Guinea - Livestock Sector Rehabilitation Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 16143 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA LIVESTOCK SECTOR REHABILITATION PROJECT (Credit 1725-GUI) November 19, 1996 Country Department 16 Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfornance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Guinean Franc (GF) US$ 1.00 - 360 GF (at negotiations, March 1985) US$ 1.00 - 1,000 GF (at closing, December, 1995) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER January 1 - December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS APILEC Mineral Licks for Cattle Atelier (Atelier de piere a lecher) BADEA Banque Arabe pour le Developpement Economique en Afrique (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa) CAR Central African Republic CAVET Veterinary Input Supply Center (Centrale d'Approvisionnement Veterinaire) CBPP Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia CCCE Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (now CFD) CFD Caisse fran,aise de Developpement (French development aid agency, formerly CCCE) DNE National Livestock Directorate (Direction Nationale de l'Elevage) ENCOBE State Cattle Marketing Agency (Entreprise de Commercialisation du B3etail) ERR Economic Rate of Return FAC Fond d'Aide et de Cooperation (French Ministry of Cooperation) ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association PPF Project Preparation Facility PSA Agricultural Services Project (Projet de Services Agricoles) SAR Staff Appraisal Report SPRA Regional Livestock Directorate (Service Prefectoral des Ressources Animales) Vice President Jean Louis Sarbib Director : Mamadou Dia Division Chief/Manager: Jean Paul Chausse Staff Member : Noel Chabeuf (Sr. Livestock Specialist)  - 111 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA LIVESTOCK SECTOR REHABILITATION PROJECT (Credit 1725-GUI) Table of Contents Page P reface ................................................................................................................................i Evaluation Summary ............. ii PART 1: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .I A. Introduction .I B. Project Objectives .I C. Achievement of Objectives .3 D. Major Factors Affecting the Project .4 E. Project Sustainability .5 F. Bank Performance ...................5 G. Borrower Performance .6 H. Assessment of Outcome .7 I. Future Operation .8 J. Key Lessons Learned .8 PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES ............................. to10 Table 1: Summary of Assessments ............................. 10 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits ..............................11 Table 3: Project Timetable ............................. 12 Table 4: Loan/Credit Disbursements ............................. 13 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation ................................................... .... 13 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation................................. ............................ 14 Table 7A: Studies Included in Project ....... .................................................................. 15 Table 7B: Other Related Studies ........................................................................ 16 Table 8A: Project Costs ........................................................................ 17 Table 8B: Project Financing ........................................................................ 17 Table 9A: Economic Costs and Benefits ........................................................................ 18 Table 9B: Economic Costs and Benefits ........................................................................ 20 Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants ........................................................................ 21 Table I1: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements .............................................. 23 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ........................................................................ 24 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions ........................................................................ 25 Table 14: Project's Financial Execution ........................................................................ 27 APPENDICES: Appendix A: Mission's Aide-M6moire ........................................ ................................ 28 Appendix B: Borrower contribution to the ICR ................................................................... 31 Map - IBRD 18990R T| is document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their l |orxcial duties. Its contents may not otherAise be disclosed wiLhout World Bank authorization. l  I  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA LIVESTOCK SECTOR REHABILITATION PROJECT (Credit 1725 GUI) Preface This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Livestock Sector Rehabilitation Project (LSRP) for which IDA Credit 1725-GUI in the amount of SDR 8.5 million (US$9.8 million equivalent) was approved on July 8, 1986 and made effective on July 7, 1987. The original closing date of December 31, 1992 was extended three times to December 31, 1995. The Credit was fully disbursed and the final disbursement took place on May 22, 1996. The ICR was prepared by Mr. P. Bono (Consultant) with the support of Mr. Noel Chabeuf, Task Manager, and reviewed by Messrs. Jean Paul Chausse, Technical Manager, Africa Region Agricultural Group 11 and Cornelis de Haan, Livestock Advisor, Agriculture and Forestry Systems Division, Agriculture and Natural Resources Department. The ICR is based on material in the project files and the findings of the Bank's final supervision/completion mission to Guinea. The Borrower's representatives, particularly the Director and staff of the National Livestock Directorate, worked very closely with the mission providing information and views that are reflected in the mission's Aide Memoire in Appendix A. The Borrower contributed to the ICR by providing its own evaluation of the Project's execution, which is included in Appendix B. The ICR was sent to the project's co-financiers for comments, but none were received.  I I  - ii - IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA LIVESTOCK SECTOR REHABILITATION PROJECT (Credit 1725-GUI) EVALUATION SUMMARY Credit Number: Cr. 1725-GUI Credit Amount: SDR 8.5 million (US$9.8 million equivalent) Beneficiary: Ministry of Rural Development Co-financiers: Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE), Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC), and Banque Arabe pour le Developpement Economique en Afrique (BADEA) Date effective: July 7, 1987 Date closed: December 31, 1995 Introduction 1. The Livestock Sector Rehabilitation Project (LSRP) was prepared at the request of the new Government that took office in Guinea in 1984. The lessons learned from the cancellation of the Livestock Development Project (Credit 1063 GUI, approved in September 1980 and canceled three years later) were incorporated in the LSRP. IDA's involvement in the LSRP was seen as essential in helping the Government implement its new economic strategy and contributing to growth in an economy undergoing restructuring. The Government's new policy direction and changes were in line with IDA's recommendations as elaborated in the Agricultural Sector Review.I Poor animal health is the main constraint to livestock productivity and growth on which about 160,000 families or 30% of Guinea's rural population depend. Under the previous Government, the livestock sector suffered discrimination and harassment; 10% of the herd had to be sold at a fixed, below market, price through the State Cattle Marketing Agency, ENCOBE. Many herders emigrated and others hid their animals in forests to avoid taxation and forced sale to ENCOBE. Project Objectives 2. The major objectives of the LSRP were to increase the productivity of cattle herds and improve the living standards of cattle-herding families. Three basic components were included in the project: Report No. GUI-4627, 1984.  - iii - (a) support for the privatization of the livestock service through the establishment of herders' associations; creation of the Veterinary Input Supply Center (CAVET; Centrale d'Approvisionnement Veterinaire) for the production, purchase, and distribution and sale of livestock inputs; and the provision of a pilot credit component to establish private veterinarians, animal production farms, herders' associations, and a system for the distribution of livestock inputs; (b) strengthening of a reduced public National Livestock Directorate (DNE) by constructing or renovating the central livestock department and network of 33 field offices, laboratories, training centers, and purchasing of vehicles; and (c) provision of technical assistance (TA) and training. 3. ~ Total project costs were estimated at US$22.2 million; cofinancing was provided by the Banque Arabe pour le Developpement Economique en Afrique (BADEA) for US$4.5 million, Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE, now Caisse Francaise de Developpement) for US$3.8 million, and Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC) for US$1.4 million. 4. The objectives were pragmatic, clear, and well-adapted to the prevailing conditions in the country, i.e., ineffective Government services, poor operational budgets, and inadequate infrastructure. Herders were not organized and were basically distrustful of the Government since they had been continuously harassed by the previous regime. Inputs were generally scarce and of poor quality. Before the LSRP was started, the cattle marketing monopoly of ENCOBE was abolished and prices were liberalized. During implementation of the LSRP, staff of DNE was reduced by two-thirds to 600 and a relevant training program was carried out at all levels. The LSRP was demanding for the implementation agency, although it was not overly complex since the different components were interrelated. The only risks that might have affected the project's success were resistance to implementation of the DNE staff- reduction program and herders willingness to participate in the LSRP. Neither of these risks proved to be a serious threat as project management was able to cope with them successfully. DNE was the implementing agency. Implementation Experience and Results 5. The most important achievement was the creation of 240 herders' associations and the training of more than 1,000 veterinary auxiliaries, the majority whom belong to herders' families. The construction program at DNE, as well as the purchase of vehicles and an intensive staff training program, contributed to building an efficient team both at headquarters and in the field. Efforts were made to privatize the veterinary profession and establish the parastatal CAVET and an Atelier for Mineral Licks (APILEC; Atelier de Piere A Lecher). However, these institutional-building components did not achieve their objectives and the institutions are soon to be privatized. An important achievement was the restoration of trust between the herder community and the Government. This trust was instrumental in the return of a large number of herders who had fled the country during the tenure of the previous regime. More than 600,000 head of cattle are estimated to have returned to Guinea as a result of the new Government's liberalization policy.  - iv- 6. The project was positively affected by the Government's steady commitment to its objectives and the exemplary relationship maintained between the Borrower and co- financiers. Joint supervision missions were systematically carried out and the LSRP evolved into a national sectoral "umbrella" program with the participation of a number of donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 7. The project, however, suffered some serious setbacks because of delays in the provision of counterpart funds. At one stage, this problem posed serious consequences for the vaccination program. Other obstacles to implementation included bureaucratic procedures and the excessive time required for approval of essential legislation. Implementation delays were also caused by setbacks in the construction program. The closing date had to be extended three times to accommodate an expanded program for the organization of herders' associations. 8. The in-depth dialogue between the Bank and the Government before project preparation, which led to the identification of key problems, such as cattle marketing and DNE's excessive bureaucracy, was particularly useful in paving the way toward smooth implementation. Two Project Preparation Facility (PPF) allocations helped in designing buildings and purchasing vaccines as part of start-up activities, and in carrying out the selection of DNE staff. Bank performance at appraisal, considering the serious problems it had to face, was satisfactory. The financial package was appropriate and the amount adequate. The credit component suffered from the beginning due to the lack of a credible institution to carry out this component. The Project's initial disbursement period was also unrealistically short. 9. The Government in general and the Ministry of Agriculture in particular followed the recommendations made of the supervision missions. However, DNE was powerless to change some of the procedures that affected disbursements, such as the availability of counterpart funds. It had also, at one stage, problems with the timely delivery of some audits. The implementing agency complied with the major Credit covenants. It made good use of technical assistance and applied most of the studies' recommendations. 10. Overall, the LSRP was successful in achieving its objectives. The outcome is likely to be sustainable because of Government's commitment to the Project's objectives, and because the basis for financial autonomy is being established with herders paying partially or fully for cattle vaccinations and other services. Cattle drenching is now fully paid for by their owners. The herders' associations are well on the way to becoming financially autonomous. 11. Actual project costs were US$24.6 million, as against US$22.2 million estimated. The difference can be explained by higher than estimated operating costs, training and equipment purchases. Actual project financing by IDA was US$11.45 million (US$1.65 million more than estimated, primarily because of the depreciation of the US$); CCCE US$3.8 million (same as estimated); BADEA US$4.75 million (US$0.25 million more than estimated); FAC US$1.3 million (US$0.1 million less than estimated); and Government US$3.3 million (US$0.7 million more than estimated). Summary of Findings, Future Operations, and Key Lessons Learned 12. Project outcome was satisfactory; its physical, institutional, and economic objectives were achieved despite the difficulties encountered at the beginning. The macroeconomic changes introduced by the new regime were instrumental in opening up a  v - dialogue between the herders and DNE. The training program helped promote a better understanding of the problems affecting the livestock sector and gave a certain measure of independence to carry some of the animal health program, such as vaccinations, drenching, and animal disease prevention. Technical assistance was an essential element in the success of the LSRP; the transfer of experience from the Central African Republic (CAR) in organizing the herders' associations is a good example. 13. Future project operations will concentrate on completing divestment of commercially viable productive activities and services from the Government to herders associations and private veterinarians and on developing other professional organizations of herders, butchers, poultry and pig producers, and livestock traders and constructing small abattoirs and village cattle and poultry markets. Finally, DNE's normative functions will be strengthened by designing sectoral policies, epidemiological surveillance, data collection, and analysis. 14. The most important lessons leamed from the LSRP are the following: (a) an appropriate macroeconomic framework is essential to achieving success; (b) sound project identification and preparation are helpful in recognizing the major difficulties likely to be encountered during implementation; (c) the frequency and regularity of supervision missions and their composition, as in the LSRP, of technical specialists and representatives of Co-financiers contributed significantly to successful project implementation; (d) a full and frank dialogue between the Bank and the Government, particularly in respect of DNE, was constructive and helped to obtain successful project outcomes; (e) training can play a key role in upgrading skills, as it did in this case for both the DNE and herders; (f) the mid-term review can be very helpful in making midcourse changes during implementation, as it did in the LSRP to reorient some project components, particularly those related to the herders' associations and the emphasis on animal husbandry and nutrition; the successful turnaround of relations between the herders and livestock services is a major accomplishment of the LSRP and also a major factor in the likely sustainability of the Project's achievements; and (g) the problem that will require particular attention in the future is the timely availability of counterpart funding; without a proper solution to this bottleneck, successful project implementation will be difficult.  I IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA LIVESTOCK SECTOR REHABILITATION PROJECT (Cr. 1725-GUI) PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. Introduction 1. The Livestock Sector Rehabilitation Project (LSRP) was prepared at the request of the new Government that took office in Guinea in 1984. The lessons learned from the cancellation of the Livestock Development Project (Credit 1063 GUI, approved in September 1980 and canceled three years later) were incorporated in the LSRP. The involvement of the International Development Association (IDA) in this project was seen as essential in helping the Government implement its new economic strategy and contributing to growth in an economy undergoing restructuring. The Government's new policy direction and changes were in line with IDA's recommendations as elaborated in the Agricultural Sector Review. Poor animal health was the main constraint to livestock productivity and growth on which about 160,000 families or 30 percent of Guinea's rural population depended. Under the previous Government, the livestock sector suffered discrimination and harassment; 10 percent of the herd had to be sold at a fixed, below market price through the State Cattle Marketing Agency (ENCOBE). Many herders emigrated to neighboring countries, while others hid their animals in forests to avoid taxation and forced sale. B. Project Objectives 2. The major objectives of the LSRP were to increase the productivity of cattle herds and improve the living standards of cattle-herding families. Greater productivity of cattle herds was to be achieved through simple measures such as vaccinations against common cattle diseases, provision of medicines and mineral licks, and upgrading of livestock husbandry and veterinary support services. The project was to help create an environment conducive to the privatization of livestock services and provision of inputs. 3. The project included three basic components: (a) Support for the privatization of livestock service through the establishment of 45 herders' associations to enable them to employ their own agents for simple animal health treatments and sale of livestock inputs. On average, each association would include 2 Report No. GUI-4627, 1984.  2 about 700 herders, owning about 7,000 cattle and 4,000 sheep and goats; and support was to be provided to them for an initial supply of livestock inputs and through the creation of the a Veterinary Input Supply Center (CAVET; Centrale d'Approvisionnement Veterinaire), at Conakry, for the production, purchase, distribution, and sale of livestock inputs. Since private sector interest in marketing livestock inputs was limited at the start of the LSRP, the Government was mainly responsible for the operations of CAVET, but it was expected that the herders' associations especially would begin to participate as soon as CAVET became an attractive operation. A small pilot credit component was included for the establishment of private veterinarians, animal production farms, herders' associations, and distribution of livestock inputs; (b) Strengthening of a reduced public livestock service by renovating and constructing facilities at the central National Livestock Directorate (DNE; Direction Nationale de l'Elevage), including a diagnostic laboratory, 22 Prefectoral Livestock Services (SPEs; Service Prefectoral de I'Elevage) field offices and training centers, and provision of equipment, vehicles, and basic materials to DNE, SPEs, and 320 Livestock Posts (PE; Poste d'Elevage) for the annual national vaccination campaigns against common cattle diseases; and (c) Technical assistance (TA), which included 19 staff years of internationally recruited resident specialists and about 39 months of short-term consultants to assist in project implementation, carry out studies, and prepare a possible follow-up project. The training sub-component included the establishment of a training center in Labe with a capacity for 40 trainees to attend refresher courses and to provide training for about 240 staff and livestock agents appointed by the herder's associations. Fellowships for external training was to be provided for high-level staff of the National Directorate of Livestock (DNE). The most important components were the upgrading of livestock services (US$4.5 million), technical assistance (US$4.0 million), livestock inputs (US$2.4 million), and training (US$2.3 million). Total project costs were estimated at US$22.2 million; cofinancing was provided by the Banque Arabe pour le Developpement Economique en Afrique (BADEA) for US$4.5 million, Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE, now Caisse Fran,aise de Developpement) for US$3.8 million, and Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC) for US$1.4 million; the Government for US$2.6 million; and the beneficiaries for US$100,000. 4. Although one of Government's objectives was to increase the availability of animal products, principally meat and milk for the urban population, other important goals were to improve the monetary income of herders by increasing the offtake rate and to protect the national herd against major animal diseases. An earlier project with the same objectives (Livestock Development Project, Credit 1063-GUI, for SDR 13.3 million), effective in July 1981, encountered major counterpart financing and implementation problems from the beginning. Perhaps the most serious problem that affected the viability of the previous project was the marketing system that required herders to sell 10 percent of their animals at a very low official price. This, together with the vaccination tax, discouraged herders from participating in the project, and the IDA credit was canceled in 1983. Very little was achieved and the  3 principal disbursement was for TA However, after the change in Government in 1984, ENCOBE was dissolved and IDA was requested to consider a new project with the same objectives as the earlier one, but in a better economic environment. The new project was appraised in June 1986 and became effective in July 1987. 5. Project objectives were pragmatic, clear, realistic, and well-suited to tackling ineffective government services because of poor personnel management, very limited operational budget, inadequate infrastructure and derelict equipment and vehicles. Herders were not organized and worse, many of them had abandoned the country because of the repressive environment, poor cattle prices, arbitrary marketing systems, and constant harassment through excessive taxes. The veterinary profession was generally poorly trained and its services, provided through the Government, were generally of low quality. Inputs were scarce and their supply unreliable. 6. In a situation in which the majority of Government services were overstaffed, plagued with bureaucracy, and deprived of any effective operational means, the project initially placed heavy demands on DNE as implementing agency. Although the project included several subcomponents, its design was not overly complex, as all of them were interrelated. The risks mentioned in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) that might have affected the project were the implementation of the staff rationalization program and the willingness of livestock owners to participate in the LSRP. Neither became an issue during project implementation. The issue of timely counterpart funding was not considered a risk factor. C. Achievement of Objectives 7. The strengthening of a reduced public livestock service was substantially achieved through a cornprehensive training program implemented both nationally and overseas, a building program for headquarters and field offices, the purchase of vehicles, and establishment of a training center at Labe. DNE management and administration were effectively supported with the continuous presence of high-quality technical advisers and the establishment of a monitoring unit. As a condition of Credit effectiveness and in line with the country's new macroeconomics policies, DNE staff was reduced by two-thirds, after a rigorous and transparent test program. This resulted in the dismissal of 1,200 unqualified people. Another condition of effectiveness was the dissolution of ENCOBE, which resulted in the instant liberalization of livestock marketing. 8. The sectoral objectives were obtained first through the successful creation of some 240 herders' associations that are increasingly involved in the design and implementation of livestock development activities at both the regional and local levels. The original concept in the SAR was that of 45 herders' association with 500 members each; this concept was reconsidered during the mid-term review, when the concept of a family or kinship-size association was adopted instead. This led to the establishment of some 240 herder groups with a total membership of 7,000 herders. The creation of CAVET opened a national market for veterinary pharmaceuticals. Although it was instrumental in supporting the initial development of a private veterinary profession, CAVET failed to keep up with the growing demand for veterinary products and in the end became a bottleneck instead. Furthermore, the Atelier for Mineral Licks (APILEC, Atelier de piere a lecher), which was designed to address recognized needs for livestock mineral supplements and which had received steady support from donors, appears to have outlived its usefulness. APILEC was technically justified as a tool to combat mineral deficiencies  4 and improve livestock productivity, but it failed to achieve commercial viability because of its inability to respond to consumer purchasing patterns. 9. Institutional development was one of the most difficult components to implement, but it was achieved substantially by reducing DNE staff numbers, augmenting DNE's infrastructure and logistics, and improving standards for professionals and field agents, mainly through training. The establishment of the herders' associations was a major achievement, and they are functioning satisfactorily despite initial difficulties. The absence of an enabling regulatory framework and a financial support system delayed the establishment of private veterinarians. Institutional problems manifested themselves in the operations of the Banque pour le Commerce et 1' Industrie de la Guin6e (Commercial and Industrial Bank of Guinea), the on-lending agency. Implementation of the credit component became possible only after a suitable financial operator was identified and appropriate procedures agreed upon. 10. The physical components, including the construction and rehabilitation of the DNE and field offices, suffered delays mainly because of difficulties by the Government in meeting BADEA's (the major financier of the building component) loan disbursement conditions. This led to some cost escalation and scaling back of the construction program. Construction of the Labe training center and rehabilitation of the Kindia vaccine laboratory were also delayed somewhat. But, overall the building program was carried out satisfactorily. Vehicles were purchased on time, and repair and maintenance problems were resolved despite some initial difficulties. 11. Improvement in the country's general sociopolitical conditions produced: (a) the return of a large number of herders who had earlier fled the country; (b) liberalization of cattle marketing; and (c) restoration of trust between herders and the Government, yielding more reliable livestock data. All these factors contributed to higher recorded livestock figures: 2,177,325 head of cattle recorded in the December 1995 official census, versus 1,100,000 officially recorded at project appraisal in 1985. It is estimated that repatriation and the end of under-reporting that had been caused by fiscal and political pressures accounted for about 500,000 to 600,000 of the increase in the number of cattle head, while the rest is attributable to herd growth, averaging 2.5 % annually over eight years, in response to improved animal health and technical support. An economic rate of return (ERR) of 18%, compared with 16% estimated at appraisal, was computed on the basis of preliminary census data. D. Major Factors Affecting the Project Factors Subject to Government Control 12. Implementation was positively affected by Government's commitment to achieving the project's objectives as seen in its adherence to sound socio-economic policies and the exemplary cooperation between the Borrower and Co-financiers, as well as among the latter. This was reflected in the systematic implementation of joint supervision missions throughout project implementation. Another result of this close cooperation was the gradual evolution of the LSRP into a national sectoral  5 "umbrella" program under which all bilateral and multilateral projects were accommodated and coordinated. 13. On the other hand, the project suffered, especially during 1989-92, because of the increasingly acute shortage and late release of counterpart funds, even though the financial commitments made by Government at appraisal were eventually exceeded. The delays in financing led to increased construction costs for the building and remodeling of DNE headquarters, laboratories, training center, and field offices and implementation delays of about two years. 14. Difficulties in communications between BADEA and the Government also delayed the construction and rehabilitation program. Bureaucratic procedures slowed implementation, especially the cumbersome procurement and lengthy custom clearance processes that often took almost ten months. 15. Performance of DNE, the implementing agency, was satisfactory. DNE's two directors over the implementation period were technically competent and fully committed. The administrative and finance directors, however, were less well-suited to their positions and had to be replaced several times. Until the appointment of the current manager three years ago, heavy reliance was placed on TA, which was both timely and of good quality. Nevertheless, the LSRP closing date had to be extended by three years, largely because of delays in implementing the decisions made at the mid-term review and the shift to a greater focus on creating the herders' associations. The studies envisaged at appraisal were carried out as planned and the results were of substantive value E. Project Sustainability 16. The LSRP is likely to be sustainable because: (a) the Government is committed to the Project's objectives, which were mostly achieved and produced a financially and technically viable operation; the streamlined and strengthened livestock services have gradually evolved into an "umbrella" program, establishing a level of control and coordination at the national level of all livestock operations, whether financed bilaterally or multilaterally; (b) the social impact of the project is significant in having created the herders' associations that have demonstrated their capability to organize national events (the Boke cattle fair) and significantly contributed to the financing of their development; (c) cattle owners are now paying all or part of the animal vaccination costs and are paying fully for the treatment of calves; the coverage attained by the project is expected to expand in the near future, even though Government's timely delivery of its financial contribution remains erratic; and (d) project sustainability will be strengthened with the implementation of a follow-on operation approved by IDA in April 1996, the National Agricultural Services Project (Cr.2839-GUI). F. Bank Performance 17. Bank performance was satisfactory during project identification, preparation, and appraisal because staff evaluated realistically Government's commitment, weakness of the implementing agency, and the need to completely overhaul the DNE. The Project's design, although complex, was sound and consistent with the need to have an integrated sectoral approach with different but closely interrelated components that had to be implemented simultaneously. Project risks were recognized early and did not pose serious problems during implementation. The financial package was appropriate and adequate. Experience gained with the previous IDA-supported livestock project (Credit 1065-GUI)  6 helped to produce a sound project and the fruitful dialogue that the Bank and the Government maintained over the period of one year was useful in exploring key issues such as the liberalization of cattle marketing, reduction of DNE staff, and privatization of some services. A Project Preparation Facility (PPF) financing for US$ 350,000 paid for architectural services for the design of buildings, a base line survey of the livestock sector, the cost of vehicles for a vaccination campaign, and a study of financial procedures and control. Another PPF financed the tests and personnel selection at DNE, as well as a cost analysis study for inputs and services. Project preparation was financed from funds for the previous project and was carried out by a consulting firm with the participation of local staff and assistance from the Bank. Livestock sector problems were clearly defined together with a possible development strategy. All the major aspects, technical, financial, economic, and institutional were well covered, with the exception of the social aspects, which were not given very high priority, and the environmental ones, which were practically ignored. Bank assistance in the pre-appraisal totaled 48 staff weeks with the participation of livestock specialists, financial analysts, economists, and others. Appraisal was completed within 37 staff weeks. 18. In general, the performance of Co-financiers was also satisfactory, although delays were experienced in meeting BADEA's conditions of effectiveness because of tardy answers from BADEA's Khartoum head offices, which resulted in an increase in the cost of building headquarters facilities. Cofinancing for some operational expenses was provided by the CCCE/CFD to keep operations on track when counterpart funds were late in being released. 19. The LSRP required a considerable amount of supervision, which was satisfactorily conducted. An average of two to three missions a year, totaling 136 staff weeks, was required and generally included two or three people, predominantly technicians (livestock specialists and agronomists) who dealt efficiently with complex financial, institutional, and legal issues, and spent about 10-12 days in the field per mission The cofinancing agencies, mainly CFD and FAC, participated systematically in the supervision missions. When certain problems became acute, such as those caused by the periodic delays in provision of counterpart funds, quick interventions by the Bank and other Co- financiers, particularly the European Union, averted the crises. The quality of supervision was satisfactory, although it suffered from a lack of staff continuity. Only in the last three years has supervision been carried out by the same team. G. Borrower Performance 20. The design of the LSRP reflected Government priorities and strategies to rehabilitate a sector that had been seriously undermined by the previous regime. During implementation, although the Ministry of Agriculture in general, and the DNE in particular, supported the project objectives and followed very closely the suggestions of the joint Bank/Co-financiers supervision missions, the official bureaucracy and the extremely complex administrative procedures caused some of the serious implementation delays. For example, they were responsible for jeopardizing vaccination campaigns and putting at risk serious efforts made in earlier years to control Rinderpest and Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP). The credit component suffered because a credible institutional solution was not found despite vigorous efforts made by DNE, the Bank, and Co-financiers. 21. The institutional and the physical objectives were the most important targets met during project implementation, and were closely followed by the social ones. The implementing agency, with  7 few exceptions, complied with the major Credit covenants, particularly those relating to institutional changes and effective management and staffing. Project implementation progress was adequately reported. Government, in general, followed the advice of the Bank and Co-financiers particularly in critical areas, such as finance, administration, and procurement. DNE was almost powerless in resolving the counterpart funding problem and required strong support from the Bank and the Co-financiers. It had difficulties in ensuring the timely delivery of audits, and these were often qualified. It made a good use of the TA and, in most cases, it implemented the results or findings of the studies financed under the LSRP. H. Assessment of Outcome 22. The project achieved all of its major objectives, in spite of its complex design and the problems that originated outside DNE. DNE did not have any experience in managing projects such as the LSRP, and had to find its way in a sector, the participants of which were distrustful of Government intervention. Although herders were prepared to adopt the simple practices of vaccination and drenching, it took major effort in terms of logistics and persuasion to consolidate the technical messages. The establishment of the herders' associations had mixed results at the beginning. Following the mid- term review and the establishment of the linkage with the Central African Republic (CAR) National Livestock Project, which was noteworthy for its achievements in this field, LSRP objectives were reassessed and a new approach was adopted that produced successful results. Delays were experienced in implementation because of: (a) the socio-political situation at the beginning of implementation and the complete change in vision and culture that the project implied; b) delays in the availability of counterpart funds during the second half of the implementation, which in turn resulted in delays in funding operational expenses out of the IDA Credit; and (c) bureaucratic hurdles, partly inherited from the previous regime, partly resulting from a high turnover of senior staff, particularly at the Ministry of Finance and Planning, involved in processing financial documents. 23. The privatization of veterinary services became successful in 1996, when the enabling legislation (Code de l'Elevage) was enacted, allowing private veterinarians to establish themselves independently and to participate in the vaccination campaigns under the "mandat sanitaire." 24. Although no environmental impact assessment was made at the time of appraisal, the survey carried out for the appraisal of the National Agricultural Services Project, clearly indicates the positive impact of livestock development on the environment. 25. Poverty alleviation was not included explicitly among the original project objectives. It was, however, achieved through implementation of the village small ruminants and poultry vaccination components, which benefited the poorest among the rural population. 26. Actual project costs were US$24.6 million, as against US$22.2 million estimated. The difference can be explained by higher than estimated operating costs, training and equipment purchases. Actual project financing by IDA was US$11.45 million (US$1.65 million more than estimated, primarily because of the depreciation of the US$); CCCE US$3.8 million (same as estimated); BADEA US$4.75 million (US$0.25 million more than estimated); FAC US$1.3 million (US$0.1 million less than estimated); and Government US$3.3 million (US$0.7 million more than estimated).  8 27. The minimum requirement for a satisfactory project is a net present value that is positive when flows are discounted at 10% for a major portion of the investment. Yearly operating costs were not available. The mission adopted the operating-cost time series used at appraisal, converted into constant values, using the 1987 inflator (1.305). Production of meat was estimated by the increase in the off-take rate from 10.4% in year nine (1994) to 11.5% in year twenty (2005) Milk production was estimated following the same criteria ( see Tables 9A and 9B in Part II, Statistical Annexes). 28. A farm gate price of US$ 0.80 per kilogram (kg) cattle liveweight and US$ 0.40 per liter of milk, based on current data, was used in the economic analysis. In calculating LSRP's ERR, only the direct quantifiable benefits, i.e., meat and milk production, were taken into account. Based on the above assumptions, the ERR was estimated at 18% (see Tables 9A and 9B in Part II, Statistical Annexes.). 1. Future Operation 29. A future operation would be based on the following premises: (a) Complete Government divestment of commercial productive activities through their transfer to herders' associations and private veterinarians, particularly with respect to the privatization of CAVET and APILEC and contractual arrangements with private veterinarians for their participation in vaccination campaigns, through the "mandat sanitaire." (b) Develop professional organizations for butchers, livestock traders, and poultry and pig producers, for example, as well as provide support to their organizations through planning and construction of infrastructure, such as small slaughterhouses and stock marketing. (c) Further strengthen DNE in its public service functions-- design and supervision of sector policies -- through data collection, processing, and analysis, particularly in the field of epidemiology and diagnosis, as well as gathering socioeconomic information; and improve DNE's ability to support professional organizations by increasing its TA and training resources and capacity. J. Key Lessons Learned 30. The most important lessons learned from the LSRP are the following: (a) an appropriate macroeconomics framework is essential to achieving success; (b) sound project identification and preparation are helpful in recognizing the major difficulties likely to be encountered during implementation; (c) the frequency and regularity of supervision missions and their composition, as in the LSRP, of technical specialists and representatives of Co-financiers contributed significantly to successful project implementation; (d) a full and frank dialogue between the Bank and the Government, particularly in respect of DNE, was constructive and helped to obtain successful project outcomes; (e) training can play a key role in upgrading skills, as it did in this case for both the DNE and herders; (f) the mid-term review can be very helpful in making midcourse changes during implementation, as it did in the LSRP to reorient some project components, particularly those related to the herders' associations and the emphasis on animal husbandry and nutrition; during the latter half of project implementation, contacts  9 between Guinean herders and organized herders in other countries, such as the CAR, were instrumental in promoting the development of herders associations; and (g) the problem that will require particular attention in the future is the timely availability of counterpart funding; without a proper solution to this bottleneck, the success of any project in Guinea will remain in doubt, an important lesson learned from the LSRP. 31. An overoptimistic approach regarding the institutional capacity of the Government, particularly its ability to provide counterpart funds, was at the origin of several crisis that endangered the project's achievements. The estimated disbursement period did not coincide with the country's disbursement profile and resulted in the need for three successive annual extensions. A more realistic, longer disbursement period should have been adopted or the project should have been simplified. a:gui 1 725.doc\NPrevoo:gr  10 PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessment A. Achievementof objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable Macro policies Sector policies 7 Financial objectives = = Institutional development Physical objectives Poverty reduction = Gender issues - X Other social objectives _ Environmental objectives = Public sector management Private sector development Other (specify)-Perf. Tech. Assist. B. Project sustainabilt Likely Unlikely Uncertain Highly C. Bank performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification Preparation assistance Appraisal Supervision Highly D. Borrowerperformance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation Implementation Covenant compliance Operation (if applicable) Highly Highly E. Assessmentof outcome satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory I I E z m~~~~~II  I1 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Loan/credittitle Purpose Year of Status Approval Preceding operations 1. Guinea Livestock Sector Rehab. (Cr. 1725-GUI) Livestockdevelopment 1981 Canceled 2. GueckedouAgricultureDevelopment(Cr. 1635-GUI) Areadevelopment 1985 Completed 3. First Agricultural Services (Cr. 1636-GUI) Improve agricultural planning and 1985 Completed project preparation Following operations I. ResearchExtension(Cr. 1955-GUI) Improve agricultural services 1988 Completed 2. NationalRural lnfrastructure(Cr. 2106-GUI) Improve rural infrastructure and 1990 Ongoing policy reformulation 3. AgriculturalExport Promotion (Cr. 2407-GUI) Promote crop exports 1992 Ongoing 4. NationalAgriculturalServices(Cr.2839-GUI) Agricultural extension, research, 1996 Ongoing and livestock service and institution-building  12 Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in project cycle [ Date planned J Revised date Identification(Executive Project Summary) 04/10/84 05/20/84 Preparation - Appraisal 04/15/85 Negotiations 03/11/86 03/11/86 Letter of development policy (if applicable) Board presentation 07/08/86 Signing 03/03/87 Effectiveness 12/15/86 07/31/87 First tranche release (if applicable) n.a. n.a. Mid-term review (if applicable) n.a. n.a. Second (and third) tranche release (if applicable) n.a. n.a. Project completion 06/30/92 12/31/95 Credit closing 12/31/92 12/31/95 1 Preparedby Governmentwith the assistanceofa consultingfirm.  13 Table 4: Loan/Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (1/) Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements US$ Millions FY 87 FY 88 FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 Appraisal Estimate 1.18 2.65 5.10 7.25 9.02 9.70 9.80 Actual 0.90 1.33 2.52 3.77 6.16 7.19 8.48 10.43 11.45 Actual as a % of 0 34% 26% 35% 42% 64% 73% 87% 106% 117% Estimate Date of Final Disbursement: May 22, 1996 Difference is due to exchange rate between SDRs and US$ dollars. Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Key implementation indicato-r-sin SAR/ President'sReport Estimated Actual I1. Establishherdersassociations 45 237 herders associations and 1,100 auxiliary herder associations 2. Livestock inputs (sales) per year US$180,000 US$150,000 3. Pilot credit scheme 4. Upgrading of public Livestock services: US$ 1.3 million US$2,300,000 - constructionofbuilding 15 12 - renovation of building 9 7 5. Training 50 fellowships 6. National vaccination campaign unspecified Average of 260,000/year for rinderpest. Average of 500,000/yr for CBPP 7. Technical assistance 9 positions 10 positions 8. Purchase of vehicles - cars 25 78 - motorbikes 110 11. Modified indicators (if applicable) N/A 11. Other indicators (if applicable) N/A  14 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Counterpart funding (in millions 161,200 159,072 236,008 291,310 146,000 226,000 115,000 of Guinean Francs) CAVET cash sales of inputs (in 68,781 62,206 185,085 187,162 156,992 130,000 131,000 millions of Guinean Francs) Total DNE staff - - - 621 683 654 797 Cattle census 1,436,075 1,471,946 1,564,679 1,663,253 1,753,069 1,847,735 2,177,325 Controlled slaughter a. cattle (head) 86,351 86,994 97,299 100,676 103,312 109,518 - b. small ruminants 15,516 17,129 29,196 26,896 22,343 17,041 - Cattle on markets: a. presented 29,719 39,347 47,623 57,976 60,407 73,470 - b. sold 21,019 27,384 31,266 41,540 38,506 45,593 - accinations of cattle: a. rinderpest 558,254 511,243 560,828 559,399 77,904 40,492 - b. CBPP 351,909 377,572 324,605 246,690 393,754 99,799 380,000 ocal training (beneficiaries-m/d) a DNE staff 85-2,431 105-2,770 146-3,466 190-3,968 75-6,87 236 155 b. headers 26-141 76-258 71-223 194-573 158-526 522 - c. special - - 13-78 36-288 220-1,432 31 - Headers associations: - 9 15 35 93 144 237 membership: - - 402 1,021 2,800 4,777 7,577 capital (in Guinean Francs): - - 2,565,925 3,701,650 10,403,575 25,331,775 35,735,350  15 Table 7A: Studies Included in Project No TITLE YEAR AUTHORS STATUS I Preliminary sociological study 1992 P.Paoletti, CAE Study carried out at CAE with in Boke prefecture team Italian Technical Assistance 2 Study of transhumance in Boke 1994 Boke CAE Study carried out with Italian prefecture TA at Boke CAE 3 Agrostological study of the 1994 Boke CAE Study carried out with Italian Boke CAE's zone of TA at Boke CAE intervention 4 Study of transhuman herding in 1994 P.Ledroit, M.Diallo, Study carried out with the northern part of Guinea's J.F.Renard, F. De Transhumance Project Maritime region Martin de Vivies 5 Study in Boke prefecture 1994 Boke CAE Study carried out with Italian TA 6 Economic study of management 1994 Boke CAE Study carried out with Italian of Boke CAE TA 7 Survey on fodder resources in 1994 Boke CAE Study carried out with Italian l____ Boke prefecture TA 8 Agrostological study of Badiar 1995 M. Diallo Study carried out with VSF l____ National Park - 9 National monograph on 1995 A.T. Balde, DNE Study carried out with managers biodiversity (fauna resources) team of DNE on behalf of the Environmental Directorate Note: CAE = Centre d'Appui a l'Elevage (Livestock Support Center)  16 Table 7B: Other Related Studies No TITLE YEAR AUTHORS STATUS 1 Survey on veterinary legislation 1988 M. Lobry and DNE Completed l ___________________________________________ (June) 2 Study of establishment of zoo-economic 1989 J. Tyc, N. Dechervois Completed l___ monitoring of PRSE (SEDES) / DNE 3 Survey on livestock marketing in Guinea 1990 DNE Completed (June) 4 Strategy and action plan for livestock 1991 DNE / International Completed subsector (July) consultants 5 Diagnostic summary and indicative 1991 F. Chagnaud / DNE Completed strategy for livestock and meat marketing (July) 6 Study of pastoral hydraulics program in 1991 S. Solage (BRGM) / Completed Guinea (Aug.) DNE 7 Study of funding of Livestock Service 1991 J. Samiguet (SATEC)/ Completed (Aug.) DNE 8 Study of privatization of CAVET and 1992 G. De Gonneville, Completed APILEC (March) J.P.Hencque (SFC SEDES-SEGOS) / DNE || 9 National livestock census 1990 1992 DNE Completed (May) 10 Privatization of the veterinary profession 1993 R. Seynave / DNE Completed and draft livestock and animal products (May) code for the Republic of Guinea l 11 Livestock development program in Guinea 1993 J. Tyc, M. Revol, / DNE Completed (PDEG) (June) 12 Map of pastoral resources of Guinea 1993 SESAM / DNE Completed 13 Milk subsector in Guinea 1994 J.M. Centres (GRET) / Completed (June) DNE 14 Training plan for DNE 1993 DNE/ Mme Kattar Completed 15 Study of livestock marketing and 1995 J. Tyc, J. Duc (SATEC) / Completed slaughtering facilities in Guinea (April) DNE 16 Law pertaining to Livestock Code 1995 DNE / Local consultant Completed (Aug.) S. Camara 17 Law pertaining to Pastoral Code 1995 DNE / Local consultant Completed (Aug.) S. Camara 18 Study of environmental impact of livestock 1995 DNE/intemational Completed ____ component of PSA II (Aug.) consultant M. Nicolas 19 Survey of animal production systems 1995 DNE In process of publication 20 Demographic study of DNE personnel 1995 DNE/ Local consultant Study completed, report M.L. Keita in progress 21 National livestock census 1995 1995 DNE Data being analyzed, provisional results issued in November 1995  17 Table 8A: Project Costs Appraisal estimate (US$'000) Actual/latestestimate (US$'000) 3 Item Local costs Foreign costs Total Local costs Foreign costs Total 1. Construction 1,100 4,500 5,600 - 4,750 4,750 2. Vehicles 200 2,000 2,200 234 1,985 2,219 3. Equipment 300 1,300 1,600 253 2,108 2,361 4. Livestock Inputs 100 3,000 - 30 - 30 5. Tech. Assist. - 4,900 4,900 161 3,646 3,807 6. Fellowships - 800 800 332 1,197 1,529 7. Operating Cost 900 1,800 2,700 3,566 863 4,429 8. PilotCreditProgram - 1,300 1,300 120 - 120 TOTAL 2,600 19,600 22,200 4,696 14,549 19,245 Table 8B: Project Financing Appraisal estimate (US$'000) Actual/latestestimate (US$'000) Source Local costs Foreign costs Total Local costs Foreign costs Total IDA 850 8,950 9,800 1,145 10,345 11,450 CFD 600 3,200 3,800 588 3,212 3,800 l BADEA- 4,500 4,500 - 4,750 4,750 | FAC - 1,400 1,400 - 1,300 1,300 3 These numbers only reflect part of the costs financed by CCCE/CFD, FAC and BADEA and can therefore not be compared with Table 8B.  18 Government 900 1,700 2,600 3,306 - 3,306 TOTAL 2,450 19,750 22,200 5,039 19,567 24,606  19 Table 9A: Economic Costs and Benefits (US$ '000) Year Capital Livestock Operating Total With Benefits Incremental Net Costs Inputs Costs Costs Project Without Benefits Benefits Project 1986 2,101 0 365 2,466 26,212 26,212 0 -2,466 1987 4,751 0 457 5,208 27,076 26,608 468 -4,740 1988 4,680 0 507 5,187 27,920 26,944 976 -4,211 1989 1,782 0 535 2,317 29,680 27,107 2,573 256 1990 4,044 0 3,405 7,449 30,058 27,271 2,787 -4,662 1991 1,946 0 3,405 5,351 32,440 27,456 4,984 -367 1992 2,111 0 3,405 5,516 33,718 27,557 6,161 645 1993 3,123 0 3,405 6,528 35,068 27,827 7,241 713 1994 1,610 0 3,405 5,015 36,586 28,000 8,586 3,571 1995 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 38,552 28,176 10,376 3,174 1996 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 40,186 28,354 11,832 4,630 1997 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 42,266 29,110 13,156 5,954 1998 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 43,958 28,797 15,161 7,959 1999 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 45,722 28,935 16,787 9,585 2000 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 47,478 29,076 18,402 11,200 2001 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 49,501 29,260 20,241 13,039 2002 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 50,796 29,445 21,351 14,149 2003 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 52,953 29,631 23,322 16,120 2004 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 55,104 29,818 25,286 18,084 2005 1,307 2,490 3,405 7,202 56,920 30,007 26,913 19,711 IRR = 18% Note: IRR = Internal Rate of Return Economic Analysis Capital Costs used in the Economic Analysis are current US$ disbursed by financiers by year converted into 1995 constant US$ using the USA Consumer Price Index; see table 9A. Replacement and  20 maintenance costs from year 10 onwards have been assumed to represent 5% of the total amount disbursed from year I to 9. Livestock Inputs capital costs from year I to 9 are included in the capital costs. Livestock inputs running costs from year 10 onwards have been assumed to be those estimated at appraisal but adjusted to current values using the 1987/88 inflator (1.305). Yearly actual operating costs were not available; the mission used the operating costs time series used at appraisal but converted into constant values by using the 1987/88 inflator (1.305). Physical production of meat has been estimated by an increase in the off-take rate from 10.4 at year one to 11.5 at year twenty. Incremental milk production has been estimated following the same criteria (see table 9B). Prices A farmgate price of US$0.8 per kilogram of liveweight has been used in the economic analysis. Milk price used in the analysis is US$ 0.4/liter. In calculating the Project's economic rate of return, only the directly quantifiable benefits, i.e. meat and milk production of cattle herd, were taken into account. Based on the above assumptions the ERR was estimated at 18%. Net Present Value was estimated at 10,360.7,at 12% Opportunity Cost of Capital. Sensitivity Analysis The effect on the Project's economic rate of return under various sensitivity tests is as follows: Costs Benefits ERR % Plus 10% Unchanged 15 Plus 20% Unchanged 13 Less 10% Unchanged 21 Unchanged Plus 10% 21 Unchanged Minus 10% 12 Unchanged Lag of 2 years 12  21 Table 9B: Economic Benefits With Project Without Project Herd Off Sales Meat Milk Herd Off Take Sales Meat Milk Take YEAR Projections Rate % Tons 000 liter Projections Rate % Tons 000 lite Number Number Number Number '000 '000 '000 '000 1986 1600.0 9.5 152 18578 28375 1600.0 9.5 152 18578 2837 1987 1612.8 9.6 155 19025 29641 1612.8 9.5 153 18801 2891 1988 1636.1 9.7 159 19472 30855 1627.2 9.5 155 18988 293E 1989 1675.4 9.9 166 20866 32467 1638.9 9.5 156 19132 295( 1990 1708.4 10.0 171 20866 334121 1649.3 9.5 157 192871 296( 1991 1760.4 10.0 176 22825 35451 1659.5 9.5 158 19435 297 1992 1814.1 10.3 187 23587 37121 1670.0 9.5 159 19567 299 1993 1864.8 10.3 192 24417 38835 1680.7 9.5 160 19691 301 1994 1916.9 10.5 201 25289 40888 1691.4 9.5 161 19814 303 1995 1979.01 10.6 210 26478 43425 1702.1 9.5 162 19940 305 1996 2043.5 10.7 219 27650 45166 1712.8 9.5 163 20067 307 1997 2116.3 10.8 229 28964 47738 1723.6 9.5 164 20914 309 1998 2188.2 10.9 239 30203 49491 1734.5 9.5 165 20312 311 1999 2261.4 11.0 249 31446 51413 1745.4 9.5 166 20499 313 2000 2335.91 11.1 259 32680 53335 1756.4 9.5 167 20578 315 2001 2413.3 11.2 270 34056 55639 1767.5 9.5 168 20708 317 2002 2493.3 11.3 282 34432 58126 1778.7 9.5 169 20839 319 2003 2575.8 11.4 294 35892 60598 1789.9 9.5 170 20970 321 2004 2661.0 11.5 306 37354 63052 1801.2 9.5X 171 21103 3234 2005 2749.1 11.5 316 38586 65127 1812.6 9.5 172 21236 3254  22 TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL CONVENANTS TEXT COVENANT STATUS DESCRIPTION OF COVENANT REFERENCE CLASS(ES) 3.01 (a) Implementation C Borrower declares commitment to objectives of the Project as set forth in Schedule 2 to this Agreement and, to this end, shall carry out the Project through its Ministry of Rural Development with due diligence and efficiency and in conformity with appropriate admin., financial and agricultural practices, and provide, promptly as needed, resources X______________ required for the Project. 3.01 (b) Accounts/audit CD Without limitation to the generality of para. 3.01 (a), Borrower shall establish and maintain in a commercial bank a revolving account exclusively for the purposes of the Project and shall, after an initial deposit therein as described in para. 5.01 (c) of this Agreement, replenish said account as and when required to ensure that on the first day of each calendar quarter an amount equal to at least the initial deposit, shall be available to ftnance the Borrowers contribution to the estimate cost of the Project for Th. said quarter and the following quarter. TEXT COVENANT STATUS DESCRIPTION OF COVENANT REFERENCE CLASS(ES) 3.02 Flow and C Except as the Association shall otherwise agree, procurement of the utilization of goods, works and consultants' services required for the Project and to be project funds financed out of the proceeds of the Credit shall be govemed by the provisions of Schedule 3 to this Agreement. 3.03 (a) Implementation NC Borrower shall: (i) establish a National Seeds Committee comprising, inter alia, representatives of MDR, farmers and representatives of rural development projects; and (ii) cause said committee to hold its initial meeting not later that Sept. 30, 1988, and thereafter meet at least once a year. 3.03 (b) Implementation NC Said committee shall be responsible inter alia for: (i) establishing seed Status: C - Complied with CD - Compliance after Delay NC - Not Complied With SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CP - Compliance with Partiality NYD - Not Yet Due Status: C - Complied with CD - Compliance after Delay NC - Not Complied With SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CP - Compliance with Partiality NYD - Not Yet Due  23 quality standards and monitoring their application; (ii) coordinating national seed production; (iii) establishing price guidelines; and (iv) considering the recommendations of the regional and technical seeds committees on incentive systems for producers, outgrowers and SCCs. 3.03 (c) Monitoring, NC Borrower shall submit at least once a year its seed policy and pricing review and guidelines to the Association for its review and comment; said policy reporting and guidelines to determine prices for SCCs that provide an adequate incentive to contract outgrowers, encourage the responsible use of seeds and allow the profitable operation of the SCCs. 3.04 (a) Implementation C Borrower shall not later than December 31, 1988, establish in different regions of the country and under arrangements satisfactory to the Association about six SCCs which shall be responsible inter alia for (i) supervising production of base seeds at research stations; (ii) ensuring the purchase and distribution of base seeds to outgrowers; (iii) collecting improved seeds through -development projects and extension programs; (iv) supervising and training extension staff and outgrowers; (v) conditioning improved seeds; and (vi) selling commercial seeds. 3.04 (b) Management C Each SCC referred to in (a) above shall be headed by an agronomist aspects of the who shall be assisted by a seed production technician, all with Project or of its qualifications and experience acceptable to the Association. executing agency l 3.05 Accounts/audit CP Borrower shall allow each SCC to: (i) open bank accounts in a commercial bank; (ii) deposit therein the receipts from the sale of seeds to finance said SCC's operating costs; and (iii) retain cash surpluses to meet working capital and assets replacement requirements. 3.06 Monitoring, NC Borrower shall: (a) upon completion of the establishment of the SCCs, review and furnish to the Association for review and comments a plan of action for reporting gradually involving the private sector in the business of seed conditioning and purchase and distribution of base seeds to outgrowers (include. offering SCCs for sale to the private sector after completion); 3.06 (b) and (b) soon thereafter take into account the Association's comments COVENANT STATUS' DESCRIPTION OF COVENANT CLASS(ES) 4.01 (a) Accounts/audit CD Borrower shall maintain or cause to be maintained records and accounts adequate to reflect in accordance with sound accounting practices the operations, resources and expenditures in respect of the Project of the departments or agencies of the Borrower responsible for carrying out the Project or any part thereof. 4.01 (b) Accounts/audit CD Borrower shall: (i) have the records and accounts referred to in par. 4.01 (a) including those of for the Special Account of reach fiscal year audited in accordance with appropriate auditing principles consistently ________________ _________ applied, by independent auditors acceptable to the Association; Status: C - Complied with CD - Compliance after Delay NC - Not Complied With SOON - Compliance Expected in Reasonably Short Time CP - Compliance with Partiality NYD - Not Yet Due  24 4.01 (b) ii Accounts/audit CD Furnish to the Association, as soon as available, but in any case not later than six months after the end of such year, a certified copy of the report of such audit by said auditors, of such scope and in such detail as the Association shall have reasonably requested; and 4.01 (b) iii Accounts/audit CD fumish to the Association such other information concerning said records, accounts and the audit thereof as the Association shall from time to time reasonably request. 4.01 (c) i Accounts/audit CD (c) For all expenditures with respect to which withdrawals from the Credit Account were made on the basis of statements of expenditure, the Borrower shall: (i) maintain or cause to be maintained, in accordance with par. 4.01 (a) records and accounts reflecting such expenditures; 4.01 (c) ii Accounts/audit C retain until at least one year after the Association has received the audit for the fiscal year in which the last withdrawal from the Credit Account was made, all records (contracts, orders, invoices, bills, receipts and other documents) evidencing such expenditures; (iii) enable the Association's representatives to examine such records; and 4.01 (c) iv Accounts/audit C ensure that such records and accounts are included in the annual audit of referred to in par. 4.01 (b) and that the report of such audit contains a separate opinion by said auditors as to whether the statements of expenditures submitted during such fiscal year, together with the procedures and internal controls involved in their preparation, can support related withdrawals. Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Statement number and title Describe and comment on lack of compliance The project complied with the major operational manual statements.  Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of project cycle Planned* Revised Actual Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Preparation to appraisal 48.1 44,200 Appraisal 36.9 85,400 Negotiations through Board 9.7 42,800 approval I-l Supervision 39 136.0 376,600 Completion 9 11.0 50,100 TOTAL 48 241.7 599,100 *Planned staff inputs are available only from FY94.  Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions Performance rating Stage of project Month/ Number Days Specialized staff skills Impleme Develop- cycle year of in represented n-tation ment Types of problems persons field status objectives Through 06/86 3 20 Econ., Live. Spec., Fin. Anal. - _ appraisal Appraisal 07/86 3 . _ _ through Board approval Supervision 1 4/87 2 9 Live. Spec., Fin. Anal. N.A. N.A. Lack of counterpart funding 2 10/87 1 7 Live. Spec. N.A. N.A. Bureaucratic problems. Building progr. behind. Schedule. Vehicles management. 3 1/88 1 4 Live. Spec. I I Building program affected. Vehicles maintenance. Bureaucracy. 4 10/88 3 3 3 Live. Spec.s 2 2 Counterpart funds. Accounts. Slow privatization. Staff per diem. 5 05/89 3 5 2 Live. Spec.s, Fin. Anal. 2 2 Accounting problems. Building construction. Late training. 6 12/89 2 12 Live. Spec., Fin. Anal. 2 2 Credit behind schedule. Counterpart funding. Problems with financial and Animal health Directors. Mid-term review 08/90 2 20 Live. Spec., Fin. Anal. - - Counterpart funding. Cadre organique. Organization of CAVET. 7 03/91 2 15 2 Live. Spec.s 2 2 _  8 08/91 _ 10 Fin. Anal. 3 3 Counterpart funding. Cadre organique. Procurement. 9 11/91 l 1 1 Live. Spec. 3 3 Counterpart funding. Cadre organique. 10 06/92 1 6 Live. Spec. 2 2 Counterpart funding. Cadre organique. II 09/92 2 15 2 Live. Spec. 2 2 Animal health. Vaccinations. Custom procedures. 12 01/93 2 16 2 Live. Spec. 2 2 Legal text veterinary profession. Recruitment of DAF. Counterpart funding. Credit disbursement slow. 13 09/93 2 11 2 Live. Spec. 2 2 Counterpart funding. Credit disbursement slow. 14 06/94 2 13 Live. Spec., Agron. 2 2 Counterpart funding. Vaccination campaign affected ag. extension. 15 08/94 1 6 Live. Spec. 2 2 Problems of bridging with ASP II. 16 12/94 1 10 Live. Spec. 2 2 ASP 11. Basis for follow up. 17 07/95 l 12 Live. Spec. 2 2 Problems with CAVET. Completion 11/95 2 7 2 Live. Spec. _ Agron = Agronomist Financ. Anal. = Financial Analyst Econ = Economist Live. Spec. = Livestock Specialist  28 Appendix A Page 1 of 3 REPUBLIOUE DE GUINEE PROJET DE REHABILITATION DU SECTEUR DE L'ELEVAGE (Credit IDA 1724-GUI) MISSION D'ACHEVEMENT DE PROJET AIDE MEMOIRE 1. La mission d'achevement du Projet de Developpement du Secteur de l'Elevage (PRSE, Credit IDA 1725 Gui), s'est deroulee du 10 au 21 Novembre 1995. Elle a et effectuee par M Percival Bono, Specialiste de l'Elevage, consultant, avec l'appui des cadres de la DNE, notamment M. Mamoudou Diallo, Directeur National et le Docteur Seny Mane, Directeur Adjoint, ainsi que, A partir du 13 Novembre, de M Noel Chabeuf, Charge du Projet a la Banque Mondiale. 2. La mission s'est rendue a Kindia, Dabola, Labe, Gaoual, Boke et Kamsar pour visiter les actions conduites par la DNE et ses partenaires (Vetrinaires sans Frontieres, Projet Transhumance), et rencontrer des groupements d'dleveurs constitues dans les differentes regions. La mission a visite la foire de l'Elevage A Boke. 3. La mission exprime ses plus vifs et plus sinceres remerciements A Madame le Ministre de ]'Agriculture, de l'Elevage et des Eaux et Forets pour les facilites logistiques apportees par la DNE, la collaboration efficace et cordiale de ses cadres et la qualit6 des informations foumies. OBJECTIF DE LA MISSION: 4. L'objectif de la mission est de rediger un rapport representant le bilan institutionnel, technique et financier du Projet au moment de sa cloture. Il s'agit d'un exercice commun entre l'emprunteur et la Banque, dont la presente mission ne represente que la deuxieme etape, la premiere etant la preparation par la DNE d'une serie de documents. Le rapport de mission sous forme provisoire sera adresse au Gouvemement Guineen pour observations et pour etre complete par la partie relative au point de vue du Gouvernement sur le deroulement du Projet. Le rapport final d'achevement du Projet sera constitue de l'ensemble de ces contributions. CONSTATATIONS DE LA MISSION: Constatations d'ordre g6n6ral: 5. Bien que ce Projet ait ete concu et ait debute dans des conditions macro- economiques et socio-politiques peu favorables, les objectifs initiaux, pourtant relativement ambitieux, ont e atteints. Parmi les acquis techniques du Projet A l'issue de huit ans d'execution on peut souligner particulierement les elements suivants:  29 Appendix A Page 2 of 3 (a) la formation de 237 groupements d'e1eveurs sur 1'ensemble du territoire; (b) la consolidation des structures operationnelles de la DNE a travers (i) la formation, (ii) I'achat de vehicules et (iii) la construction ou la rdhabilitation d'une partie des bureaux locaux ( siege, SPRA et postes); (c) la distribution d'intrants pour l'elevage; (d) un important programme d'assistance technique; (e) la realisation des campagnes nationales de vaccination contre les grandes epizooties qui touchent maintenant un demi million de bovins. 6. Les sacrifices considerables consentis par le Gouvernement au debut du Projet en particulier pour la reduction des effectifs de personnels de la DNE, conjugues avec un effort soutenu et tres rationnel de formation ont porte leur fruits. Ceci se manifeste dans la qualite des services fournis, parfaitement percue par les beneficiaires, en particulier les groupements d'eleveurs, et les partenaires de la DNE, qu'il s'agisse des Bailleurs de Fonds ou d'autres organisations (administrations, ONG, etc.). La mission a pu constater la qualite de la contribution de la DNE a la preparation du PSA II, et a beneficie elle meme d'un appui tres apprecie notamment pour la preparation des documents de fin de Projet. 7. Le Projet a bdneficie d'une cooperation exemplaire, continue et intense de 1'ensemble des Bailleurs de Fonds qui s'est manifestee des le partage des financements des differents volets lors de l'evaluation, s'est poursuivie par des supervisions conjointes (FED, CFD, FAC, IDA), et des interventiosn ponctuelles des uns ou des autres dans des periodes critiques (suspensions de decaissements ou manque de fonds de contrepartie) pour assurer la continuite des activites du Projet. 8. Bien qu'entrepris a une epoque oui il etait difficile de determiner avec certitude les priorites pour le developpment du sous secteur, le Projet permet a l'isssue de 8 ans d'etablir de facon claire une strategie de developpement appuyee sur des donnees concretes. II dispose aussi de messages techniques clairs en ce qui concerne la protection du cheptel national ainsi que l'integration de I'agriculture et l'elevage et le developpement des filieres specialisees (aviculture, porciculture, lait). CONCLUSIONS DE LA MISSION: 9. La continuation de l'effort porte sur le secteur de l'elevage s'effectuera dans le cadre du PSA II. Ceci correspond a une option fondamentale commune du Gouvemement et des Bailleurs de Fonds. Au moment de la cloture du PRSE, la DNE dispose d'une avance de plusieurs annees par rapport aux autres directions du MAEF en matiere de competence technique et administrative, comme cela a et constate lors de la preparation du PSAII. II apparait donc essentiel que les soucis de coordination ne portent pas atteinte a la specificite des actions relatives a l'elevage.  30 Appendix A Page 3 of 3 10. La mission est confiante dans I'aptitude de la DNE et de ses partenaires representants des eleveurs a concevoir et mettre en oeuvre les evolutions de la politique d'e1evage qui s'avereront necessaires a I'avenir. 1I. La mission prevoit d'envoyer le projet de rapport d'achevement en langue Fran9aise dans le courant du mois de janvier 1996. La contribution du Gouvernement sera attendue six A sept semaines apres reception du document. Le rapport final sera pret un mois plus tard, soit, en principe, debut avril. Fait A Conakry le 20 novembre 1995 Percival Bono, Consultant Specialiste de I'Elevage  31 Appendix B PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE The project review from Borrower's perspective was spelled out on January 18 by the Secretary General of the Ministere de l'Agriculture, de l'Elevage et des Forets in the following extract of a speech delivered at the Ministry's New Year celebration: " En ce qui conceme l'Elevage, permettez moi, Madame le Ministre, de rappeler sommairement les conclusions de la mission d'achevement du projet qui s'est deroulee du 10 au 21 Novembre 1995; "Le PRSE a e le mieux reussi parmi les programmes de restructuration de l1'levage finances par l'IDA en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre...pour citer M. Percival Bono, specialiste de l'elevage, consultant de l'IDA. Puis il ajoute qu'au moment de la cl6ture du PRSE, la DNE dispose d'une avance de plusieurs annees par rapport aux autres directions du MAEF en matiere de competences techniques et administratives, comme cela a deja et constate lors de la preparation du PSA Il. Il apparait donc essentiel que les soucis de coordination ne portent pas atteinte a la specificite des actions relatives A l'elevage. La mission est confiante dans l'aptitude de la DNE et de ses partenaires representant des eleveurs A concevoir et A mettre en oeuvre les evolutions de la politique de l'elevage qui s'avereront necessaires A l'avenir. Fin de citation". A mon humble avis, ces citations seraient suffisantes pour presenter le bilan de cette direction. Neanmoins, je voudrais citer quelques actions de portee nationale: * Le recensement national du cheptel; en attendant la saisie des cahiers de recensement, les resultats globaux se presentent comme suit: 207.235 eleveurs, 2.186.954 bovins, 609.978 ovins, 738.436 caprins, 44. 729 porcins, 614 equins et 138 asins. Ces resultats denotent une augmentation significative des differentes especes de 1988 A 1995 A 66,84% pour les bovins, 58,35% pour les ovins, 63,76% pour les caprins, 115,67% pour les porcins, avec un accroissement des eleveurs de 8,9%. * La vaccination de 380.000 bovins contre la PPCB et 350.000 contre la DNCB, de 105.000 ovins et caprins contre la PPR et de 44.000 volailles. * La realisation de 14 infrastructures de commercialisation du betail et de ia viande, la collecte de 110 tonnes de coton-graine, 52 tonnes de sous produits agricoles stackes, 50.000 animaux tatoues, 1'encadrement de 567 eleveurs de bovins, le contr6le de qualite de 116.000 carcasses de bovins, 16.000 carcasses de petits ruminants et 900 carcasses de porcins, l'octroi de 88.626.000 GNF A 18 promoteurs dans le cadre de la privatisation, 102 Millions de GNF A 18 promoteurs, toutes filieres confondues, dont 12 Millions de subventions ont ete accordes dans le cadre des credits pilote PRSE, la formation de 700 auxiliaires d'elevage et 500 eleveurs en sante animale et l'organisation de la foire nationale de l'Elevage A Kolaboui sous votre presidence d'honneur, constituent la synthese de quelques realisations de terrain. Enfin, 76 agents ont beneficie de 3 sessions de formation au CFEL de Labe, 9 cadres ont beneficie de stages A l'exterieur et 4 cadres ont participe A des voyages d'etudes A l'exterieur. This statement clearly indicates the very positive assessment of project achievements by the Borrower's representative.  I  IBRD 18990R MAURITANIA 12- 10- t rv-_ ~~~S E N E G A Lj SENEGAL r -M A L I- M A L I .., ,-.- r FASO B,SSu 'GUINEA- SIERRA LEONE- COTE DRIVIT P CR E GHANA LJ ProjectILocations S .S A t . A . -L. . /~~~~~~~-M /|CP acnto oe- ls Ctgr od < Q~~~~ Kolobiavi~ ~ ~~~~~~~olb 10, S. eria r: LU~~~~~~~~~~~~~inkv OGE H- d