major source of constraint for two reasons: one, because PCMIJ and most Implementing Agencies did not have own funds to spend initially on the basis of which IDA was to reimburse them; and two, many Implementing Agencies did not account for the funds used quickly and adequately - a fact which delayed reimbursement by IDA. For the first year ofPAPSCA operation, Government did not provide counterpart funds to initiate the imprest system- Although IDA went ahead and disbursed its credit to PAPSCA in the absence of matching Government counterpart funds. this laxity on the part of IDA plunged PAPSCA into a funding crisis in subsequent years since IDA was forced to suspend disbursement of funds to PAPSCA in mid-1993 until (iovernment's arrears were cleared. Another effect of the accumulated Government arrears was the enhanced fund recovery by IDA - which meant a reduced imprcst to PAPSCA, and therefore a greatly reduced level of project implementation activity. 5 17. The procurement procedures prescribed by IDA and I Jganda Government's Central Tender Board (CTB) were a major factor which adversely affected PAPSCA implementation. Several key inputs for PAPSCA implementation such as vehicles, cement and roofing iron sheets were subjected to the prolonged ICB procurement procedure. CTB on its part set a very low threshold figure for procurement without prior authority from the Board, thus making most procurement subject to CTB vetting. All these had the effect of holding up procurement and, therefore, PAPSCA implementation. The problem was eased by the introduction in 1992 of a PAPSCA Procurement Committee whose function was to carry out a preliminary evaluation of tenders before forwarding to Central Tcnder Board with recommendations. Membership of the Committee included officials from PCMU, CTB, Mimstry of Finance and Economic Planning and Office of the Solicitor General 18. Frequent changes of PAPSCA Task Management, and consequent inadequate supervision of the programme by IDA also affected PAPSCA's implementation. Assessment of the Performance of Key Role Plavers 19. Government: Government seems not to have had adequate time or resources to study the practical impacts of its 1987 Economic Recovery Programme and to credibly identify the social groups adversely affected by the programme for targeting by PAPSCA. A PAPSCA- type intervention should ideally be preceded by a careful survey and study of how structural adjustment measures affect various income groups and households. It is only from such a study that targeting beneficiaries becomes credible. 20. Government introduced PAPSCA at a time when it had a very tight budgetary constraint, and as a result, it failed to provide its counterpart funds for PAPSCA in the first fiscal year 1990/91. However. later on. Governrment's budgetary situation improved and this, together with a reprioritization of the Government projects into core and non-core projects (in which PAPSCA was designated a core project) enabled Government to fund PAPSCA adequately and according to the budget. 21. Initially, IDA credit was disbursed to PAPSCA through a special account held in, and managed jointly by. the Treasury and Bank of Uganda. Since this arrangement applied to 6 many other IDA-funded projects in Uganda, it was marked by a prolonged delay. In the middle of 1992, Government and IDA agreed to transfer project special accounts to commercial banks, and this, together with an easing of Government ftnd release to projects, considerably speeded up project activities. Further improvement was occasioned when Government and IDA introduced the practice of Uganda country programme implementation review whereby implementation bottlcnecks were reviewed annually and solutions to them found. 22. Government had created an inter-Ministerial Steering Counittee to guide PAPSCA implementation and to resolve inter-sectoral issues. However, Government did not enforce the role of this Committee, thereby leaving PCMU to operate with a high degree of autonomy. As was the case with IDA's Task Management of PAPSCA, supervision of PAPSCA by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was deficient because of frequent changes in the Ministry Departments and officials responsible for PAPSCA. Because of this frequent changes, officials in the Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning did not develop a full understanding of the complex issues and problems which PCMU and the Implementing Agencies confronted in the management of PAPSCA. 23. In order to speed up implementation pace, Government agreed to strengthen the PCMU through additional staffling in the critical activities of procurement, financial record keeping, and monitoring and evaluation. 24. The initial PAPSCA Programme as planned by Government envisaged a budget of US$108m., and a larger group of beneficiaries, including retrenched civil servants, the disabled, rural water supply, etc. In the end, however, only one third of the planned budget was realized, and several earmarked social groups including the retrenched and the disabled, were dropped. 25. LD By advancing PPF and also disbursing funds to PAPSCA in the first year even when Government failed to provide its counterpart fund, IDA greatly facilitated PAPSCA's start-up activities. 7 26. IDA also readily agreed to Government's request for amending PAPSCA credit in order to improve implementation. Six such requests were granted. IDA also collaborated with Government in order to transfer PAPSCA special account from Bank of Uganda to Conuiercial Banks, and in introducing Uganda Country Programme Implementation Review meetings which made it possible for implementation bottlenecks to be reviewed and cased. 27. Mid-way during PAPSCA implementation, IDA decided to use US$2.9m. of PAPSCA credit in order to fund the Veterans Assistance Programme, a project not initially part of PAPSCA. Had it not been for the exchange gain which made it possible for PAPSCA to draw rnore dollars against the fixed credit of SDR.22 million, this fund diversion would have had a crippling effect on IDA funded PAPSCA Projects. 28. IDA Disbursement Office appears not to have kept good record of disbursement to PAPSCA., a fact which caused IDA to advise PCMU in October 1995 that there were no more funds on Credit 2088-UG, when in fact shortly afterwards, a balance of SDR.328,000 was discovered to be still on the Credit. This finding caused a last minute scramble at PCMU to prepare withdrawal applications at a time when most Implementing Agencies had closed PAPSCA operations. Sustainability: 29. Sustainability of PAPSCA initiatives was introduced as an objective only at the PAPSCA mid-term review in September, 1993. In pursuit of this objective, the practice of user charge was introduced for health and sanitation facilities in Part C (Rubaga), Part D2 (Luwero), and part D3 (Masindi). Other actions to promote sustainability of initiatives included purchase of a cesspool emptier for Part C to be hired by City authorities and private people; and an unsuccessFul attempt to introduce a solid waste recycling project as an income generating component of the Keep Kampala City Clean project. 30. Apart from these deliberate attempts at sustainability, it should be noted that several PAPSCA initiatives have in-built potentials fbr sustainability. These include primary school classrooms which arc built ol' permanent materials; revolving credit funds which, if managed successfully, can expand and revolve among beneficiaries; urban water supply and sanitation 8 facilities which are built of permanent materials and are charging user fees; training of mature orphans in practical skills which enables them to sustain themselves; technical capacities created in line Ministries through SDA training and equipment; and skills and training imparted to craftsmen trained to build schools and rural infrastructure facilities in Part A (Kamuli) and Part B (Primary School Reconstruction in 12 Districts). Two international NGOs (World Vision International and World Learning Inc.) have agreed to continue implementing the PAPSCA initiated projects using their own funds, Similarly, local NGOs and the PiU in Kampala City Council have agreed to continue with the PAPSCA initiatives. Key Lessons Learned: 31. The following are the key lessons learned from the implementation of PAPSCA. 32. A programme to mitigate social costs of an economic policy should be preceded by a careful survey and analysis of the impacts of the policy on different elements of society. 33. Collaboration among Government, the donors and NGOs to implement anti-poverty programmes and projects in Uganda is not only possible, but is actually desirable because such collaboration promotes NGO fund mobilisation and creates implementation capacity in the rural areas where such capacity is usually lacking. Such a collaboration makes use of NGOs acclaimed capacity to mobilise the communities and to deliver services to them. 34. A community based programme such as PAPSCA, which is supposed to be quick implementing and to involve community participation, should not be subjected to the complicated and long-drawn disbursement and procurement procedures prcseribed by IDA and the Central Tender Board. 35. A unit like PCMU which is created to coordinate and monitor programme implementation should be adequately staffed. All key personnel in such a unit, and in collaborating NGOs, as well as in Government and IDA should he fully familiari7ed with Ibe ohjectives and work methods of the programme. It is indeed, very desirable that key personnel in the coordinating office be recruited early so that they are involved in the programme design at the planning, staff appraisal and credit negotiation stages. 9 36. The beneficiary coimunitics and the cooperating NGOs should be involved in conceiving and planning a PAPSCA-type of intervention in the implementation of which the beneficiary communities are expected to play a rok 37. Beneficiary communities are not averse to paying user fees provided the services they are paying for are readily available and of good quality. The user fee should not be so high as to be prohibitive for the poor. In view of this, it must be borne in mind that the user flee proceeds are normally not enough to nect the cost of running and maintaining a 13cality. Therefore, the state or donors must supplement the user lee if the facility is to be sustained. 38. In order 10r Government to associate itself with the findings and recommendations of policy studies undertaken by hired Consultants, and to use those recommendations as inputs into policy formulation, it is desirable that the unit managing the policy study and the study fund be placed within the control Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, instead of placing it in outside organisations like PCMU which operated more or less autonomously of the Ministry of Finance and Economic planning. J W Okune PAPSCA Coordinator Economic Policy Research Centre Makerere Campus P 0 Box 40178 Kampala, Uganda March, 1996 10 IBRD 21 751 긷 IMAGING Report No: 15726 Type: ICR