Somalia - Special Emergency Assistance Grant Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 14299 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SPECIAL EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE GRANT (No.SOTA12030) April 5, 1995 Agriculture and Environment Operations Division Eastern Africa Department Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY AND EQUIVALENT UNITS Currency = US$ WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 Square Km = 10,000 m2 I Metric Ton = 1,000 kg ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AMER African Medical and Research Foundation CARE Cooperative Assistance and Relief Everywhere ICRC International Committee for the Red Cross MCH Mother and Child Health Center NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations SEPHA Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa UN United Nations UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNICEF United Nations Children's Education Fund UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia USAID United States Agency for International Development WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization WTOE World Food Programme Transport Operation in Ethiopia FISCAL YEAR UNICEF, WFP, WHO January 1 - December 31 IDA July 1 - June 30  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SPECIAL ASSISTANCE GRANT (No. SOTA12030) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ..............................................i EVALUATION SUMMARY .............................................. it PART I: PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT 1.................................. A. INTRODUCTION .I B. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES .2 C. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS 3 D. SUPERVISON PERFORMANCE 5 E. SUSTAINABILITY 6 F. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS 6 G. LESSONS LEARNED 7 PART II STATISTICAL ANNEX .........................9 APPENDICES: Map UNICEF Completion Report WFP Final Monitoring Report WHO Completion Report This document has a restricted distribution and mav be used by recipients only in the performance of their ofricial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SPECIAL EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE GRANT (NO. SOTA12030) PREFACE At the time of preparation of this program and to date, no government recognized by the international community existed in Somalia, while major cities were reduced to rubble and divided into regions by fractured political movements and subclans' civil strife. Traditional lending instruments were unavailable for Bank assistance, and the call for humanitarian aid under the United Nations 100-Day Action Program for Somalia was processed in the form of a grant. Therefore, this is a modified Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Special Emergency Assistance Grant for Somalia, for a total amount of US$20 million equivalent which was approved by the Board on October 27, 1992. The funds were provided under three separate agreements with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for US$7.0 million, World Health Organization (WHO) for US$3.0 million and World Food Programme (WFP) for US$10.0 million, and effectiveness took place upon signing of the legal agreements with the above agencies on December 7, 1992, December 16, 1992 and December 9, 1992 respectively. The grant closed on the original closing date of June 30, 1993, for UNICEF and WHO, with a six-month extension given to WFP, to December 31, 1993. The first tranche (for each agency) was released upon signature of the three separate agreements. Upon disbursement or commitment of at least 75 percent of the first tranche, the agreements provided for release of the second tranche for each agency. The second tranche for UNICEF was released April 1993, for WHO in March 1993 and for WFP in June 1993. The ICR was prepared by Donna Criddle, AF2AE of the Africa Region and reviewed by Sushma Ganguly, Division Chief, AF2AE and Luciano Borin, Acting Project Advisor, AF2DR. Relevant statistical tables are attached as Part II and completion reports submitted by the three borrowing United Nations agencies are included in the Appendices of this report. Preparation of this ICR was based on materials in the project files, signed Legal Agreements, progress reports from the implementing agencies, correspondence between the Bank and the relevant institutions involved, and discussions with Bank staff directly involved in the program's preparation and supervision.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SPECIAL EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE GRANT (No. SOTA12030) EVALUATION SUMMARY Background 1. In October 1992, the World Bank responded to the shortfall of the UN's 100-day Action Program for Somalia to bring urgent cash assistance to relieve the violence, misery and starvation brought on by political instability and conflicts. To address the magnitude of destruction (which had already killed thousands of people and threatened to annihilate a significant portion of the population) and in the absence of a functioning government that would qualify for traditional World Bank lending, a grant was made available through three United Nations agencies. The funding was approved October 27, 1992 under three separate agreements with UNICEF, WHO and WFP to finance emergency food and non-food items under separate proposals submitted by the three agencies. Project Objectives 2. UNICEF's proposal was to provide essential drugs, train health care workers in diagnostics and treatment of illnesses and to store essential medical supplies through establishment of a central warehouse. WHO's plan centered on providing an epidemiological surveillance system, a central referral laboratory for prompt feedback on diseases, a pharmaceutical warehouse, and establishing a capacity for nutritional assessments. WFP submitted a proposal for airdrops of food and non-food items, establishment of overland routes, provision of essential port equipment; and renovation of bridges and re-establishment of storage facilities at strategic areas. Implementation Experience and Results 3. The Bank reacted in a very expeditious manner to the immediacy of the needs identified by the UN agencies, and has given proof of a remarkable flexibility (for instance, the utilization of simplified procedures), by its condensed response time to the exigencies of the situation. Therefore, sensitivity to the humanitarian implications of the Somalia catastrophe and flexibility in responding to the contingent needs have been among the positive achievements of this program. In terms of more tangible accomplishments, the physical objectives of the program were completely achieved. While not a part of this grant, it was hoped that a halt to the internal conflicts would permit some rebuilding of the social, agriculture and infrastructure sectors. However only rudimentary basic social services and infrastructure were implemented due to the continuation of clan and factional fighting and lawlessness within the country. UNICEF's relief efforts were implemented as planned. WHO's activities were redirected to areas of greatest need as security deteriorated in various parts of the country, i.e., containing cholera and hiring a firm to implement a central laboratory service when local and international staff were unwilling to work in  iii Somalia, plus financing unforeseen local costs for rent, vehicles, security personnel and stipends for trainees. WFP's activities were more fluid than those of the other two organizations, and its work program had to be modified in response to parallel interventions by other relief groups (including U.S. Military efforts, assistance from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), etc.), in the area. The original expenditure categories were amended by approval of the Bank, as needed. Since the total amount of the grant to WFP was not committed before the original closing date, due to interventions by other relief groups mentioned above, a six-month extension of the closing date was given to WFP (to December 31, 1993). 4. Some degree of sustainability was achieved as relief activities financed under this grant, were able to continue through further contributions from other donors. In fact, the grant was seen as a first step toward possible economic recovery with longer-term reconstruction under traditional IDA lending terms (upon the return of normalcy). The Bank appointed a task force to conceptualize a reconstruction program in coordination with other donors, pending the reinstatement of a legitimate government. Unfortunately, further violence made it impossible for any meaningful reconstruction to take place. 5. Although security improved in some areas by February 1993 and the flight of Somalis had decreased, Somalia was no closer to stability than when it collapsed into anarchy in January 1991. The Kismayo Port, which had been closed since September 1992, and the Mogadishu port were made operational to provide food and supplies by military personnel from the UN and US. A road system was re-instated for all major routes in the famine areas, thereby eliminating most of the need for expensive airlifts partly financed under this grant. Some monetization took place by means of selling food through commercial channels, and the revenue was used for labor-intensive cash-for-work projects. Other food-related emergency schemes were conducted through CARE, WFP and USAID and by early 1994 harvests were estimated to be 80 percent of normal . 6. While it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of actual costs, the documentation in the operation's files indicate that the expenditures incurred were based on the prevailing market rate for similar aid/relief activities at that time (provided by NGOs and other agencies). The prevailing market rates were probably reasonable for the aid/relief activities carried out. This is supported by the 1992 efforts of the UN to integrate their emergency relief into a more coherent process through a new inter-agency working group. With respect to WFP, local transportation costs declined. However, lack of field coordination resulted in a duplication of efforts between UNCTAD and WFP over the management of the Mogadishu port. This was mutually settled during subsequent meetings, but the confusion left WFP somewhat less efficient in redirecting its overall program in a limited time frame. In this context, it is understandable that the widespread insecurity and volatility of the situation, called for both exorbitant security measures and a constant adjustment of plans and operations; could have had a negative impact on cost- effectiveness and may also explain the less than precise financial record-keeping in some instances. 7. Relief activities financed by this grant, were able to continue through further contributions from other donors, and the implementing agencies are of the view that some elements of the relief activities carried out in Somalia (particularly with respect to improved primary health care and nutrition facilities), were established on a somewhat solid footing, and had a sustainable impact. However, in this regard, it should be noted that at the time the Grant was requested, the issue of  iv sustainabilty was not a key concern for any of the participating agencies, as clearly, the over- riding objective was to save as many Somalis as possible from the imminent danger of death by starvation and disease. It was this immediate concern, to which the Bank reacted, as best as it could. 8. The aid effort was satisfactory in that it responded quickly to the exigency of keeping people alive in a catastrophic situation. It permitted flexibility without bureaucratic constraints and was prepared in a short time with simple binding agreements. Additionally, the relief / aid provided through the Grant was duly utilized and reached (at least in large part) the intended beneficiaries, or contributed to the establishment of the infrastructure necessary for the delivery of relief Lessons Learned and Recommendations 9. The key lessons learned are as follows: (i) more specific guidelines, regarding the content/timing of implementing agencies' proposals, as well as on supervision and monitoring aspects, would have prevented initial delays and would have been conducive to more efficient program execution; (ii) greater clarity of the agencies' respective obligations on disbursements, commitments, audits and completion reports, could have been achieved in the legal agreements or a memorandum of understanding; (iii) coordination problems arose with respect to the auditing and accounting requirements of the Bank due to differences in fiscal years. It would have been more efficient to establish audit deadlines in accordance with the UN's fiscal year to alleviate administrative constraints; (iv) release of funds through tranches proved to be appropriate for this type of aid, additionally, the use of the UN's procurement procedures was necessary to keep the momentum going under wartime conditions; (v) coordination with appropriate UN agencies permitted the World Bank to address urgent concerns and basic human needs in the context of an emergency situation, notwithstanding the absence of a standard Bank (lending) instrument for dealing with such an exigent situation, (vi) an emergency assistance program should be kept flexible and implementable within a short time-frame, in order to be most effective and responsive to changing events; and (vii) outside criticism of the UN's delayed response in delivering relief aid to Somalia can primarily be attributed to poor coordination of the various groups already active in the field, and confusion about the actions already in progress. The need to work in a well- coordinated, cohesive manner was, and still is, paramount to attract future donor funding. At the same time, a better mechanism for fund raising by the UN needs to be explored.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SPECIAL EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE GRANT (NO. SOTA12030) PART I: PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. INTRODUCTION: Rationale for Bank Involvement 1. By 1988, the extensive civil war left major Somali cities without recognizable infrastructure, communications, water systems or any means of delivering the most basic social services. Not surprisingly, the agriculture sector was virtually paralyzed due to the continued insecurity and drought. After the overthrow of former President Siad Barre in January 1991, there was no functioning government, and the political instability and conflicts continued to hinder commercial and foreign aid relief efforts. In January 1992, the Secretary-General, Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations issued an Inter-Agency Appeal for the Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa (SEPHA). Although the response from the international community was generous, actual deliveries against pledges were less than anticipated. However, actual consignments of food were delayed until April 1992, and much of the aid that was pledged was insufficient to develop a sustained pipeline. Unavailability of food, non-food items and medical supplies thus translated into a life-threatening situation for a population deprived of the basic means of survival. 2. An updated appeal from the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations for the SEPHA was launched in July 1992, based on a review of developments in each of the affected countries in the Horn of Africa with participation from United Nations entities, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and various Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), in consultation with affected countries. 3. Donations for food relief in Somalia were a fraction of what was needed, and attention by the international community to Somalia was overshadowed by the violence and death in Bosnia- Herzegovina. By August 1992, there were indications that at least one-fourth of the children under the age of 5 had died, and an estimated 1.5 million of the nation's 6.5 million people were in danger of starvation due to the anarchy, hoarding and hijacking of food and brutal killings. Without proper interventions, an entire generation of Somali children could die or grow up with serious physical and mental deficiencies due to severe malnutrition and lack of education. The fragile cease-fire agreement of March 1992 between the two factions of the United Somali Congress allowed some expansion of relief assistance, but delivery continued to be difficult and dangerous, and the displacement of people placed a severe strain on existing refugee camps beyond its borders in Kenya and Ethiopia.  -2- 4. Various United Nations agencies, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs continued to work with Somali doctors, nurses and community groups to provide assistance to those in greatest need. On August 13, 1992, the United States Government announced several new initiatives to assist in delivering humanitarian relief to Somalia through airlifts of food, non-food items and medical supplies through the U.S. Department of Defense resources. Donations through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were also made to support water projects in Mogadishu, emergency veterinary programs and to purchase agricultural implements and blankets. However, by September of that year, the situation was out of control due to clan and factional warfare, indiscriminate shootings and looting, exacerbated by drought and mass migrations of people out of the towns in search of food and no active or functioning economy in which to establish buying power. 5. A coordinated meeting on humanitarian assistance for Somalia was held in Geneva in mid- October 1992 to promote a 100-day Action Program; the Program was sponsored by some UN Organizations on the basis of a mission to Somalia, led by the Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs of the UN. Due to the unusual circumstances within Somalia, i.e., lack of a functioning government, traditional Bank lending instruments were not appropriate. In the absence of a recognized government, the critical financial assistance needed to relieve the human misery could only be provided through grant funds, and the Bank was prepared to respond to the shortfall from the donor community. The grant was approved by the Board on October 27, 1992. The funds were provided under three separate agreements with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) for US$7.0 million, World Health Organization (WHO) for US$3.0 million and World Food Programme (WFP) for US$10.0 million, and effectiveness took place upon signing of the legal agreements with the above agencies on December 7, 1992, December 16, 1992 and December 9, 1992, respectively. B. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES: Overall Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance For Somalia & Individual Proposals 6. Priority activities for Somalia under the Updated Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the period July-December 1992, focused on: (a) ensuring survival of the most vulnerable people, including women, young children, and those wounded in the war; (b) promoting self-sufficiency and less dependency on food aid, especially in the southern and central regions (and in the Northern areas as conditions permitted); (c) resettling of displaced persons in order to resume their productive lives; (d) health improvement through the supply of drugs, equipment and medical supplies to stem rampant diseases and the death rate of children; (d) provision of clean water and other basic sanitation facilities; (e) fostering the basis for recovery and rehabilitation of the economy; and (f) restoring the ability of farm families in relatively stable areas to produce food and to reinitiate livestock vaccination programs. The specific programs submitted to IDA by the relevant UN agencies for financing under this Grant, are described hereunder. 7. UNICEF's proposal consisted of: (a) providing essential drugs to hospitals, Mother and Child Health Centers (MCH), and approximately 500 community-based health posts; (b) training health care workers in diagnosing and treating common illnesses and, managing and storing essential drugs; (c) developing training guides for those involved in health care; and (d) establishing a central warehouse for incoming and outgoing drug supplies.  -3- 8. WHO's plan was to: (a) reach selected peripheral health institutions (using a zonal approach) that could play the role of a coordinator in the absence of a central health authority; (b) establish epidemiological surveillance system and communicable disease control mechanisms to address the main causes of morbidity and mortality; (c) establish a central referral laboratory for prompt feedback on disease outbreak, (d) establish a central pharmaceutical warehouse for drug supplies; (e) provide surgical supplies and equipment to selected hospitals for trauma cases; (f) provide nutritional assessment capacity to complement existing programs; and (g) provide training for staff involved in capacity building. 9. WFP's plan encompassed the following: (a) support for airdrop operations of food commodities and non-food items; (b) re-establishment of overland routes as an alternative to airlifts; (c) setting up bulk food facilities in Mogadishu port; (d) provision of essential port equipment for communications, transporting foodstuffs, spare parts and fuel; (e) emergency bridge and road repairs, to provide a means of food delivery; (f) food for work to defray unskilled labor costs; and (g) rehabilitation of storage facilities in various strategic areas. 10. The standard Staff Appraisal or President's Reports were not prepared for this Grant; a Memorandum from the Bank's President and the presentation to the Board of Executive Directors, set out the objectives, for a budget supplement to finance the special assistance grant. The three Legal Agreements provided that each grant was to cover the reasonable cost of goods and services based on separate implementation plans, submitted by UNICEF, WHO and WFP to the Bank. These were received in November 1992 and were found satisfactory by the Bank. Evaluation of Project Objectives 11. Since the political and security problems in Somalia were not expected to cease in the short- term, project objectives appropriately focused on addressing the most urgent needs of the hundreds of thousands of affected Somali people. The design of the grant was based on the urgency of the situation, and the proven, valuable experience of UNICEF, WFP and WHO to deliver large-scale humanitarian aid. The ICRC, Cooperative Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), other relief agencies and NGOs with considerable relevant expertise, which were already involved in a substantial manner in relief activities such as, delivery of food, provision of sanitation and health aid for a number of years in the Horn of Africa, were appropriately subcontracted to carry out activities supported under the grant. C. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS 12. Physical objectives were completely achieved. While from a pragmatic point of view, the prevailing situation would not have permitted the furthering of social and institutional development objectives under the operation, there was partial progress in these areas, despite the extraordinarily hazardous conditions within the country, which from time to time stabilized, but never abated. Results of UNICEF's Program 13. UNICEF's funds were utilized as planned, on drug supplies and kits for safe pre-natal, delivery and post-natal care at MCHs, the halt of communicable diseases, especially measles in infants and children who were extremely vulnerable due to excessive malnutrition, and on technical  -4- assistance and transportation. Details of their support to 26 hospitals, 158 health posts and MCHs are given in their Completion Report included in the Appendix to this report. The supply of various types of refrigeration equipment and generators contributed substantially to safeguarding the drugs from spoilage. Most of the aid was given to central Somalia where 70 percent of the affected population live. All funds were committed and spent, and exact amounts utilized for each category are presented in their Completion Report. Results of WHO's Program 14. WHO's achievements centered on the establishment of five sub-offices for emergency health activities in Mogadishu, Bosaso, Hargeisa, Kismayo and Baidoa to serve central and peripheral areas; an epidemiological surveillance system with delivery of specialized equipment for 21 posts, an action plan for improved control of malaria in southwest Somalia and control of tuberculosis, cholera and dysentery in other areas; and the establishment of a central pharmaceutical warehouse in Mogadishu. In all of its activities, WHO placed major emphasis on the upgrading or development of national staff capacities with a view to re-establishing a basic level of national response capacity in the primary health field as rapidly as possible. Partly as a result of this focus, the success of these ongoing operations fluctuated, depending on the security conditions, and eventually the central pharmaceutical warehouse was closed down and other activities were curtailed. Some of the aid that was documented consisted of 69 shipments of urgent medical supplies and health kits for 10,000 persons, and financing of a laboratory in Mogadishu to support the surveillance system. This was to be administered by the African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF), according to WHO's report dated September 28, 1994. However, their report of November 7, 1994 clarifies that, although the structure was built, AMREF could not be contracted due to security problems. Some delays were encountered in the recruitment of international and local staff due to difficulties related to processing paper work and finding a way to remunerate local employees without any banking facilities or the existence of other financial mechanisms. 15. During the course of implementation, with the agreement of the World Bank, WHO's original four categories (Temporary Assistance, General Operating Expenses, Supplies and Materials and Equipment) were expanded to include Consultants (to comply with their own financial regulations), Contractual services (to hire a firm to implement a central laboratory service, due to unavailability of local and international staff willing to work in Somalia) and Local Costs (to pay for rent, vehicles, security personnel and stipends for persons attending training). Deterioration in the security situation in various parts of the country mandated adjustments in WHO's work plan. Activities were redirected to areas of greatest need, such as containing a cholera outbreak and services to locations that were still accessible. In accordance with the information provided in WHO's September 1994 completion report, and subsequent clarifications of November 1994, US$2.86 million had been committed and disbursed (as of July 31, 1994), and the remaining balance of US$142,165 was returned to the World Bank on December 29, 1994. Details on the outcome of their program are included in their Completion Report in the Appendix to this report.  -5- Results of WFP's Program 16. WFP's activities were more fluid than those of the other two organizations, as its work program had to be modified in response to parallel interventions by other relief groups (including U.S. Military efforts, assistance from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), etc.) in the area. Expenditure categories that were not needed or underutilized, such as bridge construction and repairs (provided by US military forces under Operation Hope), necessitated an amendment to their original proposal so that the required amount of the first tranche could be committed and disbursed. Since some stabilization had occurred and security improved, a road system for overland deliveries was reinstated for major routes in the famine areas, thereby eliminating most of the need for further expensive airlifts partly financed under this grant. The Kismayo Port, which had been closed since September 1992, and the port at Mogadishu provided food and humanitarian supplies for distribution to Baidoa, Bardera, Hoddur, Wajit, Gialalassi, Belet Huen and Merca. Pending the institutionalization of a local port authority at the end of the war, sustainability of the port (after the grant's closing) was helped through the financing of a team of port management consultants working through UNOSOM, which set tariff rates, established towage arrangements, and coordinated training of local counterparts. Funds were refocused on Somali local truck rehabilitation, spare parts, and maintenance so that trucks, provided by World Food Programme Transport Operation In Ethiopia (WTOE), could be returned to Ethiopia and Eritrea. The amended proposal, including port management and security by WFP when the US military was scheduled to leave at the beginning of May 1993, was based on an evaluation by Hamburg Ports Consultants. In June 1993 after SOEs documented the spending of the required 75% of the first tranche, the second tranche was processed. Since the entire balance could not be committed before the original closing date due to changes in WFP's work program, following interventions by other relief groups, and due to delays stemming from necessary consultations with the Bank, the grant was extended to December 31, 1993, by the Bank's Board. WFP's Final Monitoring Report of February 1994 (attached) and final extracts from the audited biennial accounts submitted to the Bank in January 1995 indicate that the entire US$10 million was disbursed. D. SUPERVISION PERFORMANCE 17. Bank Operational Guidelines clearly prevented staff from being directly involved in the delivery (or field-level monitoring) of relief efforts; hence, no Bank supervision missions were planned. Consequently, Bank staff had to rely upon the Executing Agencies to supervise the utilization of the Grant's proceeds. Supervision feedback was carried out through representatives of UNICEF, WHO and WFP by means of fax, telex, and telephone. Due to the non-existence of a functioning Government and the unique circumstances for the financial assistance under the agreements, in effect, only partial monitoring of this Grant by Bank staff proved to be possible. E. SUSTAINABILITY 18. Relief activities financed under this grant, were able to continue through further contributions from other donors. For example, after World Bank funding ended, the Italian Government continued financing WHO's epidemiological offices; and subsequent Japanese funding continued WFP's activities at the port in Mogadishu. The grant was intended to be a first step toward future economic recovery with possible longer-term reconstruction; however, these  -6- prospects were impaired by the deteriorating political and economic situation and the renewal of hostilities. The implementing agencies are of the view that some elements of the relief activities carried out in Somalia (particularly with respect to improved primary health care and nutrition facilities), were established on a somewhat solid footing, and had a sustainable impact. However, in this regard, it should be noted that at the time the Grant was requested, the issue of sustainabilty was not a key concern for any of the participating agencies, as clearly, the over-riding objective was to save as many Somalis as possible from the imminent danger of death by starvation and disease. It was this immediate concern, to which the Bank reacted, as best as it could. Additionally, sustainability would have implied a range of preconditions which were not and are not to date present in Somalia, viz., a political agreement among factions which would have permitted a minimum level of security to more effectively structure relief operations and initiate developmental activities for the reconstruction of the economy (at least at the micro-level). Experience has demonstrated that these preconditions cannot be imposed from the outside. Indeed, the uniqueness of this operation, vis-a-vis other similar initiatives supported by the Bank, lies in the fact that this assistance was provided under conditions of war, with no formal or informal Somali authority in place -- which could have with some degree of legitimacy functioned as a reliable counterpart. In view of the singular circumstances under which the program was implemented, the notion of sustainability may not have been very meaningful. Plans for Reconstruction 19. At the end of January 1993, a consolidated immediate and longer-term reconstruction plan involving all sectors was prepared by the World Bank, detailing the most significant issues, constraints, status at that time and the future priority needs. At a February 1993 address given in Brussels and again at a subsequent meeting in Paris, the World Bank announced the appointment of a task force to begin drafting a reconstruction program in coordination with other donors, pending the reinstatement of a legitimate government, return of physical security in Somalia and a solution to its outstanding debt to the Bank and the Fund. UNDP and USAID mounted reconnaissance missions, with an exploratory mission planned by the Bank, based on their findings. The Bank was prepared to play a major coordinating role for reconstruction, if such a motion was endorsed by the other donor institutions. Unfortunately, this prospect became moot when further violence made it impossible for any meaningful reconstruction to take place. However, the Bank stands ready to assist with proposals formulated in the "Framework For Planning of Long-Term Reconstruction and Recovery," dated December 15, 1993. F. SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS 20. The Bank reacted in a very expeditious manner to the immediacy of the needs identified by the UN agencies, and has given proof of a remarkable flexibility (for instance, the utilization of simplified procedures), by its condensed response time to the exigencies of the situation. Therefore, sensitivity to the humanitarian implications of the Somalia catastrophe and flexibility in responding to the contingent needs have been among the positive achievements of this program. The more tangible achievements of the operation included, the reinstallation of overland routes and restoring port functions mentioned in para. 15 above. Another significant achievement of this collaborative (multilateral) assistance exercise was the drop in the malnutrition rates (this rate fell from about 70 percent in August 1992, to about 22 percent by February 1993, in Mogadishu). The ability to produce food for both subsistence and commercial purposes, and to re-establish the basic livestock  -7- subsector (the major source of exports), was often limited because of the continuing upheaval within the country. Some of the food distribution was converted to a monetization program involving the sale of relief food through Somali commercial channels and the application of these sales revenues to implement labor-intensive and cash-for-work projects. Security improvements through Operation Restore Hope added to the monetization program by the sale of wheat flour through CARE and WFP to Somali merchants. The money was then used to support a sanitation project in the Hiran region and a road construction project. Other monetization schemes were conducted through USAID, for the repair of irrigation canals by employing about 10,000 people and sugar donations by the Irish Government for sale to local merchants. Review of Program Costs 21. While it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of actual costs, the documentation in the operation's files indicate that the expenditures incurred were based on the prevailing market rate for similar aid/relief activities at that time (provided by NGOs and other agencies). Price escalation or overheads per unit of inputs was not a factor, as the three agencies' delivery costs were based on the subcontracts already in effect. Thus, price negotiation was not a feasible alternative, nor was there an opportunity to verify expenses recorded against actual field deliveries. Historically, WFP's administrative costs averaged less than 6 percent of expenditures, although there was no mechanism to determine whether this overall low overhead continued during the course of the operation. However, with respect to WFP's land costs, after WTOE was deployed in Somalia, local transport rates declined from US$0.38 C/Tn-km to US$0.22 C/Tn-km. Lack of inter-agency coordination resulted in some duplication of efforts between UNCTAD and WFP over the management of the Mogadishu port. This was mutually settled during subsequent meetings, but the confusion left the WFP operation somewhat unfocused and less effective, particularly in redirecting its overall program in a limited time-frame. In this context, it is understandable that the widespread insecurity and volatility of the situation, called for both exorbitant security measures and a constant adjustment of plans and operations; this could have had a negative impact on cost-effectiveness and may also explain the less than precise financial record-keeping in some instances. Performance Rating 22. On balance, the operation's performance may be deemed satisfactory in that it responded quickly to the expediency of keeping people alive, in a catastrophic situation. It permitted flexibility without bureaucratic constraints and was prepared in a short time under simple binding agreements. Additionally, the relief / aid provided through the Grant was duly utilized and reached (at least in large part) the intended beneficiaries, or contributed to the establishment of the infrastructure necessary for the delivery of relief The documentation available on the operation's implementation experience indicates that the impact was particularly positive in the case of UNICEF and WHO activities, and less evident for WFP, which in some areas suffered from the lack of coordination with other aid agencies. The Completion Reports of the three UN agencies are contained in the Appendix. G. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23. The key lessons learned in the process of implementing this emergency program, are as follows:  -8- * More specific guidelines, indicating content and timing of proposals to be submitted by UNICEF, WHO and WFP, would have prevented initial delays in reaching legal agreements; additionally, clearer guidance with regard to supervision and monitoring by the implementing agencies, would have been conducive to more efficient program execution. * Greater clarity of the (implementing agencies) respective obligations with regard to disbursements, commitments, audits and completion reports, could have been achieved in the legal agreements or a simplified memorandum of understanding. * Since the implementing agencies' fiscal year is January through December, coordination problems arose with respect to the auditing and accounting requirements of the Bank (fiscal year - July through June). It would have been more efficient to establish audit deadlines in accordance with the UN's fiscal year to alleviate administrative constraints. * Release of funds through tranches proved to be appropriate for this type of aid; additionally, the use of the UN's procurement procedures was necessary to keep the momentum going under wartime conditions, particularly, in view of the absence of established procurement mechanisms with respect to the emergency conditions. 3 Coordination with appropriate UN agencies permitted the World Bank to address urgent concerns and basic human needs in the context of an emergency situation, notwithstanding the absence of a standard Bank (lending) instrument for dealing with such an exigent situation; this experience should ensure a more cohesive approach for the next stage of planning for future rehabilitation of the country, conditions permitting. S o An emergency assistance program should be kept flexible and implementable within a short time-frame, in order to be most effective and responsive to changing events. Extension of the program closing date, is an adequate tool for meeting any changing requirements. Outside criticism of the UN's delayed response in delivering relief aid to Somalia can be attributed to poor coordination of the various groups already active in the field, and confusion about the actions already in progress. To improve the situation, the March 1993 appeal for rehabilitation assistance was launched with a centralized effort to coordinate the separate contributions of UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, WFP and other agencies. The need to work in a well-coordinated, cohesive manner was, and still is, paramount to attract future donor funding. At the same time, a better mechanism for fund raising by the UN needs to be explored.  -9- PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES TABLE 1: Summary of Assessments Macro Policies4 Sector Policies4 Financial Objectives4 Institutional Development4 Physical Objectives4 Poveily Reduction4 Gender Issues4 Other Social Objectives4 Envirownmental Objectives4 Public Sector Management4 Private Sector Development4 Other (specify) f L~~~te~~~y UiiMliqvRwi ly b Project Sustainability I . ...... .. ..................... . . . ... . N / Identification Preparation Assistance Appraisal Supervision (Headquarters) Preparation Implementation Covenant Compliance4 Operation (if applicable) W H. . . . . . . . . .. .a ~ * r -S i7t '7y777 Preparation Implementation Covenant Compliance Operation (if applicable) Preparation4 implementation Covenant Compliance operation (if applicable) iBgldy~~~~~~~~~~f  - 10- Tabk 2: Related Bank Grants . N . . .... ., .., ... .. .E Preceding Operations Drought Relief For Sub-Saharan Africa USS 2.0 million to finance the delivery costs Apr-84 Closed of WFP of emergency food supplies in poor low income drought-stricken areas 2. World Food Programme US$3.0 million to facilitate receipt, storage Jan-85 Closed and distribution of food relief by WFP Following Operations I1. Special Emergency Assistance Grant for US$10.5 million to UNICEF for emergency Aug-94 Active Rwanda health care; US$1.5 million for deliery of basic disease-prevention drugs and medical services; US$4.0 to UNHCR for shelter and infrastructure; USS4.0 million to FAO for seeds and planting materials. Table 3: Project Timetable T ~~Actual/Estimated Steps in Prqject cycle IDate Identification July 1992 Preparation Aug-Sept 1992 Board Presentation October 28, 1992 Plans Submitted (UNICEF) Nov. 18, 1992 Plan Submitted (WHO) Nov. 4,1992 Plans Submitted (WFP) Nov. 11, 1992 Signing/Effectiveness(tJNICEF) 1/ Dec. 7, 1992 Signing/Effectiveness (WHO) 1/ Dec. 16,1992 Signing/Effectiveness (WFP) I/ Dec. 9, 1992 2nd Tranche Release (UNICEF) April 1992 2nd Tranche Release (WHO) Feb. 1992 2nd Tranche Release (WFP) June 1992 Closing Date (UNICEF) June 30, 1993 Closing Date (WHO) June 30, 1993 Closing Date (WFP) Dec. 31, 1993 I/ Signing of legal agreement triggered release of first tranche  - 11 - Table 4A: UNICEF Project Costs (USS millions) NOV. 1992 LATEST ITEM/EXPENDITURE CAT. PLANNED 7/31/93 EST. Drug Supplies 5.87 5.86 MCHlHealth Center Repairs 0.40 0.40 Program Support 0.76 0.49 Technical Assistance 0.28 L== L==S@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7g 1/ I/ Figures may not add due to rounding. Table 4B: WFP Project Costs (USS millions) NOV. 1992 LATEST ffEMIEXPENDfTURE CAT. PLANNED | 1/31/94 EST. Air Drop 4.80 Air Lift 2.50 3.20 Bulk Fuel 0.20 0.80 Port Rehab., Equip. & Spare Parts 0.25 5.80 Bridge & Road Repairs 2.00 Storage Rehabilitation 0.25 Other Supply Costs 0.50 tOA .>: J0 1/ 1/ Figures may not add due to rounding. The details of individual expenses are included in WFPs final audited biennial statements. Table 4C: WHO Project Costs (USS mnillions) NOV. 1992 1 LATEST [ITIEEXPENDITURE CAT. | PLANNED I 7/31/94 EST. Salaries 0.30 Temporary Assistance 0.30 Official Travel 0.04 Contractual Services 0.08 General Operating Expenses 0.30 0.02 Medical Supplies & Materials 2.03 1.42 Fumiture & Equipment 0.37 0.28 Data Processing Equipment Program Support Costs 0.08 Other (Local) 0.63 1/ Figur es may~. ............. I/ Figures may not add due to rounding.  - 12 - Table 5A: Status Of Legal Covenants Somaha: Special Emergency Assistance Grant I NICEF 1.01 3 C June 30, 1993 Financ reasonable cost of goods and services 1.02 3 C June 30, 1993 75