Burkina Faso - Agriculture Sector Adjustment Project

 Agriculture sector adjustment project Report No: ; Type: Report/Evaluation Memorandum ; Country: Burkina Faso; Region: Africa; Sector: Agriculture Adjustment; Major Sector: Agriculture; ProjectID: P000295 Burkina Faso: Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (Credit 2381-BUR) The Burkina Faso Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AG. SECAL I), supported by Credit 2381-BUR for SDR 20.6 million, was approved in FY92, and made effective on August 31, 1993. Parallel financing was provided by the European Union and the Government of France. The credit was fully disbursed and closed on December 31, 1995, one year later than planned. The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was prepared by the Africa Regional office. The borrower also prepared a full implementation completion report, and the English translation of the conclusions is annexed to the ICR. The annex also includes borrower's comments on the ICR, in French. The project objectives were to modernize and diversify agriculture, increase food security and improve natural resource management. The program sought to achieve these goals through reforms aimed at (a) improving the land tenure system; (b) trade liberalization; (c) reorganizing and privatizing key sector institutions; (d) improving public financial management; and (e) reducing the role of the state in domestic grain markets. The design of AG. SECAL I was based on the government's letter of agricultural development policy (LPDA), the preparation of which was highly participatory and consistent with the government's Policy Framework Paper as well as IDA's country assistance strategy. To achieve these objectives, fifty measures were identified by the LPDA. Of these, several core measures were selected as tranche release conditions. The project partially achieved its objectives. Despite its complexity, substantial progress was made in the areas of trade and price liberalization, tariff reform, food security and strengthening of the cotton and sugar sub-sectors. Delays occurred in the reforms related to land laws, reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MARA), privatization, and public financial management. Reforms in land laws and improvement in public financial management are currently under way, at a slower pace than originally planned. MARA restructuring and privatization stalled owing to divergent opinions among key donors on the design and programming of the restructuring. Privatization efforts were thwarted in some instances due to lack of sufficient preparation of the entities by government and in others due to the limited absorptive capacity of the private sector. The Government decided to liquidate some institutions which could not be privatized, even though such action was not contemplated under the project. Nevertheless, those measures that were initially unsuccessful are now being implemented. The ICR does not include any performance indicators, primarily because such indicators were not included in the design of the program. The lack of any performance data makes it difficult to assess the outcome of the project. Based on the information presented in the ICR, the Operations Evaluations Department disagrees with the ICR in rating project outcome as satisfactory. OED rates project outcome as marginally satisfactory because of the failure to make progress towards some of the key objectives and delays in some others. However, OED agrees with the ICR in rating institutional development as moderate, sustainability as likely and IDA performance as satisfactory. Nevertheless, the progress made in implementing several difficult sectoral reforms highlights the importance of participatory processes in their preparation and implementation. Such participation materially enhanced the borrowers ownership and commitment to reform. The project also demonstrates the need for performance indicators for monitoring (e.g., for purposes of tranche release, as noted in the ICR) and for the evaluation of the program. The delays experienced in carrying out some reforms indicate the importance of a complete appraisal of the potential and optimal sequencing of the privatization of public entities and the design and flexibility of performance contracts with continuing parastatals. Another lesson is the need for prior donor agreement on both the principles and actions of reform. There is also the need to give the agency responsible for managing sector reform projects sufficient authority to overcome capacity and leadership constraints as well as friction among technical line ministries. The quality of the ICR is satisfactory. However, its presentation could have been improved by avoiding the appearance of conflicting views in different parts of the report. An audit is planned.