Niger - Economic Recovery Credit Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 15772 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER ECONOMIC RECOVERY CREDIT (Credit 2581-NIR) June 21, 1996 Country Operations Division West Central Africa Department Africa Regional This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfornance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = CFA franc (CFAF) US$1.00 = CFAF 500 (March 1996) CFA franc I million = US $ 2,000 SYSTEM OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURE Metric system FISCAL YEAR January 1-December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Central Bank) BCN Banque Commerciale du Niger BIC Imp6t sur les B3nefices Industriels et Commerciaux BIN Banque Islamique du Niger CNCA Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole ESAF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility ICTS Imp6t Cedulaire sur les Traitements et Salaires IGR Imp6t General sur les Revenus IRVM Impot sur les Revenus des Valeurs Mobilieres rUTS Impot Unifie sur les Traitements et Salaires NIGELEC Societe Nigerienne d'Electricite NIGETIP Public Works and Employment Project ONPPC Office National des Produits Pharmaceutiques PESAP Public Enterprise Sector Adjustment Program PFP Policy Framework Paper SAL Structural Adjustment Program UEMOA Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union)  FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Evaluation Summary ........................................................... i PART I: PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .............. .................. I Introduction ............................................................. I Economic Background . ............................................................ 1 Devaluation and the Econonic Recovery Credit ............................. .................. 2 A. EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES ................................... .......................... 3 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES .......................................7.....................7 C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT .........................9 D. SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS . ............................................................ 10 E. BANK PERFORMANCE ............................................................ 10 F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE ...........................1................................. 1 G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME ............................................................. 1 H. FUTURE OPERATIONS ............................................................ 11 1. KEY LESSONS LEARNED ................... ......................................... 12 PART 11: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessment .14 Table 2: Related Bank Credits .15 Table 3: Project Timetable .15 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual .16 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation 16 Table 10: Status of Lgal Covenants .18 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs .19 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions .19 APPENDICES: Appendix A: Mission Aide-Memoire Appendix B: Borrower's Evaluation Appendix C: Reform Matrix This docuLment has a restricted distribuuon and may bc used by recipients ordy in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed widhout World Bank authorization. 1   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER ECONOMIC RECOVERY CREDIT CREDIT 2581-NIR Preface This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Economic Recovery Credit (ERC) in Niger, for which Credit 2581-NIR in the amount of SDR 18.2 million equivalent was approved on March 17, 1994 and made effective on March 25, 1994. The Credit was closed on June 30, 1995, the original closing date. This was a one- tranche operation which was fully disbursed on February 21, 1995. The special account was fully recovered on April 28, 1995. The ICR was prepared by Mr. Mbida-Essama, Consultant, under the supervision of Mr. Amadou Cisse (AF4CO), Task Manager, and reviewed by Mr. Franz Kaps, Operations Advisor (AF4DR). Preparation of the ICR was begun during the Bank's completion mission, April 1 to 12, 1996. The Aide-Memoire of this mission is provided in Appendix A. The ICR is based on material in the project file, including the Memorandum of the President, the Statement of Economic and Social Policies, supervision reports and related documents. The Borrower commented and prepared its own evaluation, an English summary of which is attached as Appendix B. The full report is available in Africa Files.  a  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER ECONOMIC RECOVERY CREDIT CREDIT 2581-NIR Evaluation Summary Introduction 1. Since the early 1980s, the Bank, in collaboration with the [MF and other donors, has helped the Government implement a series of adjustment programs. These programs were aimed at improving economic and financial management by: (i) reinforcing controls on public expenditures; (ii) improving the revenue collection system; (iii) restructuring the public service sector; (iv) inducing economic growth by improving the incentives framework for the private sector; (v) improving the resource allocation process; (vi) improving policies for the management of human and physical resources; and (vii) improving the quality and implementation of the public investment program. 2. The Economic Recovery Credit is a continuation of such Bank's assistance. It is an emergency effort to help the Government through the immediate trauma of the devaluation of the CFA franc on January 12, 1994. It is disbursed in one single tranche subsequent to the devaluation and untied to any other action, albeit associated with several important measures/actions, many of which are carry-overs of previous adjustment programs. Statement and Evaluation of Objectives and Design 3. The emergency financial support had two-pronged objectives: (i) to provide immediate relief to the Government to mitigate the negative social effects of the devaluation and forestall further deterioration of the economy; and (ii) to help leverage efforts to continue to deepen ongoing macro-economic dialogue and the reforms efforts started under the last ESAF (many of which would go beyond the ERC period), and lay the foundation for the next adjustment program at an opportune time. Specific objectives and/or measures of the ERC addressed issues related to overall macro-economic management, public finance, revenue and taxation, wage policy, trade and price policy, monetary and financial policy, public investment, public enterprises, the promotion of the private sector, and a selected number of social measures. 4. The Government's ability to consolidate the early gains from the devaluation and maintain its financial and economic program required immediate availability of budgetary support and a refocussing of its priorities as reflected in the "Statement of Economic and Social Policy". The credit judiciously did not have any heavy conditionalities that could have delayed disbursements and provided for a one tranche disbursement. Finally, the  ii objectives adequately reflected the transitional nature of the program which had to fit within a wider framework of future assistance to Niger to help it widen and deepen its reforms while consolidating the gains already made. 5. However, the scope of the objectives, the measures required to achieve them and the timeframe provided may have been unrealistic in some respects given the known institutional weaknesses of the Niger public administration and specially in the context of an uncertain and unstable political context of change and transition. Achievement of Objectives 6. As discussed below, the objectives of the ERC have been achieved. In particular, the main objective of the devaluation was to restore extemal competitiveness, which required that the expected initial surge in inflation would be brought under control effectively within a few months. This was achieved and the conditions for the long run sustainability of gains in external competitiveness seem assured. Other specific reforms were intended to reinforce the Government's commitment to the ongoing adjustment process by providing immediate relief to mitigate the negative social effects of the devaluation, and help leverage efforts to deepen the reform program. With the resumption of donor support, the Government has almost doubled the investment share of GDP focusing on human resource development and private sector led growth, thus affording the country with the first increase in per capita incomes since 1988. Factors Affecting the Program Factors not generally subject to Government control 7. The credit was implemented during a period of political transition characterized by the emergence of active political parties, pressure and interest groups bent on counterbalancing the weight of the Government and requiring coalition-building skills to arrive at consensual decisions. This created an environment of high political instability and gridlock which was hostile to the introduction of far-reaching social reforms. The decision making process became very slow and inoperative and was beyond the Government's control. 8. Finally, the weight of the informal sector in the economy and the impact of neighboring Nigeria and its currency on the local economy also had a major impact on the implementation of the program and its results. Factors generally subject to Government control 9. The implementation of the ERC program was also substantially influenced by factors which were essentially within Government control, and amongst these were: (i) weak political commitment to reforms as evidenced by the fact that sufficient logistical and administrative support was not provided to the agencies involved such as the tax  111 directorate, the customs directorate and the treasury; (ii) the inadequate and ill-defined coordination and follow-up mechanism considering that the program dealt with many agencies, many sectors and a wide geographical area; (iii) the delays experienced in appointing competent staff in certain key positions (customs, taxes and treasury) when there was no major constraint to doing so. Sustainability of Results 10. The implementation of the ERC-supported reforms has in many respects laid or reinforced the foundations for the further deepening and expansion of structural adjustment programs. With the devaluation, the long run sustainability of gains in extemal competitiveness seem assured. In view of the results scored by the additional specific objectives of the ERC, sustainability may have more to do with the consolidation and expansion of the reforms than with the results themselves. The sustainability of the reforms will depend on: (i) a clear definition, targeting, scheduling and sequencing of the reforms taking into account the institutional and implementation capacity of the Government to carry out the program and the characteristics of the overall socio-political environment; (ii) the provision of adequate institutional strengthening measures to help implement the reforms with a particular emphasis on planning, programming and public resource management; (iii) continued support from external partners for the design and implementation not only of adjustment programs but also of operations or investments in priority sectors; (iv) the taking into account of the Nigeria/Naira factor; and (v) strong political commitment from the Government. Bank Performance 11. The Bank acted with exceptional speed to process the ERC in a way consistent with the requirements of the need to provide immediate assistance to Niger. Such speed was permitted by the advance preparation of the credit done in conjunction with the preparation of the CFA franc devaluation. The Bank coordinated its work well with the Government and other donors to insure a coherent and convergent approach for all. Bank supervision of the ERC was good and carried out within the context of the necessity to prepare future adjustment programs. With hindsight however, the inclusion of a technical assistance in program design, could have further improved program performance with respect to the determination of the incremental manpower, logistics, and administrative needs to strengthen tax revenue collection. Borrower Performance 12. The borrower performed well under the program. The Government worked diligently with the Bank and the Fund to put together a credible program in record time. It tried to implement the program under very hostile and difficult circumstances. To that extent, it may have underestimated the risks to be faced by the reform program and allowed for a too optimistic implementation timetable. The Government also failed to ensure that the coordination and follow-up agreed upon with its partners is made effective.  iv This led to a dispersion of efforts and sometimes to poor coherence and resulted in minimal impact. The Government did not display an adequate political commitment to the reform process. This may have reduced its capacity to influence political debate and consensus building at the National Assembly. Finally, the Government was slow in putting competent personnel in key positions when necessary and this fact seriously delayed effective implementation of the revenue and tax collection measures of the prograrn. Assessment of Outcome 13. Based on the Bank's ex-post evaluation norms, the ERC is classified as "satisfactory". Most objectives of the ERC have been achieved, albeit with delays in some cases. In many of such instances however, corrective steps have been taken to put the reform program on a sounder path and results are being obtained. A good groundwork has therefore been laid to support the reforms to come. The chief reasons for the satisfactory performance include: (i) the program succeeded in reviving the investment program through heightened donor support that addressed the large requirements in social infrastructure; this, in conjunction with above average rainfalls, yielded a higher than expected economic growth and positive growth in per capita incomes for the first time since 1988; (ii) the program succeeded in dampening inflation, and eventually in restoring price stability following the devaluation; (iii) substantial progress was made in the area of education, and to a lesser extent in health; (iv) following the initial administrative controls, the price regime has been liberalized quickly in the aftermath of the devaluation. The main reason for some of the partial results was the inability to build coalitions that put the Government and the reform process at the mercy of emerging pressure groups. Future Operations 14. The continuation and deepening of reforms are fundamental in order to achieve economic stabilization and to promote an environment conducive to growth, sustainable economic development and poverty alleviation. The main thrust of future reform programs has been defined in the 1996-98 PFP and would include: (i) institutional development and capacity building; (ii) more efficient resource mobilization and management; (iii) more rational public investment planning, programming and implementation; (iv) the promotion of the private sector; and (v) strong and adequate support for the development of the social sectors. 15. The instruments that can be used are adjustment and reform programs supported by the Bank, the IMF and other donors; they should also include institutional development schemes; public service reform assistance; social sector investment programs; and the creation of a good environment for the private sector. Key Lessons Learned 16. Keeping in mind that this was a special operation under special circumstances brought about by the devaluation of the CFA franc, the overall positive performance  v scored by this credit was largely due to the simplicity of its design. Additionally, some of the key lessons that can be drawn from the implementation of the ERC-supported program are: (i) One tranche operations in general, and ERCs in particular, are best to address concrete upfront policy decisions, and are less adequate vehicles for structural reforms requiring extended implementation periods. This is all the more so in environments like Niger where there exist long run reforms carried over from past operations; (ii) The design of a reform program under conditions of political uncertainty and instability requiring a high degree of consensus building should include provisions for a meaningful communications effort to promote a better understanding of the need and rationale for reforms by the different political, interests and pressure groups that have to be won over and to ensure a greater assimilation and ownership within the administration. (iii) The setting of reform objectives and the timetable for their implementation must be realistic and take into account the risks inherent in a pluralistic political situation where coalition- building and consensual decision making are the name of the game.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER ECONOMIC RECOVERY CREDIT CREDIT 2581-NIR PART I: PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT Introduction Economic Background 1. Since the collapse of uranium prices in the early 1980s, Niger's economic performance has continued to be unsatisfactory despite the adoption of a number of adjustment programs supported by the international donor community. During the second half of the 1970s, Niger's traditional dependence on subsistence agriculture shifted to uranium as highly favorable market conditions led to a dramatic increase in uranium export earnings. As a result, the modem sector grew to a dominant position through the creation of many public enterprises and the rapid expansion of the civil service. The increased revenues were also used to support an extensive public investment program in infrastructure and construction projects to the detriment of agriculture. At the same time, recurrent expenditures favored personnel and transfer payments, neglecting existing infrastructure and basic public services. 2. The sharp decline in uranium prices in 1981 and the failure of the Government to curb public spending led to rapidly increasing balance of payments and budget deficits as well as debt servicing problems as the structural weaknesses of the uranium-led boom came to the fore. Faced with this deteriorating situation, the Government implemented a series of adjustment programs with the support of the IMF, the World Bank and other donors beginning in 1983. 3. The adjustment programs implemented by the Government aimed at improving economic and financial management by: (i) reinforcing controls on public expenditures; (ii) improving the revenue collection system; (iii) restructuring the public service sector; (iv) inducing economic growth by improving the incentives framework for the private sector; (v) improving the resource allocation process; (vi) improving policies for the management of human and physical resources; and (vii) improving the quality and implementation of the public investment program. 4. Despite all these efforts, little progress was made and in fact the situation continued to deteriorate. Over the 1985-92 period, real GDP growth remained very low at an estimated average of 0.25 percent per year while per capita income has declined by 3.4 percent per year since 1980. In 1992 and 1993, the situation continued to deteriorate and substantial domestic and external payment arrears accumulated while fiscal imbalances continued. The current budget deficit increased from 3.0 percent of GDP in 1991 to 3.9  2 percent in 1992 and 4.2 percent in 1993. In 1992, tax revenues decreased to a level hardly sufficient to cover the civil wage bill and in 1993, civil service wages reached to four months of arrears. Further arrears accumulated with respect to consumption of public utilities and government agencies. External debt servicing fell to a minimum, and the counterpart funds towards foreign-financed projects declined, a major contributing factor to excessively low levels of public investment. The balance of payments current account deficit, excluding official transfers, remained at 7.5 percent of GDP as in the previous two years. 5. Factors that have contributed to the overall worsening situation are both external and internal. External factors include the continuous decline in uranium prices, worsening terms of trade, droughts and the effects of adjustment policies in Nigeria within the context of cross-border trade between the two countries. Internal factors include inefficient economic management, low savings and investment ratios, and the lack of appropriate incentives for the development of the formal private sector which has been gradually decreasing in importance to the benefit of the informal sector. In addition, the dramatic change in the political situation and the long transition period until the installation of a democratically-elected government in April 1993 was a major cause of the derailment of the adjustment program. 6. The Government has attempted to curb the deterioration in fiscal balances via internal adjustment measures, notably a 13 percent wage cut in September 1993. However, it became increasingly obvious that the extent of appreciation of the real exchange rate and its adverse consequences had become so serious that these measures alone could not improve the competitiveness of Niger's economy and restore its financial viability. A major policy change was therefore necessary. Devaluation and the ERC 7. The Government of Niger, jointly with the other members of the CFA zone, decided to strengthen its adjustment strategy by changing, as of January 12, 1994, the parity of the CFA franc from 50 to 100 CFA franc per FF. With this currency realignment, a new macro-economic program was adopted to improve competitiveness and bring the country to a path of sustainable growth. The 1994-96 adjustment program aimed at: (i) achieving a real GDP growth rate of 3.9 percent in 1994 and 4.2 percent over the next two years; (ii) rehabilitating public finances and achieving primary surpluses in the Government budget; (iii) substantially increasing the investment-to-GDP ratio; (iv) sustaining the improvement in extemal competitiveness through resuming structural and sectoral reforms, and a return to low inflation after the initial transitional period; and (v) reducing poverty and reorienting public expenditures priorities in favor of human resource development. 8. The ERC was conceived as an emergency effort to help the Government through the immediate trauma of the devaluation of the CFA franc. It was disbursed in a single tranche subsequent to the devaluation and untied to any other action, albeit accompanied  3 by several important measures/actions, many of which are carry-overs of previous adjustment programs. It was part of a donors' concerted action that included a 12-month SDR 18.956 million stand-by arrangement approved by the IMff on March 4, 1994. Finally, it was designed to complement on-going social sector assistance provided by the European Comnmunity and some bilateral donors such as the French Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC). A. EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 9. The emergency financial support had two-pronged objectives: (i) to provide immediate relief to the Government to mitigate the negative social effects of the devaluation and forestall further deterioration of the economy; and (ii) to help leverage efforts to continue to deepen ongoing macro-economic dialogue and the reform efforts started under the last Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) (many of which would go beyond the ERC period), and lay the foundation for the next adjustment program at an opportune time. Specific objectives and/or measures of the ERC were to: (a) Macro-economic goals: (i) achieve a real GDP growth rate of 3.9 percent in 1994, to be increased to 4.2 percent the following years; (ii) limit inflation to some 37 percent in 1994, 7 percent the following year and less than 3 percent by 1996; (iii) limit the worsening of the current account deficit of the balance of payments to 16 percent of GDP in 1994 (from 7.5 percent in 1993) and reduce it to 12 percent by 1996; and (iv) increase investment from 5.7 percent of GDP in 1993 to 15.5 percent in 1996. (b) Public Finance: (i) adopt a revised 1994 budget in agreement with the IiMF; (ii) adopt a revised system of public accounts; (iii) limit the current budgetary deficit, on a commitment basis and excluding grants, to CFA franc 48.4 billion (5.7 percent of GDP) in 1994, to be reduced to 2.7 percent the following year; (iv) limit the overall fiscal deficit (excluding grants) to 9.0 percent of GDP (CFA franc 77 billion) in 1994 before reducing it to 6 percent in 1995; (v) eliminate external arrears estimated at CFA franc 102 billion (new parity) at end-December 1993 by the end of 1994; (vi) make a cash settlement of domestic arrears for CFA franc 17.5 billion (out of an identified stock of CFA franc 35 billion) while the remaining arrears were to be settled through issuance of government securities; and (vii) establish an inventory of all arrears at end- 1993 and proceed with their formal regularization. (c) Revenue and Taxation: increase overall budget revenues from CFA franc 47.6 billion in 1993 to CFA franc 76.5 billion in 1994 through a series of measures including: (i) the regular payment of mining royalties; (ii) the advance payment of BIC (business income tax) and. IRVM (securities income tax), and dividends by Uranium companies; (iii) the unification of the VAT at 17 percent; (iv) the in:.roduction of the VAT to public utilities (water, electricity, transportation); (v) the use of numbered tickets with printed price for road toll; (vi) the introduction of automobile stickers; (vii) the strengthening of tax audits; (viii) the definition of tax collectors and collection targets; (ix) the strengthening of collection of tax arrears; (x) the passing of collections code in parliament; (xi) the merging  4 of the Imp6t General sur les Revenus (IGR) and the Imp6t Celulaire sur les Traitements et Salaires (ICTS), simplification of rates; (xii) a significant reduction in BIC exemptions (Investment Code); (xiii) a stricter application of profit tax to the informal sector; (xiv) the strengthening of desk tax audits; and (xv) the levying of property tax on all homeowners. (d) Wage Policy: (i) limit the civil wage bill to CFA franc 44.3 billion in 1994 while slightly increasing civil service size from 38,738 to 39,080 by end-1994 and raising salaries by a maximum of 10 percent of their September 1993 level after March 31, 1994; (ii) limit overall scholarship amounts to CFA franc 4.8 billion; and (iii) establish a rigorous student selection process. (e) Price Policies: (i) maintain lower taxes on gas-oil and no taxes on kerosene for a three-month period; (ii) freeze water and electricity rates until mid-April 1994 and readjust them thereafter taking into account increases in import costs and sector restructuring measures; and (iii) maintain free agricultural producer pricing. (f) Trade policy: (i) double the minimum administrative values; (ii) cut cumulative taxes and duties on essential and intermediate goods by 50 percent; (iii) introduce transitional clauses for imports paid for before the parity change; (iv) eliminate ad hoc exemptions except those related to projects, diplomatic privileges and special conventions; and (v) introduce a comprehensive tariff reform. (g) Monetary and Financial Policy: (i) complete the closing and liquidation of the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA); (ii) speed up the restructuring of the Banque Islamique du Niger (BIN), the Meridien-BIAO, and the Banque Conmuerciale du Niger (BCN); (iii) increase money supply in 1994 by 24 percent; (iv) increase net bank credit to Government by 11 percent in 1994; (v) increase credit to the economy by 30 percent during 1994; and (vi) maintain outstanding central bank advances to the Government within the statutory ceiling (20 percent of last registered fiscal revenues) in 1994. (h) Public Investment: (i) take measures to strengthen the planning, programming and implementation of public investment; and (ii) reactivate the three-year rolling public investment program. Specific measures to be implemented included a systematic budgeting of the requirements for counterpart funds for the project and programs launched with assistance from external donors and of foreign debt arrears; a close follow- up of procurement procedures; an increase in the investment budget from CFA franc 27 to 70 billion; and higher level of investment budget execution. (i) Public Enterprises: (i) make an inventory of the cross debts of the public sector and a timetable to clear them by end-April 1994; (ii) conduct independent audits for NIGELEC (electricity), ONPPC (pharmaceuticaib,, SONIDEP (petroleum), and CNSS (social security); (iii) liquidate COPRO-NIGER (distribution); and (iv) implement the reforms of the uranium sector and NIGELEC in accordance with agreed timetable.  5 (j) Promotion of the Private Sector: (i) eliminate Government monopoly on hiring; and (ii) revise the labor code. (k) Accompanying Social Measures: in addition or concurrently with (e) and (i) above: (i) eliminate tariffs on rice and sugar for three months and set total taxation at 10 percent thereafter; (ii) eventually take steps to supply markets with essential goods (cereal, sugar, cooking oil) at subsidized prices; (iii) substantially increase in real terms appropriations for non-salary expenditures in education and health in the revised 1994 budget; (iv) insure adequate supply of free essential drugs in public health facilities and improve the supply of low cost generic drugs in private pharmacies; (v) provide allocation in the 1994 revised budget of CFA franc 10 billion for the foregoing social measures; (vi) put in place special programs targeting the poorest social groups with the assistance of NGOs and donors, including IDA; and (vii) increase on-going labor intensive programs with the assistance of IDA and other donors. 10. The objectives of the ERC were well defined and reflected the needs of the Niger economy within the context of previous reform programs and shortly after the devaluation. The program was prepared by the Government in close coordination with its partners, most specifically the World Bank and the IMF. The Government's ability to consolidate the early gains from the devaluation and respect its financial and economic program required immediate availability of budgetary support and a refocussing of its priorities as reflected in the "Statement of Economic and Social Policy". Finally, the objectives adequately reflected the transitional nature of the program which had to fit within a wider framework of future assistance to Niger to help it widen and deepen its reforms while consolidating the gains already made. The objectives were consistent with the need to: (i) pass-through the benefits of the devaluation to the rural producers; (ii) reduce absorption by the Government, adjust taxation and external tariffs and limit wage increases; (iii) address the political and social dimensions of the realignment strategy; and (iv) accelerate the structural reforms necessary to support the supply response. 11. However, in hindsight, the scope of both the objectives, the measures required to achieve them and the timeframe provided appear to have been unrealistic in some respects given the institutional weaknesses of the Niger public administration and in particular in the context of an uncertain and unstable political context of change and transition. About 60 specific measures or goals were to be undertaken, completed or achieved in 1994, about 40 percent of which immediately, i.e. within 30 days of effectiveness of the credit and the balance in the course of the year, as summarized in Table 1 below.  6 Table 1: Summary of Goals and Measures Area Number Immediate During 1994 1.Macro-economic 4 0 4 2. Public Finance 7 1 6 3. Revenue/taxation 15 10 5 4. Wage Policy 3 1 2 5. Price Policy 3 1 2 6.Trade Policy 5 5 0 7. Monetary Policy 6 0 6 8.PIP 2 1 1 9. Public Enterprises 4 1 3 10. Private Sector 2 0 2 11. Social Measures 7 3 4 TOTAL 58 23 35 Source: President's Report. ICR Mission 12. Although a number of these measures (about a dozen or so) had reportedly been undertaken, the effective implementation of most of them was by no means assured and proved problematic later, a reflection of institutional weaknesses, weak political will or unstable political environment. 13. Some measures such as the advance payments of taxes and dividends by uranium companies have raised legal and regulatory issues that are still unresolved. 14. Finally, three points need to be underlined. The first is that a coordination and follow-up mechanism was clcarly agreed upon but not included in either the policy statement or the credit documents. This informal set-up was subsequently lost on the administration and reduced the effectiveness of the program. The second point is that the Government may have interpreted the lack of conditionalities and the one-tranche disbursement provision as an indication of the inevitability of donor assistance to reward the devaluation. This may have had a dampening impact on their determination or commitment to undertake meaningful reforms despite the clear link of the ERC to future adjustment programs and continued external assistance. 15. The third point is that practical considerations such as incremental staff, office space and supplies, transportation and current expenditure needs necessary to implement some of the reform measures seem to have been overlooked. For instance, no provisions seem to have been made in the budget or otherwise for the intensification and expansion of tax collection efforts beyond Niamey to other cities whose contribution to fiscal revenues has traditionally been weak and below their recognized potential. Likewise, the need and time to train tax inspectors or collectors on the realities of a unified and simplified tax rate, and to educate the taxpayers accordingly seems not to have been explicitly recognized or accounted for. This has led to considerable delays in tax collection. Another illustration is the fact that the need for the restructuring of the pharmaceutical parastatal ONPPC as a  7 prerequisite for the successful importation of generic drugs on the scale projected seems not to have been realized. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 16. As discussed below, the objectives of the ERC have been achieved. In particular, the main objective of the devaluation was to restore external competitiveness, which required that the expected initial surge in inflation would be brought under control effectively within a few months. This was achieved and the conditions for the long run sustainability of gains in external competitiveness seem assured. Other specific reforms were intended to reinforce the government's commitment to the ongoing adjustment process by providing immediate relief to mitigate the negative social effects of the devaluation, and help leverage efforts to deepen the reform program. With the resumption of donor support, the government has almost doubled the investment share of GDP focusing on human resource development and private sector led growth, thus affording the country with the first increase in per capita incomes since 1988. 17. Macro-Economic Policy. All macro-economic goals were met: GDP surpassed the growth target of 3.9 percent (4.0 percent) in 1994 owing to a good rainy season and a good supply response to export needs of products like niebe, onions and livestock. Gross domestic investment rose to 10.4 percent of GDP from 5.7 percent in 1993. The current account deficit was 13.6 percent of GDP against a target of approximately 16 percent. On an annual average basis, inflation stood at 36 percent, i.e., lower than the projected 37 percent. 18. Public Finance. Public finance objectives have been partially met. The revision of the 1994 budget and the adoption of a revised system of public accounts were implemented on schedule. Other targets were either partially met, or not at all. The current 1994 budget deficit excluding grants was 6.4 percent of GDP, slightly above the projected 5.7 percent. By contrast, the overall fiscal deficit slipped at 12.5 percent of GDP as against the projected 9 percent. Approximately 65 percent of external arrears were eliminated, however, the bulk of non-wage internal arrears was left untouched; and the inventories of all arrears was completed with delay and a formal mechanism to clear them has just begun at credit closure. However, a process of negotiations with various lenders has been initiated and agreements have been reached with BADEA and Algeria. Unfortunately, the Government has not lived up to its part of these agreements and the process may have to start afresh. 19. Revenue and Taxation. Fifteen measures were to be implemented, of which ten immediately and the rest during the year or within twelve months. Three of the proposed measures were achieved within the deadline: the unification of the VAT as of January 1st, 1995; the passing of the collections code by the parliament; and the definition of the collectors and collection targets. Two measures have still not been taken: the advance payment of taxes and dividends by uranium companies and the tax exemptions under the  8 investment code. All the other measures were carried out with delays varying from a few months to more than a year; some of them were also achieved only partially. 20. Wage Policy. Overall, objectives is this category were unmet: the wage bill exceeded the target by CFA franc 3.1 billion (47.4 versus 44.3) or 7 percent, and scholarship payments reached CFA franc 5.5 billion, 0.7 billion or 15 percent over their ceiling. Finally student eligibility criteria were defined, but seem unlikely to be followed. 21. Price Policy. The price policy measures were adopted within the planned timeframe. 22. Trade Policy. All the trade policy measures were adopted except for the elimination of ad-hoc tariff exceptions. The comprehensive tariff reform was introduced in September 1994. 23. Monetary and Financial Policy. The liquidation of CNCA was effectively carried out. The restructuring of the commercial banks has met with delays: BIAO-Meridien was restructured one year later than planned and the Banque Islamique du Niger and the Banque Commerciale du Niger are still being restructured. Money supply increased by only 6.7 percent compared to the 25 percent planned. Net bank credit to the Government increased by 12.9 percent against a target of 11 percent. Credit to the economy increased by only 10 percent compared to the 30 percent target and advances by the Central Bank to the Government represented 27 percent instead of the statutory 20 percent of fiscal revenues. 24. Public Investment Program (PIP). The three year rolling PIP was prepared as required, and some of the measures aimed at strengthening the institutional setting for the planning, programming and implementation of the PIP were taken. With a larger volume of projects once again eligible for inclusion in the PIP because of the progress attained in eliminating some of the external arrears, the investment rate almost doubled in one year at 10.4 percent of GDP, even though the budget was about 48.8 percent executed in 1994. Stricter selection criteria for projects were adopted for the 1995 budget which was subsequently executed at 76.1 percent. 25. Public Enterprises. Most of the measures on public enterprises were either partially achieved or carried out with delays varying from a few months to more than one year. An inventory of the debts of only 17 out of 60 companies was made, however, they were the most important ones. Independent audits were carried out on time for two companies and with a one-to-two year delay for the other two. The liquidation of COPRO-NIGER was not completed as planned in 1994, but started in January 1995. Finally, the reforms of both the uranium vector and NIGELEC are still underway. 26. Promotion of the Private Sector. The labor code has still not been revised and Government monopoly on hiring has not been eliminated.  9 27. Accompanying Social Measures. Most of the proposed seven social measures were partially implemented. The elimination of tariffs on rice and sugar for three months, and the labor intensive programs, were carried out in a satisfactory fashion. The kerosene and gas oil program was not implemented. Three measures were partially executed: the provision of essential goods at subsidized prices; the supply of essential free drugs; and the appropriation of CFA franc 10 billion in the revised 1994 budget to support the social measures (only about CFA franc 2.6 billion was allocated). Finally, appropriations for non-salary expenditures in education and health moderately increased in real terms in the revised 1994 budget. C. FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROGRAM Factors not generally subject to Government control 28. The credit was implemented during a period of political transition characterized by the emergence of active political parties, pressure and interest groups bent on counterbalancing the weight of the Government and requiring coalition-building skills to arrive at consensual decisions. This created an environment of high political instability and gridlock which was hostile to the introduction of far-reaching social reforms. The decision-making process became very slow and inoperative and was beyond the Government's control. 29. The need to build coalitions in the National Assembly sometimes led the Government to appoint officials, without the required experience or background, to key Government positions just because they were members of the parties willing to support its programs. These officials contributed to a further weakening of the effective operation of the administration. 30. Finally, the weight of the informal sector in the economy and the impact of neighboring Nigeria and its currency on the local economy was also a major factor that affected the implementation of the program and its results. Factors generally subject to Government control 31. The implementation of the ERC was also substantially influenced by factors which were essentially within the Government's control and among these were: (i) weak political conmmitment to reforms as evidenced by the fact that sufficient logistical and administrative support was not provided to the agencies involved such as the tax directorate, the customs directorate and the treasury; (ii) the inadequate and ill-defined coordination and follow-up mechanism considering that the program dealt with many agencies, many sectors and a wide geographical area; (iii) the delays experienced in appointing competent staff in certain key positions (customs, taxes and treasury) when there was no major constraint to doing so; (iv) the inadequate management of the CFA franc 10 billion provided for in the Financial Operations of the Central Government (TOFE) but not satisfactorily appropriated in the revised 1994 budget. This led to  10 dispersion of efforts and inefficient management of the social measures; and (v) the inability to complete the inventory of public enterprise debts because of the lack of cooperation of some agencies. D. SUSTAINABILITY OF RESULTS 32. The implementation of the ERC-supported reforms has in many respects laid or reinforced the foundations for the further deepening and expansion of structural adjustment programs. In view of the generally partial achievements of the ERC, sustainability may have more to do with the consolidation and expansion of the reforms than with the results themselves. The sustainability of the reforms will depend on: (i) a clear definition, targeting, scheduling and sequencing of the reforms taking into account the institutional and implementation capacity of the Government to carry out the program and the characteristics of the overall socio-political environment; (ii) the provision of adequate institutional strengthening measures to help implement the reforms with a particular emphasis on planning, programmning and public resource management; (iii) continued support from extemal partners for the design and implementation not only of adjustment programs but also of operations or investments in priority sectors; (iv) the taking into account of the Nigeria/Naira factor; and (v) strong political commitment from the Government. E. BANK PERFORMANCE 33. The Bank acted with exceptional speed to process the ERC in a manner consistent vith the requirements of the need to provide immediate assistance to Niger. It coordinated its work well with the Govermment and other donors to ensure a coherent and convergent approach for all However, its efforts to provide effective institutional development assistance to Niger were seriously hampered by the failure of the 1990 ESAF. This assistance would have helped better achieve the objectives of the ERC. The hostile attitude towards adjustment that prevailed throughout the transition period made matters even more unwieldy. It may have been helpful to take more account of some of these factors in determining the design, objectives, and implementation timetable of the reform program. 34. Bank supervision of the ERC was good and carried out within the context of the necessity to look forward to, and prepare future adjustment programs. Close coordination with the other donors was carried out in an efficient manner. With hindsight however, the inclusion of a technical assistance in program design, could have helped program performance with respect to the determination of the incremental manpower, logistics, and administrative needs to strengthen tax revenue collections. This is a direct consequence of a program hurriedly designed.  11 F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 35. The Government worked diligently with the Bank and the Fund to put together a credible program in record time. It tried to implement the program under very hostile and difficult circumstances. To that extent, it may have underestimated the risks to be faced by the reform program and allowed for a too optimistic implementation timetable. The Government also failed to ensure that the coordination and follow-up agreed upon with its partners would be effective. This led to a dispersion of efforts and sometimes to poor coherence and resulted in minimal impact. The Government did not display an adequate political commitment to the reform process. This may have reduced its capacity to influence political debate and consensus building at the National Assembly. Finally, the Government was slow in putting competent personnel in key positions when necessary and this fact seriously delayed effective implementation of the revenue and tax collection measures of the program. G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 36. As discussed below, the objectives of the ERC have been achieved. In particular, the main objective of the devaluation was to restore external competitiveness, which required that the expected initial surge in inflation would be brought under control effectively within a few months. This was achieved and the conditions for the long run sustainability of gains in external competitiveness seem assured. Other specific reforms were intended to reinforce the Government's commitment to the ongoing adjustment process by providing immediate relief to mitigate the negative social effects of the devaluation, and help leverage efforts to deepen the reform program. With the resumption of donor support, the Government has almost doubled the investment share of GDP focusing on human resource development and private sector led growth, thus affording the country with the first increase in per capita incomes since 1988. H. FUTURE OPERATIONS 37. The continuation and deepening of reforms are fundamental in order to achieve economic stabilization and to promote an environment conducive to growth, sustainable economic development and poverty alleviation. The main thrust of future reform programs has been defined in the 1996-98 PFP and would include: (i) institutional development and capacity building; (ii) more efficient resource mobilization and management; (iii) more rational public investment planning, programming and implementation; (iv) the promotion of the private sector; and (v) strong and adequate support for the development of the social sectors. 38. The instruments that can be used are adjustment and reform programs supported by the Bank, the IMF and other donors; they should also include institutional development schemes; public service reform assistance; social sector investment programs; and the creation of a good environment for the private sector.  12 I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 39. Keeping in mind that this was a special operation under special circumstances brought about by the devaluation of the CFA franc, the overall positive performance scored by this credit was largely due to the simplicity of its design. Additionally, some of the key lessons that can be drawn from the implementation of the ERC-supported program are: (a) One tranche operations in general, and ERCs in particular, are best to address concrete upfront policy decisions, and are less adequate vehicles for structural reforms requiring extended implementation periods. This is even more the case in situations where there exists an important continuing reform agenda carried over from past operations (such as in Niger). The assessment of ERCs in such cases would require that the credit be judged on its own merit, rather than being clouded by the progress of otherwise long term continuing reforms; (b) The design of a reform program under conditions of political uncertainty and instability requiring a high degree of consensus building should include provisions for a meaningful communications effort to promote a better understanding of the need and rational for reforms by the different political, interest and pressure groups that have to be won over and to ensure greater assimilation and ownership within the administration. (c) The setting of reform objectives and the timetable for their implementation must be realistic and take into account the risks inherent in a pluralistic political situation where coalition-building and consensual decision making are the name of the game. In addition, the officials at all levels of government who ultimately bear the responsibility for introducing and implementing the reforms must be involved in their design and the determination of the implementation timetable and the administrative requirements that the program entails. (d) In the final analysis, the success of a reform program and its effective implementation depend to a large extent on the political will and unequivocal commitment of the Government to undertake reforms, the existing institutional capacity to implement the reforms, a realistic design of the program taking into account local absorptive capacity, and an adequate awareness of the stakeholders of the need for reforms. All these factors should be reflected in the project design.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER ECONOMIC RECOVERY CREDIT CREDIT 2581-NIR PART H: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessment ................... ............................... 14 Table 2: Related Bank Credits .................................................. 15 Table 3: Project Timetable .................................................. 15 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual ............ ......... 16 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation ............................................ 16 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants ... ................................................ 18 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs .............................. .................... 19 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions ....................... ........................... 19  14 Table 1: Summary of Assessments 4A.AchievementofObectives Substantial Partial Ne _i iec le Macro Policies X Financial Objectives X Institutional Development X Physical Objectives X Poverty Reduction X Gender Issues x Other Social Objectives X Environmental Objectives X Public Sector Management X Private Sector Development X | B. Proejct Sustainabiliq Likel Unlikely Uncertain x C. Bank Performance _HighlySatisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification X Preparation Assistance X Appraisal X Supervision X D. BorrowerPerformance Hi hi Satisfacto Satisfactor Deficient Preparation X Implementation X Covenant Compliance X E.Asesmet f utoe ig!ySaisacorStifato UsaisaXo  15 Table 2: Related Bank Credits Credit Title Purpose Year of Status __ Approval Preceding Operations 1. SAL I To introduce reforms aimed at 1986 Closed improving basic macro-economic management 2. PESAP To restructure the public enterprise 1987 Closed sector Following Operations 1. Human Resources To restructure and improve human 1994 On-going Secal resource development and management 2. SAL II To continue supporting public sector N/A Under management (civil service and PE preparation. reform, improved public investment), Not yet . and support private sector development a2praised. Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Actual Date Initial Discussions with IDA January 10-14, 1994 January 10-14, 1994 Appraisal Mission January 17-25, 1994 January 1994 Negotiations February 28, 1994 February 28, 1994 Board Presentation March 17, 1994 March 17, 1994 Effectiveness March 31, 1994 March 25, 1994 Credit Closing June 30, 1995 June 30, 1995  16 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ million) _ _ _ _:__ _ _ _ _ _ _ FY94 Appraisal Estimate 25 Actual 25.8 Actual as % of estimate 103.2 Date of final disbursement 4/28/95 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation 1. Macro-economic data Objective for 1994 ActuallEstimate GDP Real Growth (%/o) 3.9 % 4.0 % Inflation 37 % 36 % Current Account Deficit (% of 16 % 24.4 % GDP) Investment (% of GDP) From 5.7 in 1993 tol5.5 % in 10.4 % 1996 2. Public Finance CFAF Bn % of GDP CFAF Bn % of GDP Current Budget Deficit 48.4 5.7% 55.5 6.4% (Excluding Grants) Overall Fiscal Deficit 77 9 % 108.9 12.5% (Excluding Grants) I I Reduction in External Arrears CFAF 102 Billion CFAF 65 Billion Cash Settlement of Internal CFAF 17.5 Billion Not Available but believed to Arrears be negligible Other Settlement of Intemal CFAF 17.5 Billion Not Available but believed to Arrears be negligible 3. Revenue and Tax CFAF Bn %ofGDP CFAF Bn % ofGDP Fiscal Revenues 76.5 9% 46.6 5.4% 4. Wage Bill CFAF 44.3 Billion CFAF 47.4 Billion 5. Strength of Civil Service 39,080 civil servants 40,761 civil servants 6. Scholarships CFAF 4.8 Billion CFAF 5.5 Billion 7.Monetary and Financial Policy Increase in Money Supply 25% 6.7% Increase in Net Bank Credit 11% 12.9% to Government Increase in Credit to Economy 30% 10% Central Bank Advances to 20% 27% Government (Statutory limit of 20% of fiscal revenues) Sources: Bank, IMF staff estimates; PFR, Central Bank; TOFE.  17 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Implementation NOT APPLICABLE Table 7: Studies Included in Project NOT APPLICABLE Table 8A: Project Costs NOT APPLICABLE Table 8B: Project Financing NOT APPLICABLE Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits NOT APPLICABLE  Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Credit Covenant Present Orinl Revised Description of Covenant Comments Agreemst Type Status Fufiflment Fulfillment Section ._.__Date Date 3.03 (a) Financial C The Borrower shall mnaintain or cause to be maintained records and accounts adequate to reflect in accordance with consistently mnaintained sound accounting practices the expenditures financed out of the proceeds of the Credit. 3.03 (b) (i) Accounts/ NC The Borrower shall have the records and accounts referred to in paragraph Auditing finn has been Audits (a) of this Section, including those for the Special Account for each fiscal selected. Audit in year audited, in accordance with appropriate auditing principles progress. consistently applied, by independent auditors acceptable to the Association. 3.03 (b)(ii) Financial N.C. The Borrower shall furnish to the Association as soon as available, but in Report to be provided any case not later than four months after the end of such year, a certified after audit has been copy of the report of such audit by said auditors, of such scope and in such carried out detail as the Association shall have reasonably requested, and 3.03(bXiii) Financial N.C. The Borrower shall furnish the Association such other inforonation concerning said records and accounts and the audit thereof as the Association shall from time to time reasonably request. Go 3.03 (c) Financial For all expenditures with respect to which withdrawals from the Credit Account were made on the basis of statements of expenditure, the Boffower shall: 3.03(cXi) Accounts C maintain or cause to be maintaied, I accordance with paragraph (a) of I_________ _________ this Section, records and accounts reflecting such expenditures; 3.03(cxii) Accounts NYD) retain at least one year aftcr the Association has received the audit report Records expected to be for the fiscal year in which the last withdrawal from the Credit Account raintained as required. was made, all records (contracts, orders, invoices, bills, receipts and other ________ _______ ________ documents) evidencing such expenditures; 3.030(c)(iu) Accounts NC enable the Association's representatives to examine such records; and Expected to be complied with 3.03(cXiv) Accounts NC ensure that such records and accounts are included in the annual audits Complied expected referred to in paragraph (b) of this Section and that the report of such audit despite the delay contains separate opinion by said auditors as to whether the statements of experienced. expenditure submitted during such fiscal year, together with the procedures and internal controls involved in their preparation, can be __________ _________ __________ __________ relied upon to support the related withdrawals. ______lte_w__drwas C: CoMlied witb NC: Not Complied witl; NYD: Not yet Due  19 Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements NOT APPLICABLE Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of Planned Revised Actual Project Cycle Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$ 1. Through Appraisal 0 0 0 0 2.7 9,300 (preparation, pre- appraisal, appraisal) 2.Appraisal-Board 0 0 0 0 0 0 3. Board- 0 0 0 0 0 0 Effectiveness 4. Supervision 0 0 0 0 9 16,200 5. Completion 8 7,600 13 19,000 8.1 31,800 TOTAL 8 7 7,600 13 19,000 19.8 57,300 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions Stage of Month/ Number Days Specialized Performance Rating Types of Project Cycle Year of in Staff skills Problems Persons Field Represented status Objectives Preparation & Jan. 3 8 2 Economists Appraisal 1994 1 Country ___________ _____ ______ ~O fficer _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Appraisal-Board Board- Effectiveness Supervision I Nov 1 12 Econornist 10-22, 1994 Supervision II May 1 10 Economist Unsatifactory Unsatisfactory Project 3-13, Manag. 1995 Perform. Supervision III Sept 1 8 Economist 17-25, 1995 Completion April 2 11 Consultant 1-12, Economist ____ ___ ___ ___ 1996   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF NIGER ECONOMIC RECOVERY CREDIT CREDIT 2581-NIR APPENDICES Appendix A: Mission Aide-Memoire Appendix B: Borrower's Evaluation Appendix C: Reform Matrix   APPENDIX A REPU-BLIQU ;E DU NTGER `ISSION D'ACHEVENLENT (I-12 AVR[L 1996) CREDIT D'APLPI A LA RELANCE ECONOLMIQLE (C,ARE) AIDE-.VENIOCRE Lr nrroduction I. Une mission de la Banque LMvfondiale composee de \.f Bonaventure \IBIDA-ESSAMA (Consultant er chef de mission) et \Mf. Ide GNA;NDOJU (Economiste a la .'Mission R-sidente de la Banque LMondiale) a rravaille au Yiger du ter au 12 Avril en vue de la preparation du Rapport d'Achevement du Cr.dit d'Appui l la Relance =conomlque (CARE). La mission voudrair remercier les autronrzes nigeriennes ainsi que les rer esentanrs des bailleurs de fonds pour ia franche collaboration, I'assistance et 1'accuetl chaleureux qu el[e a rectis. Le present Aide-M&.rmoire presente les conclusions ore iminaires de la mission qui seront conrirmees car la direction de la Banque 4vfondiale. Obieztifs de la Mlission Le pnnc;pai objecnf du rapporr d'achevemnent (ou de ['evaluation .rroscectlvej est daopprecier dans quelle rnesure les reformes conom:ques er rIsT:rurtonneiles insc;-ires au CAIRE ont _re mises en oeuvre er si ces reformes se sont . velees perunentes pour resoudre les problemres qut avaient ete identities. Dans c- conrexre. Ies Objeczi s spec.riTues de [a mission -raienr de: (i) dere.rminer si les pr.nc;paux volets du CARE correspondaient aux conditions econorniaues, soc:ales et. ;rsziLrurzonnelles cui prevalaienr au momenr de sa are-ararion: (ii) faire 'e poinr sur les ,mesures de rer'ores -r'fectivernent pnses er appliquees et c [les aui n'ont pas ere prises ou _ont la mise en oeuvre a _!e carrielle: (iii) comparer Ies resultats obtenus aux resultars -scompires (iv) evaluer le r6ie et 1'efficac1re de la Bancue \.londiale dans la conception cu CARE et le suivi de son execution ainsi que le r6le er ['drficacire de [a pamde migerienne dans la detinicion des politiques macro-economiques -t secaonelles. leur -xecun