Somalia - Second Agricultural Extension Project

Docramt of The World Bank FOR OmaCAL USE ONLY RePort No. 13761 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION PROJECT (CREDIT 1794-SO) NOVEMBER 29, 1994 Agriculture and Environment Operations Division Eastern Africa Department Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY AND EQUIVALENT UNITS Somali Shilling (So. Sh) = 100 Cents US$1.00 (at appraisal - Sept. 1986) = So.Sh. 83.00 (official) = So.Sh. 136.00 (market) US$1.00 (at suspension - Jan. 1991) = US$1.00 (at ICR stage - October 1994) = So. Sh. 3,287 WEIGHTS & MEASURES 1 Hectare (ha) = 10,000 m2 I Square Km = 100 ha 1 Metric Ton = 1,000 kg ABBREVIATIONS AF2AE - Agriculture and Environment Operations Division AfDB - African Development Bank AFMET - Agricultural, Farm management, Extension and Training Project CP - FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program DCA - Development Credit Agreement DOR - Directorate of Research (of MOA) FEA - Field Extension Assistants GOS - Government of Somalia ICR - Implementation Completion Report IDA - International Development Association (of the World Bank) MOA - Ministry of Agriculture PMU - Project Management Unit SAEP - Second Agricultural Extension Project SAR - Staff Appraisal Report TA - Technical Assistance FISCAL YEAR GOS January 1 - December 31 IDA July 1 - June 30  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION PROJECT (Cr. 1794 - SO) TABLE OF CONTENTS P R E F A C E ...............................................i EVALUATION SUMMARY .............................................. ii PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ............................................... 1 A. O BJECTIV ES .........................................1 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES .........................................2 C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT ....................................4 D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY ..................... ....................5 E. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................ 5 F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE .........................................6 G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME .........................................7 H. FUTURE OPERATIONS .........................................7 I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED ......................,. .. .,.7 PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES ........................ ..9 APPENDICES Map This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION PROJECT (Cr. 1794 - SO) PREFACE This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Second Agricultural Extension Project (SAEP) in Somalia, for which Credit 1794 - SO in the amount of SDRIo. 1 million was approved on June 9, 1987 and made effective on September 28, 1987. The Credit was never formally closed because of the civil war in Somalia which forced project operations to be suspended. SDR5.2 million equivalent to US$6.9 million was disbursed, and the last disbursenment took place on January 25, 1991. Co-financing for the project was provided by the African Development Bank (AfDB). The ICR was prepared by the staff of the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program (CP) and the Agriculture and Environment Operations Division (AF2AE), Eastern Africa Region, and reviewed by Mrs. S. Ganguly, Division Chief, AF2AE, and Mr. S. Agarwal, Project Advisor, AF2. In view of the absence of government authority in Somalia, comments on the ICR could not be sought from the Borrower. Comments from AfDB have not been received. As it was not possible to visit the country, preparation of this ICR was carried out as a desk review in Washington, on the basis of the materials in the project files and discussions with Bank staff who were involved with the project.   IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION PROJECT (Cr. 1794 - SO) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction 1. At the time of project formulation in 1986/87, over 30 percent of the total International Development Association's (IDA) lending to Somalia went to agriculture. On-going projects included the North West Agricultural Development (Second Phase) (Cr. 1538-SO), Bay Region Agricultural Development (Cr. 972-SO), Central Rangelands (Cr. 906-SO), and the Agricultural Farm Management, Extension and Training Project (Cr. 905-SO). These projects covered crop and livestock activities and sought to deliver, in the nroject areas, a range of services including extension, input supplies, water and related infrastructure as well as to increase adaptive research, small scale irrigation, and soil and water conservation works. Project Objectives 2. The objectives of the Second Agricultural Extension Project (SAEP) were to increase agricultural production and farmers' incomes through supporting activities initiated under the preceding IDA financed Agricultural Farm Management, Extension and Training (AFMET) Project (Cr. 905 - SO), as well as supporting institution building in agricultural research. The project had four components, namely: support to the Project Head Office; strengthening field extension organization (increasing extension coverage from 125,000 to about 158,000 farm families or about 75 percent of all farm families in the operational area); training; and, agricultural research. Total project costs were estimated at US$26.7 million. 3. To assist the project attain its objectives, the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) included special covenants for procurement of goods and services; project implementation and management; and financial recording and reporting. 4. The objectives of the project were clear and realistic. As it was a follow -on operation to the AFMET project, SAEP had the benefit of the latter's successes and failures, as well as lessons  - iii - of experience. The project's objective of extending the coverage of extension services to a further 33,000 farm families, was feasible given the intended 7 year implementation period of the project and an expanded geographical coverage. Project risks were realistically acknowledged, although the specter of civil war a few years down the road could not have been foreseen. Implementation Experience and Results 5. Following Board approval in September 1987, the project got off to a promising start. The formalization of a collaborative arrangement between the Directorate of Research (DOR) and the Somali extension service, helped facilitate project implementation. However, by 1990, the security situation in Somalia began to deteriorate. The insecurity eventually spread to most parts of the country, culminating into a full blown civil war which resulted in the ouster of the Government in January 1991 and the cessation of project activities. Over its short implementation period, the project managed to distribute improved varieties of wheat and sorghum as well as develop planting and weeding equipment, all of which contributed to a significant increase in crop production, estimated at 6 percent per annum. The project's objectives of increasing farm family incomes as a result of increased agricultural output were therefore partially - and temporarily - achieved. The institutional objectives were also only partially achieved. There were delays in recruiting TA for training and research assignments. With the outbreak of hostilities, the expatriate consultants left the country. The civil works program was nearly completed but most of the physical infrastructure built by the project has reportedly been destroyed during the war. The vehicles and equipment procured by the project have been destroyed or looted. The project offered short and long-term external training to about 130 people. An unspecified number were trained locally: on-the-job or in local institutions. Many of the trainees have either left the country or are dispersed and are unable to perform their research and extension activities because of the war. Although, in face of the protracted instability, the activities promoted by the project could not be sustained, its key agricultural research and extension initiatives can perhaps be revived by assembling some of the former project staff, upon the return of political stability in the country. 6. Project costs amounted to an estimated US$19.4 million as against the appraisal estimate of US$26.7 million. The large shortfall is attributable to the fact that project operations were prematurely halted, lasting only three years, as compared to seven years as originally planned. About SDR5.2 million or 51 percent of the IDA Credit was disbursed. The US$10.4 million AfDB loan was fully disbursed, in spite of a temporary suspension of financing by AfDB. GOS contribution is estimated to have been about US$2. I million or 58 percent of the appraisal estimate. 7. Overall project performance was adversely affected by the civil strife. Not only did this result in impairing project implementation in many areas, but also led to project operations being abandoned altogether in 1991. Performance was also negatively affected by the changes in top project management in the first six months of the project; key decisions could not be taken and  - Iv - plans and strategies for future project implementation could not be developed early on. Additionally, project implementation suffered from changes in senior extension and training staff cadres, and delays in recruiting TA. However, the change in project management was short- lived. The original project manager was reinstated, and proved to be competent and dynamic. Once appropriate staffing arrangements were in place, the project was able to make good progress. In fact, GOS nominated SAEP as the only outstanding development project in 1990, (this honor was bestowed on the project by a selection committee in the Office of the President, as a part of an annual exercise, wherein the committee identified certain exceptional agricultural development projects. These projects were officially recognized during Farmers' Week). In this connection, the substantial efforts of the project management team, particularly the dynamism of the Project Manager, which helped move the project forward, should be noted. On its part, GOS showed unwavering commitment to the project, virtually meeting all its local currency financial obligations. However, the DCA had to be amended about an year after project effectiveness, as Government had difficulty in meeting its foreign exchange commitments (due to its inability to obtain adequate foreign exchange resources). 8. Bank performance was satisfactory throughout the project cycle. The supervision of the project was particularly good in terms of staff mix, continuity, advice offered to the Borrower, and reporting. There was however, inadequate coordination between AfDB and IDA in oversight of the project, and AfDB staff could not participate in joint project supervision missions. The Borrower's performance was satisfactory, complying with most of the legal covenants, adequately funding the project and showing continued commitment to it. However, in spite of a promising start and the good-will shown by the parties to the project, its final outcome is unsatisfactory because of the civil strife in the country which terminated project operations mid-stream. In view of the unstable socio-political situation in Somalia, the sustainability of initiatives supported under the project is highly unlikely. Findings, Future Operations, and Key Lessons Learned 9. In view of the current insecurity and political instability in the country, there are no plans for future operations. Upon the return to normalcy, SAEP will most likely be revisited and its experiences sought as an input into a program to rescucitate Somalia's agricultural research and extension services. 10. The major lessons learned over the short duration of the project are as follows: (i) Collaborative arrangements between key agencies involved in the execution of a project should be worked out at appraisal, or their finalization should be a condition for Credit/Loan effectiveness. In projects where two or more implementing agencies/ institutions are involved, the success of the intervention will greatly depend upon the level of cooperation and collaboration between these  - v - institutions. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of Research and the Somali extension service, formalizing the working arrangements and linkages between the two institutions greatly improved the collaboration between extension and research services. SAEP benefited from this collaborative arrangement, which greatly facilitated its implementation. (ii) The project financing plan should carefully evaluate Government's ability to meet its counterpart funding requirements. In particular, the foreign exchange commitments to be shouldered by the Government should be realistically assessed at appraisal, prior to finalizing the financing plan. While GOS was fully committed to the project, and met its local currency commitments to the project in a fairly regular manner, it could not readily raise the foreign exchange required to finance the project costs incurred in foreign currencies. (Some 25 percent of total GOS contribution was planned to go towards meeting foreign exchange costs). The DCA therefore, had to be amended as early as one year after project effectiveness, so that IDA could finance 100 percent of the foreign exchange required for meeting operating costs under the training and extension components of the project. (iii) A key lesson which emerges from this project is that, arrangements for collaboration between the co-financiers in areas such as joint supervision of the project, should be firmed up at appraisal. There was inadequate coordination between AfDB and IDA staff in oversight of the project, and the co-financier's staff could not participate in joint project supervision missions.  IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA SECOND AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION PROJECT (Cr. 1794 - SO) PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT A. OBJECTIVES 1. The primary objectives of the Second Agricultural Extension Project (SAEP) were to increase agricultural production and farmers' incomes. These were to be achieved through support to the activities initiated under the preceding International Development Association (IDA) financed Agricultural Farm Management, Extension and Training (AFMET) Project (Cr. 905 - SO), as well as supporting institution building in agricultural research. The project aimed at: a) strengthening the extension system in eight regions through the provision of housing, infrastructure, transport, equipment and technical assistance; b) up-grading the training program for extension staff by improving facilities at the training centers, increased and improved staff training, and expanding the field trials program; and c) strengthening and coordinating agricultural research through the establishment of a strong Research Directorate in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), supporting on-going research at Bonka Station, and the establishment of a research support fund to be used in commissioning adaptive research. Project components thus included: support to the Project Head Office (US$7.2 million); strengthening organization of field extension activities (US$8.6 million); training and capacity building (US$5.8 million); and agricultural research (US$5.1 million), bringing total project costs to US$26.7 million. 2. Under SAEP, the extension service coverage was to be increased from 125,000 to about 158,000 farm families, or about 75 percent of all farm families in the operational area. This target was feasible given the proposed seven year implementation period of the project and an expanded physical area to be covered. The main risk to the project was the uncertainty regarding the continued availability of capable staff and adequate input supplies. However, these were to be minimized through financial and physical incentives given to staff by the project. Furthermore, Government support to farmers by way of adequate incentives, and free trade between the public and private sectors was felt to ensure availability of adequate quantities of inputs. However, the specter of civil strife which overtook the country a few years later, could not have been foreseen in the mid- 1 980s. 3. The project's objectives were clear and realistic. As a follow in operation, the project was to build on the successes and lessons learnt from the AFMET project. The findings from the latter, were as follows: the lead time required for an extension system to take root is quite long;  - 2 - the involvement of multiple donors with different views on extension methodology confuses both the project and its managers; the country's research base was weak, with little to recommend to farmers, particularly in the rainfed areas; and, field staff mobility was constrained by inadequate arrangements for vehicle maintenance. It was the goal of SAEP to address some of these problems. Implementation of the project was not seen as a problem because a well established, adequately staffed project implementation unit was already in place. 4. The country's sector strategy had been articulated in the Agriculture Sector Survey earlier undertaken by the Bank, GOS, and other donors. The survey concluded inter alia, that foodgrain output could grow by about 5 percent per annum during the next two decades, but this would require major yield increases accompanied by a 0.5 million ha increase in the area under cultivation. Output of other crops, such as fruits, would also increase comparably. The Survey also recognized that investment in agriculture would need to be bolstered by better management of a range of agricultural services (research, extension, credit, input supplies, etc.) accompanied by the strengthening of appropriate institutions to deliver them. The project sought to address this requirement by aiming at strengthening the country's research and extension services. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES General 5. About one year after the project got underway in September 1987, the security situation in Somalia began to deteriorate. This hampered smooth and orderly project implementation in some areas. The insecurity eventually spread to most parts of the country, escalating into a full blown civil war which resulted in the ouster of the Government in January 1991. Soon after that, project activities completely ceased, and could not be resumed thereafter. The project was therefore implemented for only slightly over three years as compared to the appraisal estimate of seven years. The early cessation of project operations resulted in only a partial achievement of SAEP's objectives (notwithstanding a promising start). No field visit has been undertaken in the course of preparing this ICR. As a result, project achievements cannot be accurately assessed due to lack of complete data. However, the project's impact on enhancing the credibility of the extension service was significant. Extension services provided were relevant to farmer needs. They were clearly beneficial in increasing yields and incomes. Some evidence of this was offered by the strong demand by farmers' organizations for extension services initially provided by AFMET, and subsequently supported under SAEP. Another indication was the award given by the Government to the project as the most outstanding development project, in 1990, the only project to be thus recognized that year; (this honor was bestowed on the project by a selection committee in the Office of the President, as a part of an annual exercise, wherein the committee identified certain exceptional agricultural development projects. These projects were officially recognized during Farmers' Week).  -3 - Financial Objectives 6. The project aimed to improve farmers' incomes through increased agricultural production. Although production data is not readily available, it is believed that the project, notwithstanding its short life-span, contributed to increased agricultural output, particularly in the irrigated areas. Improved varieties of sorghum, rice, mung beans and various vegetable crops were distributed and readily adopted by the farmers. Steps were also taken to further improve on animal draft powered planting and weeding implements introduced by the project. These improvements, along with the liberalization of agricultural input/output marketing, resulted in increased agricultural production of about 6 percent per annum. Although farmers interviewed by the IDA supervision missions complained about the intermittent scarcity of some inputs, particularly fertilizers and herbicides, they reported increased profitability from their farming operations. The project therefore did partially achieve its financial objective albeit, for a limited period, due to the civil war. Institutional & Physical Objectives 7. Not surprisingly, the project's institutional strengthening objectives could only be achieved partially. Project implementation was adversely affected initially, due to project management being over-hauled in the first six months of the project, changes in senior extension and training staff, and delays in recruiting TA. However, this change in top management was short-lived. The original project manager was reinstated, and proved to be effective and dynamic. Qualified Somali nationals were appointed to head the extension and training activities while two expatriates (TA) were recruited in the posts of Technical Manager and Research Advisor. With this staffing arrangement in place, and with the reinstatement of the competent project manager, project implementation improved substantially in terms of technical operations, training, planning, monitoring and evaluation, and counterpart funds mobilization. The staff improvements were complemented by the vehicles purchased under the project which facilitated mobility. 8. Notwithstanding the delays in finalizing housing and infrastructure construction contracts, rehabilitation of Bonka Research Station, and some of the staff housing and training centers had been completed by the time the project operations ceased. However, most of the civil works carried out under the project were reportedly destroyed in the ensuing civil war, while the equipment and vehicles procured were either damaged or looted. 9. The extension activities under SAEP made good progress, introducing new high yielding varieties of wheat and sorghum to the farmers, as well as donkey and camel-drawn planting and weeding implements. On-farm trials were carried out; specific programs such as, introducing women and youth to improved agricultural practices were implemented. The project was also successful in consolidating a number of diverse extension activities scattered across the country, under the umbrella of the Extension Directorate. Although the research activities lagged behind, eventually these picked up in key food crops such as sorghum, maize, groundnut and sesame. The project took over full operation of the Bonka Research Station after the completion of the Bay  - 4 - Region Agricultural Development Project (Cr. 972-SO). SAEP also rehabilitated the Central Research Station at Afgoi, financing for which was to be provided under another donor funded project. Agricultural research was in full operation at the time of the project's cessation. The training component did well within the short life of the project. About 130 staff went on short and long-term training outside Somalia (including nine staff who undertook Masters Programs). There was also considerable staff training at the local training institutes and in the field, particularly of Field Extension Assistants (FEA) and farmers. Women and youth were in particular given access to these training programs. Although, most of the staff who obtained external training returned to Somalia upon completing their training, an unspecified number have reportedly left the country because of the on-going civil unrest. C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT 10. The project was adversely affected by the civil strife which broke out, some three years after project implementation started. Not only did this hamper project operations in many areas, but also resulted in project operations ceasing altogether in early 1991, following the collapse of the Government. Another extraneous factor which affected the project was the suspension of AfDB loan disbursements soon after the project got underway. This resulted in delays in the procurement of vehicles and construction of civil works. The problem was, however, resolved after several months and disbursements were resumed (total AfDB disbursement amounted to some US$10.5 million as at April 30, 1994). 11. The project was partially affected by the changes in top project management in the first six months of the project, which meant that key decisions could not be taken and plans and strategies could not be developed for the future implementation of the project. As indicated earlier, this problem was resolved when the former General Manager was reinstated. GOS was fully committed to the project, and it met its local currency budgetary commitment to the project in a fairly regular manner. Government, however, had difficulty in meeting its foreign exchange commitments due to its inability to obtain adequate foreign exchange resources. 12. The project management team at PMU, particularly the effective leadership of the Project Manager, substantially aided the project. The project's management was able to convince Government to contribute its financial share to the project, and also followed up with the relevant authorities whenever any institutional bottlenecks arose. The Directorate of Research (DOR) took some time to establish, and like the PMU it also suffered from weak management and ineffective technical assistance in the early stages. Its operation improved with the appointment of a new Research Director who was able to mobilize resources and establish strong linkages with the PMU. The new Director was also able to establish technical and administrative supervision of both the Bonka and Afgoi research stations. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of Research and the Somali extension service, formalizing the working arrangements and linkages between the two institutions greatly improved collaboration between extension and research services. SAEP benefited from this collaborative arrangement, which greatly facilitated its implementation.  -5 - D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 13. The sustainability of the initiatives supported under SAEP are highly unlikely. Since project operations ceased in 1991, there has been no effective government in Somalia and large parts of the country have continued to be affected by civil strife. According to secondary sources, it is understood that much of the research and extension infrastructure in terms of buildings, equipment and vehicles have been destroyed or looted. Both research and extension advisers recruited by the project left the country soon after the Govemment fell. Most of the senior Somali research and extension officials have left the country or are dispersed. Thus, without an effective government to provide the necessary policy environment and borrower commitment, absence of physical facilities to operate from, and senior and mid-level staff to cover the research and extension systems, the activities started by the project are not likely to be sustainable. However, they can perhaps be revived by assembling some of the former staff, when the political stability is restored. E. BANK PERFORMANCE 14. The Bank's performance in the identification of the project was satisfactory, adequately taking into account the lessons and experience gathered from the preceding project and GOS strategy for increasing food production. Of particular significance was the project's provision of support for the Bonka Research Station after the completion of Bay Region Area Development Project. 15. The Bank's performance in project preparation was also adequate. Detailed project preparation work was assigned to external consultants whose terms of reference had been prepared by the Bank. Later, the Bank mounted a one man brief mission to review the progress made by the consultants. Bank staff also reviewed in detail the working papers prepared by the consultants to ensure they were complete and addressed all the major and relevant aspects of the proposed project. 16. Bank appraisal of the project took place a few months after GOS had submitted the project preparation report. Overall, the performance of the Bank was satisfactory. The appraisal team of three people with expertise in research, extension and institutional development, was suited for this type of project. Borrower commitment to the project was ascertained; the implementing agency's capacity was evaluated and augmented with TA where necessary. Although not specifically identified in the SAR, the appraisal team agreed with the provision of improved housing facilities and training to project staff Project risks were fairly well evaluated. However, the threat of a complete socio-economic breakdown, as a result of civil war in the country, was not analyzed, and perhaps could not have been foreseen at the time. The project financing plan was realistic. The only exception was the expectation that GOS could raise the foreign exchange required to meet its contribution to project financing, without any major problems. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) had to be amended in December 1988 (one year after project effectiveness), so that IDA could finance 100 percent of the foreign exchange  - 6 - required for meeting operating costs under the extension and training components. The DCA was amended again in November 1989, so that the amount of the IDA credit allocated to meeting these operating costs was nearly doubled. 17. Bank supervision of the project was satisfactory. As shown in Table 13, only four supervision missions visited the project before hostilities made it difficult for further missions to visit Somalia. The skill mix of the Bank missions was appropriate, although the inclusion of an institutional development specialist would have helped increase effectiveness. There was adequate continuity of staff, and in fact, the last three missions comprised the same staff Their reports succinctly documented implementation progress and identified problems and offered advice for improving performance. They also followed up with the Borrower where covenants were not being complied with. The supervision missions worked satisfactorily with the Borrower and maintained cordial relationships. There was inadequate coordination between AfDB and IDA staff in oversight of the project, and AfDB (co-financier) staff could not participate in joint project supervision missions. F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE 18. GOS performance in the preparation of the project was satisfactory. The Government discussed with the Bank the terms of reference for the consultants contracted to do the project preparation work and supervised them. The preparation report delivered by GOS was considered of a sufficient quality to contribute to the basic framework for project. 19. Once the staffing arrangement for the project had been settled, the project was satisfactorily implemented by GOS. Although the execution of the civil works was delayed by several months because of the suspension of disbursements by AfDB, the pace picked up and work was progressing satisfactorily by the time project operations had to be suspended. As shown in Table 5, the vehicle procurement program was also proceeding well with 22 out of 38 motor vehicles received, and 59 out of 109 motor cycles also delivered. Following initial delays in procuring TA for training, the training program (both in-house and external) made fairly good progress by the time the project operations were halted. GOS also sought via SAEP to further the objectives of improved agricultural performance of women and youth. Government provided adequate levels of counterpart funding (particularly, meeting its share of local currency expenditure) throughout, demonstrating a high level of commitment to this project. 20. The performance of the consultants hired for the project was satisfactory in the short time they were in place. Reportedly, the input of the training consultants was particularly effective in various areas, including the in-service training of staff, training of farmers and in facilitating the implementation of the external training component. The consultant working on farm implements was most effective, not only in improving indigenous farm implements and adapting them for use with donkeys and camels, but also in training animals to work with these implements. In contrast, the TA for research was largely ineffective, being reactive rather than proactive.  - 7 - 21. As shown in Table 10, on balance, the Government satisfactorily complied with the major legal covenants in the DCA. Preparation of Annual Work Programs was initially delayed but this improved with time. At the time the project became effective, audits of the financial accounts were 2 years in arrears but the situation improved, and by June/July 1989 the project accounts for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1988 had been handed in to the auditors. G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME 22. Although the initial results of the project were satisfactory, these were later reversed because of the civil strife in the country. Thus, despite a promising start and satisfactory implementation performance by the Borrower, the mid-stream cessation of operations left the project unable to achieve most of its objectives and the initiatives launched under it unsustainable. Its physical investments, e.g., buildings, and equipment and vehicles, etc., have been largely destroyed or looted during the war. Staff trained by the project have either fled the country, or like other staff in the implementing agency, are dispersed and unable to carry out their duties. H. FUTURE OPERATIONS 23. In view of the current insecurity and political situation in the country, no plans for future operations could be prepared. However, when peace returns and agricultural operations resume, SAEP will most likely be revisited and its experiences sought as an input into a program to resuscitate Somalia's agricultural research and extension services. In this regard, key agricultural research and extension activities can perhaps be revived by assembling some of the former project staff, upon the return of political stability in the country. 1. KEY LESSONS LEARNED 24. The major lessons learned over the short duration of the project are as follows: (i) Collaborative arrangements between key agencies involved in the execution of a project should be worked out at appraisal, or their finalization should be a condition for Credit/Loan effectiveness. In projects where two or more implementing agencies/ institutions are involved, the success of the intervention will greatly depend upon the level of cooperation and collaboration between these institutions. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of Research and the Somali extension service, formalizing the working arrangements and linkages between the two institutions greatly improved the collaboration between extension and research services. SAEP benefited from this collaborative arrangement, which greatly facilitated its implementation.  - 8 - (ii) The project financing plan should carefully evaluate Government's ability to meet its counterpart funding requirements. In particular, the foreign exchange commitments to be shouldered by the Government should be realistically assessed at appraisal, prior to finalizing the financing plan. While GOS was fully committed to the project, and met its local currency commitments to the project in a fairly regular manner, it could not readily raise the foreign exchange required to finance the project costs incurred in foreign currencies. (Some 25 percent of total GOS contribution was planned to go towards meeting foreign exchange costs). The DCA therefore, had to be amended as early as one year after project effectiveness, so that IDA could finance 100 percent of the foreign exchange required for meeting operating costs under the training and extension components of the project. (iii) A key lesson which emerges from this project is that, arrangements for collaboration between the co-financiers in areas such as joint supervision of the project, should be firmed up at appraisal. There was inadequate coordination between AfDB and IDA staff in oversight of the project, and AfDB (co-financier) staff could not participate in joint project supervision missions.  - 9 - PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES Table 1: Summary of Assessments Not A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Applicable Macro-economic policies = Sector policies Financial objectives Institutional development _ Physical objectives"' Poverty reduction = Gender concerns _ Other social objectives I Environmental objectives = Public sector management I Private sector development I Other (specify) B. Project sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain (H) 5) Highly C. Bank performance satisfactor Satisfactory Deficient (I) (I) () Identification Preparation assistance Appraisal Supervision The project's achievements were largely destroyed in the war.  - 10- Highly D. Borrower performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient (V) V/) ) Preparation Implementation Covenant compliance Operation (if applicable) Highly Highiy E. Assessment of outcome 2- satisfactorv Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 21 Project activities were halted in mid-stream because of war.  - 1 1 - Table 2: Related IDA Credits Year of Credit Title Purpose Approval Status Preceding Operations Cr. 905-SO Agriculture Extension 1979 Completed. Cr. 906-SO Central Rangelands Development 1979 Completed. Cr. 972-SO Bay Region Agriculture Development 1979 Completed. Cr. 1538-SO NW Region Agric. Development 1985 Suspended. Cr. 1711-SO Agric. Sec. Adjustment Program (ASAP) 1986 Suspended. Following Operations Cr. 1774-SO Rainfed Farm Semi. Mech. Agriculture 1987 Suspended. Cr. 1856-SO Baardhere Tech. Assistance 1987 Suspended. Cr. 1957-SO CRDP II 1989 Suspended. Cr. 2030-SO ASAP II 1989 Suspended. Table 3: Project Timetable Steps in project cycle Date planned Date actual/ latest estimate Identification (Executive Project Summary) 12/85 12/85 Preparation 5/86 Appraisal 9/86 9/86 Negotiations 3/87 3/87 Board presentation 5/87 Signing 6/87 Effectiveness 9/87 9/87 Project completion 6/93 * Credit closing 12/93 * *Project operations ceased in early 1991 because of insecurity.  - 12 - Table 4: Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual (US$ thousands) FY87 I FY88 I FY89 I FY90 I FY91 FY92 FY93 Appraisal estimate 900 3,300 5,800 8,000 9,900 11,400 12,700 Actual - 1,442 3,577 5,887 6,969 - 6,855 Actual as % of estimate 0 44 62 74 70 0 54 Date of final disbursement 1/25/91 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation Unit SAR Actual Estimate 1. Staff Housing - House for FEAs (30 sq. m. each) No. of houses 196 n.a. - Type A Houses (100 sq. m. each) No. of houses 6 n.a. - Type B Houses (75 sq. m. each) No. of houses 31 n.a. - Type C Houses (50 sq. m. each) No. of houses 46 n.a. 2. Bonka Building Rehab. Sq.m. 100 n.a. 3. Vehicles -Project Head Office No. of vehicles 14 - Field Extension Organization No. of vehicles 9 22 - Training No. of vehicles 7 - Research No. of vehicles 8 - Motorcycles No. of 109 59 motorcycle. 4. Technical Assistance - Training m/year 19 n.a. - Research m/year 6 n.a. - Project Head Office m/year 25 n.a. 5. Training - In-house Training No. of courses 79 - External Training __1291' 6. Incremental Extension Coverage F/Families 34,000 n.a. I/Including 9 Masters Degree Courses.  - 13 - Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation No key indicators for project operation were defined in the SAR. Because of the current state of war in the country, no operational indicators can be defined for the future. Table 7: Studies Included in Project Purpose as Status at Study defined at appraisal Impact of study appraisal/redefined No specific studies were included in the project. However, the SAR stipulated that if a need for studies arose during project implementation, the Somali extension service or the Research Directorate would prepare terms of reference which would be cleared by IDA. No studies were carried out prior to project closure in early 1991.  - 14 - Table 8A: Project Costs Item Appraisal estimate-1t Actual/latest estimate (US$M) (US$M) Local I Foreign | Total Local Foreign n Total 1. Project Head Office 1.2 5.1 6.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2. Field Extension 2.8 4.7 7.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. Organization 3. Training 1.4 3.7 5.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4. Agricultural Research 0.6 3.9 4.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. Total Baseline Costs 6.1 17.3 23.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. Physical Contingencies 0.5 1.3 1.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. Price Contingencies 0.5 1.2 1.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. Total Project Costs 7.0 19.7 26.7 n.a. n.a 19.44' Table 8B: Project Financing Appraisal estimate-/ Actual/latest estimate (US$M) (US$M) 3Source Local I Foreign ITotal Local Foreign Total IDA 2.1 10.6 12.7;/ n.a. n.a. 6.85 AfDB 2.2 8.2 10.4 10.43 GOS 2.7 0.9 3.6 2.12/ TOTAL 7.0 19.7 26.7 19.384/ I/Per SAR. 2/ Equivalent SDRIO.I million. 3/Estimated data. 4/Estimated from World Bank and African Development Bank disbursement data and supervision reports.  - 15 - Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits No Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was calculated at appraisal. The quantifiable benefits from the project were expressed in terms of increased CDP yields and higher income as indicated below. 1. Incremental Yield Per SARI/ Actual a) Controlled Irrigation ----------QTL/Ha---------- Maize 5.0 n.a. Sesame 1.5 n.a Pulses 3.2 n.a b) Flood Irrigation Maize 5.1 n.a Sesame 1.1 n.a Pulses 2.7 n.a c) Rainfed Sorghum 1.3 n.a Pulses 1.2 n.a 2. Incremental Income (per Farm) -----------So.Sh---- a) Controlled Irrigation (3 ha farm) Gross value of production 60,850 n.a Net farm cash income 26,694 n.a Net income (return to management) 27,205 n.a b) Flood Irrigation (3 ha farm) Gross value of production 54,575 n.a Net farm cash income 19,269 n.a Net income (return to management) 19,780 n.a c) Rainfed (4 ha farm) Gross value of production 21,800 n.a Net farm cash income 6,020 n.a Net income (return to management) 6,020 n.a 1/Full development (year 10).  - 16 - Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants-" Page I of 5 Original Revised DCA Covenant Present Fulfillment Fulfill- Description of Covenant Comments Section Type Status Date ment Date 3.02 3 C Except as the Association shall otherwise agree, procurement of the goods, works and consultants' services required for the Project and to be financed out of the proceeds of the Credit shall be governed by the provisions of Schedule 3 to this Agreement. 3.03 5 C The Borrower shall: (a) maintain in operation the Project Management Unit (PMU) established under the Agricultural Extension and Farm Management Training Project (Credit 905-SO) with the same membership as provided therein which shall assist the Borrower in carrying out Part A of the Project; and (b) maintain in employment, during execution of the Project, the General Manager, Technical Manager and Financial Controller of PMU, whose qualification and experience shall be acceptable to the _____________________________ A ssociation. i/ Convenant types Present status: I = Accountsaudits 8. = Indigenous people C = covenant complied with 2 Financial performance/revenue 9 = Monitoring, review, and CD = complied wiLh after delay generation from beneficiaries reporing CP = complied with partially 3 = Flow and utilization of project 10 = Projec implementation not NC not complied with funds covered by categories 1-9 4 = Counterpart funding 11 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral 5 = Management aspects of the budgetary or other resource project or executing agency allocation 6 = Environmental covenants 12 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/ 7 = Involuntary resettlement regulatory/institutional action 13 = Other  - 17 - Page 2 of 5 3.04 5 C In order to assist the Borrower in carrying out Part B of the Project, the Borrower shall: (a) maintain in operation until the completion of the Project, the Research Directorate established in MOA which shall be responsible for coordinating all research activities under the Project and identifying areas requiring the application of adaptive research methods; and (b) maintain in employment, during execution of the Project, the Director General of Research whose qualifications and experience shall be acceptable to the Association. 3.05 11 C June 30 1987 n.a. With reference to Section 9.08 of the Specific date of fulfillment not General Conditions the Borrower shall available on files. furnish to the Association, not later than June 30, 1987 documentary evidence showing that land has been allocated for the Project. 3.06(a) 3 CP The Borrower shall or shall cause the preparation and submission to the Association for review and comments, not later than March 1 of each year, the Annual Work Programme and Budget for the succeeding two agricultural sessions.  - 18 - Page 3 of 5 3.07 5 n.a. Dec. 31, 1987 n.a. The Borrower shall, not later than December 31, 1987 establish Status information not within MOA a Project Technical Coordination Committee whose available. chairman shall be the Vice Minister of Agriculture and whose other members shall include the General Manager, Somali extension service- AFMET, the Director General of Research, the Research Advisor, the Directors of research stations, one representative each from MFLR and MOF, and the Technical Manager of AFMET who shall be the Secretary of the ._______ ____________ ________ Com m ittee. 3.08 3 C Without limitation upon its obligations under Section 3.01 of this Agreement, the Borrower shall: (a) for the purposes of the Project open and thereafter maintain until the completion of the project in the Central Bank of Somalia, two Project Advance Accounts to be used for the purposes of meeting recurrent expenditures for Parts A and B of the Project respectively; (b) deposit in the said Accounts the sum of Somali Shillings thirty million (So.Sh.30,000,000) and Somali Shillings fifteen million (So. Sh. 15,000,000) respectively; and (c) maintain at all times a minimum balance of Somali Shillings ten million (So.Sh. 10,000,000) and five mission (So. Sh.5,000,000) in each account respectively.  - 19 - Page 4 of 5 4.01(b) 1 CD The borrower shall: (i) have the records and accounts referred to in paragraph (a) of this Section including those for the Special Account for each fiscal year audited in accordance with appropriate auditing principles consistently applied, by independent auditors acceptable to the Association; (ii) furnish to the Association, as soon as available but in any case not later than six months after the end of each such year, a certified copy of the report of such audit by said auditors, of such scope and details as the Association shall have reasonably l _________ ___________________ _________ ________________ ____________ requested. _____rque ted  - 20 - Page 5.of 5 4.01(c) 1 CD For all expenditures with respect to which withdrawals from the Credit Account were made on the basis of statements of expenditure, the Borrower shall: (i) maintain or cause to be maintained, in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section, records and accounts reflecting such expenditures; (ii) retain, until at least one year after the completion of the audit for the fiscal year in which the last withdrawal from the Credit Account or payment out of the Special Accounts was made, all records (contracts, orders, invoices, bills, receipts and other documents) evidencing such expenditures; (iii) enable the Association's representatives to examine such records; and (iv) ensure that such records and accounts are included in the annual audit referred to in paragraph (b) of this Section and that the report of such audit contains a separate opinion by said auditors as to whether the statements of expenditure submitted during such fiscal year, together with the procedures and internal controls involved in their preparation, can be relied l ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~upon to support the related withdrawals.  - 21 - Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements Statement Number and Title Describe and Comment on Lack of Compliance Basically, there was compliance with the applicable Bank Operational Manual Statements. Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs Stage of Project Cycle Planned Revised Actual Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$ ('OOOs) Through appraisal 50.0 Appraisal-Board 10.1 Board-effectiveness 0.2 l Supervision 73.5 62.9 45.0 Completion 11.0 28.3 8.5-I l TOTAL n.a. n.a. n.a. 113.8 n.a. l/Estimate as of 10/1/94.  - 22 - Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions Stage of Month/ Number Days Specialiazed Performance Rating2/ Types of Project Cycle Year of in Staff Skills Problems1' Persons Field Represented __ Implemen- Development tation Objectives Status Identification 12/85 3 10 R, E, I Preparation 5/86 1 5 E Appraisal 9/86 5 18 R,C,I,E,M Supervision 1 11/87 2 5 R, E S S Supervision 2 5/88 3 12 E,A,P S S F,M Supervision 3 11/88 3 10 E,A,P S S F Supervision 4 6/89 2 7 A,P S S P Project 5/94 2 F Completion (Desk . _______________ ______ Review ) /R= Research; E = Extension; I = Institutional Development; C = Economics; M = Marketing; A = Agriculture; P = procurement; F = Finance. 2/S = Satisfactory. 3/F = Funding; M = Management; P = Procurement.  MAP SECTION   IBRD 20121 PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN '2' DJIBOUTI ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Beredo 1 2' DJIBOUTI ) 4I9OUTI .~dloyodo * SeylIa Adodo Bososo + Mart t 15 ~~~~~Berbera r,gayo Laz Daa 8<cra;!o ', \<n t .\' cslb Tug WcIe a?- e Aburrin t-~ZfiO ~X geroo / Gardc t