Local forest access control in Senegal : toward participatory forestry policies - a forestry sector policy report

21801 January 1995 Regional Program for the Traditional Energy Sector Discussion Paper Series LOCAL FOREST ACCESS CONTROL IN SENEGAL: TOWARD PARTICIPATORY FORESTRY POLICIES A Forestry Sector Policy Report January, 1995 Dr. Jesse Ribot Center for Population and Development Studies, Harvard University Directed by The World Bank, Africa Region Supported by Directorate General for International Cooperation The Netherlands  RPTES Coordination Team Boris Utria, Program Manager Max Wilton, Senior Adviser Mathieu-C. Koumoin, Energy Economist Koffi Ekouevi, Economist Suzanne Roddis, Operations Analyst For additional information on the RPTES program or the Discussion Paper series, please contact: RPTES Program Energy Africa Region The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 tel: (202) 473-4488 / 473-0719 fax: (202) 473-8249 e-mail: RPTES@worldbank.org  REVIEW OF POLICIES IN THE TRADITIONAL ENERGY SECTOR RPTES LOCAL FOREST ACCESS CONTROL IN SENEGAL: TOWARD PARTICIPATORY FORESTRY POLICIES A Forestry Sector Policy Report January, 1995 Dr. Jesse Ribot Center for Population and Development Studies, Harvard University NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT WAS PRODUCED AS PART OF A CONSULTING ASSIGNMENT BY THE AUTHOR TO THE RPTES PROGRAM. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL WORLD BANK DOCUMENT. THE FINDINGS, INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS PRESENTED HEREIN ARE ENTIRELY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHOR.   Table of Contents List of Acronyms .v.......... .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . v Glossary .............. ... ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. . . vi SECTION I: INTRODUCTION .1....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 SECTION II: ACTORS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE CHARCOAL MARKET ...... 3 I. Woodfuel Sector Actors and the Organization of Production and Marketing ... .... 3 II. Prices, Quantities, Incomes and the Distribution of Benefits ................ 3 A. Income and Distribution in the Sector ......................... 3 1. Surga, Patrons, Coxeurs and Villagers .................... 3 2. Transport as a Special Issue ........................... 8 3. Summary ...................................... 8 III. Maintaining Concentration: structures and mechanisms .................. 9 1. Surga ........................................ 9 2. Patrons ....................................... 10 3. Coxeurs and Diallo Kerifi ............................ 11 4. Summary ...................................... 12 SECTION III: POLICY ANALYSIS ................................ 14 I. Abbreviated History of Forestry Policy and Access to Forest Benefits in Senegal-- Policy and the Politics of Access ............ .................. 14 A. Land Law, Forestry Codes and Local Forest Resources Control ... ...... 14 B. Access to Commerce ................................... 15 C. Access to Production ................................... 16 D. Access and Implementation--Multiple Meanings of Forestry Policy .. ..... 16 E. Summary .......................................... 18 II. Review and Critique of New Forestry Code and Application Decree ........... 19 A. Repartition of the Forested Domain .......................... 19 1. The Classified Domain of the State ...................... 20 2. The Protected Domain of the State ...................... 21 3. The Private Forest Domain ........................... 22 4. Classified Domain of Regions, Local Collectives? ............. 22 5. Summary ...................................... 22 B. Management Plans .................................... 24 ii  C. Exploitation Rights and Permits ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 D. Pricing Policies ............. ... .. .. ... .. .. .. .. ... .. . . 31 E. Taxes . ............................................ 32 1. Relative Taxation of Charcoal and Firewood ...... . . . . . . . . . . 32 2. Danger of Expressing Taxes and Quotas in Steres ..... . . . . . . . . 34 3. Disposition of Tax, Fine, Sale of Confiscated Goods, and Fee Revenues ........... .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . . 34 III. Other Policies Shaping Distribution in the Woodfuel Sector ..... . . . . . . . . . . 36 A. Woodfuel Production Quotas ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 B. Professional Cards ............... ... ... .. ... ... .... . 38 C. Garage at Bargny ................................ .... . 39 IV. Legal and Institutional Issues ............. ... .. ... .. .. ... .. .. . . 40 A. Local Councils, Representation and Traditional Authority ..... . . . . . . . . 40 1. Who Represents Rural Populations? ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 2. Recognized Non-Governmental Institutions ...... . . . . . . . . . . . 44 B. Conflicts Between Migrant Charcoal Producers and Local Populations .... . 45 C. Organizing the Market ........... . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . 45 SECTION IV: STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 I. Strategy for Woodfuel Sector Reform--Glasnost avec Peristroika .. ....... . . . . 47 A. Oligopoly Substitution Decentralization with a Free Rider Benefit: A transitional strategy .......... . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . 47 B. Oligopoly as "User Group" .............. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . 47 C. The Free Rider Benefit ........... . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . 48 D. Substituting Oligopoly with Competition and Free Rider Benefit with Higher Producer Prices ......... . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . 48 E. Protecting the Fledgling Peasant Producers ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 F. How to Proceed .5.0........... .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. ... . ... . SO Introduce Agreements of Understanding ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Move From Fixed National Quota to Ecological/Local-Need-Based Production Ceilings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Tax and Fee Incentives ........... .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . . . 52 Measures to Encourage Vertical Penetration of the Market by Village- Based Producers ......... . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Accompanying Measures .54 Vision and Re-vision .54 G. Negotiation Strategies .54 II. Other Key Options .54 Representation .54 Rights over the Disposition of Forests .55 iii  Entry into Marketing .................... . ..... ... ... 55 Accompanying Measures .55 Establish Recourse Channels .55 Annex A: Price Data .56 Annex B: The Story of Makacoulibantang .63 Bibliography .66 Works Cited .66 Other Works Consulted ................................... 71 iv   List of Acronyms CONAFAS Le Comite National des Foyers Ameliores (National Committee for Improved Cookstoves) CR Communite Ruraux (Rural Community) CTS Companie Tourbiere du Senegal (Peat Company of Senegal) DA Direction de I'Artisanat (Crafts Bureau) DE Direction de l'Energie (Energy Office of MEMI) DEF Direction des Eaux et Forets (Office of Water and Forests) DEFCCS Direction des Eaux et Forets, Chasse et de la Conservation des Sols (Office of Water, Forests, Hunting and Soil Conservation--Referred to in this report as the Forest Service) FNCS Federation Nationale des Cooperatives du Senegal (National Federation of Cooperatives of Senegal) GIE Groupement d'Interet Economique (Economic Interest Groups) IREF Inspection Regionale des Eaux et Forets (Regional Inspection Bureau of DEFCCS) LC Local Collective (Collectivities Locales) MC Ministere du Commerce (Ministry of Commerce) MEF Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances (Ministry of Economics and Finance) MEMI Ministere de l'Energie, des Mines et de l'Industrie (Ministry of Energy, Mines and Industry) MEPN Ministere de l'Environnement et de la Protection de la Nature (Ministry of the Environment and the Protection of Nature) MFEF Ministere de la Femme, de l'Enfant et de la Famille (Ministry of Women, Children and the Family) MTG Ministere des Transports et la Gendarmerie (Ministry of Transport and of State Police) PAF Plan d'Action Forestier (Forestry Action Plan) PDDF Plan Directeur de Developpement Forestier (Master Plan for Forest Development) RDS Republique du Senegal (Republic of Senegal) RC Rural Community (Communite Ruraux) UNCEF Union Nationale des Cooperatives d'Exploitants Forestier (National Union of Forest Producer Cooperatives) v   Glossary Competence The domain over which an individual or institution has legal decision making powers. Jurisdiction. Codes The Francophone countries call their forestry laws forestry codes, reflecting the history Napoleonic code law in these countries. Corv&e Obligatory or forced labor. Tax in Labor. Coxeur Urban Woodfuel Wholesaler. Decentralization The process of devolving decision making powers to smaller and more deconcentrated administrative and representative bodies. This may include transferring the power to manage natural resources from the Forestry Service to a local Territorial Collective. Deconcentration The process of moving government agencies and services closer to the constituent and recipient populations. This may include such measures as having representatives of the Central Government or its Ministries at the level of the Arrondissement or Circle. Filiere This French term (meaning string) refers to the entire chain of production from the rural origins of woodfuels to their final consumption. It is analogous to the term sector, but more specifically focuses on the set of market relations that hold a sector together. Groupements Economic or social interest groups or organizations. Kontrapalaas Intermediary between charcoal patrons and charcoal surga. Legal Personality Having legal status and legal administrative powers. A body that is given the power by the state to make decisions has Legal Personality. Local Collective The smallest elected administrative unit in Senegal. In rural areas they are called Rural Communities and in urban areas they are called Communes. vi  Moral Personality Having the legal status of a person, as in a corporation. Patron Woodfuel merchant. Prefet Prefect in English. The prefet is the administrative appointee of the central government (ministry of the interior) at the level of the region, province or arrondissement. Quittance Receipt given when confiscated forest products are sold at auction by the Forest Service. These receipts serve also as transport permits. Responsibilization The giving of responsibilities often including the giving of authority. It usually refers to the teaching of rural populations to manage forests accompanied by the devolution to them of forest management tasks. Rural Community The smallest elected rural administrative unit. This is a rural Local Collective. Sous-Pr6fet The administrative appointee at the next lower level of administrative organization below the prefet. Surga Woodcutter/charcoal maker. Territorial Collective These are territorial divisions recognized by the central state such as Regions, Provinces, Arrondissements, Circles, Rural Communes, Rural Communities, etc. Terroir The usage area of a village or other social group. The area in which a group has usufruct claims or exercises usufruct rights. The village commons. vii  SECTION I: INTRODUCTION In Senegal rural household energy consumption is almost 99 percent woodfuels while in urban areas woodfuels make up over 88 percent of household energy (ESMAP 1989).' Urban dwellers tend to consume charcoal while rural dwellers consume firewood directly. Most firewood collection and use is non-commercial gathering of deadwood that is relatively diffuse and has few social or ecological effects. Charcoal production, however, is a commercial endeavor that takes place on a large scale and in a concentrated manner, often cutting the forests out from under forest village populations. Wood is cut, carbonized and trucked to the urban centers by urban merchants and their hired migrant woodcutters. Based on a long history of centralized forestry policies these merchants have access to the forests, while villagers have little control over this resource on which they depend for subsistence and commercial fruits, leaves, barks, wood, roots, tubers, dies, herbs, medicines and game. In addition, the benefits that flow from the commercial use of forests in Senegal accrue to merchants and transporters, rather than to the forest-village populations who bare the costs of forest vegetation changes. But, there is change afoot. There is a movement toward decentralizing and de- concentrating rural resource management. Senegal's Forestry Action Plan (PAF) calls for increased popular participation or "responsibilization" of local populations (RdS 1993a). The PAF also calls for creating financial incentives for villagers to enter forest production (RdS 1993a:89). As part of the effort to realize these goals, a new forestry code has been written. A new forestry code passed through the national assembly in February of 1993. The new code will restructure the distribution of responsibilities and benefits from commercial use of the forest resource. It is unclear, however, whether the changes foreseen in the new code will constitute decentralization or result in equitable and accountably representative inclusion of village populations in the management of their forest resources, or inclusion of villagers in the benefits of forest resource production. The new code decentralizes some limited control over forest resources by incorporating local governance structures, called Local Collectives (LC)2, into forest management. While the new code specifies that LCs will, under certain circumstances, have the rights to commercial production in their forests, the administrative structures and specifications do not guarantee local control of the resource or accountable representation in decision making over the disposition of forest resources. Most problematic, the new code does not explicitly dismantle the policies that support highly concentrated merchant control over forest product markets, where the benefits that flow from Senegal's forests are now locked up. 'Over 60 percent of all primary energy is derived from woodfuels, 36 percent from charcoal and 25 percent directly from firewood. The remaining 40 percent of Senegal's energy comes from imported petroleum, almost all used for transport and industry. (RPTES 1994:17.) 'Local Collectives or Collectivities Locales are the smallest unit of elected representation with legal standing. Rural Local Collectives are called Rural Communities or Communite Ruraux (RC). LCs and RCs are discussed in greater detail under "Legal and Institutional Issues."  The new code moves toward inclusion of rural populations in forest management. This report evaluates just how far that inclusion goes and proposes some alternatives for enabling greater peasant participation in control over forests and the benefits that flow from them. This report is divided into four Sections: "Introduction," "Actors and Income Distribution," "Policy Analysis," and "Strategies and Options." The second section of this report, provides an evaluation of income distribution and its underpinnings in Senegal's woodfuel markets. It introduces the actors within the market and briefly describes the organization of production. It then evaluates the highly skewed distribution of income among these actors. The section ends with an outline of the structures and mechanisms by which the currently unequal distribution is maintained within this sector. Section three examines how old and new policies applied to Senegal's woodfuel sector shape opportunities for involving rural populations in the management and benefits of forest- based production in Senegal. This section evaluates how the skewed distribution developed through the historical evolution of forestry policy toward a highly concentrated form of control over forest products and forest product markets. Section three then examines new policies aimed at better integration of rural populations into forest management. It evaluates: 1) how the new code (both its legislative and its regulatory portions) departs from and reinforces historical trends--in tenure, access to resources, access to markets, management, etc.; 2) how other policies including: policies, pricing and taxation, production quotas, professional cards, etc., effect the sector; and 3) how the new code articulates with existing rural institutions in structuring rural rights and control over forests and forest management. Section four of the report proposes a strategy for using the existing inequalities in the charcoal market as the motor for reform. Some recommendations developed in the analyses are also summarized. More detailed recommendations, however, are presented in the text at the end of the discussion in each sub-section. This report focuses on charcoal production and marketing, since charcoal dominates the market and commercial firewood production and consumption is marginal. Nevertheless, the firewood trade is conducted by the same actors trading in charcoal, hence, by examining charcoal markets, the firewood trade is effectively covered. 2  SECTION II: ACTORS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE CHARCOAL MARKET I. Woodfuel Sector Actors and the Organization of Production and Marketing: Figure 1 shows the actors working in Senegal's Charcoal market. The market is currently composed of surga, mostly Guinean Fulbe migrant laborers hired by the patrons to cut and carbonize wood for the production of charcoal.3 Foremen called kontrapalaas, coordinate groups of surga into various working parties and act as intermediaries between surga and their patrons.4 The patrons are merchants who are organized into cooperatives regrouped by the National Union of Forestry Cooperatives (UNCF). These predominantly urban-based merchants hire surga, give them subsistence advances and return (about three months later) with a trucker to buy the charcoal when the kontrapalaas informs them that the charcoal is ready. The transporters are truckers who transport the charcoal from the forests to the cities where it is consumed. Once in the city, patrons sell their charcoal to a coxeur, or wholesaler, who then distributes charcoal to the vendors, called Diallo kerini.5 II. Prices, Quantities, Incomes and the Distribution of Benefits: A. Income and Distribution in the Sector: 1. Surga, Patrons, Coxeurs and Villagers: Table I presents estimates of 1987 charcoal prices based on extensive surveys conducted in 1987 and present prices based on a spot survey of the market conducted the last week of June 1994, in Dakar and the Tambacounda region. In the table, these prices are compared with the price structures the Forest Service's Division of Forest Exploitation considers to be currently in effect (The Forest Service is officially called: Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forets et Conservation des Sol--DEFCCS). For the purposes of this report, I will use the price structures derived from my June spot surveys. Using prices from Table I, Table II and Table III present estimates of the vertical distribution of income in the market in 1987 and 1994 respectively. Table It evaluates the vertical distribution of income and of profit within the market (the top half of the table) and the benefits that accrue to one small village, Daru Fall, that was host to charcoal makers in the region of Tambacounda (bottom half of table). Subtracting the subsistence cost of living at the time from the net income of each actor derives a rough estimate of annual profits. The net annual average income figures show that income is highest among the coxeurs and patrons. This figure does not include income and profits for the transporters since transport is considered here as an exogenous cost. 3This report will also use the term woodcutter to refer to the surga or primary producers. Woodcutting here includes the cutting of wood and its carbonization. 4Kontrapalaas come from among the surga. They are simply surga favored by their patrons. They cut and carbonize wood, while playing the role of foreman. 'For a detailed description of the social, economic and political economic dynamics of this market see Ribot 1994; 1993; 1990. 3  Urban population Retailers Ruraiollo Kerisi Urban wholesalers Coxeurs RTransportersio | ~Merchants Patrons | Rural producers l ~~ Surgo- Rural population --Rural environment-- Legend: Loans-f Charcoal - - Reciprocal -relations Figure 1: Organization of Senegal's Charcoal Market 4  Table I: Price Structure of Charcoal Delivered to Dakar from the Region of Tambacounda: Survey Data and DEFCCS Estimates FCFA/42 kg Sack Actual Real' Actual Prces Derived from Spot Checks Prices Estimated by Prices Derived from Surveys 1987 6/94 DEFCCS 2194 Producers (Surga) Price (or Margin) 512 550 750 Forest Tax 75 250 250 Truck Leading and Unloading Labor: -Loading 60 115 75 -Unloading (25) (65) (35) (50) Diverse Coats (1987 Extrapolatioms) -Umpecified 200 -Paid by Surga 67 91 -Paid by Patron 103 140 -Paid by Coxeuw 0 0 -Paid by Diallo kerift 57 77 Toal: 227 308 Transpon 663 900 800 Mercihm (Patron) Profit Margin 365 1127 250 Patron Price 1796 3250 2325 Urban Wholesale (Coxeur) Margin 142 150 250 Coxcur Price 1940 3400 2575 Vender (Dallo keri8) Margin 389 590 200 Diallo Ker,i Price 2329 3990 2775 Price per Kg in Dakar -Official -Estimated 40 95 50 -Measured | 70 l ~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~56 95l OURCES: RdS 1994a; RdS 1994b; Ribot 1990; Field Surveys (see Annex A for more detailed explanation of table and data). In this market the benefits are concentrated in the hands of the patrons and the coxeurs. As can be seen from the analysis based on 1987 data, roughly 50 percent of the profits are with the patrons, 20 percent with the coxeurs, 20 percent with the surga and 10 percent with the Diallo kerini. While the surga retain 20 percent of the profits (a portion of which they send back to their families in Guinea), they are a very large group, and the total profit each retains is very small. In addition, the income among surga is evenly distributed, hence, there are few surga making more than twice the average. There is a considerable amount of concentration among the patrons and coxeurs. The figures in this table show the average income in each group. But, of the over 4000 patrons, 5  Table II: Vertical Distribution of Income from Commercial Charcoal Production in Senegal 1987 Groups Involved in Group Avg. Net Group Per- Per- Dis- Charcoal Market Size Income Net cent cent tnbu- (1000 CFA Income of Net of tion per (CFA Market Market __________ person) xlO') Income Profit Retailers + Outlet owner 1,850 270 490 10.3 10.5 even Urban Wholesalers 300 1,705 525 10.6 18.4 skewed Merchants 4,100 465 1,925 39.5 52.6 skewed Charcoal Makers 11,650 165 1,925 39.6 18.4 even Total 4,830 100 100 Gross Group Income Gross as Income % of Gross (CFA Market xlOh) Revenue |Forestry Dept NA Taxes/Fees 385,000 J 3851 4.6 NA Villagers (DF) (DF) (all (all villages) villages) Daru Fall 500 c' -Payoffs skewed to chief 0.1 17.5 0.2 g2Jc -Room/Food 6.0 315 4.0 skewed comparisons GDP/capita 451 NA Min. Wage 595 OURCE: Data taken from Ribot 199. Notes: Jc=skewed by class. 2g=skewed by gender. a large portion are registered as cooperative members just to fill cooperatives with dummy members, justifying larger quotas for the cooperative. Only 15 to 20 of the 4000 registered patrons control over 50 percent of the commerce (Ribot 1990; Madon 1987). Similarly, most coxeurs are small operators, while there are only on the order of 25 who control half of the urban wholesale market. Many of the larger coxeurs also are owners of vending outlets, 6  hence they also collect part of the margin indicated under the Diallo kerini and outlet owners. In short, in the analysis of 1987 data, the average income of the top group of larger patrons and coxeurs bring in profits on the order of 30 or 40 million and 10 million FCFA per year respectively. (Ribot 1990.)' Table III shows an analysis of the vertical distribution using the June 1994 spot- checked price data. These are rough estimates that simply put the conclusions from 1987 in more current terms. These spot-check prices were checked by one of the largest merchants in the market who confirmed that these prices are accurate. Table m: Vertical Distribution of Income from Commercial Charcoal Prodiction in Senegal 1994 Estimate Groups in Charcoal Group Avg. Avg. Avg. Net Group Dis- Market Size Volume of Sacks Net Annual Net Income. tribu- (6.400,000 sacks/year Handled Income Income (CFA x106) tion produced for urban per Person per per (CFA x1O' consumption) year Sack perI____ person) Retailers t+ Ouderi wner 3,300 1W950 513 1.0 3,300 even Urban Wholsalers 300 11,700 150 1.76 530 skewed (Dakar Only) _ Merchants 4,350 1,560 987 1.54 6,700 skewed Cnarcoal Makers 18,300 350 459 0.16 2.930 even Total 26,250 [ 2.109 13.460 SOURCES: Ribot 1990; RPTES 1994; Derivatio of figures iscussed in Annex A. A similar analysis, assuming the 1987 horizontal distribution of income in the market today, shows that the income gained from the sale of charcoal in Dakar' for the wealthiest 20 patrons and the top 25 coxeurs would average 92 to 120 million CFA per year for the patrons, and around 11 million for the coxeurs. These estimates are based on spot prices taken at one period during the year (June 1994). Caution must be taken since these latter figures are extrapolations over the whole year for prices and quantities that vary with the seasons. This high degree of concentration in the market is certainly present today. For example, in August 1994 the single largest patron in the market was allocated a 6All figures are in current CFA. 'Assuming the consumption in Dakar is 3,500,000 sacks per year (RPTES 1994:22). 7  supplementary quota (above the initial national quota) of over 250,000 sacks for his private enterprise (Sarr 1994; personal communications with DEFCCS 1994). The profits (expenses subtracted out) from selling the charcoal from this supplementary quota alone is on the order of 280 million FCFA (half a million U.S. dollars). (This figure does not include the income that this same merchant--who also owns trucks--makes from transporting the charcoal at a price fixed at around 30 percent above the market price for transport. Simply the fixing of the transport price would add an additional 75 million FCFA in profits.) In short, the large merchants and coxeurs in this market concentrate enormous wealth. In stark contrast to the income of the large coxeurs and merchants, minimal benefits remain with village populations. The bottom half of Table II shows what happened in one village of 500 Serer and Wolof inhabitants in the Tambacounda region. In 1987, 35,000 sacks of charcoal were produced in the surrounding forests by 100 migrant surga living temporarily in the village. This village gained a total income of 17 million CFA from payoffs to the village chief (5000 FCFA per truckload). An additional total of 315 million FCFA was paid to the heads of household for the rental of a hut and a "bowl," or meals (at 6000 FCFA per month per surga). On average, if the income were evenly distributed, each villager would have a gross income of 6,100 FCFA per year from the woodfuel trade.8 This meager income remaining in the villages, represents only about four percent of the gross market revenues. In other words, four percent of the sales price of charcoal remains in the village. Further, this little income is not evenly distributed within the village. The income from payoffs goes to the village chief--it is not clear how much is spent on behalf of the village. The income from food and housing goes to the male heads of households, while the women do the work of cooking meals and cleaning house. Hence, the small portion of benefits from the charcoal trade that remain in the forest villages is skewed along gender lines, and perhaps along lines of authority as well. 2. Transport as a Special Issue: The above analysis counts transport as an exogenous expense paid by the patrons. The price of transport in this sector, however, is not competitive. It is fixed in collusion among the transporters and the patrons. The larger patrons in the market own trucks. Together with the other truckers working in the charcoal markets, the transporters and merchants have colluded to fix the price of transport from the Tambacounda region (the largest production center in Senegal) to Dakar, for example, at 900 FCFA per sack. This price is, according to truckers interviewed in June 1994, about 30 percent hire than the price they can conmmand in transporting other goods. Hence, there is approximately a 300 FCFA per sack benefit, above the competitive price, that accrues to truckers due to collusion in this sector. 3. Summary: The current situation in the market is one of highly skewed distribution of income. Villagers retain a very small portion of the benefits, less than five percent of the market's gross revenues, that flow from the commercialization of the forests in which their 8Unlike the figures presented above, the expenses are not yet subtracted from these due to the difficulties in estimating the value of the housing and food that villagers supplied. In other words, these are overestimates of the 'benefits' that remain in the village. The actual benefits are therefore below four percent. 8  communities are located. In the next section I will discuss the history of how access to the benefits of forest resources has been maintained through forestry policy, and how a small group of merchants have managed to concentrate and control these benefits. It is critical to understand the mechanisms of concentration if decentralization is to proceed in a manner that devolves benefits of commercial forest activities as well as responsibilities for forest management to village communities. This section illustrates the distributional problems within the market. The next section sketches some mechanisms by which actors are included and excluded from production and marketing at each level of the market. The policy analysis section that follows, helps explain how this distribution came about and how the new and proposed forestry policies may shape it. III. Maintaining Concentration: structures and mechanisms The ultimate question is how the benefits concentrated high up in the market can be devolved to village populations so as to make it worth their while to manage the resource base. To do this there are at least three reasons that the mechanisms currently underpinning concentration must be understood. First, some of these mechanisms need to be removed so that the benefits of the market are available to village populations. Second, these mechanisms are useful for devolving benefits and control to village populations. Third, these mechanisms are pervasive and have deep historical roots. If these mechanisms are not well understood, they will re-emerge in the hands of the same groups now controlling market benefits. Indeed, concentration will re-emerge in this market regardless of the new policy strategy taken. Hence, concentration must be monitored and the mechanisms by which it is achieved must be understood so as to be able to identify the problem as it re-emerges and to adjust policies in response to the new situation. Policies are applied in a complex and fluid context. They must be as flexible as the social and political economic arrangements that will reshape them in the process of implementation. Below is a quick sketch of the entry and exit barriers and mechanisms used to maintain them at each level of the market.9 1. Surga: Surga have had access to labor opportunities in the charcoal market through long- standing relations with their merchant patrons. There is a long and complex history of the dependent productive relation between the migrant charcoal makers and the patrons (see history section, above, and Ribot 1990). In short, access to labor opportunities in the market depends on relations with patrons. Under current policies, local villagers wishing to enter the market often cannot because: 1) Villagers cannot find a patron from whom they can obtain an identity card and a production permit, or to protect them from the fines or abuses of Forestry Agents if they are to produce outside of these legalities; 2) They cannot afford to organize themselves into cooperatives so as to be able to obtain their own quotas, identity cards and permits, due to the high entry barriers in the form of social relations and in the form of official and unofficial payments that 9This section was written as an annex, however, given the essential nature of these elements to the policy analysis and formulation process they are included here. 9  make entry prohibitive (see discussion under "Protecting Fledgling Peasant Producers"); 3) Without a patron to provide subsistence loans a villager cannot afford to support himself'" during the cutting period; 4) Due to the caste nature of charcoal production (usually associated with blacksmiths), many villagers will not enter this profession. Migrants are less subject to these constraints. As one migrant now living permanently in Koumpentoum explained: "There are things you don't do where you live. If you ask me to take a broom and sweep the streets here in Koumpentoum, forget it! But, if I go to Europe and you ask me, I would have no problem doing it." 5) Villagers will not cut in the area around their village if the other villagers do not want them to. Migrant laborers, however, armed with a cutting permit (permis de coupe) and backed by Forest Service agents asserting that the forests belong to the state and not to the village, can more easily work in these areas. This is particularly true since they do not have to live in the village after their work is done. Hence, the solida villagers serves to make villagers more conservative, while the migrants who ..-ore closely tied to their patrons than to the villagers, and who can use the protec aon of the foresters, can enter by force and produce without stigma. This list of entry barriers is not exhaustive, but it outlines the main problems that villagers wishing to cut wood and produce charcoal face. Today there are many villagers, whorr I have iterviewed, who would be very happy to produce charcoal if given the oppc anity. _y have simply not been able to obtain permits and quotas. These same villa5 ers are against migrants cutting in their forests, partly because they would like to do some cutting themselves and partly because they have felt the effects of over-cutting in their areas. 2. Patrons: Barriers to entry into marketing include: 1) Difficulties in entering and in forming cooperatives, mentioned above. Cooperative membership is required by the state and the number of cooperatives in the market L limited. 2) Without entry into cooperatives, villagers cannot obtain permits, identity cards or quotas. 3) hout quotas villagers cannot obtain circulation permits. 4 1uired merchant licenses (also discussed under "Professional Cards and C erative lembership") are also hard to obtain, and without a merchant's license viid,gers cannot operate in the market (in a cooperative or firmr 5) Villagers cannot afford to pay the price of transport up froi: 6) Villagers cannot afford to make the necessary payoffs or pay ui, price of auction to enter the market through the route of "quittances" (discussed in history section). 7) Villagers cannot afford to pay the taxes and fees prior to selling their product, hence, they cannot afford to obtain a circulation permnit. '