Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY Rqpt No. 11887 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1314-BEN) MAY 21, 1993 Agriculture Operations Division Occidental and Central Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) CFAF 435 = US$1.00i CFAF 1000 = US$2.30 AVERAGE ANNUAL EXCHANGE RATES YEAR CFAF US$ 1985 449 1.00 1986 346 1.00 1987 301 1.00 1988 298 1.00 1989 319 1.00 1990 308 1.00 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 meter (m) = 3.28 feet (ft) 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile (ml) 1 sq. kilometer (km2) = 0.386 square miles (sq ml) 1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres (ac) 1 metric ton (m ton) = 2,204 pounds (Ibs) ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CARDER Centre d'action r6gionale pour Le deveLoppement rural (Regional RuraL DeveLopment Agency) CCCE Caisse centraLe de cooperation economique DEP Direction des etudes et de la planification (Studies and Planning Department) DGR Direction du genie rural (Agricultural Engineering Department) DRA Direction de la recherche agronomique (Agricultural Research Department) ERR Economic Rate of Return FAC Fonds d'aide a la cooperation GF Groupement Feminins GRVC Groupement revolutionnaire A vocation coop6rative (Revolutionary Cooperative Group) GV Groupement villageois (Village Group) ICB International Competitive Bidding IDA International Development Association MDR Minist6re du developpement rural (Ministry of RuraL Development) PCR Project Completion Report PCU. Project Coordinating Unit SAR Staff Appraisal Report SONAGRI Societe nationale de l'agriculture SONAPRA Societe national pour la production agricole (successor to SONAGRI) T & V Training and Visit UCP Unions Comnunales des Producteurs UPSP Unions des Producteurs au niveau des Sous-Pr6fectures ZRDP Zou Province Rural Development Project GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR January 1- December 31 The exchange rate for the CFAF Franc is fixed at a ratio of 50:1 with the French Franc, which is free floating currency. bt This is the exchange rate quoted in the Staff Appraisal Report and it referes to the parity on November 5, 1984, at the start of negotiations. FOR OFTICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation May 21, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Benin Zou Province Rural Development Project (Credit 1314-BEN! Attached is the Project Completion Report on Benin - Zou Province Rural Development Project (Credit 1314-BEN) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. This complex project (with 13 components) aimed to raise rural incomes and expand exports. The project design built on the experience of earlier projects (PPAR/PCR of August, 1980) by focussing on the whole cropping system rather than just cotton (the main export earner). Even so, the focus remained on cotton, with production increasing beyond appraisal targets, initially at the expense of foodcrops. Incomes of participating farmers were substantially higher and increased cotton exports made a valuable contribution to foreign exchange earnings. Results of six components were short of expectations, however, especially food crop development and food crop processing (through women's groups). The project is rated satisfactory overali, but with disappointing institutional impact mainly because the intended streamlining of the main implementing agency did not occur (PCR, para. 4.04). However, the dialogue on the need to restructure all agricultural development institutions was pursued (in collaboration with all other lenders) in the context of the recently approved National Agricultural Services Restructuring Project and satisfactorily completed in early 1993. Although the current cotton-based production system is functioning well, sustainability is uncertain because of emerging soil erosion and fertility problems. The PCR gives a comprehensive and frank account of project experience, except that the analysis of production growth makes insufficient reference to exogenous factors. The PCR was sent to the cofinanciers (CCCE and FAC of France) for comments but none were received. The project may be audited to explore production results and sustainability issues. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by reciplents only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwcs be disclosed without Wordd Bank authorizatlon. I~~~~~~~~~~~~~ F6R OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLEION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1314 - BEN) TABLE OF CONTENT PREFACE ................................................ i EVALUATION SUMMARY ..................................... iii PART L. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ............. 1 1. Project Identity ..................................... 1 2. Background ....................................... 1 3. Project Objectives and Description ........................ 2 4. Project Design and Organization ......................... 3 5. Project Implementation ................................ 4 6. Project Results ..................................... 5 7. Project Sustainability ................................. 7 8. Bank's Performance ................................. 8 9. Borrower Performance ................................ 8 10. Project Relationships ................................. 9 11. Consulting services .................................. 9 12. Project Documentation and Data ......................... 9 PART H: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .. ..... 11 PART I: STATISTICAL INFORMATION ......................... 19 1. Related Bank Credits .... 19 2. Project Timetable ................................... 20 3. Schedule of Disbursement .............................. 21 4. Project Implementation ............................... 22 5. Project Costs and Fmancing A) Project Costs ..................................... 23 B) Project Financing .................................. 24 6. Project Results A) Direct Benefits. ................................... 25 B) Economnic Impact. ................................. 26 C) Studies .... 27 7. Status of Covenants .......... .. ...................... 28 8. Use of Bank Resources A) Staff Input (Staffweeks) ..... 29 B) Missions (Personnel and Consultants) .... 30 ANNEXES 1. Technical Annex 2. Economic Evaluation This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their omcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. I PROJECT COMPLEITON REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1314 - BEN) Prerac This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Zou Province Rural Development Project in Benin, for which Credit 1314-BEN in the amount of SDR 18.7 million was approved in November 1982. The credit closed in September 1992, two and a half years behind schedule. It was almost fully disbursed (99.4%) and the last disbursement was on February 24, 1993. Parts I and III of the PCR were prepared by a mission of the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program and revised by the staff of the Agriculture Operations Division of the Occidental and Central Africa Department of the Africa Regional Office. Part II was prepared by the Borrower. This report is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Project File, the Credit Agreement, supervision reports and information provided by the Zou CARDER, the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR) and the representatives of other funding agencies in Benin. - iii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1314 - BEN) Evaluation Summary Objectives 1. Following an unsuccessful experience with a rural development project in the Zou and Borgou provinces of Benin (Cr. 307-BEN, 1972), which was cancelled as a result of institutional difficulties, an improved policy environment in the late 1970s permitted IDA and the Government of Benin (GOB) to proceed with the preparation of the present project and also of a similar project (Cr. 1127-BEN and Cr. 1127-1-BEN) in the Borgou province. The Zou project aimed at improving rural incomes and promoting agricultural exports by strengthening institutions and by ensuring adequate and timely supply of inputs and efficient evacuation and processing of cotton, while simultaneously increasing food crop production. Implementation experience 2. The project was implemented mainly through the CARDER 11 of the Zou department and involved parallel funding by three external agencies: IDA, CCCE and FAC, the first two in the form of loan and the latter in the form of grant aid. In general implementation was successful with farmers responding well to the restructured cotton production system which offered reliable input supply, a secure market and reasonable financial returns. The greatest operational difficulty was in relation to the provision of government counterpart funding, and the collapse of the national banking system which caused substantial amounts of project funds to be frozen in disbanded state banks. Cash flow difficulties contributed to the slower than planned disbursement rate and created practical implementation problems for CARDER staff. 3. A recurring preoccupation of supervision missions was therefore to find ways of easing the counterpart funding difficulties. Despite the financial difficulties, the CARDER was resourceful in carrying out its mandate, with the consequence of giving priority to cotton income generating activities at the expense of other components. 4. One shortcoming of the project in terms of both implementation and design was the Za-Kpota seed farm, funded by FAC. The choice of the site had already been made at the time of SAR but proved most unsuitable and the contribution of this component to the project fell far short of expectations. No serious consideration appears to have been given to finding another site. 5. Another weakness was in relation to a technical assistance component, also funded by FAC, which was supposed to carry out two key studies, one on the CARDER's organization and methods of intervention and the other on a possible follow-on project. None of these studies were satisfactorily executed. The technical assistance team, based in Cotonou, embarked on a four-year research program involving little collaboration with the CARDER. As a result the research and development unit in the Zou Centre d'action rdgionale pour le ddveloppement rural. This is a quasi-autonomous regional unit of the ministry msponsible for rural development. - iv - CARDER was left with inadequate resources. Moreover, a significant failure in the organization of the project was the poor integration of the research component with other activities. Results 6. The project was a success in terms of achievement of its main objectives. After early delays caused by counterpart funding difficulties and shortages of key personnel, by project year 5 the targets for cotton production within the project area had been exceeded, and by project year 7 cotton production was 75% above SAR projections. Projected yields were exceeded by project year 7 in the case of all crops except groundnut. The macroeconomic impact of the project was therefore very positive, helping the external account during a critical period. There is no doubt also that incomes of participating farmers have been substantially higher than they would have been without the project. The number of beneficiaries attained 97% of target by PY 8. These results are reflected in an ERR identical to that estimated in the SAR (22 %) despite the lower economic price of cotton. The greater production of cotton compensated for the lower international prices and the slower implementation rate for certain components. Sustainability 7. A national agricultural services restructuring program has started in November 1992, aiming at the reorganization of the CARDERs and of the Ministry of Rural Development (MDR) for the establishment of more cost-effective development institutions, capable of implementing national programs and whose operations would be progressively financed by the national budget. The future of the cotton production system seems assured. The Societe Nationale pour la Production Agricole (SONAPRA), in charge of the industrial and commercial aspects of cotton production and marketing, is functioning well and production of cotton in the Zou province seems likely to increase further, limited mainly by ginning capacity. Long term sustainability of the farming system in terms of soil fertility was not studied as intended in the project design, and it is difficult to gauge to what extent this issue should be a cause for concern. A specific omission of the research component was the failure to recruit an expert agronomist whose tasks, as defined in the Project File, were to work on food crops and to consider inter alia erosion issues and the long term effects of the cotton farming system on the fertility of the soil. Findings and Lessons Learned 8. The Zou Province Regional Development Project was overall a successful project which realized its main objectives, in spite of the macroeconomic difficulties faced by the country. An improved market-based economic environment was successfully introduced by the project into the Zou province as well as practical systems for the supply of inputs on credit linked with efficient cotton marketing. These enabled a substantial increase in cotton and maize production while simultaneously eliminating subsidies on inputs. Nonetheless, it is not surprising that a project designed ten years ago was somewhat "top-down" in approach, offering less scope for participation by beneficiaries than would be considered desirable today. 9. On balance, the Zou CARDER has proved to be a successful mechanism for project implementation. The main implementation shortcomings were due to (i) the difficulties of the Borrower in meeting counterpart funding commitments, which tended to slow down the project implementation rate after 1985 and lead to a concentration of activities on the cotton sector at the expense of food crops, and (ii) poor integration of the seed farm, research, and studies components. The main lesson learned is that projects with many components and multiple funding agencies and beneficiary institutions, must be subject to multi-partite reviews, preferably every two or three years, during which close attention should be paid to the integration of components dependent on different funding sources. The shortcomings related to the seed farm, deviation in studies implementation and uncertainties concerning the cotton-based farming -v - system, would not have arisen or would have been more easily resolved if there had been a tri-partite review in 1986 or 1987. 10. Other lessons which may be drawn from the project include the need to monitor institutional changes introduced after project effectiveness and which run counter to stated project objectives - in this case involving the expansion of the Zou CARDER when the project aimed to streamline the organization. In addition, the installation of an effective system for the supply of inputs, and the marketing of production of one crop (cotton) is bound to impact negatively, to some extent, on other crops for which such support is not available. Attention to maize marketing arrangements, for example, might have helped to achieve a better balance between cotton and food crop production. Satisfactory performance of extension appears to have played an essential role in the achievement of project objectives. Nevertheless, as the project progressed, farmers moving along the intensification process developed a certain fatigue due to obsolete or unadapted technical messages. Adaptive research often proved inadequate to maintain the relevancy of the message in line with farmers needs. More important factors in the ultimate success of the project were the supply of inputs on credit and the guaranteed market outlets for cotton. PROJECT COMPLFI1ON REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROIECT (Credit 1314-BEN) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identit Project Name Zou Province Rural Development Project Credit No. 1314-BEN RVP Unit Africa Regional Office Country Republic of Benin Sector Agriculture 2. Background 2.01 Benin has a population of 5.4 million (1992), growing at approximately 3.2 per cent per annum, in a territory with a total area of 112,622 km2. Population densities are higher in the wetter south of the country than in the north. The estimated annual per capita income in 1991 was US$400, making Benin one of the poorest countries in the world. Urban population growth is particularly high (estimated at over 8 per cent per annum in Cotonou) and the agro-demographic pressure on agricultural land is acute. 2.02 During the 1970s, national resources were directed mainly towards the development of industry and physical infrastructure to the relative neglect of agriculture and food production. The Marxist-Leninist policy emphasized national control and self reliance, most foreign owned businesses were nationalized and many new state enterprises were created. The first medium term development plan (1977-1980) was used to further expand the state-owned economy. The economy performed fairly well during the late 1970s (average growth of 5 per cent per annum), but mainly thanks to the spill-over effects of the oil-based prosperity of Nigeria. However, by the early 1980s, falling world demand for oil and Nigeria's ensuing economic difficulties made it essential that Benin reassess its economic strategies. The present project was conceived at a time when it had become imperative to improve the export performance of the economy - production of cotton, for example, first introduced successfully in 1963, had fallen from 50,000 metric tons in 1972 to 16,000 metric tons in 1980-81. 2.03 The decade of the 1980s was a period of prolonged economic difficulty. The economy was unable to ensure the maintenance of the standard of living of ordinary citizens (cotton farmers being an exception). Benin suffered acute debt service problems and the country's debts had to be rescheduled through the Paris Club mechanism. The internal banking system failed, to a large extent dragged down by non performing loans to public sector enterprises. By the end of the decade, a vigorous adjustment program had been introduced with the aim of reducing the size of the public sector and liberalizing the economy. But, the economic strains of the 1980s led to growing political discontent and culminated in the transition to a multiparty democracy, which was achieved in April 1991. - 2 - 2.04 Despite the general economic difficulties of the 1980s, the improved performance of the export sector, especially cotton, coupled with reduced imports, resulted in a marked improvement in the balance of payments position. Cotton exports increased in value from FCFA 4.3 billion in 1983 to FCFA 17.9 billion in 1987. From a figure of 25 per cent in 1981-82, the current account deficit/GDP ratio fell to 9 per cent in 1985-86 and to 6.2 per cent by 1989, and this was in spite of declining world market prices for cotton and crude oil. 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.01 The Zou Province Rural Development Project (ZRDP) was designed in 1982 in the context of the preoccupations of the time, which were predominantly macroeconomic in nature: addressing balance of payments deficits through rehabilitation of the cotton industry. It followed on from two previous projects, the Zou-Borgou Cotton Project (307-BEN, of US$ 6.1 million, signed in 1972) which was predominantly concerned with cotton development within the two specified regions, but which had suffered from the frequent institutional upheavals and had been rather disappointing, and a Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 716-BEN) aimed at strengthening the cotton marketing chain and preparing future agricultural investment projects. The Zou-Borgou Cotton Project was succeeded by two projects, one in each of the two provinces: the present Zou project (Cr. 1314-BEN), and the Borgou Province Regional Development Project (Cr. 1127-BEN), which had similar aims and which could be regarded as a parallel project to the ZRDP. 3.02 Objectives. The principal objectives of the Zou Province Rural Development Project were to improve rural incomes while simultaneously increasing production of cotton and food crops and export. The project was aimed at reversing the decline of cotton production in the Zou province through the supply of inputs (fertilizers and insecticides mainly), strengthening agricultural services and facilitating the processing and marketing of cotton. Over a period of five years, the project aimed at reaching 38,000 families (about half the population of the Zou province) and to increase annual production of cotton by 5,700 metric tons. Parallel improvements in food crop production were expected to occur not only through residual effects arising from fertilizers applied to cotton, but also through improved genetic material and better farming methods, including greater use of animal traction. Annual targets of food crop increase were 5,200 tons of maize, 4,000 tons of groundnut, 3,300 tons of cowpeas and 400 tons of paddy. The project also aimed to produce an additional 200 tons of tobacco per annum. 3.03 Description. The project as described in the SAR consisted of 13 different components: (a) Strengthening and reorganization of the Zou CARDER; (b) Consolidation and development of cooperatives; (c) Financing and improving supply of agricultural inputs (mainly fertilizers, seeds and insecticides); (d) Introduction of a better primary marketing system for cotton; (e) Animal health care (small ruminants and oxen); (f) Strengthening of applied research and improved seeds for food crops and cotton; (g) Introduction of animal traction (300 pairs of oxen with associated equipment) (h) Development of 200 ha of bottomlands, rehabilitation of 100 wells and construction of 50 new ones; (i) Installation of a project monitoring and evaluation unit; (j) Improving the efficiency of SONAPRA and cotton marketing channels; (k) Strengthening the Ministry of Rural Development's studies and strategic planning department; (I) Technical and managerial support to the cotton ginneries in the Zou province; and (m) A study for a possible follow-up project and a second study to improve the organization and management of services provided by the CARDER. - 3 - 4. Project Design and Organization 4.01 Design. Three broad approaches for achieving the project objectives were adopted and could be grouped as follows: (i) institutional strengthening; (ii) support to the cotton marketing channel, and (iii) a series of complementary rural development initiatives. The project was designed to reach 38.000 families through agricultural extension, based on T&V principles. The project differed from its predecessor in avoiding the mono-crop approach and aimed at achieving a balance between cash crops (groundnut and cotton) and food crops (maize and cowpeas). The project concept was not notably innovative and aimed at diffusing known techniques, although higher yielding cotton varieties were promoted through the project. Project preparation was thorough and was carried out in Benin under the Technical Assistance Project (Cr. 716-BEN) through SONAGRI's 1/ consulting unit. 4.02 The project was conceived ten years ago and it is not surprising that the project design was different in style and concept from current approaches to integrated rural development. The project had a broadly "top-down approach" and was not focused particularly either at farm or village level participation in project design and implementation. 4.03 In assessing the project it is possible to identify some shortcomings in project design, notably related to the insufficient attention given to environmental considerations (erosion problems) and the sustainability of the cotton-based farming system whose neglect was as much attributable to failures of implementation as to design weaknesses. Also, little consideration was also given to very poor access roads situation of some enclaves in project area. 4.04 Organization. The project organization was fairly complex. In addition to the 13 components listed above, there were three external financing agencies (IDA, and the French CCCE and FAC), and three institutions benefiting from direct support (the Zou CARDER, the MDR and SONAPRA). The large number of components reflected the complex organizational structure of the main implementing agency, the Zou CARDER. It had been the intention to streamline the CARDER structure by means of the project but this was thwarted by a reorganization imposed at the national level in late 1985. Whereas the objective had been to reduce personnel in the CARDER which had 600 staff in 1983, the personnel had grown to over 1,000 by the end of 1991. 4.05 An unforeseen organizational change took place in 1985 when SONAGRI was abolished and replaced by SONAPRA. Initially, the division of responsibilities between the CARDERs and SONAPRA was unclear, and for a period of time the Zou CARDER took responsibility for the management of the cotton ginneries in the province. This became a major preoccupation of the CARDER management and tended to reinforce the focus on cotton to the detriment of food crops. The ginneries were returned to SONAPRA in 1987. 4.06 Despite the financial difficulties due to lack of GOB counterpart funding and freeze of project funds after the collapse of the banking system, the CARDER was resourceful in carrying out its mandate which for a period also included the operation of the cotton ginneries in the Zou department. However, the effect of the financial difficulties (exacerbated also by key personnel shortages) was to give priority to income generating cotton activities at the expense of other components and was probably the major cause of implementation delays. I/ Socictc Nationale de I'Agriculturm, later to become SONAPRA (Socictd nationale pour 1l Production Agricole). -4 - 5. Prolect Implementation 5.01 Loan Effectiveness and Project Start-up. The project was appraised in November 1981. The Credit was approved in November 1982, signed in February 1983 and became effective in September 1983. The closing date initially expected for December 1989, was extended three times till September 1992 to compensate for the delay in implementation and disbursement. 5.02 Implementation Schedule. The good performance of the project in relation to the achievement of its main objectives (see section F), means that project implementation was, on balance, a success. However, there were some difficulties and shortcomings. In particular implementation was slower than planned in relation to most components except cotton. The greatest operational difficulty was in relation to the availability of Government counterpart funding. The GOB's cash flow difficulties contributed to a slower than planned disbursement rate and created practical implementation problems for CARDER staff. Following the collapse of the national banking system, IDA funds in the Special Accounts became frozen. A recurring preoccupation of supervision missions was therefore to try to ease the counterpart funding difficulties and the permanent illiquidity situation that the project had to face. In October 1990, the Credit Agreement was amended to increase the funding level of operating costs by IDA. This was implemented after an interim period during which CCCE agreed to use up its remaining credit by funding a higher proportion of costs than initially envisaged. 5.03 The components which fell short of expectations were: animal traction, livestock, rural engineering (wells and development of bottomlands, small barrages,etc), value added processing of food crops (which was seen as a vehicle for the advancement of women) and the development of food crops in general. The main reasons were the poor response from the farmers and lack of skilled personnel in the rural engineering Department of the CARDER. 5.04 Procurement. Input supplies for producers were available throughoutthe project. Bidding and award of contracts were usually made in a timely manner, but ICB procedures proved to be lengthy and cumbersome especially for the purchase of specialist equipment. 5.05 Project Costs. The estimated cost of the Zou Rural Development Project at appraisal was about US$62.7 million, including an estimated farmers' contribution (in kind) of about US$22 million (30%) and US$ 10 million from the Government as shown in Table 5B in Part III. The actual cost is about US$67,5 million, which reflects an increase of about 8% mainly due to exchange rate fluctuations, an estimated increase of farmers' participation and a drop of Government contribution. 5.06 Disbursement. IDA disbursements were delayed by almost three years due to delays in implementation of the project. The closing date was extended three times. Disbursements against commitments were authorized till February 24, 1993. The CCCE loan and FAC grant were fully disbursed. The IDA Credit was disbursed to the amount of SDR 18.577.687 (99.4%) as of January 31, 1993, as shown in Table 3 of Part 111. In addition to payment of salaries to CARDER staff, GOB's contribution totalled about 1,023 million FCFA (US$3.8 million) or 30% of initial commitment. 5.07 Loan Allocation. The original and revised allocation of funds for Cr. 1314-BEN are shown in Table 5 of Part III. Two major activities not foreseen at the time of appraisal were undertaken by the project on recommendation of the supervision missions in 1991 and in view of the considerable undisbursed balance. The first was the establishment of two training centers for young out-of-school farmers and for extension workers, to be subsequently taken over by the Natural Resources Management Project and the National Agricultural Services Project respectively. The second was the purchase of ginning equipment, in response to a serious constraint in the cotton ginning capacity in 1991/92. Consequently, the IDA allocation for equipment was substantially increased from SDR 430,000 to SDR - 5 - 810,000 to accommodate for setting up of the two training centers, and a new category was introduced by amendment of the Development Credit Agreement in February 26, 1992 with an amount of SDR 780,000, for cotton ginning. 6. Project Results 6.01 Project Objectives. The project was a success in relation to its main objectives. The necessary market-based economic environment and policy framework were successfully introduced, combining adequate prices for farmers with the elimination of input subsidies. After early delays, by project year 5 the targets for cotton production within the project area had been exceeded, and by project year 7 cotton production was 75 % above SAR projections. Projected yields were exceeded by project year 7 in the case of all crops except groundnut. The project reached 97% of the number of families initially planned. 6.02 Physical Results. The physical targets of the project were achieved substantially as planned (see Tables 4 and 6 in Part III and the Technical Annex). However, it should be noted that the expansion of cotton was achieved at least partially at the expense of areas under maize, especially in relation to the second maize crop. Less support from the research component for food crops and the absence of assistance to farmers for marketing of food crops may have been influencing factors on the relative performance of the project's crops. Groundnut production was adversely affected by difficulties in the supply of seeds. Minor crops such as rice and tobacco were adversely affected, respectively, by the slow progress in bottomland development and the loss of market outlets for brown tobacco. 6.03 The livestock component, including the introduction of animal traction, seems to have evoked only a limited response from the intended beneficiaries of the project, and was hampered by difficulties with the credit arrangements for the purchase of the pairs of oxen and their equipment. Although 300 pairs were scheduled to be active after 5 years, only 269 were functioning after 9 years. After very high mortality levels early in the project, strict criteria were imposed for the selection of farmers to be supported by the project. The credit terms and mandatory contribution by beneficiary farmers, probably also rendered animal traction financially unattractive to farmers. Additional possible reasons for the shortcomings of this component are the inappropriate selection of animals (resistance to disease, etc.,) and inadequate training of farmers in the use of animal traction. The slow uptake of the animal traction component (including the shortage of oxen teams for destumping in the northern area) has had at least one undesirable environmental effect by encouraging more clearing of new land rather than intensification (which is made possible by animal traction). 6.04 The project components (bottomland development and wells) associated with the DGR were very slow to start. This may be explained partly by shortage of certain skilled personnel, lack of continuity of the national staff assigned to the Department, and partly by difficulties in obtaining key items of specialist equipment through the international competitive bidding procedures of the Bank. The activities aimed at developing on-farm processing of food crops, through support to women's groups, was also administered by the DGR and, similarly, was very slow to make progress and seems not to have received due attention. 6.05 The extension service was organized on the "training and visits' system and was associated with contact groups (unites de suivi) of farmers, all at a similar level of advancement. Although the cotton technology was well assimilated, it became apparent during the course of the project that there was a certain amount of "fatigue" associated with the repetitive nature of the technical messages relating to cotton, with a consequent loss of interest on the part of the farmers. Attempts were made to redress this, following supervision missions, by means of additional and improved training of extensionists. A training center, for school leavers aspiring to be farmers, has also been set up to promote remunerative but sustainable agricultural systems with better integration of food and cash crops. However, - 6 - the lack of information and of new technical messages on food crops (which stemmed from weaknesses in the research program, as noted above) probably contributed to the lack of interest of participating farmers. It may also be noted that once the key appropriate technical messages had been identified, the role of extension became relevant. Overall, the extension system as a management tool performed well with continuous training and regular upgrading. Results are particularly visible on cotton and food crops grown by farmers with the lowest yields. The components of the project associated more directly with cotton production were, in general, accorded more attention and were successfully implemented. The supply of inputs on credit, the collection, processing and marketing of the cotton crop and the transfer of the technology were all effective. 6.06 The SAR envisaged an evolution of the village cooperative groups towards a high degree of autonomy from state institutions, in particular concerning the management of inputs (including credit recovery) and the primary marketing of cotton. The "top-down' approach of the project doubtless contributed to the slow progress in this direction, but several cooperatives have made significant though belated progress during the past two years and are now managing their own inputs and primary cotton marketing to a large extent. They remain handicapped by lack of training in accounting and a lack of medium term credit for such needs as transport and storage facilities. Field visits carried out by the PCR mission confirmed these concerns and a desire on the part of farmers for more assistance with marketing of food crops such as maize. This suggests that slower progress in food crop production derives, to some extent from difficulties experienced in marketing food crops. 6.07 The most notable failure of the project in terms of both design and implementation was the Za-Kpota seed farm which was designed to provide improved seeds for maize and groundnut. The choice of the site had already been made at the time of SAR. Unfortunately the 65 ha site is characterized by mediocre soil quality, steep slopes and an acute shortage of water. The soils are inappropriate for the cultivation of groundnut, and seed production had to be abandoned in 1987 and delegated to the farmers themselves. Over 9 years, the average annual seed production was only 47 tons of maize and 16 tons of groundnut, with average yields respectively of 600-800 kg/ha and 300 kg/ha. There appears to be no clear explanation for the decision to remain on this site, although the glaring shortcomings of the site had become apparent early in the project. Under these circumstances the personnel assigned to the farm appear to have done their best but were placed in an invidious position. 6.08 Institutional support from the project to the MDR (the parent ministry of the CARDERs) at national level was focused in the DEP and was financed by FAC. Apart from the more routine tasks of data collection, monitoring and planning, the DEP was supposed to carry out, under project funding, two key studies, one on the CARDERs organization and methods of intervention, and one on a possible follow-on project. The former, an 8-month study, was conceived in the SAR (November 1982) as a means of improving the efficiency of the CARDERs, and the Zou was seen as a pioneering CARDER where new approaches could be tested on the farm and, where successful, diffused to other CARDERs in the country. However, the terms of reference of the study, contained in the Project File (February 1883) differed from the SAR concept and envisaged a very limited role for the CARDER in this activity. In practice the technical assistance team did not carry out the initial study but embarked on a four-year research program involving little collaboration with the CARDER. Moreover, the team was based in Cotonou and attached to the DRA. As a result, the research and development unit at Bohicon in the Zou CARDER, was left with inadequate resources. Some benefits did arise from the research efforts (introduction of improved varieties and dissemination of techniques allowing for greater farmer self- sufficiency) but, it is clear that a major failure in the organization of the project was the poor integration of the research component with other activities 1/. A specific omission of the research component was the failure to recruit an expert agronomist to be based at Niaouli whose tasks, as defined in the Project File, were to work on food crops, and to consider inter alia soil erosion issues and the long term effects of the cotton farming system on the fertility of the soil. 6.09 The second study, for a follow-on project to the ZRDP, budgeted with 29 months of consultancy time, was supposed to have been undertaken through the DEP in the third year of the project. It was intended to pave the way for an extension of the ZRDP, incorporating more farmers and building on the results of the applied research. No such coordinated study involving the three funding agencies took place, although a study was conducted with a view to preparing a separate FAC-funded regional project in the Zou department, to be implemented independently of the CARDER. Two factors may be cited as having played a part in this: first, FAC funding was in the form of grant aid and therefore not subject to the same supervision as that provided by CCCE and IDA, and, second, the absence of a tri- partite, mid-term review which might have obviated such a divergence of views. 6.10 Financial Performance. In general, and in terms of the indicators selected at the time of SAR, the project results have been good and are reflected in an ERR identical to that estimated in the SAR (22%) despite the lower economic price of cotton. The greater production of cotton compensated for the lower international prices and the slower implementation rate in crops other than cotton during the first five years. The financial statements are given in Annex 2. 6.11 Impact of Project. The excellent performance of cotton implies that the macroeconomic impact of the project was very positive, helping the external account during a critical period. There is no doubt also that incomes of participating farmers have been substantially better than they would have been without the project. The number of target beneficiaries attained 97% of target by PY 8. In practice the project reached all cotton farmers, since it was no longer rewarding to grow cotton outside of the new system, although some may have participated informally through links with family members who were official participants. Farm budget analyses show that project results have been more favorable in the north of the project area owing to better availability of land relatively less depleted of organic matter than in the south. 7. Project Sustainability 7.01 Sustainability needs to be considered at two levels: sustainability of the institutional mechanisms put in place and supported by the project on the one hand, and the sustainability of the farming system on the other. 7.02 While there is likely to be some institutional uncertainty in the wake of the on-going agricultural services restructuration process, no negative impact on cotton production is considered likely as a result of the closure of the project. Indeed cotton production and yields seem to continue growing in the Zou province 2/, and this is becoming a cause for concern owing to limited ginning capacity. SONAPRA is functioning well and according to broadly commercial principles. The project has helped to create a favorable economic environment based on liberal market principles and without input subsidies. With the increasing transfer of responsibility to the cooperatives, a gradual diminution of the role of the CARDER is likely. Its role will remain, however, in accordance with the principles of the Government's recent policy declaration (Lettre de Declaration de Politique de Developpement Rural) j/ These comments relate to FAC funded research in the context of the preent project and in particular in relation to food crop. It should be noted that French funded research efforts at the national and regional (Wedt African) level have been instrumental in introducing high yielding cotton varieties and have made a substantial contribution to the performance of this crop. 2/ See the technical annex for forecast. - 8 - which retains (though not exclusively) for the CARDERs certain important functions (e.g. extension and support to producer organizations), and it also reserves for them the role of coordination of all external assistance. A restructuring effort is being pursued by MDR since 1989 and has led to the preparation of a national restructuring of agricultural services program supported by most donors. It aims at helping the reorganization of the CARDERs through the transitional period of retrenchment in the public sector, and at strengthening the Ministry of Rural Development with enhanced responsibility in coordinating the CARDERs and in the implementation of national policies through their public functions, with financing being progressively taken care of by the national budget to ensure better sustainability. 7.03 Whereas continued regionally-based initiatives in the Zou are to be welcomed, a consensus among donors and with GOB on the approach and articulation between regional projects and national services, is still difficult to find. CARDERs have expanded in the past beyond their original mandate and carried out tasks which should and will be entrusted to the private sector. However they have proved to be a successful mechanism for project implementation. 7.04 With regard to the long term sustainability of the farming system being applied, the issue requires more in depth studies and research in view of the degradation of soils through erosion or excess depletion of organic matter. It is to be hoped that the land management approach under the Natural Resources Management Project (Cr. 2344-BEN), will address effectively the possible negative aspects of the current cotton farming system employed in the Zou and neighboring provinces. 8. Bank's Performance 8.01 The absence of a mid-term review contributed to the poor coordination of external donors. The Bank's awareness of the weaknesses of the research component and the difficulties of the seed farm also seems to have been slow to develop. The seed farm received no mention in supervision reports until December 1986, and then only in the form of a comment on the quality of the technical assistance. However, the supervision of the project was conscientious and when difficulties arose in relation to counterpart funding and the collapse of the banking system, the Bank responded promptly and effectively in concert with the CCCE. 8.02 The Bank was not able to influence the organizational changes which took place in 1985 and did not oppose the expansion of the CARDER which may be regarded as running counter to the intended objectives expressed in the SAR and Project File. However, these reorganizations were imposed at the national level and would have been difficult to block on ground of their impact on a regional project. Similarly, retention by the Borrower of qualified staff was not adequately addressed through the credit conditionality and supervision missions could not prevent staff changes, although staff nomination is part of Government policy and is difficult to address. 8.03 The Bank was flexible enough to permit three closing date extensions to compensate for delays in project implementation and disbursement for causes not directly related to project management performance. It also permitted, towards the end of the project, to slightly reorient the use of the undisbursed balance to finance the establishment of two young farmers training centers and the purchase of equipment to solve a critical cotton ginning constraint. 9. Borrower Performance 9.01 The main weakness of Borrower performance was the failure to meet its counterpart funding commitments. This difficulty was, however, the result of macroeconomic problems and was not project specific. The CARDER, through its cotton marketing revenues, showed resourcefulness in coping with the cash flow problems and was able to keep the project running in spite of them. - 9 - 9.02 The Borrower cooperated well in project preparation. However, the reorganization of the CARDERs in 1985 may be regarded as largerly counterproductive, and the rapid turnover of senior project management staff (5 directors general during the course of the project) created problems of continuity. Nevertheless, in general, the project management performance was considered satisfactory, the Borrower was conscientious in creating an environment for project success, and the necessary elimination of subsidies and liberalization of markets was brought about after only slight delays. The supply of inputs and crop marketing were handled well, and when bottlenecks developed (for example in ginning capacity) measures were taken to remedy them. 10. Project Relationship 10.01 Relationships between the Bank, the Borrower and project personnel were in general excellent. Supervision missions received full support and good cooperation from the Borrower, as well as from the CCCE and FAC. However, in the latter case (and with the notable exception of the technical assistance assigned to the CARDER's monitoring and evaluation unit), coordination was poor, largely due to its independent approach. 11. Consulting Serices 11.01 The consulting services provided under the project appear to have been adequate, with unsatisfactory personnel replaced when necessary. Communication between the technical assistance personnel associated with the research component and the CARDER appears to have been poor. This problem was linked more to the general difficulties associated with the research component (see para. 6.08 above). Technical assistance for training in extension performed well, as did the expert attached to the CARDER's monitoring and evaluation unit. 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.01 The initial project documentation was comprehensive and thorough. It appears to have provided a good basis for project management. The monitoring and evaluation unit of the CARDER provided a useful support service to the project and supplied in general the data required. However, the ritual generation of quarterly reports represented a considerable analytical effort, some of which should have been more profitably devoted to specific issues. The accounting system of the project was adequate with respect to disbursement categories, but was not adequate in terms of cost accounting by project components, as shown in the Project File and the SAR. In particular the CARDER management had very limited financial information on the FAC-funded components. - I1 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1314-BEN) PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE I/ I. Project Description and Objectives The Zou Province Rural Development Project, which became effective in September 1983, was co-financed by the World Bank (IDA credit), the French Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC), the Caisse Frangaise de Developpement (CFD, formerly known as the CCCE) and the Government of Benin, with substantial farmer participation. The overall cost of the project is assessed at CFAF 21,772 million. The Project was meant to reach 38,000 rural families, and was expected to increase cotton production by 5,200 tonnes, groundnut by 4,000 tonnes, cowpeas by 3,300 tonnes, rice paddy by 4,000 and tobacco by 200 tonnes (after five years). The main Project objective was to increase the income of the rural population by: * increasing the production of food crops, and * increasing export crops. In order to achieve these goals, special attention was given to: * training and agricultural extension * strengthening cooperatives * providing agricultural inputs * transforming agricultural products * improving animal health care and the productivity of cattle breeding * adaptive research (cotton and food crops) * seed production * promoting animal traction * bottomland development * improving water supply through tubewells and by rehabilitating wells. The Project was supposed to last five years, but was extended a few times until 1992 so that accomplishments made during the first phase could be consolidated and other activities developed. I/ This report was written by the CARDER-Zou, the project executing agency, on behalf of the Borrower. - 12 - II. Project Design and Oreanisation 2.1 Project Design The three main themes of the Project design were as follows: * institutional strengthening of the CARDER-Zou * development of the cotton "filiere" * strengthening socio-economic infrastructure in rural areas. Target groups were trained using the training and visit extension method. The Project design did not foresee the possible effect of the development of cotton on the environment (soil erosion and deforestation in order to expand the area, etc.) neither did it focus on other constraints to agricultural production (health, rural tracks etc.). 2.2 Organisation The Project's executing agency was the CARDER; however, the streamlining of the CARDER, which had been envisaged by the Project, never materialised because of the Government's unexpected interference (change in organisational structure and frequent reassignment of key personnel involved in the project implementation). Furthermore, the unclear relationship between the CARDER and SONAPRA with regard to the management of the cotton ginneries and agricultural inputs, did not improve matters. The financial difficulties caused by the Government's inability to provide counterpart funds and the freeze on all Project's assets following the collapse of the national banking system did not facilitate project implementation either. III. Results and Project Impact The Zou Project had a definite impact on the technical, social and economic conditions of the farmers. 3.1 Technical Aspect The level of training received by the agents clearly improved due to the training and visit system, and the fact that training was provided at all levels. The number of extension agents (AVA) should have reached 200 in 1988, in line with Project objectives, but rather dropped consistently; in 1984 there were 172 such agents while in 1992 this number fell to 148. The number of Chefs d'Explotation (CE) trained during the same period increased from 12,768 to 36,000, which represents 97% of Project objectives. When comparing the number of CE reached under the Project to the number of extension agents, the ratio changed from 74 CE/AVA to 243 CE/AVA at the end of the Project. Improved technology enabled to achieve the following results: 3.1.1. Crop Production One of the Project's objectives was to intensify production of the main crops, i.e., cotton, maize, cowpeas, groundnut, rice and tobacco. The Project had envisaged the intensification of growing methods without increasing the cultivated areas, apart from those areas used to grow cotton, rice and tobacco, whose sizes were respectively 6,000, 300 and 350 ha. The intensification activities included the gradual use of fertilisers, improved seeds for maize, groundnut, rice and tobacco, and insecticides for cotton and cowpeas. - 13 - (a) Groundnut More than 60% of the area used to grow groundnut is at the first stage of intensification. The Project's objective to transform 50% of the groundnut cultivation area for the purposes of intensified growth (stages 1 and 2 of intensification) was reached at 120% in 1989. That same year, yields in the intensified stage reached 86% of Project objective (640 kg/ha against the objective of 740 kg/ha) and the average yield reached at 90% (581 kg/ha against the objective of 650 kg). One should note that the TS 32-1 variety selected to meet Project needs, did not yield the expected results because of its sensitivity to fungal disease. (b) Cotton Of the six crops whose production was to be intensified under the Project, cotton exceeded by far expectations. In terms of area, objectives were exceeded by 40%, yields by 10% and production by more than 50%. (c) Cowpeas Thirty per cent of the area under cowpeas cultivation was intensified against the objective of 50% set by the Project. Were intensification was possible, the target average yield of 589 kg/ha was achieved at 100% (594 kg/ha according to CARDER-Zou statistics). The modest results obtained with respect to the set objectives of area to be intensified are due to the fact that at the beginning of the Project, treatment was rare, or was done with oil, given the lack of products and equipment. In 1989, almost 30% of farmers treated their cowpea crop. Half of them, covering almost 30% of the area, did two or three treatments, while the other half did only one, diluted the treatment with oil, or did not administer any treatment at all. However, according to the CARDER's statistics, production objectives achieved over eight years were met by 99.5% with an average annual production of 14,500 tonnes, representing an increase of more than 40% compared to the production at the start of the Project. (d) Maize The intensification programme was rather successful. Almost 12% of the area is at level 1 or 2 against a target of 13%, and the average yield of all the levels combined exceeded forecasts. Production targets for the first five years (243,000 t) were met at 99%, and at 88% of targets for the following three years. Overall 94 % (406,000 t against 431,000 t over eight years) was met with an average yield of more than 800 kg/ha, i.e., 112% of the target of 761 kg/ha. Targetted yields for stage 2, which is a more intensive stage, were never reached because a larger amount of fertiliser was required and because of the poor soil quality. (e) Rice The average yield achieved after eight years exceeded target by 185%. The increase in the areas (over eight years) was slower than anticipated (72% of target) and only 16% during the first five- year phase. It was only in the second three-year phase that the targetted production was reached at 120% when the objective was reviewed at a lower level. It is important to note that the direct involvement of Project staff, without the effective participation of the farmers, hindered the good use of bottomland development. Judging by the - 14 - quantity of rice produced from the bottomlands, this would be an activity worth supporting; however, husking is still the main problem. (f) Tobacco During the first phase of the Project, and despite the degeneration of the Paraguay variety, the average target yield was reached at 108%. Nevertheless, the production targets were only met by 50% due to the smaller increase in the area under cultivation. Although reviewed with lower expectations during the second phase of the Project, these areas had still not been achieved during the last three years. A solution for tobacco production in the Zou region should be sought, but not as part of the Project's activities (transfer of activities to private companies). 3.1.2. Cattle Breeding Project activities with regard to cattle breeding included improving animal health care and husbandry for cattle as well as small ruminants. At the end of the Project the number of "demonstration herds" totalled 150, which represents about 10% of total cattle stock. This implies that sanitary treatment was being carried out on this scale and that some effort was being made to improve animal husbandry. These activities made it possible to reduce the adult death rate to 13% and that of calves in the "demonstration herd" to 31%. The fertility rate of the cattle increased to 54%. Small Ruminants Activities are limited to the administration of treatment against parasites for the 23 "demonstration herd". 3.1.3. Animal Traction It was envisaged that 300 pieces of animal traction equipment would be set up; by the end of the Project 308 had been set up, 152 during the first phase of the Project (between 1983 and 1989) and 156 during the extended period (1989-1992). The constraints to the initial development of this component at the departmental level, can be explained by the very high personal contribution demanded from farmers and the absence of destumping assistance. The introduction of this facility permitted to the beneficiaries to grow the areas under cultivation by 3 ha in 1984 and 7 ha in 1992. Other factors, for example, the poor selection of cattle (in terms of resistance to disease, the young age of the animals, etc.) and the unsatisfactory training of farmers in animal traction were to blame for the poor results recorded. 3.1.4. The Provision of Agricultural Inputs There was also a marked improvement in the use of agricultural inputs, for example, fertiliser use jumped from 1,820 tonnes in 1983 to 6,643 tonnes in 1992; and pesticides from 66,875 litres to 410,806 during the same period. Fertilisers were always available during the course of the Project, especially where coton was concerned. Bidding and contract awards were carried out in a timely manner, although procedures were often long and cumbersome, causing delays in the supply of inputs. - 15 - 3.2 Social Aspects Works and Infrastructure The Zou Project: * succeeded in bottomland management: 136 ha out of the 200 forecast, i.e., 68% of set targets; * created 50 boreholes, meeting objectives by 100%; * rehabilitated 32 wells out of the 100 projected; * constructed 7 storage facilities; and * procured 8 pieces of transformation equipment. These activities resulted in improved bottomland management with the promotion of rice and fewer water control problems. The results would have had a more substantial impact if this component had been implemented without delay; unfortunately, this was not possible because the necessary equipment was not available. It is also worth noting that the absence of office buildings at both the central management level and at field level had a negative impact on the normal development of this component. 3.3 Employment Employment was generated by the Project for farmers, agricultural workers, transport companies and labourers. 3.4 Economic Aspect In terms of economic development, the Zou Rural Development Project enabled farmers to: * improve their productivity by using animal traction and applying modern technology to cultivate crops; and * increase their income; the technical expertise acquired by the farmers who produced maize, cowpeas and cotton, in particular, made it possible for their income to increase substantially. 3.5 Farmers' Organisations It should be noted that no particular emphasis was placed on this component during Project design. The Project developed through the cooperative structures which previously existed (GRVC, GF, GV, 4D-Clubs)l/; however, during its implementation, efforts were made to: (i) Create and rehabilitate the cooperative or pre-cooperative structures. The Zou department presently has 445 GV, 399 GVC, 63 GF and 21 4D clubs which are all operational. At present, there is a tendency to regroup the structures into a Producers' Union both at the district level and the 'sous-prefecture' level. The long-term objective is to create a framework for dialogue whose focus would be to resolve mutual problems faced by these structures. There are presently 91 Unions Communales des Producteurs 1/ GV = Groupement villageois, GF = Groupement feminin, GVC = Groupement villageois k vocation cooperative. - 16 - (UCP) at the departmental level and 10 Unions des Producteurs au niveau des Sous- Prefectures (UPSP). (ii) Functional Literacy: The different activities undertaken by these structures involve the functional literacy of their members within the framework of operations linked to the marketing of agricultural products, particularly cotton. 3.6 Other Project Impacts Socio-economic Impact: About 20% of the households, approximately 19,000, within the Department depend primarily on cotton for their livelihood. Assuming three farmers per family unit, this means that approximately 57,000 farmers are employed in cotton production for a good part of the year. For cotton alone, the minimum revenue is CFAF 60,000 per farm. In addition to this, revenue is generated from marketing operations, employment of labourers, watchmen, etc. Cotton factories use more manual labour now than they did in the past. In the same way, transport companies carry a higher volume of freight than in the past. Ginning factories had a 12% ginning capacity, but, with the implementation of the Zou Project, and, to some extent, the Borgou Project, previously abandoned factories were refurbished. The flow of cotton generated a considerable development of private transport firms which were able to improve profitability of their fleets through more efficient use of their operational capacity. Ecological Impact: With the increased area under cotton cultivation, there was a more marked degradation of soils in the southern part of the Department. Likewise, in the northern part of the Department where cotton growth was increased the most, deforestation is rampant. Farmers pressure on gazetted forests in search of good land to expand agriculture is strong, and bush fires are started late. IV. Problems and Weak Points Problems and weak points were due to the design, organisation and implementation of the Project. 4.1 Project Design The weaknesses in project design are most obvious in the areas of health and road accessibility, both of which were the main constraints to improved production throughout the Project. Insufficient attention was given to other aspects, such as environmental issues (i.e., the problem of soil erosion), the sustainability of the agricultural system based on cotton, and the construction of certain buildings for the CARDER staff (offices, housing, etc.). With respect to Project design, some inadequacies have been reveiled between the Project's objectives with regard to food crops and smallholders limited possibilities, in terms of access to credit and marketing facilities. 4.2. Proiect Organisation The fact that there were several financing agencies (IDA, CFD and FAC) did not allow the synchronisation of the various disbursements for the same activity or for complementary activities; this created serios problems for project implementation. - 17 - The failure to streamline the CARDER's structure within the framework of the Project, which was due to the often unexpected interference of the Government, ended up in the creation of organisational structures which were not in line with Project's objectives. The lack of clarity on the responsibility for the ginning factories often disrupted the CARDER's organisational structure, and thus hindered the Project. Although these factories are no longer the CARDER's property, emphasis was still placed on cotton production at the expense of food crops because cotton commercialization offers a stable source of revenue for the CARDER. 4.3 Proiect Implementation * Irregularity and inadequacy of counterpart funds from the Government; * The poor integration of FAC-financed components, particularly the seed farm and research components, into other Project activities; * The freeze of IDA fund following the collapse of the national banking system; D The cumbersome procedures adhered to for disbursements at the national level which prevented the various funds earmarked for the Project from being mobilised in a timely manner. V. Conclusion and Recommendations Following this analysis of the impact of the Zou Rural Development Project, it is clear that the main objectives were met, particularly with respect to agricultural extension through the adoption of various extension messages by the majority of farmers. However, the intensification package on food crops, which many farmers were already familiar with, were not strictly applied due to financial difficulties and lack of credit. Furthermore, the absence of adequate working facilities was a handicap which hanpered the implementation of various activities (i.e., the construction of offices and housing for the field agents). In light of what has already been stated, the following recommendations might be incorporated into a new Project: * Target groups should be associated with the identification of Project activities so that they are more focussed on the realities of rural life; * Credit availability should be more simple to enable smallholders to have access to credit facilities; * Other crops which offer potential benefits to farmers (i.e., maize, cassava, etc.) should be promoted; * Disbursement procedures should be improved; * Programs of functional literacy, drinking water supply, bottomland and watershed management, expansion of animal traction and the development of cattle breeding should be pursued and strengthened. - 19 - REPUBLIC OF BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Credit 1314 -BEN) PART III STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Credits Title Purpose Year of approval Status Cr. 307-BEN To stimulate 1972 cancelled Zou-Borgou cotton production Cotton project Cr. 716-BEN To strengthen 1977 Completed Technical SONAGRI & Assistance project CARDER and to prepare new projects Cr. 1127-BEN Improving rural 1981 Completed Borgou Rural incomes and Development promoting agric. project and exports Cr. 1877-1-BEN 1986 under supervision Second Borgou Rural Dev. project CR. 2285-BEN Reorganize agr. 1991 Effective Agr. Services dev. institution for November 1992 Restructuring better provision of Project services - 20 - 2. Project Tunetble Item Date planned Date revised Date acul Identification i1078 Preparation 1980/1982 Appraisal mission 11/81 Credit negotiation Board approval 11/82 Credit signature 2/83 Credit effectiveness 9/83 Project completion 06/89 09/92 Credit closing 12/89 12/90 01/93 12/91 09/92 - 21 - 3. Schedule of Disburents Actual Cumulative FiscaL Year and Estimate (SOR OOOs) (USS 000s) Actual as X Quarter Cumulative (SOR of Estimate OOOs) FY 83 3 0 0 A 4 1,356 0 0 A 0.0 FY 84 1 800 840 A 2 2,478 800 840 A 32.3 3 1,113 1,170 A 4 3,600 2,957 3,090 A 82.1 FY 85 1 4,393 4,560 A 2 5,002 4,679 4,840 A 93.5 3 4,886 5,040 A 4 6,311 6,455 6,600 A 102.3 FY 86 1 6,798 6,950 A 2 7,948 7,028 7,200 A 88.3 3 7,258 4,460 A 4 9,818 9,258 9,790 A 94.3 FY 87 1 9,375 9,930 A 2 11,828 9,780 10,420 A 83.7 3 10,373 11,170 A 4 13,971 11,900 13,150 A 86.3 FY 88 1 12,317 13,690 A 2 15,661 12,692 14,190 A 81.0 3 12,970 14,570 A 4 17,344 13,360 15,110 A 77.0 FY 89 1 13,722 15,580 A 2 18,046 13,868 15,770 A 76.8 3 13,888 15,800 A 4 18,700 14,215 16,210 A 76.0 FY 90 1 14,469 16,530 A 2 18,700 15,042 17,260 A 80.4 3 15,249 17,530 A 4 18,700 15,302 17,600 A 81.8 FY 91 1 15,608 18,020 A 2 18,700 15,935 18,490 A 85.2 3 16,167 18,810 A 4 18,700 16,167 18,810 A 86.5 FY 92 1 16,320 19,020 A 2 18,700 16,678 19,520 A 89.2 3 17,441 20,580 A 4 18,700 17,598 20,730 A 94.1 FY 93 1 18,700 17,600 20,890 A 94.4 2 18,700 18,481 22,030 A 98.8 3 18,700 18,578 22,170 A 99.4 - 22 - 4. Proiect IJtlewmntation Estimated Indicators SAN Actual Cohents PT 5 Py 9 Extension PY 0 a 18.000 Project farmers (number) 38,000 36,816 Extensionists (AVA) 200 149 Cooperative movement GRVC-GVC (Evolution) 550 488 extension GV and others (Addit.) - 446 cotton marketing procurement Ioputs Improved seeds maize/year 15 t 37t Improved seeds groundnut/year 24 t 7.9 t from farmers only after 1987 FertiLizers 3,300 t 6,223 t Insecticides 290,000 l 364,000 1 Sprayer cumul./year 4,214 8,175 Oxen/ploughs cumul./year 300 269 DGR Works Lowland development 200 ha 136 ha New wells (borehole)/year 50 50 Rehabilitation welts/year 100 32 Stores 7 7 Food crop processing equipment 11 4 (units). Note: Greater detail is available in the amex. - 23 - 5. Project C06ts and Financing! A. Project Costs (IDA Credit) Item SAR Actual (US$ OOOs) _/ (SDR 000s) (US$ OOs)k/ (SDR 000s) la Vehicles 1,797 1,680 2,333 1,955 lb Equipment and furniture 449 420 964 808 Ic Operating costs 3,380 3,160 5,967 5,000 Id Technical assistance 2,246 2,100 3,425 2,870 le Consultancies 235 220 26 22 2 DEP (MDR) Technical 1,016 950 1,298 1,088 Assistance 3 CNCA (Credit) 278 260 138 116 Input financing 4a Additional needs 2,898 2,710 1,724 1,445 4b Working capital (impoit 4,706 4,400 5,298 4,440 funding) 5 Initial Deposit 856 800 6 PPF Advance refund 288 270 64 54 7 Unallocated 1,850 1,730 8 Factory equipment and spares 930 780 a/ TOTAL 20,000 18,700 22,170 18,578 a/ New category introduced in February 92 by amendment of DCA b/ At the average exchange rate of ISDR = 1,193 US$ c/ SAR exchange rate of ISDR = 1,069 US$ - 24 - B. Project Financing Source Planned (Cr1314-BEN) Agreement Actual (M.FCFA) (US$000s) (M.FCFA) (US$ 000s) IDA (18.7 SDRs) 6,800 20.0 7,162(a) 22.2 a/ CCCE 2,210 6.5 2,210 8.2 FAC 1,258 3.7 1,300 4.8 GOB 3,383 9.9 1,023 3.8 Farmers 7,684 22.6 7,700(b) 28.5 TOTAL 21,335 62.7 21,772 64.5 (a) Differences due to exchange rate fluctuation. (b) Not verifiable. - 25 - 6. Project Results A. Direct Benerits Indicators Appraisal Actual Actual Actual PY Actual Estimate PY 5 PY 9 5/ PY 9/ PY S Estimate Estimate PY5 PY5 Benericiaries 38,000 18,100 36,800 48 97 Output ('000 t) Seed cotton 10.8 13.7 32.7 127 303 Maize 51.4 36.5 64.7 71 126 Groundntits 32.4 17.5 33.7 54 104 Cowpeas 13.5 10.4 18.8 77 139 Rice 1.1 0.3 1.3 25 121 Tobacco 0.4 0.1 0.02 25 5 Area ('000 ha) Seed cotton 12.5 15.4 37.3 123 298 Maize 77.0 47.7 75.7 62 98 Groundnut 46.0 33.6 52.5 73 114 Cowpeas 29.0 24.1 36.6 83 126 Rice 1.2 0.1 0.6 10 49 Tobacco 0.7 0.2 0.1 34 7 Yield (kg/ha) Seed cotton 864 891 877 103 102 Maize 667 766 856 115 128 Groundnut 704 520 642 74 91 Cowpeas 465 433 513 93 110 Rice 916 2,250 2,254 245 246 Tobacco 571 417 400 73 70 - 26 - B. Economic Impact SAR Estimate Estimated Actual Economic Rate of Return 22% 22% 1. Economic rate of return. The economic rate of return of the project estimated on the basis of the data available approximately half way through the 20 year project "life" is the same (22%) as that estimated in the SAR, which is coincidental. Although the economic price of cotton fell it was balanced by greater production of cotton and of other crops than expected. The tables in Annex 2 show the basis of the calculation of the ERR. Notes on the economic analysis 2. Project level costs and disbursements. Owing to the form in which historical accounting data were available to the mission, it was not possible to follow exactly the SAR economic analysis. The main difficulty was that project costs were only available by disbursement category and that Government costs (project operating expenditures) had to be estimated by grossing up the relevant categories of IDA credit disbursements according to financing percentages (which were also modified in the course of the project). CCCE disbursements were available by category for the whole disbursement period but a breakdown by component was not available for individual years. However, total phased disbursements by year were available. The proportion of the CCCE financing for purchase of farm level inputs (and which had to be eliminated to avoid double counting) had therefore to be estimated pro-rata without knowing the detailed phasing of these costs. Only a simple phased schedule of expenditure of disbursements was available from FAC. Project support costs after 1992 were assumed to be maintained at levels only slightly lower than those of the last year of the project (at 420,000,000 F CFA per annum in 1991 prices) reflecting ongoing CARDER operating costs related to extension and support to cooperative groups. 3. Other cost and price levels. The analysis was conducted in 1991 prices. In the case of the incremental benefits of the project, the physical incremental production data which were provided by the CARDER were valued in terms of international prices (World Bank current price level series, historical and projected, except for rice for which an FAO series for parboiled Thai rice, typically imported into Benin, was used). Economic price calculations for project benefits were made in current terms (and subsequently adjusted to 1991 prices using the G-5 MUV index), whereas incremental costs were estimated in 1991 terms throughout. This procedure was followed for convenience and in order to benefit from and be consistent with the economic analysis of the parallel Borgou Province rural development project (Cr. 1127-BEN). Incremental farm level input costs were based on data provided by the project monitoring and evaluation unit. Labor costs were estimated using the man-day estimates per hectare according to the SAR but modified to take into account the stage of development actually achieved by the farms concerned. 4. Base line. A difficulty encountered was that production levels of all crops except cotton and cowpeas during PYI were estimated to be below those assumed in the SAR. In order to avoid the implausible result that the project was responsible for a decline in all these crops in the first year, the base figure for estimating incremental production was taken to be the lower of the SAR figure and the PYI figure as recorded by the project monitoring and evaluation staff. 5. Other assumptions. In general other assumptions (eg regarding ginning rates, loss rates and haulage costs) followed those of the Borgou PCR, modified where appropriate for differences in distances and the one year difference in the base year for analysis - 1991 as opposed to 1990. - 27 - C. Studies Purpose as defined at Status Impact of Studies appraisal CARDER organization Improve the efficiency Completed but TOR No impact in terms of and intervention of the CARDER and objectives differed improvement of methods from those at appraisal CARDER efficiency. Some impact on adaptive research results Preparation of a Consolidate project Completed but TOR No impact on possible follow-up project results and propose and objectives continuation of extension of activities different from those at CARDER activities to increase number of appraisal under a new project, beneficiaries but preparation of a separate independent regional project Comments on Studies Component. Both studies, financed by the FAC, considerably diverted from the initial objectives and scope, as defined during appraisal. No coordination between the financing agencies took place and very poor integration did occur in addressing CARDER constraints and activities (para 1.27). - 28 - 7. Status of Covenants SoEtio/ Decnrition SAmu mcInt 4.01 Accounting practices,keeping of records nd Complied with in general but detailed record keeping audits, etc. not adapted to monitoring SAR expenditure categories. 4.02 Insurnce, maintenance of equipment, sound Complied with, although final sllcation of 780,000 enginering, fmacial and agriculturl practices. SDRs for repairr and replacement of ginnezy equipment may have reflected inadequate past maintenance. 4.03 (i) Complete elimination of input subsidies by Complied with but not according to original timetable Febmary 1989 (pauwe in 1984) (ii) prenotification of prices Complied with - price variation were minimal. (iii) Interest on credit inputs at 11% 1983/84. Not complied with. (iv) Subsequent adjustment of interest ates. Complied with, but instead of pecific interest charges, SONAPRA introduced cash purchase discounts to farmens from 1987/88. Implicit interest charge varied according to the input. (v) Cotton prices - barOme to be regularly Prices were modified infrequently, but consistent adjusted to reflect production costs. with stabilization mechanism. (vi) Seed charges to reflect marginal costs of Inadequate information for the ystematic recovery of production. seed cos. 4.04 (i) Bonus system for extension agents. Complied with. (ii) Salaries increasd to same level as other Complied with. state enterprises. 2.02 Counterpat funding. This was a major problem, particularly serious from 1985 onward. - 29 - 8. Use of Bank Resources A. Staff InDuts (Staffweeks) TASK FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 TOTAL Preparation 3.5 5.3 8.7- --- -- -- -- -- -- 17.5 ApprsisaL - -- 47.9 6.4--- -- -- -- -- 54.3 Negotiations/Board 6.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 6.0 Loan Processing CLOP) 0.4 3.2 6.3 --- -- - -- -- -- 9.9 .... ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- . ---- ---- . .... .... . ----- ..... ... .. .......... Sub-totaL 3.5 5.7 59.8 18.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.7 Supervision 5.6 17.1 8.9 13.1 7.9 6.5 6.9 10.0 11.5 13.0 1.2 101.7 Project Adninistration (PAD) 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 -- - -- - -- 1.8 Project CoepLetion Report -- -- -- -- -- 4.5 -- 4.5 Sub-totaL 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 17.2 9.5 13.2 8.0 6.5 6.9 10.0 11.5 17.5 1.2 108.0 TOTAL 3.5 5.7 59.8 25.2 17.2 9.5 13.2 8.0 6.5 6.9 10.0 11.5 17.5 1.2 195.7 3 ... ... 33.3 33.3 .323 3333 33 3323 3333 33 . 333 333 33fl - 30 - B. Missions (Statf and Consultants) - -I Missions Date Number SW in Specialty Rating Type of persons Field 1/ Status Problem Preparation 05/81 3 5 Ag. Ec. FA 09/81 1 1 Agq Appraisal 11/81 4 4 Ag Zc AZ FA Post.appr 04/82 2 2 Ag Ec Supervision 12/82 3 2 Ag Ec RE 2 05/84 7 10 Ag AE ME Li 2 Technical Ag Tr FA Manag. 11/84 2 2.5 Ag PA 2 04/85 2 3 Ag Ec 2 financial 06/85 1 1.S Ag 2 technical 12/85 2 4 Ec AZ 2 technical managem. 03/86 3 7 Ec AE Ag 1 10/86 1 1.5 FA 1 12/86 1 2 Ag 1 04/87 1 0.5 FA 1 02/88 2 2 Ag FA 2 technical financial 07/88 2 2 Ag FA 2 managom financial 03/89 2 2 Ag FA 2 financial 12/89 2 1.5 Ag FA 2 financial 10/90 2 4 Ag Ec 2 financial 07/91 2 5 Ag Ec 2 financial 05/92 2 5 Ag Zc 2 financial I/ Ag: Agronomist, Ec: Economist, AZ: Agricultural economist FA: Financial analyst, ME: Monltoring & Evaluation specialist LI: Livestock specialist, RE: Rural Engineer, Tr: Training op. 2/ 1 Problem free or minor problems 2 Moderate problems ,/ Final supervision mission combined with PCR mission 4/ brief mission to review financial situation only - 31 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1314-BEN) TECHNICAL ANNEX BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Area - Production - Yields PYO PY 1 PY 2 PY 3 PY4 PY5 PY 6 PY 7 PYs PY 9 1841 I8as 186) 1871 I88i I89s (901 (91 ( 921 Cow Pow Area (000 ha) 29.00 25.62 29.13 23.57 23.71 24.07 27.75 31.23 30.43 36.64 Production('Tons) 10.15 11.14 17.19 13.46 10.81 10.42 13.35 16.30 15.51 18.81 Yields (kg") 350 435 590 571 456 433 481 523 510 513 Rice Area('OOOha) 0.85 0.36 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.43 0.66 0.59 Production ITons) 0.62 0.54 0.39 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.46 1.03 1.80 1.33 Yields (kgf/l 729 1,504 2.060 1.603 1.520 2,189 2.580 2.415 2.727 2.254 Tobacco Area ('OOO ha) 0.40 0.18 0.28 0.36 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.05 0.04 0.05 Production I'Tons) 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02 l Yields 1kg/h) 400 420 495 548 500 435 512 430 500 400 U PY O PY I PY 2 PY 3 PY 4 PY 6 PY 6 PY 7 PY8 PY 9 (641 (851 (861 (871 (S8o (891 (90) (911 1921 h30h 6.50 7.84 12.78 18.13 18.73 15.38 22.79 20.33 28.04 37.30 mloOOOTons) 5.12 5.25 16.01 11.50 23.70 13.70 18.73 18.91 35.05 32.70 Sk* 0 ge)788 670 1.252 634 1.265 891 822 930 1.250 877 X ha) . 46.00, 33.38 42.42 48.23 42.80 33.60 46.16 44.96 45.63 52.52 ('000 Tons) 28.33 18.36 32.24 37.19 24.27 17.47 32.08 30.70 29.74 33.70 * sib.) 616 550 760 771 567 520 695 681 652 642 0 ha) 77.00 64.84 67.94 63.90 55.60 47.11 64.45 68.48 60.04 75.57 >n lTons) 46.20 45.53 54.92 53.81 42.81 36.54 52.85 55.70 44.70 64.69 g/ha) _ __ _600 702 808 842 770 766 820 813 745 856 CARDER nnuud reponts 30 - 34 - ANNN EX I Page 2 of 8 BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Crops - Objectives/Achievements Objective SAR PY 0 PY 9 % Difference % Oifference (92) from from PY 0 Oblecilvee Conton Area ('000 ha) 12.5 6.so 37.30 + 198 + 474 Production ('000 Tone 10.8 5.1 2 32.70 + 203 + 539 Yields (kg/ha) 864 788 877 + 2 + 11 Maize Area ('000 ha) 77.0 77.0 75.57 2 2 Production ('000 Tons) 51.4 46.2 64.69 + 26 -40 Yields (kg/ha) 667 eoo 856 + 28 + 43 Groundnuts Area ('000 ha) 48.0 46.0 52.52 + 14 + 14 Production ('000 Tn 32.4 28.3 33.70 + 4 + 19 Yields (kg/hal 704 616 642 9 + 4 Cow pee. Aree ('000 hal 29.0 29.0 36.64 + 26 + 26 Production (000 Tn 13.S 10.1 18.81 + 39 + 86 Yields (kg/ha) 48S 350 513 + 10 + 47 Rice Area ('000 ha) 1.2 (0.5t 0.59 - 51 Production ('000 Tn 1.1 (0.d21 1.33 + 21 Yields (kg/hal 83 729 2254 + 155 + 209 Tobacco Area ('000 ha) 0.7 0.4 0.05 -92 Production ('000 Tn 0.4 .0.16 0.02 - 95 Y'islds (kgfhe) 514 400 So00. + 429 Source: CAROER annuai repors. "As from Staff Appraisal Report. BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Extension Service 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 PYO PYI PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 PY6 PY7 PY8 PY9 Number of farmers 18.0 21.0 24.0 28.0 33.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 ('000) Number of contacted 12.8 15.7 16.4 18.1 25.3 33.2 30.9 36.8 farmers ('000) 21 Number of AVA 172 171 170 170 170 166 156 149 (ext. agents) 2v Farmers/AVA 74 92 96 107 149 200 223 246 oolG UAs from Staff Appraisal Report. ,! 0 'As from CARDER annual reports. m wMission estimates. - 36 - ANNEX I Page 4 o f 8 BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJET Additional Production Predictions Versus Achievements (metric tons) Predictions Achievements | Achievemet % SAR PY 5 Actual PY 5 s Actual PY9 Seed-cotton +5,700 +8,580 +51 +27,580 +333 Maize +5,200 -9,660 -285 +18,490 +256 Groundnuts +4,000 -10,860 -286 +5,370 +34 Cowpeas +3,300 +270 -92 +8,660 +162 Rice +400 -350 -188 +710 +77 Tobacco +200 -60 -130 -140 -180 -37 - ANNEX 1 T,-ge of BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Crop Development Stages. PY 7: 1989/90 (kg/ha) (SAR = Object PYS) Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Average SAR PY7 SAR PY7 SAR PY7 SAR PY7 Cotton 600 806 800 928 1.000 1.243 860 879 Maize 600 815 1.000 1.020 1.600 1.063 740 840 Groundnut 600 488 800 640 1.100 - 820 581 Cow peas 350 300 500 504 700 485 580 357 Rice 700 NA 1.000 NA 1.300 NA 880 2.581 Tobacco 400 NA 600 NA 800 NA 510 519 BENN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Yields per Hectare (kg/ha) PY 0 PY I PY 2 PY 3 PY 4 PY 5 PY 6 PY 7 PY 8 PY 9 Mog. (1983) % 4an Cotton 788 670 1,252 634 1,265 891 822 930 1,250 877 970 Groundnuts 616 550 760 771 567 520 695 681 652 642 668 Maize 600 702 808 842 770 766 820 813 745 856 809 Cowpeas 350 435 590 571 456 433 481 523 510 513 507 Rice 729 1,504 2,060 1,603 1,520 2,189 2,580 2,415 2,727 2,254 2,494 Tobacco 400 420 495 548 500 435 512 430 500 400 461 X > Dlz OC . 0r co BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Inputs - Equipment P PT7 OP IV PT 9 Total nw og F1;91;21 ip "190 b n 190 4 l9907 1991S 1n9929 oe 1. Eqait (I-.) Utv Sprayer (929) 672 898 1,103 1.125 1,044 830 581 1,401 1,193 8,175 Oxen Pair MA 39 0 34 49 35 33 36 43 269 Ploughs NA 14 0 27 44 32 27 32 26 202 II. Iqpats A. Fertilizer (t) Cotton copoW UPK 0 1,326 2,033 2,723 2.955 2,595 3.262 2.893 4,117 4,348 24,926 Urea 0 387 808 1,044 907 848 m 875 1,357 1,421 8.037 Potassium Chloride 0 25 102 160 197 51 25 94 107 143 879 Triple superph. 0 31 25 120 45 14 9 156 255 311 935 Total: 1,769 2,968 4,047 4,104 3,508 4,03 4,018 5,836 6,223 34, m7 Prix engrais FCFA/kg 60 60 90 90 100 90/100 85/95 85/95 85/95 B. Inseeticides ('000 t) lnsect. cotton 0 116.6 231.9 257.7 300.2 256.9 285.6 239.0 348.2 342.1 2,261.6 Insect. cow peas 0 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.6 5.1 11.0 18.3 22.2 60.5 Total 366.5 364.3 2,322.1 Prix insecticide FCFA/titre 600 600 850 1,100 1,500 1I5o I 00 I Soo I C. Ilnroved Seeds (t) "size 0 22.05 34.44 34.06 28.71 41.96 43.81 76.96 67.53 37.30 364.77 Groundhuts 0 0.49 11.00 3.17 14.49 15.75 11.24 7.9 64.04 Rice 0 0.04 0.18 0.51 1.14 0 0 0 1.87 Sorce: CAlDER an tl reports. C, BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Cooperative Movement PYO PYI PY2 PY3 PY4 PY5 PY6 PY7 PY8 PY9 SAR 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Object. Others 186 340 326 318 318 374 458 488 Newly created GV 52 139 267 429 446 Total groups 186 340 326 370 457 641 887 934 550 GV = Groupements villageois 0C co - 41 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF BENIN ZOU PROVINCE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1314-BEN) ECONOMIC EVALUATION ANNEX . Pw~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I i. Ao t 91" PA" lots isle Otto *MA, at"f it" et" sawl "Its Otto PSS S.w Iz sit oil Mo t et I ey " ,I nt s z tt n g* e* @t -
Группа Всемирного банка · Project Completion Report
Benin - Zou Province Rural Development Project
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