Uganda - Third Technical Assistance Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFCLAL USIE ONLY Report No. 13590 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1951-UG) OCTOBER 7, 1994 Public and Private Enterprise Division Eastern Africa Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  ABBREVIATIONS BOU Bank of Uganda CSRP Civil Service Reform Program CTB Central Tender Board EAU Economic Analysis Unit EFM(P) Economic and Financial Management (Project) ERC II Second Economic Recovery Credit ERP Economic Recovery Program FIS Financial Information Systems FSAC Financial Sector Adjustment Credit MFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (formed in April 1993, merging MPED and MOF) MOF Ministry of Finance MPED Ministry of Planning and Economic Development NRM National Resistance Movement PCC Project Co-ordination Committee PCR Project Completion Report SAC I First Structural Adjustment Credit TA II Second Technical Assistance Credit 1434-UG TA III Third Technical Assistance Credit 1951-UG UCS Uganda Computer Services UNDP United Nations Development Program USD Uganda Supplies Directorate  FOR OFFICIAL USE THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C 20433 U.S. A. Offrce of Director-General Operations Evaluation October 7, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXEClTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Uganda Third Technical Assistance Project (Credit 1951-UG) Attached is the Project Completion Report on Uganda - Third Technical Assistance Project (Credit 1951-UG) prepared by the Public and Private Enterprise Division, Eastern Africa Department, with Part II contributed by the Borrower. Credit 1951-UG in the amount of SDR 13.8 million (US$18 million equivalent) was approved on August 23, 1988 and closed on May 31, 1994. Its main objective was to provide institutional capacity to implement the government's Economic Recovery Program in the areas of policy formulation, budget reform, procurement, financial information, statistics and agricultural planning. This operation followed two previous TA operations and was followed by the Economic and Financial Management Project (EFMP) to be completed in 1999. UNDP has also provided technical assistance since 1979. IDA's execution of the UNDP project provided further opportunity for Bank missions to enhance in-country dialogue and facilitated the development of the EFMP and of the assistance program of other donors, including the U.K., Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, through cofinancing with the EFMP credit. This successful partnership among donors is expected to ensure maxinum benefits to the Government of Uganda. The PCR tells a story of success based upon close supervision, continuity, flexibility, and targeted interventions in areas closely related to the ongoing reform effort. The lessons of TA II were applied to TA m, and the lessons from TA m were applied to EFMP. Supervision and flexibility allowed managers to discontinue and restructure less successful sub-components and to enhance more successful sub-components. The advisory services provided to Uganda's Economic Recovery Program and the enhancement of government procurement were especially successful activities. The Financial Information System, the Project Monitoring and Evaluation Unit and the Budget Reform sub-components of TA III were less successful and therefore restructured under EFMP. Based on the analysis in the PCR, the project outcome is rated as satisfactory and the institutional development impact as substantial. Sustainability is rated as uncertain because of continuing difficulties to achieve appropriate public sector salaries. The PCR provided detailed analysis of the achievements and difficulties of most technical assistance sub-components of the project, but omitted analysis of the agricultural planning sub-component (US$2.5 million). An audit is planned. The audit will look at TA HI as an integral part of continuous TA given to the Government of Uganda over the years and will focus on lessons to be learned from successful coordination among donors, on supervision and flexibility of project design, and on sustainability issues. Robert Picciotto by H. Eberhard Kopp Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT CREDIT' 1951-UG CONTENTS PREFACE .............................................. i EVALUATION SUMMARY .................................. ii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE .... ........ 1 A. Project Identity ................................... 1 B. Introduction and Background ........................... 1 C. Project Objectives and Description .... ................... 2 D. Project Design and Organization ......................... 2 E. Project Implementation and Results ....................... 3 F. Overall Performance and Institutional Development (Sustainability) ... 9 G. IDA/Government Performance and Project Relationships .... ..... 10 H. Summary and Conclusions ........................... 11 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE A. Background ..................................... 13 B. Implementation of the Project .......................... 14 C. Use of Advisors/Consultants Under TA III ................. 15 D. Evaluation of the 3rd IDA Technical Assistance .............. 16 E. General Conclusion ................................ 17 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION ....................... 18 Summary of Assessment ............................... 18 Related Bank Loans/Credits ............................. 20 Project Timetable ................................... 21 Credit Disbursements ................................. 21 Project Implementation ................................ 22 Project Costs and Financing ............................. 27 Aspects of Implementation and Project Results ................. 28 Status of Covenants .................................. 41 Use of Bank Resources ................................ 42 Missions ......................................... 43 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their lofficia]duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT CREDIT 1951-UG PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Third Technical Assistance Project (TA III), for which Credit 1951-UG in the amount of SDR 13.8 million was approved on August 23, 1988. The credit was closed at the end of May 1994 with complete disbursement, some nineteen months earlier than the closing date set in the DCA. During the effectiveness period a total of approximately US$8 million was also made available to the credit beneficiaries through a UNDP project to provide assistance to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development and the successor Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. This UNDP project was executed by IDA using for the most part the same management as the IDA Credit. The PCR (Parts I and HI) was prepared by the task manager, Mr. I. Knapp, of the Public and Private Enterprise Division; reviewed with the Principal Country Officer for Uganda, Mr. G. Gebhart and then commented upon by the Borrower (Part ED). Preparation of the PCR began during a final supervision mission to close off all administrative matters for the Credit in July 1993, and is based, inter alia, on the President's Report, the Credit Agreement, supervision reports, and sub project files. While this report attempts to provide a self contained analysis of the funds used under 1951-UG, (TA III), it should be recognized that many of the subprojects financed were either started or had their genesis under the Second Technical Assistance Credit (1434-UG, TA II). Further, some subprojects started under the Third Technical Assistance project are being continued under the follow-on technical assistance project-the Economic and Financial Management Project (EFMP). Thus, to ensure a more complete understanding of the results from this project, this report should be read in conjunction with the Project Completion Report for Technical Assistance II and the Technical Annex of the President's Report for the Economic and Financial Management Project. i   PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT CREDIT 1951-UG EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. The Third Technical Assistance Project (TA III) became effective at the time (May 1989), when uncommitted funds from the Second Technical Assistance Credit (TA II) were approximately US$1 million. The program areas covered by TA III were complementary to those begun under TA II, while also reaching new areas in need of improvement within Government. With continuity of project management on both the Government and IDA sides, TA III was able to maintain and extend momentum in terms of progress toward overall credit objectives and specific program areas, which were similar under both projects. On the policy side, TA III was used to extend the macroeconomic and sector dialogue begun under TA lI and to extend the overall framework for subsequent project assistance through the lending program. 2. While the project continued to rely extensively on foreign expatriate assistance, (as had been the case in TA II) more and more emphasis was laid on training of middle and senior level civil servants in the core ministries. As the project progressed, fewer short term consultancies were used as civil servants were better prepared to take on the technical tasks required of them under both the specific subprojects and more generally, across the target organizations. 3. The project also continued the process begun under TA II of joint efforts by IDA and donors in focusing technical assistance within a common framework. With strong leadership from the central government ministry, (the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MPED), which became the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in April 1993), technical assistance continued to be used efficiently in addressing issues of economic policy and in breaking through specific bottlenecks that confronted Government. Also continued from TA II in this joint effort in practical partnership with the donors, was the complementary UNDP project at the MPED. The continued integration of the UNDP funded experts, over a period of seven years, within the framework of IDA funded subprojects was of great assistance to Government in ensuring maximum benefits, while also providing Government with independent analysis and support for their discussions with IDA, the IMF, and at the Consultative Group Meetings in Paris. Not unimportantly, IDA's execution of the UNDP project provided significantly increased funds for missions to Uganda that enhanced in-country contact and dialogue. 4. Many of the lessons learned from TA III and its predecessor TA II have been incorporated into the major follow-on technical assistance project-the Economic and Financial Management Project (EFMP)-which was presented to the Board in August 1993. The modality of expatriate long-term assistance to co-manage major subprojects with senior counterparts has been widely extended under EFMP whenever new areas of operation are being tackled. However, in many areas where support was previously provided under TA II and TA III, expatriate "leadership" has given way to full time Government management, with only limited and part time support from the former advisors. A further lesson learned under TA II and accounted for under ii  the flexible execution mode of TA III concerns the success of technical assistance in transferring skills and building enduring capacities. In the Ugandan context, in comnlon with many other countries, enduring capacity has been recognized as all too fragile, unless Government is willing to pay proper attention to the issues of wages/benefits, basic equipment, and recurrent cost considerations. The successes achieved under TA IH through the use of small incentive payments for: (i) training, (ii) extra project work, and (iii) performance of specific tasks related to project work have been widely recognized, (and positively commented upon by independent evaluators reviewing the UNDP project/program). The extent of these successes is further evidenced by the fact that Government decided, with IDA's concurrence, to provide its counterpart project contribution in the form of incentive packages for staff involved in the follow-on technical assistance project-EFMP. Beyond individuals covered under the EFMP, the question of satisfactory pay levels for all civil servants is now being taken very seriously by Governmnent. This effort is being coupled with deep retrenchments in all parts of the Civil Service and the armed forces. At the time of writing this PCR, retrenchments and efforts to eliminate ghost employees have achieved genuine recurrent savings in the wage bill of more than US$10 million per annum, from a total wage bill cost of approximately US$80 million. These funds have been ploughed back into increased salary levels. (These efforts at Civil Service Reform are now being supported under the EFMP, and will continue to receive attention under the planned Capacity Building Project (FY95)). 5. Another important lesson first drawn from TA ll and strongly reinforced under TA III was that project design can never be a substitute for good leadership and commitment within Government. Moreover, the achievement of a commonly shared view of what needs to happen and how something should be processed and managed requires a considerable amount of time and face to face contact. New areas of project coverage under TA III, (and then under EFMP), introduced new Government managers to the difficulties of administering and managing technical assistance. It also brought into the open differences between senior Government officials on the use and appropriateness of technical assistance as a vehicle for development. While these differences and difficulties had little effect upon the performances under TA III, they are now (January, 1994) exhibiting themselves in the design and use of technical assistance, both at the sub project and overall credit level. These changes reinforce the view, reiterated by Government, that experienced supervision, provided in-country and at levels beyond that normally programmed, will be needed for several years to come to ensure that maximum benefits derive from the funding provided for technical assistance. 6. Beyond the specific lessons detailed above, the results achieved under TA III (and TA II) raise the question as to why these particular credits were (in the main) successful. This is of relevance as the track record in general for free standing Technical Assistance, across the continent, has been disappointing. Four specific factors can be identified: (i) the subprojects/interventions were targeted to areas that were closely coupled to the ongoing reform efforts; (ii) targeting of interventions kept up with and in some cases was upstream work for the reform effort, which moved very swiftly by comparison with many other countries; and (iii) the TA was designed and implemented with the utmost flexibility possible, consistent with the Development Credit Agreement and (iv) the credit received significantly greater amounts of supervision, both in the field and from Washington, with greater continuity of personnel than is normally the case. iii  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CREDIT 1951-UG) PART I. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity Name Third Technical Assistance Project (TA III) Credit Number 1951-UG RVP Unit Africa Region Country Uganda Sector Public Sector B. Introduction and Background 1. The Third Technical Assistance Project (TA III) was the first technical assistance project requested by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government under President Museveni, following its rise to power in 1986. Following a preliminary mission in March 1987 the project was formally appraised in February 1988 and presented to the Board on August 23, 1988. While the initial thrust of TA III was oriented to provide technical assistance within the framework of the Economic Recovery Credit I, and the Policy Framework Paper, it was also oriented to further support initiatives that had been started under Technical Assistance II, particularly in the areas of Statistical and Agricultural reform. Additionally, the project sought to address some fundamental areas of institutional weakness that were central to the attainment of policy objectives in relation to control of the budget, restoration of price stability, and implementation of an appropriate exchange regime. Further, the project recognized the importance of Government having a functioning Civil Service. At the time of appraisal there was a significant lack of local expertise, following the departure of many qualified Civil Servants. Thus a program of repatriation was designed into the project as part of the underpinning for the entire recovery program. 2. During the course of implementation of TA III, reform momentum increased significantly, led primarily by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. Many of the activities that were initiated under the 'Special Advisory Services for the Economic Recovery Programn were either oriented to preparing the way for agreements on the reform agenda, under ERC II and SAC I, or were directly linked to the implementation of actions conditioned under these credits. Additionally, the project was used to provide funding for the development of a successor project, Economic and Financial Management, thus negating the need for a project preparation facility and allowing an unusual amount of continuity of personnel and operating procedures. 3. It should also be noted that TA III was implemented in parallel with the Second Technical Assistance Project (TA II) for some four years and that to a great extent the distinction between 1  the two projects became blurred, particularly as the Development Credit Agreements for both credits allowed significant flexibility over the use of funds within a defined common focus of improving public administration. Moreover, with management on Government and IDA's sides remaining the same under TA II and TA III, in conjunction with a cohesive country team, and in terms of its interaction with Government being abnormally high, decision making on the use of funds and methods for implementation of needed actions was extremely effective. C. Project Objectives and Description 4. The stated objectives of the project were to: (i) establish and institutionalize data collection and analysis at the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Uganda; (ii) improve the budgeting process; (iii) strengthen the capacity for policy formulation in the Ministry of Finance; (iv) rationalize Government's procurement functions; and (v) provide implementation capacity to Government, oriented toward attainment of objectives under the Economic Recovery Program; special attention was to be paid to returning experienced Ugandans from overseas to Government posts. 5. To achieve these objectives, the credit of SDR's 13.8 million (equivalent to US$18 million) was to finance high priority activities (i.e., "sub projects") in the following areas: Financial Information System US$4.2 million Budget Reform US$2.8 million Rationalization of Government Procurement US$4.3 million Advisory Services for ERP US$7.1 million Statistics Rehabilitation US$2.1 million Policy & Planning for Agriculture US$2.5 million (* The amounts listed above include Governnents contribution and anticipated cofuiancing for Statistics, for a total value of US$23million) D. Project Design and Organization 6. The project brief was distributed in March 1987 and the project was appraised in February 1988, following preparatory missions in June and November of the preceding year. A Staff Appraisal Report (# 7221-UG) was issued and the project went to the Board on August 23, 1988, with effectiveness being declared in May 1989. TA III followed on directly and overlapped with TA II [PCR UG-1434, dated May 27, 19931. 7. The organization for managing and administering the credit built directly upon the structure and personnel that the NRM Government introduced two years earlier for TA II. The same ministry (Planning and Economic Development) and the same key personnel (the Permanent 2  Secretary and the Project Coordinator), were the focal points for administration and management. In addition, each of the major subprojects had a clearly defined manager as the direct interface with IDA. At the Ministry of Finance, Government appointed i) a Steerhig Committee to oversee the Financial Information Systems work, led by the Acting Commissioner for the Uganda Computer Services Center (UCS), and ii) implementation managers for the Budget Reform, Assistance to the Economic Analysis Unit, and Procurement Rationalization. 8. As noted in the PCR for TA II, and reflecting the blurring of management processes between TA II and TA III, the project's Review Committee chaired by the Permanent Secretary (PS) of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, operated at arms length (as would the Board of a private cooperation) and primarily focused on definition and approval of new project proposals which were formally communicated to IDA in writing under signature of the PS. Hence successful project implementation, particularly in the earlier years, relied heavily on supervision activities by the Task Manager and country team members, reinforced by the strong country dialogue at the technical level of the Ministries. E. Project Implementation and Results 9. From a management and monitoring perspective, for the most part, TA Im was run successfully. Government quickly learned to utilize the special account system, and while in late 1990 some difficulties were discovered with accurate recording of expenditures, these were quickly rectified with the movement of special account control from BOU to a commercial bank. Auditing was satisfactory, and needed accounts were produced without undue difficulty. Financial reporting and monitoring was greatly helped by the introduction of a "sub project' numbering and accounting system within the project office. This became necessary as the Bank's Disbursement Group was unable to continue the practice initiated under TA II, whereby computerized expenditures against each sub project were made available to Government as part of monthly statements. 10. For the most part, problems in implementation that did occur were primarily the result of internal differences within Government over the use of technical assistance, the role it was playing in moving forward the policy dialogue, and the use of expatriate assistance. Between late 1990 and mid 1992, these differences were at their height, particularly between the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MPED) and the Ministry of Finance. The differences also showed themselves most markedly in the implementation progress made under each of the major subprojects originally agreed for support under the project. Those under the direct control of Finance lagged significantly behind those controlled through Planning. Moreover, as newer projects were agreed and initiated under the auspices of MPED, technical assistance became more interwoven with the internal politics of structural adjustment, with "sides" becoming more markedly distinguishable. These difficulties were particularly marked in the areas of assistance to Budget Reform, the Financial Information Systems area, and for parts of the assistance to the Bank of Uganda. By contrast, the subprojects covering Statistics Rehabilitation, the Agricultural Secretariat, Assistance to Bank of Uganda (Accounting/External Debt Management), and Assistance to the Ministry of Public Service were all executed very efficiently and in close cooperation between MPED, IDA, and the component managers. The level of involvement of technical assistance (from all sources) in the internal aspects of development in the period February 1992 through mid 1993 is most easily understood through reference to the press and magazine coverage of the times. 3  11. Despite these "differences," all subprojects were completed and for most of them significant benefits can be attributed to the results achieved. The paragraphs below briefly describe the major subprojects, organized by sector or ministry. (A full listing of all subprojects, as taken from the Government's project office and the Task Manager's files, are shown in Table 4 of Part III). 12. It is worthy of note that implementation under this credit was greatly concerned with "doing," rather than "planning." As such, very few studies were undertaken, (Table 6 (f)) and those that were commissioned had extremely clear objectives to be met, in terms of the follow on action that was likely to result from the details of the study, or the type of decision that was to be made, based on the study facts and conclusions. Ministry of Finance 13. General overview of assistance received. At the time of appraisal, four major subprojects were planned for implementation under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance: Budget Reform; Financial Information Systems; Procurement Reform at the Central Tender Board and the Uganda Supplies Directorate; and set up of the Economic Analysis Unit. Nominally, these subprojects were all under the control of the Secretary to the Treasury, though management and operations for signing contracts, agreeing to specific funding requests, invoicing, special account operations, etc, all integral to the performance of the subprojects, were vested with the project office and the Permanent Secretary of MPED. To some extent, this split in management in the subprojects was a factor in the difficulties of achieving the stated objectives. The total value of expenditures on these four main projects was approximately US$3.9million. Beyond this, another US$0.4million was spent on a range of other minor activities, for an approximate total of US$4.3million. 14. Budget reform. The assignment for Budget Reform was awarded to an independent consultant, originally supervised by IDA's Country Operations Division, as part of the ongoing dialogue with Government on macroeconomic reforms under ERC II, and the Public Expenditure Reviews. The consultant faced significant difficulties in completing the task; Government was often not prepared for his visits, or needed counterparts were absent from the office. Moreover, there was a general suspicion that the consultant was more an "agent" for IDA and MPED than a useful part of Government (Ministry of Finance). The original terms of Reference (TOR) were revised on several occasions as the assignment progressed and the nature of the assignment became more oriented to assisting with the actual budget preparations of 1989 and 1990 than with introducing a new budget system. Late in 1991, a final report was prepared, discussed, revised, and agreed. This report was then taken as the basis for designing a much more ambitious budget reform project than had originally been foreseen, with initial funding to be provided under the remaining budget of TA III, and the rest under the EFMP. 15. Financial information system. Under TA II, Price Waterhouse prepared a detailed information system study, oriented to the most crucial subsystems needed by Government. TA III funding was envisaged to implement this study. In fact, delays and difficulties in finalizing the study prevented full start-up and implementation from taking place under TA III. Recognizing the critical importance of this operation to Government, IDA agreed to fund a series of small "one- off" projects and activities that helped sustain the existing systems and equipment, such as they were, until the larger project could be initiated. The "one-off" actions included funding of rented back up equipment and an agreement for maintenance; needed supplies; installation of training 4  equipment, drawn from another sub project upon completion of its tasks; hiring of an international and local expert to provide assistance to the Uganda Computer Services (UCS); provision of a vehicle; and provision of incentives for staff employed on the Payroll RJform exercise, which was allied to part of the Civil Service Reform Program. By mid 1993, while TA Im continued to provide support, the EFMP project for UCS became operational, and the funding under TA m was concluded with the successful tendering for new equipment and software; the full development and implementation of the subsystems is now expected to take place under EFMIP. 16. Procurement. Assistance under six separately approved subprojects (TA-11; TA-27; TA- 45; TA-50; TA-64; and TA-66) totalling US$ 2.5million was provided with the objective of establishing the newly constituted Uganda Supplies Directorate and integrating its functions with those of the Central Tender Board (CTB). In one sense, the project was successful: Government now has a functioning Supplies Directorate capable of sourcing the most frequently procured items for Government's use. However, after completion of the consulting assignment which helped the start up of the Supplies Directorate there were difficulties that began to emerge with awards for technical assistance contracts that had to pass through CTB, which greatly reduced the benefit of the progress made and may further prevent the fulfillment of the overall objectives for an efficient, effective, and transparent procurement systems within government's machinery. This sub project amply demonstrates that regardless of the technical competence of the consultants and their counterparts, an appropriate political environment is needed for long term sustainability. 17. Economic Analysis Unit. The Economic Analysis Unit (EAU) was formed as an enclave organization at the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to help offset the great differences in internal capacity between MOF and MPED. Initially staffed with recruits from outside Government who were paid special allowances and salaries, this small group became the driving force within the Ministry of Finance as they worked directly for the Minister and the Secretary to the Treasury. Importantly, they maintained close professional and personal relationships with counterparts at MPED, thus allowing for a form of "bridging" between the two organizations, and greatly facilitating a more balanced Government approach and response to the issues being discussed under the macroeconomic policy framework. The assistance provided by IDA included payment of incentives, financing of purchases of computing equipment, a series of financing of short term training/course attendances overseas, and general equipment and supplies. With the merger of the Ministry of Finance with Planning and Economic Development in April 1992, the economic analysis staff were merged into the restructured Macroeconomic Policy Department. 18. The importance of the EAU to Government's fiscal and monetary program (and an indication of the lack of capacity within MOF) can be partly gauged through the unfortunate events of late 1991, when Government lost control of the money supply and inflation soared to over 60 percent per annum. This coincided with the (voluntary) departure of the unit head to become a key Commissioner at the Uganda Revenue Authority; the attendance of his deputy at a three month computer training course; and lack of IDA supervision missions around this time. Ministry of Planning and Economic Development 19. General overview of all assistance received. The design of the Project provided for two areas over which the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MPED) had direct control-Statistics Rehabilitation, and assistance to the Economic Recovery Program. In reality, except for the subprojects directly under the supervision of MOF, all other subprojects were 5  either influenced, initiated, supervised, or controlled from MPED. This is not to say that other credit beneficiaries (e.g. BOU), did not play their appropriate role with regard to the execution of the subprojects, but the leadership for the strategic direction in which project funds were spent frequently lay with, and in all cases, was approved by MPED, following discussions with IDA. 20. Statistics department rehabilitation. Under TA III the statistics department received US$1.7million directly, and approximately US$0.3million from other donors, within the framework developed by Government in agreement with IDA. (he project continues to operate with funding from EFMP). Accomplishments under this sub project have been impressive. Starting from almost nothing the department now has trained statisticians, strong data collection techniques and staff and an efficient departmental computing capability. As of May 1994, the co- director moved from this position to be the advisor, and management reverted to complete Ugandan control. Government statistics, (abstracts) are now available on a monthly basis covering a wide variety of economic indicators. Technically the department is quite capable of continuing to collect and disseminate information on the economy; long term sustainability will depend to a large degree on Government's ability to ensure appropriate funding for recurrent costs of operation. Assistance to the Economic Recovery Program (managed by MPED) 21. Approach and management of assistance. The SAR provided a category of expenditure labeled "Special Advisory Services for the Economic Recovery Program" (ERP), with a value of US$7.1 million. In the event, and depending to some extent on the classification used, some US$9.9million was spent in this area. The SAR indicated three areas to be assisted under this category: the Economic Analysis Unit; returning expatriate Ugandans; and short term consultants to assist in "... monitoring economic performance and advise on adjustments in economic policy." T'he modality for accessing the funds is laid out in the DCA as "Part D" of the project and states simply that "all proposals supported by the Review Committee shall be submitted to the Association for its review and final approval." 22. This simple, straightforward procedure for requisitioning funds proved to be of great assistance to the dialogue between IDA and Government. When problems arose, the parties frequently agreed to the use of this "fund' to hire experts to review the area under discussion, make proposals, or to implement agreements. Moreover, the fund was also used as a way of attracting and "co-opting" donor money. If a donor wanted to support a particular activity with which IDA agreed, yet the donor procedures were too slow to accommodate the situation, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Planning, in full consultation with all parties, would use the IDA funds. Later, the donor would fund something that IDA and Government felt should be done, that fell within the donor program, and could be accommodated within the needed time scales. Thus, flexibility, speed, and cooperation were the main characteristics of the use of funds. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, this "style" also entails risks. The paragraphs below provide a review of the main areas assisted under this SAR category that are not elsewhere described. 23. Project Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The Project Monitoring and Evaluation Unit received approximately US$1.2 million over a three year period. The original objective of Government, strongly supported by IDA, was to create an "enclave" unit, attached to the MPED 6  that would develop and institutionalize, in line ministries, within the planning unit function, a monitoring and evaluation mechanism covering the seventy or so most important projects in the Economic Recovery Program. The sub project was slow to develop, and it was a year before all staff were on board, housed appropriately, and with the necessary office accommodation and equipment. In the following two years, the unit developed a database on key projects by collecting and distributing information. However, the style of management employed and the unsuitability of the modality used to employ the unithead, presented a number of obstacles to efficient and effective supervision. The difficulties were such that the supervising agency (UNDP-OPS) informed Government that if the project were extended they would only continue their role if significant changes in management personnel and the modality for implementation were made (e.g. all personnel, project funds, and implementation plans were presented to one agency for proper coordination). At the end of three years, following discussions between the parties, the unit head's contract was not renewed. Government and IDA agreed that future funding would be allocated based upon the results of a review of the past three years and a reorganization of the unit as an integral part of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The unit's equipment has been transferred to other sub project usage in the ministry. At the time of writing this PCR the needed review has been completed, and the future funding for this important activity will be integrated within the total assistance to the newly reorganized ministry, under EFMP. 24. Bank of Uganda. Assistance to the Bank of Uganda was in two major parts. First, for improving the internal computing and financial controls, including updating the accounts of the BOU, which had not been done for five years; and second, in the area of debt management and strategy development. 25. Coopers and Lybrand were employed to work with BOU's accounting department to sort out what the Governor described as "an appalling mess." Many detailed procedural improvements were made to the accounting department, and these in turn were tied to improvements in computerized recording of financial transactions. Computer Solutions, a training and development organization, was employed to assist the MIS department. Also, as part of the upgrading of operations and personnel, several young internationally qualified Ugandans were recruited under the "returning expatriate" scheme to strengthen accounts, and a new head of MIS was contracted. 26. With the objective of improving donor disbursements, functioning of the Open General Licensing, and debt management, three companies were utilized-CSL, Syviton, and S.G. Warburg, respectively. Details of major assignments and consultants performance are provided in Table 7 (G). 27. The results achieved from the assistance to BOU were considered to be above average, though there is still work to be done under EFMP and the Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC). In three years, BOU reorganized all the major functions; produced the first set of accounts for five years; completed a detailed inventory of debt; and began implementation of a debt strategy, including the successful completion of a buy back operation; strengthened its accounting and computing departments immeasurably; upgraded the supervision capabilities; and improved outputs from the research department. At the same time, under the macro-economic framework, legalized foreign exchange bureaus were introduced, and a weekly auction system for foreign exchange was initiated. (All of this was done with only three long-term resident advisors who were more concerned with departmental/ operational matters than with policy considerations). Although the changes represent only the beginning of what needs to be done, they 7  clearly indicate the potential for technical assistance that is well thought out, properly managed and supervised, and where the consultants maintain close communications with IDA and Government so that there is enhanced co-ordination between the project and macroeconomic setting. 28. Returning Ugandans. This sub project evolved into one of the most successful under TA III, with extremely well qualified expatriate Ugandans being assisted to return. At the time of the final completion of this PCR (May 1994), 40 'returned' Ugandans were employed within the country (see Table 7A). Despite the numerical indicators of success, the program was not without difficulty. To some degree, the program was open to abuse in that it tended to cater more to individual needs, rather than to Government needs. Under strict management, the process might have been to conduct a review of what positions needed filling, and then recruit people for them. In reality, on many occasions, very well qualified people used a number of formal and informal channels to present their credentials, and appropriate jobs were found within Government., IDA exercised some degree of control in that the positions that were filled were all related to the central dialogue and/or covered areas where projects were being implemented and no position was filled without review by IDA and concurrence as to the candidates' qualifications and experience. 29. Training. Training under TA III was extensive, and helped to build up skills in a number of areas. The most easily understood aspects are those where IDA formally approved expenditure for local or foreign training. The overview shows that 63 people attended courses overseas, for a total of 100 plus months; a further 150 people attended domestically funded courses. The funding utilized was US$809,000. A detailed breakdown of personnel, and courses is shown in Table 7B. The training programs and the results achieved suffered from a lack of consistency and criteria. It is commonly understood, though not often discussed, that training is frequently used and seen as a "reward" for good performance, particularly in settings like Uganda where base salaries are very low, and overseas per diems, by contrast, are extremely attractive. TA III did not manage to overcome this difficulty. That is not to say that the wrong people were sent/accepted for training, or that they did not learn things of value. Rather, the relationship between the course attended, the timing of the course, and a person's position was sometimes tenuous; moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the way that people were selected for training lacked a preferred level of advance planning and transparency. These difficulties are being resolved under the follow on project, with the use of yearly training programs and a formal training committee. 30. Ministry of Public Service. The Ministry received approximately US$1.6million of assistance from the project, which with prior assistance received under TA II, resulted in approximately US$3.Omillion of total assistance over a period of 6 years. (This assistance has been further extended under the EFMP by US$2 million). 31. As recorded in the PCR for TA II, in 1989 Government decided to close out the then existing implementing arrangement, change the Chief Technical Advisor, and redirect its efforts toward more general aspects of civil service reform, including studies of the structure and roles of ministries; operation and efficiency of the payroll system; and a census of civil servants, part time workers, and teachers. These activities continued to receive funding under TA III, and resulted in a number of documented changes, including (i) the removal of some 35,000 ghosts from the payroll; (ii) a complete elimination of part time employment; (iii) a reduction in Ministries from 44 to the current 19, and (iv) the completion of the most accurate census to date of Government employees. Perhaps most importantly, the continuous dialogue afforded by the necessity of 8  supervising the sub project elements resulted in a large degree of trust being built up between IDA and Government on what are normally very sensitive matters. This trust has been translated under the follow on EFMP into the design and implementation of one of the most comprehensive civil service reform programs undertaken anywhere in Africa. Just one dimension-reduction in government employment-serves to illustrate the point. In 1991, payroll records showed 312,000 people; currently the total at the end of April 1994 stands at 169,000, with projections for June 1994 indicating 150,000 people, as donor assistance with retrenchment costs becomes available . 32. A key proportion of the 150,000 employees are teachers-some 95,000. Under TA mI, a long and very detailed exercise was conducted by Government to authenticate the teachers' payroll, which upon completion resulted in a yearly savings of over US$10 million. This represents more than a twelve times payback in one year against the cost of the exercise (approximately US$0.8 million). 33. As mentioned above, technical assistance to the Ministry of Public Service, through the Ministry of Planning, provided solid groundwork and the opportunity over an extended time period for confidence building between IDA and Government that resulted in the launching of the full scale reform program. It can be argued that the dialogue has assisted Government to "stay the course" with the CSR program, with the result that it is now being assisted by many donors, including UNDP, the British, Dutch, Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden, through cofinancing with the EFMP credit. F. Overall Performance and Institutional Development (Project Sustainability) 34. Performance under the Third Technical Assistance Credit has been, in the main, very satisfactory. The Credit continued the successful assistance to Government in laying the ground for a range of IDA (and donor) funded investment and policy-based operations. It continued the trend of utilizing technical assistance in a flexible manner, whereby an expatriate advisor was directly teamed with a civil service counterpart in a senior management position e.g., commissioner; or deputy permanent secretary; and together, the details of a sub project were worked out, within the general framework and overall budget previously agreed between IDA and Government. Where this modality had been used under TA II, steps were taken under TA III to phase out the expatriate as the co-manager, and return him/her to an advisory role, if possible on a part time basis. 35. The results achieved under TA III clearly demonstrate the benefits that can accrue through technical assistance if there is a strong focal point within Government (in this case the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development). Unfortunately, the project also occasionally exhibited the difficulties inherent in technical assistance when Government policy makers are not in agreement on the strategic direction for resource usage, and the visibility and cost of expatriate advisorsj/. 1/ As the TA was primarily supportive of major policy reforms about the direction of which consensus within Government could not be expected, the presence of such expertise was bound to be controversial. This, however, was no reason for the Bank not to finance the TA- - as demonstrated by the remarkable achievement of Uganda over the last few years. 9  As with TA II, under TA III it should be noted that proper and fully required administrative procedures as defined in the SAR for Government were not strictly followed. Many of the smaller subprojects, covering training of individuals, procurement of equipment, funding for small studies, etc. were not discussed by the required project review committee and the updating and understanding of the project by interested government officials owed more to the missions and aide memoires than to outward communication from MPED. (However, these lessons covering technical assistance and its relationship to internal differences within Government were quickly understood, both by IDA and Government, as demonstrated in Government's strict adherence to the use of the Project Coordinating Committee (PCC) under the EFMP. Beyond required quarterly meetings, Government also produces and distributes a detailed and comprehensive quarterly report on progress under the EFMP, thereby ensuring complete transparency as to the cost and usage of project funds). 36. In terms of building institutional capacities, many of the subprojects achieved significant improvements in the skill levels, procedural approaches, and general operating efficiencies of respective organizations and units. Among many of note, the changes introduced at the Central Bank, which again are partly attributable to committed management having an agreed and shared vision with IDA, stand out. Tables 7 (D) and (C) show that the use of funds recognized the need to utilize local capacity wherever possible, through the use of both long- and short-term consultants. It is perhaps worth noting that from a total expenditure under the Credit of US$18 million, more than 40 percent can be identified as having been paid directly to Ugandans, used for training/study tours, or used for equipment. Put another way, less than 60 percent went directly outside the country for foreign consultancy fees. While this figure may seem large, almost all of it can be identified as having been used for areas where there was no internal capacity of any sort- computing, accounting, and debt monitoring. Two of these areas are the central focus of the follow on EFMP, with the objective of building up indigenous capacity. G. IDAlGovernment Performance and Project Relationships 37. The importance of effective, continuous, and frequent supervision cannot be overemphasized in trying to improve the results from technical assistance, and certainly IDA's performance was greatly dependent upon this. However, it must be noted that continued involvement in the manner practiced between 1989 and 1993 has its risks-in terms of fostering an added degree of dependence and also in the possibility of IDA being perceived by certain parts of Government as too involved in internal matters. Effectively managing technical assistance in an environment of low capacity while appropriately balancing the level of intervention is extremely difficult. While continuity brings greater efficiency, through increased experience and trust, it also brings increased risks. A lesson for the future, and currently being applied under EFMP to mitigate these risks, involves greater use of "sub task managers" for the various specialized subcomponents. In essence the IDA "sub task managers" and the Task Manager comprise a team that tackles the intricacies and shares the decision making process, thus negating the appearance of "monopoly power" that may be associated with a single Task Manager of a comprehensive TA project. 38. The results under TA III were greatly reinforced by a strong continuity of IDA and Government personnel between TA II, TA IHI, and EFMP and interlocking structures that greatly facilitated policy and implementation aspects. On Government's side, the same team of Permanent 10  Secretaries involved in the use of proceeds from this Credit were also involved in the design and implementation of TA II and the follow on EFMP, which utilized many of the outputs and experiences from TA III. On IDA's side, management of TA III was passed from the Country Officer to a Public Sector Management Specialist, who in 1989, was transferred to the controlling Country Operations Division, and was then the Task Manager and led the design of the EFMP. Even following the subsequent movement of the Task Manager to a sector division, management remained with the same person. This very unusual amount of continuity, over a period extending from early 1989 to the writing of this PCR (May 1994), allowed for significantly enhanced common understandings of practical difficulties in implementing technical assistance, and the opportunity to learn from mistakes. The lessons of experience have been reflected in changes to the follow-on project EFMP, and will be further refined in the planned Institutional Capacity Building Project [FY95]). This continuity of personnel resulted in the ability to utilize assistance very rapidly, without long delays and difficulties that can be associated with such issues as procurement, contract awards, terms of reference, access to appropriate consulting expertise, etc. The third aspect involving continuity and evolving expertise in the use of technical assistance concerns a core group of expatriate advisors, recruited under TA II, retained under TA III implementation, and utilized in the design of the EFMP project. The risks of perpetuating "external expertise dependency" and the issue of the advisors in the politics of using technical assistance became more problematic under TA III than had been seen previously. However, the past decisions taken by Government (MPED) and IDA staffs that long term resident experts, teamed with appropriately selected senior staff, and supported by contracted local staff was the most efficient way to ensure that problems were tackled quickly and effectively was maintained, as this approach continued to provide the best environment for providing training, as opposed to merely putting people through classroom courses. As reported in the PCR for TA II, the success of this approach is evident when looking at any number of departments within the core organizations, where many civil servants first recruited to work on TA II subprojects graduated to hold significant positions in subprojects under TA III and then with the merger of the Ministries of Finance and Planning, assumed senior level positions in the newly organized ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 39. As reported in the PCR for TA II, an extremely important element in IDA's performance was the continued involvement of key donors-in particular UNDP, ODA, and USAID. It is estimated that between 1986 and 1993, the Government of Uganda received approximately US$60 million from these donors and IDA for technical assistance. Such assistance has covered every sector, with by far the most funding being expended around 'core' Government ministries and associated economic policy and implementation. The IDA TA II Credit was the initial vehicle for providing a focal point, (MPED) and a general framework for much of this expenditure. The framework and expenditure patterns were reinforced under TA HI. The relationships with these and other donors resulted in significant parallel financing, cofinancing, and trust fund activities for activities within the EFMP framework. Without the very close cooperation that has evolved, the impact of technical assistance would have been greatly impaired, as would IDA and Government performance. H. Summary and Conclusions 40. The Third Technical Assistance Credit met the stated general objectives of continued strengthening of the capacities of core agencies and of transferring skills through training. 11  However, the particular issue of sustainability and most importantly, the payment of appropriate salaries remains as Government's greatest challenge in deriving maximum advantage from Technical Assistance inputs. These issues are now well to the fore in Government's program under the CSRP, demonstrated by the 40 percent salary increase granted in the July 1993 budget, the mid year increase of 30 percent plus, and the planned increment, along with monetization of benefits, in the July 1994 budget. 12  PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE A: BACKGROUND 1. During the appraisal of the 3rd IDA Technical Assistance Project in mid-1988, the Government of Uganda was implementing a 2nd IDA Technical Assistance Project. The 2nd IDA Technical Assistance Project was, by then, nearing its completion date. The project catered for general technical assistance needs, technical assistance related equipment and training even in areas where these needs had not been identified at the time of appraisal. 2. Unlike the 2nd IDA Technical Assistance Project, the 3rd IDA Technical Assistance Project was more focussed. It was focussed to the rehabilitation of the Government's essential administrative and management functions in the key economic ministries. It included Components that were designed to:- (i) restore the computerized accounting system and develop an integrated financial information system; (ii) strengthen the Government's budgeting processes; (iii) rationalize the Government procurement process; (iv) develop the requisite database for the implementation and monitoring of the Economic recovery programme and subsequent development programmes; (v) support a programme to encourage, the return to Government service, highly qualified expatriate Ugandans and; (vi) provide logistical support to critical economic recovery program tasks. 3. These objectives have been achieved to a large extent through use of local and international consultants, in-country and overseas training, resettlement of returning expatriate Ugandans, and purchase of office equipment such as computers, stationery and vehicles. The benefits to Government have been tremendous. (a) A mainframe computer will soon be installed at the Uganda Computer Services (UCS) and a number of networked desk-top computers will also be installed at the UCS training centre. Installation of the equipment and subsequent linkages to Bank of Uganda and Uganda Revenue Authority equipment will restore the computerized accounting system and develop an integrated financial information system. 13  (b) A total of forty (40) expatriate Ugandans have returned and hold various positions in different Government agencies. They are all highly qualified Ugandans. (c) The Uganda Central Purchasing Corporation (UCPC) was supported in its formative stages and is now a strong body handling Government procurement functions. (d) In support of critical economic recovery programme tasks, the project funds were used to purchase office supplies and vehicles as logistics. Government also used the proceeds of the project funds to finance the cost of advisory services provided by local and international consultants for various agencies of Government. In view of the fact that these were the project objectives, they (objectives) have been broadly achieved. B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT 4. The former Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MPED) was responsible for implementation of the project. Responsibility for coordination and overall project administration therefore lay with MPED. The Ministry compiled and submitted semi- annual reports, prepared replenishment applications, procured goods and services after necessary clearances of Letters of Invitation, shortlists, bidding documents etc. While MPED was responsible for general project administration, the implementation of each project Component was done by the Government Agency or Department directly concerned. 5. The project consisted of six (6) parts viz; (i) The Financial Information; (ii) the Budget reform; (iii) Rationalization of Procurement functions; (iv) Advisory Services for the Economic Recovery Program; (v) Statistics Rehabilitation and (vi) Strengthening of the Agricultural Secretariat. The first three parts were to be implemented under the former MOF while parts (iv), (v) and (vi) were to be implemented under the former MPED. The strengthening of the Agricultural Secretariat lay under MPED's responsibility because the PS for MPED was the Chairman of the Agricultural Policy Committee which oversees the functions of the 14  Agricultural Secretariat. The two major beneficiaries under the project were therefore the two ministries of Finance and Planning and Economic Development. 6. The former Ministry of Finance (MOF) - a major beneficiary under the project,was supposed to assign Team Leaders for each of the major project components such as the Financial Information System, the budget reform exercise and the Uganda Central Purchasing Corporation. It (MOF) did not appoint the Team Leaders. 7. The then MOF and MPED had differences over the need and use of technical assistance and because of Government's internal differences over the need and use of technical assistance, the Review Committee, which had been constituted for approval of sub- projects, met only in the early years of the project. As the differences between MPED and Ministry of Finance became more pronounced, MOF failed to appoint the Teamn Leaders of the Ministry's project components and as a result, the implementation of the Financial Information System and the budget reform exercise components were not implemented in a timely manner. The Financial Information Systems Component is being implemented now while the Budget Reform Component is expected to be implemented under the on-going Economic and Financial Management Project. The Uganda Central Purchasing Corporation and the Economic Analysis Unit Components were implemented in a timely manner, inspite of the "internal differences' referred to above. This is possibly attributable to the personal abilities of the then Head of the Economic Analysis Unit and the then Director General of the Uganda Central Purchasing Corporation. 8. The sub-projects covering the Statistics Department and the Agricultural Secretariat were all executed in a timely fashion in close collaboration between MPED, IDA and the Component Managers. C. USE OF ADVISORS/CONSULTANTS UNDER TA m 9. At the time of preparing this contribution to the PCR Government has become aware of the growing debate in development circles and particularly in the Africa Region of the Bank on the use of technical assistance, consultants and long term advisors. The emerging consensus appears to be that expatriate long term advisors are not a successful model in building up local capacity and transferring skills, (and that in future project design this approach should be avoided at all costs). While this may be true for some countries and some projects, the results of this project provide a very different picture in the use of resources. The evidence of the last seven years of Technical Assistance provided under TAIR and TAII clearly demonstrates that the most important factors contributing to successful use of TA involve: (i) Government being fully committed to the project objectives; (ii) close and continuous supervision of the project, performed jointly by Government and IDA; (iii) proper integration of the TA efforts within the overall country dialogue between Government and IDA. These factors determined the skills needed at any time for implementing project components. In turn skill needs were then translated into when and where long term advisors or short term consultants were appropriate. 15  10. A detailed review of the annexes for the project shows that the skills needed involved a considerable mix of long term expatriate advisors; long term Ugandan advisors/experts; and short term consultants. Thus, Government would contend that proper analysis, including assessments of the political context within which the assistance is rendered should be the key determinants for the type of inputs. Had there been any blanket rule against the use of long term advisors for TAIII, undoubtedly the results achieved would have been considerably less. D. EVALUATION OF THE 3RD IDA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT 11. The achievements made under the 3rd IDA Technical Assistance Project speak for themselves. The total credit amount was SDR13.8 million or about US$18.0 million. Of this amount, over US$1 million has been used to procure Computer hardware and software not only for UCS but also for other Government agencies; about US$494,000 was used for the budget reform exercises, about US$2,461,000 was used for strengthening of the procurement agencies i.e. the Uganda Central Purchasing Corporation and Central Tender Board; US$1,510,000 was applied for the rehabilitation and development of the Statistics Department; about US$236,000 was used for the Economic Analysis Unit (EAU) - a unit which played a big role in Economic Policy formation before the merger of the former MOF and MPED. About US$2,430,000 was used by Bank of Uganda; US$613,000 by the Uganda Revenue Authority and US$1,094 by the Ministry of Public Service. All these Government agencies above have been undergoing reforms and are still. The assistance provided for these reforms took the form of technical assistance, training of staff, provision of office supplies and vehicles and in some cases, payment of staff allowances. 12. The project retained a flexible design as the 1st and 2nd IDA Technical Assistance Projects while placing greater emphasis on institutional reform and development and strengthening of the core agencies. As such, other areas/agencies of relevance to the recovery programme were assisted under the project. 13. The Project has been implemented over a period of six (6) years. The implementation, as shown by disbursement of funds over the project life, followed a near normal distribution curve with disbursements at US$0.6, $3.6, $4.8, $4.5, $2.6 and $1.9 in the fiscal years 1988/89, 1989/90, 1990/91, 1991/92, 1992/93 and 1993/94 respectively. The Credit proceeds were fully disbursed approximately nineteen months ahead of the scheduled closing date of December 31, 1995. The fact that we were able to close operations under the project ahead of the scheduled closing date also indicates accelerated project implementation despite the difficulties. In Government's view this record is a commendable achievement given the slow implementation of other similar Government projects. 16  E. GENERAL CONCLUSION 14. The Third IDA Technical Assistance Project has been a tremendous success. Almost all the project objectives were met viz: (a) strengthening core agencies through provision of technical assistance and transforming of skills through training; (b) strengthening of core agencies through provision of vehicles, computer hardware and software etc; (c) provision of special advisory services for the economic recovery programme such as funding of the former Economic Analysis Unit. In order to sustain continuity in areas that still needed further assistance, funds provided under the on-going Economic and Financial Management Project are being used. Government is indeed grateful for this assistance. 17  D. Borrower Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Preparation X Implementation X l Covenant compliance X Operation (if applicable) E. Assessment of outcome Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient x 19  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA THIRD TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (CR.1951-UG) Part III: Statistical Information TABLE 1: Summary of Assessment A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible N/A Macro policies _____________ X Sector Policies X Financial Objectives X Institutional development X Physical objectives X Poverty reduction X Gender issues X Other social objectives X Environmental objectives X Public sector management X Private sector development X Other (specify) B. Project Sustainability Likely | Unlikely Uncertain C. Bank Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient Identification X Preparation Assistance x Appraisal ___ ____ X Supervision X 18  Table 2. Related Bank Loans/Credits Year of Loan/Credit Tide Purpose Approval Status Comments Economic Recovery I Support for economic 1987 Completed in TA III supported (Cr. 1844-UG; measures under the 1991 implementation of US$65 million) economic reform ministerial reviews program Economic Recovery II Support for economic 1990 Completed in TA III supported (Cr. 2087-UG; measures under PPF 1993 implementation of US$125 million) (1988/89-90/91) ministerial reviews, group worker reductions The Second Technical Strengthen Government's 1983 Completed in TA III continued Assistance Project (Cr. economic decision 1993 implementation of 1434-UG; making, planning, and on-going projects US$ 15.0 million) implementation capacities Structural Adjustment I Support GOU's 1991 Completed TA III funded URA (Cr. 2314-UG Stabilization Jan. 1994 set-up; studies in US$125 million) Agriculture, CSR reform Economic and Build greater institutional 1992 Ongoing, EFMP continued Financial Management capacity in key Completion budget reform, Project government expected in UCS operations and (Cr. 2180-UG; organizations. 1999 BOU assistance US$ 29.0 million) I _started under TA III Public Enterprise Assist GOU in preparing 1988 Ongoing, has Project (Cr. 1962-UG; detailed sector plans for led to the US$50 million) finance and industry Enterprise Development Project. 20  Table 3. Project Timetable Item Date Actual Identification March 1987 Preparation November 1987 Appraisal February 6, 1988 Negotiation July 18, 1988 Board Approval August 23, 1988 Credit Signature November 14, 1988 Effectiveness May 11, 1989 Credit Closing December 31, 1995 Credit Completion May 31, 1994 Table 4. Credit Disbursement (US$ million) Cumulative Appraisal Estimate Actual as percent of IDA Fiscal Appraisal | Year Annual Cumulative Annual Cumulative Estimate 1988/89 0.6 0.6 0.325 0.325 54.2 1989/90 3.6 4.2 1.560 1.885 44.8 1990/91 4.8 9.0 5.270 7.155 79.5 1991/92 4.5 1.35 4.992 12.147 89.0 1992/93 2.6 16.1 4.732 16.879 104.8 1993/94 1.5 17.6 1.121 18.000 102.3 1994/95 0.4 18.0 21  Table 5. Project Implementation Listing of Specifically approved expenditures Subproiects SAR Category Brief Description Amount budgeted (UJS$) 2 Expatriate Ugandans MD @ UEB 250,000 3 Ag. sector strengthening FAO executed 2,300,000 4 ERP assistance Phoenix contract at CMB 800,000 6 ERP assistance TA II/III proj. office 61,000 7 Stats. rehab. program Admin. asst. ct. 36,000 8 ERP assistance Pop. Census advisor 100,000 9 Expatriate Ugandans Various ministries 125,000 10 ERP (BOU) Debt monitoring advisor 475,000 11 Rationalize procurement IDBS contract 180,000 12 ERP assistance MPS pro. doc.; Teaching 20,000 13 ERP assistance EAU equipment 52,000 14 ERP assistance Min. of Animal Industries rationalization study 150,000 15 ERP (BOU) OGL advisor 90,000 16 Ag. sec strengthening Advisor startup 3,000 17 Stats rehab. program Local consultant; 25,000 18 ERP assistance EAU incentives 140,000 19 ERP assistance ERC II project office 45,000 20 Stats. rehab. program Local consultants 4,500 21 Ag. sector strengthening Training tour 56,000 22 ERP assistance Training UP&T; o/s 17,000 23 Ag. sector strengthening Training; o/s 13,000 24 Ag. sector strengthening Advisor on coffee 34,000 25 Rationalize procurement Training; o/s 6,000 26 Not used - 27 Rationalize procurement Training o/s 71,000 28 Budget reform Training o/s 13,000 29 ERP assistance Land tenure study 45,000 30 ERP assistance Local advisor, CB 113,000 32 ERP (BOU) Mgt. assistance 200,000 33 Stats. rehab. program OPS execution 950,000 34 ERP assistance PMEU; OPS exec. 1,000,000 35 ERP assistance Study; ERC II 25,000 36 IS Implementation mg. selection costs 20,000 37 Ag. sector strengthening Training; local 44,000 38 Stats. rehab. program Consultant fund 370,000 39 Stats. rehab. program Local consultant 18,000 40 ERP assistance ETF local consultancy 200,000 41 FIS (BOU) Training o/s 11,000 42 FIS (BOU) Training local 68,000 43 ERP assistance Training o/s 16,000 44 ERP assistance Training o/s 11,000 22  45 Rationalize procurement Crown Agents consultancy 2,000,000 46 ERP assistance Northern Study 34,500 47 ERP assistance Training o/s 11,000 48 ERP assistance Training tour 3,000 49 Expatriate Ugandans (BOU) Various Departments 63,000 50 Rationalize procurement Equipment CPD 100,000 51 Budget reform Intl. consultant 71,000 52 Expatriate Ugandan D/G CPD 60,000 53 Expatriate Ugandan MD @ UCB 25,000 54 ERP assistance Training o/s 5,500 55 Expatriate Ugandan (BOU) D/G 50,000 56 ERP assistance Training EAU o/s 7,000 57 ERP (BOU) Warburg consultancy 850,000 58 Expatriate Ugandan MD @ UDB 13,000 59 ERP (BOU) Local consultant 68,000 60 FIS Equipment 200,000 61 ERP assistance MPED supplies 12,000 62 ERP assistance MOF/MPED facilities study 58,000 63 ERP assistance Training PMEU o/s 1,000 64 Rationalize procurement Training o/s 8,000 65 Rationalize procurement Training; local 46,000 66 Rationalize procurement Equipment CTB 50,000 67 Expatriate Ugandan MD @ UEB 13,000 68 ERP assistance MPS G.E. Study 590,000 69 ERP assistance TA Il/Il audit 50,000 70 ERP assistance Training accountants 75,000 71 ERP assistance Study on protection 145,000 72 ERP assistance Consultancy, North. Proj. 15,000 73 ERP assistance Consultancy for AIDS 300,000 74 Returning Ugandan Consultancy 154,000 75 ERP (BOU) Consultant-research 80,000 76 ERP (BOU) Local consultant 72,000 77 ERP assistance Loc. consult. (Northern proj.) 11,000 78 Budget reform Overseas training 25,000 79 ERP (BOU) Interview expense 600 80 ERP assistance Accounts training 29,000 81 ERP (BOU) C/L contract-accts. 200,000 82 Not used 83 ERP (BOU) consultancy; accounts 24,000 84 ERP (BOU) Training; computers 150,000 85 ERP assistance Local consultancy (MPED) 1,500 86 Budget reform Computer training 25,000 87 ERP assistance URA procurement 280,000 88 ERP assistance Land policy training 5,000 89 ERP assistance KPMG @ MPS 250,000 90 ERP assistance Local contract @ UEB 15,000 91 ERP (BOU) Consult; supervision 200,000 92 ERP (BOU) Loc. consultancy; ops. 60,000 23  93 ERP assistance Loc. consultancy EAU 36,000 94 ERP assistance Loc. consultancy MPED 10,000 95 Budget reform Local payment MPED 50,000 96 Expatriate Ugandans BOU 32,000 97 Expatriate Ugandan Ministry of Justice 14,000 98 ERP assistance Study-APT 64,000 99 ERP assistance Road study contract 250,000 100 ERP assistance Training o/s 12,000 101 Budget reform Training o/s 35,000 102 ERP assistance BOU-lawyers 14,000 103 ERP assistance UAC 18,000 104 ERP assistance URA D/G contract 250,000 105 ERP assistance Secretarial training 3,000 106 ERP assistance Legal training 10,000 107 Budget reform Financial training 30,000 108 ERP assistance Financial training 40,000 109 ERP (BOU) Financial training 30,000 110 ERP assistance Legal training 12,000 111 Budget reform Financial training 3,000 112 Expatriate Ugandan Dir. @ UMI 15,000 113 Stats. rehab. Training local 6,000 114 ERP (MPS) Incentive payments 12,000 115 ERP (MPS) Op. costs 30,000 116 Budget reform Equipment 3,000 117 Expatriate Ugandans Accountant (BOU) 50,000 118 Expatriate Ugandan Accountant (BOU) 82,000 119 Budget reform Equipment 10,000 120 ERP assistance Secretarial training o/s 5,000 121 ERP assistance Financial training local 5,000 122 ERP (URA) Short-term consultancy 23,000 123 ERP assistance Financial training local 3,000 124 ERP (MPS) Equipment 30,000 125 ERP assistance Legal training o/s 12,000 126 ERP (MPS) Short-term consultancy 45,000 127 ERP (UCS) Incentive payments 54,000 128 ERP (URA) Short-term consultancy 30,000 129 Budget reform Financial training o/s 5,000 130 ERP (UCS) Consultancy expense 4,000 131 ERP assistance Training inductees (local) 5,021.66 132 ERP (URA) Taxation degree o/s 30,000 133 ERP (BOU) Training local 3,000 134 Not used 135 Budget reform Operating costs 12,000 136 ERP (UCS) Long-term consultancy 240,000 137 Expatriate Ugandan Long-term consultancy 82,000 138 ERP (MPS) Long-term consultancy 115,000 139 Budget reform Financial training o/s 12,000 140 ERP assistance Financial training local 8,500 24  141 ERP (MPS) Training local 6,000 142 ERP assistance Secretarial training o/s 16,000 143 ERP Purchase of UCs mini computers 938,180 144 ERP (BOU) Refund to BOU 106,000 145 ERP assistance Training local 4,100 146 ERP assistance Short-term consultancy 40,000 147 ERP assistance Legal training o/s 10,000 148 ERP Assistance Local consultancy (oil) 4,000 25  Table 5. Project Implementation (continued) Summary (US$ 000's) Classification by Major Beneficiary and Cost Category (Drawn from Project files) FIS Budget Procurement Agriculture Statistics EAU BOU URA MPS Foreign 344 171 2,180 1,984 770 - 2,106 250 784 Consultancy _ Local - - 50 184 136 238 53 170 Consultancy Training 79 148 131 113 200 7 180 30 140 Staff Costs 54 50 - 100 200 140 106 - 120 Equipment 200 10 150 150 100 52 - 380 190 Operating 20 15 - 50 250 - - 190 Costs _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | Total 697 394 2,461 2,447 1,710 336 2,430 713 1,594 Additional use of funds across all beneficiaries: (a) Transportation and local contracts for expatriate Ugandans: $1,334,000 (b) Training beyond beneficiaries listed: $302,000 Major contracts with international agencies have been broken into indicated cost categories on the basis of contract budget. (c) ERP 'other activities' accounted for US$ 3.5 million o Studies $450,000; PMEU $1.2Million; MPED $0.4 million; Agric. Sector $1.1 and other $0.4. million 26  Table 6. Project Costs and Flnancing Sources Planned Actual * IDA US$000's US$000's 1. Consultants' services 9.75 15.00 2. Equipment and vehicles 1.41 1.08 3. Training 1.80 0.75 4. Staff Costs 0.54 0.37 5. PPF 0.60 0.60 6. Unallocated Total 3.90 _ IDA Total 18.0 17.80 GOU 3.0 4.80 Donors 2.0 0.40 Total 23.0 23.00 The SAR projected a formal contribution to the project of US$2.0 from CIDA for use in statistics; in the event this money was not available, but was partly made up with parallel financing from UNDP, EEC, and SIDA. GOU counterpart assistance was provided in kind, rather than funds. No counterpart project fund was established, but internal records were kept of Government employees and activities dedicated full time to the project activities. Total costs under this approach far exceeded the amounts required for counterpart, at an estimated value of US$4.8million. Under "actual" some training is recorded as part of consultancy services, values are converted from SDR's. 27  Table 7. Aspects of Implementation and Project Results A. Expatriate Ugandans who returned from overseas and provided local contracts Name Institution of Work Designation Dr. C. Magimbi Mulago Hospital Mr. Rutta Uganda Electricity Board Managing Director Dr. Bukwirwa Mulago Hospital Mr. Kamusingize Uganda Development Corp. Dr. Kasirye Uganda Railways Corp. Dr. Ndyanabangi Mulago Hospital Mr. Kateba Min. of Natural Resources Dr. Nahamya NRM Secretariat Dr. Muheirwe E.A. Steel Mills Dr. Kironde Ugandan Posts & Tel. Corp. Mr. J. Nuwamanya Prime Minister's Office Miss Mutyabule Makerere University Mr. Turyagumisiriza Jinja Hospital Mr. Tugumisirize Mulago Hospital Dr. Musoke Ugandan Railways Corp. Mrs Sabiti Min. of Natural Resources Mr. Katerega Uganda Railways Corp. Mr. Nsubuga Ministry of Environment Protection Dr. Kamugisha UVRI Doctor Mr. Kayondo Ministry of Energy Commissioner for Hydro Power Dr. Mulinde Papsca Mr. G. Rubagumya Uganda Inv. Authority Executive Director Mr. Turyahikayo Ministry of Energy Assistant Director of Research Mr. S. Kaboyo Bank of Uganda Banking Officer 28  Mr. Kajubi Wsswa Bank of Uganda l Dr. Kiyingi Makerere University Senior Lecturer Prof. Hyuha Makerere University Academic Registrar Mr. Mugenyi Bank of Uganda Bank Secretary Mr. Katimbo M. Bank of Uganda l A. Luswata Bank of Uganda Assistant Chief Accountant Mr. Timothy Lwanga U.C.P.C. Director General John Twinomusinguzi Uganda Development Bank Managing Director S. K. Lwanga Uganda AIDS Commissioner Director General Mr. Tuzinde Kagwa J. Bank of Uganda Consultant Mrs. Rukimirana Uganda Law Society Sec Uganda Law Society Mr. Simon Rutega Bank of Uganda Banking Officer Mr. Mdoe Uganda Airlines Financial Controller Mr. Francis Tyaba Bank of Uganda Consultant Dr. Petero Kwizera Uganda Computer Services Systems Manager Mr. Sempebwa Statistics Departnent Computer Manager Results: 40 returned at a cost of approximately US$1.85 million, including 100+ person years of contracts. 29  Table 7. Aspects of Implementation and Project Results (continued) B. Details of training/study tours provided Details of Training/Study Tours Provided Under TA III Name Course/Tour Location Approx. Actual Cost Cost l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (US$) (US$) Ag. Secretariat Coffee study tour Madagascar 56,000 50,188 1. Dr. Suruma Costa Rica 2. Mr. Kibirango L. Colombia 3. Mr. Kakwano E. 4. Mr. L.E. Eturu 5. Mr. K.M. Agarwal Mr. Nyende Investment appraisal Harvard 17,000 10,870 Mr. Nsimbi Agricultural policy Harvard 13,000 12,809 Supplies Directorate Study tour for Washington 71,200 71,200 1. Prof. S. T. Tumwine procurement 2. Mr. E. Kliza 3. Mr. S.A. Ukkonika 4. Mr. B. Kafuko Waibi 5. Mr. Kubaza Lwanga 6. Mr. E.P.O. Lijala 7. Mr. Mukalazi Kibuka 8. Mrs. Sematiko 9. Mrs. Muguma 10. Mrs. Bigombe B. 11. Mr. Musisi 12. Hon. Butele Wokadala Budgeting Harvard 13,000 12,798 Adv Plan Proj (IBRD) Agric. policy in country 43,900 40,722 30  Isanga Loan negotiations ILI 16,000 15,246 Okwakol Not utilized n/a 10,000 n/a Nsubuga Loan negotiations ILI 11,000 10,860 Kibirango & Tete Stock exchange Kenya 3,000 2,100 Muguma Legal training Inst. Devt. 7,000 7,200 Kimbowa Legal training/procu. ESAMI 4,500 4,346 MPED Budget Accountancy training Glasgow 75,000 76,905 Personnel 1. Mr. D. Kisembo do do 2. Mr. C. Odongo do do Okino 3. Mr. D. Mayito do do Kiwanuka 4. Mr. Kalanguka do do Kayondo 5. Mr. G. A. do do Dhatemwa Ssekandi & Tisasirana Budget Harvard 25,000 26,154 Wokadala Financial management Washington 28,500 29,132 Kitabire Computerized financial Washington 25,000 25,022 analysis Twinomukunzi Land policy Washington 5,000 6,533 Kwarija Tumwebaze Ind. plan. & invest. Bradford 15,000 18,016 appraisal 31  12 Gov't. Officials 120,000 133,280 1. Oluka Budgeting Harvard 2. Anyali Budgeting Harvard 3. Okot Budgeting Harvard 4. Muduuli Budgeting Harvard S. Kayondo Budgeting Harvard 6. Tukei Olupot Budgeting Harvard 7. Basobokwe Alice Inv. appraisal, mgt. Harvard 8. John Bitete Public relations Holborn College 9. Bagyenda Bank restructuring Intados/Int'l. Mgt. 10. Banyoya Budgeting Crown Agents 1I. Ssekandi Budgeting Crown Agents 12. R. Nsubuga Admin. of Justice ILI Lilian Bahihuga Secretarial ESAMI 3,000 8,351 Mutyaba Loan negotiations ILI 10,000 Gov't. Officials __ _ __ _ - 40,000 53,812 Kyazze Loan negotiations ILI Byamugisha Legal training Crown _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ A gents_ _ _ _ Kasande Debt mgt. RIPA Apire Mgt. & accountancy RIPA 40,000 53,812 W. Kabega (DPP) Legal London 12,000 10,350 Mayanja Caroiane Legal (human rights) Strasbourg 3,000 2,513 Kaliba Secretarial ESAMI 6,000 6,168 A. Mulondo Secretarial ESAMI 5,000 8,669 Nyakairu Inv't. negotiations Washington 12,000 11,161 Acul Mgt. appl. for computers Washington 12,000 17,781 32  Kwizera Debt management Warburgs 5,000 6,727 Isanga Degree in taxation UK 30,000 26,875 Kabega Debt management Harare 3,000 1,537 Kitabire & Muhakanizi Economic policy Washington 12,000 7,150 Kyambadde & Admin./secretarial ESAMI 8,500 12,604 Turyahikayo Basemera Admin./secretarial ESAMI 6,000 6,168 M. Ichem Secretarial London 16,000 15,607 Nyago MIS course Arthur D. 11,000 10,363 Little Bahigeine Conf. on Women Judges New Zealand 10,000 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 8,613 Total in US$ 809,600 826,929 33  Table 7. Aspects of Implementation and Project Results (continued) C. Details of Local consultancies and local advisor/consulting contracts Name/Organization Position/assignment Duration/Value Kafura Administration assistant Statistics Department 4 yr contract Sempebwa Computer Specialist 4 yr contract Zake Head, EAU 2 yr contract Prof. Hynha Economist, MFEP 2 yr contract Opio census advisor 1 yr contract Kibirango BOU consultancy 128,000 Lwanga DIG Supplies Directorate 2 yr contract Kayondo Consultant (Engineer) 1 yr contract Suruma D/G BOU 2 yr contract Ssentogo MOF/MPED buildings 58,000 Rutta MD U.E.B. 2 yr contract Lwanga DIG AIDS Comm. 2 yr.contract Affuriate Advisor, BOU 1 yr contract Musoke BOU consultancy 24,000 Musabe electrical engineering 1 yr contract Skill Consult auditing 20,000 Mdoe UAC 1 yr contract Larbi-Siaw D/G URA 3 yr contract Kwizera computing, UCS 2 yr contract 34  Table 7. Aspects of Implementation and Project Results (continued) D. Details of Long- (over six months) & Short-term contracts to individual expatriates (US$ values are given where the contract was not for residency; less than six months, or intermittent). Name Area of Responsibility Duration Value Hodgkinson Co-Director Statistics 4.5 years Crone Census advisor 0.5 year Tanjutco CTA, CSR 4.5 years Gordon Advisor, coffee 34,000 Davies MPS Reform 25,000 Brett Northern region Study 51,000 Kotulus Budget Reform 94,000 Swinimer Computing, BOU 8,000 Porter Supervision, BOU 1 year Raje Systems, UCS 2 years Massutti Capacity Building, MPS 1 year Person years. and total values: 13.5 years at a cost of US$1,860,000 plus US$192,000 35  Table 7. Aspects of Implementation and Project Results (continued) E. Listing of Major Consulting Contracts awarded to international companies/organizations Company Narn Area of Assignment Coopers & Lybrand Accountancy/Audit/Computing BOU FAO Agricultural Secretariat Strengthening Phoenix Associates Coffee Marketing Board reorganization IDBS Assessment of Procurement assignment needs Agrisystems Reorganization of Agricultural Ministries Syviton Financial Sector Reorganization-BOU CSL Debt management/Records at BOU Warburgs Debt management Strategy, implementation Crown Agents Implementation of Supplies Directorate M/S Repim LTD Study of protection/tariffs/trade Computer Solutions Computer Set up/training, BOU APT Study of small scale agricultural industries Scott, Wilson, Kirkpatrick Re-evaluation study for Mubende road KPMG Rationalization of ministries study & work on monetization of benefits Total value of all contracts: US$ 9,145,000 36  Table 7. Aspects of Implementation and Project Results (continued) F. Studies Studies Purpose Status linpact Rationalization of the Support for conditionality of Completed mid Assisted with Ministry of Animal ERC 11 on Administrative 1990 changes to Industries/Fisheries Reform Agricultural ministries, and all ministries Northern Region Study/ Assist Government in Completed late New Project Paper preparing IDA/donor 1990 prepared, became financed project effective 1991 Protection Study Support for ERC 11 completed mid MFEP were able negotiations 1991 to persuade cabinet against restrictive tariffs. Small scale industries Support to Government's completed 1992 assisted ongoing (agriculture) case for free market liberalization of approach in agriculture the agricultural sector sector F. Portal/Mubende Road Provide a basis for detailed completed 1992 road now to be Reassessment costing/economic analysis of built to more cost proposed road effective standards Customs review provide assistance to completed 1992 unit refined in new restructuring of MFEP structure department l Petroleum Study review cost completed 1993 cost savings of advantages/operation of ICB US$5 million p.a., for petroleum identified. PMEU Reassessment provide input for integration completed mid structure/operating of the function into new 1993 mode defined MFEP structure 37  Table 7. Aspects of Implementation and Project Results (continued) G. Major T.A. Contracts: General Performance 1. Civil Service Reform. As previously noted under the Project Completion Report for TA 11, UNDP OPS became more strongly involved in IDA funded technical assistance in Uganda when they took over the contract for assistance to the Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet Affairs from another UN agency, which Government felt were unresponsive to the need for speed, particularly in regard to procurement matters. This sub project was continued under TA III, as was the project for Statistics. Government judged their performance to be more than satisfactory and awarded several other contracts during the life of the credit, for procurement activities and project implementation. These contracts covered procurement of computing equipment for UCS; procurement of a range of items-vehicles, computers, weigh bridges etc. for URA; procurement of vehicles for many agencies within the project scope; and implementation of the Project Monitoring and Evaluation Unit and Economic Advisory Task Force sub projects. The relationship that was developed between Government, OPS, and IDA has been above the average. The flexibility of the modalities offered by OPS was utilized on a case by case basis to meet different needs at different stages of sub project design. Moreover, the quickness of response, the ease of organizing joint missions, and the cost elements of their work all assisted in the achievement of results. Under the follow on Credit, EFMP, Government has extended further contracts in recognition of their performance. 2. Assistance to BOU. The major consulting organization to which this contract was awarded provided significant assistance to the Bank of Uganda (BOU) in the areas of computing and accounting. Early in 1990 a new Governor was appointed at BOU. One of his first tasks was to bring the internal financial situation under control. No accounts had been produced since 1986 and during that time the location of the Bank had been changed, with the result that many records were missing. The local office of the consulting firm was employed, using BOU funds to provide an audit of accounts. It quickly became evident that this was not possible, as no accounts existed. The firm's UK HQ were brought in on a sole source contract to work with the accounting and the MIS department to generate the needed financials. This task was completed, resulting in agreed and audited "Statement of Affairs," (which was accepted by the IMF in lieu of audited accounts). Further, through the work on producing the financial statement many new processes and procedures were introduced into the accounting area, (which are planned for further refinement under EFMP). It should be noted that this work benefitted significantly from the program to return qualified expatriate Ugandans to the country. Five qualified accountants, including a new head of the department were recruited during this time frame. 3. Assistance to CMB. A consulting firm was hired under wide ranging terms of reference to "strengthen the operation of the Coffee Marketing Board (CMB). This approximately US$800,000 contract encountered a number of problems. CMB was in the throws of change, and the new managing director was resistant to some of the policy changes agreed under the Agricultural Structural Adjustment Credit (ASAC), that affected CMB's role and functions. Further, the area of computing and computer operations presented difficulty as CMB did not provide suitable counterparts for training. Towards the end of the contract there was significant discussion between Government (MPED), CMB and the contractor concerning 38  the level of billing in relation to the completeness of deliverables. In retrospect there is little doubt that the policy difficulties relating to significant change in the sector at the time of the assignment, the changes in personnel at CMB, the matter of unpaid invoices, and the weak coordinating mechanisms between the many actors involved with this specific sub project were all partly responsible for a less than completely successful sub project. 4. Debt Management. A UK based merchant bank won a contract to assist BOU in the reconciliation of their debt figures and the development and implementation of a debt strategy. This work, performed over approximately 18 months might be considered not only the most successful use of funds under TA III, but could serve as a model for what can be achieved if there is complete and total agreement and commitment to objectives, and extremely close coordination between the parties. The final result of the work was: (i) the Ugandan Government, advised by the consultant, received the most favorable terms for debt relief ever given by the Paris Club, (1992), and (ii) an IDA funded debt buy back operation was successfully effected. Beyond these specific measurable achievements the consultants also restructured the External Debt Monitoring Unit at BOU; trained several members of staff in computer operations related to data base management and scheduling techniques, and assisted in introducing a transparent system for the decision making within Government for the decisions on the payment of debt. It should be noted that this work was also tied to the work of another consultant, supplied under a different contract, who was working on the disbursement side of the EDMO office, and significant synergy was derived from the two assignments, to the credit of both parties. 5. Procurement. Following preparation work performed by International Development Business Studies (IDBS) to precisely define the scope of assistance needed, a consulting firm specialized in procurement won a competitive bid situation to supply assistance to the Central Tender Board (CTB), and the Uganda Supplies Directorate (USD). The objectives were to help set up the USD, a new organization, and to interlink operations with those of the CTB. Consultants were fielded promptly, per the contract, and work was completed according to the TOR's on time and in an efficient manner. Regular reports on progress and difficulties were provided to the recipients of the assistance, the supervising ministry and IDA. At the conclusion of the assignment USD was functioning in an efficient manner, with senior staff in all the main positions having been trained in their duties and the operation of their departments; accounting, purchasing, and computing systems were installed and documented. Assistance to CTB involved working closely with the Board and setting up systems for the clearance of procurement tenders. The full benefits to Government of the consultancy were never achieved because of the suspension of the Director General shortly after the assignment finished. (Though he was subsequently cleared of the alleged indiscretions he declined to resume his post). This change in continuity at the top of the organization and the cloud cast over USD at the time also had effects upon the staff morale and the ability of the organization to continue with its mandate. However, these matters were not related to the work of the consultants which was judged to be satisfactory. 6. Agriculture (Policy) Secretariat. FAO were given a sole source contract to strengthen the Agricultural Secretariat that operated under the auspices of the Bank of Uganda. The contract, covering 24 months, involved inputs of long and short term expertise, acquisition of vehicles and equipment, and the organization and conduct of training. Under the project several working parties were constituted to tackle different aspects of Agricultural reform. 39  With the three different ministries in the country responsible for different parts of Agricultural policy and implementation the working parties represented the only truly independent source of planning and implementation expertise available to the Ministry of Planning in its efforts to liberalize the agricultural sector. FAO's performance in execution was judged satisfactory; resident experts were fielded mainly on time, and short term experts of appropriate quality were fielded as needed. 7. Ministry of Animal Industries and Fisheries. A consulting organization was contracted to help reorganize the role and functions of the Ministry of Animal Industries & Fisheries, as part of the evolving developments in the agricultural sector, and of the structure of all Government ministries. The consultants report was produced on time, and of a reasonable standard but lacked ownership within government, as it was produced at a time of intense internal discussion on the future of the Ministry, where political issues carried more importance than organizational issues. However, the report did provide a numeric and qualitative basis for later studies under the Civil Service Reform Project. Moreover, it also allowed further discussions on the respective roles and interfaces of the three ministries, which was important in the context of an evolving liberalization policy in the sector. 8. Lessons. Consistent with past practice, established under TA II, discussions with all the contractors were undertaken during supervision missions, sometimes by the TM, sometimes in conjunction with or by the sub component manager, and occasionally with the Project Coordinator. The lessons learnt under TA II and as TA III progressed called for significantly greater efforts to be made to explain to consulting groups the environment within which they were operating and the possible difficulties that they might have to face in achieving stated objectives under the TOR's. Ideally this should have been the responsibility of the Government's project office and the main counterparts; over time they did in fact take on more and more of this responsibility, but the consultants relied heavily on IDA supervision to resolve both general and specific task related difficulties (e.g. questions on housing payments, or questions relating to overcoming obstacles of inter government politics). Another difficulty that surfaced under TA III was the question of responsibility and accountability, on both IDA and Government's side, when a sub project was supporting a sectoral adjustment operation, as opposed to a "macro-economically oriented adjustment operation." In the future if "general" technical assistance operations are to provide assistance to sector specific operations there will need to be a clear up front agreement, on the divisions of responsibility. This has led to adoption of the concept of the "sub project manager", which clarifies operating procedures governing the letting of contracts, reporting, and invoicing. Finally, and most importantly, the consultants need to understand the role their performance can play in the overall dialogue between Government and IDA. The duality of roles-- Government as the contracting party; IDA as supervisory party of the project--can become extremely difficult if not anticipated and dealt with openly at the commencement of an assignment. 40  Table 8. Status of Covenants Covenant Compliance Status 3.01 (a) Borrower's commitment to the objectives Compliance of the project. 3.03 Maintain within MPED the position of Compliance Project Coordinator (to approve sub projects.) Formal requirement dropped as CIDA 3.05 Submit evidence that the Government budget cut; alternative ad hoc financing had secured US$2 million for financing obtained from UNDP/EEC of Statistics. 4.01 Maintain records. Furnish plans, reports, Project records were properly maintained. contracts and other project documents. 4.01 (c) Furnish annual audit report Accounts were audited annually. 41  Table 9. Use of Bank Resources A. Staff Inputs Stage of FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 Project Cycle Preparation 8.0 Appraisal 6.8 Negotiation 2.1 Supervision * 6.5 16.3 8.9 11.2 Total 14.8 2.1 6.5 16.3 8.9 11.2 * It should be noted that between 1989 and 1992, supervision was undertaken in conjunction with TA H. From 1992 to closure, supervision was undertaken in conjunction with EFMP.  Table 9. Use of Bank Resources (continued) B. Missions 1/ Stage of Project Month/Year No. of Persons Specialization Performance Types of Cycle Represented 2/ Rating Status 3/ Problems 4/ Appraisal August 1989 1 PSM I Supervision November 1989 1 PSM 1 Supervision January 1990 1 PSM 1 M Supervision June 1990 1 PSM 1 M Supervision October 1990 1 1 Supervision February 1991 1 1 M/l Supervision May 1991 1 1 M/I ___________________ A ugust_199 1 _______________ __________________ Supervision July 1992 1 1 Supervision March 1993 1 1 M June 1993 Supervision September 1993 2 PSM/TA 1 KEY: Cons=Consultant, PA=Project Advisor, PSM=Public Sector Management Officer, TA=Technical Assistance Advisor. 1 = Minor problems, 2 = Moderate problems, 3 = Major problems. I = hnpact, M = Management.