Benin - Second Borgou Rural Development Project

Doc==n of The World Bank FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 13444 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN SECOND BORGOU RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1877-BEN) AUGUST 15, 1994 Agriculture Operations Division Occidental and Central Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their ofricial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENT Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATESI! 1986 US$1.00 = CFAF 346 1987 US$1.00 = CFAF 301 1988 US$1.00 = CFAF 298 1989 US$1.00 _ CFAF 319 1990 US$1.00 = CFAF 270 1991 US$1.00 = CFAF 282 1992 US$1.00 = CFAF 265 GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR January 1- December 31 PROJECT YEAR September 1- October 31 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BCEAO Central Bank of the West African States BOAD West African Development Bank CAA Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (Debt Service Agcncy) CARDER Centre d'Action Regionale pour Ie D6veloppemcnt Rural (Regional Rural Developmcnt Agency) CFD Caisse Fran,caise de D6veloppement (Fornerly Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique CFDT Compagnie Fran5aise pour Ic D&veloppement des Textiles CLCAM Caisse Locale de Crddit Agricole Mutuel (Local Savings and Loan Cooperative) CNCA Agricultural Credit National Bank COBEMAG Cooperative Beninoise de Materiel Agricole (Cooperative for Agricultural Equipment) CRCAM Caisse Regionale de Crddit Agricole Mutucl (Regional Savings and Loan Cooperative) DEP Direction des Etudes et de la Planification (Studies and Planning Directorate) FSS Fonds de Stabilisation et de Soutien (Support and Stabilisation Fund) GV Groupement Villageois (Village Groups) [FAD International Fund for Agricultural Development MDR Ministry of Rural development (forncrly Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperative Action) ONC Cereal Marketing Board OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries RCF Recherche Cuton Fibre (Lint Cotton Research) SONAPRA Societc Nationale pour la Production Agricole (National Agency for Agricultual Production) SRDR Scrvicc des Routes et des Dessertes Ruralcs (Service for Roads and Feeder Roads) URP Units de Recherche et de Production (Production and Research Unit) 1/ The parity of the CFAF with the French Franc was fixed at 50/1 throughout the project. It has been realigned to 100/1 on January :2, 1994.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation August 15, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Benin Second Bormou Rural Development Project (Credit 1877-BEN) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Benin - Second Borgou Rural Development Project (Credit 1877-BEN) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. A copy of the report was sent to the cofinanciers (CFD, BOAD and IFAD), but no comments were received. This project was prepared and appraised at a time of historically low international cotton prices. Its objectives were to continue the improvements in agricultural productivity made under the first Borgou Project and to reorganize and financially rebabilitate the cotton sub-sector to ensure its long-run viability. The project included rural development components (extension services, credit, and infrastructural support); and institutional support to the cotton subsector (strengthening management and accounting systems of the major organizations, establishment of a Stabilization Fund, and changes in financial and marketing procedures). The objectives have been met. Production and yields have met or exceeded appraisal targets for all the major crops, cotton ginning yields have increased and cotton quality has improved. The latter improvements, together with institutional restructuring and cost containment measures, have contributed to the achievement of financial viability by the cotton sector. Sustainability is considered likely, and institutional development has been substantial. The ERR has been re-estimated at 29% compared to 25 % at appraisal and the outcome of the project is judged to have been highly satisfactory. The completion report provides an adequate account of project implementation. An audit is planned. Attachment |This document has a rstricted distribution and may be useod by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN SECOND BORGOU RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1877-BEN) Table of Contents Preface Evaluation Summary ii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity 1 B. Background 1 C. Project Objectives and Description 2 D. Project Design and Organization 3 E. Project Implementation 4 F. Project Results 5 G. Project Sustainability 9 H. Bank's Performance 9 I. Borrower's Performance 10 J. Project Relationships 10 K. Consulting Services 10 L. Project Documentation and Data 10 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 11 PART In: STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Credits 15 2. Project Timetable 16 3. Credit Disbursement 17 4. Project Implementation 18 5. Project Costs and Financing 21 6. Project Results 22 A. Direct Benefits 22 B. Economic Impact 23 C. Studies 24 7. Status of Covenants 25 8. Use of Bank Resources 26 A. Staff Inputs 26 B. Missions 27 ANNEXES I. Economic Analysis This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BEMNN SECOND BORGOU RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1877-BEN) Preface This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Second Borgou Rural Development Project, for which Credit 1877-BEN in the amount of SDR 15.9 million was approved on February 16, 1988. The Credit was closed on September 30, 1993, nine months behind schedule. The credit was fully disbursed and the last disbursement took place in February 1, 1994. Part I and m were prepared by a consultant and revised by staff of the Agricultural Operations Division of the Occidental and Central Africa Department of the Africa Regional Office. Part II has been prepared by the Borrower. Preparation of the PCR was done within six months after the Credit was closed. It is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Development Credit Agreement; The CFD Loan Agreement; supervision reports; correspondence between the Bank, the Borrower and the implementation agencies; internal Bank memoranda; reports prepared by the implementation agencies; discussions with representatives of the Bank, the Borrower and the co-financing agencies; and various reports by consultants.   -U- - 11. - PROJECT COMPLk-7ION REPOR REPUBLIC OF BENIN SECOND BORGOU RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1877-BEN) Evaluation Summary project Objectives 1. The principal objective of the project was to consolidate the gains made under the first Borgou Project with specific emphasis on productivity improvements at the farm level for both cotton and food crops; preparation of medium-term restructuring and development program for the rural sector; and reorganization and financial rehabilitation of the cotton sub-sector to improve its economic and financial viability. ImIement Exprience 2. The IDA credit became effective on schedule but the original closing date was extended by nine months to allow one IDA-financed component to be completed. Most key components were successfilly implemented by the four main executing agencies: the Borgou CARDER for rural development, the FSS and SONAPRA for the rehabilitation of the cotton sub-sector and the Ministry of Rural Development for conducting a review of the agricultural sector policies. 3. Implementation experience for the rehabilitation of the cotton sub-sector has been the most successful, with SONAPRA and FSS becoming among the best performing institutions in West Africa for the organization of cotton production, processing and marketing. Through internal restructuring and cost containment measures SONAPRA managed to recover and maintain profitability since 1989/90 until today in spite of depressed world market cotton prices and a depreciating dollar. Farmers responded promptly to the rehabilitation of the 'fllibre with increased production and productivity. The CARDER was also very effective in putting in place a performing extension system to assist producers respond to a better environment. 4. The Borrower participated actively in project preparation and carried out the preliminary studies that were required. It worked hard to meet effectiveness conditions and provided competent staff for the project. However, near the end of the project, unjustified staff changes in SONAPRA have raised controversies. Failure of the Government to meet its financial obligations and provide counterpart funds was a problem throughout project implementation. However, implementation agencies used their own funds to avoid problems. This may, on the other hand, have induced the CARDER to favor cotton income generating activities to the detriment of the organization of food crops.  5. The delay of some of the rural development components, for the most part not financed by IDA, resulted in part from credit suspensions from one of the donors arising from Govemment non-compliance with debt servicing of loans, and the lack of familiarity with the procedures of some co-lending agencies. The performance of the Bank was satisfactory especially on the cotton restructuring component. One wealness was the failure to focus early on rural development activities though this was remedied mid-way through implementation. Finally, the Bank did not staff its missions with specialists in research as often as perhaps was warranted. This led to a benign neglect of this component early in the implementation. Results 6. The project has been successful in achieving its main objectives. Production and yields for all crops have met or exceeded appraisal targets except for nieb6 and millet. Cotton ginning yields have increased from 38% to 42.5% and cotton quality has improved. 7. Inputs were distributed on time and credit recovery has been about 99%. Women's activities have been promoted through a successful credit scheme. Village groups (pre- cooperatives) have been created and are taking increasing responsibilities in primary cotton marketing. Environmental protection measures are taking root. Institutions have been strengthened as evidenced by the replacement of expatriate technical assistance in the CARDER Borgou. FSS has worked well with SONAPRA to improve the performance of the cotton sub- sector. Industrial technical assistance to SONAPRA has been efficient. 8. Overall, the impact of the project both at the farm and national levels has been positive. Revenues from exports of cotton have increased by 160% since the project started despite the trend toward lower world market price, the cash flow of the cotton sub-sector is again positive after years of heavy losses and tax payments have been considerable. Cotton has been the driving force behind the agricultural growth of these past years. Farmers' incomes have also increased with cotton price paid to producers being the highest in the sub-region. The project's ERR is estimated at 29.2%. SustainabiUly 9. Project sustainability appears good though it can be affected by: (i) uncertainty over the future functions of the CARDERs under the on-going Agricultural Services Restructring Project. This raises the problems of recurrent costs financing and coordination between the central services of MDR and the regional services of the restructured CARDERs; and (ii) the independence and autonomy that FSS and SONAPRA will continue to enjoy in the absence of a well defined project and the constant presence of lenders which has served as deterrent to undue political interference. Findings and Lessons Lemed 10. The project has been successful despite its complexity in terns of the number of components and lending and executing agencies involved. The components or sub-components  - iv - that have performed poorly although not affecting the overall positive project impact are i) the rural roads construction and bottomland development program financed by BOAD which has not really started yet and which was affected by lengthy procedure, cumbersome and poorly understood conditionalities and little supervision coordination; ii) the establishment of a common central accounting system in MDR for the CARDERs was not accomplished mainly because of the unsatisfactory performance of the technical assistance and the setting-up of a separate system by the CARDER Borgou itself. 11. It appears that even complex projects can be successfully implemented, despite some coordination problem, provided that i) a clear framework is put in place to respond to well identified and documented constraints affecting a complex sector; ii) the project is properly designed with a clear consensus on the need for action; iii) there is strong Government commitment; (iv) roles and responsibilities for the implementing agencies involved are clearly defined; (v) a proper institutional and policy framework, including sound but manageable conditionalities and an adequate incentive structure for the farmers is put in place; (iv) strong supervision and coordination among the lenders is ensured; and (v) there is an appropriate selection of both national staff and technical assistance. Satisfactory performance of extension services appears to have played an essential role in the achievement of project objectives. Nevertheless, as the project progressed, farmers moving along the intensification process developed a certain fatigue due to obsolete or unadapted technical messages. Adaptive research often proved inadequate to maintain the relevancy of the message in line with farmers needs. 12. The final lesson is taken from the Borgou I PCR because it applies equally to the present situation:" the key finding of this project is that establishment of the appropriate framework can elicit the desired production response from farmers . Components which met a felt need of farmers were successful, while those which did not, such as the bottomlands development, failed." Bottomlands development appears to have failed again, mainly with respect to unrealistic targets, while implementation of such technique requires an approach which has to adapt itself to the organization and implementation capacity of the local community.   PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN SECOND BORGOU RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1877-BEN) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECIIVE A. PROJECT IDENTYIT Project Name Second Borgou Rural Development Project Credit Number 1877-BEN RVP Unit : Africa Regional Office Country Republic of Benin Sector : Agriculture B. BACKGRQUON 1. Benin has a population of 4.9 million (1991) growing at an estimated annual rate of 3.2%. Its land area is about 113,000 km2. With an estimated annual per capita income of $410 in 1992, Benin is one of the poorest countries in the world. Urban population growth is particularly high (about 8 % per annum for Cotonou) and demographic pressure on agricultural land is acute in the southern part of the country. 2. In the 1970s, a heavy emphasis was put on the development of industry and physical infrastructure which absorbed close to 80% of budgetary allocations. Most foreign-owned businesses were nationalized and many state enterprises created to underpin the official policy of national control and self-reliance. The first medium term development plan (1977-1980) was used to further expand the state-owned economy. The economy performed fairly welU during the late 1970s (average growth of 5% per annum), but mainly thanks to the spill-over effects of the oil-based prosperity of Nigeria. However, by the early 1980s, falLing world demand for oil and Nigeria's ensuing economic difficulties forced the Benin Government to reassess its economic policies. The Government decided to emphasize self-sufficiency in food production and export promotion to generate foreign exchange. The decade of the 1980s was a period of prolonged economic difficulty. The economy was unable to ensure the maintenance of the standard of living of ordinary citizens. By the end of the decade, a vigorous adjustment program has been introduced with the aim of reducing the size of the public sector and libealizing the economy. But, the economic strains of the 1980s led to growing political discontent and culminated in the transition to a multiparty democracy, which was achieved in April 1991. 3. The provincial rural development agencies (CARDERs) created in 1976, were made responsible for the organization and promotion of primary agricultural production through the provision of extension services, agricultural inputs, cooperative and primary marketing services,  - 2 - agricultural inputs, rural roads maintenance, water and other infrastructure development. The Bank and other donors supported this regional approach to development. Following an unsuccessful experience with a rural development project in the Zou and Borgou provinces of Benin (Cr. 307-BEN, 1972), which was cancelled as a result of institutional difficulties, an improved policy environment in the late 1970s permitted IDA and the Government of Benin to proceed with the preparation of two rural development projects in the Zou and Borgou Provinces (Cr. 1314-BEN and Cr. 1127-1-BEN). The present project was the continuation of the successful First Borgou Project. It was consistent with the accepted agricultural development policies and was designed in the context of the preoccupations of the time, which were predominantly macroeconomic in nature: addressing balance of payments deficits through rehabilitation of the cotton industry. C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPION 4. Project Objectives. The project's main objectives were to a) consolidate the gains made under the First Borgou Project with specific emphasis on strengthening farmers' groups and improving provision of extension services and input supply; b) improve productivity at the farm level for cash crops (mainly cotton) and food crops; c) prepare a medium-term restructuring and development program for the rural sector to review the CARDERs' role and efficiency in the provision of agricultural services; and d) reorganize the financial rehabilitation of the cotton sub- sector to improve its economic and financial viability. 5. Project Description. To achieve these objectives, the project had the following components: (a) Rural Development: (i) improved extension services for some 50,000 farn families and intensified training for extension staff in the Borgou Province; (ii) agricultural credit for the purchase of inputs in the province; (iii) further promotion of animal traction; (iv) applied foodcrops and cotton research; (v) environmental protection through forestry programs and prevention of forest fires; (vii) a pilot program for the rehabilitation of 100 ha of bottomlands and construction of 15 village wells for human consumption and 50 small wells for vegetable production; and (viii) rehabilitation and maintenance of about 300 km of feeder roads in the province. (b) Institution Building: (i) further improvements in the management of the CARDER Borgou, also extended to Zou and Atacora CARDERs; (ii) strengthening of SONAPRA's financial management and cost control capability; (iii) establishment of a cotton Stabilization Fund; (iv) establishment of a central audit, accounting and financial training unit for the cotton sub-sector as a whole; and (v) studies and consultant services to help prepare a medium-term restructuring and development program for the rural sector; and (c) Cotton Sub-Sector Rehabilitation: (i) redefinition of the respective roles of SONAPRA and the CARDERs around the newly established Stabilization Fund; (ii) changes in the financial and marketing policies and procedures of the cotton sub-sector; and (iii)  - 3 - financial restructuring of SONAPRA and the CARDERs to enable them to repay their debts to each other and the outside economy. D. PROJECT DESIGN AND ORGANIZATION 6. Design. The project design was developed and evolved through appropriate collaboration and coordination between the Bank, the Government and the other financing agencies. The preparation mission and report were preceded by nine studies on various aspects of the agricultural, rural development and cotton activities with a likely impact on the proposed project. These studies were done through close collaboration between FAO/CP, consultants, the Bank, other donors and MDRAC's directorate of studies and planning. A FED-livestock project in Borgou was adequately integrated into project activities. 7. Finally, the concept and design of the project tried to incorporate the lessons learned in the implementation of the First Borgou Project and a previous project (Zou-Borgou Cotton Project, Cr. 307-BEN) in the cotton sub-sector. The project concept finally adopted was innovative in many respects: it put a much needed emphasis on the role of women in development, an aspect that was overlooked in the First Borgou Project (Borgou I PCR, para. 20 & 29); the project was conceived as a hybrid-type project that included a sectoral adjustment component with quick disbursing tranches and conditionalities on policy, institutional and marketing issues; and it proposed the replacement of the 'forfait system' ('barbme') by an actual cost system for the determination of the price of cotton to farmers to remove inefficiencies. 8. Organization. Organization of project management involved ten Government agencies. The CARDER Borgou was the lead agency for project implementation and had overall responsibility for the coordination of the implementation of rural development activities, including applied research to be executed by URP at Ina and RCF; feeder road construction and maintenance to be done through SRDR and credit for animal traction to be channeled through the CRCAM. The reorganization of the cotton sub-sector was to be implemented through FSS and SONAPRA, under the overall supervision of the Management Committee of FSS. The sector review study was to be coordinated by the Planning Unit of MDRAC (DEP). Accounting training and intemal audit units were to be supervised by MDRAC and involved two additional CARDERs. 9. However, despite all this thorough and careful planning and preparation effort, the project had the following shortcomings: (i) too many components (16) and too many agencies involved in project implementation (10) and financing (IDA, CFD, IFAD, BOAD), which led to some coordination problems and delays in the implementation of some components (para. 11); (ii) a short implementation period of three years, to make it dovetail with the start of the Agricultural Services Restructuring Project, scheduled for 1991. This failed to take into account possible delays and the gestation period of some project components such as the bottomlands development program, research and some rural development activities which cannot be conceived within such a short time-frame; (iii) the balance between the existing cotton ginning capacity and cotton production levels was not properly accounted for. Measures undertaken to deal with this  - 4 - problem, although alleviating some of the short term constraints (expanding storage capacity and procuring equipment to rehabilitate two factories), have proved insufficient to cope with cotton expansion in the medium term. However, it must be recognized that it may have been difficult to predict such a booming response of cotton production to the rehabilitation effort of the sub- sector. Excess production over capacity is now estimated at about 30,000 tons and expansion of ginning capacity is presently underway; (iv) the problem of Government counterpart funds was not properly handled despite the bad experience of Borgou I. No effort seems to have been made to ascertain that the Government could pay its share of project financing as planned; (v) finally, the financing of some clearly identified needs (working capital for the Boko training center, para. 22) was not provided in the project. E. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 10. Credit Effectiveness and Pioject Start-up. The project was appraised in May 1986. The credit was approved in February 1988, signed in April and became effective in December 1988. All these actions were basically on schedule when compared to the final project brief. The credit was closed on September 30, 1993, nine months behind schedule. 11. Implementaion. The good performance of the project in relation to the achievement of its main objectives (see section F), means that project implementation was, on balance, a success. However, there were some difficulties and shortcomings. In particular, implementation was delayed for the components financed by BOAD and IFAD. In the case of BOAD which financed feeder roads, bottomlands development, wells and environmental protection, delays were initially due to the suspension of BOAD disbursements because of Government arrears and failure to submit required CVs for the bottomland development specialist. Subsequently, the road component was delayed because of coordination problems with SRDR. After its late start, the bottomlands development component has been hampered by a lack of farmers' interest due to the high investment cost required in terms of labor, insufficient coordination with the credit component and the competitive advantages of cotton and sorghum over rice, the main bottomlands crop. Implementation of the feeder road component is still at its inception and that of the bottomlands development was delayed by about two years. Extensions of credit's closing dates have been granted in both cases. The implementation of the research component under IFAD financing was delayed by more than two years because of the lack of familiarity of project management with WFAD procedures. 12. The construction of extension centers (IDA financed) has been delayed because of the CARDER restructuring program and by non-compliance of the first selected contractor to the established schedule. It is the only IDA financed component which was not achieved in time. However, extension of the credit's closing date permitted completion of the works. 13. The institutional development component has been well implemented with the exception of the central financial services. The technical assistance provided for the internal audit and accounting unit proved unsatisfactory (para. 28). The cotton sub-sector rehabilitation program was well implemented and on time. , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - -  14. Project implementation was facilitated by close supervision and the flexibility shown by the lenders. However, the failure of the Government to provide counterpart funds was potentially project-threatening. The capacity of the CARDER-Borgou and SONAPRA to generate and use their own resources to make up for the Government shortcomings permitted to compensate for Government's default. 15. One activity not planned or foreseen by the project was undertaken and financed by the CARDER Borgou and has been successful: the settlement of young unemployed school graduates. One practical training center was opened by the CARDER in 1990 to train for a fee about 12 technical school graduates each year in agriculture and livestock practices. After a 13- month period, the youngsters are given a loan to start their own farm. This has helped alleviate the unemployment problem. 16. Procurement. Procurement was handled by three main entities: the CARDER-Borgou, SONAPRA and the central planning unit of MDRAC. Input supplies for producers were available throughout the project. Bidding and award of contracts were usually made in a timely manner. Problems encountered concerned for the most part the lack of familiarity of the executing agencies with the procedures of some of the co-financing agencies (BOAD, IFAD). 17. Priect Costs. Total project costs were estimated at CFAF 19.9 billion (US$67.3 million) including implicit taxes and duties. IDA contributed to about US$21 million, CCCE to US$21 million, IFAD to 10.5 million, BOAD to US$7 million, the Government to US$6.6 million and beneficiaries contribution estimated at US$1.2 million. 18. Disbursements and Credit Allocation. Disbursements are provided in Part m Section 3. On February 1, 1994, following the extension of the credit closing date, all credit funds had been disbursed in the total amount of US$21,9 million. This represent an increase of about 4% mainly coming from fluctuations in the exchange rate of the US$/SDR. No particular or unusual problems were encountered in this area. Total disbursements at completion of the IDA Credit are estimated at CFAF 14.4 billion (US$ 48.7 million). The difference is due mainly to unfinished components under on-going credits and grants (Part M-5). 19. PrQject Risks. The main risks identified at appraisal were the cotton growers' likely reaction to a possible reduction in producer prices and the risk of soil deterioration due to reduced fallow or extension into areas with inadequate soils. Initial cotton price reduction has not discouraged farmers, due in part to the lack of attractive substitution crops. There has been no noticeable soil erosion as a result of project activities. One risk that was not properly addressed is that of excess seed cotton production over existing ginning capacity. CFD has agreed to finance a new ginning factory but it will not become operational before 1985/86. P. PZoject Results 20. P=ject Objectives. The results of four years of project implementation indicate that the project has achieved or surpassed most of its objectives: foodcrop and cotton production exceeded appraisal estimates; institutions were strengthened; and the cotton sub-sector has been  - 6 - restructured and rehabilitated and remains the most healthy in the sub-region. Project indicators and results are presented in Part [-4. One problem that has emerged is the difficulty that farmers faced trying to sell their maize production. This has dampened their enthusiasm for maize and increased the likelihood that they will concentrate again on cotton in a way that does not insure a proper balance between cotton and food crop production. Project design included the setting up of an economic observatory to follow up on food crop prices province-wide and communicate this to farmers as well as attempts to improve their cereal storage. These did not however help to improve food crops marketing. 21. Rural Development. Cotton production increased from about 72,000 tons in the without project scenario to 112,000 tons in the 1991/92 campaign, the last year of the cotton rehabilitation program. This compare with the appraisal estimates of 97,000 tons for 1991/92. The rehabilitation of the cotton sub-sector (see below) proved beneficial not only for the Borgou province but nation-wide as evidenced by the increase of the national production from 109,700 tons in 1988/89 to 177,600 tons in 1991/92, 162,000 tons in 1992/93 and an estimated 270,000 tons in 1993/94. This resulted from both yield and area increase. Cotton yield met appraisal targets by increasing from 1.20 tons/ha (without project) to 1.37 tons/ha in PY4 (appraisal estimate 1.33 tons/ha). Total maize production for the period is reported at 292,000 tons compared to a SAR estimate of 200,000 tons. The increase is mainly the result of an expansion in planted areas. Production of sorghum is also substantially above target (226,000 tons compared to 148,000 tons), due also to an increase in areas planted; and that of groundnut only moderately above target (52,000 compared to 47,000 tons). Production of niebe and millet over the period is below appraisal targets (respectively 36,000 tons compared to 41,000 tons and 36,000 tons to 62,000 tons). 22. Training of producers has met targets through the establishment of an extension system organized on the 'training and visits' system and was associated with contact groups ("unites de suivi") of farmers. Although the cotton technology was well assimilated, it became apparent during the course of the project that there was a certain amount of 'fatigue' associated with the repetitive nature of the technical messages or inadequacy of messages for the food crops. The lack of information and of new technical messages on food crops stemmed from weaknesses in the research program. Overall, the extension system performed well as a management tool with continuous training and regular upgrading. Results are particularly visible on cotton and food crops grown by farmers with the lowest yields. The components of.the project associated more directly with cotton production were, in general, accorded more attention and were successfully implemented. Lack of well defined market outlets for food crops has been a major constaint for the development of these crops on a commercial basis and improve relevancy of extension messages. Training of extension agents has been behind schedule due to the delay with the construction of the training and extension centers. Performance of the animal tradon component has also been below targets in part because of problems and delays with the credit scheme for the purchase of implements. However, training for animal traction at the Boko training center was successful and exceeded appraisal targets in terms of farmers' participation, refresher courses and training of blacksmiths. Availability of working capital, identified as a serious problem but not financed under the project, remains a serious constraint. Transfer of CARDER's  - 7 - activities related to cotton primary marketing were also initiated towards 65 village groups as planned. 23. Inputs were distributed on time and credit recovery was about 99 %. Quantities distributed were above appraisal estimates for the first two years but decreased later due to Government efforts to curb cotton production. The number of beneficiaries under the village development loan scheme was about equal to appraisal targets (6,904 compared to 6,960 targeted). Total loans approved and disbursed under the village fund program amounted to CFAF 484 million over four years, with an additional CFAF 206 million already approved in the fifth year. About 167 women's associations were created compared with a target of 156. 24. Environmental protection activities were reinforced with the creation of 14 village tree nurseries (appraisal target: 22) and the replanting of 2,000 ha with trees. Concurrently, a vigorous environment campaign was started. The bottomlands development program reached only 28% of its target (para. 11). More village wells were built than planned because of the higher than anticipated demand from farmers. The road construction and maintenance program experienced an important delay and has not started yet due to coordination problems between the road construction agency and the financing agency. 25. Applied research for both cotton and foodcrops has on the whole been successful due for the most part to the active support of the CARDER Borgou and SONAPRA which provided financing when the Government failed to do so. This has also been true of seed production. 26. Institution Building. The CARDER Borgou, FSS and SONAPRA have been successfully strengthen and proved effective in project implementation. This included the selection of qualified national and technical assistance staff, with expatriate staff progressively replaced by trained national staff, careful planning, preparation and management of a good training program and strong commitment of senior management. Sixty five village groups also started to replace the CARDER Borgou in seed distribution and in the primary marketing of seedcotton and inputs as a first step towards the privatization of these activities. During the course of the project it was also recommended to progressively disengage the State from SONAPRA. The Government agreed to open-up the capital of SONAPRA, initially, to cotton producers only, and is presently studying the related modalities. Privatization of the input supply, although not addressed during project preparation and appraisal, was also started by the Government through a private agent who initially supplied 20% of fertilizer needs in 1992/93. However, fearing the creation of a rent seeking situation, the lenders have reluctantly followed the Govemment and recommended to open-up competition among the private sector for more efficiency and eventually better prices to farmers. The share of the fertilizer market to be privatized is programmed to gradually increase to 40, then 60 and 80% in subsequent years. 27. The establishment and functioning of the FSS and its management committee have worked well because (i) their roles and responsibilities were well defined during project preparation, appraisal and negotiations, and adopted by the Government together with a set of mechanisms to determine producers' prices, stabilization and support rules; (ii) the Government recognized the need for a well structured assistance to the ailing cotton sub-sector, its chief  - 8 - foreign exchange earner and, in many respects, the engine of development of the rural sector; (iii) the lenders worked well together and put in place adequate conditionalities which they supervised well; and (iv) national staff selection for key posts was appropriate. However, the strengthening of SONAPRA's financial management had a difficult start because of the low quality of the initial technical assistance provided, this is now on the right course and has been given a new impetus. 28. At the central financial services level in MDRAC, the objective of putting in place a common accounting and internal audit system for the CARDERs has not been met and this was compensated by the CARDER Borgou itself. These efforts failed because of the unsatisfactory performance of the technical assistance in MDRAC and the highly decentralized and autonomous systems of both the CARDERs and SONAPRA which made it difficult for the MDRAC to establish another relevant and acceptable system. 29. Cotton Sub-Sector Rehabilitation Program. This program has reached or exceeded most of its objectives. The ginning factories were transferred as planned from the CARDERs to SONAPRA; SONAPRA's structure was modified to include an industrial department and a bureau of transport; and the FSS did effectively supervise SONAPRA. Concurrently, the recommended policy measures have been adopted: changes of the lint and ginning grading procedures, replacement of the forfeit ("bareme") system with an 'actual cost" system; limitation of advances to field agents for seed cotton purchases; adoption of a flexible cotton pricing system linked to the world market; and removal of subsidy on fertilizers and insecticides. 30. The consequent results have been as follows: ginning yield have increased from 38.4% in 1987/88 to 42.8% in 1991/92 and an estimated 42.5% in 1993; guaranteed seed cotton prices have been reduced from CFAF 105/kg in 1989 to the current CFAF 95/kg with supplementary payments made to the farmers when world market permits it; the factory gate cost of seed cotton decreased by 17% from CFAF 306/kg in 1988 to CFAF 253/kg in 1992 and the unit lint cost (FOB basis) by 22% from CFAF 461/kg in 1988 to CFAF 360/kg in 1992. Equally as important, the cash flow of the whole cotton sub-sector has improved from nothing in 1989 to yield a total of CFAF 6.2 billion from 1990 through 1992; despite the trend toward lower international cotton prices. Finally, the cotton sub-sector has repaid its external debts and settled its internal arrears. These positive results have been caused by the same reasons provided in para. 27 above. In addition, industrial technical assistance provided to SONAPRA for its ginning factories has been a major factor. 31. Project Impact. The project's impact has been positive. Increased cotton production generated a higher level of foreign exchange than would have otherwise been the case. The combined value of lint and seed exports grew from CFAF 11.3 billion before the project in 1987/88 to CFAF 30 billion in 1991/92, an increase of over 160%. The increase in the production of foodstuffs made it possible to export more to other parts of the country which are deficient and to neighboring countries. Payments to the Government in the form of direct taxes, income taxes and special gains amounted to CFAF 4.7 billion from 1989/90 to 1991/92. Over the same period, farmers received CFAF 3.5 billion as supplementary payments over and above  - 9 - the purchase price of cotton from the net margins of the sub-sector after taxes. In the same time the stabilization fund could be replenished at a level of about CFAF 3.4 billion. 32. The project's ERR was estimated at 25.5% in the base case. The analysis for this report gives a rate of 29.2% (Part Iml, 6B). The difference with the appraisal estimate comes mainly from (i) the improvement in cotton quality which has meant higher average export prices. The appraisal report included a substantial quality discount that is no longer justified; (ii) higher agricultural commodity prices in the new World Bank Commodity projections compared to appraisal numbers and, at the same time, lower projected fertilizer prices than those at appraisal; (iii) higher production volumes than appraisal estimates; and (iv) lower production and processing costs by SONAPRA as a result of the efficiencies obtained (para. 30). G. Project Sustainability 33. The sustainability of the project's benefits appears good although it can be affected by two factors: (i) uncertainty over the future role and functions of the CARDERs. Under the on-going Agricultural Services Restructuring Project, the CARDERs are expected to have no revenue earning activities and to depend on the central Government budget for their financial needs. Given the Government's failure to honor its budgetary commitments in the past, there is a serious risk that important CARDERs' field activities will suffer from a lack of recurrent costs financing and its staff lack motivation for further work. This could have a negative impact on rural development activities. The Alaflarou seed production center which has been transferred to the department of agriculture is already facing working capital problems. Coordination with central ministry services is proving elusive. (ii) FSS and SONAPRA have functioned relatively free of undue political interference because of the conditionalities, implicit or otherwise, of the project and the presence of the lenders which served as a deterrent. It is not clear that in the absence of a well focused project and constant supervision by the lenders, the FSS and SONAPRA will be left to function independently on purely efficiency criteria. 34. The transfer of responsibilities to local communities and cooperatives although very encouraging and under strong demand is still at an embryonic stage. Cooperatives are still weak and require much training and management assistance to play the roles assigned to them. H. Bank's Performance 35. The Bank's performance has been good by most yardsticks. Project preparation and design were done systematically and sought to learn from existing and/or past operations as much as possible (paras. 6 and 7). The appraisal was well conducted with a balanced multi- disciplinary team and the physical implementation targets established were on the whole realistic. There have been eleven supervision missions with an average of two a year except in the last  - 10- two years. The continuity in the staffing of these missions was good. The CFD participated in seven of these missions. Finally, the Bank showed great flexibility in dealing with a number of important issues as they arose. 36. A weakness in the performance of the Bank is the failure to properly focus on rural development activities in the first two years or so of project implementation. It devoted most of its attention during this period to the cotton sub-sector. The relative neglect of rural development may have been a factor in the delays of some rural development activities. The Bank also did not initially staff its missions with specialists in rural development and research. Again, this may have had a negative impact on project implementation. I. Borrower's Performance 37. The performance of the Borrower has been generally satisfactory. It participated actively in project preparation and carried out many of the preliminary studies that were required. Effectiveness conditions were met without delay and most of the staff required to be posted were nominated on time and had for the most part adequate experience and qualifications. Finally the required budgets, and annual work plans and operating reports were produced on time. 38. The Borrower consistently failed to make the necessary budget contributions. Near the end of project implementation, it made important staff changes in SONAPRA without consulting the lenders and in a way put at risk the capacity building efforts undertaken until then. J. Project Relationships 39. The relationship between the Borrower and the Bank has been good. The relationship between the Bank and the co-financiers and the Borrower and the co-financiers has also been good except for procedural matters with IFAD and BOAD. K. Consulting Services 40. The performance of consultants used by the project has generally been good except for the initial financial specialist in SONAPRA (para. 27) and the technical assistance team provided to the central financial services of MDRAC (para. 28). L. Project Documentation and Data 41. All project documents (legal agreements, staff appraisal report) were comprehensive and provided a useful framework for the Bank and the Borrower during project implementation. They also provided sufficient flexibility to project management to allow it to adapt to certain field conditions as they evolved. 42. All the data relevant to the preparation of the PCR were readily available, namely the balance sheets and other financial statements of the project for a number of years and certain performance indicators as well as project operating reports.  - 11 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN SECOND BORGOU RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1877-BEN) PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE The Borrower prepared an extensive report which is available on file. The following main conclusions and recommendations have been extracted from the report and translated. I. Positive aspects of the project The results obtained at the end of the project are largely satisfactory, considering the record production levels attained for all crops, and especially cotton. We noted: a) A high level of farmer participation in the achievement of the project goals. This is evidenced by the solid performance levels attained in food and cotton production. b) Substantial improvement in farmer revenue, especially as the result of the increase in cotton production by introducing high-yield varieties (STAMF), and the generalization of the use of inputs. c) Development of a new type of partnership with the farmers producing and multiplying seeds of maize, ground-nut and cotton. High yield plant material could be produces at a lower cost. d) Increased technical level of extension workers and producers through numerous courses provided at the CARDER training center of Ina and at subregional meetings, as well as through the study visits and tours that were organized. e) Support of the Village Development Fund program led to improved purchasing power for a number of rural women through the development of their economic activities. f) Increased responsibility assumed by producers, now better organized within the farm structures, i.e., the Village Groups (GV) and sub-prefectoral unions, for crop marketing, primarily cotton, and inputs management. g) Diversification of animal traction equipment: in addition to the plow, the use of the cultivator and the ridge plow is becoming widespread in the villages. h) Existence of a framework for fighting against bush fires through the establishment of committees and brigades, and test trials as awareness tools for the villagers.  - 12 - i) Improved management of the cotton sector has led to a substantial decline in its production costs, making this product more competitive on the international market. II. Problems encountered These problems involve the following: a) Disorganized food sector. b) The level of women's participation in the literacy program is still low. c) Excessive cost of technical assistance and lack of social skills on the part of certain assistants. d) Extension of herbicides products was largely curtailed by prohibitive prices. e) The high price of pesticides to be bought directly by farmers has led to use of insufficient quantities, with the risk of lower yields and lower quality of seed-cotton. f) In matters concerning research, whether on food crops or cotton, the training of researchers under the project has barely begun. The non-existence of technical support missions at these levels is another complaint. g) The difficulties in mobilizing BOAD loans prevented to achieve the planned completion rates for the financed components, primarily in respect of hydro-agricultural developments and the construction of offices for the former Planning Bureau in the Ministry of Rural Development. h) Agriculture is still itinerant. Despite the commendable intensification efforts resulting from the increasing use of mineral and organic fertilizers, itinerant slash and burn farming still characterizes the production system in the Department of Borgou. The clearing of thousands of hectares every year has led to climatic disturbances. i) In the context of environmental protection, the forest species used in extension programs do not always meet producers' requirements. In addition, the bush fire fighting committees and brigades are not fully functional and have made little contribution to the expected change in the villagers' behavior, in matters concerning bush fires. j) The Borgou Village Development Fund for Women program succeeded to a certain extent in developing agricultural activities. On the other hand, there was no notable progress in processing activities from the standpoint of introducing new adapted technology despite the Research involvement in the execution of this component. k) Extension services have not yet succeeded in getting farmers to adopt the use of the complete mix of animal traction equipment.  - 13 - The following recommendations should be made in light of the problems which were found so that project accomplishments and assets could be preserved and consolidated. III. Recommendations The following should be emphasized as recommendations: a) Literacy for rural women to strengthen their self-management capacity, and better adapted financial support required to develop their economic activities. b) The establishment and organization of sub-sectors for cereals (maize) and oleaginous plants (ground-nuts) would enable a substantial improvement of farmers' income, and above all would ensure that a market exists for these products. c) The GV and the Cooperative Unions should be adequately supported and trained to manage successfully the marketing and input supply activities that are being gradually transferred to them. d) Where environmental protection is concerned, it will be highly beneficial to strengthen the intervention capacity of the bush fire fighting brigades and local committees and to intensify reforestation activities in the villages. The possibility of extension activities involving species useful to producers (e.g. medicinal plants) should be considered. e) The continuous deterioration and absence of feeder roads make the collection and marketing of agricultural products particularly difficult, and pose an ongoing problem that the "roads and bridges operation" which the villagers organize annually with rudimentary tools alone cannot solve. It would thus be desirable for CARDER Borgou to be equipped with a light unit responsible for the roads not covered by Public Works. f) Because of the serious financial problems which occurred in the execution of the bottomlands development component, new impetus should be given to these activities in the best interest of a number of rice and vegetables growers in the department. g) Urgent measures should be taken to complete the construction of the former planning Bureau, which is now an integral part of the MDR construction under the Agricultural Services Restructuring Project. h) The problem of improving technologies for processing agricultural products remains unchanged. More research and studies on this aspect should be developed for helping rural women improve their working conditions and their incomes. i) Definition of an adapted policy for the sedentarization of agriculture.  - 14 - j) Although phase two of the Borgou Rural Development Project clearly yielded satisfactory results in many areas, farmers must received continued support in order to build upon these accomplishments.  - 15 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN SECOND BORGOU RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1877-BEN) PART III: STATISTICAL DATA 1. RELATED BANK CREDITS Title Pu se App Srova Year Cr. 307-BEN To stimulate 1972 Cancelled Zou-Borgou production of cotton Cotton Project Cr. 716-BEN To strengthen 1977 Completed Technical SONAGRI and Assistance CARDER and Project prepare projects Cr. 1127/1-BEN To Improve rural 1981 Completed Borgou Rural incomes and Development promoting agric. Project exports CR. 1314-BEN To raise rural 1982 Completed Zou Province Rural incomes and Development Project expand exports Cr. 2285-BEN Reorganization 1991 Under Agricultural agric. institut- Supervision Services ions for better Restructuring provisions of Project services Cr. 2344-BEN Institution building 1992 Under Natural Resources and pilot actions Supervision Management Project to promote sound environmental management Cr. 2529-BEN To rehabilitate 1993 Under Second Rural Savings rural savings and Supervision & Loans Rehabilitation loans institution Cr. 2601-BEN Poverty alleviation 1994 Not yet effective Community-Based through income generating Food Security Project activities and nutrition  - 16 - 2. PROJECT TIMETABLE Item Planned Revised Actual Dat Date Da= Identification 9/1984 9/1984 9/1984 Preparation 8-10/1985 8-10/1985 Pre-appraisal 3/1986 Appraisal Mission 1/1986 5/1986 5/1986 Credit Negotiations 3/1987 11/1987 Board Approval 6/1987 2/1988 Loan Signature 4/1988 Credit Effectiveness 12/1988 Project Completion 6/1992 3/1993 Credit Closing 12/1992 9/1993 9/1993  - 17 - 3. CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (US Dollars Million) Bank Fiscal Year Appraisal Actual Actual/ Estimate Aggraisal FY88 Sept 1987 Dec 1987 March 1988 June 1988 1.28 0 FY89 Sept 1988 1.51 0 Dec 1988 4.26 5.16 121 March 1989 5.74 6.55 114 June 1989 8.14 8.99 110 FY90 Sept 1989 9.86 10.17 103 Dec 1989 11.45 10.64 93 March 1990 12.77 12.29 96 June 1990 14.31 13.15 92 FY91 Sept 1990 15.10 13.91 92 Dec 1990 16.59 14.34 86 March 1991 16.99 15.93 94 June 1991 18.27 16.98 93 FY92 Sept 1991 18.67 17.48 94 Dec 1991 19.76 18.70 95 March 1992 20.02 19.28 96 June 1992 21.00 19.39 92 FY93 Sept 1992 19.73 94 Dec 1992 19.93 95 March 1993 20.41 97 June 1993 20.47 98 FY94 Sept 1993 20.47 98 Dec 1993 20.79 99 March 1994 21.00 100 June 1994  - 18 - 4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Indicators Appmisal Actual Estimate Year 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 A. Rural Development Trainine of azents: (man-days) periodic meetings 1080 1080 1080 1080 10903 7828 6706 3271 refresher courses 6140 6140 6140 6140 5150 5502 5043 3614 Training of producers: (man-days) Through groups - - - - 29700 34800 1675 Group formation 1472 1424 1392 1392 1432 1424 1093 1257 Model Plots Work 1472 1424 1392 1392 512 881 1139 1456 Training of Village Group secretaries 1726 1816 1115 952 1726 1816 1115 952 Inputs: Fertilizers (tons) 12761 13493 16843 23300 14925 14329 12067 16832 Insecticides (1000 liters) 957 1012 1129 1417 711 831 921 946 Spreaders(units) 450 530 1196 3735 889 1331 2130 3409 Seeds: (tons) Maize 100 100 100 112 116 179 275 123 Groundnut 30 30 30 200 28 14 306 - Cotton 30 30 30 43 30 30 40 54 Animal Traction Ploughs 2000 1500 1500 1780 1260 916 330 1067 Carts 400 40 400 42 192 238 30 233 Attelages 500 1000 1500 940 674 736 - 302 Draft oxen pairs(total) 3000 2270 Cooperative Development: Literacy Courses: A 3881 4175 5246 5450 2635 3580 6489 B 4720 4175 4943 5450 2236 1193 6198 Vilaize Develovment Fund: Animal Traction Equipment: Medium Term Loans (FCFA Mn) Loans to Women - - - - - - - 6 Loans to men - - - - 96 167 - 90 Seasonal Loans(Women) 19 7 19 - - 32 29 64 (CFAF Milion) Total Loans: Women 19 7 19 - - 32 29 70 Total Loans: Men - - - - 96 167 - 96 Total Loans 19 7 19 - 96 199 29 160 Loans Beneficiaries (Number) Medium Term Loans: Women - - - - - - 36 Men - - - - 712 1312 - 798 Sub-otal - 240 1080 - 712 1312 - 834 Seasonal (Women) 480 1800 4680 - 1116 928 2002 Total Beneficiaries 480 2040 5760 - 712 2428 928 2836 Women's Associations 24 48 84 - 30 55 80 2 Number of members 1440 2880 5040 6 1556 2067 2489 6 Farmers' Groups Created - - 13 52 - - 13 52 USPP Created - - 3 7 3 7  - 19 - 4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION (CONTINUED) Indicators Appraisal Actual Esttmate Year 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 A. Rural Devpt(Ct'd) Environmental Protection Fight against brushfire Trial sites(total) 7 Awareness Brigades(total) 2 Village committees to fight brushfire(total) 291 Replanting Program: Village Nurseries(total) 22 14 Trees Planted - - - - 36641 33575 32305 17567 Areas Planted(ha) - 420 492 492 599 Awareness Programs Brushfire Campaigns(total) - - - 3 (two week campaign) Bottomilands Development (ha): 100 28 Soil preparation (ha) 150 24 Village WeUs(total) 10 23 Farm wells(total) 50 Seed farm wells(total) 10 9 Rural Road Rehabilitation (km) 300 Road maintenance (km) 200 35 Constructions: SONAPRA Warehouses (total) 8 7 Village warehouses (total) 10 10 Rural Social Centers(total) 5 5 Extension Centers(total) 33 33 PACAPAR(total) 3 80% done Seed Farm(units:total) 2 60% done Research Farm(units:total) 6 60% done Extension Indicators: Farmers reached (% total) 69 73 75 75 - 63 66 57 Monthly contacts(%i total) 44 44 44 44 - 36 32 30 Average farmers' monthly participation(% total) 100 100 100 100 - 45 54 52 Adoption of themes: Ploughing (%) - - - - - 16 39 22 Density (%) - - - - - 20 34 24 Fertilizer application(%) - - - - - 40 46 40 Production (Borgou only) Cotton(1000 tons) 77.6 85.9 97.4 109.4 66.6 88.3 113.5 103.1 Maize (1000 tons) 43.7 49.2 53.5 53.5 65.4 60.7 75.5 90.6 Groundnut (1000 tons) 9.6 11.4 12.8 12.8 12.2 11.0 14.3 14.7 Niebe (1000 tons) 9.2 10.0 10.7 10.7 9.7 8.5 8.8 9.2 Millet(1000 tons) 15.0 15.5 16.0 16.0 7.6 6.0 10.4 11.8 Sorghum (1000 tons) 34.9 36.8 38.3 38.3 57.3 47.5 59.2 61.6 Yields(tons/ha): Cotton 1.22 1.27 1.29 1.33 1.16 1.27 1.32 1.37 Maize 0.80 0.85 0.90 1.00 1.04 0.93 1.05 1.17 Groundnut 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.70 0.89 0.92 Niebe 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.53 0.56 Mwet 0.70 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.64 0.53 0.70 0.73 Sorghum 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.66 0.66 0.77  - 20 - 4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION (CONTINUED) Indicators Appraisal Actual Estmrnate Year 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 A. Rural Devpt(ct'd) Applied Research 1. Cotton: Station trials: classical varieties 7 6 6 7 7 6 6 7 glandless varietiea 3 5 4 5 3 5 4 5 Outside trials: classical varieties 27 20 18 20 27 20 18 18 glandless varieties 20 27 19 24 20 27 19 22 Seed Multiplication(ha) IRMA 96+97: "000" & "00" Zones 2.4 2.4 2.0 - 2.4 2.4 1.2 - "0" Zones:CARDER 110 90 93 - 110 100 110 - STAMF: "000" & "00" Zones 5.3 5.3 7.7 8.0 5.3 5.3 7.7 8.0 "0" Zones: CARDER 30 30 130 30 30 30 130 32 RFC PARAKOU Multiplication farmers - 80 - 170 - 43 - 134 "1" Zones: CARDER 1310 2234 4659 4661 1310 2729 5492 4123 2. Foodcrops: Variety Improvement: Station trials 54 70 63 65 54 57 56 68 Outside trials 40 55 51 39 40 38 61 39 Production Systems Trials 68 68 296 220 0 45 96 130 Other Trials 16 16 30 37 0 16 34 36 B. Cotton Subsector Rehabilitation Pro2ram Indicators (PY=Project Year) PY I PY 2 PY 3 PY 4(est.) Years 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Seed Cotton (lOOOtons) 133 70 109 105 146 178 162 Ginning Yields: Lint (%) 39.0 38.9 40.5 40.7 40.6 42.8 42.5 Grain yield (%) 52.5 57,3 57.2 56.9 56.3 56.5 54.7 Seed Cotton price 110 100 105 95 95+5 95+5 95+5 Costs: (CFAF/kg) Factory gate 346 306 301 262 263 253 Ex-factory lint cost 402 354 347 309 311 296 Total lint cost 480 431 399 428 366 353 Cotton subsector Cash Flow (CFAF bns) -6.4 -1.1 - 2.0 2.5 1.7 Taxes on profits-BIC (CFAF Mn) 345 220 337 890 1104 635 Distribution of net profits after BIC (CFAF Mn) - FSS 504 562 366 - Farmers 378 421 275 - SONAPRA 189 211 137 - Nat.Budget 189 211 137  - 21 - 5. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING A. Total Proiect Costs (Actual-CFAF Million) YEAR0 YEAR1 YEAR2 YEAR3 YEAR4 TOTAL 1. CML WORKS 0 42 205 744 259 1250 2. EQUIPMENT 37 450 611 412 45 1555 3. OP. COSTS 0 1208 652 315 139 2314 4. CONSULITRNG 23 857 409 171 13 1473 5. INPUTS/SPARES 187 3977 218 77 0 4459 6. PPF:IDA 0 230 0 0 0 230 7. ENVIRONMENT 0 0 31 63 20 115 8. OTHER:CFD 3011 0 0 0 0 3011 TOTAL 3259 6763 2127 1782 476 14407 B. IDA Proiect Costs ('000 SDR) IDA Credit Estirnate Actual 1. CML WORKS 720 763 2. EQUIPMENT 1000 420 3. OP. COSTS 1990 3658 4. CONSUL/TRNG 3080 3565 5. INPUTS/SPARES 7270 6919 6. PPF:IDA 1140 575 7. NON ALLOCATED 700 TOTAL 15900 15900 C. Financin2 Plan (Actual - CFAF Million) IDA CFD IFAD BOAD GVT TOTAL LCIVIL WORKS 188 396 37 529 100 1250 2.EQUIPMENT 661 584 111 0 199 1555 3.OPERATING COSTS 1391 0 326 0 596 2314 4.CONSUL./TRNG 1337 132 4 0 0 1473 5.INPUTS/ SPARES 2769 475 1215 0 0 4459 6.PPF IDA 230 0 0 0 0 230 7.ENVIRONMENT 0 0 0 115 0 115 8.OTHER:CFD 0 3011 0 0 0 3011 TOTAL ACTUAL 6576 4598 1693 644 896 14407 SAR ESTIMATE 6189 6185 3103 2106 2289 19872 DIFFERENCE -387 2/ 1587 1410 1462 1393 5465 DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS: T.A. 853 INPUTS AND SPARES 734 684 BORGOU INPUTS 421 MEDIUM TERM CREDIT 305 RURAL ROADS 1105 OTHER 357 SHORTFALL OF GVT AND BENEFICLRIPES 1393