Cameroon - Economic Management Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFIClAL USE ONLY Rqxwt No. 14156 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) 9 a (LOAN 3110-CM) MARCH 29, 1995 FLECoPY Country Operations I Division Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used bv recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents mav not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) Currency Equivalent Currency unit = CFA Francs * Average Exchange Rate 1987 300.54 1988 297.85 1989 319.01 1990 272.26 1991 282.11 1992 264.69 1993 283.16 1994 586.00 Fiscal Year July I - June 30 * The CFA Franc (CFAF) is tied to the French franc (FF) in the ratio of FF1 to CFAF 100. (1994) The French franc is currently floating.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY' REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric ton (mt) = 2.200 pounds = 1,000 kg Kilometer (lum) = 0.6215 = 1,000 meters Cubic meter (m3) = 1.000 liters Meter (m) = 1.09 yards Square meter (m2) = 10.76 square feet ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED AIDB - African Development Bank BEAC - Bank of the Central African States CAA - External Debt Agency (Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement) CRA - Administrative Reform Committee DCE - Division des Contr6les Economiques DGTC - Direction Generale des Travaux du Cameroun DP - Direction de la Prevision DPP - Directorate for Projects and Programs DRA - Division de la Reforme Administrative DSCN - Directorate of Statistics and National Accounts ERC - Economic Recovery Credit FAC - Fonds d'Aide a la Cooperation ISMP - Institut Superieur de Management Public MIINASCOP - Ministry of Social Affairs MINAT - Ministry of Territorial Administration MINDIC - Ministry of Industry and Commerce MINEDUC - Ministry of Education MRNEI - Ministry of Finance MINFOPRA - Ministry of the Civil Service MINPAT - Ministry of Planning MINSANTE - Ministry of Health MINTPS - Ministry of Labor and Social Security PAGE - Economic Management Project (Projet d'Appui A la Gestion Economique) PE - Public Enterprise PIP - Public Investment Program POE - Plan d'Organization et d'Effectifs SAC - Structural Adjustment Credit SGP - Secr6tariat de Gestion du Projet UDEAC - Union Douaniere et Economique des Pays de I'Afrique Centrale (Central African Customs and Economic Union) This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their |official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 31 1-CM) KEY PROJECT DATA US$ Million Appraisal Actual Total Project Costs 14.5 10.5 of which: Government 1.5 1.5 Bank 9.0 9.0 Cofinancing 4.0 Total 14.5 10.5 Bank Loan Amount 9.0 9.0 Terns: Interest Rate: First semester of 1989 = 7.65 percent. Thereafter variable interest not equal to the costs of qualified borrowing plan: one-half of one percent Maturity: 17 years Grace: 5 years Commitrnent Fee: 3/4 of 1% Time Overrun: None Borrower: Government of Cameroon Executing Agency: Ministry of Planning (later Ministry of Stabilization and Plan) Institutional Development: A coordinating unit (Project Management Secretariat) was established to manage the project on a day-to-day basis Timetable of Key Events (a) Project prepared by: Government of Cameroon with Bank assistance (b) Identification Mission: Novernber 1988 (c) Appraisal Mission: February-March 1989 (d) Completion of Negotiations: May 1989 (e) Board Approval: July 11, 1989 (t) Loan Agreement signed on: July 17, 1989 (g) Actual Date of Effectiveness: January 3, 1990 (h) First Disbursement: January 29, 1990 (i) Initial Closing Date: December 31, 1993 (j) Actual Closing Date December 31, 1993 (k) Last Disbursement Date: June 30, 1994' The gace period to receive the last application under the loan has been extended to June 30, 1994, to allow for the full docunentation of the Special Account  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 USA. Office of Director-General March 29, 1995 Operations Evaluation MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Cameroon - Economic Management Proiect (PAGE) (Loan 3110-CM) Attached is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Cameroon Economic Management Project (PAGE) (Loan 3110-CM), prepared by the Africa Regional Office. The PCR includes Part II, prepared by the Borrower. The Economic Management Project was a technical assistance loan designed to help the Government of Cameroon to: formulate and implement the reforms within the framework of the structural adjustment program that was also supported by the Bank through a SAL; strengthen the institutional capacity to conduct policy analysis and manage the long term development of the economy; and improve coordination among many key agencies of the Government. Technical assistance was to be provided in support of public investment programming; improvement of debt management and monitoring; improvement of national statistics; support of reforms in civil service; and public enterprise reforms. During its implementation period, the project's objectives were increased to include other activities, even though additional cofinancing resources for the operation did not materialize. The project also called for recruitment of local technical expertise. The project fell short of its objectives. Limited project results were mainly due to lack of Government commitment to pursue the reforms under the SAL. Moreover, program implementation was hampered by management problems, which led to delays in selection of experts and substantial shortfalls in meeting institutional development objectives. The PCR discusses other reasons for the shortcomings, including the ambitious scope of the project, and the fact that the public administration was il-prepared to accept change. Given the above shortcomings, the project outcome is rated as unsatisfactory. The institutional development is rated as modest. Project sustainability is unlikely. The PCR is of good quality. No audit is planned. Francisa a Acting Director eneral Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and my be used by recipients only in the perfonnance of their ofricial duties. hts contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY' REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 31 1-CM) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Preface .....................................................i Evaluation Summary .................................................... ii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identity .....................................................1 2. Background ......................................................I 3. Preparation and Appraisal ......................................................3 4. Project Objectives and Description .....................................................3 5. Project Cost and Financing ......................................................5 6. Project Design and Organization .....................................................6 7. Project Implementation and Results ................ .....................................6 8. Consultants Performance .................................................... 10 9. Impact and Sustainability of the Project ...................... .............................. 11 10. Bank Performance .................................................... 12 11. Borrower Performance .................................................... 12 12. Project Financing and Total Cost .................................................... 13 13. Project Documentation and Data .................................................... 13 14. Findings and Lessons Leamed .................................................... 13 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ... 15-50 PART mI: BASIC DATA/STATISTICAL INFORMATION ANNEXES Annex I Related Bank Loans .51 Annex 1! Project Timetable .52 Annex m Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements .53 Annex IV Project Cost and Financing .54 Annex V Allocation of Proceeds .55 Annex VI Manpower Allocation.56 Annex VII Use of Staff Resources .57 Annex VIII Status of Loan Covenants .58 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their officia duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.l   REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Economic Management Project, for which Loan 3110-CM in the amount of US$9.0 million was made to the Republic of Cameroon. The project was designed to (i) provide short-term assistance to assist the Government in fornulating and implementing reforms within the framework of the structural adjustment program supported by Bank Loan 3089-CM; (ii) achieve a lasting strengthening of the government's capacity in policy analysis and management of the country's economy in the long-term; and (iii) improve coordination among key government agencies. The major components of the project were: strengthening policy analysis and macroeconomic management, particularly in public investment programming, debt management, and statistical data generation; and reforms of the civil service and the parapublic sector. The loan was approved on July 11, 1989, signed on July 17, 1989, and became effective on January 3,1990. The loan was closed on schedule on December 31, 1993. The PCR preparation mission was carried out in February 1994. The last disbursement is expected to be made on June 30,1994.1 This PCR was prepared by the Country Operations Division, of the (then) Occidental and Central Africa Department (AFl), Africa Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary and Parts I and III), and the Borrower (Part H). Preparation of this PCR began in February 1994 and is based, inter alia, on the President's Report, the Development Credit Agreement, Project Supervision Reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, interviews of Bank staff involved in project implementation and internal Bank memoranda. 1 The gree period to receive the last application under the loan has been extended to June 30, 1994, to allow for the full documentation of the Special Account.   EVALUATION SUMMARY OBJECTIVES 1.01 The Economic Management Project (PAGE) ' was designed to assist the government achieve the following objectives: (a) formulate and implement reforms in the context of its structural adjustment program; and (b) promote lasting, long-term improvements in policy analyses and management of Cameroon's economy. Another key objective was to foster improved coordination among key government agencies to improve the notorious lack of coordination existing in the Cameroonian administration. The project also put emphasis on the extensive use of Cameroonian consultants to broaden local participation in the structural adjustment program and included a special training program for local staff in key ministries in charge of economic management. 1.02 The SAL-supported program had broad objectives, namely, to reinvigorate the economy and increase per capita income; to remove progressively the constraints to increased competition and efficiently functioning markets; to reorient the role of the State from direct intervention in the production of goods and services to one of supporting private sector development; and to reorient public services. To pursue these objectives, the Program identified concrete actions in the areas of public resource management; public enterprise reform; financial and banking reform; and productive sectors (agriculture, forestry, manufacturing) development, including trade and price reforms. PROJECr DESCRIPrION 1.03 The project addressed high priority activities linked to the structural adjustment program supported by the Bank (para. 1.02). Loan effectiveness took place in January 1990 and almost immediately thereafter the Government requested the addition of two new study components: trade liberalization and balance of payments, which the Bank subsequently approved. A forestry sector reform component and a banking sector restructuring component were added later in 1990. Another amendment to the project as negotiated was the cancellation in early 1990, shortly after loan effectiveness, of the procurement sub-component of the PIP component. RESULTS 1.04 Overall project results were unsatisfactory. Several important components failed to achieve significant results. The government's lack of commitment and political will to carry out several of the SAL reforms, which were supported by the PAGE, was a main factor behind the limited project results. The government allowed conflicting political interests, disputes over jurisdiction among ministries and agencies, bureaucracy resistance to change, and limited expenditure accountability to prevail over the objectives of helping restructure the public administration to overcome the shortcomings identified during project preparation. These were: I PAGE: Projet dcAppui la Gestion Ecnomique.  - Hii - weak public institutions and administrative guidelines and procedures; lack of coordination among government ministries and agencies; and an inadequate statistical and information base requisite for proper economic management and decision-making. FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED 1.05 The PAGE aimed at providing the government with the tools, measures and policies to improve its macroeconomic management, public investment programming, debt servicing and statistical information as well as restructuring key agencies in the administration and the public enterprise sector. These were areas considered essential to the success of the adjustment program supported under the SAL. However, the PAGE failed to achieve significant results in most of these important objectives. Several factors account for the unsatisfactory project results. First, the government was not fully committed to implement the reforms and, in addition, political interests were in conflict with important project objectives. Second, the public administration was ill-equipped and unwilling to accept change. Third, the project was too ambitious in scope, i.e., it basically supported an in-depth restructuring of the public sector, for which full support was lacking. Fourth, the project scope was changed during implementation, further broadening the tasks and complicating its coverage. Fifth, the financing of the project's total cost was not assured at loan approval: expected Japanese cofinancing did not materialize. This proved to be a source of difficulties in completing components as funds became scarce. Sixth, the Bank's recruitment and contracting procedures were not always followed by the project's management unit. Seventh, the project's management unit experienced administrative difficulties as key personnel were responsible for tasks in other government ministries or agencies and, as a result, management and accounting practices were not entirely effective. 1.06 The inconsistency between the medium- to long-term objectives of PAGEs with those of structural adjustment programs which have a more short-term perspective due to their nature as quick-disbursing operations are major constraints to PAGEs meeting their objectives. PAGEs are less likely to achieve their institution-building goals when the Government is not fully committed to carry out the structural adjustment reforms that the PAGE supports. Government commitment and the obstacles posed by political interests which run counter to the project's objectives should be assessed at appraisal. At the same time, project objectives must be carefully measured against institutional capacity for implementation, and local management must be fostered in order to ensure that institution-building takes place. Finally, arrangements should be made early on in project design to ensure that adequate accounting systems and audit procedures are set up to ensure transparency in financial management {paras. 14 (a)-(e)}.  REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. PROJECr IDENT Project Name: Economic Management Project Loan No.: 3110-CM Amount: US$9.0 million RVP Unit: Africa Region Countuy: Cameroon Sector: Public Sector Management 2. BACKGROUND 2.01 Cameroon has a population of 12 million and covers a territory of 475,000 square kIlometers. The population growth rate is high at 3.2 percent a year and life expectancy is low at 56 years. Cameroon is among the countries in Africa with the greatest development potential and is richly endowed with tropical forests, coastal fisheries, mineral resources (petroleum, bauxite, natural gas), fertile agricultural land and a largely favorable climate. The country's economy is served by a well-developed infrastructure and communications network, and until the mid-1980s a well-functioning financial system. During the first 25 years after Independence (1960-85), an appropriate mix of policies allowed this potential to be realized and real economic growth averaged about 7 percent a year throughout the period. Agriculture was the main source of growth and foreign exchange earnings until 1978, when oil production started and became the cornerstone of economic growth. 2.02 The flow of oil revenues, while notionally improving the macroeconomic indicators, exacerbated Cameroon's mounting structural problems. The external resources balance went from a small deficit in 1976/77 to a surplus of 11 percent of GDP in 1984/85 and gross domestic savings increased to more than 35 percent. The ensuing improvement in government revenues (through royalties and income taxes) and a relatively high credit rating in the international financial markets, enabling Cameroon to gain access to external financing, generated a substantial expansion in the public sector at large and public investments in particular. However, the public sector-led expansion was driven by conspicuously high levels of consumption - i.e., civil servant  wages, subsidies and transfers -- and capital intensive and generally unsustainable public investments. At the end of the oil boom, the country was thus left with an over-dimensioned infrastructure, a large civil service and public enterprise sector, and a significantly higher external indebtedness. 2.03 During the 1986-89 period, Cameroon suffered from three major shocks which unmasked the fragility of the oil-dependent development strategy. First, the sharp decline in export prices - led by petroleum in 1986 and followed by cocoa and coffee - caused Cameroon's extemal terms of trade to fall by more than 55 percent from 1984/85 to 1988/89. Second, Cameroon's oil production started to decline after reaching its peak in 1985/86. Third, with its exchange rate linked to a rising French Franc and unable to contain domestic inflation below those of its main trading partners, Cameroon's real effective exchange rate (REER) appreciated substantialy, thus reducing the international competitiveness of the country. 2.04 In the absence of appropriate corrective adjustment measures, these shocks dragged the Cameroonian economy into a long and deep crisis. Real GDP feDl by an average of 3.4 percent a year from 1985/86 to 1988/89 and real per capita income levels dropped by almost 40 percent. Budgetary revenues decreased by 35 percent during the same period. In the face of constant current expenditures, this drop caused a sharp rise in the overaDl budget deficit to above 13 percent of GDP in 1986/87. A reduction to 5 percent of GDP by 1988/89 was only achieved by slashing public investments and expenditures on maintenance. These deficits were largely financed by an accumulation of domestic arrears and by increased foreign borrowing. The external current account switched from a surplus in 1984/85 to a large deficit in 1988/89 and was financed mainly through draw down of foreign assets of the banking system and a further build-up of external debt. The emergence of domestic arrears and the decline in foreign assets created a liquidity crisis in the banking system, exposing imprudent past lending practices. 2.05 To address economic, financial and structural weaknesses, the Government launched an economic reform program which was supported by a Standby Arrangement with the IMF in 1988 and an IBRD Structural Adjustment Loan in 1989. The program aimed at correcting the macroeconomic disequilibria based on the assumption that these objectives could be achieved through internal policies only. Progress was made in implementing reforms in a number of areas, notably in liberalizing trade. However, government's inability to implement strong internal measures, meant that the overal objectives were not achieved and the fundamental structural problems of the economy became increasingly apparent. 2.06 The oil-led boom and the ensuing period of inadequate adjustment left Cameroon with several structural imbalances which have become major obstacles to its long-term development. The principal legacies from that period which constitute major development chaDlenges relate to: (i) an overextended, inefficient and deficit-ridden public sector; (ii) a deteriorating physical and human capital base and declining productivity; and (iii) deepening poverty. 2.07 Realizing that an economic reform program exclusively focused on internal adjustment measures was inadequate to bring about the structural changes needed, the Government of Cameroon, along with its partner countries in the CFA zone, decided on January 12, 1994, to  -3 - realign the parity of the CFA Franc from 50 CFAIFF to 100 CFA/FF. To ensure the success of the devaluation, the government has adopted a new macroeconomic program whose main objective is to secure the country's international competitiveness and to return the economy on to a sustainable growth path. The underlying reform program, supported by an IMF Standby Arrangement (approved on March 14, 1994), aims to: (i) bring inflation to a level below 5 percent from 1995/96 onwards, following initial adjustments in relative prices; (ii) attain sustainable real GDP growth of about 5 percent per annum from 1995/96, primarily led by improved competitiveness and export performance; and (iii) quickly achieve primary and, eventually, overall budget surplus to enable increased domestic savings, reduce the current account balance deficit and finance an increasing share of domestic investments. 3. IPREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 3.01 The PAGE was designed to strengthen government capacity in economic management and improve coordination of activities among key economic agencies in support of the preparation and implementation of the adjustment program to be supported under SAL I. The PAGE was identified in November 1988 and appraised in February 1989. Other donors--France, Canada, USAID and UNDP--also provided assistance to the adjustment program, notably in the areas of institution-building. 4. PRoJEcr OBJECTIES AND DESCRITON 4.01 Project Objectives. Project design aimed at assisting government to achieve the following objectives: (i) formulate and implement reforms in the framework of its structural adjustment program; (ii) develop lasting, long-term improvements in policy analyses and the management of the economy; (iii) improve coordination among key government agencies; (iv) increase the use of local consultants and train local staff in key ministries with a view to broaden local participation in economic management. 4.02 Project Components. The project consisted of priority activities in direct support of SAL I, namely: (i) policy analysis and macroeconomic management, in particular developing a framework of guidelines and procedures for public investment programming (PIP), strengthening government debt management capacity and improve the collection and production of stafisfical data; and (ii) reform of the civil service and the large public enterprise sector. Specific activities to be undertaken under each component involved: (i) PIP: the establishment and updating of a computerized rolling multi-year investment program as well as supporting improved procurement procedures; (ii) statistics: overhaul of the national statistical system through improvement of the organization of data collection, processing and statistical methodologies; (iii) debt management: reform of debt management practices including the establishment of an autonomous debt agency, the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA); Civ) civil servce: reform of the civil service, particularly with respect to the regulatory framework, restructuring of staffing requirements, payroli management, and development of national consulting capacities; and (v) public enterprise: reform and rehabilitation of the public enterprise sector.  - 4 - 4.03 The project also provided for financing consultant services and other technical assistance needs which were identified during the early stages of implementation of both the PAGE and the adjustment program supported by SAL I. The project further provided financing for a Project Management Secretariat (SGP) to administer the project and provide general administrative support to the SAL Technical Committee. 4.04 Shortly after loan effectiveness in January 1990, government submitted a proposal to expand the project components to include support for: (i) Trade Liberalization. The objective of this component was to assist in the revision of the Commerce Code Law 80/25 covering the orientation of trade activities, the preparation of manuals on competition, and preparation of anti- dumping legislation. (ii) Balance of Payments. The objective of this component was to (i) carry out a diagnostic study of the agencies involved in the production of the balance of payments including the institutional linkages among them; (ii) develop methods and tools to forecast and aggregate balance of payments data from the national accounts, public finance and the central bank; (iii) design a computerized master plan with recommendations on the phasing of its implementation; (iv) set up a training program with a short-, medium- and long-term perspective. (iii) Reform of the Forestry Sector. This component supported studies on Cameroon's forestry legislation to prepare the groundwork for the revision of the forestry code, one of the SAL's tranche release conditions. (iv) Banking Sector. This component supported the MIMFI in the reform of the sector and in making the link between enterprise rehabilitation and banking sector restructuring. The French Cooperation (FAC) also supported this component of the SAL. The Bank agreed to these proposals and to the proposal to drop the procurement sub-component under the PIP component. It was determined following appraisal that the procurement sub- component was no longer needed given the establishment in 1988 of the Directorate General for Public Works of Cameroon (DGTC), an entity within the Presidency with overall responsibility for all major investment projects and all major procurement. 4.05 Project Management Secretariat This component aimed at providing financing for the project secretariat whose primary responsibility was to manage the PAGE and provide support to the technical committee in charge of the adjustment program. Institutionally, the SGP was part of an existing structure within the administration staffed largely by civil servants, which was attached to the SAL Technical Committee under the Interministerial Committee. The secretariat was responsible for the coordination of project activities and the setting up of project accounting and financial management procedures. The SGP consisted of a figurehead administrator, a deputy  -5 - administrator, who was the person actually responsible for the PAGE Secretariat, a coordinator, and technical staff. 4.06 Other Activities. This component provided for additional technical assistance, training, studies and acquisition of equipment to be identified during project implementation. 4.07 Project Consultants and Other Support Components. The project as appraised included: (i) the recruitment of four long-term resident specialists in procurement, statistical systems, national accounts and systems analysis for two to three years; (ii) a specialist in public investment programming for a year; (iii) short-term consultants, including specialists in debt management, public management, payroll systems, public enterprise management, privatization and liquidation; (iv) general and on-the-job training for local staff, (v) the acquisition of computer hardware and software for several program components; (vi) office space, additional staff, vehicles and operating expenses of the technical Commission for Public Enterprise Reform; (vii) staffing, material and financial resources for the SGP; and (viii) studies, short term consultants' services and other activities to be identified during project irnplementation. 5. PROJECT COST AND FiNANCING 5.01 Total project costs as appraised were estimated at US$14.5 million equivalent, of which about US$12.4 million were foreign costs (86 percent). The Bank financed US$9.0 million covering 72 percent of foreign costs and 62 percent of total costs. The government's contribution was US$1.5 million (10 percent). At appraisal, Japanese cofinancing was expected to provide US$4.0 million to cover the balance of total project costs (28 percent), which was being favorably considered by the Japanese Grant Facility. However, the Japanese withdrew their support for the project and the Bank did not increase its share to cover the financing gap left by Japan's withdrawal. Total project financing was thus insufficient to cover the appraisal components as unallocated project funds were below the US$4.0 million needed. Despite this financing shortfall, new small project components were added in connection with SAL objectives. As a result, some project activities were curtailed, for example, in the areas of procurement, balance of payments and strengthening of the national statistics system in order to allow for project activities to be covered under the US$9.0 million envelope. 5.02 Procurement. The Bank's procurement guidelines were to be applied in the hiring of consultants and purchase of goods and services. The project accorded priority to the recruitment of local consultants according to Bank's procedures for the selection of consultants as a means to strengthen local capacity. Local competitive bidding was envisaged for the purchase of equipment and vehicles. Procurement under cofinancing was expected to be awarded in accordance with the respective cofinancier's procurement procedures. 5.04 Disbursements. The Loan was expected to be disbursed from 1990 to 1994 in line with then applicable disbursement profiles. A Special Account of US$300,000 equivalent was to be established upon presentation of the withdrawal application and replenished on the basis of fully documented reimbursement applications in amounts of US$100,00. Contracts under US$50,000  -6 - equivalent would be replenished on the basis of SOE's. A Project Account for the counterpart funds was to be established in a local commercial bank acceptable to the Bank. 6. PROJECr DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION 6.01 The PAGE's primary objective was to provide support to the government in the preparation and implementation of the structural adjustment program supported by the Bank's SAL. The weak administrative capacity of key agencies, inadequate coordination, lack of well- established guidelines and procedures, and a weak statistical base were major constraints facing the Cameroonian administration at the time of project appraisal. These turned out to be key issues in the implementation of both the PAGE and the SAL as these weaknesses in the administration increasingly strained capacity and placed a heavy burden on the government agencies in charge of the adjustment program. Another key objective of the PAGE was to provide assistance in capacity-building and institution-building through well-targeted technical assistance. 6.02 To expedite project preparation, a Project Preparation Facility (PPF) was approved. The project costs included up to US$350,000 for the reimbursement of the PPF. UNDP funds and about US$250,000 of the PPF funds were used to hire consultants to prepare restructuring plans for about 40 enterprises, which were presented in 1988 to the Interministerial Committee for a decision about rehabilitation, privatization or liquidation of each enterprise. Other studies were commissioned on privatization methods, a strategy for government ownership of enterprises, taxation policies, trade liberalization, and the social dimensions of public enterprise restructuring. Finally, Cameroonian lawyers were to be contracted to draft legislation to be presented in late 1989 to the National Assembly on a general law and statutes governing public enterprises, a new labor code, commnercial policy, and privatization of public enterprises. 7. PROJECT IlMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 7.01 Project Components Results Project results were overall unsatisfactory. With the exception of the debt management and the civil service reform components few of the institution- and capacity-building objectives under the PAGE were met. Some progress was achieved under the public enterprise and civil service reform components to the extent that the project financed the diagnostic studies essential to support policy reform measures (public enterprise component) and the implementation of the POEs for the four key ministries targeted under the SAL (civil service reform component). The debt management component was successful in establishing a more efficient internal debt monitoring agency and accounting system. Less satisfactory results were achieved with the PIP and the national statistics system components. A more detailed description of the results of the project are described below. (a) The public enterprises reform component successfully completed the studies but very few of the studies' recommendations have been implemented to date. The government fell short of implementing its sector declaration policy which it adopted in May 1989 and which provided for a large-scale rehabilitation effort in the public enterprise sector. The PAGE was meant to support that effort by providing financing for the studies and technical assistance to the committee  -7- in charge of public enterprise reforn. As an initial step, 22 public enterprises were dissolved and 39 corporations were liquidated through court action or by amicable settlement, while 25 enterprises were slated for privatization. However, the liquidation process is still incomplete, and the privatization program is barely underway (only five operations completed). Outcome on the performance contracts for the 25 largest public enterprises differed widely for the following reasons: (i) the sustained economic crisis which affected government's capacity to finance the excessive commitments it had made under the first-generation performance contracts; (ii) shortcomings in the institutional framework within which the public enterprise reform would be implemented; and (iii) absence of a legal framework for the public enterprises and the clear definition of their relations with the government. To date, the government is still involved in 140 enterprises, whose financing needs are continuing to place a burden on public finances. As a result, the outcome of the rehabilitation program has so far produced unsatisfactory results. (b) The civil service reform component has made significant progress albeit at a slow pace. The key objectives of this component were to (i) control the wage bill and (ii) improve the efficiency of the civil service. With respect to the wage bill, a number of short term actions with a budgetary impact (reduction of personnel benefits and allowances for lodging, family, health, relocation, etc.) were carried out. In addition, the government, in December 1993, reduced the nominal wage bill to 60 percent of the level it was a year earlier. However, despite these actions, the wage bill has not been significantly reduced from the level it was in 1989 given that Government has still not put in place concrete measures to reduce the number of excess civil servants. With respect to improving the efficiency of the civil service, the SAL conditionality targeted the adoption and implementation of the staffing plans (POEs) of the four key economic ministries (Finance, Plan, Civil Service, and Industry and Commerce) as priority. The government added the preparation of POEs for another four ministries (Health, Social Security, Education and Social Affairs) to that list. POEs for all eight ministries were completed by April 1994, well behind original targets. The implementation of the POEs for the four key ministries is expected to take place beginning June 1994 and for the other four by August 1994. The adoption of the regulatory texts for the implementation of the POEs for the four key ministries was a condition for Board presentation of the Economic Recovery Credit (ERC), which was approved on June 16, 1994. The government has also prepared a document presenting how excess staff will be laid off, the timing and sequencing of lay-offs and the budgetary costs and savings of these staffing reductions. Preparation of this document was a Board presentation condition under the ERC. Implementation of this program is expected to begin with the 1994/95 fiscal year. The Government has already mobilized UNDP support for financing expected redundancies at the Ministry of Civil Service (MINFOPRA) and it is seeking additional external assistance to finance the retrenchment of staff in the other ministries. Furthermore and with a view to improving the central administration, the government will adopt a revised statute for the civil service (Statut GCnn&al) by end-1994, based on the recommendations provided in the August 1992 review under PAGE financing of the legal framework for the civil service. Finally, the PAGE financed a study to merge infonnation concerning the payroll (currently kept in the Ministry of Finance) and the  - 8 - civil service files (kept by the MINFOPRA) into a single computerized file ("fichier unique"). The study has been completed and is being examined by the Administrative Reform Conmmittee (CRA). A decision on a master plan is expected in August 1994. The PAGE supported these activities by financing technical assistance for the realization of the POEs, the review of the legal frarnework and long-term consultants to provide logistical support and advice to the Cameroonians in charge of these dossiers. Nearly a third of the resources available under the PAGE was used to finance activities under this component. Local consultants were also recruited to provide back-up to the CRA. With the exception of the ISMP and two of the international consultants recruited for the POEs, most consultants under this component performed satisfactorily (paras. 8.02 and 8.03). Progress made in the completion of the POEs was directly related to the performance of the consultants in charge of carrying out the studies in the various ministries and government reaction to the recommendations made by the consultants. Some consultants performed poorly while others were able to complete the work in record time. Some ministries' objections to the recommendations made under the POEs also added to the delays registered in the completion of the POEs. (c) The debt management component was the project's best performer. All activities included in the project were completed, including the fuDl computerization of the CAA. The CAA now has the capacity to carry out creditworthiness analysis for the country although it is still not fully able to manage the country's internal debt given the absence of an adequate legal framework which would give the agency the mandate to do so. (d) The computerized rolling investment program (PIP) failed to meet its objectives. Although there was some improvement in PIP preparation under the PAGE, the PIP continues to be of little value as an economic management tool given that it does not adequately reflect the government's overall objectives and strategy with respect to public investments. This failure is largely due to a lack of political commitment to use the PIP as a coherent and rational macroeconomic tool. Part of the problem lies with an overly centralized government administration with little authority and involvement of line ministries in this exercise. Although the PAGE provided logistical support including a computer system, the PIP does not integrate the key objectives which were identified as essential to an improvement in the process, namely: (a) an overall public investment strategy which should reflect agreements reached with donors; (b) sectoral strategies; (c) project description including how these fit into sector strategy and their economic and financial justifications; and (d) recurrent cost implications project by project over the medium-term. (e) The national statistics system component performed poorly. The execution of this component was slow and only one of the three long-term consultants was recruited. The Directorate of Statistics and National Accounts (DSCN) is symptomatic of the institutional crisis facing the Cameroonian administration. As an agency dependent upon the Ministry of Plan, the DSCNs role as the key agency for the collection and production of statistics on a national scale is not well-defined and in fact competes with other agencies of the Ministry, such as the Directorate of Projects and Programs (DPP), which is also responsible for the collection of statistics. Moreover, each technical ministry has its own department in charge of collecting statistics but  -9 - there is no coordination among any of these agencies. The DSCN has very few resources allocated under the public budget to carry out its work and depends on external financing for its limited operations. In addition, due to the lack of vision and poor management of the DSCN itself the agency's ability to draw upon the resources allocated under the PAGE was severely limited. In 1993, the Bank realized that the present institutional envirorunent would not allow for the implementation of the recommendations of the study carried out by the only expert recruited under this component and which called for a fundamental reorganization and redefinition of the role of the DSCN. This would involve the establishment of an autonomous agency with full mandate as the sole agency responsible for the collection and production of statistics on a national scale. As a result, the Bank and the government agreed upon a reorientation of the terns of reference of the expert in order to ensure the production of rudimentary national accounts for 1993, a consumer price index for 1993 (the last one was published in 1991) and an index of industrial production for 1991-1993. However, as priority was not accorded to these tasks, little progress was made in assisting the govermnent improve its capacity for economic management. (f) Performance under the balance of payments component was unsatisfactory. Although the PAGE did finance a computerization and staffing plans for the Direction des Controles Economiques (DCE), none of this was actually implemented. The institutional problems which were identified at appraisal persist and the DCE has managed to put together only a rudimentary BOP for 1990. This is largely due to coordination problems among the various agencies involved, the lack of reliable statistics (see para. 7.02 (e)) and DCE's inability to mobilize the resources available under the PAGE. The PAGE did finance the rental of computer equipment which allowed the DCE to put together the 1990 BOP. (g) The trade liberalization component supported the installation of an information system in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MINDIC) which established links between the DSCN and the MINDIC. (h) Theforesty component supported a study of forestry legislation in 1990 to help reorient policies in this area and thereby assist the government in fulfilling SAL conditionality. In January 1994, government adopted a forestry code which was significantly different from the draft agreed upon with the Bank. Under the Structural Adjustment Credit', the government made the commitment to introduce specific amendments to the Code in order to correct the discrepancies between the original draft version which was approved by the Bank and the one subsequently adopted by Parliament. The adoption of implementation decrees satisfactory to IDA is a condition of effectiveness for the ERC. C3) The banking sector component supported banking sector reforn by financing an expert in the MINFI as part of SAL conditionality. The French Cooperation provided another expert. () Although the development of a national consultants roster, initially included in the project, was canceled and presented for financing with the Institutional Development Fund, the lhe third tanche of SAL I was disbursed under an IMA Credit-the Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) in March 1994 upon Cameroon becoming eligible for IDA credits.  - 10 - project did make an effort to finance local consultants under the civil service reform component {see (b) above). 7.02 Management Unit. The SGP did not develop a reliable accounting system nor did it efficiently monitor the use of project funds until the last year of project execution. As a result, the SGP did not have a clear idea of the status of project accounts nor of the availability of funds under the project. The Bank raised the issue with the government and stressed the need for the setting up of a reliable accounting and sound financial management systems to help the SGP monitor the movement of financial transactions under the project and to keep the accounts reconciled with the disbursement data at headquarters. The problem was compounded when in mid-1993 the Bank discovered that the costs of existing and outstanding commitments plus new government commitments were likely to create a financial gap. On the administrative side, the Deputy Administrator, who was supposed to be in charge of day-to-day operations divided his attention between his post and those of his position with the Ministry of Stabilization. As a result, he dedicated insufficient time to focus on establishing a sound project accounting system, monitoring the efficient use of project funds and, more importantly, coordinating activities under the project. Overall, the performance of the SGP has to be rated poor. 8. CONSULTANTS PERFORMANCE 8.01 Management of Contracts Consultant performance was not entirely satisfactory. In the case of the civil service reform component, the project initially approved the participation of a local training institute--the Institut Superieur de Management Public (ISMP), which is a service unit attached to the MINFOPRA, to provide technical services in the area of administrative reform. Poor performance by ISMP led to a reformulation of the contract significantly limiting ISMP's role in the last year of project implementation, and the hiring of an international consulting firm to take over. ISMP's poor performnance was largely due to lack of initiative on the part of ISMP to provide the services for which it was recruited. In addition, the ISMF was overwhelmed by the demands made upon it under the terms of its contract for lack of adequate personnel to advise government on administrative reform. However, given that ISMP was a national consultant, the government hesitated in agreeing to rescind ISMP's contract which became a source of protracted negotiations between the Bank and the government for over a year. In the end, the government agreed to significantly reduce ISMP's terms of reference to providing logistical support to the CRA. Savings on the ISMP contract were used to finance other work, including the preparation of the POE for the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT) by the CRA. 8.02 Long-term Resident Experts The performance of the long-term resident experts was not up to expectations. The Government did not proceed with the recruitment of the three resident experts envisaged under the national statistics component severely affecting the realization of the component's objectives. As a result, the impact of the statistician, who was recruited with a two-year delay, was limited. The PAGE's contribution was mostly limited to the identification of guidelines for orienting the rehabilitation of the statistical office. The institutional environment (para. 7.01 (e)} was not adequate for the training of local counterparts. More importantly, in the absence of the experts, none of the institution- and capacity-building objectives  - 11 - of the component were achieved given that it was envisaged that they would make the recommendations needed to provide the framework for strengthening the DSCN based on their terms of reference. The systems analyst under the public enterprise component performed well and put in place a much-needed statistical database on the sector. He operated mostly alone and did not provide any training to his Cameroonian counterparts. However, the PAGE did finance overseas training, including seminars, for several of the technical cadres. With a few notable exceptions, the long-term experts under the civil service reform component performed well and provided training and advice to the two administrative reform committees made up of Cameroonian civil servants. As a result, the staff of the CRA were able to prepare the POE for the IINAT on their own with little guidance from the international expert. In line with the project intent of hiring Cameroonians, about 25 percent of consultants' expenditures were apportioned to Cameroonian experts. Expenditures for short-term resident experts exceeded appraisal levels. 8.03 Procurement Issues. Recruitment raised difficulties. Inadequate adherence of SGP to the Bank's guidelines for recruitment of consultants and for ensuring their implementation was the subject of intense reviewing and monitoring by the Bank, particularly with respect to the selection criteria and pricing in the early stages of the project. In some cases, notably under the public enterprise reform component, consultants' contracts were not renewed. 8.04 Disbursements. Commitments and disbursements lagged significantly with respect to appraisal forecasts owing largely to the lack of efforts made on the part of beneficiary agencies to mobilize the resources available under the project and to lack of interest in the program supported by the PAGE. Procurement issues also affected the project and the Bank had to consistently remind the government of the importance of abiding by Bank guidelines in the recruitment of consultants. 8.05 Audit Reports. Audit reports were not carried out on schedule despite reminders by the Bank. The inadequate and inefficient accounting system under the project were a major factor in the delays registered in the preparation of the audits and in the lack of clear and transparent financial management of the project. No regular reconciliation was made between the project accounts held in Yaounde and those held at headquarters. This led to confusion towards the end of project life with the net result that the SGP had no clear idea as to the amount of funds left available under the PAGE. The decision was taken to cancel a number of planned activities for fear of cost overruns. The government finally took steps in early 1993 to improve the accounting situation. Most of the funds under the Special Account have been reconciled with the initial deposit under the Special Account. The government is expected to justify the remaining balance of CFAF 17 million by end-June, when the final audit of the project is expected to be completed and submitted to the Bank. 9. IwPACT AND SUSTAINABiLY OF THE PROJECT 9.01 Project results were below those expected at appraisal. The project objectives were too ambitious and implied a broad restructuring of government management and administrative functions for which Cameroon was ill-prepared. First, the government lacked commitment to the  - 12 - technical assistance objectives of providing better economic management, more efficient programming and budgeting of public investments, control over external indebtedness, improved government administrative and productive apparatus and better coordination among ministries. Second, weak institutions, poor coordination, unwillingness to cooperate, prevalence of each institution's intent and political considerations proved to be serious obstacles. In brief, the project objectives rested not only on faulty premises about Cameroon's ownership of the program but also about the country's capacity to overcome its institutional and political problems. 9.02 Sustainability of most of the project results is not assured. For example, the public investment programming, in the absence of decisive action by the government, is likely to have little influence on future public investment decisions by the Ministries. Only the debt management component seems to have no problem in continuing its favorable performance in future years because the CAA's institutional capacity is now in place. The Civil service reform, although it has made progress, is still incomplete and pending further government decisions on further restructurings of ministries; the February 1994 amendment of the Statut General is a step backwards. The PE reform implementation has been slow and very modest with respect to privatization and also performance contracts. 10. BANK PERFORMANCE 10.01 Bank performance in the design of the project, despite efforts to coordinate with other donors and identify critical gaps, underestimated the magnitude of the tasks and problems to be tackled by the project. The project design intended a large revamping of Cameroon's public sector to be accomplished in support of the SAL program with the assistance of a large input of consulting services. The basic concept was flawed and worked only partially. Each project component success depended on this technical expertise but its implementation had difficulties in overcoming the resistance of civil servants and high officials to change, intertwined political factors and, above all, the magnitude of the task itself. Thus, it is not a surprise that results are below expectations. 10.02 The number of supervision missions was adequate particularly taking into account the technical support of the Resident Mission. Bank missions in the early stages of the project implementation tended to be over-optimistic about the progress and results achieved, and even moved to propose a second project (PAGE II). Later missions were more critical of the progress of the project and openly criticized shortcomings. 10.03 Bank missions repeatedly worried about lack of funds to carry out all the tasks agreed at appraisal because of the failure to obtain Japanese cofinancing. This led to the reduction of some technical assistance components for an apparent lack of funds. 11. BoRROWER PERFoRMANcE 11.01 Problems identified at appraisal as creating difficulties for project preparation (lack of coordination in the government, weaknesses of key directorates, lack of procedures, weak  - 13 - statistical data base) continued to plague project implementation and were exacerbated by the resistance to a substantial revamping of the public sector. 11.02 The above problems were compounded by the unsatisfactory performance of the project management unit. As noted earlier, the Secretariat in charge of the project had trouble developing a reliable accounting system, did not effectively monitor the use of project funds, nor was very adept at following Bank procurement guidelines. Audits of the project accounts experienced delays. Finally, the officials involved in managing the unit had too many responsibilities to do an effective management job. 12. PROJECT FINANCING AND TOTAL COST 12.01 At Board approval, the full financing of the project depended on a cofinancing operation expected to be provided by the Japanese Grant Facility. This cofinancing did not materialize and several attempts were made by the Bank to obtain the additional funds from other donors such as UNDP, France and the European Development fund (EDF). Despite optimistic forecasts about filling the financing gap with this assistance, the support received was marginal and project implementation confronted several cases in which further activities had to be postponed in the expectation of a second Bank project. It should be noted, however, that, in spite of the financial shortfall, new components were added to the project list. 13. PRoJEcT DOCUMENTATION AND DATA 13.01 Project documentation and data used in the preparation of this report included legal documents, the President's Report, mission back-to-office reports, supervision reports, progress reports prepared by the Borrower, and internal documents and memoranda. 13.02 The Legal Agreement and the President's Report were adequate for project purposes and provided a satisfactory framework for project implementation. Supervision mission reports provided comprehensive insights into the project's progress and administration but initially they tended to underestimate the difficulties encountered in implementing several components. These initial supervision missions also tended to agree readily to changes in components (e.g. public investment procurement) which might not have been fully justified and even suggested, at an early stage of the implementation of the project, that the Bank move forward with a second economic management project. The Bank tended to be more critical toward the end of project life in identifying the factors negatively affecting project implementation and which undermined the rationale for a second project. 14. FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED (a) There is a certain inconsistency of approach in closely associating two very different instruments to achieve similar goals. By their nature, Economic Management (PAGE) projects have to have broader long-term objectives which support institution-building and capacity building than Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL), which are fast-disbursing operations. PAGEs provide a lithmus test of government commitment to reform as efforts are made to bring about  - 14 - changes in institutions which by their very nature react slowly to change. At the same time, the pressure to meet program targets in order to obtain quick-disbursing funds mean that PAGEs' long-term objectives are likely to be overlooked in the race to fufill SAL conditions. As a result, PAGEs' failure to meet their institution-building and capacity-building goals can largely be attributed to the ambivalence in the design of these projects. Support to the implementation of adjustment programs should, therefore, be provided under technical assistance projects which are essentially a pool of funds made available to government for that purpose. These technical assistance projects should not pretend to long-term objectives as they cannot attain them. More long-term objectives should be included in public administration projects which are designed in phases and which have no other objective but to provide institution-building and capacity-building to the administration. (b) Technical assistance projects should not have an ambitious, over-optimistic design in countries with conflicting political interests, weak institutions, coordination and organizational problems, which run counter to the medium- to long-term objectives set under the respective components. These projects should be more focused and concentrated in areas where the environment allows for relative success. (c) Care should be taken not to overload technical assistance projects with too many components particularly after appraisal except where there is an urgent need imposed by unforeseen circumstances. The expansion of PAGE coverage shortly after effectiveness overextended the PAGE, particularly in view of (i) a lack of priority analysis, (ii) the already broad range of econornic management issues covered by the project and (iii) the financing shortfall discussed below. Those needs should have been anticipated at appraisal since the components covered key areas of the adjustment program. (d) As for all investment projects, it should be required that the Borrower sets up a financial management and accounting system before Board presentation to ensure a good administration and proper and timely utilization of the project's resources. As noted earlier, the management unit of the Cameroonian project was subject to jurisdictional and high level personnel changes, part- time management, poor accounting practices, and a shortage of adequately trained staff. (f) Fully committed financing is requisite before loan approval. The PAGE illustrates the importance of this point. Failure to obtain the Japanese grant of US$4.0 million hampered the effectiveness of project implementation as sub-components had to be scuttled or cut short. Efforts to get funding from other donors (UNDP, FED) got only limited results.  - 15 - REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE (TRANSLATION) 1. PRoJECT CONTEXT The Economic Management Project (PAGE) was launched in 1989 in response to the need to improve the Cameroon govemment's capacity to manage the development process. Cameroon was facing an economic crisis and a decline in its oil revenues. To turn this situation around, the government launched an Economic Recovery Program with the support of the World Bank in the form of a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL). Preparation of the SAL had run into difficulties due in part to an absence of coordination within the government and to management weaknesses in key departments. Management of Cameroon's economy was likewise hobbled by the lack of firm orientation and clear procedures and by the weakless of the statistical data base. The PAGE was designed to remedy these weaknesses through support to the government in management of the Structural Adjustment Program. 2. PROJECT OBJEC'rVES The main objectives of the PAGE were to assist the Cameroon Government prepare and execute reforms under the PAS and so promote a sustainable improvement in policy analysis and the management of the country's economy. There was also a need to improve coordination among the various departments of key ministries. This was a vital requirement for Cameroon where there is a tendency for government departments to work in isolation from each other. The PAGE was also designed to make the greatest possible use of local expertise and encourage the participation of national consultants in the adjustment process. Training to help Cameroonian personnel upgrade their management skills was also included. 3. PROJEcT DESCRITON The priority activities financed under the PAGE were the improvement of policy analysis and macroeconomic management, in particular the establishment and implementation of appropriate procedures for public investment programming, management of the public debt, the production of statistical data, civil service reform, and the resuctuing of the public and  - 16 - parapublic enterprise sector. These were the core activities of Cameroon's PAS supported by the World Bank. At the time of PAGE appraisal, five specific components were identified: (i) support for the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the four-year rolling Public Investment Program (PIP); (ii) support for reform of the national statistics services; (iii) support for improvement of debt management; (iv) support for civil service reform, in particular, the reorganization of public services, restructuring of civil servants' statutes of employment, review of the civil service's compensation system and the development of local consulting capacities; (v) support to the technical commission responsible for reform of the public and parapublic sectors. In addition, the PAGE also covered: (vi) activities to be identified during project execution; and (vii) the financing of equipment and operating costs for the Project Management Secretariat (SGP) responsible for day-to-day management of the project and for technical support to the technical committee responsible for preparation and monitoring of the PAS. PAGE activities specifically targeted national statistics administration, certain aspects of which were to be complemented and strengthened under the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) project. PAGE project activities were expected to be implemented over a four year period. It was envisaged that it could be foliowed by further operations of this kind to provide support to future stages of the PAS, depending on how the government's reform efforts proceeded. 4. PROJECT COST AND FINANCING Total project cost was estimated at US$14.5 million equivalent. The World Bank loan would finance 62 per cent of total costs, or US$9.0 million equivalent, and the government's contribution would be approximately 10 per cent, or about US$1.5 million equivalent. The remaining 28 per cent or US$4.0 million equivalent was expected to be financed by a Japanese grant.  - 17 - 5. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK A key objective of the PAGE was to provide government with the necessary support to design and implement its structural adjustment prograrn. The Conseil Interministeriel de Supervision (CIS) was responsible for preparation, implementation and supervision of this program. The membership of the CIS included top officials from the Office of the President and the minister responsible for finance, planning, commerce and industry, agriculture and the civil service as well as the national director of the Central Bank (BEAC). Day-to-day management of the PAS was delegated to the Technical Committee for preparation and monitoring of the adjustment program (CT/PAS) created by presidential decree in December 1988. The CT/PAS comprised representatives of the Presidency, the Director General of the public debt agency, the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA), and representatives of the ministers responsible for agriculture, mines, power and water and planning. The coordinator was a ranking officer of the Ministry of Plan (MINPAT). The PAGE Project Management Secretariat (SGP) was to serve as the technical secretariat of the CT/PAS and as the managing unit of the PAGE. The Coordinator of the CT/PAS would also be Coordinator of the SGP. The SGP team would also include an administrator, an accountant and support staff. The accountant and the support staff were to be recruited from outside of the public administration and would be provided with the logistic support and resources necessary for efficient project implementation. The team was expected to receive training in World Bank procedures before project start-up. 6. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AND PROBLEMS Overall, the project served as an efficient instrument to support Cameroon's structural adjustment program. In all, 98 percent of project funds, US$8.8 million equivalent, were disbursed to finance: (i) studies which provided government with information indispensable for implementation of the PAS; (ii) management training of personnel responsible for activities under the PAS; (iii) equipment needed for the efficient functioning of the agencies responsible for implementing PAS activities. Management information gained from the various studies conducted under the PAGE brought about a higher level of awareness of the need for vigorous pursuit of the PAS and for development of the management capacities of the institutions responsible for implementing the adjustment program so that the orientation of program execution could be better laid out through clear government policy statements in key sectors of the economy. At the time of project closing, the government had at its disposal: operational structures for management of key sectors of the economy (the CAA for debt management); action plans for the implementation of fundamental reforms in other areas (the Civil Service, Public Enterprises); and  - 18 - master plans for information systems and the reorganization of other sectors (National Statistics, the Balance of Payments). The coordination which characterized certain periods during the implementation of the PAS was due to the dynamism of the project's SGP which functioned simultaneously as the technical secretariat of the CT/PAS. Moreover, the SGP's technical mastery of various elements of the economic reform process allowed it to take a lead role nationally and with the international donor community who saw in it a credible interlocutor whose advice was valuable. The successes of the SGP are due to the nature of the management mechanism established and to the quality of its continuing relationship with the World Bank Resident Mission in Yaounde and Washington staff responsible for supervision of the PAGE. More specifically, the different components of the project can be categorized in three groups: Components in which the project objectives were fuUy met: - support to the forestry sector; - support to the official gazette; - support to the management of the debt; - support to the reform of the civil service; and - support to the reform of public enterprises. Components in which the objectives were partialy reached: support to the balance of payments; and support to the PIP. Components in which the objectives were not reached: support to national statistics; and support to the liberalization of prices and commerce. With respect to the first group, the PAGES' "success factors" were: - the commitment of responsible staff to realizing the PAS's objectives; - their understanding of the procurement guidelines; - pressure from the government in these areas since their objectives were associated with the conditions for various tranches of the SAL; - the management capacity of the institutional structures responsible for these components.  - 19- As to the second group, the failure to fully achieve their objectives is due to the lack of a clearly articulated government strategy and adequate management structure in these areas. As to the third group, they failed largely because those responsible for these components failed to understand the importance of the PAGE agenda or did so only tardily. Beyond these results, which can be considered positive, the general problems encountered in implementation of the PAGE were: the delay in project start-up: the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) was signed on July 17, 1989 and the effectiveness conditions had been fulfilled by January 4, 1990. This delay is certainly the root cause of the difficulties which occurred in justifying the funds committed through the PPF; - the fact that some officials responsible for implementation of PAS activities remained in ignorance of the very existence of the PAGE, which hindered the implementation of those PAS activities; - lack of understanding of World Bank procurement guidelines and disbursement procedures which delayed the start up and implementation of certain components; - staff turnover in some key economic management posts following various ministerial shuffles which often slowed, or even halted, project implementation; - staff turnover in key areas of PAGE components with negative consequences for these components; - the absence of clearly defined lines of interaction among the various PAGE components and between them and the SGP often hindered the supervision of certain components; - the slowness of the decision-making process in some instances which gave rise to delays in carrying out specific actions. In general, the studies carried out under the PAGE were in four phases: the diagnostic phase after validation of which the study could proceed, the preliminary report which presented several scenarios for the government to choose from before the study proceeded further and the final report which elaborated on the scenario selected and the recommendations for action. The cumbersome nature of this process resulted from the lack of a clear policy directive is certain sectors. the shortcomings of the supervision mechanisms for different reform initiatives; these mechanisms were designed to keep decision makers in the ministerial departments informed of day-to-day PAS and PAGE progress;  - 20 - changes in World Bank staff responsible for PAGE supervision also gave rise to some hesitation in project management; PAGE management staff were also responsible for a lack of systematic supervision of all project components and for delays in transmitting certain project supervision documents to the World Bank; the failure to make certain staff of the PAGE management structure, not well prepared to assume greater responsibilities, more accountable; the modest amount of the loan in comparison to the extent of the needs. 7. RECOMMENDATIONS The importance of the PAGE in improving management of the structural adjustment program has been thoroughly demonstrated. The implementation of most of the activities included under the government's economic recovery program will require management support. For example: Civil Service Reform: implementation of the Organization and Staffing Plans (POEs) of the various ministries, the computerized civil service personnel management information systems, the establishment of the new regulatory framework for the civil service, the start-up and execution of the civil service social plan; Public Sector Rehabilitation: support for privatization studies of selected enterprises, support to the establishment and implementation of the SISEP; enhancement of economic analysis capacities: continued training for specialized staff, in particular, project economic analysis training for SGP staff; As was stated in the PAGE appraisal report of June 29 1989, the project was designed to help the Government obtain information necessary for establishing reform action plans; a second PAGE would be negotiated with the World Bank to help the Government implement those action plans. It should be emphasized that the negotiation of a second PAGE would need to be preceded by resolution of the problems which have weakened some of the results obtained under the first.  - 21 - PROJECT EVALUATION BY COMPONENT 1. THE DEBT MANAGEMENT COMPONENT 1. PAS OBJECTIVES: The PAS objective under this component was to achieve mastery of the public debt statistics to allow a public debt policy compatible with the overall macroeconomic equilibria to be defined. 2. PAGE OBJECTIVES: PAGE support was designed to strengthen management of Cameroon's public debt. To achieve this objective, it was necessary to create an autonomous debt management agency, make a comprehensive inventory of the public debt and master the relevant data. 3. PAGE ACTIVITES: Actions financed under the PAGE involved: The recruitment of: A consultant for the Master Plan study who carried out studies defining the structure, organization and procedures of the CAA, including: i) drawing up a master plan, a staffing plan and a training program which would be implemented in a later phase; ii) formulation of procedures to improve monitoring of State- guaranteed debt; A consultant for Software Clean-up who cleaned up the CAA's existing data base and updated the system user's guide installed by SYNORG and established procedures for data quality control. He also prepared and supervised the execution of training programs for Cameroonian national counterpart staff - A computer specialist who drew up the specifications for future CAA computer needs; - A public debt specialist who carried out an inventory of Cameroon's debt as of December 31, 1989, - A personnel expert who assisted the Director General to recruit the personnel needed for the various posts which needed to be filled; - An accountant who assisted the Director General establish an accounting system for the new CAA and trained accounting staff. Training and supplies of computer equipment and materials which facilitated data collection on publicly guaranteed debt and the definition of future medium and long term needs, such as studies of State guaranteed debt were also financed under this component.  - 22 - 4. PERFORMANCE UNDER THIS COMPONENT At the time of Project Closing, the following actions had been carried out with the following results: an autonomous public debt management structure had been established. With support from the PAGE, debt management was transferred from the Public Debt Directorate of the Ministry of Finance to the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement; reliable data on the direct external public debt are now available and a mechanism is being set up to provide the same data for publicly guaranteed debt (adoption of regulations, establishment of an appropriate system); data have been established on the internal debt but they have not yet been satisfactorily analyzed and responsibility for dealing with it is dispersed between the Ministry of Finance and the CAA. There is no effective system in place for the management and supervision of the internal debt. 5. ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE UNDER TEHIS COMPONENT PAGE objectives under this component were satisfactorily reached. Moreover, in keeping with PAGE aims, public debt management capacities were enhanced. This had a significant and positive effect on Cameroon's management of direct public debt. The positive inplementation experience under this component is explained by the fact that responsible officials had a firm grasp of PAS objectives, of the objectives and the content of the PAGE and of the World Bank's guidelines and procedures for disbursement and for supervision of PAGE activities. This degree of awareness of the importance of the project made for more expeditious implementation of the component and helped to avoid institutional problems which otherwise might have occurred. Nevertheless, the PAS objectives for this component have been only partially met since control of the public debt is not yet total. Further actions are required to bring about optimal management of the public debt: the establishment of a management and monitoring system for internal debt and State-guaranteed external debt; improved analysis of the State's overall indebtedness - the recent acquisition of an econometric software system should help in this regard; better management of debt accounting; the present system lacks adequate interfaces between the accounting and debt management functions.  - 23 - 6. RECOMMENDATIONS In light of the above and in order to achieve fully the objectives of the PAS, a second PAGE should provide support in the following areas: full control of the public debt with emphasis on the establishment and application of a coherent and integrated management policy covering the management of the intemal debt and publicly guaranteed debt; with respect to the latter, the Government should adopt a regulatory framework governing the granting of the State's guarantee; the development of interfaces between the debt management and accounting functions of the CAA; the establishment of a management and supervision system for the entire debt; and .staff training in the area of debt policy analysis. 2. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT COMPONENT 1. PAS OBJECTIVES: PAS objective for this component was to make the balance of payments division into an operational tool for economic management, in particular with regard to economic forecasting. 2. PAGE OBJECTIVES: To support the realization of the PAS objective, the PAGE aimed to strengthen the management capacity of the balance of payments division through: - improving the operational performance of this service by bringing its organization more into line with its mandate, skills improvement and upgrading of appropriate operational facilities; - improvement of the data gathering and compilation functions of balance of payments information; - the regular annual production of balance of payments statistics; - improvement in the distribution of this information.  - 24 - 3. ACTIONS ENVISAGED UNDER THEE PAGE To achieve the four objectives outlined above, the following actions were included in the design of the PAGE: The recruitment of specialist to draw up a master plan for the balance of payments. This specialist would be responsible for: - carrying out studies including studies to assess physical facilities, the organization of staffing, the computerization of the balance of payments master plan and a training program; - assistance to the government with preparation and evaluation of bidding for the recruitment of specialists for implementation of the master plan. The recruitment of specialist to put the master plan into operation. These specialists would be responsible for assistance to the government in starting up the system to be established following the recommendations of the specialist responsible for drawing up the master plan, including: r eorganization of the balance of payments service and training of its staff, the installation of the hardware and software chosen through the bidding process. 4. PERFORMANCE UNDER THIS COMPONENT The first of the two activities envisaged was successfully carried out and as a result a master plan for computerization of the balance of payments is now available. If implemented within a coherent institutional framework, it would allow the four PAGE objectives to be attained. Unfortunately, although the invitations to bid were sent out and the bids evaluated, and although a specialist was retained, no master plan for computerization of the balance of payments has been set in place because of the insufficiency of World Bank PAGE funds and a lack of alternative sources of financing. Nevertheless, the government's perceived need for reliable balance of payments information led to the hiring of a prototype with budget funds and this allowed the Balance of Payments for 1990 to be reliably established, thereby satisfying the immediate information needs at that time. 5. ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE UNDER TEIS COMPONENT Support provided under the PAGE resulted in the following: a higher level of awareness on the part of the authorities of the importance of reliable balance of payments information; prior to PAGE-funded activities, there had been little sustained attention either to form or to the content of balance of payments information produced;  - 25 - increased awareness of institutional problems in the balance of payments service; the establishment of dialogue, through periodic seminars, between on the one hand, suppliers and users of balance of payments information, and on the other, the services responsible for assembling this information. This dialogue has resulted in improved contacts between these parties; identification of the outlines of the system which the authorities intend to set in place for monitoring the principal economic activities which involving the Ministry of Finance, "Decor" and the existing systems, "Trinite" (taxes), "Pagode" (customs), and "Patriot" (treasury) which is the process of being set up, and will consist of the following sub-systems: - "Brise" for the balance of payments, - "Acte" for exchange control, - "Samba" for money and credit - "Oasis" for insurance activities, and - "Presage" the economic data base for the whole "Decor" system. Nevertheless, the PAS and PAGE objectives under this component were not reached. Two fundamental reasons explain which PAGE targets remained unmet: First, all the activities envisaged were not, in the event, undertaken because of the insufficiency of PAGE finds and the absence of other sources of finance. - Second, even if financing had been available, the objectives might still have not been attained because of the underlying problem of clarifying the institutional framework of the balance of payments service. The authorities need to take a clear position with regard to the responsibility for calculating and producing balance of payments information. Either: these functions come under the BEAC, with the balance of payments division being responsible only for analysis and making related economic projections; or - calculating and producing the balance of payments to be done partly by BEAC and partly by the balance of payments division; or - all functions to be performed by the balance of payments division. The distribution of responsibilities for the above will determine the relative position of the balance of payments division within the official hierarchy and its relations with its suppliers and users.  - 26 - 6. RECOMMENDATIONS Given a macroeconomic policy orientation which is aimed, among other things, at reducing foreign exchange resource constraints on the Cameroonian economy, the government should undertake reorganization of the balance of payments division as a matter of priority. Important decisions need to be taken and PAGE II should provide support to the follow-up action which will be needed. For this reason, the PAGE II program of action should be oriented along the following lines: 6.1 Clarifying the Institutional Framework: Support to the balance of payments division will be fruitful only if the government first clarifies: its balance of payments policy within a coherent macroeconomic framework, that is to say, a policy which takes account of production growth and monetary and budget policy objectives; the institutional framework of the balance of payments division itself. 6.2 Support for Continuing Actions Begun under PAGE I: Specifically, the establishment of a system in accordance with the recommendations made by the specialist hired under PAGE I with respect to: ,reorganization of the balance of payments services and the drawing up of a staffing plan for them; - installation of the hardware and software selected following invitations to bid; - staff training in methods of data collection for producing the balance of payments, in use of the equipment installed, and in analysis of balance of payments data. 6.3 Support for Start-Up of the System Identified under PAGE I for Monitoring Main Economic Activities under MINFI Oversight. Specifically, support for the setting up of the "Decor" system which comprises the following sub-systems: - "Brise" for the balance of payments, - "Acte" for exchange control, - "Samba" for money and credit - "Oasis" for insurance activities, and - "Presage", the economic data base for the whole system.  - 27 - 3. THIE NATIONAL STATISTICS SUPPORT COMPONENT 1. PAS OBJECTIVES: The PAS objective for this component was to make appropriate information available for use in drawing up economic and social policy. 2. PAGE OBJECTIVES: In order to achieve the PAS objective, the PAGE was designed to strengthen the management of the National Statistics Service (DSCN) through defining an appropriate institutional framework. This called for: reorganization of the national statistics system; improvement in statistical methodology; iimprovement in the compiling of national accounts. 3. ACTIONS ENVISAGED UNDER THE PAGE The following actions were planned in order to reach PAGE objectives: The recruitment of a Statistics Systems Specialist to prepare a master plan for reorganizing the national statistics information system, making organizational improvements and improvements in statistical methodology and carry out training programs and organize seminars; The recruitment of a national accounts specialist with counseling and training responsibilities to establish a new basis for the improvement of national accounts, prepare and supervise operations designed to collect information on which to base more accurate estimates of national accounts. Four statistical surveys were planned under the Project. T he recruitment of a data base specialist with responsibility for designing a statistical data bank to become operational in phase II. 4. PERFORMANCE UNDER TEIS COMPONENT 4.1 The statistics systems specialist was recruited and his contract extended for an extra year. As a result of his work: Recommendations were formulated on: i) the reorganization of the National Statistics and Accounts Directorate (DSCN) and its regional offices; ii) on the drawing up of a multiyear plan for the development of the statistics service was drawn up; and iii) on short term training and equipment needs. National Accounts for the four year period 1985/6 to 1985/9 were established and published;  - 28 - The national accounts service was able to make use of existing statistics with a view to: i) producing the main accounts for 1989/90 and 1991/2; and ii) the TES for base year 1989/90 for which the data are most complete. To collect DSF for the most recent (89/90 and 91/92) years in July and August of 1993; this allowed the response rate of the DSCN services to be significantly improved. 4.2 The specialist/trainer in National Accounts was not recruited due to the difficulty of finding a candidate with the right profile for this post. Some of the operational objectives of this subcomponent were transferred to the statistics systems specialist, specifically: i) support for the surveys planned under statistics production activities with a view to improving estimates of the national accounts before the end of 1993; ii) ensure that complementary surveys were carried out so as to finalize the weighting of the consumption baskets to be used in calculating consumer price indices; iii) ensure that arrangements for price monitoring were set up; iv) assist the DSCN to produce statistical data on the consumer price index, the industrial production index, and the improvement in the estimates of national accounts. 4.3 At the end of the extension of the specialist's contract, the status of project activities was as follows: The estimates of national accounts had not been improved because of i) a short period of uncertainty following a change in the management of the DSCN; ii) the inadequacy of data processing equipment. The very low number of microcomputers was a serious handicap both in carrying out current work and in the development of new applications; the non-availability of credits anticipated under the PAGE (FCFA 63 million for carrying out planned surveys). The consumer price index is still not available; No new industrial production index was calculated for lack of available data to identify which products should be monitored and what their relative weighting should be. 4.4. The data base specialist, who was to have been responsible for the design of the statistical data bank to be established in the second phase was not recruited because the statistical systems specialist failed to draw up terms of reference as specified. 4.5 The computer equipment supposed to be placed at the disposal of DSCN never was made available because the statistical systems specialist failed to draw up terms of reference for the computerzation master plan as specified. This master plan would have allowed the types of equipment and software that were needed to be identified.  - 29 - 4.6 The training programs have not yet begun because the new computer system is not in place: the most important element of these programs was to ensure that technical staff was able to operate the new national statistics system once it was delivered and operational. 5. ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE UNDER THIS COMPONENT The activities planned under this component were designed to respond to the perceived need to redefine the statistics service in order to arrive at an operationally appropriate institution. At the close of PAGE I, this need continues to be felt. 5.1 From analysis of the principal results obtained from the PAGE under this component, it is clear that: Not all the activities planned were, in fact, carried out because: - start up of this component was much delayed by the resistance to it of the responsible officials. They did not believe that they needed technical assistance to carry out the program of action but rather that they needed logistical and financial support. This situation was ultimately resolved but it impeded start-up and was at the root of certain slippages which occurred during implementation of the component; and difficulties occurred in the recruitment of a national accounts specialist/trainer. Invitations to bid were sent out twice and each time they led nowhere because of the near impossibility of finding a consultant with the desired profile. some progress was made, in particular in greater mobilization of DSCN services in carrying out planned actions as well as some improvement in the production of national accounts and price indices. However, these positive results were somewhat weakened by DSCN's institutional problems and the dependence of its services on external financing (France) to support certain current and operating needs. Neither the objectives of the PAGE nor those of the PAS could be reached in these circumstances. 5.2 The principal problems under this component were: the lack of an appropriate institutional framework and of a clear policy on the production of national statistics; insufficient data processing capacity.  - 30 - the dependence of its DSCN services on external financing to support certain current and operating needs. 6. RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 To rehabilitate the statistics service, the following areas will have to be emphasized: the establishment of appropriate institutional setting for statistics and national accounts management; implementation of the recommendations of the ACHOUR consultant; and the provision of adequate human and material resources for the statistics services. 6.2 In light of the preceding: the government should make it a priority to clarify the role which it wishes to see the national statistics service play and set up an appropriate institutional framework for it; despite the crisis, the government should increase its efforts to put budgetary resources at the disposal of the statistics service. 6.3 A PAGE II should provide support to the implementation of the ACHOUR consultant's recommendations, in particular: the establishment of a decentralized statistics management structure for data collection and the harmonization of information processing methods as well as the methodology to be put in place to carry out large surveys; the establishment of the master pan for reorganizing the national statistics system; and the implementation of on-the-job training programs and the organizing of seminars. 6.4 A PAGE II should also provide support to: the establishment of a new base for national accounts; and the preparation and implementation of specific surveys aimed at improving estimates of the national accounts.  -31 - 4. SUPPORT TO THE PUBLIC INVESTMEENT PROGRAM COMPONENT 1. PAS OBJECTIVE The PAS objective for this component was to establish a four-year rolling investment program consolidating the entire process of public investment planning and supervision of investment execution. The program was expected to: - identify the overall level of public investment within a framework adapted to national macroeconomic objectives such as the rate of growth, the budget deficit and the level of the country's indebtedness; define the distribution of investments between sectors and in line with an overall development strategy; and fix the distribution of investment within sectors and select projects on the basis of criteria such as economic and financial rates of return within the framework of a well-defined sectoral strategy. 2. PAGE OBJECTIVES PAGE support to this component was designed to provide the government with the tools (both logistic and in the form of technical assistance) necessary for strengthening its management of the public investment program (PIP) within a medium-term macroeconomic framework. To achieve this goal, technical assistance under the PAGE was to support MINPAT with the preparation, monitoring and updating of a computerized multi-year rolling investment program, including: i. the establishment of specific criteria for project selection and the establishment of a computerized file for every project; ii. a coherent three-year rolling investment program based on a the creation of a four- year rolling program; ii. the creation of an information unit with the Directorate of Programs (DPP) and the provision of on-the-job training for national counterpart staff of this unit; iv. the preparation and implementation of training programs; v. the analysis of the impact of major projects on the State's operating budget; and vi. the drawing up of a program of priority investments for 1990- 1991; 1993-94.  - 32 - 3. ACTIONS ENVISAGED UNDER THE PAGE To realize these objectives, the following actions were planned under the PAGE: the recruitment of two specialists, an economist and a computer specialist to carry out all the activities related to achievement of the objectives listed above; training for DPP and other MINPAT staff involved in the planning and monitoring of public investments and for members of the planning units in the technical departments. This training would be delivered through seminar/workshops in several short cycles and would deal with; project evaluation methods; principles and methods of rationalizing budgetary choices; external financing. The installation of: three additional computers (two already in place); a laser printer networked to the computers; copying equipment (high capacity photocopy machine, electronic stencil machine); filing equipment such as desks or cabinets to accommodate hanging files; a stock of administrative supplies, work tables, diskette keepers and other computer accessories; a direct telephone line to facilitate contact with project directors and to avoid unnecessary trips on the part of unit staff who, in any case, do not have car transport access. 4. PERFORMANCE UNDER THIS COMPONENT 4.1 The two specialists were recruited and, at the end of their service, the status is as folows: - specific project selection criteria have been established but they need to be fine- tuned and, in the event, are not adhered to; - the four-year roiling investment program has also been established but it is not situated within a consistent macroeconomic framework and investment programming is done with respect to sector priorities - the computer unit is operational and is carrying out the tasks assigned to it; - project riles: the data base has been worked up and set in place. The project files are not, however, complete or contain unreliable information - nevertheless, they  - 33 - are in place. The number of projects identified is 450 at the present time, this is all projects except those of the public enterprises. 4.2 Training in the DPP was limited to on-the-job training. The staff of the DPP computer unit are able to enter data and use the project file system. 4.3 As to the expected installation of equipment and facilities: - office space was renovated and equipped using PAGE counterpart funds; two work stations and a laser printer have been delivered to DPP; a telephone line has been installed and this has facilitated contact with project directors to update file information. 5. ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE UNDER TEIS COMPONENT The PAS objectives under this component have not been reached since the PIP is not yet situated within a coherent macroeconomic framework This is because: the PIP framework does not take account of the growth rate objectives being pursued, of the country's treasury problems or of its level of indebtedness. the sectoral strategies are not well-defined and do not support an overall government investment strategy. *the project selection criteria used in the PIP are not based on the economic rate of return of the projects. 5.2 Most of the actions planned under the PAGE did, in fact, take place but the PAGE objectives were not achieved. 5.3 The problems encountered under this component were as follows: institutional problems due to the lack of clearly defined distribution of tasks and poor coordination between the different actors involved in the planning, budgeting and public investment monitoring processes. The result has been an intervention by other agencies into DPP's areas of responsibility, for example: interventions from DGTC; interference from the Planning and Economic Cooperation Departments of MINPAT; the failure of the planning units in the technical ministries to respect the rightful role of the DPP.  - 34 - the lack of an appropriate interface between DPP and the technical departments and, as a result, the inaccurate entries made by these latter in the project files; insufficient equipment which significantly reduced DPP's work capacity and the fact that the planning unit has great difficulty in fulfilling its appointed tasks; the fact that the rehabilitated office space is too cramped for the planning unit. It can accommodate no more than three staff at the time, hence the practice of rotating unit staff to get given jobs done; moreover, the limitations of the rehabilitated facility were such that it was impossible to set up more work stations there or to hold meetings with the technical ministries or donors. the lack of modem, high-performance reproducing equipment; the acquisition of such equipment and of further computer equipment is dependent on moving the DPP (or enlarging its facilities). In summary, the objective of endowing the government with a basic tool for public investment planning has not been achieved. DPP is not yet in a position to carry out macroeconomic analysis of the PIP and so provide the government with a rational and consistent management tool. The lack of a clearly articulated government policy in this area has hampered the establishment of an institutional framework and an environment favorable to improving this tool which is an essential of sound macroeconomic management. However, thanks to the PAGE, the government does have a project files system which covers public investments, including those planned in the public enterprises sector. 6. RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 In order to ensure that the actions necessary for strengthening the DPP's institutional capacity do not fail, the government should: define the macroeconomic framework for the PIP. This framework should: take account of the rate of growth objectives and of the country's treasury and debt problems; clearly define the sector strategies which are to be put in place to support government's overall investment strategy; determine the project selection criteria to be included in the PIP with reference to the economic rate of return of the projects; find an appropriate solution to the institutional problems of allocation of tasks and coordination which PIP management faces. This action should address questions of the institutional relationships between MINPAT and the technical departnents. A national network for planning and monitoring public investments should be established. It should be made up of the coordination services at the central level  - 35 - and at the sectoral level, by the technical departments, projects and para-public enterprises which are the Plan ministry's interlocutors. - free up budget resources for the operation of the planning unit; 6.2 Once the above conditions are fulfilled, PAGE II should provide support to: strengthening the existing computer system; training for planning unit staff, to include: methods and techniques of project evaluation; principles and methods of rationalizing budgetary choices; monitoring of external financing. training seminars such as were planned under PAGE I. 1. THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM COMPONENT 1. PAS OBJECTIVES There were two main PAS objectives for civil service reform, control of the wage bill and improving the efficiency of public administration. 2. PAGE OBJECTIVES PAGE support was designed to provide the government with the tools (technical assistance, training and logistical support) for collecting and processing information it needed for making decisions relative to the achievement of PAS objectives. 3. ACTIONS ENVISAGED UNDER THE PAGE I 3.1 Studies of the Organization and Stafling Plans of the Ministries (POEs). Specialists in public administration management were to be recruited under this component to help the Government carry out the POEs. This was to take place in two stages: a. Stage 1: Drawing up the Ministries General Organization Strategy. This was considered a necessary preliminary to drawing up the POEs and its purposes were: "horizontal" analysis of the mission of each ministry to identify possible duplications of effort or gaps; make a proposal for a new government structure; and  - 36 - - establish the methodology for analysis of the POEs. When the studies were completed, the govermnent was expected either to opt for a new structure with fewer ministries having wider missions or for the same structure and number of ministries but to strearnline their missions. To avoid overlap and duplication of efforts, the government opted for the second alternative but its implementation has not altogether eliminated all the overlaps in the system. It would be judicious for the govemrnent to review its structure in light of the conclusions of the SGOM study. a. Stage 2: Study of the POEs by groups of ministries, beginning with MNII, MINPAT, MINFOPRA, and MIDIC, then, if the resources were available, to add a second group (Health, Education and Agriculture). This second phase was to consist of each ministry's drawing up a minimal plan of its operational organization in light of its mission and of its institutional relations with its other external partners. On this basis, a listing of the posts needed and their description (by tasks) and the professional profile of the staff who would be needed for them. The aims were to identify: the minimum number of necessary staff for the ministry's efficient functioning; and r ealistic operating budgets (other than salaries) for efficient functioning. The study was to cover central and external services of each ministry as well as projects or other entities directly attached to it or under its oversight (that is, those having activities which related directly to the mission of the particular ministry in question). 3.2 Review of the Judicial Framework of the CivDl Service This was to cover the harmonization of the General Statute (SG) and the Particular Statutes (SP), the implementation of a new remunerations policy, the definition of career plans and the definition of a system for objective evaluation of the performance of individual staff members. On the basis of an in-depth study of existing legal texts, the government was to be provided with a diagnosis of the present situation with regard to statutes covering state employees. This would highlight weaknesses, ambiguities, overlaps, contradictions and regulatory gaps and go on to make a series of recommendations and propose a plan of actions with a view to giving new dynamism to the career based on increased accountability and better motivation of personnel. The following were to be included in the study: - statutes; - career and promotion; - recruitment and employment; - pay.  - 37 - 3.3 Recruitment of a Public Management Specialist The role of this specialist was to support the Civil Service Ministry in reorganization of payroll management. The objective was to make a detailed examination of the links between the Payroll Directorate, MINFOPRA, and other services involved in the management of state employees. The expected results were the establishment of an overall master plan, a master plan for computerization and a training program. 3.4 Recruitment of a Computer Hardware Specialist The role of this specialist was to set up a system for computerized management of the payroll. Studies including an assessment of computer needs were to be carried out (under PAGE financing). The specialist was to be responsible for drawing up specifications, contacts with potential installers and opening of bids. 3.5 Recruitment of a Software Specialist The role of this specialist was to design and deliver a software program for the budgetisation of the payroll. This would be complementary to the work of the computer specialist. It was expected that the invitations to bid for posts 1 and 2 would be made at the same time. 3.6 Recruitment of a Management Information Systems Specialist The role of this specialist was to provide personnel training in the new procedures and the use of equipment as identified by the computer specialists and by those specialists working on the review of the judicial framework. 3.7 Study of the Integrated MIS for State Employees and the Public Payroll (SIGIPES) This would consolidate the activities of the four posts outlined above initially planned under the PAGE: a) the public management specialist; b) the hardware specialist; c) the software specialist; and d) the MIS specialist. Activities included the carrying out of a study and the setting up of an integrated M1S system for management of State employees and of the public payroll. The participation of concerned administrative services in the sectoral ministries. The basic principles of the new integrated personnel management system were to improve management control (computerized and administrative) by the services with institutional responsibility for personnel management (DPE, DS, DT, DAG) as well as their greater accountability within this management framework  - 38 - by making available to them all the institutional and informational means necessary with the greatest possible flexibility. The studies were to examine in detail: i) institutional aspects of the proposed management system (organization, procedures and information flows within each service; institutional relationships between the services); and ii) computerization aspects. The work was to proceed in four main phases: - study of the management administrative system; - study of the management computer system; - development and setting up of the administrative and computer systems (including tests and installation of the systems); - training of the management administrative personnel (the "users"). 3.8 Support to National Consultants The PAGE was to finance the establishment of a computerized list of national consultants, provide the organization of training seminars with the support of the Federation of African Consultants and to supply equipment (computer and other necessary materials). 3.9 Census of State Employees In addition to the above actions, during project implementation it was decided to carry out a census of State employees with the three following principal objectives: supply the specialists responsible for drawing up the POEs with information they needed to speed up their work and finish their contracts within a reasonable time frame; Complement and verify information in the computerized payroll files; establish a qualitative and quantitative data bank on state employees to facilitate bringing the numbers of employees to optimum levels through: filling empty posts with the best suited candidates; remove the less suited surplus staff from overstaffed administrative units; and make the optimum match between the requirements of a post and existing staff qualifications (and other criteria) in cases where the new staff numbers and the old are the same. 4. PERFORMANCE UNDER THIS COMPONENT 4.1 Ministry Staffing and Organization Plans This activity was carried out as planned in two stages. The POE proposals for the first list of eight ministries selected by the govermment are now available despite delays in their  - 39 - drawing them up. The CIS has taken its decisions with respect to the POEs. The draft plans for implementing the POEs are in the process of being finalized. The evaluation report of the invitation to bid on the Ministry of Public Works POE has been submitted to IBRD for its non-objection. The program for implementation of the MNFOPRA POE over a four year period has received the support of UNDP in the form of a grant of US$ 935,000, of which US$ 850,000 is earmarked for MDP, US$ 85,000 for CIP. 4.2 Review of the Judicial Framework of the Civil Service The final report of the study on the judicial framework of the civil service has been available since August 1992 and makes recommendations, considered satisfactory by the World Bank, concerning statutes, the career development and promotion, recruitment, terms of service and remuneration. A draft decree for a civil service General Statute based on the study recommendations is in the process of being examined by an interministerial technical commission in the Prime Minister's office. The draft decree text has been transmitted to the World Bank. 4.3 Study of the Integrated MIS for State Employees and the Public Payroll (SIGIPES) The report on the SIGIPES master plan is available; the Committee for Administrative Reform (CRA) has made its recommendations to MINFOPRA on the scenario to be selected; the whole dossier is now being analyzed in NMIFOPRA. 4.5 Support to National Consultants This activity has been withdrawn from the PAGE and a request for an Institutional Development Fund financing has been made instead. The World Bank reply is not yet known. 4.6 Census of State Employees The census was carried out under the responsibility of the SGP and the CRA with the participation of the engineering adviser and of MINFOPRA's Administrative Reform Division. The quantitative and qualitative data bank on state employees is now available. The census data was given to the specialists responsible for drawing up the POEs and this information allowed them to speed up their tasks and cany their mandate to completion. Reconciliation of these data with information in the computerized payroll files is now being carried out.  - 40 - 4.7 Civil Service Social Plan A social pan for the civil service was drawn up on the basis of the POE study results, of the census data and of the informnation in the computerized payroll files. This plan lays out the mechanisms for retraining and reorientation of staff quitting the public service. It provides an incentives framework for jobs creation built round the central bank and the commercial banks and private consultants advising on enterprise formation. 5. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE UNDER THIS COMPONENT Despite certain slippages, and with the exception of the support to national consultancies subcomponent, all planned activities under this component were carried out. The PAGE objectives, which were to identify the substance of civil service reforms, were attained. The substance of these reforms is now widely known thanks to the recommendations of the various studies which have been carried out and the documents produced by the CRA with active support from the DRA and ISMP. 6. RECOMMENDATIONS To achieve the goals of bringing the numbers of civil servants under control and improving the efficiency of the public administration: 6.1 The Government should clearly define the role of the civil service, its size and its policy for personnel management in the service. 6.2 PAGE II should support continued implementation of activities begun under PAGE I, specifically: - carrying out POE studies for the remaining ministries; - implementation of the POEs in those ministries for which they have been completed; - adoption and implementation of a new General Statute of the civil service; - adoption and implementation of a master plan for the integrated computerized management of state personnel and of the payroll; - finalization of the data on state employees yielded by the latest census and its implementation within MINFOPRA: - the drawing up and implementation of a new remuneration system for civil servants based on individual performance; and - the implementation of the civil service social plan.  -41 - 6. THE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM COMPONENT 1. PAS OBJECTIVES The objectives of the Reform of Public and Parapublic Enterprises (RESPP) under the PAS are as follows: reduction of the financial burden of the public enterprises on public finances; - minimizing the human, social and financial consequences of reform; and improving the performance of those enterprises remaining within the State's portfolio. 2. PAGE OBJECTIVE 3. ACTIVITIES ENVISAGED UNDER THE PAGE 3.1 The recruitment of experts to carly out the diagnostic studies and preparation of rehabilitation plans for 75 enterprises. 3.2 The recruitment of experts for a series of studies concerning: identification of the means whereby the potential negative social consequences of the reduction of staff numbers in the public enterprise sector could be minimized; - detailed study of the relationships between the public authorities and certain selected public enterprises and the drawing up of specific case-by-case recommendations on how to clarify these relationships; analysis of the National Basic Products Marketing Board (ONCPB) marketing activities and those of other agricultural marketing boards. 3.3 The recruitment of experts of whom half were to be Cameroon nationals to assist the govermnent in applying enterprise rehabilitation, privatization and/or liquidation measures. These experts were to take part in the supervision of public enterprises in the process of being restructured and to provide legal, auditing and liquidation services to enterprises which are to be privatized or liquidated. 3.4 The recruitment of a specialist in MIS systems to set up the management information system to be installed within the technical Commission. 3.5 Strengthening of the operations of the Technical Committee responsible for the reform of public enterprises through financing the purchase of five vehicles, office furniture and supplies and participation in seminars on public enterprise reforn.  - 42 - 4. PERFORMANCE UNDER THIIS COMPONENT Diagnostic studies were carried out on 75 public enterprises which were a heavy burden on the finances of the State, including private sector banks. Decisions concerning liquidation, privatization and restructuring were taken on the basis of these studies. Performance contracts were signed between the State and 25 enterprises remaining in the public portfolio. By end 1993, 67 enterprises had been dissolved and were in the process of liquidation in various forms, six enterprises had been effectively relinquished into other hands, 16 were in the process of privatization and 121 remained in the State's portfolio, of these, 25 had signed performance contracts. The PAGE financed the audits for eight liquidation operations. These audits brought to light serious shortcomings in the way in which the liquidations had been conducted, in particular, the lack of an appropriate judicial framework in which to carry them out, the failure to establish the assets and liabilities situations of the companies before liquidation began and a lack of rigor in realizing assets and recovering debts. The PAGE also financed the recruitment of a long term expert to assist the technical commission in installing a management information system for public enterprises (SIGEP). Initially, work concentrated on the collection of basic data needed to establish what the State's portfolio was. Financial data were then gathered. Significant efforts are still needed to establish the system on a sustained basis because the enterprises are not obliged to supply information with any specified periodicity or in any specified format. Data gathering is done ad hoc as the financial statements become available and SIGEP reports are not formalized. The PAGE strengthened the capacity of the Technical Commission for Rehabilitation of Public and Parapublic Enterprises (CTIMREP) through financing the purchase of five vehicles, office fuimiture and supplies and the participation of CTIMREP members in seminars on public enterprise reform both in Cameroon and overseas. 5. EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE UNDER TEHIS COMPONENT All activities planned for this project component were carried out. Nevertheless, the PAS objectives were not realized because of the following serious problems: 2 5.1 Institutional Problems Related to the Structures for Guiding Restructuring, Liquidation and Privatization Operations the interministerial committee's approval mechanisms are ponderous and its decisions are not formalized, which makes it relatively easy to call them repeatedly into question with subsequent loss of credibility for the privatization program; See also the Mw-NelU mpot oflmumy 26,1994.  -43 - the respective mandates and authority of the technical commission and the technical committee are not sufficiently clear which impedes efficient operation. Certain technical competencies of the CIM could have been entrusted to the technical commission in the interests of greater efficiency; the technical commission does not exercise its fuD range of authority, certain entities described in the legal texts no longer are operating (for example the sub- commission on banking) and certain liquidation or privatization operations wholly escape the attention of the technical comrnission (for example the liquidations of ONCPB and of GETRAM); and the lack of any real coordination by the technical commission of the work of the different sub-commissions means that each functions more or less in a sealed environment which leads to the dissipation of responsibilities and further increases operational delays. 5.2 Institutional Problems Linked to the Lack of Any General Declaration of Policy on Disengagement of the State The will of the government to disengage from the parapublic sector has never been clearly stated nor has any policy to this effect. The result is an ad hoc approach to implementing reforms and this, in turn, results in choices which are not always in line with priorities with respect to privatizations and performance contracts. 5.3 Problems Specific to Privatization - the judicial framework for privatization has not been clearly defined insofar as the texts relating to a privatization operation may fail to specifyr what entity will make the decision to privatize and what form that decision will take. This has led to difficulties in implementing privatizations; - the Government has never clearly enunciated what its objectives are in pursuing privatization. This leads to a situation where the specificities of a given enterprise are often not taken into account in launching the privatization operation and in the evaluation methods selected. 5.4 Problems Specific to Liquidations Liquidation operations have run into several problems: the absence of legal texts specifying the manner in which liquidators are to be nominated, their areas of competence and their obligations.  - 44 - the selection of persons having only limited knowledge of liquidation procedures and the work to be done; the fact that certain privatization operations (for example, ONCPB) take place entirely outside the control of the organism responsible for supervising them; and the fact that the sub-commission directly manages some liquidations (SOFIBEL, ONDAPB, and COCAM), making it judge and party in the same case, and ties up its personnel. 5.5 Problems Related Specifically to Enterprises Remaining in the State's Portfolio the government has still not defined the legal framework of public enterprises which could simplify the categorization of those enterprises, redefine their relations with the State, lighten the oversight burden and make their Boards of Directors and General Managers more accountable; the means available to CTJIREP are not enough to allow it to meet the objectives of monitoring performance contract implementation. CT/MREP's needs to meet these objectives (reorganization, strengthening management systems) were underestimated. some large enterprises refuse to comply with the contracts and do not supply the information needed to monitor them; the enterprises financial statements are often seriously late and are not transmitted to CT/MREP in time for the SIGEP to be updated since there is no arrangement to that effect; the enterprises remaining in the State's portfolio are not systematically audited as they should be once a year. Such audits are indispensable to ensure the reliability of the financial information produced and the sound management of the State's patrimony. 6. RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 The government should unambiguously confirm its intention to withdraw competitive service and production activities which are normally the domain of the private sector as well as from commercial public services. 6.2 To improve the legal and institutional environment for restructuring, liquidation and privatization operations, PAGE II should provide support to the goverrrnent in defining and implementing the following program of action: - establish the list of all activities from which the State intends to disengage;  - 45 - reorganization of the CT/MREP; establish the legal framework of the public enterprise sector; implementation of operations. 6.3 To help achieve the objectives of the liquidation and privatization operations, PAGE II should provide support to the government in implementing the following program of action: active follow-through on liquidation operations already begun once the authorities have reached decisions based on the recommendations of the liquidation audits for overcoming present constraints; finalization of the privatization operations at present in abeyance pending a decision by the authorities. 6.4 To help achieve the performance objectives of the enterprises remaining in the State's portfolio, PAGE II should provide support to the government in implementing the following program of action: active follow-through on establishing the SIGEP and extending it to other enterprises remaining in the State's portfolio and systematic data gathering; and - reorientation of performance contracts of enterprises which have a significant irnpact on the State budget and on the economy. 7. THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT SECRETARIAT (SGP) I1. The SGP's Mission For purposes of technical and financial coordination, the Permanent Technical Secretariat and the PAGE Management Unit are grouped in one unit, the PAGE Management Secretariat (SGP). The administrative responsibilities of the SGP are: administrative support to World Bank, BAD, IXM and other missions involving the PAGE or other Economic and Financial Adjustment Agreements; support to specialists and consultants on missions connected to the PAGE, PAS or nIF.  - 46 - The technical responsibilities of the SGP are: monitoring and supervision, in conjunction with the other concerned agencies, of activities under the PAGE, PAS or IMF programrs; the preparation of reports on the status of each component of the PAGE, PAS and of the IMF program; transmission to the World Bank of all requests from ministries or agencies involved in the implementation of the various PAGE components. 2. Coordination and Monitoring Mechanisms Coordination and Monitoring mechanisms are in the form of meetings and matrices established to allow supervision of progress towards objectives. With respect to the operational objectives described above, the SGP's work has been organized around regular meetings with each technical assistant (at least two sectoral meetings per week) in the concerned ministries and sectoral agencies and with the donor community. Meetings with the World Bank were principally: bipartite meetings with the participation of the SGP and concerned sectoral staff to analyze progress in compliance with conditionalities and to elicit suggestions or, meetings between the SGP, the World Bank or BAD to coordinate positions; tripartite meetings with the participation of the SGP, concemed sector staff and donors; or general meetings with the participation of the SGP, donors and concerned sectoral staff Following these meetings, progress reports on the various programs are regularly sent to the Coordinator of the SGP. 3. Work Organization within the SGP The president of the Committee for Preparation and Monitoring of Agreements and Programs is also Coordinator of the SGP. He is assisted in these functions by a Technical coordinator and an Administrator. The Technical coordinator has four technical assistants; support staff are two secretaries, a chauffeur/clerk and one staff member responsible for computer and accounts support. This staff is paid under the State budget except for one secretary and the computer and accounts assistant.  - 47 - 3.2 Distribution of Tasks The workload within the SGP is distributed so as to cover all the objectives of the stabilization plan, the adjustment program and Cameroon's economic recovery, specifically: stabilization covers the control of State expenditures, restructuring of budget expenses, rationalization of investment choices, restructuring and increase of revenues and the settlement of state arrears; the streamnlining of public and parapublic sector management covers public enterprise reform and civil service reform both as well as public enterprise rehabilitation; economic recovery covers the rural, industrial, commercial, mining energy and water, infrastructure, communications transport, urbanism and housing sectors. There are therefore ten posts to be covered within the SGP and this is done as follows: The tasks of the Coordinator are: - ongoing relations between the SGP, the World Bank, BAD and the IMF with whom he is the designated interlocutor; - supervision of the SGP's work, which he directs and approves; - coordination between the SGP and Ministry of Stabliliation. He directs the flow of information from Ministry of Stabilization to the SGP, whose responses are also channeled through him; - other interventions to settle particular questions. The tasks of the Technical coordinator are: Negotiation of contracts and orders with beneficiaries and suppliers of consultant services to the PAGE and with equipment suppliers; day-to-day monitoring of PAGE accounts, including: establishing the financial PAGE statements; monitoring of uncommitted funds as recorded by the SGP and World Bank statements using the World Bank exchange rates; drafting PAGE financial reports; day do day accounts management.  - 48 - The tasks of the Technical Assistants are: - monitor compliance with the calendar of action established by the CT/MREP in their particular sector of responsibility and compliance with PAS/PAGF/IMF program conditionalities; - draft sectoral notes on program monitoring; - maintain ongoing contacts with the sectoral staff of ministries and donors in their areas of responsibility; - organize the sectoral committees for program supervision, several of which they are members. The Accounting Assistant's tasks are: The Accounting Assistant's principal responsibility is to provide support to the Accountant in day to day monitoring of PAGE accounts through: - monitoring of PAGE commitments using the consultant's contracts and equipment supplies documentation; - coordinates and monitors payment requests from consultants and suppliers which he transmits to the CAA after they have been initialed by the Accountant and the Coordinator; - monitors disbursement requests transmitted from the CAA to the World Bank; - draws up regular statements of account for the Accountant. The computer assistant's principal task is to manage the SGP computer network and ensure proper operation of the computer equipment. The clerk's tasks are to purchase office supplies, distribute these supplies and materials to staff monitor the petty cash and do photocopying. The chauffeur's main task is to ensure timely and efficient distribution of office mail. The secretaries are responsible for typing and filing.  -49 - 3.2 SGP STAFFING PLAN POST STAFF NOs NAME RESPONSIBILITIES Coordinator I Nieck J. PH. Supervision Technical I EKINDI C. Technical Coordination PAS, PAGE, Coordinator F_EI Administrator I OBAM NL.R. Accountant I EKINDI C. Financial management Technical Assistance 5 EKINDI C. Civil Service; Banking and Financial Sectors. ENANDJOUM B. Forests sw,b, PASA; PAGE, FMI. NGOUANTEU A. Industry and Commerce; liberalization of the economy; PAS. MAKANG M. Public Finances PST BAYHA CL. Public Enterprises Accounting Assistant 1 EYDI S. PAGE accounting_ Computer Assistant 1 EYDI S. Computer network Clerk 1 AISSOU B. Photocopying and materials Chauffeur I AISSOUB. Mail Secretary 2 NGANDO Typing ; ____________ ________ ABEGA Typing 'OTAL 16 I l In all, ten posts requiring a staff of 16 but filled, in fact, by 11 persons. 4. SUMARY OF SGP's ACTIVITIES All PAS/BAD and PAS/World Bank conditions of disbursement of the third tranche were met thanks to the support of the SGP. Moreover, although discussions between the World Bank and Caneroon on the medium term framework were interrupted in April 1992, the SGP began preparation of the documentation relative to the sectoral adjustment loans in Transport and Agriculture in anticipation of negotiations with the World Bank on a further adjustment program.  - 50 - With the assistance of World Bank staff, the SGP has been able to pilot the PAGE to successful conclusion and achievement of its objectives without the perturbations that other World Bank-financed projects have suffered from suspension of disbursements. Had it not been for slippages in meeting PAS Third tranche conditionality, a second PAGE could already have been negotiated with the World Bank -- outline matrices for a second PAGE had already been drafted and a calendar established for project negotiations. The progress with the civil service reform program should be noted here. The CIS reached decisions concerning eight POEs. Wit respect to IMF program objectives, the judicious intervention of the SGP allowed significant progress to be made under the second program with the Fund. Lack of revenue did not allow the financial objectives to be reached, however, and the program has been suspended.  - 51 - ANNEX 1 REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) PART III: BASIC DATA RELATED BANK LOANS a x Title. LPurpose Year Status Ln. 3089 CM Structural Adjustenet Supporit govenrmentes 1989 Two tranches Program reform program disbursed; third tranche cancelled as country slipped from Bank to IDA -________________ eligible Ln. 3206 CM Social Dimensions of Provide assistance to 1990 After four years of Adjustment government in its attempts unsatisfactory to reestablish growth with perfornance, the equity and to help alleviate Govermnent has the impact of the structural requested adjustment progrwm cancellation of the balance of the loan, which is expected to take place by end-June 1994. Cr.2576 CM Structural Adjustment Support government's 1994 One tranche Credit reform program operation which replaced the 3rd tranche of SAL I. Fully disbursed. Cr.2627 CM Economic Recovery Support government's 1994 One tranche Credit economic recovery program operation which was approved on June 16, 1994.  - 52 - ANINEX II REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) PROJECT TIMETABLE ACFIVI1Y DATE PLANNED DATE REVISED DATE. Identification November 1988 _ Preparation December 1988 - February 1989 Appraisal February-March 1989 - Feb-March 1989 Negotiations May 1989 _ May 1989 Board Approval June 1989 July 11, 1989 Loan Signing July 1989 July 17, 1989 Loan Effectiveness _ January 3, 1990 Loan Closing June 30, 1993 December 31, 1993 December 31, 1993 Last Disbursement June 30, 1994' May 13, 1994 June 30, 1994 lhe grace period to receive the lst application under the loan has been extended to June 30, 1994, to allow for the full documentation of the Special Accowt  - 53 - ANNEX III REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (US$ MILLION) FY90 | FY'91 I FY92 j FY93 [FY94 FY95 Appraisal Estimate 1 /|0.70 2.90 5.40 7.40 | 8.20 | - 9.00 Actual L 0.68 1.64 4.43 7.18 8.82 -- I Actual as % of estimate 97.1 56.6 59.9 97.0 107.6 1/ Based on the region's disbursement profile Date of First Disbursement January 29, 1990 Initial Loan Closing Date June 30, 1993 Actual Loan Closing Date December 31, 1993 Date of Last Disbursement June 30, 1994' lThe grace period to receive the last application under the loan has been extended to June 30, 1994, to allow for the full documentation of the Special Account.  - 54 - ANNEX IV REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) PROJECT COST AND FINANCING (US$ MILLION) APPRAISAL ACTUAL :______- __= __ :___ FOREIGNI LOCAL TOTAL FOREIGN LOCAL TOTAI. Public Investnent Programniing 0,6 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.7 National Statistics 1.7 0.2 1.9 1.9 0.2 2.1 Debt Management 0,7 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.7 Civil Service Reform 3.1 0.4 3.5 3.7 0.2 3.9 Public Enterprise Reform 3.7 0.5 4.2 4.0 0.5 4.5 StudyFund&OtherActivities 1.7 0.1 1.8 1.9 - 1.9 Project Management Secretariat 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.7 Base Cost 11.6 1.9 13.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. Contingencies 0.8 0.2 1.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. Totul Project Cost 12.4 2.1 14.5 13.0 1.5 14.5 Financing Plan Bank 9.0 - 9.0 9.0 - 9.0 Govermnent - 1.5 1.5 - 1.5 1.5 Cofinancing or other 4.0 - 4.0 4.0 - 4.0 Totui Cust 13.0 1.5 14.5 . 13.0 1.5 14.5 n.a. Not available  - 55 - ANNEX V REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) A. ALLOCATION OF PROCEEDS (US$ THOUSANDS) Categories Original Loan Actual Disbursement ________________________ Allocation ______ = = _ Resident Specialists 1,100 338 Short-term Consultants 5,300 6,774 Other Consultants (Needs to be 1.150 285 identified) Training 100 218 Equipment 100 804 Reimbursement PPF 350 296 Special Account 106 Unallocated 900 Total 9,000 8,822.  - 56 - ANNEX N1 REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) B. MANPOWER ALLOCATION ITEM DURATION OF SERVICES EXPECTED DATE OF AN mo1NTH5 EMPLOYMENT A. Public Investment Program * PIPAdviser 12 September 1989 * Software Adviser 4 November 1989 * Procurement Adviser (resident) 24 September 1989 B. National Statistics * Specialist statistical systems (resident) 24 September 1989 (expanded TOR to cover partially the other two) * National accounts specialist (resident) 36 September 1989 (not hired) * Data base specialist/trainer (resident) 24 September 1990 (not hired) C. Debt Management * Specialist for master plan 6 May 1989 * Specialist for software changes 6 May 1989 * Specialist on guaranteed debt management and 3 June 1990 monitoring * Computer system specialist 3 January 1990 D. Civil Service Reform * Public management expert 6 September 1989 * Computer payroll experts (short term) 26 May 1990 * Software payroll experts (short term) 40 September 1990 * Management Information systems expert 4 September 1991 * Expert in staffing plans (short term) 25 September 1989 * Institutional experts 10 January 1990 * Human resources expert 5 September 1989 E. Public Enterprises Reform * Management information systems expert 6 September 1989 * Public enterprises sector experts (short term) 100 May 1989 - June 1991 * Experts for studies (short term) 25 May 1989 - June 1991 * Legal and other experts (short tern) 80 May 1989 - June 1991 F. Other Consultant Services * To be determined during project execution  57 - ANNEX VII REPUBLIC OF CANIEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) USE OF STAFF RESOURCES STAFF INPUTS STAGE OF PROJECR CYCLE STAFF WEEKS STAFF WEEKS (PLANNED) (AC-TUAL) Through Appraisal n.a. 21.1 Negotiations n.a. 6.2 Supervision n.a. 92.6 PCR n. a 6.0 Trotal 125.9 MISSIONS Activity Fiscal No. of No. of Specialization Rating Typt of Year Persons Weeks Status Problenm Identification 1988 1 0.3 S Preparation/ 1989 Appraisal 5 9.7 3S, C, CO Appraisal 1989 5 11.1 CO, L, S Negotiation 1989 5 5.3 CO, S Negotiation 1990 2 0.9 CO, S Supervision 1990 8 29.2 2CO, 3S, L, HL, N.A. M Supervision 1991 6 22.2 CO, 2S, 2L, HL 1, 2 M Supervision 1992 5 14.7 CO, 2S, LEG, L 2 P, N/S Supervision 1993 8 18.0 2CO, ECN, 2S, L, 2HL 3 M, PR, F Supervision 1994 6 8.5 CO, ECN, 2S, 2HL 3 P, M, F, T PCR 1994 2 6.0 C. CO . TO3TALS ... .. S Specialists: CO = Country Officer; ECN = Economist; C = Consultant; S = Specialist; L = Local HL = Higher Level Local; LEG = Legal Type of Problem: T = Technical; M = Managerial; P = Political; Pr. = Procurement; F = Project finances; n/s = unspecified,  - 58 - ANNEX V'II Page 1 of 2 REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROJECT (PAGE) (LOAN 3110-CM) STATUS OF LOAN COVENANTS LO." SUBJECT SATE TAS 31NIARICS AGREEWENT REMARKS Section 2.02 (b) The Borrower shall open and maintain Complied Payment of local counterpart funds was in CFA Francs a Special Account in a with often not made on schedule. commercial bank on terms and conditions satisfactory to the Bank. Deposits into, and payments out of, the Special Account shall be made in accordance with the provisions of Schedule 5 to this Agreement. Section 3.01 (a) The Borrower declares its Ongoing Not fully Government commitment to project commitment to Project objectives complied objectives was weak as evidenced by detailed in Schedule 2, which are to with difficulties in implementing components assist the Borrower, to achieve dealing with economic management and structural adjustments of the economy structural reforms. in: (a) formulating and implementing refonrs; and (b) promoting a better policy analysis and management of the economy. Section 3.01 (b) Establish and maintain a Project January Complied Secretariat set-up and administrators, Management Secretariat within the 1990 with coordinators and support staff appointed. Technical Committee headed by the However, due to other tasks and the Technical Committee Coordinator, diverse responsibilities in other including an administrative officer government offices of one of the and an accountant and assisted by administrators, who was to also serve as support staff in adequate numbers. the project accountant, there were for all intents and purposes no accountant in charge of the project's accounts and financial management system. As a result, the financial situation under the project was weak and financial statements and subsequent audits experienced delays. A 1993 Bank mission reiterated the recommendation that the Government follow-up on previous Bank recommendations to recruit an accountant on a short-term basis to help set up a sound accounting system. This was finally done following the audit of the projects accounts for 1991-92 and resulted in a _ much improved accounting system.  - 59 - ANNEX VIII Page 2 of 2 REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON STATUS OF LOAN COVENANTS 'LOAN SUBJECT DATE STATUS REALARKS AGREEMENT f _E _RK_ Section 3.03 (a) Borrower to submit to the Bank for Ongoing Complied The Bank was regularly consulted in approval a detailed proposal for with accordance with this covenant. activities to be carried out under Parts B (b), C (d) and F of the project, including justification, plan of execution and supporting services, if needed. l Section 3.04 (a) Detailed draft annual work programs Ongoing Not fully Work programs were submitted to the (i) and budgets to be submitted to the complied Bank for review and approval in the Bank through the SGP for review and with course of SPN mission. The frequency approval beginning on December 31, would therefore be regulated by those of 1989 and thereafter at six months' SPN missions. However, submission of intervals. budgets to the Bank have been irregular (see comments under 3.01 (b) above). Section 3.04 (a) Borrower and Bank to exchange views Ongoing Complied Done on a regular basis during supervision (ii) on the status of the Project Activities, with missions which were carried out on the ensuring results and average twice yearly and formalized in the recommendations and further action proces-verbaux of SPN missions. to be taken for carrying out the Project and meeting project objectives. Exchange views no later than June 30, July Done as indicated in the July 27, 1990 1990 on the Project funding 1990 proces-verbal of the SPN mission (BTO requirements and the proposed ways dated 8/10/90). and means to fulfill them. Section 3.04 (b) Borrower to report on the progress Ongoing Complied The SGP prepared progress reports on achieved in carrying out the Project with project activities in preparation for SPN prior to the exchange of views missions whose work was carried out on required under 3.04 (a) (ii) the basis of these reports. Section 4.01 (a) Maintain adequate records for project Ongoing Partially The accounting system improved (b) accounts and annual audit by complied significantly in the last 18 months of independent auditors. Furnish to the with project execution, following the Bank certified reports of said audits recommendations of the Bank and the and all relevant records no later than project's auditors. The 1993 accounts are six months after the end of each FY. now being audited and an intermediate report has been submitted to the Bank for comments. The final audit report is expected to be submitted on time by end- ______________ _______________________________ June 1994. N.B. Credit became effective January 3, 1990 ABBREVIATIONS Project Management Secretariat (in French SGP: Secretariat de Gestion du Projet)    FILE COPY G CQbb Report No; 14156 Type: PCR