Docmment of The World Bank FOR OFFClCAL USE ONLY Report No. 13723 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOURTH STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) (CREDIT 2090-SE) NOVEMBER 22, 1994 Africa Region Sahelian Department Country Operations Division This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS Currency Unit: CFA Franc (CFAF) US$1.0 (1988) = CFAF 298 US$1.0 (1989) = CFAF 319 US$1.0 (1990) = CFAF 272 US$1.0 (1991) = CFAF 303 US$1.0 (1992) = CFAF 265 US$1.0 (1993) = CFAF 287 FISCAL YEAR July I - June 30 = Up to June 30, 1991 July I - December 31 (18 months) = For FY 1991/92 January 1- December 31 = Starting January 1, 1993 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB : African Development Bank AGETIP : Agence d'execution des travaux d'interet public contre le sous-emploi (Public Works and Employment Project I) BCEAO : Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Central Bank) CFA : Communaut6 Financiere Africaine (African Financial Community) CIF : cost insurance freight CSS : Compagnie Sucriere Senegalaise (Sugar Company) EFF : Extended Fund Facility ESAF : Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility FSECAL : Financial Sector Adjustment Loan NTBs : nontariff barriers OED : Operations Evaluation Department PAGD : Projet d'Appui a la Gestion du Developpement (Development Management Project) PE : public enterprise SAF : Structural Adjustment Facility SAL : Structural Adjustment Loan SAR : Societe Africaine de Raffinerie (Oil Refinery) SDR : Special Drawing Rights SECAL : Sector Adjustment Loan SMIG : Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel Garanti (minimum wage) SOCOCIM : Societe Commerciale des Ciments (Cement Company) SONACOS : Societ6 Nationale de Commercialisation des Oleagineux (Groundnut Oil Company) SPA : Special Program for Africa TSECAL : Transport Sector Adjustment Loan USAID : U.S. Agency for International Development ZFID : Zone Franche Industrielle de Dakar (Industrial Free Zone) FOR OFFICLAL USE THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U. S. A. Ofrice of Director-General Operations Evaluation November 22, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: SENEGAL - Structural Adjustment IV (Credit 2090-SE) Attached is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on Senegal - Structural Adjustment IV (SAL IV, Credit 2090-SE) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. This PCR does not contain Part ll. Previous attempts at structural adjustment in Senegal, during the early 1980s, aimed to liberalize trade, improve economic efficiency, and promote competitiveness. These early attempts failed in achieving their principal objective which was to restore competitiveness and economic balance. SAL IV, approved in 1990 was designed to contribute to reform in four areas: (a) improvement of production incentives system; (b) reforms in public expenditure, including downsizing the civil service; (c) reduction of subsidies to public enterprises, elimination of their cross-debts, and privatization; and (d) reduction of the transitional costs of adjustment, especially of civil servants who lose their jobs during adjustment. A major target of the program was to reduce aggregate demand by cutting public expenditures. Despite the fact that most of the actions in the SAL were designed to be frontloaded, the Government could not maintain the required fiscal austerity. Opposition from many sources made it difficult to achieve progress in other areas of reform. In particular, the privatization program also failed to live up to its plans. Eventually, the credit was closed before the release of the third tranche. The adjustment operation failed to attain its main objectives, and its outcome therefore rated as unsatisfactory. Sustainability is rated as unlikely. The institutional development is rated as modest. Institutional development objectives were supported by a parallel technical assistance operation designed for that purpose. The PCR quality is satisfactory. An audit is planned. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOURTH STRUCTURAL ADJFUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) (CREDIT 2090-SE) PROJ,ECT COMIPLETION REPORT Table of Contents PREFACE ........ ....................................... ii EVALUATION SUMMARY .................................... iii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ... .. 1 A. Project Identity ................................. I B. Introduction ................................... I C. Background ................................... 2 Initial and Renewed Attempts at Reform: SALs I, II, and III . . 2 Implementation of the SALs ....................... Accompanying Sectoral Adjustment Operations .... ....... 3 D. SAL IV: Identification, Objectives, and Design .........4 E. Evaluation of SAL IV Achievements .................... 4 Macroeconomic Performance ...................... 5 Production Incentives ........................... 5 Civil Service Reform ........................... 6 Parapublic Sector Reform ........................ 7 Social Dimensions of Adjustment .................... 8 F. SAL IV Second and Third Tranches .................... 9 G. Credit Monitoring and Supervision .................... 10 Management and Monitoring of the Program ... ........ 10 Supervision by the Bank ........................ 10 Disbursements and Procurement ................... 10 Auditing and Counterpart Funds ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 H. Lessons Learned ........ . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 11 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ..... . . . . . . . . 13 PART III: STATISTICAL ANNEX ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 ANNEX I: POLICY MATRIX ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Key Economic Indicators ........ .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . 27 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their |official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOURTH STRUCTURAL ADJ.USTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) (CREDIT 2090-SE) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Fourth Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL IV) to Senegal approved by the Board of Executive Directors on February 8, 1990 for an initial amount of SDR 62.4 million (US$80 million equivalent) from IDA. This amount was supplemented by an additional SDR 12.1 million from IDA reflows. The first two tranches of the credit were fully disbursed, with the second tranche released in January 1992. The third tranche was cancelled and the loan was closed in June 1993. The SAL IV Credit was supplemented by US$58 million in co-financing funds from Switzerland, Belgium, France, Japan, and the USA, mostly as part of SPA. ii. This Project Completion Report was prepared by the Country Operations Division of the Sahel Department of the Africa Region. The Bank through its Resident Mission requested the Borrower to complete Part II of the PCR; in spite of a favorable response, the Bank did not receive Part II from the Borrower. iii. The PCR is based on the President's Report, aides-memoire, loan documents, a study of project files, and discussions with Bank staff. In addition, this PCR draws on the report Senegal: Stabilization. Partial Adjustment and Stagnation (Report No. 11506-SE). - iii - REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOURTH STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) (CREDIT 2090-SE) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY A. Background i. As has been the case in several primary commodities exporter developing countries, Senegal failed to adjust quickly once the boom in its export commodities had subsided. This led to substantial macroeconomic imbalances. In response, during the early 1980s, the authorities formulated reform programs supported by the IMF and the Bank with SAL I. These initial attempts were not very successful. However, the mid-1980s led to more satisfactory programs and both SAL II and III were fully disbursed. Nevertheless, despite the important steps taken by the authorities, the competitive position of the Senegalese economy worsened during this adjustment period due to the deterioration of its terms of trade, the appreciation of the French franc, and the competitive devaluations in the neighboring countries. Import liberalization, which constituted part of a comprehensive reform program of the system of industrial incentives in Senegal, could not be achieved while the real exchange rate was appreciating and, little by little, some of the major reforms undertaken by the Government were reversed. B. Objectives ii. To help restore Senegal's competitive position and achieve growth with macroeconomic equilibrium, there were four areas targeted by SAL IV: a) the tax system for the corporate sector, reducing production costs, and reducing labor market rigidities; b) rationalizing public current expenditure by means of downsizing the civil service, increasing its productivity, and better investment planning; c) rationalizing the public enterprise sector through drastically reducing all Government subsidies (direct and indirect), eliminating cross-debts, and pursuing aggressive privatization; and d) minimizing the transitional costs for certain groups in society, in particular civil servants who lost their jobs during the adjustment program. - iv - C. Implementation Experience iii. The design of SAL IV reflected several lessons learned from previous adjustment programs in Senegal. There was greater reliance on up-front conditionalities with more than half of the core conditions required before Board presentation. SAL IV focused on relatively fewer areas than the previous SALs and supported a limited number of critical actions. Overall the achievements of SAL IV fell short of the required objectives. Although some progress was made in some areas (e.g., public enterprise reform, civil service management, and reductions in production costs), much of it was subsequently eroded. Failure to implement the intended reforms led to the third tranche being postponed and then cancelled. The principal problems were unsustainable increases in the wage bill; inability to contain civil service recruitment; failure to privatize SONACOS; and lack of progress toward adoption of the revised Labor Code. iv. The macroeconomic environment deteriorated significantly in 1992 and 1993. Stabilization efforts in Senegal had relied on the compression of demand, primarily through private consumption and public investment, and the gains remained fragile. Furthermore, the majority of these gains had been achieved with last minute fixes and ad-hoc measures on the budget. Thus, in spite of adjustment efforts which had been generously supported by the donor community, the country found itself unable to guarantee employment to new entrants into the job market, its fiscal situation was precarious as arrears had reached record levels, and production costs were extremely high. v. In the area of production incentives, attempts to reduce non-labor costs were largely unsuccessful and the revised Labor Code was never adopted by the Assembly. In an effort to reduce the tax burden on the private sector, the tax structure was simplified with the introduction of a single corporate tax at the rate of 35%. The overvaluation of the real exchange rate continued to be a substantial obstacle and efforts at supporting the export sector were largely unsuccessful as the Government was simply unable to pay the export subsidies which were required to compensate for the overvaluation of the CFAF. As far as conventions speciales (which grant specific tax advantages and protection to selected companies), although SOCOCIM (cement company) was privatized, it retained its convention spe'ciale, but revisions of the agreement with SAR (oil refinery) were for the most part not implemented and no progress was made in renegotiating the agreement with CSS (sugar company). vi. It is in the area of civil service reform and wage bill restraint that the Government's performance has been most disappointing. All gains were subsequently lost; hiring resulted in a civil service size larger than at the beginning of the Voluntary Departure Program and the wage bill exhibited a constant upward trend since the release of the second tranche. vii. The most successful component of SAL IV was in the area of parapublic sector reform. The Government has reduced direct subsidies and eliminated overdraft facilities for PEs. Initial progress was also made in the implementation of measures to prevent the recurrence of cross- debts, but this was not sustained and cross-debts have again accumulated. SAL IV was also initially successful in the area of divestiture but the privatization program lost steam as economic conditions deteriorated. v D. Lessons Learned viii. Senegal's performance under SAL IV was disappointing. Overall goals in restructuring Government finance and resource mobilization and improving incentives in the economy were largely unsuccessful. Senegal's competitive position worsened during the period. ix. The importance of dynamic leadership of policy reform should not be understated. SAL IV attempted to use financial leverage to get the Government to do things it was not really interested in doing. In the areas of the adjustment program where leadership was strong, such as the initial PE divestiture program, significant progress was achieved despite some political opposition. In the areas of the program where leadership was weak, such as in the areas of civil service size and wages, reforms made little headway. Government support for a measure and public understanding of its importance need to be in place if the measure is to be sustained. x. In Senegal, repeated effort at structural adjustment in the form of quick-disbursing budgetary assistance has focused Government attention on the availability and release of these funds at the expense of longer-term development goals. Thus, it remains crucial to design conditionalities with care and to enforce them strictly. Nonetheless, the Government's failure to implement third tranche conditions casts some doubts on the use of time-specific conditionalities. The design of future programs should emphasize well-focused and measurable conditionalities which should not be amenable to interpretation. The design should also focus on the process of change itself by addressing directly issues of ownership and consensus building. xi. Within the context of simpler operations with greater up-front conditionality, the following should guide future Bank support for adjustment in Senegal: (i) Efforts at increasing the rate of departures from the civil service should continue to support fiscal stabilization and efficiency in the civil service. However, the Government should not rely exclusively on external resources and should take more responsibility for the program; (ii) Further progress should be sought in reducing the cost of PEs to the State and to the productive economy, principally through privatizing their management and opening them up to private capital, under conditions of competition whenever possible. This now particularly concerns SONACOS and the utility companies. (iii) In addition to labor policy issues, a number of other factors continue to hamper private sector activity. Excessive regulation, shortcomings in the administration of the law, and financial uncertainty continue to act as disincentives. REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOURTH STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) (CREDIT 2090-SE) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART I: PROJECT REVIEW F'ROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity Project Name: Fourth Structural Adjustment Credit (SAL IV) Credit No.: 2090-SE VP Unit: Africa Region Country: Senegal Sector: Country Operations B. Introduction The Fourth Structural Adjustment Credit to Senegal (SAL IV) in the amount of US$80 million (SDR 62.4 million) was approved by the Board of Executive Directors on February 8, 1990 and became effective on February 22, 1990. The credit supported the Government of Senegal's Medium- and Long-Term Adjustment Program (1984/85-1992/93) and consisted of three tranches, the first of SDR 25 million and the second and third of SDR 18.7 million each. The first two tranches were released and disbursed in full. The third tranche was cancelled before the credit was closed. Three supplemental credits totaling SDR 12.1 million from the IDA Fifth Dimension were disbursed in addition to the first two tranches. The adjustment package supported under SAL IV consisted of a limited number of fundamental policy reforms accompanied by technical and managerial steps to implement them. These were: 1) the improvement in the production incentives system through a reduction in the taxation burden of the corporate sector, the containment of costs of production, and the elimination of labor market rigidities; 2) the rationalization of public current expenditure by means of downsizing the civil service and increasing its productivity; and (3) the rationalization of the public enterprise sector through a drastic reduction of all Government subsidies (direct and indirect) and through aggressive privatization. In addition, the program addressed the social impact of the adjustment program through accompanying operations supporting job creation and shifts in public expenditures towards human resources. SAL IV continued a succession of Bank-supported efforts at adjustment in Senegal, beginning in 1980 with SAL I, and followed by SAL 11 (1986) and SAL III (1987). The Government's adjustment program has received further support through a series of SECALs in the finance and transport sectors. In addition, the IMF has supported Senegal's efforts, first through a series of stand- bys and subsequently through the EFF, SAF, and the ESAF. SAL IV received bilateral support from the Swiss (US$6.3 million released on effectiveness), the Belgian, French, Japanese, and American Governments. - 2 - C. Background Initial and Renewed Attempts at Reform: SALs I. II. and III In response to substantial macroeconomic imbalances which were due to the Government failing to adjust its expenditures once the boom in its export commodities had subsided, the Senegalese authorities formulated a reform program covering the period 1980-84. This program was supported by a three-year Extended Fund Facility and a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I) from the Bank. However, due to incomplete implementation of the programs both loans were suspended shortly thereafter. By 1984, the economic situation had deteriorated further, with GDP registering a 4.6% decline and the current account deficit at 17.3% of GDP. In response to a request for financial assistance and the Government's adoption of its Medium- and Long-Term Adjustment Program (1984/85-1992/93), the Bank approved in January 1986 SAL II, whose principal objectives were to support accelerated growth in production and employment through improving incentives in agriculture and introducing industrial policy reform. Following the Government's request, and in further support of the ongoing adjustment process (the overall economic goals of the Government's development strategy were articulated in a Letter of Development Policy issued in April 1987), the Bank approved SAL III in May 1987. In addition to deepening the reforms initiated under SAL 11, SAL III included measures to improve financial intermediation, the rehabilitation of three publicly-owned banks, the formulation of a population policy and action program, and the alleviation of the adverse transitional impact on employment caused by structural adjustment. ImDlementation of the SALs Difficulties with SAL I led to the postponement and ultimately the cancellation of the second tranche. For both SALs II and III, required tranche release conditions were fulfilled and both credits were released and disbursed in full. In general, despite some delays, a significant number of actions were implemented, with 25 of 39 agreed-upon actions completed during SAL II and 71 of Ill actions being accomplished during SAL III. Under SAL II, a number of important steps were taken on trade reform, including the preparation of a new Tariff Code, the elimination of quantitative restrictions on most goods, the elimination of prior authorization for imports, and the adoption of a new duty drawback system. In the agriculture sector, fertilizer subsidies were reduced and eventually eliminated and free distribution of seed to groundnut farmers was discontinued. In the area of public finance, targets were respected for the number of civil servants, the ratio of wages plus salaries to fiscal receipts, and the settlement of all arrears on external debt. However, little progress was made in reducing the heavy burden of the parapublic sector and in reducing the rigidities of the labor market. The results of SAL III were mixed. Substantial progress was made in the parapublic sector with the liquidation of 9 enterprises and the offering for sale of the Government's shares in 10 others, and the reduction of subsidies to the remaining parapublic enterprises. Regarding public finance, the Government submitted a new Customs Code. Civil service and personnel targets were achieved and the first phase of a tax reform was implemented with the application of a new general tax code. In the area of industrial incentives, a new Investment Code was submitted to the National Assembly, quantitative restrictions were abolished, and a "One-Stop-Window" for prospective investors was established. However, in addition to the delays experienced in the parapublic sector reform and the disappointing results there, there was little progress on agriculture sector reforms, particularly concerning the implementation of the SONACOS interim plan. Despite the reform measures adopted during SAL II and III, Senegal's competitive position weakened during this adjustment period due to the deterioration of its terms of trade and the appreciation of the French Franc, which led to an appreciation of the CFA Franc against Senegal's trading partners and competitors outside the Franc Zone. In the absence of a parity change, a depreciation of the real exchange rate of a sufficiently large magnitude could not be achieved. In theory, the real exchange rate depreciation could have been engineered by a combination of cost cutting measures, appropriate import taxes, and export subsidies and deflationary fiscal and monetary policies. In practice, the longer adjustment had been postponed, the harder it became to follow an internal adjustment path, since the magnitude of the deflationary policies required increased with time. Furthermore, improvements in the regulatory environment and investment incentives were additional steps necessary to restore Senegal's competitiveness. Until the mid-1980s Senegal's trade regime was overly protective, complex, and biased against exports. The trade reform measures which started in 1984 were part of a comprehensive reform of the system of industrial incentives in Senegal. The import liberalization program required the Government to progressively eliminate the NTBs, abolish special tariff regimes, and rationalize the tariff structure. Export promotion was to be achieved through direct export subsidies. The Government implemented the trade reform only partially. Furthermore, the impossibility of undertaking trade liberalization while the real exchange rate was appreciating led to the reversal of the trade reforms implemented by Senegal. This led to a considerable increase in the level of protection and the trade regime remains quite restrictive and heavily biased against exports. Accompanying Sectoral Adiustment Operations The complex nature of macroeconomic adjustment programs placed substantial burdens on Senegal's administrative capacity, and consequently, there was a recognized need to shift from fewer and more complex operations to a series of specific and well-focused operations. In support of this need, the Bank approved the Financial Sector Adjustment Loan (FSECAL) in December 1989 for US$45 million to support bank restructuring/rehabilitation and liquidation, bank supervision and control mechanisms, and credit policy reforms. The second and final tranche of this credit was released in February 1992. By most measures, the FSECAL was a success, leading to a more active role by BCEAO in bank supervision and monitoring, a substantial reform of credit policies, including a reduction in abusive practices (e.g., forced crop credits, Government guarantees on parastatal borrowing) and bank-by-bank credit ceilings, the liquidation of seven banks and the restructuring of two other banks. The Transport Sector Adjustment Loan (TSECAL) for US$65 million was approved by the Bank in June 1991 and became effective in February 1992. This operation is on-going and has sought improvements in resource allocation between infrastructure maintenance and investment, fostering more efficient execution of works through private contractors, and restructuring sector parastatals, putting them on a financially self-supporting basis. The TSECAL has encountered considerable implementation problems because as a consequence of its fiscal difficulties, the Government has not been meeting its local financing obligations. In addition, the Government has continued to undermine the financial position and managerial autonomy of the restructured parastatals. - 4 - D. SAL IV: Identification. Objectives, and Design Despite the progress made under SALs 11 and III, the adjustment process in Senegal was far from complete. A number of obstacles to Senegal's competitiveness remained, including high production costs due to labor market rigidities and high energy prices (which also contributed to high transport costs), deficiencies in the regulatory environment, and high levels of taxation. Furthermore, serious weaknesses persisted in the management of public resources, especially the allocation between wage and non-wage expenditures and the performance of the parapublic sector. Unless these problems were addressed, the likelihood of eliminating the budget deficit and restoring public savings would not be very high. The design of SAL IV reflected several lessons from previous adjustment programs in Senegal. The studies undertaken in SALs II and III and the OED review of the relationship between Senegal and the Bank made it possible to design the actions of SAL IV. There was a greater reliance on up- front conditionality: more than half of the core conditions were conditions required before Board presentation. In recognition of the need to not overburden the Government's capacity to implement the necessary reforms, SAL IV focused on relatively fewer areas than the previous SALs and supported a limited number of critical actions (highlighting the importance of the SECALs as part of Senegal's adjustment strategy). To help restore Senegal's competitive position and achieve growth with macroeconomic equilibrium, there were four areas targeted by SAL IV: a) the improvement in the production incentives system through reducing the tax burden of the corporate sector, containing costs of production, and reducing labor market rigidities; b) the rationalization of public current expenditure by means of downsizing the civil service and increasing its productivity; c) the rationalization of the public enterprise sector through drastically reducing all Government subsidies (direct and indirect), eliminating cross-debts, and pursuing aggressive privatization; and d) the minimization of the transitional costs for certain groups in society, in particular civil servants who lost their jobs during the adjustment program. E. Evaluation of SAL IV Achievements Overall the achievements of SAL IV fell far short of the original objectives. Although some progress was made in specific areas, much of it was subsequently eroded. Furthermore, the macroeconomic environment deteriorated significantly towards the end of the period. Failure to implement the intended reforms led to the third tranche being postponed and then cancelled. The repeated slippage on tranche release conditions and the failure to tackle the more difficult reform components of the program indicated the almost non-existent commitment of the Government to the adjustment program. In addition, quick-disbursing budgetary assistance has become less effective in Senegal as it has had the undesirable effect of focusing Government attention on the availability of such funds to the detriment of longer-term development issues. -5- Macroeconomic Performance Senegal's economy is in a state of acute crisis. The real economy has experienced a serious decline in key sectors since 1990. In particular, in 1991, fish processing declined in volume terms by 66.4% while phosphates declined by 24.1 %. Agriculture production remains flat and traffic at Dakar Port continues to decline. In general, growth performance has been disappointing with real GDP growth registering a 1.2% increase in 1991 and an estimated figure of 2.4% in 1992 (against population growth rates of 2.9%). Stabilization efforts in Senegal have relied on the compression of demand, primarily through private consumption and public investment, and any gains remain fragile. Investment levels remain low at 13.7% of GDP in 1991. The Government lost gains made on the budget deficit which, on a commitment basis and excluding grants, recorded a surplus of 0.2% of GDP in the 1990/91 fiscal year: the surplus turned into a deficit (1% of GDP) in 1991/92 and deteriorated further during the election year of 1993 and total accumulated internal and external arrears were projected to be CFAF 185 billion by the end of 1993. These gains had been achieved with last minute fixes and ad-hoc measures (e.g., payments of tax arrears by certain enterprises in return for offsetting payments of nonbudgeted export subsidies) and illustrate very well the fact that the Government of Senegal was totally unwilling to tackle the adjustment program seriously. The current account has remained relatively constant, moving from 7.5% of GDP in 1990 to 7.4% of GDP in 1992 against a program target of 6.9% for the 1990/91 fiscal year. Inflation has remained consistently low since the mid- 1980s. Thus, in spite of structural adjustment efforts which have been generously supported by the donor community, Senegal finds itself in a precarious position characterized by: 1) the inability to guarantee employment to new entrants in the labor market; 2) the accumulation of Government arrears as a result of structural deficiencies which imply a potentially explosive fiscal situation; 3) the high costs of production in spite of successful efforts to reduce inflation; and 4) the continued dependency on external financing for public investment and budget support. and the overall objective of stabilization with growth has not been achieved. Production Incentives Objectives: improve production incentives by: a) supporting labor market flexibility with a view toward reducing costs; b) reducing input and infrastructure costs to industry (energy, transport and telecommunications); c) improving the investment climate through simplified administrative regulations, appropriate fiscal incentives, and elimination of distortions; - 6 - d) improving incentives for the export sector; and e) not renewing conventions spgciales and revising certain existing conventions. Results: The Government took a number of important initial steps in increasing labor market flexibility, including allowing firms to extend temporary contracts up to 5 years, exempting firms in the industrial free zone (ZFID) from compulsory employer contributions for additional hiring, exempting small and medium-scale enterprises from prior authorization for laying off workers, and freezing the minimum wage (SMIG). The Government pursued a complete revision of the Labor Code drawn up in consultation with employers groups and labor unions. The revised Labor Code was publicly debated and then submitted to the National Assembly, but was never submitted to a vote. As a consequence, despite the increased public awareness of the need for labor market reforms, serious rigidities continue to exist and present an obstacle to the competitiveness of Senegalese firms. Attempts to reduce non-labor input costs to industry met with limited success. Telecommunication tariffs were reduced in June 1990. However, a new transparent pricing and taxation system for petroleum products, allowing automatic quarterly price adjustments in line with world prices was adopted but only used once (precisely at the time of the release of the second tranche) and domestic prices of petroleum remain at more than twice world levels. There has been modest progress in the area of the investment climate with the introduction of streamlined approval for investment requests and an increase in the amounts (up to 40% of production) which firms in the ZFID can sell in the domestic market. In an effort to reduce the tax burden on the private sector, a new corporate tax at the single rate of 35% has replaced all the different taxes to which companies were previously subjected. In addition, a single personal income tax with a maximum marginal tax rate of 50% was introduced to replace a variety of taxes. However, an ineffective tax administration limited the fiscal benefits of the tax reform. Efforts at supporting the export sector have not been successful and exports in volume terms have declined since the late 1980s with substantial production problems in key sectors, notably the fishing sector. The overvaluation of the real exchange rate continued to be a substantial obstacle to improving Senegal's export position in addition to the high input costs mentioned above, and the real exchange rate had appreciated by roughly 20% in foreign currency terms from 1985 to 1991. The inability of the Government to pay export subsidies has also hampered export performance in key sectors. Improved administration of the ZFID and the export subsidy schemes were conditions for overall performance of SAL IV and were largely not met. The Government maintained its strategy of letting conventions speiales expire. Five expired by 1991, five more should expire by 1995, and the remainder will lapse by 2000. As an overall performance condition of SAL IV, the Government had committed itself to a revision of agreements for SAR, CSS, and SOCOCIM. SOCOCIM was privatized and cement prices were reduced by 10%, but revisions of the agreement with SAR were for the most part not implemented and no progress was made in renegotiating its agreement with CSS. Civil Service Reform Objectives: To reduce the high cost and poor performance of the civil service, the Government committed itself under SAL IV to adopt a program with the following components: - 7 - a) reduction in the number of civil servants through a program of administrative restructuring and voluntary departures; b) management of the wage bill within a tightly defined ceiling; and c) further institutional reforms to increase civil service efficiency. Results: It is in the area of civil service reform and wage bill restraint that the Government's performance has been most disappointing. All gains from the program in these areas have been lost and an upward trend continues in the size of the civil service and wage bill. These problems threaten gains made in stabilizing the economy; the wage bill continues to crowd out development expenditures. In addition, public sector wages keep formal sector wages at relatively high levels, inhibiting the reduction in factor costs essential for improved competitiveness. The focus of the Government's attempt to reduce the size of the civil service was a Voluntary Departure Program. The program was introduced with initial success notwithstanding its high cost and resulted in the departure of 3,745 staff from the payroll by the end of 1991. However, the Government was unable to restrain new recruitment and by June 1992, civil service employment stood at about 64,000 against a target of 61,743. Recent increases in recruitment have resulted in a civil service size larger than before the program was begun. Subsequently, the Government has indicated that a further 2,800 civil servants have been identified for the Voluntary Departure Program, if financing can be found to cover the cost of their separation packages. The Government had committed itself to limiting the wage bill to CFAF 126.8 billion in 1989/90 and to maintaining it at or below CFAF 125 billion in 1990/91 and 1991/92. Although the Government achieved the 1989/90 target (through a reduction in the Government's contribution to the civil service retirement fund and the implementation of the Voluntary Departure Program), the wage bill has exhibited a consistent upward trend since then and was estimated at CFAF 132.9 billion for 1992 and at CFAF 132.3 billion for 1993. In addition, although a condition of overall performance was the elimination of arrears on wage payments, arrears such as the ones for automatic promotion have continued to accumulate. The Government did manage to implement most of the institutional reforms related to the civil service. By 1990, the number of ministries had been reduced to 15 from 26 in 1989 through the elimination of some departments. Key departments, such as the Tax Department and the Customs Department, were strengthened. However, the number of ministries has since been increased again to a total of 27 in 1993. Parapublic Sector Reform Objectives: Reform of the parapublic sector followed efforts begun under SALs II and III to support the withdrawal of the Government from enterprises which the private sector could manage better and the improvement in the efficiency of those PEs that would remain under Government control. Toward these ends, SAL IV focused on three inter-related policy areas: a) elimination of direct operational subsidies to commercial PEs and reduction of indirect subsidies to non-commercial PEs; - 8 - b) elimination of cross-debts, allowing for more a more healthy and transparent financial picture to emerge; and c) a reduction in the number of enterprises to remain under Government control. Results: The Government has reduced direct subsidies and eliminated overdraft facilities for PEs. Following settlements of cross-debts between PEs and the Government between 1990 and 1991, debts from non-financial PEs to the Government dropped from CFAF 57.4 billion to CFAF 5.6 billion and debts owed by the Government to PEs were reduced from CFAF 48.9 billion to CFAF 1.2 billion. Initial progress was also made in the implementation of measures to prevent the recurrence of cross-debts, including automatic withholding of resources in the Treasury for enterprises with debt to the Government, a monthly inter-departmental review of financial transactions between the enterprises and the Government, and regularized billing and payment procedures. However, implementation of these measures was not sustained and since 1991 cross-debts have again accumulated, which will require a further settlement of these arrears. In the area of divestiture, SAL IV was initially successful with the complete privatization of 10 companies out of 30 targeted in the program, the privatization of management of 5 enterprises, the liquidation of six enterprises targeted for privatization, and the conversion from leasing to hire- purchase arrangements for 3 other enterprises. In addition, the Government privatized 5 enterprises not included in the program. However, the privatization efforts stalled on the six remaining enterprises, foremost among these SONACOS. The level of success achieved by the privatization program was largely due to its focus on profitable companies, the lack of budgetary support for PEs, and a more transparent privatization process. Unfortunately, the Government insisted on certain conditions in the divestiture efforts which hampered privatization performance, including higher prices and no reduction in personnel. Overall, despite the progress on the steps mentioned above, reform of the PE sector has been slow and not sustained. Important structural issues, such as the regularization of PE-Government financial relations, privatization of the remaining enterprises, and the elimination of interference of the Government in PE operations remain unaddressed. Management of the PEs still in the Government portfolio remains weak; in particular, those companies operating under "contrat-plans" have not realized any significant improvement in performance. Social Dimensions of Adjustment Objectives: To minimize the adverse short-term impact of the structural adjustment process on specific socio-economic groups (primarily through job losses to civil servants and employees of public enterprises), the Government agreed to: a) review the experience of the National Employment Fund and expand it if necessary; b) support efforts by the Bank and the donor community to design and implement innovative job creation programs; and c) monitor public expenditure programs in the education and health sectors to ensure that adequate resources would be made available for primary health and primary education. - 9 - Results: A number of measures in accompanying operations were taken in support of SAL IV to address the social dimensions of adjustment. The Government undertook a comprehensive household consumption survey for use by the Government and the donor community to target assistance to vulnerable groups. Substantial employment and income generation was created through the Bank-funded AGETIP project set up to rehabilitate urban infrastructure through sub-contracting out work to small firms in the private sector. To support an increased public resource commitment to the development of human resources, the Bank included target allocations of Government expenditures for health and primary education sectors in the First Human Resources Development Project. F. SAL IV Second and Third Tranches Overall implementation of SAL IV had been very slow with disbursements lagging considerably behind schedule. To allow the Government more time to implement the reforms, the closing date of the credit was extended from April 30, 1992 to October 31, 1992. Explicit conditions specified by the Development Credit Agreement for the release of the second and third tranches can be found in Annex III of the President's Report. Although some serious doubts already existed as to the sustainability of the macroeconomic and fiscal performance, the Government was given the benefit of the doubt and it was agreed after a supervision mission in October 1991 that the second tranche (SDR 18.7 million) should be released, which amounted to a one year delay, the tranche being effectively released in January 1992. The Bank was aware both of the need to launch the dialogue in a positive direction and that the Labor Code issue could only be resolved if sufficient time was allocated for consensus building. At the request of the Head of State who said he needed time to build the necessary consensus, the Bank showed flexibility by having the credit amended so that the Labor Code conditionality could be moved from the second to the third tranche. The Country Team felt that the Government had met all twelve of the second tranche release conditions in letter if not in spirit. (For example, the Government opted for small reductions in diesel and fuel prices for all consumers instead of more significant reductions to industrial users.) By the time the second tranche was released, there had been significant slippage in the areas of the wage bill and the size of the civil service. There had also been further slippage on the trade front. For example, reference prices had been reintroduced in 1990 to fight under-invoicing and dumping. The manner in which the fiscal position was maintained pointed to future areas of difficulty. The tax base continued to shrink, giving rise to increased reliance on taxation of the energy sector with adverse consequences for the competitiveness of domestic industry; the Government was unable to extend the tax base to the rapidly expanding informal sector. On the expenditure side, overruns on the wage bill were compensated for by shortfalls in outlays on operations and maintenance. Following the release of the second tranche, reform efforts continued to unravel in key areas of the program and the third tranche was cancelled, since key conditionalities had not been met. The principal problems were further increases in the civil service wage bill, the inability to contain civil service recruitment, no subsequent progress made in the area of privatization including that of SONACOS, and no further movement toward passage of the revised Labor Code. The fiscal balance had turned into a deficit in 1991/92 with the wage bill rising to CFAF 132.9 billion for 1992. In addition, the Government was accumulating arrears, which totaled roughly CFAF 80 billion by the end of 1992. The Government increasingly relied on exceptional measures (e.g., the heavy taxation of - 10 - petroleum imports) and on ad hoc measures (e.g., payments of tax arrears by certain enterprises in return for offsetting payments of nonbudgeted export subsidies) to raise revenue. In light of the election cycle (Presidential elections in February 1993 followed by National Assembly elections in May 1993) as well as the desirability of having quick-disbursing funds available in the event of key macroeconomic reforms, the Bank allowed SAL IV's closing date to pass without formally closing the credit. Subsequently, the third tranche was cancelled and on June 21, 1993, the credit was closed. G. Credit Monitoring and Supervision Management and Monitoring of the Program An inter-ministerial committee chaired by the President of the Republic and supported by a technical body, "Le Comite de Suivi des Programmes de Politique Economique" had responsibility for coordinating and monitoring the preparation and execution of the program. Following the first supervision mission, quarterly status reports were changed to monthly reports. However, problems with Government monitoring of the program arose in mid-1991 when the Ministry of Finance was restructured in August 1991 and the structural adjustment monitoring committee was eventually dissolved. Supervision by the Bank Substantial staff resources were devoted to supervision of SAL IV, both in the field and headquarters. Four separate supervision missions visited Senegal during the life of the project. There was continuity of staff in that the task manager responsible for the proposal to the Board led the four supervision missions (although this task manager did not close the project). Co-financiers, in particular the African Development Bank (ADB) and representatives from the Japanese and Swiss Governments, participated in the supervisory aspect of the project through missions and discussions with the Bank. All told, 100.5 staff weeks were spent on SAL IV from its preparation in November 1988 through its last supervision mission in October 1991, comprising 30.0 staff weeks spent on preparation, 32.5 staff weeks spent on appraisal, and 38.0 staff weeks spent on supervision. Disbursements and Procurement The proceeds of the credit were used to reimburse 100% of the CIF costs of eligible general imports, with procurement of petroleum and food imports limited to 20% each of the total credit disbursements. Eligible imports by public agencies and the private sector exceeding US$2 million were subject to international competitive bidding (ICB). Procurement by public agencies for items costing below this threshold followed standard Government practices. Eligible imports below the threshold by private entities were procured in accordance with normal commercial practices. A special account was opened at the Central Bank, the BCEAO, to facilitate disbursements. Upon effectiveness, an initial deposit of $10 million was made. This account was replenished upon the basis of fully documented reimbursement applications in excess of US$500,000 or for smaller amounts on the basis of a statement of expenditures. Retroactive disbursement was permitted for an amount not exceeding 20% of the total credit amount for eligible imports procured no earlier than four months prior to credit signing. - 11 - Auditing and Countermart Funds An accounting firm was used to audit the credit and the use of counterpart funds. Despite substantial delays, audit reports have been received covering the period from effectiveness of the credit to June 30, 1992. The reports found that the audited accounts were acceptable in form and in substance. H. Lessons Learned Senegal's performance under SAL IV was disappointing. Overall goals in restructuring Government finance and resource mobilization and improving incentives in the economy were largely unsuccessful. Almost no progress was achieved in real exchange rate policy and Senegal's competitive position in the world economy did not improve during the SAL IV period. However, the lack of progress does provide lessons for the design of adjustment programs in Senegal and how the Bank can best support these programs. Diminishing Returns to Adjustment Lending: In Senegal, repeated support for structural adjustment in the form of quick-disbursing budgetary assistance has focused Government attention on the availability and release of these funds at the expense of longer term developmental goals. This type of lending has encouraged the addiction of the national budget to such financing. This addiction and a reluctance on the part of donors to enforce strict conditionality only slow real progress on adjustment. This does not necessarily imply that quick-disbursing funds are always inadequate. However, for this strategy to be effective, it must be accompanied by ownership promotion and consensus-building efforts. Further adjustment support operations should include more up-front conditionalities maintained during the duration of the program. Dynamic Leadership and Ownership: The importance of dynamic leadership of policy reform should not be understated. SAL IV attempted to use financial leverage to get the Government to do things it was not really interested in doing. In some cases, key players did not know what had been agreed upon until after signature (privatization, labor code); in other cases they consented in the belief, born of past experience, that the Bank could be persuaded to soften its conditionality or accept symbolic rather than real compliance. In areas of the adjustment program where leadership was strong, such as the initial PE divestiture efforts, significant progress was achieved despite some political opposition. In areas of the program where leadership was weak, such as in areas covering civil service size and wages, reform efforts made little headway. One point not given enough attention at the time the program was designed is that following the 1988 elections, the Government's commitment to adjustment had diminished. Greater strides need to be made in ensuring Government ownership of any future program and in developing stronger public consensus over the measures included. The problems the Government had in maintaining progress on particularly difficult issues, such as the civil service size and wage bill, indicates Government support for a measure and public understanding of its importance need to be in place if the measure is to be sustained. Two cases in point are the revision of the Labor Code, which involved extensive discussions between the Government, the labor unions, and the employers union, and more recently the discussion of the higher education sector. - 12 - Conditionality: In recognition of lessons learned from earlier adjustment programs, SAL IV had a greater proportion of up-front conditions required for Board approval and a stronger focus on concrete actions than previous adjustment credits to Senegal. Nonetheless, the slippage by the Government on many (particularly second tranche) conditions and the failure by the Government to fulfill third tranche conditions before project closure casts doubt on the strategy of setting time-specific conditions. Dated covenants prevent greater flexibility for the Governrment in achieving its targets and for the Bank in assessing the Government's compliance. However, the design of future programs should emphasize very well-focused and measurable conditionalities which should not be amenable to interpretation. Social Impact of Adjustment Measures: The importance of considering the social impact of the adjustment program was clearly evident during SAL IV. The AGETIP operation has been very successful in generating employment, raising incomes, and addressing some of the concerns that the adjustment program was not bringing any tangible benefits. Similarly, the impact of shifting the balance of Government expenditures toward human resource development (pursued under the Human Resource Development Projects I and II) was to provide much more tangible social benefits from the program. However, more work should be done in this area. Results from the recent household survey should provide more complete information that will allow targeted anti-poverty measures to be built more directly into future adjustment work. Donor Coordination: The Government often received what it interpreted to be conflicting messages from various donors and was very good at playing the donors off against each other. For example, the French Cooperation was sometimes at odds with the Caisse Francaise de Developpement and the same was true for USAID and the US Treasury. There was throughout the duration of the project close cooperation between the IMF and the Bank. However, the former insisted more on reestablishing as quickly as possible a sustainable fiscal equilibrium while the latter was more concerned with the long term and restoring competitiveness, and although both objectives were sometimes incompatible, the two institutions implicitly adopted the view that these objectives could be achieved jointly. Specific Lessons: Within the context of simpler operations with greater up-front conditionality, the following specific lessons should guide future Bank support for adjustment in Senegal. * Voluntary Departure Program: Efforts at increasing the rate of departures from the civil service should continue to support fiscal stabilization and efficiency in the civil service. However, the Government should not rely exclusively on external resources and should take more responsibility for the program. In addition, more rigid constraints on civil service recruitment must also be in place to prevent the effects of the Voluntary Departure Program being negated. * Privatization: Although the privatization effort eventually stalled, progress was made in restructuring PEs and in reducing their financial dependence on the State. Further progress should be made in this area, especially concerning the utility companies and SONACOS, even if only the management and not the assets are privatized. * Private Sector Incentives: In addition to labor policy issues, a number of other factors continue to hamper private sector activity. Excessive regulation, shortcomings in the legal framework (e.g., an inefficient judiciary), and financial uncertainty continue to - 13 - act as disincentives. Nonetheless, further progress in this area will depend on a good regulatory and incentives framework being in place. Technical Assistance: There was no technical assistance component of SAL IV, although technical assistance was provided under the Development Management Project (PAGD) and Industrial Sector Restructuring Project to support institutions involved in the reform process. PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE The Bank's Resident Mission in Dakar contacted the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning on July 8, 1993 to request that the Government of Senegal submit comments to this Project Completion Report. No comments have been received. - 14 - PART III: STATISTICAL ANNEX FOURTH STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN (2090-SEN) TABLE 1: LOAN DATA Amounts: SDR 62.4 million (US$80 million equivalent) As of October 14, 1993 (in US$ million) Original Disbursed Cancelled Repaid Outstanding Cr. 2090-0 80.0 59.43 23.97 0.0 61.58 Cr. 2090-1 4.4 4.75 0.0 0.0 4.93 Cr. 2090-2 7.1 6.96 0.0 0.0 7.19 Cr. 2090-3 4.7 5.05 0.0 0.0 4.93 Cr. 2090-0 Cr. 2090-1 Cr. 2090-2 Cr. 2090-3 Initiating memorandum 06/20/89 Letter of Dev. Policy No. 3 12/29/89 Negotiations 12/11/89 __ Board Approval 02/08/90 05/18/90 11/06/90 04/28/92 Credit Agreement 02/09/90 06/11/90 096/27/91 06/23/92 Effectiveness 02/22/90 07/05/90 09/23/91 09/23/92 Loan Closing 10/31/92 04/30/92 04/30/92 06/23/93 Actual completion I I I _ _ CUMULATIVE LOAN DISBURSEMENT (in US$ million) FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 (i) Planned 32.0 56.0 80.0 0 (ii) Actual 30.58 44.4 69.58 76.19 (iii) (ii) as % of (i) 96% 79% 87% 100% - 15 - LOANS RELATED TO THE SAL IV 1. Transport Sector SECAL, Cr. 2266 in the amount of US$65 million Board Date: 6/13/91, Effectiveness: 2/28/92, Closing Date: 12/31/97 2. TA Development Management, Cr. 1910 in the amount of US$17 million Board Date: 5/24/88, Effectiveness: 3/6/89, Closing Date: 6/30/94 3. Industry Sector, Cr. 1868 in the amount of US$33 million Board Date: 12/22/87, Effectiveness: 10/31/88, Closing Date: 6/30/98 4. Financial Sector Adjustment, Cr. 2077 in the amount of US$45 million Board Date: 12/18/89, Effectiveness: 12/21/89, Closing Date: 6/30/92 TABLE 2: MISSION DATA Month/Year Avg. No. of No. of Staff Mission Date Weeks Persons Weeks of Report Preparation 11/88 2.5 30.0 11/24/88 Appraisal 07/89 2.5 13 32.5 07/21/89 Supervision I 05/90 2.0 6 12.0 05/22/90 Supervision II 12/90 2.0 4 87 12/18/90 Supervision III /91 3.0 4 12.0 06/14/91 Supervision IV 10/91 2.0 36.0 10/28/ Completion TOTAL 42 100.5 STAFF INPUT (Missions & Headquarters) (in staffweeks) FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 TOTAL LENA 1.2 LENN 26.7 27 LENP 52.9 69211.2 SPN 41.9 46.0 18.9 1.8 108.6 PCR 3.5 T3. TOTAL 53.5 64.9 162.6 46.0 18.9 1.8 3.5 351.2 - 16 - DISBURSEMENT SCHEDULE AMOUNT DATE (US$ million) |No. 5 1. 03/05/90 10.374 2. 03/29/90 1.749 3. 03/29/90 1.283 03/29/90 1.720 03/29/90 5.763 6. 05/31/90 5.768 06/01/90 3.920 07/17/90 3.957 9. 08/14/90 3.726 10. 08/14/90 (3.726) 11. 07/17/90 (.942) 12. 10/11/90 (.907) 13. 01/10/92 7.771 14. 01/10/92 .091 15. 01/13/92 4.427 16-. 01/13/92 12.892 1 7.- 06/29/92 (11.412) i8. 06/29/92 11.412 1 g9. 07/02/92 1.480 20. 07/14/92 11.412 21. 07/14/92 (11.412) 22. 07/31/92 .082 TOTAL Cr.2090-0 59.434 23. 08/14/90 3.726 24. 07/17/90 .942 25. 10/23/91 .084 TOTAL Cr.2090-1 4.752 26. 10/03/91 6.405 27. 10/25/91 .480 28. 11/04/91 .070 TOTAL Cr.2090-2 6.956 29. 07/24/92 4.797 08/06/92 .220 31. 08/18/92 .031 TOTAL Cr.2090-3 5.048 MTAL: Crs. 2090-0 + 2090-1 + 2090-2 + 2090-3 76.19 SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX Annex I Pace I of 10 i.REFORKMAREAS A (1jECTfMES STATUS9*7 - EETA~lNSAL IVMO RGA IIG(;NYINEA SAU. 1. MACROECONOMIC AND FISCAL MANAGEMENT 1 Financial Stabilization. Continue - Notable progress has bocn maade in recent 1. Redrcss the budgetary position (on a commitnent basis ad excluding to improve the Govcrnmcnt's fiscal years such that the budget deficit went from exteral grants) from a dcficit of 4.0% of CDP in 1988/89 to: and current account operations. 8.2% of GDP in 1982/83 to 2.8% of GDP in -2.9% of GDP in 1989/90 6/90 Overall -4.0% 1987/88 and the current account deficit from -1.6% of GDP in 1990/91 6/91 Performance -0.1% 17.4% to 10.2% over the same period. The Reduce the current account deficit (excluding grants) firom 9.6% of inflation ratc declined sharply. GDP to: -.3% of GDP in 1989/90 6190 Ovcrall -8.4% -6.9% of GDP in 1990/91 5/91 Performance -.9% 2. Current Expesditur. Rcduce the - See civil service and PEa actions. Sce civil service and PEs sections. wage bill and improve allocationa betwoen wage and non-wage expesditurea so as to increas the productivity of civil service. Reduce trnfers to -a. 3. Revenue Mobilization. Improve - A tariff reform was adopted in August 1986 2. Remove the import duty exemption on inputs to textilca, battcrics, 7/91 Overall Not revenue performance and reduce nd a tax reform was initiated under SAL m. and mahes industries. Performance implemented reliance on exccptional rcources Including the extension of the Value Added (profits from import of ricc and Tax (VAT) to new gubecaon raad the petroleum) by shifting to a more stable simplification of direct taxation for revenue ba. individuals ad companies. Further to a sharp decline in customs collections in the econd half of FY89, on an ceptional and temporary basis, tariffs have been raised by 5 percentage points across the board in September 1989 for a two-year period. - A plan of action was developed on the basis 3 Implemcnt the domestic tax and administration scwtor program, in Continuous Ovcrall Implemented of a study of the domestic tax syetm and particular extend VAT to services and commerce, and reduce the Performancc administration in collaboration with the IMF under-invoicing of imports by introducing a minimum duty on under- and the World Bank. The tudy aimed at (i) invoiced items. reducing the dependence on taxation on energy and (ii) identifying other sources of revenue 4. Implementation of an action plan to improvc customs administration, 9/90 Overall Partially without overtaxing the modern sector (July 1989). particularly the valuation sections and the computerization of Performance implemented customs clearance procedures to roduce fraud. - Implementation of tax adminisrtiuon measures 5. Take dock of arrears and reinforce the mechanism of their recovery Continuous Overall Not aimin at improving tax collection. These through computerization of information. Performance implemented mcsures, patticularly the in the ar of ceuoms, were identified umder SAL IIL SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX Annex I Page 2 of 10 REFORM AREAS & O*JCT(E STATUS & ciEt ALVrhION r _ W J 4. Public Investment Programmiag - Basic principles of projects planang and 6. Improve the preparation of the three-year rolling public investment 6190 Tranche II Implemented - Coauolidate the process of preparation are well eatablished (3 PTIPs have program by consolidating PTIP with recurrent budget and beaer budgeting alrcady undcway to brcn satisfactorily reviewed by the BasLk defining sector stratcgies: and adopt for each year an investmcat achicve greatcr efficiency of includiag that for 1989/90-1991/92). Studies program in consultation with IDA. public investment. are under way to take into consideration the 1990/91-1992/93 recurret cost impact of the PTIP in four 1991/92-1993/94 6/91 Tranche m Implemented sectora (Education, Health, Hydraulics, and Transport). A guide for project analysis (for productive projects) have been completed and is being diaseninated. 5. Financial Sector. Improve the The Govemnet is currently implementing a financial intermediation procea. financial sector reform program with the support of IDA, France and USA. 0x SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX Annex I Page 3 of 10 REF(IR MU~A & OUCflVES 6TATtJN & Wum:N AMrON. ~ 94L IV NCM.O RGA IIG VN~lNFR 0AU H. PRIVATE SECTOR INCENTIVES 1. Removel of labor market ngiditics - Two aspects of labor code bave been changed I Expand significantly pouibility of using fixed-term contract by 10/89 Board Preseat. Partially and reduction in labor costs, under SAL nI which allow employers to (i) hire (a) passing applicatioa decree to the Labor Code to cover existing implemented without using the 'Service de Is Main d'Oeuvre: firms which are expanding: (b) modifying the Investment Code to and to (ii) expand somewhat use of fixed-term allow firms to use reewwable fixed-term contracts of up to 5 year employment contracts, and exempt SHEa from prior authorization for laying off workes, and (c) modifying the ZFID satute to enable enterprise to benefit from most favorable conditions under the invetmeat code. 2. Reduce labor cost by freezing the SMIG for 3 years and exempting 10/89 Board Present. Implemented ertain enterprises from both *eontuibution forfdtaire' and payment for the of income tuxes on their employeea. ZFID only 3. Review the country's wage atting system with the view to move 9/90 Tranche H Implemented towards market determined wages. Participation of employers and labor organizations will help solidify practice of realistic negotiations and dialogue among social partners. 2. Reduction in production costs other - A number of studies have been completed in 4. Amend the special agreement with SAR on term and conditions 12/89 Board Present. Implemented than labor, the energy ector. They cover audit of SAR, acceptsble to IDA and publish a decree to that effect reflecting a but pricing the system of procurement, refining and new transparent pricing and taxation system for petroleum products. system used distribution of petroleum products, and the Under the new system, ex-SAR prices will be se at import parity only once fil aspect of puroleum practice and taxes and adjusted quarterly. In addition, SAR will be paid a handling (IMF/Bank study). fee to be negotiated with the two parties concemed. 5. Reduce, in consultation with the World Bank and IMF, energy priccs - First phase 7/90 Tranche 11 - Subsequent actions 1990/91 Oveal Implemented Pcrformance - Off-peak telecommunications charges reduced 6. Reduce further telecommunications prices for peak and semi-busy 6/90 Overall Implemented by 20 % from July 1, 1989. hour periods, and tariffs for the port of Dakar. Perfornance - A tudy is underway to formulate appropriate tariffs for the port of Dakar. 3. Improvement in investment incentives - Establishment of one-op services for 7. Study and implement measures aimed at simplifying the administrative and in the regulatory eavironment, investors (Guichat Unique). regulations for doing busineu in Senegal and for the strengthening of fiscl administration (D1ID). - Prepare plan of action based on the findings of the study. 11/89 Board Preent. Implemented - Implement plan of action. Continuous Overall Partially Performance implemented - Resructure DGI) and improve operating procedure. 9/90 Tranche L Implemented S. Prepare and implement an action plan for reducing the marginal 12/89 Board Present. Implemented effective tax rate, following the findings of the corporate taxa- tion study and the implementation of the new direct tax tructure. SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX Annex I Page 4 of 10 -i-- i*i! ! ~~~~~~~~~~~~~RCETA -! - ------ - Implement plan of ction Continuous Overall Implemetd Performance - Etablish single peronal income tax, sepaa corporate tax 1/90 Tranche 1 Implemented and eliminate PBE. 4. Promotion of export. - Duty drawback scheme nd export subsidies 9. Revise legislation of ZFID and improvc administration to eliminate introduced undcr SAL I and rationalized undcr contraints to its expanion. SAL U. - Implement ction plan 7/90 Overall Implemented Performance 10. Revie effectiveness of duty drawback scheme and administration 12/90 Overall Implemented and structure of export subsidy scheme. Implement findings of the Performance review. 5. Special Agreements. 11. Implement a plan of action revising the SOCOCIM special agreement, 6/90 Overall Not in particular the pricing system. Performance implemented CD SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX AeX I Page 5 of 10 .:: . AREAS & .................T....... STATU7 & ECLNT A=1ON SA4L; IV AMON PR-OORAM-ft, FO m. PARAPUBLIC SECTOR REFORM (PEr) 1. Subsidy Reductions. Improved - A program of direct operating subsidy 1. Elimination of direct operational subsidy to commercial PEs and financial relations between the reductions bha been agreed under SAL m Reduction of direct operational subsidy to non-commercial PEs State and the Parapublic Sector and ad Implemcnted according to the following (excluding CDUD). The budgeted and actual total amount should reduction of the burden on public schedule: not exceed: finances. 1986/87 5% reduction vis-a-vis 1985/86 amounts CFAF 9.9 billion for 89/90 for non-commercial PPs 7/90 Trancbe nI Implemented 1987/88 15% reduction vis-a-via 1985/86 amounts CFAF 9.1 billion for 90/91 for non-commercial PEs 7/91 Tranche Ill Implemented 1988/89 30% reduction via-a-vis 1985/86 amounts CFAF 7.4 billion for 91/92 for non-commercial PE. 1989/90 50% reduction via-a-vis 1985/86 amounts . CFAF 0.6 billion for 89/90 for non-commercial PEs 7/90 Tranche nI Implemented CPAF 0.3 billion for 90/91 for non-commercial PEs 7/91 Tranche I Implemented CFAF 0.0 billion for 91/92 for non-commercial PE. - Government has issued circulr discontinuing 2. All future Capital Increases should be either in the form of Continuous Overall Not practice of equipment subsidice. As of July long-term loam or equity injections as appropriate and should be Performance implemented 1989, pnrctice of allowing PE. to have over- subjected to the same criteria as the rest of the PTIP. dafts has beca discontinued. 3. Transform stock of overdrafts as of June 1989 into longer term 7/90 Overall Not loans and write off the pant that cannot be paid by non-commercial Performance implenmcted enterprises. Cross-debts between the PEB and the State were 4. Develop an ction program satisfactory to the Bank to sete all 12189 Bosd Implemente deteriorated up to the end of 1986. Timetable crosebts as of December 1989. The progrm should include Presntation has been established for their setclment. mcasures to prevent the recurrence of cross-debts. Governmcat eliminated indirect financial 5. Cancel all undisputed cross-debts, ttdle all disputed cross-debts, 9/90 Tranche 11 Implemented subsidies through (a) abolishing Govcrnment write off all debts of non-commercial PEs to Government as of guarantes on PE domestic borrowing and (b) December 31, 1989; include in the 1990/91 budget at least one third charging commercial interest rates on on-lent of all debts owed by the Government to the PEr, nd assure sttle- foreign debt. ment of at lcat one third of all debtU owod by commercial PEB to the'Government as of December 31, 1989. 6. Include in the 1991/92 budget at leat one third of all debts owed 9/91 Tnache HI Implemented by the Govcrnment to the PEs and assure sttlement of at least one third of all debUt owed by commercial PEB to the Goverarnment as of December31, 1989. SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX AnseK I Page 6 of 10 REFOIRM AREAS & oBjEcTIvEs STnAT(*WW & RCEh AiA=10-I SAL.:: IV. :AM W PrM0-GRAM T 4 O oNi FM WTATUS h 2. Privriization. Withdrawal of the - The liquidation of 7 SBis and 2 Etablisso- 7. Complction of all preparation and formal offer for sale in a manner Statc from non-strategic PEa by ments Publics was finalized in March 1989. atisfactory to the Bank of: mean of privatization and liquidation. - 20 SBis were selected for privatization and - SIDEC, VACAP, SAIH, SERAS, SNSS, SENPRIH (Project), SONED, 12/89 Board Implemented 10 were nnounced for sale in October 1987. SENHOTEL Presentation Shars in two of the companies on the list and in one other company were sold and those of a - SIPOA, SINAES, MAMO, DAKAR MARINE, IRANSEM, SODEME, 9/90 Tranche nI Largely fourth company were offered for sle in the Fruiticr Mboro, ONCAS, BICIS implementd third quarter of 1989. - SOTEXKA, SICAP, BMS, SODIDA, SODBZI, SODIMI, SODISA, SO 9/91 Trache m Not - Governmncat has cadorsed a srategy for SONEPI, SIAS, SEPPA, SOMADIS, SONACOS impiemented privstamtion aimed at vithdrawal from al non-drategic PEs. S. Liquidations - Government has decided on five PEa for - Liquidation decee signped, employoa laid off and all 6/90 Trache iL Implemented liquidation, operations sopped for five enterp,rim to be liquidated. - Signature of liquidation decreem for second group of at lstw 6/91 Tranche m Implemented 5 PEs, employees laid off and all operations stopped. 9. Undertake stdy and act on recommendation for the creation of 12/90 Overall Not scondary markct for sbame. Performance implemented 3. Rehabilitation of PEs. Maintain - Etablissements Publics (EPs) were converted 10. Rehabilitation program and contract plans Continuous Overall Implemented efficiency and performance of those to Socidtds Nationales (SNs) in 1987. Improving - Include all subsidy reductions, cross-debts settlment and Performance PEs to remain under Goverwnent their management autonomy. other financial transations with Government in the CPs. control by mean of rehabilitation sJ plan and the contract-plan (CP) - Rehabilitation programs werc prepared for - No CPs will be in force without identification of resources Continuous mechanism. SOTRAC, SONATEL, SONERS ad SENELEC. in the current and following year's national budget to finance them If neccasary, CPs will be renegotiated annually, according - CPs werc signed for SOIRAC, SONATEL, SONEES, to the budgetary resources available. SENELEC, and Lettres de Misions (LM) werm signed for SODAGRI, SODEVA, SODEFITEX, SAED, - Prepare program and begin impleamtation for NIS, DRTS, 1ITA, 6/90 Overall Patially and SOMIVAC. SICAP, OMLH, PAD, AND RCPS. Performance implemented - Sign CPs for OMLH PAD, RCFS, DPCE and SONATRA. 6/90 Overall Partially Performace implemented - Submission of revised CPs consitent with regard measures to 7/90 Tranche 11 Implemented reduce subsidies and scttle cross-debts. - AH new CPs to include performance iaceatives bonuses for PE Continuous Overall Partialy manager. Performance implemented - Honor all financial obligations of Government within the CPs. Continuous - The DRSP will advise on the necessary measures at enterprise Continuous Overall Not level program to ensre compliance with agreements. Performance implemented SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX Annex I Page 7 of 10 REFifSR4<BA- & -TAT & AT FO 4. Sector Management, Legal and - Thc Contract-Plan Cell was upgraded in lunc 11 Strengthen institutional framework for Pe reform. Institutional Rcform. 1987 to the Delegation of Parapublic Sector Reform (DRSP) and hu recently been provided - Maintan the tafring and financing of the delegation for PE Continuous Ovcrall with new premkisA and additionl staff reform (DRSP) to allow it to continue formulating, manging Performance implemented and monitoring the PE reform program and to maagc a pcrformance incentive system for PE mag err. - Retain spelist advice in the form of long-tern TA and short-term conaultants to help with audit, evaluations, negotiation nd sale of PEs to be privatized Implemented - Studies on the organization and functions 12. Strengthen parapublic cell in Ministry of Finance to enable it to 3/90 Overall Reversed of the upervisory agenciea were completed in monitor all Government/PB financial transactiona. Crete an Performance later March 1988. information system which will work alongside that of the DRSP and be compatible with it. Deaign and implment sytem. 13. Amcad and publish parapublic sctor law (87.19) so as to: - Eliminate special controla on mixed economy PEs (SEMI) in which government is a minority patner and on private ector companies receiving financial support from Government. E Bliminate the right to vote on PE board decisions by linancial Controller of the Preaidency (CFP). - Limit the role of the Office of Organization and Methodsa (BOH) in the PE sector to responding to specific requet a from the Boards of Directors. - Rcstrict the role of the Audit Commission (CVCCEP) to a posteriori auditing of PB account. - Transform all commercial public establishments (EP) into socidtds nationales (SN), and turning all administrative and non-conumercial EP to the central administration. Closing down the center for public establishmcnts CEP) which includes the ccntral accounting agency (ACC) and the controller of financial operations (COP). - Modify the composition of all PE boards of directors to include in each cae at leas two persons nominated because their capabilities ad qualifications and not bcause of their positions in the adminisration or their representa- tion of interest groups. 14. Pul impeimenation of cloure of ACC/CDF and changes to all PE 12/90 Overnll Not Board of Directors. Performance iple-mentd SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX Annex I Pace 8 of 10 IV. CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 1. Overall objective. 1. Prepre an action plan in consultation with IDA to reduce the wage 11/89 Negotiations Implemcnted bill and improve civil service management. The plan is to include in particular the measres described below. In addition, the Government is committed to maintain, beyond 1992, the number of servants below 1991/92 levels, and the wage biU below 40% of revenues. 2. Staff reduction. No new hiring, except for replacement and 2. Reduce the number of civil ervants through a program of reduction, in the number of intake from administrativc restructuring and voluntay departure. training chools. A number of studies have Implemented been completed by the Government, namely the Implement the restructuring plan reducing the number of 3/90 Overall later July and November 1989 BOM reports which miniatriea from 26 to 15. Performance reversed focus on the restmucturing of the current administration. Partially - Reoduce the number of civil servants by about 4,300 through 6/91 Overall implemented voluntary departure, restructuring an early retirement by Performance latcr reversed June 1992. - Privatize selected services thus reducing the civil sevice by 12/91 Overall Partially another 1,800 staff. Performance implemented - Eliminate from the payroll all irregular cases identified by 6/90 Overall Implcmcnted the second staff census. Performance - Ensure that recruitment does not exceed the following: 6/90 Tranche 11 Implemented - 435 schoolteachers, and 27% of program departures in the non-education ectors for 1989/90. At a minimum, there will be 584 net staff reductions by June 1990. - 681 schooltechers, and 30% of program depature in the 6/91 Tranche M Not non-education sectors for 1990/91. implemented - 797 schoolteachers, and 50% of program departures in the 6/92 Ovcrall Not non-education sectors for 1991/92. Performance implemented 3. Wage bill reduction. Staff Census completed in 1987 and updated 3. Control the wage bill and improve its management. in 1989. Audit of completion of wage bill completed in September 1989. - Keep wage bill at or below following ceilings without any areuar as of July 1, 1989: - Realize CFAF 126.8 billion in 1989/90, and budget no more 6/90 Tranche 1 Implemented than 125 billion for FY 1990/9 1. - Realize CFAF 125 billion in 1991/92, and budget no morm 6/91 Tranche m Not than 125 billion for FY 1991/92. implemented SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX Annm I Page 9 of 10 - Update the administrative status of all civil servants, 4/90 Overall Implemented determine the toul amount of back pay adjuument required, Performance and set a timetable to clear them. - Roduce Government's contribution to the Employee Pension 7/90 Overall Implemented Funds from 20% to 15 % of bawe slary. Performnace - No salary increnae until June 1992, with the exception of Continuous Overall Implemnted performance incentive bonus to be determined independently Performance from the bae salary index. - Allocae all economice on the wage bill (definod as the Continuous Overall Implemented diffcrence between the above-mentioned ceilings and the Peformnace actu wage bil minus arrea setlement, government contnrbutions to the separation packages and incentive bonuses) to the following, in that order. setle pay arrears; contribute to separtion packages; and increae bonues. 4. Improve civil service mn agement Major groundwork has been completed under the 4. Adopt and implement all institutional measures required to cArry systems and monitor the reform Developmeat Management Project. This includes out the reform. program. organizational study of Civil Service Directorate, completion of a payroll processing systm (3/89), - Adopt texts redefining the roles nd functions of the 4/90 Overall Implemented review of civil service policies and sectoral ectoral personnel units (DACE and SACE). Performance personnel units (5/89). The status of the Centrl Payroll Agency was raised to that of - lmplement new regulations governing National Training Schools 9/90 Overall Partially Directonte in September 1989. (Ecoles Nationales de Formation), in particular those putting Performance implemented s an end to automatic recruitnment in the civil sevice. L-n - Harmonize special statutes with the general statute of the 7/90 Overall Not Civil Service, ad define the new indemnaity and bonus system Performance implemented (In consultation with the Bank on the principle of fixed amounts independent of the base salry). - Implement organizational chart and staffing for the Central 4/90 Overall Partially Payroll Directorate (DCS) and the Civil Service Directorate Performace implemented (DFP): and conputerize DCS operations. Establishment of an Inter-agency Steering 5. Manag the Civil Service Program. Committee in Nov. 1987, and a task force on Automatic Data Proccsing in Sept. 1988. - Establish a Steering Committee (Comite de Pilotage) to 1/90 Overall Impiemented monitor the restructuring and voluntary departure program. Performance SENEGAL: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (SAL IV) - POLICY MATRIX Annex I Page 10 of 10 REFO1 *MAN4,S &< k ECTI - 'N STATUS &JIES4IG CONDITN FORE: S TTWIWS V. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT 1. Job Creation and Poverty AllCviation. - Creation of the 'Deegation a *Insertion I. Rcvicw experience with the FNE/DIRE program with a view of 12/89 Ovcrall Implementod a la Reinsertion et I'Emploi- (DIRE) expanding the program if doomed succeusful. Performance Esablishment of a Nationa Employment Fund (FNE) and of a Special Employment Fund. - Implement a public works and employmeat project in urban Continuous Employment Implemented areas with donor. support. Project 2. Based on estimate of demand for health and primay oducation 8/90 Overall Implemented services by urban and rural poor, propose satisfactory reallocation 8/91 Performance of public expenditures in thee subsecton to be incorporated in 1990/91 and 1991/92 budgets. 2. Population Policy and Human Resources - Statement of population policy was prepared - Revise existing legal document related to family code 12/89 Overall Not under SAL H. An adjustment program for the planning and economic rights of women. Performance implemented human rcources sector is being formulated. Prepare and implement actions contained in the HR SECAL Continous HR SECAL Implemented according to the timetable sA in the SECAL. 3. Monitoring the impact of structural F inancing was arranged in order to cstablish - Establish the survey unit at the Diroctorate of Statistics Overall Implemented adjustment. a permanent survey capacity and to catry out to design the permanent household survey. Performance soeio-economic tudies Methodology of the survey was agreed with Directorate of Statistics. - Establish regional offices to carry out dat collections. Implemented < Sampling frames and classification of households C into socio-economic groups was completed. Set up a dta analysis unit to produce results on the Impiemented sandards of living of households. Identify aocio-economic studies related to household behavior 12/89 Implemented AZ-SAL V.XLS - 27 - KZey EcTnc Irdicators Page 1 of 2 ti3 Wg t9C 1971 1992 1995 --------------------------------------------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- Est. NATIPL AMNTS (as % of GP at oes3 t 1s ' prices) GDP tCO.O 1wm.o 10.o 100. l.o lCO.O PrinEry sw:tar 22.6 2D3 21t2 203 202 19.5 Sndrysatr 1&4 183 1&5 88 19.2 19.1 Ta-tiary swtor 59.0 61.4 60.3 60.9 60.6 61.4 Carpticn 94.0 54.9 S&4 Sk.4 95.0 S5.1 G-ms d3tesic irwestrnt 1/ 12.3 12Z5 120 12.2 12.3 12_S kbJic fixed irwestus 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 PirNete fixed irwm t 8.4 8.5 83 8.5 L6 843 Resrce baLar -6.3 -6.0 -5.5 -6.5 -7.1 -7.6 E4rrts (FS 23.8 25.5 Z.6 24.7 23.7 23.8 Its (NFS -30.1 -31.5 -31.0 -31.2 -30.8 -31.4 Gss etic sEwirgs 6.0 5.1 6.6 5.6 5.0 4.9 Mm Item: GDP at nLp. (arrat LE ailLiaX 4979.2 4621.5 5701.8 563.5 6276.5 57E4.0 GDP pr cWita (aj,wt U) 714.6 644.5 770.1 7D.6 8)1.3 707.7 AuW adwW rate (CFAAMS) 297.9 319.0 272.3 22 2E5 2es.s PAIC FIWN (as X of CDP at o.rrvt nat pices) 2V CeiMut rue.e (eIl. g7u ) 18.6 17.2 19.2 18.9 17.7 t5.7 Total eqditre ard ret tl.rg 20.6 21.5 188 19.9 21.3 19.6 DA3aLl szphls (+) w cficit (-) -4.0 -4.4 0.3 -1.0 -3.7 -3.9 CQital eaditu-e 2.8 2.6 2.8 4b 5.0 4.0 WA AiNU4 GIlJTH RATES (SB' price) 0 G-;s cbTestic Frclrt 5.1 -1.4 4.5 0.8 2.9 - -2.0 Grss drestic irm 3.0 3.0 5.5 0.3 2.7 W L A4bPL PR CbPITA OIH RATES (158' pices) 00 a-Ms cJ;tic pcdrt 2.1 -4.4 15 -2.1 0.0 -4.9 Totat crrsjptic 0.9 -3.4 -03 -12 0.8 -4.7 Private c Tption 1.6 -4.2 0.3 Ob 1.6 -52 K3ETARY I0IDATCRS Velocity (GAP/Pe) 4.4 4.0 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.9 rate of QC ) 03 10.3 -4.8 5.8 3.6 -12.6 - 28 - Key EcaTfic Irdicatas (ctl'cD 1StB S8 19Y0 1R 19;2 wB 94ANLE OF PAYMGS (cuarTt CFA BiLlias) Epts GOFS 344.5 40.3 4M.9 391.0 3763 363.5 of which: Mudaise f.ob. m1 a42.0 a3uA Z52.3 219.2 ZB.7 Irpts O FS -440.8 -.5.1 -476.8 -477.5 -479.1 -474.0 of ihich: Nedwdise f..b. -2 -319 -317.0 -314.3 -317.7 -32.0 e=c blata -963 -8Z.8 -75.9 -W. -10.8 -110.5 Net fatr FaO-nts -72.0 -61.2 -64.0 -54.2 -53.0 -5.1 of Wchi nes: 1 t cLM ca) 61.6 54.5 55.0 46.1 44.0 44.7 Net cLrrut trwfers (pHiete) 1.8 2.0 8.0 8.0 9.7 11.4 Qrnwt Accourubt ., hfe off. tws -166.5 -142.0 -131.9 -L2.7 -V46.1 -153.2 Net officiat tr-sfes 81.2 8.9 72.2 74.8 74.1 6'.9 OxTeit Accxi tat., of off. o . ti-3 599.1 -59.7 -57.9 -72.0 -53 CAPITAL APcnw 12.3 33.6 35.3 134 37.5 6.5 P.b(ic Setor (tr 34.5 40.8 11.8 164 37.2 25.3 Dnw* 95.0 1l2.9 80.4 69.8 7a9 6o.3 rrtizatian -61.5 -Q.1 -66 -53b -41.7 -41.0 Prhete Swtor (ret) -23.0 -4.7 -3.4 -1.1 -9.8 -15.3 Ernrs ard Qmssia-s 0.8 -2.5 2.9 -1.9 10.1 -1.5 oeraLl baLrre -73.0 -25.5 -244 -44.5 -34.5 -7m8 FINANlCIM 73.0 25.5 24.4 44.5 34.5 78.8 Net ForeignAsw B3O) 39.1 -30.2 -17.9 -4.0 -5.4 31.7 qmraticu r.rt ad oter aB.7 -31.8 -10.7 -7.1 6.3 39.4 Not e d Fu d resarc 0.4 1.6 -7.2 3.1 -11.7 -7.7 PeAuis asws (r:iin -) 0.0 11.4 -7.5 5.6 27.4 37.3 Ode reief/Lferrat 33.9 44.3 49.8 42.9 12.5 9.9 Firmcirg p 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 N Item: br nmes, Yea-r OM aitUcr 10.7 17.9 10Q3 12.1 14.4 5.2 O-s rese-s as nmusd of inprts 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 E-ts GFSX of CP 23.2 2Z.1 25.8 2b.6 22.6 22.2 Inpr GNFS a X of QP -29.7 -32.7 -3Q7 -30.0 -25.8 -29.0 Rw aLam X of GP -6.5 -5.6 -4.9 -54 -62 -6.8 MAL aJN PATES (curwt price) ao Srdwdise eXrtS, fob. 0.2 19.7 0.5 -44 -5.7 -7.1 ftSdwdse inprs, f..b. -0.9 11.9 -0.5 -0.9 1.1 -1.8 PRICE WLDCS (195=10) Eprt price ir (CFA frrc '102.5 13 .8 100.3 889 873 .0 1pxt price irP i K (CFA frwc s 8.9 91.2 85 0 65.8 53.6 85.2 TenS of tOd 12.7 119.3 114.0 103.6 104.5 105.2 RL effstiw dwge rate (1F cts) S 33 93.8 93.3 5.3 87.1 B5.2 Cjur p-ice irS CX g-th rate) -1.8 0.4 0.3 -1.8 0.0 -0.7 IP cIEfIat Xr C gr te) 2.1 0.9 0.6 1.6 1.5 0.4 1/ Fi;S dD ret refla:t d a in sts. 2 Fig;9es fa- 1-191 are fa ew re iw fijal ys. Scrce: IW, Lr1d B&* - 29 - Key Ere Irdicato p 1 of 1 1SU SE9 1SS 1w1 19E w -------------~ -~~ --~ - ---------- ... .... -~ ~ .... ~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~ ~ ~ Est. In LS inillim at acrr ic pie: Total db dis. & atstadrg (TDO) 1/ 3E7.0 3.0 37141.0 3557.0 3607.0 3601.0 Net dis n8ts I/ 115.8 127.9 43.3 5.1 140.5 81.3 Totl dbt service d ClMS) V 3Z3.6 LO 30.1 256.3 2.5 2 Deb ad Debt aryioe SIdicetu (0 / V TDVP X7B3 71.0 5.6 63.1 57.5 6.7 TDOE 354.1 257.7 250.4 22.5 19A 2E.6 TDSI 27.7 21.0 33 18.2 2.6 21.5 C sianBL1O 52.6 53.4 53.2 55.2 57.4 d0.8 W krk DEVOR Irdicatas (IIRDOMA) 0 Wrld B-C DVRblic DS 8.8 a8 11.8 13.5 t5.0 12.9 PrewerrOditor WDRbic DS 31.0 31.3 39.8 41.4 55.1 41.1 WrLd BarkDSf 2.1 1.9 1.7 2.1 1.5 2.1 1/ Ircils pb& ic wd pbi icLy g.wts diet, priwft rnwr- d debt, u of Of aKilts, rd sht-te Sa Df, 1a Px-tirg Systu M).
Группа Всемирного банка · Project Completion Report
Senegal - Fourth Structural Adjustment Credit (SAL IV)
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