Nepal - Agricultural Manpower Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 14667 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT NEPAL AGRICULTURAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1534-NEP) JUNE 21, 1995 Population and Human Resources Division South Asia Country Department II (Bhutan, India, Nepal) This document has a restricted distribution and may be used bv recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency unit = Nepalese rupees (NRs) At appraisal: US$1.00 = NRs 17.3 At completion: US$1.00 = NRs 49.9 FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER July 16-July 15 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS DOA Department of Agriculture HMG His Majesty's Government IAAS Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science IAg Intermediate Agriculture Certificate IDA International Development Association JT Junior Technician JTA Junior Technical Assistant MOA Ministry of Agriculture MUCIA Mid-Western Universities Consortium for International Activities PIU Project Implementation Unit TU Tribhuvan University USAID United States Agency for International Development  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT NEPAL AGRICULTURAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1534-NEP) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ................................................................... ....i EVALUATION SUMMARY ..................................................... ii PART 1. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .......................................................1 A. Statement/Evaluation of Objectives .......................................................I B. Achievement of Objectives ......................................................2 C. Implementation Experience and Major Factors Affecting the Project .......................................................4 D. Project Sustainability ...................................................... 5 E. Bank Performance ......................................................6 F. Borrower Performance .......................................................6 G. Assessment of Outcome ......................................................7 H. Key Lessons Learned .....................................................7 PART 11. STATISTICAL ANNEXES .....................................................9 Table 1: Summary of Assessments ..9 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits ..10 Table 3: Project Timetable ..10 Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual ..11 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation ..12 A. Original Objectives .12 B. Modified Objectives .14 C. Civil Works: Original Plan .17 D. Civil Works: Recast Plan .18 E. Technical Assistance .20 F. Graduates by Program .23 Table 6A: Summary of Costs by Project Component .............................................. 24 Table 6B: Project Financing .............................................. . 25 Table 7: Status of Legal Covenants .............................................. 26 Table 8: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements ............................................ 28 Table 9: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ............................................... 28 Table 10: Bank Resources: Missions .............................................. . 29 APPENDICES A. Mission's Aide Memoire (October 1994) .............................................. 30 B. Borrower's Evaluation ................. 35 C. Map ..................43 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   -i- IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT NEPAL AGRICULTURAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1534-NEP) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Agricultural Manpower Development Project in Nepal, for which IDA Credit 1534-NEP, in the amount of SDR 8.5 million (US$8.4 rnillion equivalent), was approved on December 13, 1984, and made effective on June 5, 1985. The Credit closed on December 31, 1994, compared with the original closing date of June 30, 1991. Final disbursement took place on May 17, 1995, and an undisbursed balance of about SDR 1.0 million will be canceled. The ICR was prepared by Mr. Hon-Chan Chai (consultant) and Ms. Soon Hee Kim of the Population and Human Resources Division, Country Department II, South Asia Region, and was reviewed by Richard Skolnik, Chief, SA2PH, and Kazuko Uchimura, Project Advisor, SA2DR. Ms. K. Johnston and Messrs. C. Maguire and Y.K. Choi made valuable contributions to the preparation and review of the report. The report is based on Bank documents and materials in the project files, including the project authorities' periodic reports, as well as findings of Bank supervision missions to Nepal. Comments from the Borrower and USAID (cofinancier) on the ICR have been incorporated in the report. The Borrower's own evaluation of the project is included as Appendix B to the ICR.   -_j- IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT NEPAL AGRICULTURAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1534-NEP) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction i. Nepal was showing signs in the late 1970s and early 1980s that agricultural productivity was falling, while over 90 percent of the growing population of 15 million (1981 estimated) depended on agriculture for their livelihood. The cause was attributed to a combination of complex extemal factors, over which Nepal had little control, and internal factors which were believed to be amenable to some control. Among the latter was the inadequate coordination between planning agricultural programs and ensuring that there were adequate human resources to implement them. Project Objectives ii. The project was designed to address the issue of the supply of appropriately trained people with the long-term aim of helping the country improve agricultural productivity. The specific objectives were to improve the quality and relevance of middle-level agricultural training and strengthen degree-level training at the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Sciences (IAAS) of Tribhuvan University (TU). These objectives were in line with the aims of Nepal's Sixth Plan of quickening economic growth, generating employment, and raising living standards. Project activities focused on improving the IAAS's academic and communal facilities, and implementing new training programs for Junior Technical Assistants (JTAs) and the B.S. degree in veterinary science and animal husbandry, and academic (higher-degree) staff training. These objectives were clear to His Majesty's Government (HMG) and to the implementing agency, the IAAS, and were in harmony with IDA's development strategy for the agricultural and human resource sectors in Nepal. However, as noted below (iv.), these objectives had to be reformulated within three years of implementation. Implementation Experience and Results iii. Implementation proceeded well during the first two to three years, but soon thereafter slowed to a standstill, brought about by a convergence of internal problems and external events. The main internal problem stemmed from the lack of employment opportunities for IAAS's graduates, especially the JTAs, in part because they were considered less well-trained than others in comparable fields of training, but also because the general demand for them was much less than anticipated. The manifestation of this problem coincided with political turmoil which spilled over to the university campuses, resulting in student unrest that practically brought the university to a halt and highlighted serious institutional problems, including management weakness at the IAAS. The problems faced by the project were exacerbated by the price inflation of imported goods and shortages of building materials resulting from the Indo-Nepalese trade and transit dispute.  -_jj- iv. The impact of these events made it clear that the project had to be terminated or revamped. Following a midterm review in 1992, the project was recast, with the objectives reformulated to strengthen institutional management and to improve the quality of undergraduate training, partly by shifting from the three-year to four-year B.S. program. The return of political stability and a concerned University Vice Chancellor, coupled with an active and effective IAAS management team and project board, facilitated the successful completion of the reformulated project. v. The project has succeeded in achieving most of the original and the revised quantitative targets for new and rehabilitated facilities, equipment, furniture, and vehicles. The revamped project capitalized on the original investments by strategically filling in the gaps with selected additional civil works and equipment. At the formal closing date (December 31, 1994), the project's revised objectives were substantially achieved. Key institutional development indicators include the production of a draft academic master plan, a master land use plan, and a campus maintenance plan, various measures to regulate staff discipline and student affairs, the institution of a new four-year degree program, and a significant increase in faculty with higher degrees. Summary of Findings, Future Operations and Key Lessons Learned Vi. Overall, the project performance should be rated satisfactory when judged against its revised objectives. The timely and courageous decision to revamp the project, following political upheaval in Nepal, succeeded in turning around a seriously failing investment and giving it a fair chance of long-term institutional development and sustainability. The new and rehabilitated buildings, equipment, furniture and other new and refurbished facilities provide the necessary infrastructure for the further development of the IAAS. The most important asset, however, is the large body of highly trained staff, whose initiative and creativity, in concert with an effective management, will largely determine the long-term sustainability of the IAAS by leading the institution in teaching, research, and service that will forge stronger links with government and private sector agencies. The longer-term value and sustainability of the IAAS cannot be judged easily at this time but will depend on how the IAAS will use its strengthened institutional base to continue to improve the quality of agricultural education, training, research, and extension in Nepal. vii. The project experience suggests six main lessons: * First, as manpower projections are a tenuous basis for justifying investments in higher education without a supportive macroeconomic environment, a modular approach that allows for adjustments in response to changing circumstances would minimize risk. * Second, a project that does not address the institutional problems of the main project institution responsible for meeting project objectives runs a high risk of failure. * Third, sustainable institutional development entails the responsibility on the part of the institution to prove its relevance and effectiveness by improving and broadening its teaching, research, and service functions and to ensure that its graduates are relevant to local needs. * Fourth, Bank-Borrower goodwill and patience, Borrower determination, effective leadership, and good staff teamwork can turn failure to relative success. * Fifth, careful monitoring will help alert project management to potential or actual problems in time to allow for remedial action.  -iv- * Sixth to achieve more sustainable project designs, it is essential to mandate a systematic approach to project monitoring and evaluation, which requires that all key sustainability indicators be clearly identified and monitored throughout implementation.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT NEPAL AGRICULTURAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1534-NEP) PART I. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. STATEMENTJEVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 1. The project was designed with a two-pronged program to assist the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Sciences (IAAS) to: (a) improve the quality and relevance of (non-degree) middle-level agricultural (crop and livestock) pre-service training; and (b) strengthen higher-level (B.S. degree) agricultural pre- service training. The project objectives were in line with the government long-term goal of achieving self- sufficiency in food production for local needs, maintaining agricultural exports and supplying raw materials for industry. The project assumed that a key factor in improving agricultural output and productivity was to raise the quality of extension and other support services provided by trained personnel in the Ministry of Agriculture. 2. To achieve the first objective, the project was to: (a) introduce reforms in the structure and system of training; (b) improve the management and supervision of training; (c) develop appropriate curricula and instructional materials, including reference materials and teaching equipment, and the development of practical-training farms; (d) provide teacher training; (e) establish a student selection and admission system; and (f) rehabilitate physical facilities at the Paklihawa and Lamjung training centers. 3. The second objective was to be achieved by: (a) establishing a bachelor of science (animal science) three-year degree program, for which an appropriate curriculum would be developed; (b) staff training; (c) developing the IAAS farm into an effective practical training and research facility; and (d) upgrading and expanding the existing teaching, research and extension programs, and physical facilities at the Rampur campus. 4. The project was based on the assumption that the country needed an increased supply of Junior Technical Assistants (JTAs) and degree-level personnel to meet Nepal's long-term development of the agricultural sector, which was showing signs of declining productivity although over 90 percent of the people still depended on agriculture for their livelihood. Nepal's decline from a rice exporter in the 1 960s to a net rice importer by the 1970s exemplified the country's productivity decline. While several exogenous factors, such as bad weather conditions and sharply rising fertilizer and transportation costs resulting from escalating fuel prices were blamed, the basic weakness of the economy was attributed to the lack of coordination between planned agricultural development programs and the supply of appropriately trained people to implement them. Specifically, the prevailing agricultural extension and research services were assessed as inadequate, largely because of the lack of sufficient and adequately trained people. The project was therefore an attempt to respond to the need for more effective development and utilization of agricultural manpower. Its objectives were consistent with the broader aims of the (FY81-FY85) Sixth Plan's program for accelerating economic growth, generating employment, and raising living standards. However, although the project implicitly aimed to strengthen LAAS's institutional capability in meeting Nepal's agricultural developmental needs, insufficient emphasis was placed on this aspect during the first  -2- few years of implementation. At the same time, the preoccupation with manpower production was not accompanied by a commensurate concern about its utilization. Events in the late 1980s revealed that the fundamental issue of manpower production and utilization had been overlooked or misunderstood at appraisal. The lack of any effective demand for the graduates of the LAAS and its weak institutional management would ultimately seriously undermine the project. 5. The project was scarcely into the third year of implementation when it became clear that the economy, specifically the public sector, facing serious budget constraints, could employ no more than a small fraction of the graduates, especially the Junior Technical Assistants. As a result, the JTA program was suspended in 1989 and terminated in 1992. Thus, the unemployability of IAAS graduates rendered the manpower objective irrelevant and seriously weakened the basic rationale of the project. This development coincided with the outbreak of political instability in the country and the turmoil spilled over onto the university campuses. The resulting student unrest practically brought the university, including the LAAS, to a standstill. The campus turmoil highlighted serious internal problems-weak management at the IAAS, strained relations between the IAAS and its parent, Tribhuvan University, lax student and staff discipline, and low faculty morale. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 6. In this situation, it was clear that completing the project as planned was of questionable value. A review of the project by IDA and the Borrower at this critical juncture suggested either terminating or reorienting the project. A tentative decision was taken to give the project a second chance, pending the findings of an External Review Panel appointed in 1992 following an earlier request of IAAS to review its program. On the basis of the External Review Panel's recommendations for changes in the organization and management of the IAAS, it was agreed to recast the project: (i) to strengthen the management and promote the institutional development of the IAAS, and (ii) to improve conditions for undergraduate training. These overlapping objectives were to be achieved through various measures to improve the management of the IAAS, promote stronger linkages with outside research and extension agencies, and establish an upgraded four-year B.S. (Agric.) degree program and M.S. programs in selected specializations, and research geared towards improving the quality of the IAAS's academic and service functions. With the new mandate, the IAAS, with the support of the concerned government agencies and IDA, made a concerted effort to turn the Project back from the brink of failure and succeeded in achieving a substantial measure of the revised objectives. 7. The project turnaround was brought about by a determination on the part of faculty and IAAS management to succeed. It was facilitated by several fortuitous events which are described under para. 15 (Internal and External Factors). The project has substantially met the quantitative targets of the revised objectives, as well as those of the original objectives (Table 5: A and B). Key indicators of this achievement include the production of a draft academic master plan, an academic staff reference rule book, a master land use plan, and a campus maintenance plan; the appointment of a Chief of Student Affairs; and the institution of a new five and half-year bachelor of veterinary science and animal husbandry (B.V.S. and A.H.) degree program. The staff development program, financed by USAID, has resulted in a substantial net increase in the number of faculty with higher (Ph.D. and M.S.) degrees (Table 5: E(a)). The new and refurbished physical facilities will provide the necessary support for further institutional development. 8. With the achievement of these quantitative targets, which are merely a means to an end, attention is now focused on what the IAAS can and will do with a stronger institutional base to provide tangible evidence for justifying the investments made. The IAAS needs to clarify and delineate its role as a higher  -3- agricultural educational institution. It must demonstrate how it will maximize its impact on agricultural development in Nepal, now that it has many more highly qualified faculty, better physical facilities, and better academically prepared students. It needs to relate its institutional priorities in agricultural education, training, research, and extension to the needs of Nepal. 9. Given the limited demand for agricultural university graduates, the IAAS needs to ensure that the graduate output from the new four-year B.S. program is linked to effective market demand. Assurance is needed that the new graduates will not face the same unemployment problem encountered by the graduates of the outdated three-year degree program. For the record, it should be noted that, while in operation under the original project, the three-year program produced an average of 75 graduates per year during the period 1984/85-1990/91 (Table 5: F), but only a fraction could be employed. While the country's limited absorptive capacity is the main cause of the high unemployment rate, the quality of the graduates has also been a contributing factor. There is a perception that the quality of graduates varies according to the number of years required to complete each B.S. program. In this situation, employers naturally prefer those with more and better education and training, especially graduates trained in foreign universities. Graduates from Nepal's higher educational institutions are generally considered less well-trained than those from neighboring countries, such as India and Pakistan, because the latter countries' universities require 12 years versus Nepal's 10 years of formal education prior to entering university. 10. A small but significant compensation for the failure with regard to the JTA and B.S. (agric.) programs was the project's success in increasing the enrollment of women in the IAAS. In 1991/92, the B.S. program's combined enrollment at Rampur, Lamjung and Paklihawa was about 490 students, of whom 43 (9 percent) were women. This suggests that the project had substantially met the objective of having women make up 10 percent of total enrollment. The project, however, fell short of the target of increasing the number of students from disadvantaged Hill Areas. Evidently, there was no unemployment problem for female graduates, as they were reported to be in great demand, but there had been a dearth of female applicants for the IAAS programs. This was attributed to the unattractive employment conditions requiring girls to be away from home and low remuneration. Institutional Objectives 11. Technical Assistance. Technical assistance, financed by USAID, played an important role in strengthening IAAS's teaching function. The project provided 20.3 staff-years for specialist services and about 190 staff-years for fellowships (Table 5: E(a)). (Detailed list of textbooks and manuals produced are available in the project files). Foreign expert services were successfully used to: (a) conduct an agricultural teacher training program to provide pedagogical training for the IAAS staff and (b) assist the educational administration and management of the IAAS's specialized activities. Local expert services were employed in the development of 47 titles (18 Nepali, 29 English) of agricultural student manuals and 17 titles (11 Nepali, 6 English) in agricultural textbooks (list of textbooks and manuals produced are available in the project files). While the expert services made a valuable contribution to the project, the staff development program made the biggest impact. 12. Staff Development. The project continued a long-standing program of staff development dating from the 1970s with USAID support. A total of 17 staff gained higher degrees (7 in Ph.D. and 10 in M.S. programs) in various specializations in agriculture. An additional 17 staff were trained overseas in non- degree programs in specialized areas. Administrative and operational staff were provided short training courses, 105 in Nepal and 20 overseas (Table 5:E(a - b)). The impact of staff training, however, has been somewhat undermined by the "brain-drain" which evidently has weakened IAAS's academic and institutional development. In 1992, out of a total of 125 faculty members, 35 (28 percent) were not at  -4- IAAS. Of the 35 absentees, 62 percent were staff with M.S. or Ph.D. degrees. Nevertheless, the staff at the IAAS represent a large concentration of high-level agricultural experts who constitute a valuable national resource and whose contributions are expected to shape the direction of higher agricultural education in Nepal. Physical Objectives 13. The project has substantially met the original and the modified objectives for new buildings and rehabilitated facilities, equipment, vehicles, and furniture (Table 5: C and D). (List of equipment and vehicles purchased and installed are available in the project files.) The main campus at Rampur and the branch campuses at Paklihawa and Lamjung have been well provided with administrative and teaching facilities, including laboratories and seminar rooms, in addition to student hostels and staff housing. Various farm buildings, new livestock housing, reputed to be the best in Nepal, and equipment, together with newly acquired livestock, cater adequately to the needs of practical teaching and learning as well as research. The construction of service roads and irrigation and drainage canals and the implementation of a new lay-out have converted the IAAS's once-derelict property into a viable agronomy farm. 14. Most of the laboratories have been provided with the equipment for teaching and basic research. A total of 32 microcomputers and two file servers were procured under the recast plan and they are expected to serve adequately the needs of the IAAS. The project also provided the institution with three four-wheel drive station wagons, a pickup truck, and two minibuses. C. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE AND MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 15. Internal and External Factors. The Project was running well during the first two to three years, but in the late 1980s, the combination of political conflict between rival parties that spilled over into the university system, faculty and management tensions, student unrest on the various campuses, and the Indo- Nepalese trade and transit dispute brought the project to a virtual standstill which persisted for three years. The project reached its nadir during 1990/91. By the time the decision was taken in 1992 to refocus the project, with real prospects of achieving its institutional objectives, several fortuitous developments helped turn the project around. These fortunate events included a major change in the political environment that helped defuse the potentially explosive group tensions surrounding the campus and the IAAS and allow stability to return, strong and effective leadership in the office of the Dean of IAAS as well as the office of the Vice Chancellor of Tribhuvan University, and the appointment of a dynamic Project Manager. These happenings had a beneficial impact on IAAS staff morale, which was further uplifted by their active participation in preparing for a constructive and positive assessment of the IAAS by the External Review Panel. Concerted staff effort saved the project. Consequently, more development activities took place during the final two years of implementation than in the previous seven. This rededication of the project qualitatively made up for some lost time. However, the original closing date of June 30, 1991, was extended by three and half years, with a final extension to December 31, 1994. 16. Apart from the disruptions caused by political unrest on the campuses, project implementation was at times affected by a complex government review system, which was exacerbated by the administrative relationship between the lAAS and its parent, Tribhuvan University. This resulted in the tardy release of funds for civil works and equipment and for the printing of textbooks and manuals. Lack of operating funds, despite the existence of a special account, hampered overall project implementation, often curtailing the supervision of activities in the branch campuses, especially at Lamjung, located in the Hill Region. Besides Tribhuvan University and the IAAS, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Social Welfare, the  -5- Ministry of Finance, the National Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Agriculture were also involved in project implementation through the project implementation board. 17. The lack of coordination between key agencies and weakness in planning, issues that had been identified at appraisal, were major factors in the failure of the JTA program. Although the project had a planned annual output of 550 JTAs, there was apparently no preparation for their placement in government or private employment, and no monitoring of the employment situation. If proper planning had been carried out, the scale of the JTA program might have been much reduced considerably at the outset, if it were undertaken at all. 18. Similarly, in academic staff development, the lack of a comprehensive re-entry program for the utilization of faculty members returning from overseas training resulted in much professional, if not personal, frustration, which included difficulties in undertaking research. All this has contributed to the university's brain-drain. 19. Project Costs and Financing. The estimated total actual cost of the project is US$15.50 million, compared with the appraisal estimate of US$14.26 million. It should be borne in mind that the final project cost will be slightly higher than reported here because part of the civil works added under the recast project that have yet to be completed and which are being financed under the Higher Education Project (Credit 2560-NEP). The IDA credit of the SDR equivalent of US$8.4 million was to finance 64 percent of the appraisal estimate of project costs (details in Table 6A). Actual disbursements totaled US$11.75 million. The over-disbursement in US dollars is due to the SDR appreciation against the US dollar. SDR disbursements totaled SDR 7.5 million, compared with the original credit amount of SDR 8.5 million (Table 4). 20. The Borrower was to provide the equivalent of US$1.74 million to finance the project. The actual expenditure was US$1.35 million. The remaining cost of US$4.10 million was to be financed by USAID. The actual USAID expenditure was US$2.40 million (Table 6B). D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 21. The project is sustainable so long as: (a) HMG is committed to supporting the national university system, of which the IAAS is an important part; and (b) LAAS's "products", whether in the form of graduates, research output, or professional expertise, are utilized and valued by the agricultural sector in general, and public agencies in particular. It is presumed that the IAAS will continue to receive the necessary budget from HMG for administration, academic teaching, research, and general maintenance. The onus, however, is on the IAAS not merely to justify its existence, but also, more importantly, to widen and deepen its academic and practical contribution to higher agricultural education and training. This can be achieved in four mutually reinforcing ways, whose basic thrust was identified by the Extemal Review Panel and which are elaborated below. (a) The first is to improve institutional management, which entails rationalization of departmental organization to achieve scale economies. The sharing of teaching staff, physical resources, and instructional materials and equipment in complementary teaching programs tends to produce synergistic effects that benefit both teachers and leamers. The result would be improved all-around quality.  -6- (b) The second is to ensure that the teaching and research programs, which should be closely linked, are relevant to national needs. This calls for the IAAS to redefine its role in regard to its student clientele, which currently include degree as well as non-degree candidates, and to allocate staff and other resources accordingly to ensure that the objectives can reasonably be achieved. This means ensuring that the programs are qualitatively and quantitatively responsive to the agricultural community. (c) The third is to establish linkages with public and private agricultural agencies to exchange information and, as appropriate, provide services. One way to foster and strengthen the existing informal relations with the MOA is to run in-service training for the MOA and other agencies, utilizing the IAAS's research findings and related information output. Strong and dynamic relations with outside bodies are likely to strengthen the IAAS as a teaching and research institution. (d) The fourth is to try to improve efficiency and autonomy in financial matters. This depends in part on incentives being provided by HMG through Tribhuvan University for the IAAS to be more efficient, so that the fruits of efficiency are retained by the institution. Ultimately, the long- term sustainability of the IAAS will depend on its ability to rely less on governnent funding and more on its capacity to raise its own resources. E. BANK PERFORMANCE 22. With the benefit of hindsight it may be questioned whether, given the on-going USAID support for the IAAS, it was an opportune time in 1983/84 for IDA to complement and eventually replace USAID efforts in Nepal's agricultural education and training programs. It may also be further questioned whether, having decided to invest in this field, IDA should have supported the project as designed. That the manpower rationale, at least for the JTA program, proved to be ill-founded less than three years after implementation suggests that there was inadequate appraisal of the mismatch between the demand for and supply of middle-level manpower. 23. Having helped to launch the project, IDA provided strong support to the Borrower throughout implementation. Over a nine year period (October 1985-October 1994), IDA mounted 18 formal supervision missions, averaging about seven days per mission. There was an average six-month interval between missions, in addition to informal supervision visits in the course of other IDA work in Nepal. The mix of IDA staff skills was satisfactory. The project benefited from the professional expertise of the agricultural specialist and the agricultural education specialist, especially during the period of November 1988-December 1991, when the Project needed strong guidance. The above IDA staff, the facilities planner specialist, and the education specialist provided strong and constructive support for the PIU. F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 24. Except for delays in the provision of local funds, Borrower performance was satisfactory over much of the project life. Staff turnover at the PIU was moderate and did not appear to affect implementation adversely. Although there were two successive Project Coordinators, implementation continuity was maintained by the core staff responsible for the project. Implementation was most difficult during the period of political turmoil on the campuses. Faced with a challenge, the Borrower was able, with a determined effort, to turn around a failing project and to achieve a substantial measure of success in  -7- reaching the revised objectives. The fact that more work was accomplished in the final two years of implementation than in the preceding seven testifies to the Borrower's capacity for getting things done when the right conditions prevail. There were periodic delays in the timely submission of audit reports; these were due to bureaucratic procedures rather than lack of expertise. All project covenants, as amended in line with the recasted project, have been substantially fulfilled. G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 25. Despite a flawed manpower rationale and staff and student unrest in the university campuses that practically derailed the project, the outcome can be said to be satisfactory. The project was able to cut its losses and build on its achievements in staff development, thus laying the foundation for forward movement in strengthening the institutional capacity of the IAAS to plan and manage agricultural education and training. This basically central objective, implicit in the original project design, was obscured by the preoccupation with the JTA and the outdated three-year B.S. programs. The result of excising the JTA program was to clear the way for the proper focus on the institutional development of the IAAS, the central purpose of the project's investment in staff and infrastructural development. After a false start, the Project was able to reset the overriding institutional objective, which it has substantially achieved. However, it remains to be seen how the IAAS will use its strengthened institutional framework and its highly qualified staff to continue, on a sustainable basis, to improve the quality of agricultural education, training, research and extension in Nepal. I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 26. The experience of this project suggests six main lessons: (a) It is evident that the main reason why the original project collapsed was the failure of appraisal to ascertain correctly the effective, as distinct from the presumed, demand for graduates. Bank experience has shown that manpower projections are a tenuous basis for justifying investments in higher education, particularly when a supportive macroeconomic environment is absent (World Bank Assistance to A2ricultural Higher Education. OED Report No. 10751). Thus, projects aimed at producing specified quantities of manpower should require extra care in examining demand- supply assumptions and ensuring no duplication of effort. A modular approach, with provision for incremental or decremental change in response to changing circumstances, minimizes the risk of waste and optimizes the opportunity for resource-use efficiency. (b) It is also clear that a major reason why the original project failed was that project appraisal did not adequately examine the institutional problems of the IAAS as well as those of the Tribhuvan University system of which the IAAS is a constituent. The lesson is that a project that does not adequately take into account institutional problems of the main project institution will undermine the achievement of its objectives and jeopardize project sustainability. (c) Strengthening a key institution such as the IAAS would serve no real purpose if it did not take the initiative to prove its relevance and effectiveness by improving and broadening its teaching, research and service functions. Similarly, improving the quality of a degree program would be futile if its graduates were irrelevant to local needs.  -8- (d) A failing project can be turned around if there is the right combination of Bank-Borrower goodwill and patience, Borrower determination, effective management leadership, and dedicated teamwork. (e) Implementation calls for a close and consistent monitoring of internal and external events to anticipate and, to the extent possible, take appropriate actions to avert potential and actual developments that could have a negative if not disastrous impact on the project. (f) The central importance of ensuring sustainability calls for a systematic approach to project monitoring and evaluation, which requires that all key sustainability indicators should be clearly identified and monitored throughout implementation so that they provide (i) early signals of whether project progress is on-track or off-track and (ii) cumulative data for the assessment of the prospects for sustainability at implementation completion.  -9- PART H. STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable Macroeconomic policies 0 0 0