Cameroon - Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 14686 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT (SDA) PROJECT (LOAN 3206-CM) JUNE 16, 1995 Population and Human Resources Division Central Africa and Indian Ocean Department Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used bv recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its con.ents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency = CFAF* (Average CFAF per US$) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 334 280 305 260 288 542 * The CFA Franc (CFAF) is tied to the French Franc (FF) in the ratio of FF1 to CFAF50 until January 12, 1994 and CFAFIOO since that date. The French franc is currently floating. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER July 1 to June 30  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDB African Development Bank AIDS Acquired lmmuno-Deficiency Syndrome ARPP Annual Review of Portfolio Performance CAA Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement CFA Communaufe- Financiere d'Afrique CFAF CFA Franc CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CTC/DSA Comite Technique de Coordination du Projet Dimensions Sociales de / 'Ajustement DAIR Division d'Assistance a l'Insertion et a la Reinsertion ECAM Enquete Camerounaise Aupres des Menages ERC Economic Recovery Credit FNE Fonds National pour I'Emploi GDP Gross Domestic Product IEC Information, Education and Communication IMF International Monetary Fund ISMP InstitutS Sup&rieur de Management Public MCH Maternal and Child Health MESIRES Ministere de I 'Enseignement Superieur, de l 'Informatique, et de la Recherche Scientifique MINASCOF Ministere des AJfaires Sociales et de la Condition Feminine MINEDUC Ministere de l'Education Nationale MINPAT Ministere du Plan et de l 'Amenagement du Territoire MINSANTE Minisl&re de l Santa MTPS Ministere du Travail et de la Prevoyance Sociale NGO Non-Governmental Organization PAS Programme d'Adjustement Structurel (Structural Adjustment Program) PRODEC Programme de Developpement Communautaire PSU Programme Social d 'Urgence SAL Structural Adjustment Loan SAP Structural Adjustment Program SDA Social Dimensions of Adjustment STD Sexually Transmitted Disease UNDP United Nations Development Program UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activities UNICEF United Nations Children's Emergency Fund UPP Unite de Planification de la Population USAID United States Agency for International Develooment WID Women in Development This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be discloscd without World Bank authorization.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (ICR) REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT (SDA) PROJECT (LOAN 3206 CM) CONTENTS PREFACE EVALUATION SUMMARY ...................................................................... i 1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1 A. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES ...................................................................... 2 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES ...................................................................... 4 C. IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT . . 5 D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY ....................................................................... 7 E. BANK PERFORMANCE ....................................................................... 8 F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE ...................................................................... 9 G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME ...................................................................... 10 H. FUTURE OPERATION ....................................................................... 10 I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED ...................................................................... 11 2. STATISTICAL ANNEXES ...................................................................... 12 TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS ...................................................................... 12 TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANS/CREDITS ...................................................................... 15 TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE ...................................................................... 16 TABLE 4: LOAN DISBURSEMENTS - CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL (US$ '000) ............................. 16 TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ...................................................................... 17 TABLE 6: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT OPERATION ....................................... ............................... I 8 TABLE 7: STUDIES INCLUDED IN PROJECT ...................................................................... 20 TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS (PORTION FINANCED BY IBRD, MILLION OF US DOLLARS) .............................. 21 TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING ...................................................................... 20 TABLE 9: ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS ...................................................................... 22 TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS ...................................................................... 23 TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS ......................................................... 27 TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES - STAFF INPUTS ...................................................................... 27 TABLE 13A: BANK RESOURCES - MISSIONS ...................................................................... 28 TABLE 13B: BANK RESOURCES - SUPERVISION MISSIONS ...................................................................... 27 APPENDIXES: A. MISSION' S PROCES-VERBAL B. BORROWER CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR I) EVALUATION REPORT OF THE SDA PROJECT 2) EVALUATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT FUND 3) ENGLISH SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT' S EVALUATION C. CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY' S EVALUATION OF THE SDA PROJECT D. MISCELLANEOUS APPENDIXES 1) PROJECT COSTS (EXTRACT FROM STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT) 2) FINANCING OF THE SDA PROJECT (EXTRACT FROM STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT) E. MAP   Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Republic of Cameroon Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) Project (Ln. 3206 CM) PREFACE 1. This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) Project in Cameroon, for which Ln. 3206 CM in the amount of US$21.5 million equivalent was approved in May 1990, signed on August 3, 1990 and made effective on January 30, 1991. 2. The loan was closed on June 7, 1994, instead of the original closing date of December 31, 1997. Disbursements were frequently suspended and were not therefore made on schedule. The final disbursement took place on June 7, 1994, at which time a balance of US$17,562,197 was canceled. Even though nine donors pledged cofinancing for the project, funds were only provided by four: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Governments of Canada and Japan. 3. The ICR was prepared by Regina Amadi, Consultant, under the guidance of Nadine Poupart, Task Manager (AF3PH), and reviewed by David Berk, Division Chief (AF3PH), P. Hari Prasad, Operations Adviser, and Elaine Hubert, Acting Operations Adviser (AF3DR). The Borrower and the Government of Canada provided comments that are included as appendixes to the ICR. 4. Preparation of this ICR was begun during the completion mission (November 16 - 26, 1994). It is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), the Loan Agreement, the Borrower's progress reports, Bank supervision reports, internal Bank memoranda, interviews with Bank staff involved in the project, correspondence and minutes of discussions between the Bank and the Cameroonian Government, the completion mission findings, and interviews with donors. The Borrower participated in the preparation of the ICR by contributing views reflected in the completion mission's Aide-Memoire, by preparing its own evaluation of the project's execution and initial preparation, and by commenting on the draft ICR.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (ICR) REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT (SDA) PROJECT (LOAN 3206 CM) EVALUATION SUMMARY A. INTRODUCTION 1. Although the Bank has financed 75 operations in Cameroon, social sectors have to date benefited from less than 6 percent of the total commitments of US$1.5 billion. To steer the country out of the 1986 economic and financial crisis, the government adopted a Structural Adjustment Program (or SAP) supported by a Standby Arrangement with the IMF (1988), and an IBRD Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I) of US$150 million (1989). In 1990, the Government launched the SDA project to promote poverty reduction in the context of adjustment (Paras. 1.1-1.2). 2. The Cameroon SDA project was the flagship of a broader SDA initiative, launched in 1988 as a manifestation of the donor commitment to the concerns of social dimensions in adjusting Sub-Saharan African countries. The SDA project was the most complex attempt to fully apply the policy approach of the SDA initiative (Para. 1.3). B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND COMPONENTS 3. Objectives. (Source: SAR). The project had three main objectives: (a) in the medium to long run, to promote the participation of the poorest population groups in the process of development; (b) in the short to medium run, to protect underprivileged and vulnerable segments of the population, especially those groups directly affected by the economic crisis and the adjustment program; and (c) to promote the institutionalization of these concerns within the day-to-day responsibilities of existing agencies (Para. 1.4-1.6). 4. Components. The project had seven main components: (a) Population: Preparation and adoption of population policy; support for maternal and child health (MCH) centers and family planning; institutional strengthening; (b) Health: policy design; support for primary health care; information, education and communication (EEC); prevention of AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases (STD); immunization; and institutional strengthening; (c) Education: purchase of teaching materials and desks; (d) Employment: studies; support for National Employment Fund (guidance, vocational training, on-the-job training, self-employment opportunities, and micro-enterprise support); institutional strengthening; (e) Women in Development: policy design; institutional strengthening; reorientation of support services of the Women's Ministry and EC; institutional strengthening; (f) Community development program (PRODEC); and  - 11 - (g) Planning Capacity and Information Base: macro-modeling; household surveys; and preparation of price indices (Para. 1.7). 5. Agreed changes. The project was informally restructured in September 1991 in order to improve the management capability of the coordinating agency (CTC/DSA) and reflect the 50% financing gap created by the Bank's misinterpretation of donors' commitment to the financing, as opposed to the goals, of the project. The population, health, and education activities were removed from the coordinating agency's purview and handed to concerned ministries. To address the effects of frequent suspension of disbursements on PRODEC sub-projects, jointly financed by IBRD and the African Development Bank (AFDB), Schedule I (Withdrawal of the Proceeds of the Loan) was revised in July 1992 to enable the Bank to finance PRODEC activities at 100%, provided that such financing represented only 50% of the total program (Para. 1.15 and Table 8A). 6. Special loan covenants/agreements. Article V (Remedies of the Bank) was adopted as a special agreement to further promote the achievement of the project's objectives. The article included the following events of default that could justify loan cancellation: (i) a Bank finding that government performance under the SAL I (Ln. 3089 CM) program was unsatisfactory; and (ii) a Bank finding that government performance in the preparation of the statement of policy, the medium-term action plan and long-term implementation strategy for education (under Loan 2683 CM) was unsatisfactory (para. 1.7). 7. Evaluation of project objectives. The project's overall objectives were consistent with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy and Cameroon's strategy for economic recovery and development. However, the project design was too complex, seeking results across numerous sectors through a large number of institutions and over the short, medium and long term at once. As a result, the three main objectives had too many sub-objectives (Annex 2 of the SAR) that were not clearly defined (Paras. 1.9-1.10). C. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS 8. Project results. Since most of the project's objectives were not achieved, the project was canceled, three and a half years prior to the planned closing date. However, some favorable results were recorded by implementing agencies: According to the government's final report (see Appendix B), the National Employment Fund (FNE) had some success in providing employment opportunities, training assistance and support to micro enterprises and self-employed individuals. Per government's report, in spite of financial mismanagement, the community development program (PRODEC) would have financed 151 micro projects, although the success of these is unknown. In addition: (i) sectoral policy objectives were partially achieved in population and health; (ii) the household survey (ECAM) was fully prepared but not carried out; (iii) institution-building took place in FNE; (iv) studies of the planning capacities of the Ministry of Women's and Social Affairs (MINASCOF) and the former Planning Ministry were carried out; and (v) other studies were completed (Paras. 1. 11 - 1.12 and Table 7).  - iii - 9. Sustainability. Since few activities were implemented, the prospect of project sustainability is limited. The following entities are likely to be sustained: the implementing agency (CTC/DSA), which is already managing the new Social Emergency Program (PSU); FNE, which the government and AFDB continue to fund; and ECAM, which is ready to be carried out if funded. Given allegations of financial mismanagement in PRODEC, its continuation is unlikely (Para. 1.21). 10. Actual costs, financing arrangements, and implementation timetable. Total project cost was originally estimated at US$85.7 million to be provided by the Bank, the Government and nine donors. However, five donors did not provide their expected contribution and the project was re-structured after a year to cost US$54.1 mIillion. The Bank contributed US$21.5 million, AfDB US$16 million, the Canadian Government US$4 million, the Japanese Government US$1 million, UNDP US$0.8 million, and the Cameroon Government was to contribute US$10.8 million. The final total spent was only US$11.95 million. As of the closing date of the project, only US$3.9 million of the Bank loan had been disbursed and US$17.6 million was canceled. The Government contribution was US$0.6 million. Canadian financing was only partially disbursed (US$0.8 million) and the rest canceled. Only US$ 0.1 million of UNDP funds was disbursed. The US$1 million Japanese fund is fully committed. As of June 1995, US$5.5 million of AfOB contribution had been disbursed and US$13.73 million undisbursed (Tables 8A & 8B). 11. Project implementation. Project effectiveness was five months behind schedule (January 1991) and project implementation was slow due in part to the numerous suspensions of disbursements because of arrears and non-provision of counterpart funds. The majority of project activities was not implemented. Despite restructuring in September 1991, the overall implementation rating continued to worsen throughout the project. The loan was finally canceled in June 1994, after nine months of suspension and well before its official closing date of December 1997. Reasons for cancellation included the lack of counterpart funds and Cameroon's new eligibility for IDA credits (Paras. 1.15 - 1.17). 12. Key problems that affected achievement of the major objectives. Project success was obstructed by: (i) complexity of project design; (ii) serious gap in the financing of project activities; (iii) weak government commitment to poverty reduction; (iv) recurrent unavailability of counterpart funds; (v) governmental agencies' weak capacity for project implementation and intra-governmental coordination; and (vi) the project's weak financial management system, evidenced in the lack of transparency in the management of project accounts and procurement (Paras. 1.18 - 1.20). 13. Bank performance. The Bank provided abundant resources towards project preparation but project appraisal and supervision were deficient. The Bank did not pay sufficient attention to: (i) defining appropriate target indicators and identifying target groups; and (ii) evaluating the government's ability both to manage such an innovative and complex project and to provide counterpart funds. Two sub-components were not appraised. Furthermore, the Bank did not define performance indicators to monitor  - iv - project impact. A supervision plan was designed, but not properly implemented after the first year (Paras. 1.22 - 1.25). 14. Borrower's performance. Project implementation suffered from inadequate government initial commitment and a lack of institutional motivation. Overall implementation performance was severely marred by the government's non-payment of debt service obligations to the Bank and non-provision of counterpart funds. This factor was exacerbated by the weak institutional capacity of implementing agencies. As a result, the Borrower did not comply with several loan covenants (Paras. 1.26 - 1.28 and Table 10). 15. Project Outcome. The outcome of the project is unsatisfactory as it did not achieve most of its major objectives (Para. 1.29). D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, FUTURE OPERATIONS AND KEY LESSONS LEARNED 16. Most important findings/lessons of the project implementation experience: (a) The Bank should realistically assess the Borrower's political will to address poverty and design poverty projects accordingly; (b) The Bank should be mindful of its critics, but not allow them to unduly influence the shape of the projects it supports; (c) Applying a complex theoretical framework to a single operation is an unrealistic approach for project design. In their eagerness to protect the vulnerable groups in the context of adjustment, the Bank and the government designed an overly ambitious multi-sectoral project, that was difficult to appraise and to implement and too costly to supervise; (d) The Bank should make better use of existing information and carry out complementary studies during preparation; (e) The Bank should appraise project components at appraisal, and not after effectiveness; (f) Performance and impact indicators should be defined by both the Bank and the Borrower during preparation (or at least during appraisal) and should influence project design; (g) The Bank should realistically assess donors' interest in projects and better--if not fully--secure commitments for financing from cofinanciers prior to loan approval (Paras. 1.33-1.42). 17. Plans for future project operations and sustainability. Some activities of the SDA project are still ongoing with funding from the government and AfDB. Any future poverty alleviation project should take into account the following considerations: (i) An operational audit of FNE should be conducted in order to assess its efficiency and viability for donor funding. For instance, FNE can potentially become a reputable job referral service providing training/counseling of real relevance to the job market; (ii) Given its advanced stage of preparation, ECAM could be carried out at a small marginal cost; (iii) Skills developed by CTC/DSA and FNE should be maintained and could be used in future Bank-financed projects; and (iv) Given the mismanagement of PRODEC, community development programs should be executed by a non-governmental structure. The Bank should consider re-assessing and possibly integrating sectoral objectives of the SDA project in future sectoral projects (Para. 1.30-1.31).  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT (SDA) PROJECT (LOAN 3206 CM) 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 As of June 1994, the Bank had financed 75 operations (47 loans and 28 credits) in Cameroon, with commitments totaling US$1.5 billion. Support to agricultural and infrastructure development has dominated the Bank's lending strategy for the country, the two sectors accounting respectively for 32 percent and 43 percent of the total. In contrast, the social sectors have benefited from less than 6 percent of total commitments (US$90 million); Until 1975, Bank lending to Cameroon focused largely on the development of agricultural export crops and transport infrastructure. In the 1980s, the scope of Bank operations broadened and included rural and urban development in order to address the country's socio-economic concerns. 1.2 From the early seventies to the mid-eighties, the Cameroonian economy registered steady growth of about eight per-cent per annum, stimulated in the latter years by the development of the petroleum sector. Since 1986, however, Cameroon has been in the midst of a major economic and financial crisis, led by a simultaneous decline in the prices of all its major exports (petroleum, coffee and cocoa), and of the appreciation of the CFA franc. As a result, the Government of Cameroon adopted a structural adjustment program (SAP) supported by a Standby Arrangement with the IMF in 1988 and an IBRD Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I) of US$150 million in 1989. Determined to re- establish economic growth with equity over the medium and long term and to ensure the protection of vulnerable groups in the short term, the government also launched a Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) project in 1990 as an integral part of its structural adjustment program. Therefore, a failure by the government to implement SAL I in a satisfactory manner was defined as an event justifying the Bank suspending disbursements under major components of the SDA project. The project was closely coordinated in both conception and design with SAL I, the Economic Management Project and the Food Security Project approved in June 1989, July 1989 and July 1991 respectively. 1.3 The Cameroon SDA project was to be a flagship of the broader SDA initiative which was launched in 1988 to moderate the effects of structural adjustment and economic reform on the poor and vulnerable groups of adjusting Sub-Saharan African countries and to help integrate these groups into the mainstream of these economies. The SDA initiative was jointly sponsored by AtIB, UNDP and the Bank, and supported by several bilateral and multilateral donors. The project's design reflects fully the policy approach of the SDA initiative, which concentrates on: (i) improved management of  - 2 - macro and sectoral policies; (ii) social action programs; (iii) strengthened information systems; and (iv) institution building and training to support planning and implementation in the other three areas. A. STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 1.4 Project objectives (Source: SAR). Objectives in the area of human resource and social dimensions of adjustment were identified in the government's Declaration of Development Strategy and Economic Recovery, annexed to the "Report of the President to the Executive Directors on the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in Cameroon" (May 1989). These objectives were adopted by the SDA project, and are as follows: (a) in the medium to long run, to promote the participation of the poorest population groups in the process of development; (b) in the short to medium run, to protect underprivileged and vulnerable segments of the population, especially those groups directly affected by the economic crisis and the adjustment program; and (c) to promote the institutionalization of these concerns within the routine duties of existing agencies. 1.5 More specifically, the project was designed to support the government in the implementation of its poverty reduction strategy by: (a) improving basic services in population planning, health and education, rendering them more cost-effective and restoring services directed at the poor that had been crippled by budget cuts; (b) promoting job creation and facilitating job placement in the recessionary environment; (c) improving the opportunities for women to participate in development; (d) providing support to community-based micro-activities that generate income or provide basic social infrastructure for the poor; and (e) strengthening the institutional capability for formulating and implementing social policies, including broadening the information base to help the authorities obtain a better understanding of the nature and location of poverty and its evolution over time. 1.6 Three lines of action emerged from these objectives: (a) support to a fundamental policy design process in the social sectors;  - 3 - (b) immediate action programs to urgently address the priority needs of the poor while overall reform took hold; and (c) institutional strengthening to support emerging policy reforms and action programs. 1.7 Special loan covenants/agreements. Article V (Remedies of the Bank) was adopted as a special agreement to further promote the achievement of the project's objectives. The article included the following events of default that could justify loan cancellation: (i) a Bank finding that government performance under the SAL I (Ln.3089 CM) program was unsatisfactory; and (ii) a Bank finding that government performance in the preparation of the statement of policy, the medium-term action plan and long-term implementation strategy for education (under Loan 2683 CM) was unsatisfactory. 1.8 Project components. The project had: i) seven components in the areas of population, health, education, employment creation, women in development, community development programs, planning capacity and information base; and ii) 19 sub- components to reflect the three lines of actions. Individual sub-components included as many as five activities (as in the case of the National Employment Fund). The seven components were: (i) Population: Preparation and adoption of population policy; support for maternal and child health centers (MCH) and family planning; institutional strengthening; (ii) Health: policy design; support for primary health care; information, education and communication (IEC); prevention of AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases (STD); immunization; and institutional strengthening; (iii) Education: purchase of teaching materials and desks, (iv) Employment: studies; support for National Employment Fund (which provides guidance, vocational training, on-the-job training, self-employment opportunities, and micro-enterprise support); and institutional strengthening; (v) Women in Development (WID): policy design; institutional strengthening; reorientation of support services of the Women's Ministry and IEC; (vi) Community development program (PRODEC); and (vii) Planning Capacity and Information Base: macro-modeling; household surveys; and preparation of price indices. 1.9 Evaluation of objectives. The project's objectives were consistent with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and with Cameroon's strategy for economic recovery and development. However, the project's design became complex as it attempted in a single operation to intervene in too many sectors through a large number of institutions and simultaneously achieve results in the short term (by providing an urgent response to poverty alleviation), the medium term (through institution building), and the long term (through sectoral policy reforms). As a result, the project identified too many sub-objectives that were related to each of the seven components but remained poorly defined. 1.10 Additional factors affected the definition of objectives: (i) Lack of selective performance criteria: the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) utilized accounts and audits, semi-annual reports and intensive supervision as the only means for monitoring the achievement of objectives, including no specific indicators to evaluate project  - 4 - performance; and (ii) Lack of adequate information: Although a capacity assessment of NGOs was carried out, similar reviews of existing government implementing agencies were not conducted. However, a Country Assessment Paper that laid out Cameroon's poverty profile contributed to the preparation process, although it was prepared simultaneously with the SDA project and issued only in December 1990 (four months after the signing of the Loan and one month before effectiveness). B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 1.11 Most activities were not implemented and the project was canceled nearly three and a half years before the planned closing date. Therefore, the overall success of the project in achieving its objectives under the three lines of action (policy, action program and institution building) was limited. 1.12 Policy objectives. Policy objectives for Population and Health were achieved (population and health policies were adopted), while the one for the WID was not realized (due to inadequate management capacity in the Ministry of Women's and Social Affairs). The policy objectives stated in the Planning Capacity and Information Base component were not achieved as the following activities were not carried out: macro-modeling (due to lack of UNDP funding), and the preparation of pricing indices. The household survey ("Enquete Camerounaise Aupres des Menages" or ECAM) was fully designed but not carried out. For the Employment component, the National Manpower Survey was not carried out (due to disagreement with the Bank on the scope and objectives of the survey). 1.13 Action program objectives. According to the government's final report (see Appendix B), the National Employment Fund (FNE) has recorded some success, providing employment opportunities for 2,867 persons and training assistance for 2,163 persons, as well as in supporting the development of eight micro enterprises (which generated 815 jobs) and 167 individual-owned businesses which generated 218 jobs. Per government's report, the Community Development Program (PRODEC), in spite of financial mismanagement (17 million CFAF unaccounted for, case currently with the courts), claims that it financed 151 micro projects, which generated some 747 jobs; however, there is no documentary evidence on the rate of success of the micro- enterprises. The action program objectives stated for Population and Health (see tables 5 and 6), and financed with the Japanese grant, were partially achieved. Those for the Education component were not realized as it was never implemented due to poor preparation of bidding documents. Efforts to meet objectives for the Women in Development (WID) component, financed by a CIDA grant, were so poorly executed due to weak management and internal problems within the Ministry of Women's and Social Affairs (MINASCOF), that CIDA decided to withdraw its funding. 1.14 Institution building objectives. Some institution building took place in the project. The FNE was created as a permanent institution and within it new structures were set up ("Division d'Assistance a l'Insertion et la Reinsertion" (DAIR) and the Information Center), some studies carried out, and training/technical support provided to  - 5 - clients. With regard to the WID component, some benefits were realized from the creation of a Planning, Coordination and Evaluation unit and the establishment of an administrative unit in MINASCOF, and the completion of some studies; however, very little institution building in the area of training and coordination with other sectors occurred, due to MINASCOF's weak management capacity. Finally, the Higher Institute of Public Management (ISMP) carried out diagnostic studies of the planning capacities of MIN4ASCOF and the Planning Ministry. C. IMPLEMENTATION RECORD AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 1.15 Project implementation took place in an environment of political instability and amid a worsening economic crisis. To ensure efficient project management, the Borrower established, by decree, a committee (CTC/DSA) in charge of overall management and coordination of the project (initially under the President's office and finally under the Prime Minister's); appointed an administrator; and delegated implementation of components to the relevant ministries (MINPAT, MINSANTE, MINEDUC, MESIRES, MTPS, and MINASCOF) and the newly created FNE and PRODEC. The Bank designed a plan that shared supervision among the project task manager in AFICO then AFIPH and component managers from other divisions, AIF1PH and AF1IE in particular (memo of August 21, 1990). 1.16 Nonetheless, project implementation was dogged by many problems. A five- month delay in loan effectiveness due to the time required to fulfill all the conditions for effectiveness contributed to the slow start-up in the implementation of project activities. The loan became effective on January 30, 1991 and was planned to close on December 31, 1997. Following the 1990 donor meeting, the Bank misinterpreted donors' commitment to the financing, as opposed to the goals, of the project and expected the US$85.7 million project to be cofinanced by nine other donors. Actually, expected funding from the European Community (EC), France, Federal Republic of Germany, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) was not made available. Consequently, many activities were never started. The project was informally restructured in September 1991 to increase the management capability of the CTC/DSA and to focus attention on those components for which financing was available, namely those related to the FNE, WID, PRODEC, and the household surveys. To adjust the CTC/DSA work program to its management capacity, the population, health and education components were also removed from the committee's purview and handed to concerned ministries. The cost of the restructured project was lower, at US$54.1 million (Table 8B), and funds were re- allocated across activities. 1.17 The restructuring did not resolve the project's financing problems. First, although nearly three quarters of the costs of the restructured project were to be funded by the Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB), disbursements from both lenders were frequently suspended due to the government's arrears in debt service and non-provision of  - 6 - counterpart funds. Five long suspensions were imposed on the project between 1992 and 1994. Indeed, some project activities could not be carried out for even six months without interruption due to a suspension. Second, counterpart funds posed a recurring problem, particularly as the government's fiscal position declined in 1993. Because of the intractable problem status of the project (rated 4 during the last ARPP exercise), and given Camneroon's eligibility for IDA credit following the devaluation of the CFAF in January 1994, the IBRD loan was canceled in June 1994, with US$3.9 million disbursed and US$17.6 million undisbursed. Canadian funding was withdrawn, with only US$0.8 million disbursed out of a committed amount of US$4 million. Japanese funding of US$1 million is fully committed and will be fully disbursed. Only US$0.1 million of UNDP funds was disbursed. As of June 1995, US$5.55 million of AfDB contribution has been disbursed, US$13.73 million undisbursed (Table 8B). 1.18 Main factors affecting project implementation. Factors not generally subject to government control: (a) complexity of the project in terms of scope and number of implementing institutions; (b) a serious gap in the financing of project activities. The cofinancing loans and grants from five out of nine donors did not materialize. Furthermore, available funds from contributing donors became effective at different times (IBRD loan and grant from Japan in January, CIDA grant in June and AfDB loan in July 1991); this affected the implementation of the project, particularly in cases where project activities were jointly and equally financed by IBRD and AfDB. The 50/50 joint financing arrangement was also hampered by AfDB's frequent suspension of disbursement for PRODEC sub-projects; a revision of Schedule I (Withdrawal of the Proceeds of the Loan) in July 1992 enabled the Bank to finance PRODEC activities at 100%, provided that such financing represented only 50% of the total program; and (c) Inadequate assistance from Bank during implementation. Human resources were not provided according to the original supervision plan worked out with other divisions. 1.19 Factors generally subject to government control: (a) The Government's inadequate political commitment to poverty reduction in spite of its apparent determination as enunciated in the Declaration of Development Strategy and Economic Recovery; (b) Unavailability of counterpart funds. The deteriorating macroeconomic environment with its negative impact on the availability of budgetary allocations, as well as the government's priorities in allocating the available  - 7 - funds, contributed to a severe shortage of counterpart funds throughout the short life of the project; and (c) The government's cumbersome disbursement and procurement practices. Such practices were not conducive to properly managing such a complex project and seriously affected timely disbursement and procurement for the execution of project activities. The problem was aggravated since funding came from several sources, with the attendant delays in releasing funds across various structures ("Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement", CTC/DSA, and the implementing agencies). 1.20 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: (a) Government agencies' weak capacity (or motivation) for implementation and intra-governmental coordination. Supervision reports and Form 590s are replete with problems attributable to the weak institutional capacity of implementing agencies, including ministries; and (b) Weak financial management system as evidenced in the lack of transparency in the management of project accounts and procurement. D. PROJECT SUSTALNABILITY 1.21 Cameroon's policy environment is still not clearly conducive to the implementation of a sustainable poverty alleviation strategy and related projects (as evidenced by the government's reaction to the recent Poverty Assessment). Therefore, any future project in the area of poverty reduction should address this issue with the government. Since few activities were implemented, the SDA project's social impact is likely to be limited, although no impact assessment has been conducted. Nevertheless, the following entities could be maintained: the CTC/DSA, which is already managing the Emergency Social Program (PSU)' and the FNE, which the Government and AfDB continue to fund. The ECAM which was completely prepared can be implemented if funded. Given the allegations of financial mismanagement in PRODEC, its continuation is unlikely, although AfDB continues to finance it. Any new Bank-financed poverty project should consider: i) involving some of the trained persons in CTC/DSA; ii) funding some FNE activities, depending on the results of an operational audit; and iii) carrying out the household survey (ECAM). E. BANK PERFORMANCE 1.22 Identification of the project was satisfactory in that it was consistent with the government's development strategy and the Bank's country assistance strategy in I Launched by the government in 1994 as an integral part of its new adjustment program.  - 8 - Cameroon. Project design was innovative in that it addressed all dimensions of poverty. Although the Bank identified the major risks, it underestimated their scope and the remedies necessary to address them. The Bank devoted a lot of resources to project preparation and implementation. Between FY89 and FY94, it provided significant resources (371 staff weeks and US$686,800; see Table 12), including 124 staff weeks for preparation (a little above average) and 206 for supervision (greatly above average for investment projects). Nine donor agencies and a large number of consultants with requisite expertise (see Tables 13A & B) participated in varying degrees in project identification and preparation. However, project appraisal was deficient as: a) the Bank underestimated the amount of resources and the level of management capacity and inter- agency coordination needed for implementing such a complex and innovative project; b) the Bank did not pay sufficient attention to: (i) defining appropriate target indicators and identifying target groups; and (ii) evaluating the government's ability both to manage such an innovative and complex project and provide counterpart funds; c) two sub- components i.e. macro-modeling and the national manpower survey, were not appraised; d) the Bank's understanding of some of the cofinanciers' commitment to funding was incorrect; e) a number of questions raised by the country team and Bank management were insufficiently addressed; and f) the Bank did not define performance indicators to monitor project impact. 1.23 Several factors greatly influenced project appraisal. The project was designed at a time when (i) the Borrower could suffer a heavy political setback if the SAP, adopted for the first time, were to result in hardship for some segments of the country's population; (ii) the Bank was being heavily attacked, notably by UNICEF and the Economic Community for Africa (ECA), for supporting Structural Adjustment Programs that paid no heed to their social dimensions; (iii) the Bank's in-house experience and expertise in poverty reduction was still limited; and (iv) the Bank managing unit was over-ambitious, rushed the appraisal and did not make sufficient use of staff experienced in operations and especially implementation. For these reasons, including the protection of the vulnerable groups, the Bank and the Borrower jointly designed a comprehensive but extremely complex project, grossly underestimating the commensurate demands on institutional capacity and resources. Moreover, although the project designers stressed the importance of using existing structures to contain such demands, at least three new structures (CTC/DSA, FNE, and PRODEC) were created. 1.24 The Borrower's implementing institutions were allowed virtually no time to internalize the objectives and the methods for achieving them. The Bank should have expended more effort and time on: (i) identifying the needs of the poor and prioritizing objectives with the help of the Country Assessment Paper; (ii) identifying target groups and indicators; (iii) dialogue and consensus-building with implementing institutions on project objectives and the probability of their achievement; (iv) identifying performance indicators to monitor project achievements; (v) capacity assessment of the implementing agencies/ministries; and (vi) establishment and equipment of the new institutions (CTC/DSA, FNE, and PRODEC) before start-up of project activities.  - 9 - 1.25 Although ostensibly intensive during the three and a half years of the project (a total of eight missions, including two follow-up ones and 206 staff weeks), project supervision was deficient after the first year. Given the inherent complexity of the project, and its multi-sectoral nature, the Bank designed a supervision plan; unfortunately the plan was not properly implemented. The resources allocated for supervision, although far higher than usual for investment projects (50 staff-weeks per year), proved insufficient or were not optimally allocated. Sector specialists within the Bank, originally assigned to supervise the various components, were withdrawn by their divisions without replacements; this left the task manager without adequate human resources for effective supervision as originally planned. Comprehensive supervision missions (5-6 persons for 2 weeks) were too infrequent for a complex project experiencing serious implementation problems, while large amounts of time were recorded on project supervision at headquarters. F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 1.26 As an important complement to Cameroon's Structural Adjustment Program, the SDA project was a high priority for the government. Project identification and preparation by the government encompassed a participatory process in which five working groups, composed primarily of representatives from the line ministries, identified and developed the project's components and actions. Originally, the working groups included representatives from NGOs and the donor community, but the government did not actively encourage these participation and they tended to drift away. Overall, project implementation suffered from weak government commitment and from poor institutional and management capacity (or motivation) of implementing agencies. 1.27 The Borrower's implementation performance was severely marred by its failure to meet its debt service obligations to the Bank and provide counterpart funds to the project. These factors, exacerbated by the weak institutional capacity of implementing agencies, were primarily responsible for highly unsatisfactory ratings on project implementation; they also constrained the achievement of project development objectives and resulted in the Borrower's poor or non-compliance with several loan covenants (see Table 10). 1.28 The project experienced an average disbursement lag of 75 percent (Table 1 3B). Progress reports, accounts and audit reports were not submitted in time (the ones for FY91/92 and FY92/93 were late, and that for FY93/94 due by December 1994 has not yet been received by the Bank). Five of the programmed studies were not carried out (Table 7). Coordination problems arose between the CTC/DSA and the other implementing agencies, particularly the MINASCOF. Monitoring and supervision of some project activities were severely inadequate; in PRODEC-funded micro-projects in particular, this deficiency resulted in as much as CFAF 17 million (US$31,365) being unaccounted for.  - 10- G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 1.29 The project's success in achieving its primary and other objectives was limited, given: (i) its complexity; (ii) the Borrower's weakening commitment and institutional and management deficiencies; (iii) the lack of counterpart funds; (iv) the unstable political environment in which the project was implemented; (v) the Bank's under-provision of resources for supervision; and (vi) the donors' decisions not to finance some activities. Although some activities were implemented, the overall project outcome is unsatisfactory. H. FUTURE OPERATION 1.30 There is no government plan for a future operation as such. However, a number of activities are being continued when possible, some with Bank Group assistance. Following the cancellation of the SDA project, and in the context of the Economic Recovery Credit (ERC), which was approved by IDA (Cr. 2627 CM) in August 1994 mainly to respond to the effects of the January 1994 CFAF devaluation, the Bank appraised a Social Action Program which consisted of some activities from the SDA project. It amounted to US$14 million and included: the operating costs of CTC/SDA, some FNE operating costs, payment of arrears, field work of ECAM, and an expanded education component (including school rehabilitation, purchase of tables and benches and didactic material). As part of the conditionality for ERC, the government advanced CFAF 1 billion to a special account to be disbursed for the Social Action Program. The government began to disburse additional funds at the end of 1994. However, very little of the donor financing expected by the government to cover most of the costs of the Social Action Program has materialized. 1.31 To date, some activities of the SDA project are still ongoing with funding from the government and AffB. Future operations in the field of poverty alleviation should take into account the following considerations: (i) An operational audit of the FNE component should be conducted in order to assess its efficiency and viability for donor funding. For instance, FNE can potentially become a reputable job referral service providing training/counseling of relevance for the job market; (ii) The household survey (ECAM) could be carried out at a small marginal cost given its advanced stage of preparation; (iii) Skills developed by CTC/DSA and FNE should be sustained and could be used in future Bank-financed projects; and (iv) Given the mismanagement of PRODEC, community development programs should be executed by a non-governmental structure. Because the SDA project was a difficult vehicle for effecting sectoral reforms (in population, health, and education), the Bank should consider re-assessing and possibly integrating sectoral objectives of the SDA project into future sectoral projects.  - 11 - I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 1.32 The Bank should realistically assess the Borrower's political will to address poverty, and should design poverty projects accordingly. Failure to do so resulted in unsatisfactory project implementation and very limited achievement of objectives. 1.33 The Bank should be mindful of its critics but should not allow them to unduly influence the shape of the projects it supports. 1.34 Applying a complex theoretical framework to a single operation proved to be an unrealistic approach for project design. In its eagerness to protect the vulnerable groups in the context of adjustment, the Bank and the government designed an overly ambitious multi-sectoral project that was difficult to appraise and to implement, and too costly to supervise. Given the country's political situation, conflicting economic priorities and weak institutions, project design should have been kept simple and focused on areas in which the political environment and institutional capacity could have ensured some sustainability. 1.35 The Bank should make better use of information at its disposal and should carry out complementary studies during preparation. The existing Country Assessment Paper could have helped to prioritize project activities, while questions raised by the country team and Bank management should have been addressed and subsequent changes reflected in project design. In addition, an assessment of the absorptive capacity of the implementing agencies and the government's ability to provide counterpart funds would have indicated a need to scale down the project at the preparation stage. 1.36 The Bank should appraise project components at appraisal, and not after effectiveness; doing otherwise can lead to delay in start-up and non-implementation of some components. 1.37 The Bank should have paid more attention to: (i) better identifying target groups and targeting indicators; and (ii) facilitating more efficient and effective implementation of the project. 1.38 Performance and impact indicators should be defined by the Bank and the government during preparation and should be reflected in project design. 1.39 Preferably, supervision arrangements should involve one or a very limited number of the divisions in the Bank, in order to limit the risk of resource reduction during implementation. However, if inter-divisional supervision must be carried out, divisions should allocate and provide resources commensurate with their roles in the project. 1.40 Efforts to address policy design and institutional capacity in the education, population and health sectors are best left to sectoral projects.  - 12- 1.41 The Bank should realistically assess donors' interest in projects and better -- if not fully - secure commitments for financing from cofinanciers prior to loan approval. 1.42 The Bank should ensure that government's implementing agencies, particularly the newly-created entities, have efficient financial management and accounting systems for good administration, and proper and timely utilization of project resources. Failure to do this can result in financial mismanagement as was the case with PRODEC.  - 13 - 2. STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable Macro policies E Sector policies 0 Financial objectives 0 Institutional development E0 Physical objectives Poverty reduction 0 Gender Issues 0 Other social objectives 0 Environmental objectives 0 Public sector management 0 Private sector development 0 B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain (1)() (/) Highly C. Bank performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient (V) V) (V) Identification 0 Preparation assistance 0 Appraisal Supervision 0 Highly D. Borrower performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient (1) (V) (/) Preparation U E [ Implementation E [1 0 Covenant compliance [1 0 0 Operation L [ E Highly Highly E. Assessment of outcome satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory 0(/) 0) 0 0" E a3 c 3C  -14- Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits Loan/Credit Title Purpose Year of | Status |Approval| Preceding operations 1. L26830-CAM To: (i) improve the quality of primary and 1986 Canceled Education & Vocational technical secondary education; and (ii) to 06/14/94 Training increase the relevance of the vocational training system to the labor market. 2. L30890 -CAM To: (i) redress the substantial decline in 1989 Closed SAL I GDP; and (ii) achieve a positive rate of 09/30/94 per capita growth by 1995. 3. L3 1100-CAM To: (i) fornulate and implement reforms in 1989 Closed Economic Management the context of structural adjustment 12/31/93 Project program; and (ii) promote lasting, long- term improvement in policy analysis and management of the country's economy. I Following operations 4. L33880-CAM To improve access to and availability of 1991 Planned Cameroon Food food by: (i) creating opportunities for Closing date: SecurityI) increasing employment and incomes of the 1999 poor, especially of women's groups; (ii) addressing food marketing constraints; (iii) averting crop loss due to pest attacks; and (iv) improving feeding and dietary practices of children and women. 5. Cr.2627 CM To: (i) generate primary surpluses and 8/24/94 Planned Economic Recovery public sector savings sufficient to cover an Closing date: program increasing share of the country's external 6/30/95 interest obligations; and (ii) raise public investments. While the principal target group of PRODEC funding was the vulnerable and poor urban population, the participation of the rural poor was promoted primarily through the Food Security Project.  - 15 - Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Date Actual/Latest Estimate Identification (Executive Project Feb. 1989 Feb. 1989 Summary) Preparation July 1989 July 17, 1989 Appraisal Dec. 1989 Feb. 12 - 23,1990 Negotiations April 10-13, 1990 April 11-19, 1990 Board presentation April 1990 May 90 Signing Aug. 3, 1990 Effectiveness Sept. 1,1990 Jan. 30, 1991 Mid-termn review Dec. 1992 Not done Project completion June 1997 Did not occur Loan closing Dec. 31, 1997 Project canceled on June 7, 1994 Table 4: Loan Disbursements - Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ '000) FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 Appraisal estimate 2,200 7,600 12,100 15,500 18,700 21,500 0 0 Actual 950 1,516 2,868 3,938 - - Actual as % of 43 20 24 25 estimate Date of final 6/7/94 disbursement Comment: Only US$3,937,803 of the loan amount of US$21.5 million was disbursed, leaving US$17,562,197 that was canceled. This does not include any disbursements established through balance adjustment entries.  - 16- Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation 1. Key implementation indicators in SAR Estimated Actual POPULATION & HEALTH I. Establishment of coordination mechanism for 9/30/90 Around May 1991 population and health. 2. Adoption of statements of population policy and health 6/30/91 By February 1993 sector policy. 3. Timetable for introduction of essential drugs and cost 12/31/92 (i) Drugs: in progress; and recovery program throughout public health system. (ii) Cost recovery: Started in hospitals; Enacted late 1994 for health centers. EDUCATION 4. Establishment of coordination and implementation 9/30/90 Completed committee for education module. EMPLOYMENT 5. Establishment of users' committee for ECAM. 9/30/90 Completed WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT 6. Adopting of a statement of policy incorporating an 3/31/92 Not completed due to operational and multisectoral strategy on role of women. cancellation of Canadian financing. 7. Establishment of a Planning, Coordination and 12/31/90 Completed Evaluation Unit in MINASCOF. 8. (a) Re-orient MINASCOF's mandate towards a 9/30/90 Not completed due to conceptual, normative and coordination role on all cancellation of Canadian women's issues and (b) establish appropriate institutional financing. linkages to carry out this mandate. MID-TERM REVIEW 9. Conduct with the Bank a joint review of the progress 12/31/92 revised to Delayed due to suspension of the Project and, on the basis of this review, take any 6/30/93 of disbursements. Not measures deemed appropriate by Borrower and the Bank. done due to loan cancellation.  - 17- Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation 1. Key Operating Indicators in SAR Estimated Actual 1. POPULATION & HEALTH Organization of provincial workshops on draft 8/90 Done. population policy document. Ensure that the program and budgeting system 12/31/91 Being finalized under the FY95 health and the budget monitoring system are in place. sector project Preparation of training program for MINSANTE 2/91 personnel and members of management Not done committee. 8/90 Recruitment of a consultant expert in program Done budget. 2. EDUCATION Recruitment of a consultant in program budget. 8/90 Not done Request bids for manuals, school benches, 10/90 Not done equipment and teaching aids. 3. EMPLOYMENT (a) FNE: Creation of a Re-insertion Assistance Service to 10/90 Done counsel and orient job seekers, particularly those leaving the public sector. Development of MIS on the functioning and 10/90 Done performance of the labor market. Establishment of DAIR with a view to 7/90 Done undertaking coordination, assistance in program design, and channeling of candidates to appropriate institutions. Establishment of a program of technical and financial assistance to existing and new micro- 12/90 - 1/93 In progress enterprises which generate employment. (b) Ministry of Labor (MTPS) Recruitment of consultant for manpower survey. Not done Completion of the National Labor Survey. 12/92 Not done ) Division d'Assistance a t'lnsertion et a la Reinsertion  -18 - 1. Key Operating Indicators in SAR Estimated Actual 4. WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT Creation of an administrative unit to supervise 6/90 Done WID module activities. Recruitment of an international socio-economist 12/90 Done consultant. Recruitment of an international consultant expert 8/91 Not done in IEC. Training of teaching personnel in urban centers. Starting 7/91 Not done Training program for rural animators. Starting 5/91 Not done 5. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT Design of operational procedures. 9/90 Done Financing of pilot projects. 11/90 Done Implementation of program in four areas. 1/91 Implemented in the Center; Littoral; North-West; and North provinces.  - 19- Table 7: Studies Included in Project Study Purpose as defined at Status Impact of study appraisal/redefined 1. Inventory of existing capacity To strengthen the Ministry's planning Completed Not known and evaluation of needs of capacity. Ministry of Health. 2. Inventory of existing capabilities To strengthen the Ministry's capacity to Completed Not known and evaluation of needs of Ministry (a) plan objectives and operational of Education. strategies; and (b) manage resources and programs more efficiently. 3. Survey of the types, To identify 75 initial public enterprises Completed in Extended to rural zones. characteristics, and skills of people to be restructured, privatized, or closed. collaboration with likely to leave public enterprises. CENAFOP 4. Inventory of existing institutional To improve and adapt the supply of Completed Used by FNE to develop capacity for professional training. labor to the job market. training programs. 5. National manpower survey To improve the functioning of the labor Not done market over the medium and long term. 6. Possibility of creating a To improve the functioning of the labor Not done volunteer service as a means of market over the medium and long term. giving youths practical work experience. 7. Study to identify labor intensive To increase the demand for labor in the Not done projects. public investment program. 8. Literature search of studies on To develop a national strategy and Completed Not known the situation of women in Cameroon action plan for the integration of women and identification of knowledge in development. gaps. 9. Inventory of agencies active in To develop a national strategy and Completed No impact yet the area of women in development. action plan for the integration of women in development. 10. Study on improving the To improve the impact of MINASCOF's Not done Not known management of urban support urban support services (women' homes, services and on reinforcing social centers, etc.). mechanisms of self financing. 11. Priority household survey. Not done ) CENAFOP: Centre National de Formation Professionnelle.  -20 - Table 8A: Project Costs (Portion Financed by IBRD, million of US Dollars) Appraisal Estimate Revised 1) Actual 2 Undisbursed CATEGORY_LI I. Education expend. Part C. ITI 1. school desks/benches 2,000,000 2,000,000 0.00 2,000,000.00 2.Teaching man/mat. 1,600,000 1,600,000 0.00 1,600,000.00 II. MTPS Expend. Parts D.3 & D.4 3. consult.serv. & trg 600,000 600,000 29,679.56 570,320.44 4. equipm & vhs 300,000 300,000 577.61 299,422.39 5. Oper. costs 600,000 600,000 570.21 599,429.79 III. FNE expend. Parts D. I & D.2 6. D.l -CN. SVC 1,200,000 1,200,000 598,378.08 601,621.92 7. D. 1-EQ & VHS 200,000 335,000 281,511.12 53,488.88 8. D.l- OP. COSTS 300,000 300,000 217,580.89 82,419.11 9. D.1 - VOCAT. TRNG (COIC) 1,000,000 1,000,000 688,587.71 311,412.29 I OA. D. I -GOODS/SVCS 2.000,000 2,000,000 268,040.93 1,731,959.07 1OB D.l-GOODS/SVCS 6,000,000 3,170,000 0.00 3,170,000.00 IV. COMMUNITY DEVT./PRODEC EXPEND. PART. F. 11. CN. SVCS 370,000 470,000 149,433.55 320,566.45 12. GOODS/SVCS 2,500,000 2,500,000 578,177.56 1,921,822.44 V. PLANNING CAPACITY & INFO. BASE EXPEND. PART G.3 13. CN. SVCS/TRNG 50,000 1,670,000 35,235.26 1,634,764.74 14. VHS/EQ 40,000 470,000 116,622.10 353,377.90 15. OP. COSTS 100,000 1,380,000 15,225.16 1,364,774.84 VI. PROJECT ADM. EXPEND. PART H__ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ 16. TRNG 90,000 90,000 228,686.21 138,686.21- 17.VHS/EQ. 50,000 190,000 195,501.71 5,501.71- 18.0P. COSTS 250,000 250,000 135,134.37 114,865.63 19. REFUNDING OF PPF 750,000 375,000 371,174.91 3,825.09 20. UNALLOCATED 1,000,000 1,000,000 0.00 1,000,000.00 TOTAL 21,500,000 21,500,000 3,937,803.00 17,562,196.92 (Canceled) Comment: Amendment to Schedule I of the Loan Agreement on July 21, 1992 - US$3.33 million was reallocated from the National Employment Fund to the surveys component. Goods and services for Part F. 1. under the Community Development Program was amended to be borne by the Bank at 100% instead of jointly with AfDB at 50%. 2) Breakdown between local and foreign costs is not available.  -21 - Table 8B: Project Financing') Appraisal estimate Revised estimate (US$M) Actual estimate (US$M) (US$M) Source CLota Foreign Total LCotal Foreign Total Cost Foreign Total IBRD 21.5 21.5 3.9 ADB 16.0 16.0 5.5 EUROPEAN 10.0 COMMUNITY FEDERAL REP. OF 7.7 GERMANY CANADA 7.3 4.0 0.8 FRANCE 3.9 __ _ USAID 3.5 UNFPA 3.2 JAPAN 1.0 1.0 1.0 UNDP 0.8 0.8 0.1 GOV. OF CAMEROON 10.8 10.8 0.6 TOTAL 43.2 42.5 85.7 54.1 11.95 Comment: 145 million Japanese yen was provided, 124 million disbursed, 21 million undisbursed 4.6 million Canadian $ was provided, 990,000 disbursed, 3.6 million undisbursed. 12.36 million SDR equivalent was provided by AMDB, 8.8 million undisbursed. The Government disbursed CFAF 178 million. Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits No attempt was made at appraisal to estimate net present value (NPV) or economic rate of return (ERR) and therefore there is no baseline against which to judge a re-estimate for evaluation purposes. Furthermore, no parameters were given at appraisal with regard to cost effectiveness. 1) Breakdown between local and foreign costs is not available.  - 22 - Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants Cameroon Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) Project Loan 3206 CM Agreement Section Covenant Present Original Revised Description of Comments Type Status Fulfillment Fulfillment Covenant Date Date Ln.3206 Art. II PIA NC 12/31/97 - Closing date Project canceled CM 2.03 in June 1994 Ln. 3206 Art. III PIA NC - - Borrower shall Serious delays in CM 3.01 (a) provide, promptly the provision of as needed, funds, counterpart funds. facilities, services and other resources for project. Ln. 3206 3.01 (c) F NC - - Borrower shall CM make proceeds of loan allocated to Categories (6) and (10) in Para. I of Schedule I available to FNE Ln. 3206 3.01 (b) PIA NC - - Borrower shall Project CM carry out project in implementation accordance with interrupted with implementation frequent program set in suspensions. Schedule 5 of agreement. Ln.. 3206 3.03 (b) F NC - - Borrower to deposit Carried out with CM into FNE Project lot of delays of Account within 15 over 15 days. days of end of each quarter, amount of CFA equal to total amount of withdrawals from FNE project account Ln.. 3206 4.01 (ii) A/A NC - - Furnish to Bank not Audit reports CM later than 6 months submitted late. after end of each such year, report of such audit  - 23 - Agreement Section Covenant Present Original Revised Description of Comments Type Status Fulfillment Fulfillment Covenant Date Date Ln. 3206 Art. V R NC - - Conditionality Borrower's poor CM 5.01 (a) regarding link performance in between Bank's SAL caused satisfaction with frequent progress achieved suspensions of by Borrower in SAL disbursement and (no. 3089 CM) and ultimate disbursement for cancellation of this project project. Ln. 3206 Art. V R NC - - Conditionality This CM 5.01 (b) between conditionality was disbursement in not fulfilled and in Education large part component and contributed to non progress made by execution of the Borrower in component. preparation and implementation of policy, long-term strategy and medium-tekm action plan for years 1991- 1993 for education sector. Ln. 3206 Art. VI SPC- CAM - - Adviser to DG of This was CM 6.01 (b) adm. FNE has been condition for employed. effectiveness but was amended to become a condition for disbursement. Ln. 3206 Schedule SPC- CAM - - Reallocation of Also amended CM I (10) b allocative US$3.33 million were categories from FNE to survey (12), (16) and component (19), heading V, and para. 2 (c) of Schedule 1. Ln. 3206 Schedule P CAM - - Local competitive Loan agreement CM 4, Part C bidding (LCB) amended to raise Other the aggregate procure- ceilings for ment procurement proce- through LCB and dures shopping  - 24 - Agreement Section Covenant Present Original Revised Description of Comments Type Status Fulfillment Fulfillment Covenant Date Date Ln. 3206 Schedule I C 9/30/90 - Establishment of Completed with CM 5,1 (b) coordination delay around May (iii) mechanism for pop. 1991. and health. Ln. 3206 Schedule I C 9/30/90 Establishment of Completed CM 5,1 (c) coordination and Part E implementation committee for education module. Ln. 3206 Schedule I C 12/31/90 - Establishment of Completed CM 5,1 (e) (i) Planning Coordination and Evaluation Unit in MINASCOF Ln. 3206 Schedule I CP 9/30/91 (a) Reorient Not completed CM I (e) (i) MINASCOF's due to mandate towards a cancellation of conceptual, Canadian normative and financing coordination role on all women's issues; and (b) establish appropriate institutional linkages to carry out this mandate. Ln. 3206 Schedule I C 9/30/90 Establishment of Completed with CM 5,1 (g) (i) committee for delay ECAM around May 1991. Ln. 3206 Schedule SPC- C 6/30/91 Adoption of Completed with CM 5,2. (a) adm. statements of delay (ii) population policy around February and health sector 1993. policy Ln. 3206 Schedule SPC- C 12/31/92 Introduce essential (i) Drugs: in CM 5,2. (a) adm. generic drugs and progress; and (ii) cost recovery (ii) Cost recovery: systems in all public Started in hospitals; healt faciities Enacted late 1994 health fcilities for health centrers  - 25 - Agreement Section Covenant Present Original Revised Description of Comments Type Status Fulfillment Fulfillment Covenant Date Date Ln 3206 Schedule SPC- CP 12/31/91 Ensure that the Being finalized CM 5,2. (a) adm. program budgeting under the health (iii) system and the sector project. budget monitoring system are in place. Ln. 3206 Schedule SPC-adm CP 3/31/92 Adoption of a Not completed CM 5,2 (c) statement of policy due to the incorporating an cancellation of operational strategy Canadian and a multisector financing. plan to enhance the role of women in development Ln. 3206 Schedule PIA CP 12/31/92 Conduct with the Not done. Delayed CM 5,3. Bank a joint review due to suspension of the progress of of disbursements. the Project and, on the basis of this review, take any measure deemed appropriate by the Borrower and the Bank. Covenant Type: Present Status: PIA Project implementation arrangements C Covenant complied with F Financial NC Not Complied with M/R Monitoring/Reviews CP Complied with partially R Remedies CAM Covenanlt amended SPC-adm. Sector policy conditionality-administrative SPC-allocative Sector policy conditionality-allocative change  - 26 - Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Statement number and title Description and comment on lack of compliance 1. O.D. 10.60 Accounting, financial reporting Delays in submission of audit reports for and auditing 1991/92,1992/93 and 1993/94. 2. O.D. 13.05 Project Supervision (para. 4) The Bank did not allocate Bank staff and other resources commensurate with the nature, complexity and size of the project. Table 12: Bank Resources - Staff Inputs Planned Revised Actual Stage of project cycle Weeks Weeks Weeks Preparation to NA NA 124.4 appraisal Appraisal NA NA 20 Negotiations through NA NA 13.8 Board approval Supervision 145.3 176.8 206.4 Completion 2.0 9.0 TOTAL 373.6 NA=Not Available Source of data: Forms 590 and Cost Accounting System. Comments: Data on input/resources paid by trust funds was not available. Staff weeks in the table above represent only the Bank's input in the project. The breakdown for Bank's financial input for fiscal years prior to FY94 is not available. A lump sum of US$593,700 was spent prior to FY94. Original planned cost for FY94 was US$45,000, later revised to US70,900 and actual cost was US$62,000. US$22,200 is expected to be spent after FY94. A total amount of US$686,800 is estimated to have been spent by the Bank on the SDA project.  - 27 - Table 13A: Bank Resources - Missions Performance Rating | Stage of Month/year of Days in Specialized Implemen- Develop- Types of Stage of Month/year of field staff skills tation ment Tpso Project cycle persons represented status objectives problems Through appraisal Feb - Dec 29 356 PMS; E; NA NA Innovative- 1989 WIDS; ES; ness and HRS; RMO complexity CAS; HS; of project EDS; L; OA ll Appraisal through Feb - 10 120 E; L; PA; - - Co- Board approval August ES; HS; PO fioancing 1990 __ Supervision Oct. 1990 - 33 376 E; FA; 3 2 PDO; CLC; March HRS; RA; AOF; DL; 1993 (8 RMO; PMP; missions) WIDS; S; SP LO; EDS; l ___________ PO; A _ l Completion November I 10 HRS 1994 Symbols: NA= Not Available Specialization: A = Architect; CAS = Country Assessment Specialist; E = Economist; EDS = Enterprise Development Specialist; ES = Employment Specialist; FA = Financial Analyst; HRS = Human Resource Management Specialist; HS = Health Specialist; L = Lawyer; LO = Loan Officer; OA = Operations Assistant; PA = Project Assistant; PMS = Project Management Specialist; PO Project Officer; RA = Research Assistant; RMO = Resident Missionz Officer; S = Statistician; WIDS = Women in Development Specialist. Types of problems for performance: AOF = Availability of Funds; CLC = Compliance with Legal Covenants; DL = Disbursement Lag.OS = Overall Status; PDO = Project Development Objectives; PMP = Project Management Performance; PP = Procurement Progress; SP = Studies Progress; TAP = Technical Assistance Progress; TP = Training Progress. No training specialist or capacity building specialist in any stages of the project. 1) At cancellation, the project overall rating was 4.  - 28 - Table 13B: Bank Resources - Supervision Missions Supervision Month No. of Days Spec. Performance Rating by Type of Problems lYear Pers in Skills Field OS PDO CLC PMP AOF PP TAP SP DL Supervision #1 10/90 2 16 E; HS 2 2 2 2 3 - - - 100% Supervision #2 2/91 6 12 E; HS - - - - - - (590 not available) FA; HRS; RA; RMO Supervision #3 5/91 3 16 E;HRS (590 not available) RMO Supervision #4 9/91 6 12 E;S; 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 72% WID RMO Supervision macro 1/92 3 8 E;S - - - - i modeling follow- up (590 not available) Supervision WID 5/92 2 7 E;WID - - - - follow-up (590 not available) Supervision #5 6/92 5 12 E;FA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 80% Supervision#6 3/93 6 11 E;S; 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 74% RMO; HRS Total ~~~~33 Performance rating symbols: AOF = Availability of Funds; CLC = Compliance with Legal Covenants; DL = Disbursement Lag.OS = Overall Status; PDO = Project Development Objectives; PMP = Project Management performance; PP = Procurement Progress; SP = Studies Progress; TAP = Technical Assistance Progress; Specialization: E = Economist; FA = Financial Analyst; HRS = Human Resource Specialist; HS = Health Specialist; RA = Research Assistant; RMO = Resident Mission Officer; S = Staticistician; WID = Women in Development Specialist.  29 MISSION DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE pagpedif 3 EVALUATION FINALE DU PROJET DIMENSIONS SOCIALES DE L'AJUSTEMENT (DSA) - CAMEROUN (17 au 25 novembre 1994) PROCES VERBAL Une mission de la Banque Mondiale conduite par Mme Regina AMADI, Consultante, a e6journ6 a Yaounde du 17 au 25 novembre 1994 pour faire une 6valuation finale du Projet Dimensions Sociales de l'Ajustement. Pendant son s6jour, la mission a eu a s'entretenir avec les differentes autorit6s administratives, les Bailleurs de fonds et lee responsables concernes par le Projet. La liste est jointe en annexe 1. 1