Financing disaster reconstruction : the Popayan earthquake

NUMBER 68 EDPrecisH L_OpratonsEvaluation Department utM Financing Disaster Reconstruction: The Popayan Earthquake The Bank assists with disaster re- Project goals Results covery within a development frame- work, supporting measures to reduce The Bank loan ($40 million, ap- The project was successfully imple- the risk offuture disasters and safe- proved February 1984, closed Decem- mented, though 18 months later than guard people most vulnerable to them. ber 1988) supported the first three expected. Difficulties induded a nine- The highly successful Popayan Recon- years of a 15-year disaster-recovery month delay before the newly-created struction Project in Colombia set the program. The project was designed implementing agency, the Corporation standard for subsequent efforts to re- to help: for the Reconstruction of Cauca (CRC), duce the impact of disasters. A decade was assigned personnel; the appoint- later, an OED audit analyzes the ef- Restore essential facilities and ment of four different mayors and four fects of the project and the implications services and re-establish basic eco- different governors during project forfuture reconstruction projects.* nomic activity, so as to minimize eco- implementation; and the difficulty of nom-ic and social disruption over the raising counterpart funds, given that Popayan, in western Colombia, has long term, the city's annual budget had been pre- suffered major earthquakes almost 9 Build streamlined arrangements for pared two years earlier without provi- every 80 years. On March 31,1983, efficient coordination of the reconstruc- sion for emergencies. during Holy Week celebrations, an ton program, while strengthening the earthquake measuring 5.4 on the institutions involved. Low-income housing Richter scale hit Popayan and 11 other - Develop a framework for dealing municipalities in the surrounding De- with natural disasters in the Popayan The project's infrastructure compo- partment of Cauca. About 250 people region and in other geologically un- nents, which carefully targeted poor were killed and 1,50 injured. stable areas of Colombia. households, had a lasting positive im- pact on urban development. Effects of the quake The project financed the rebuild- ing of the historic city center and The social situation after the earth- About 2,400 homes were completely created new neighborhoods for low- quake was explosive: landlords could destroyed in Popayan, and another income families made homeless. It not repair low-income apartments 6,900 suffered major structural damage. supported improvements in design cheaply enough to charge rents that Also damaged were streets, rural and the creation of an improved the poor could afford. Popayan experi- roads, schools, health facilities, shops, building code, under which build- enced land invasions from 24,000 commercial and office buildings, rural ings would be upgraded to seismic- newly homeless people. infrastructure, and bridges. resistant standards. It set aside broader social issues which could be pPeinoae AuditReport, At first the damage made it difficult better pursued later. e t Region Earth- for the government to function. Public quake Reconstruction Prot", Repot utilities needed major repairs, and the A carefully crafted reconstruction No. 13203, July,1994. ED reports loss of electric power greatly compli- strategy slowly evolved. Donor agen- are available to Bank Executive cated actions aimed at disaster relief. A cies coordinated their assistance within Dirsctors and stafffom the Internal Massive operations were needed to the comprehensive plan which the Doaullyts Unit andfrom Regional provide emergency shelter and to build Bank helped the government to put Inroition Seices Centers. replacement housing. together. The project helped to defuse the situa- mentation unit, CRC; effective local Popayan, experienced Bank staff con- tion by providing funding for the acqui- leadership; and the connections of vinced the government not to "piggy- sition of land and a strong sites and CRC directors to the highest decision- back" broader social and organizational services component. Seventeen new making levels (this removed bottlenecks goals on to the recovery program, neighborhoods were created, in which and speeded decision making). which can delay the recovery effort. marginalized people received legal title to plots of land. Among the more far- Issues, lessons Mission timing in this project sighted policies supported was the inte- seems to have been critical: the first gration of the new settlements into the Time-slice approach Bank mission arrived in time to provide city; broad avenues connect them to the valuable training and guidance to the center, while the individual lots are This was the first project in which government; the second arrived in large enough for the settlements not to the Bank financed a time-slice of a disas- time to help shape a comprehensive become slums. Nearly a decade later, ter recovery program. The time-slce program. results are excellent. The housing is approach gives useful flexibility. In quite attractive and built to earthquake- Popayan, the Bank's identification mrs- Housing the poor resistant standards. Families have in- sion helped to elaborate an overall re- vested in street-side beautification, construction strategy, rather than identi- The best approach to the problems especially where streets have been fying precise project components. CRC of the urban poor, not only in a post- paved. A sewerage system and treat- was able to refine its activities as better disaster setting, may be to concentrate ment facilities have halted the pollution information became available. Largely on what worked in this project: of two rivers which flow through town. as a result of this flexibility, the recon- struction effort experienced few major e Ensure optimal urban planning. Better disaster-resistance problems during implementation. e Finance the delivery of electric power, water, and sewerage. By ensuring that all newly con- Note, however, that a disaster re- If necessary, provide land with legal- strudted and repaired buildings fol- sponse that unfolds as slowly as that in ized title for housing at the outset. lowed earthquake-resistant design cite- Popayan can have significant costs: e Let families rebuild housing accord- ria, the project significantly reduced the simple problems become more complex ing to their tastes and incomes, while likely damage from future quakes. and costly to resolve (as when land providing guidance in disaster-resistant invasions become semi-permanent), not building techniques. Institutional development to mention the health and environmen- tal implications of allowing tent camps Cost recovery CRC became a strong unit with effec- to linger in parks and vacant lots. tive leadership. Since the project, it has This project raises the important developed into a specialized regional Developing public understanding issue of whether post-disaster subsidies reconstruction authority. Its new man- are unavoidable. Though emergency date is one of environmental protection The importance of funding and loans tend to be extremely successful in and promoting the sustainable use of organizing public education about terms of institutional development and natural resources. disaster mitigation at the earliest pos- the construction of physical works, sible date cannot be overemphasized, costs are difficult to recover from ben- CRC's successful coordination of Within 60 days of the Popayan earth- eficiaries. Strict enforcement is not an the reconstruction of Popayan moved quake, a new building code had been option-no government can risk wors- the Colombian government to create a imposed and a public education pro- ening the situation of disaster victims. National Disaster Response and Preven- gram had begun. The building code has tion System, supported by adequate fi- been enforceable because it is widely Subsidies to disaster victims may be nancial planning, both to facilitate emer- understood. Publications and courses justified by the externalities associated gency recovery and to invest in disaster were developed, aimed at constituen- with the timely, effective restoration of prevention measures nationwide. cies ranging from the man-in-the-street normal economic and social conditions. to the masons and engineers. The Bank generally discourages subsi- Factors in successful implementation dies, but to the extent that its disaster- Bank staffing, mission timing recovery prects are targeted to the The Bank provided critically impor- poor, it should be more realistic during tant technical help. Other factors were: Identification missions following the design phase about the difficulty of sound design; creation of a strong imple- crises require experienced staff. In recovering costs. anDPricisis prog ed ust e useatos oantiong phuedation about CRC'spen success oriaion ofWithin 0ay oftid teWrdBn.The Popaya h erearth- fteOeain vlainsafadsolo Natial d Disaste Resonse Band revsfiaen- gaihatbegn. Theae budings codment hadeqiist h aaigeio,Rce tio nge, supp7, ored Bynk adequatoe i-1be7 efrealecue9ti.wdl to th mas n n 1egiees