Barbados - Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project

Document of TheWorld Bank FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BARBADOS ROAD MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION PROJECT (LOAN 2432-BAR) JUNE 16, 1993 Department 111 Infrastructure Division Latin America and the Caribbean Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their off~cialduties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FISCAL YEAR April 1 to March 31 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Barbados Dollar (BD$) Official Rate WEIGHTS AND MEASURES BritishlUS Units Metric Equivalent 1 foot (ft) = 0.305 meter (m) 1 mile (mi) = 1.609 kilometers (km) 1 square mile = .20,589 square kilometers kmz) 1 pound (Ib) - 0.454 kilogram (kg) 1 short ton (2,200 lbs) = 0.907 metric ton (m ton) 1 long ton (2,240 lbs) = 1.016 metric ton (m ton) Abbreviations and Acronyms AADT Average Annual Daily Traffic BPA Barbados Port Authority CDB Caribbean Development Bank CIDA Canadian International Development Agency DOT US Department of Transportation EMS Equipment Management System ERR Economic Rate of Return IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICB International Competitive Bidding IDB Inter-American Development Bank MFP Ministry of Finance and Planning MMS Maintenance Management System MTW Ministry of Public Works, Communications and Transportation PPO Policy and Planning Office TB Transport Board  THE WORLD BANK Washington,D.C.20433 U.S.A. Iffice of Director-General Operations Evaluation June 16, 1993 SUBJECT8 Project Completion Report on Barbados Attached is the report entitled "Project Completion Report on Barbados - Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project (Loan 2432-BAR)", prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. The report includes comments by the Borrower (Part 11). It is informative and comprehensive. This was the first Bank project in transport in Barbados. Objectives were to maintain high-priority roads and develop institutional capacities for road maintenance. The focus was appropriate for the country's needs. But the design overestimated borrower commitment and implementation capacity. As a result, the project took three years longer than planned. Misprocurement led to a $2.5 million cancellation and $0.6 million was left unutilized when the loan was closed. However, substantial completion of physical objectives, a wide range of institutional improvements and successful capacity building measures add up to a satisfactory overall outcome. Sustainability is likely because of the institutional and other progress made under a follow-up project (Second Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project, Loan 3493-BAR). No audit is planned. Attachment IThis docunent has a restricted distribution and may be used by recfpients only in the performence ofI their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Yorld Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICUL USE ONLY BARBADOS HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (LOAN 2432-BAR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No . Preface .............................................................. i Evaluation Surmnary ................................................... ii Part I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A 1 B Background 1 C Project Objectives and Description 2 D 3 E Project Implementation ..... Project Project Identity ........................................... .................................................. .......................... Design and Organization ............................. ...................................... 5 F Project Results 8 G Project Sustainability 9 H Bank Performance and Lessons Learned 9 I Borrower Performance and Lessons Learned .... .............................................. ...................................... ........................ .................... 10 J Bank-Borrower Relationship . ............................ 1 1 K Consulting Services ......................................... 11 L .. Project Documentation and Data .............................. 12 Part I1 PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE A . Comments on Part I of the Project Completion Report ......... 13 B 14 C Performance of the Bank .. Performance of the Borrower ................................. ..................................... 14 Part 111 STATISTICAL INFORMATION Related Bank Loans ............................................. 15 Project Timetable .............................................. 15 Loan Disbursement .............................................. 15 Project Implementation ......................................... 16 Project Financing .............................................. 17 Project Results ................................................ 18 Status of Loan Covenants ..................................... 19 Use of Bank Resources ....................................... 20 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their omcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BARBADOS ROAD MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION PROJECT (Loan 2432-BAR) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project in Barbados financed under Loan 2432-BAR for USS11.0 million. Loan 2432-BAR was approved on May 31, 1984, and the project was carried out from 1984 to 1991. The original closing date, December 31, 1988, was subsequently extended annually for three years to December 31, 1991. The loan was not fully disbursed at its closing; on July 13, 1988, the Loan was reduced by USS2.5 million to USS8.5 million as a result of misprocurement of which amount US$ 7.9 million was disbursed and the undisbursed balance of USS0.6 million was canceled from the Loan. The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Division Country Department 111, of Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. It is based on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan Agreement, information gleaned from the project files, and materials obtained during project completion mission and discussions with the Bank and the Ministry of Public Works, Communications and Transportation (MTW) staff who were associated with the project. This report contains Parts I and 111 prepared by the Bank and Part I1 prepared by the Client. Part I1 reflects the Borrower's perspective of the project's implementation achievements and difficulties.   BARBADOS PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ROAD MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION PROJECT (Loan 2432-BAR) EVALUATION SUMMARY Obfectives 1. The Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project, was closely linked with macro policy objectives to foster economic development through institutional strengthening and the reduction of transportation costs. As described in the appraisal report, the project's objectives were to: (i) support the Government's strategy to preserve rather than expand the country's main network by reducing the backlog of high-priorityperiodic road maintenance, rehabilitation, resealing and reconstruction works; (ii) carry out highway safety improvement works at selected road intersections; and (iii) to improve MTW's capacity and overall performance in planning, programming, and the execution of periodic road maintenance and reconstruction works by developing and implementing appropriate maintenance management systems. (Para 5). Imlementation Experience 2. The Loan Agreement was signed on June 14, 1984, and the project became effective on November 30, 1984. The agreed Project Completion Date was June 30, 1988; the Closing Date of December 31, 1988, was extended thrice at the request of the Government and with Bank approval, to December 31, 1991. The project's implementation was slow from its start. MTW was unable to carry out the project in accordance with the implementation schedule agreed at appraisal (para. 15). As of June 1988, the original Project Completion Date, disbursements totalled USS4.9 million, or less than 40 percent of the loan amount. The project took seven years to complete, or three years longer than agreed at appraisal. Due to its late start (para. 18), portion of the institutional strengthening program are being finalized under the on-going Bank follow-on project (para 35). At the close of the project, the Bank loan of USS11 million was not fully utilized. The amount disbursed was USS7.9 million, or 72 percent of the loan. Due to misprocurement, USS2.5 million of the loan was canceled from the Loan account, reducing the Loan to USS8.5 million. Of this total an undisbursed amount of USS0.6 million was canceled as it was not needed to complete the project. 3. The actual project implementationwas at variance with the schedule agreed at appraisal (para 22). MTW focused on carrying out civil works giving insufficient attention to the institutional strengthening program, even though both components had equal priority ranking, given that successful implementation of the works program depended on timely implementation of the institutional strengthening programs. 4. The implementation delays in carrying out civil works were due to administrative and technical problems including (para. 23): (i) inefficient programming of the project's activities (ii) inadequate preparation of engineering for the project's works; (iii) M'IW's proclivity for carrying out the project's works by force account rather than by contract; (v) frequent postponements of scheduled force account works due to lack of logistic support; and (vi) delays in land acquisition. The pace of execution of force account works was hampered by unavailability of much needed equipment that was to be procured under the project. The monitoring of the quality of the works during their execution was impaired by the lack of the materials and soils laboratory (para 24). The establishment of this laboratory was originally scheduled for the  early part of 1985. Instead, procurement of equipment for the laboratory was initiated in 1986, concluded five years later, in 1991, and the laboratory was made operational towards the end of the project, too late for monitoring the quality of the project works. 5. The implementation of institutional programs lacked MTW full support during the first years of the project (para 26). This delay in contracting the technical assistance services deprived MTW of the possibility of having in place the institutions needed for the timely implementation of the project. As a result, MTW was unable to achieve all the goals envisaged within the agreed timeframe of the project (including a three-year extension of the original closing date). Full completion of these improvements will be achieved under the on-going follow-on Second Road Rehabilitation Project. 6. The implementation of other institutional programs such as accounting and policy planning suffered from the lack of an adequate level of supervision of project accounting staff. The position of accountant has been vacant for some time and, as a result, the majority of the work load was performed by a small staff comprising an assistant accountant (acting) and two clerical officers , inadequate to ensure maintenance of effective internal controls (para. 27). Deficiencies of internal controls were eventually corrected. Results 7. The three-year extension of the Closing Date and improved Bank supervision made possible a substantial completion of the following project components (para. 32): (i) civil works for reconstruction, resurfacing, or resealing of 50 lan of the road network; (ii) acquisition of maintenance equipment to support MTW's implementation of force account works and to re-enforce the equipment management system; (iii) highway safety works for improvements at locations with high accident rates; (iv) construction of a new workshop. Substantial progress was made in the design of the Maintenance and the Equipment Management Systems, although full implementation was not possible due to time constraints; (v) strengthening of the Traffic Unit operations. The unit is carrying out a program of traffic counts and analyses to recommend traffic flow improvements and support investment analysis; and (vi) construction of a new building for the Materials and Soils Testing Laboratory, purchase of laboratory equipment, and training of laboratory technicians. The laboratory is fully operational and carrying out a testing program to monitor the quality of all materials being supplied by contractors and commercial suppliers. 8. The following institution building activities were initiated and their implementation is being finalized under the on-going follaw-on transportation project (para. 33): (i) the development and implementation of the cost accounting system for construction and maintenance, including a financial information system; (ii) the strengthening of the Policy and Planning Office, to assist MTW in setting investment priorities; and (iii) full implementation of the Maintenance Management and Equipment Management systems throughout MTW's maintenance depots. 9. MTW expressed its satisfaction with the establishment of the Maintenance Management System and the training of MTW personnel in the use of the Benkelman beam and a Mays Ride Meter to determine the strength and surface roughness of pavements, both of which are necessary to prepare reliable road condition inventories. MTW was also satisfied with the establishment of the Materials and Soils Laboratory stating that "prior to the establishment of the Laboratory little attempt was made to enforce quality standards which now is being done", and with the adaptation of computer technology for the processing of MTW,  . technical and administrative data (para. 34) As a result of its experience ftom this project, MTW opted for contracting out all works included in the investment program financed under the follow-on project and has an on-going pilot project to test cost-effectiveness of routine maintenance by contract. MTW also reduced its field and office personnel by 50 percent, from 3000 to less than 1500 by 1991. Sustainability 10. The sustainability of all the elements of this first Bank project in the road transport sector in Barbados is assured given that the Government expressed interest to proceed with the institutional improvements initiated under the project and requested the Bank to finance a follow-on project (para. 35). The Government's request was approved by the Bank (Loan 3493-BAR, USS20.6 million). Findings and Lessons Learned 11. The project's scope was appropriate for the country's needs, but the implementation schedule was unrealistic. Given that the Bank had no previous experience working with MTW, it would have been prudent to prepare the project with more attention to details regarding both the engineering for the works programs and MTW's commitment to the proposed institutional improvements (para. 36). 12. The project underscored the need for an uncompromising review of the project's status of preparation for appraisal by the Bank, notwithstanding any considerations of project processing deadlines. An in-depth review of the engineering prepared by MTW for the appraisal of the project's works program should have been made by an engineer experienced in road structural design and construction (para. 36). 13. The establishment of good communications between MTW and the Bank would have promoted a better understanding of the project's goals and the importance of an appropriate sequencing of the project activities consistent with these goals. According to the Borrower there was a lack of effective communications between Bank staff and MTW that was partly responsible for the confusion among MTW personnel working with the Bank for the first time, about the project's objectives. This affected the project progress during its first four years of implementation. An effective dialogue was established in 1987 by a new Bank supervision team which helped MTW improve the project's progress and achieve most of the project's goals (para. 41). 14. An important lesson can be drawn from the absence of dated covenants which would have facilitated rescheduling of the project implementation around critical benchmarks, such as the purchase of maintenance equipment and the establishment of the soils laboratory (para. 42). These benchmarks would have underscored the interrelationship among key activities, providing guidance for proper sequencing of the project activities.   BARBADOS PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ROAD MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION PROJECT (LOAN 2432-BAR) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity Project Name: Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project. Loan Number: 2432-BAR RVP Unit: Latin America and Caribbean Region Country Department I11 Country: Barbados Sector: Transportation Subsector: Roads B. Background 1. The Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project, the first Bank project in the transportation sector in Barbados, was designed to provide Bank assistance to support the Government strategy for preserving, rather than expanding, the country's network. During the late 1970'9, the Government's attention was focused on the development of the port and airport facilities and investments in the road subsector were minimal. As a result of this policy, the condition of the road network system had deteriorated. This condition contributed to a low standard of trafficability and increased road users costs. 2. The road network required substantial maintenance and some rehabilitation. With the completion of large investment projects in other sectors, the Government proposed to implement a Five-Year Investment Plan, (1983-1988), tripling annual expenditures to be invested in the road subsector to about 22 percent of the Government's total capital expenditures, and requested IDB, CDB and the World Bank to help finance the implementation of the Plan. 3. Responding to the Government's request for financing a part of the Investment Plan, the Bank pre-appraisal mission visited Barbados in late 1983. The mission found that although the annual budget allocations for road maintenance for the fiscal years 1978179 through 1982183 were adequate to maintain the road system in a "fair" condition, the existing poor condition of the roads was a result of inefficient use of the budgeted funds, and the lack of accountability. This assessment was supported by studies prepared by consultants coarmissioned by the Government. An IDB-financed "Institutional Strengthening Study" completed by consultants. in November 1983, analyzed the financial, technical and organizational structure of MTW, and recommended specific improvementswithin some departments to enhance MTW's overall operations. In the study entitled "A Review of Road Maintenance and Construction, December 1983", consultants, reviewed MTW's standard road engineering design procedures and construction methods, and made recommendations to improve the quality of MTW's performance in these areas. These recommendationswere in line with the comments made in the Government's White Paper about MTW's shortcomings in road infrastructure planning, cost control, equipment management, personnel training, materials testing and research.  4. Both studies recommended, unequivocally, that the quality of engineering and construction had to be improved without delay. To achieve this, it was indispensable to establish a well equipped materials and soils testing laboratory, staffed with qualified technicians able to determine the strength characteristics of the materials used in road works and their conformance with MTW's technical specifications. Other required elements included the establishment of a maintenance management unit to carry out road condition inventories and prepare road maintenance plans, and the improvement of workshops and equipment availability. C. Project Objectives and Description 5. Pro-tect Obiectives. The Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project, was closely linked with macro policy objectives to foster economic development through institutional strengthening and the reduction of traffic accidents and transportation costs. As described in the appraisal report, the project's objectiveswere to: (i) support the Government's strategy to preserve rather than expand the country's main network by reducing the backlog of high-priority periodic road maintenance, rehabilitation, resealing and reconstruction works; (ii) carry out highway safety improvement works at selected road intersections; and (iii) to improve MTW's capacity and overall performance in planning and the execution of periodic road maintenance and reconstruction works. 6. Proiect Description. The project comprised three major components: (a) Road Kaintenance and Rehabilitation program which was part of a four- year program (N84/85 -N87/88)and designed to safeguard the physical integrity of the network by reducing a backlog of deferred road rehabilitation and maintenance works, totalling about 62.4 km,namely: (i) road reconstruction (29.1 km)ll; (ii) resurfacing (28.8 km); and (iii) resealing (4.5 km) . MTW was to execute 55 percent of the project's works by force account, and to contract the remaining 45 percent with private contractors. The project also provided for the purchase of some 72 units of road equipment and vehicles, spare parts and workshop tools to facilitate the implementation of urgently needed road works by force account and supported the development and implementation of an equipment management system to improve overall management of the MTW's equipment and vehicle fleet. (b) Highway Safety program comprising (i) minor realignment works to improve road conditions and sidewalks at nine different locations,which had a high rate of traffic accidents; and (ii) the purchase of pavement striping machines and traffic signs; (c) The institutional-strengthening of MTW's road maintenance and rehabilitation operations envisaged: (i) developing and implementing a Maintenance Management System (MMS) and an Equipment Management System (EMS); (ii) establishing a Policy Planning Office and a Materials and Soils testing laboratory; (iii) improving operations within the Traffic Unit; (iv) designing a data base system for financial management; (v) developing and implementing an integrated accounting system (IAS) that would include a cost accounting system for road construction and maintenance, and interface with all MTW's operational systems. Each system was to be headed by an MTW appointed manager responsible L/This was later reduced to 16.7 h,when Highway 2A (12.4 km) was taken out of the program.  for specific outputs that the system was designed to generate; and (vi) establishing an internal auditing process. D. Project Desipn and Orpenization 7. Conceptual Foundation. The project was designed to carry out a road works program that would generate economic benefits to the national economy and help MTW develop a cost-effective road management system. The program comprised (i) periodic maintenance including minor drainage improvements, (ii) road reconstruction and widening works; (iii) resurfacing with an asphaltic concrete overlay; (iv) resealing with a bituminous surface treatment; and (v) road safety works to reduce traffic accidents and to improve pedestrians safety. To implement this program efficiently, the project focussed on improvements of MTW's institutions. The institutional strengthening program to improve MTW's management of its human, financial and equipment resources was one of the key elements of the project. The concept was shared by all relevant parties and was well understood. 8. The institutional strengthening program was designed to increase MTW's operating capacity through rationalization of the use of MTW's financial resources budgeted for the maintenance and improvement of the road network. The program aimed at: (i) developing a Maintenance Management System, to plan, schedule and execute annual road maintenance activities efficiently; (ii) developing an Equipment Management System to eliminate shortages of spare parts, reduce equipment downtime, improve workshop production and efficiency, program and carry out routine and periodic maintenance of MTW's existing equipment and vehicle fleet, and schedule replacement of economically unserviceable units, ensuring that equipment would be available to MTW' road maintenance crews when required; (iii) enhancing MTW's accountability through improvements of MTW's accounting procedures and auditing standards to evaluate cost-effectiveness of its operations, and establishment of an integrated accounting system that would interface with all other MTW-related systems, providing MTW with a management tool to control its expenditures; (iv) setting up a financial information system for higher level administrative personnel in the Policy and Planning Office who would be responsible for the determination of investment priorities in the transportation sector; and (v) establishing a Materials and Soils Laboratory to facilitate adequate engineering designs and quality control of road works. 9 . To facilitate the implementation of the systems,MTW agreed, as a condition of the loan effectiveness, to recruit the following key staff who would receive training under the Project: (i) a Deputy Chief Technical Officer to head road operations; (ii) an Equipment Manager to head Equipment and Vehicle Sections; (iii) an Engineer to head Materials and Soils Laboratory; (iv) Senior Engineer to assist in the design and implementation of the Maintenance Management System; and (v) an Engineer to head the Traffic Unit. Additional key staff including both the Senior Planning Officer and a Planning Officer for the Policy and Planning Office were to be retained at a later date, together with the necessary support staff. 10. The Training component, to be carried out by internationalspecialists,was an essential part of the institutional strengthening program. It was designed to help MTW's personnel develop and implement the Maintenance and the Equipment Management Systems; improve Traffic Department operations by carrying out periodic traffic counts and traffic analyses to design traffic flow improvements; upgrade the skills of MTW personnel in cost accounting, laboratory testing, and investment planning.  11. Innovative Aspects. The project provided for a new approach to help MTW improve accountability for its operations by introducing an integrated accounting system to assess cost-effectivenessof the funds invested in the project by the Government. Such an assessment was not practicable using the statutory Vote Book accounting data format required by Parliament and used by MTW for its Vote Book entries and Payroll accounting systems. The Vote Book system does not need to be documented and there are no documented financial accounting policies; it does not provide day-to-daymanagement informationby project, organizational unit or function, which requires data suitable to monitor performance, accountability, budget responsibility, or budgeting data for planning. 12. The implementation of the proposed integrated accounting system designed for MTW by consultants,was another key element of the project aimed at improving the efficiency of investments in the road network. The proposed system was based on fundamentalprinciples of accountability; adequate disclosure in the financial statements of all material information; a true and fair view of financial performance and status presented by the financial statements; a clear definition in the financial statement of accounting policies adopted; and an independent review of the accounts and the system. 13. Prolect Preparation. The central theme of the project preparation included measures necessary to redress major administrative and technical problems which contributed to a rapid degradation of the road network, and to establish within MTW efficient and long lasting institutions capable of delivering to MTW management viable and cost-effective programs for annual road maintenance and rehabilitation. 14. Specifically, the project preparation comprised: (i) engineering for the road maintenance, rehabilitation and safety works programs, which was prepared by MTW in the context of the Five-Year Highway Investment Plan. The quality of the initial preparation was not up to Bank standard and the Bank pre-appraisal mission requested MTW to update the engineering for Bank appraisal; (ii) institution-strengthening programwhichwas defined by MTW, based on the findings and recornmendations of the "Institutional Strengthening Study, November 198311, prepared by consultants; (iii) identificationof additional units of maintenance equipment and vehicles to be purchased under the project for MTW's Mechanical Department, which was prepared by MTW's Mechanical Department with the help of an outside equipment specialist; and (iv) the Training Component for MTW personnel designed to address the perceived needs of the Ministry to manage its operational systems that were to be implemented under the project. 15. In retrospect, the scope of the project was adequate to address the country's most pressing needs in the road transport sub-sector; however, the scheduling of =he project activities was overly optimistic given the known MTW's institutionalproblems. The project implementation schedule envisaged that about 40% of road works included in the maintenance and rehabilitation program would be carried out, mostly by force account, during the first six months of the project (June - December 1984). At the same time, MTW was expected to procure maintenance equipment that was badly needed for its force account crews; begin construction of pedestrian sidewalks; and embark upon the agreed institutional strengthening program (comprising, among others, the establishment of a much needed soils and materials laboratory, the improvement of the Traffic Unit, and initiation of the Maintenance and Equipment Management programs). This workload was not commensurate with MTW institutional capacity. 16. Roles and Responsibilities. The roles and responsibilities were clearly defined during project preparation, stated in the SAR, and agreed by all parties concerned.  E. Project Inmlementation 17. The Loan Agreement was signed on June 14, 1984, and the project became effective on November 30, 1984. The agreed Project Completion Date was June 30, 1988; the Closing Date of December 31, 1988, was extended thrice at the request of the Government and with Bank approval, to December 31, 1991. The execution of the project was carried out by MTW under the oversight of the Steering Committee-Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project that was created for this purpose in August 1984; the Committee Chairmanwas the Permanent Secretary of MTW who reported directly to the Minister of MTW. 18. The project's implementationwas slow from the start: as of June 1988, the original Project Completion Date, disbursements totalled USS4.9 million, or less than 40 percent of the loan amount. The project took seven years, or three years longer than agreed at appraisal, to complete the following programs: road maintenance and rehabilitation works; purchase of maintenance equipment and vehicles; the establishment of the Traffic Department; and the purchase of equipment for the Materials and Soils Laboratory. Due to the late start, the institutional strengthening program was not fully completed and is being finalized under the on-going Bank follow-on project. 19. The actual total project cost was BDS27 million, (USS13.5 m), comprising BDS23.1 million (USS11.5 m) for civilworks and BDS3.9 million (US$2million) for equipment and technical assistance for the training of MTW's personnel. Some 65 percent of the works were carried out by force account at the cost of BDS15.1 million (USS7.5 million) and the remaining 35 percent, BDS8 million (US$4 million) by a local contractor,under three separate contracts awarded under ICB procedures. 20. At the close of the project, the Bank loan of USS11 million was not fully utilized. The amount disbursed was USS7.9 million, or 72 percent of the original loan. An amount of USS2.5 million of the loan was canceled from the Loan account due to misprocurement, reducing the Loan to USS8.5 million. Of this new total about USS0.6 million remained unused by the closing date, part of which was due to postponement of some technical assistance to the follow-up operation. 21. Implementation of basic institutional improvements was necessary to support the agreed road works program. In compliance with the conditions for loan effectiveness, the Government advised the Bank that Road Traffic Amendment Act of 1984, was enacted on June 4, 1984; and that the following positions were filled in November 1984: (i) the head of the Construction and Maintenance division; (ii) the equipment manager and five technicians; (iii) one engineer and two technicians for the materials and soils laboratory; (iv) a senior maintenance technician and two technicians for MMS; and (v) one engineer and two technicians in the Traffic Department. The Government also approved the creation of the positions of Senior Planning Officer and a Planning Officer, whose recruitment was reported to be in process. 22. The actual project implementation was, in general, at variance with the schedule agreed at appraisal. The schedule called for simultaneous implementation of the institutional and the works components, both having the same priority ranking, as the success of the works program depended on the timely implementationof the institutionalstrengtheningprograms. This interdependence was evident in the case of the failure to establish the Materials and Soils Laboratory which precluded carrying out the desirable quality control testing during the execution of the works to verify their compliance with technical specifications.  23. The implementation delays in carrying out civil works were due to administrative and technical problems including: (i) MTW's inefficient programming of the project's activities (ii) inadequate preparation of engineering for the project's works which often required substantial revisions of the scope of most of the road sub-projects; (iii) MTW's proclivity for carrying out the project's works by force account to provide employment for its personnel rather than by contract (only three of the six projects to be executed under contract were contracted); (iv) poor coordination of force account works with the works done in the same area- by others (utility companies, etc); (v) delays due to frequent postponements of scheduled force account works for lack of logistic support (inadequate availability of equipment, materials, etc); and (vi) delays in land acquisition. 24. Progress of the road works program was affected by deficiencies of engineering designs which were prepared without the benefit of a reliable road condition inventory. Furthermore,estimates of the works' quantities and related cost estimates had to be revised to take into account the deterioration of the roads due to late intervention. As a result of these revisions, the scope and the cost of the works increased substantially. The needed changes were being discovered either prior to or while the works were in progress. Nevertheless the project contingencies were sufficient to cover all cost increases. The materials recommended for placing in the works were selected based on past experience of the designers rather than on an objective determination based on laboratory testing to confirm their suitability for use in construction. In fact, in the absence of testing of road materials, MTW design engineers had no means to compare the quality and performance characteristics of locally available road construction materials with the standards on which MTW's empirical methods of pavement design were based, to the detriment of the quality of their engineering. Finally, the lack of materials and soils testing facilities affected the quality control of the works executed both by force account and by contractors. 25. The road works program was reduced from 62.4 km to 50 km as a result of misprocurement and the Government's decision to finance with its own funds, the reconstruction works on Highway 2A, (12.4 km). The project works program initiated in September 1985 was completed by February 1990. Procurement of equipment and vehicles for road maintenance works, equipment for painting pavement marks and traffic signs was completed but also with substantial delay, between 1989 and 1991. 26. The implementationof institutionalprograms lackedMTW full support during the first years of the project implementation. This delay in contracting the technical assistance services deprived MTW of the possibility of having in place the institutions needed for the timely implementation of the project. As a result, MTW was unable to achieve all the goals envisaged within the agreed timeframe of the project (including a three-year extension of the original closing date). Full completion of these improvements will be achieved under the on-going follow-on Second Road Rehabilitation Project. 27. The integrated financial accounting system developed to improve administration and control of the Project was not functioning properly, and the auditors indicated that a complete review of the system was required. The audit of financial transactions in FY88189, prepared by external auditors, disclosed instances of payment vouchers without supporting documents and vouchers which bore no evidence of authorization; this was subsequently corrected by MTW. In their E'Y89190 Audit Report, dated September 1990, the external auditor expressed concern that there was an inadequate level of supervision of project accounting staff. The position of accountant had been vacant for some time and, as a result, the majority of the workload was performed by an assistant accountant  (acting) with the assistance of two clerical officers. Given such a small staff it was difficult, in the opinion of the auditors, to ensure maintenance of effective internal controls. The Internal Audit Department, previously established, had been vacant for a period when the Internal Auditor was transferred to another department. A year later, in their audit report dated December 31, 1991, the auditors observed similar deficiencies in the internal control of the project, namely: payroll summaries were not received on a timely basis to ensure accurate and regular update of individual project card costs, and a better coordination of work flow between the payroll department and the Project Office was necessary. These deficiencies were eventually corrected. 28. Variances in the Im~lementation.The main variance was the departure from the implementation schedule agreed at appraisal. The pace of execution of force account works was hampered by the unavailability of much needed equipment that was to be procured under the project. Although the resulting delays did not impede the completion of the works, they had a negative impact on the implementation of the MMS and EMS programs designed to strengthen MTW institutions responsible for logistic support for force account crews. Other changes in project execution were the replacement of four intersections and one of the pedestrian sidewalks sub-projectswith three other highway safety projects that had higher priority, and the elimination of one sub-project from the road rehabilitation component. Highway 2A ( 12.4 km),was taken out of the project due to misprocurement and the works were completed by a contractor with Government financing. An important variance was the delay in purchasing equipment for the Materials and Soils Testing Laboratory and the training of laboratory personnel. 29. Actions Affecting Implementation. The design of the project was appropriate and it could have been completed in four years (1984 through 1988), provided MTW had previous experience with Bank procurement procedures and the necessary institutional support to implement the project. During the initial phases of the project, MTW did not take the required measures to speed up tendering for equipment and civil works, completion of engineering designs and training of personnel. Tne Project implementation was also affected by late mobilization of managerial and support personnel to carry out institutional improvements, and by inadequate engineering for the works' program that required subsequent revisions. MTW gave low priority to the establishment of the materials and soils laboratory and instead, focused on the execution of the works rather than on the agreed institutional improvements program. 30. Possible avoidance of variances. Whether the variances of the agreed program could have been avoided, is a moot point. Variances could have been foreseen and avoided given that MTW technical, administrative and operational problems were known to the Bank from consultants' reports (paras. 3 and 4) prior to the appraisal in sufficient detail to alert the Bank mission to the need for adequate safeguards necessary to avoid problems affecting the quality of MTW's engineering design, and the need to strengthen MTW's institutions. The safeguards should have included dated 'covenantsrequiring prompt implementation of key institutional components. As is common Bank practice in similar cases, the project should have provided for technical assistance from internationally selected specialists to: (i) monitor the project's progress, including road engineering design and construction; (ii) review engineering plans and specifications prior to initiating the works; and (iii) analyze the adequacy of MTW' force account construction methods, monitor the planning and scheduling of MTW's force account works in terms of the logistic support from MTW, that required timely availability of equipment, vehicles, and the supply of required materials. Finally, the consultants should have helped MTW in the preparation of detailed construction reports providing datanecessary for full accountability  for the works, helping MTW with the preparation of detailed unit cost break-dawn in terms of inputs for labor, materials and equipment. 31. Given that this was MTW's first Bank-financed project, it is fair to assume that many of the project implementation difficulties that were experienced might have been avoided had the Bank staff responsible for the supervision of the project during the critical initial implementationphase (1984-1987), established a constructive dialogue with MTW's personnel regarding the project's design, its priorities and the implementation schedule to put the project on track to avoid substantial delays (see Part 11, paras. 6 and 7). F. Project Results 32. The three-year extension of the Closing Date made possible a substantial completion of the project: (i) civil works were carried out including reconstruction, resurfacing, or resealing of the programmed sections of the road network (para. 25); (ii) the purchase of maintenance equipment to support MTW's implementationof force account works and to re-enforce the equipment management system was concluded; (iii) highway safety works for improvements at locations with high accident rates were completed; (iv) construction of a new workshop was finalized and substantialprogress was made in the design of the Maintenance and the Equipment Management Systems, although full implementation was not possible due to time constraints; (v) the Traffic Unit operations were strengthened and the unit is carrying out a program of traffic counts and analyses to recommend traffic flow improvements and support investment analysis; and (vi) a new building for the Materials and Soils Testing Laboratory was constructed, the required equipment purchased, and the laboratory staff was trained by specialized consultants. The laboratory is fully operational and carrying out a testing program to monitor the quality of all materials being supplied by contractors and commercial suppliers. 33. The following institution building activities were initiated and their implementation is being finalized under the on-going follow-on transportation project: (i) the development and implementation of the cost accounting system for construction and maintenance, including a financial information system; (ii) the strengthening of the Policy and Planning Office, to assist MTW in setting investment priorities; and (iii) full implementation of the Maintenance Management and Equipment Management systems throughout MTW's maintenance depots. 34. An important result of the project is mentioned in Part 11 of this report, inwhich MTW expresses its satisfactionwith the establishment of the Maintenance Management System to set priorities for road repairs on rational bases; the training of MTW personnel in the use of the Benkelman beam to determine the existing strength of the existing pavements, and the use of a Mays meter to determine pavements' roughness, both of which will permit MTW to assess the condition of the pavements for the preparation of reliable road inventories. The usefulness of the newly established Materials and Soils Laboratory was well appreciated by MTW, which stated that "prior to the establishment of the Laboratory little attempt was made to enforce quality standards which now is being done". Another benefit has been the adaptation of computer technology for the processing of MTW technical and administrative data. Finally, it is gratifying to note that as a result of MTW's experience from this project, MTW opted for contracting out all works including periodic maintenance, in their investment program financed under the follow-on project (para. 35), and has an on-going pilot project to test cost-effectiveness of routine maintenance by contract. MTW has also reduced its field and office personnel by 50 percent, from 3000 to less than 1500 by 1991.  G. Project Sustainabilitv 35. The sustainability of all the elements of this first Bank project in Barbados is assured, since that the Government expressed interest to proceed with the institutional improvements initiated under the project and requested the Bank to finance a follow-on project. The Government's request was approved by the Bank (Loan 3493-BAR, USS20.6 million), and the project is being implemented. This project provides continuity for the work on equipment rehabilitation and road maintenance systems, the functioning of the traffic department, reduced loss of Transport Board; and services of the soils laboratory. H. Bank Performance and Lessons Learned 36. Preparation and Appraisal. The project's scope was appropriate for the country's needs, but the implementation schedule was unrealistic (para. 15). Given that the Bank had no previous experience working with MTW, it would have been prudent to prepare the project with more attention to details regarding both the engineering for the works programs and MTW's commitment to the proposed institutional improvements. It would also have been prudent for the appraisal mission to follow up on the pre-appraisal's mission request to improve the engineering design and related costs prior to project appraisal. The project's files make no mention of any such review of the project final engineering; it is possible that a review was not made due to the fact that the appraisal mission was assisted by a competent traffic engineer to help with the establishment of the Traffic Department, an important but a minor component, but, apparently, did not include an engineer with experience in road design and construction to evaluate the quality of the works program that constituted the project's major component. Another problem was the lack of safeguards that would have ensured timely establishment of the Materials and Soils Laboratory. Given that most of the project funds were allocated to road works whose quality control depended on the timely operation of the laboratory, its establishment was essential for the successful implementationof the project. To this end, the Loan Agreement should have stipulated that the soils laboratory would have to be established prior to a specific date after which the financing of the project's works would be contingent upon the laboratory being fully operational. The provision would have made possible an adequate verification of the quality of the works executed by force account or under contract. 37. The project's scope and its successful implementation were predicated on the assumption that the recommended institutional improvements accepted by the Government, would be made in a timely manner. This assumption might have been flawed. Prior to the project appraisal, the Bank had limited contacts with MTW's management, and it would seem that neither the pre-appraisal nor the appraisal missions had enough familiarity with MTW's interest in the proposed institutional improvements within the framework of the project. The inclusion of dated covenants flagging important institutional improvements and making the implementation of the works dependent on their compliance would have alerted MTW to the need to take appropriate action in a timely manner. In the absence of such safeguards in the Loan Agreement, putting the project on track was difficult. 38. Supervision. Both field and office supervision of the project absorbed about 61 staff weeks during the implementation period mid-1984 to mid-1991 period. Twelve field supervision missions visited Barbados over seven years. Until the latter part of 1987, the supervision of the project was made mostly by a traffic engineer and an economist without an apparent participation of a civil  engineer with experience in road design and construction. The project supervision reports prepared during the period 1984 through 1986 contained computerized statistical data on past accomplishments, and recommendations for future actions by MTW to make up for past project implementation delays. The reports rated the project's performance as 2, on a scale of 1-3, denoting problems, without offering an analysis of the problems which caused substantial implementation delays. There was hardly a reference in the supervision reports to any field visits to assess the quality of the project's works which were executed by contract or by force account. 39. The first mention of the quality issues has been addressed in the Bank's supervision reports of November 1987,when the responsibility for the project was transferred to a new division due to the Bank reorganization. The frequency and the quality of the supervision effort had since improved markedly. The supervision missions established a constructive dialogue with MTW, helping to speed up the conclusion of the project, and generated MTW's interest in institutionalimprovementswhichwere accelerated during the period 1988-1991 and which at the request of the Government, will be finalized under the follaw-on- going Bank transportation project. 40. Lessons Learned. The problems experienced during the implementation of the road maintenance and reconstruction programs underscored the need for a thorough review of the project's preparation for Bank appraisal. Furthermore, an in-depth review of the engineering prepared by MTW for the project's works programs should have been made by an engineer experienced in road structural design and construction. 41. As this was the first MTW's Bank-financed project, Bank staff should have made a particular effort at the beginning of the project to establish a constructive dialogue with the Borrower. This would have promoted a better understanding of the project's goals and the importance of an appropriate sequencing of the project activities, consistent with these goals. Of special importance were those aspects related to the institutional issues which had to be addressed under the project. According to the observations made by MTW in Part I1 of this report, the dialogue during the first years of the project's implementation was not effective (para. 6) and the lack of communications caused some confusion among MTW personnel who were dealing with the Bank for the first time, about what the project was to achieve. The benefit of such a dialogue became evident later on after a new supervision team was sent to review the project's progress in late 1987. The team established a fruitful dialogue with MTW which improved MTW's performance and enabled it to achieve most of the project's goals during the three-year extension of the project's closing date. 42. An important lesson can be drawn from the absence of dated covenants which would have induced MTW to reschedule the project implementation around critical benchmarks, such as the purchase of maintenance equipment and the establishment of the soils laboratory. Due to a six-year delay in carrying out the related personnel training programs, the works were carried out without the basic requirement of quality control and the benefit of having available the necessary equipment for force account works and a well-trained personnel to service it. The benchmarks would have underscored the interrelationship among key activities, providing guidance for proper sequencing of the project activities. I. Borrower Performance and Lessons Learned 43. Borrower Performance. Initially,MTWwas mostly interested in the purchase of equipment and vehicles needed for road maintenance, and in carrying out road works by force account which used up most of the project funds. International  competitive bidding (ICB) method of procurement of contractors for the execution of the project works was limited to three out of a total of seven contracts that were originally envisaged (one contract was fully financed by the Government due to misprocurement). The scheduling of project's force account works was, at times, in conflict with on-going works under the responsibility of other departments of the Government. 44. At the beginning of the project, MTW support for institutional improvements was marginal and its performance during that period was not up to expectations, possibly, because the Borrower was not familiar with Bank procedures (para. 3 of Part 11). MTW's performance improved markedly since 1989 especially in the institutional area. 45. Lessons learned. The Ministry needs to proceed with the modernization of its institutional structure to improve its responsiveness to the demand for its technical and administrative services. It should build upon the initial gains made under this project, and institute a plan of action to resolve problems affecting the shortage of qualified personnel and financial accountability. The project also demonstrated the need to rationalize maintenance of the road network. This should be achieved by setting priorities and adequate maintenance standards to increase productivity of maintenance operations for servicing a large paved network within budgetary constraints. The rationalization of the maintenance of the road network is an integral part of the Bank's follow-on project. 46. The project underscored the need for the Ministry to review its role as an entrepreneur of works, limiting its force account works to minor emergency works, while contracting out all other works to private contractors, with the Ministry limiting itself to a supervisory role. The follow-on project introduces maintenance by contract and eliminates force account for all investments. Furthermore, MTW should continue to strengthen its procurement procedures for international competitive bidding. Procurement under this project was handled by foreign consultants. Agreement has been reached with MTW on standard bidding documents and, in the future, procurement will be processed by MTW personnel trained for this task. J. Bank-Borrower Relationshiv 47. During the first four years of the project (1984-1988) the Bank-Borrower relationship was proper but ineffective, if measured by the progress made during that period. The relationship has been described in the Borrower's comments (para. 6 of Part 11) as appropriate, although "initially there appeared to be a communications problem and a lot of initial confusion stemmed from the fact that most of the Ministry's officials were dealing with an external agency for the first time". This problem was resolved in during the last three years (1988- 1991) when the responsibility for the project was taken over, as result of the Bank's administrative reorganization, by a new division whose staff established good communications with the Borrower. K. Consultinn Services 48. The technical assistancewas provided by external consultants in five areas of the Ministry's activities identified for help. These areas included Road MaintenanceManagement, TransportationDevelopment Planning, Traffic Management, Workshop and Equipment Management and Materials Laboratory. The objective was to help MTW develop operational systems and standards which would lead to improvements in the maintenance of existing roads.  49. In spite of a late start, the consultants' services were satisfactory and well received by MTW. The services for the Maintenance Management System included: (i) training for MTW personnel in the preparation of detailed road inventories and needs surveys as means to define maintenance priorities; (ii) definition of activities and measurements of required works quantities as a basis for planning and subsequent assessment of work measurement units, and the level of service to be achieved by way of quality and quantity standards; (iii) preparation of annual work programs and their scheduling; (iv) developing maintenance performance standards to assess productivity; and (v) design of a reporting system covering daily activities. The consultant prepared amanual for the operation of the system. 50. The technical assistance for the Equipment Management System was successfully given by an external expert who provided hands-on-training for the administrative and workshop personnel in all aspects of equipment management operations. The training encompassed topics concerning equipment management, responsibilities and duties of workshop personnel, equipment operation, preparation of financial data of equipment inventories, equipment cost history, formulation of decisions concerning the timing of equipment replacement and disposal, and a host of other related administrative and technical functions which were described in the Equipment Management System Manual. The training was effective and was appreciated by MTW personnel. Follow-up training will be carried out under the follow-on Bank's Project at MTW's request. 51. The objective of the on-the-job training for the materials testing laboratory personnel was to enable MTW to have total control over the quality of road and building construction materials used in its projects. To give the trainees a thorough understanding of the relationship between the laboratory and field work the training was conducted in both places including the laboratory constructed and equipped by MTW during the project implementation. Some MTW key staff also received overseas training in this area, in international procurement and in transport planning. Consultants also trained MTW crews in the operation of the equipment to measure road roughness. 52. Training for the Traffic Unit personnel was provided by consultants and involved: (i) traffic and accident surveys to plan traffic flows and safety improvements; (ii) country-wide traffic data for input to the functional classification of the road network, and traffic projections for the economic justification of road investments programmed by the Policy and Planning Office. The Traffic Unit was also expected to established a computerized Data Bank for transport planning, including a traffic and vehicle operating costs model for various vehicle classes and road types. L. Proiect Documentation and Data 53. Data needed for the preparation of the PCR were generally available in Bank files, including the project preparation files, Bank supervision reports, aide memoirs, and the quarterly reports, all of which were helpful.  PART I1 -PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE A. Coments on Part I of the Project Completion Report 1. The greatest benefits to the Ministry were through the Institutional Strengthening components. We were able to implement the following: i) Traffic Management Section, with the assistance of FHWA: One officer, independent of the loan, obtained post-graduate qualifications and has been able to guide the Section since the Consultant has left. Technicians have been trained and one person had an attachment to the Department of Transportation. The loan also provided a paint marking machine which is used to provide markings in primary and secondary roads. ii) Soils and Materials Laboratory. The Ministry is responsible for maintenance of all public roads in the island and generally advises the Town Planning Department at the development stage of all road projects. Prior to the establishment of the Laboratory, little attempt was made to enforce quality standards. This is presently being done. Several officers attended training courses at the Georgia Department of Transportation and the Laboratory now have a core of competent and capable officers . iii) Maintenance Management System. The establishment:of this system has allowed the Ministry to better prepare for the new World Bank loan, since this system allowed us to establish priorities for road repairs on a national basis. While it has not fully been implemented in the field, officers have been implemented in the field, offices have been trained in the use of Mays Rider and Benkelman Beam, and a group of technicians are working continuously on the collecting of the data. Consequent upon the need to have computer literate persons to properly manage the system, the Ministry is now well on its way to being fully computerized, with Personal Computers now being installed in all of the offices. iv) Equipment Management System. With the help of the FHWA, we were provided with a consultant, who established an Equipment Management System. This has allowed us to better control the use of vehicles, and relate cost of operation. V) Overseas Training. A number of officers have received overseas training and attended seminars. The most important of these has been the I.L.0 Project Procurement Course in Washington. vi) The Ministry also benefitted by the rehabilitation of 6 roads with a mileage of 50 km, the junction improvements at 5 areas, along with associated drainage and sidewalk construction in residential areas. The opportunity was also taken to compare the work of private contractors, who did 3 of the 6 road rehabilitations, with the Ministry's who carried out all of the other projects.  2. In general, the Ministry is now able to appreciate the project cycle, prepare project documents to be used for loans, and have been able to meet with counterparts and other professionals to share ideas. In addition,we welcome the transfer of technology which we have obtained. B. Performance of the Borrower 3. The project was completed in 1992, about two and a half years behind schedule. To a large measure, the Ministry's official was learning as we proceeded with the project and this would suggest that perhaps the project started one year too early. 4 . We believe the above to be so, because many of the plans/designs were not ready when the loanwas signed (unlike the current project) and changes in design occurred throughout the first 2 years of the project. We also believe that as a consequence the loan was not executed efficiently during the first 2 year period. In addition, our record keeping and report writing was inadequate, created some problems for Auditors and interfered with disbursements and drawdown of funds. 5. However, the computerization of the Ministry, the creation of the I.F.A.S. Section and the establishing of a post of Project Coordinator, has helped the performance of the Ministry. C. Performance of the Bank 6. The relationship of the Bank and the Ministry of Public Works, Communications and Transportation throughout the project was excellent. Initially there appeared to be cormnunication problems. To some extent this was caused by a lack of continuity at M.C.W. since the Project Manager and other staff were changed and it was not always clear what correspondencewas being sent to whom and by whom. 7. A lot of initial confusion stemmed from the fact that most of the Ministry's officials were dealing with an external agency for the first time. We believe that the steps which we have taken for the second loan has considerably improved our comunications and we do not expect similar problems to occur.  PART I11 Second Road Prurrvatian of the capital base June 1992 On-going US$21.2 million. Ihe Maintenance of the Borrower's road Loan became efectiw infrastructure; improvement of in October 1992. Rehnbilitation mad maintenanceplanning and Implementation of all practices; reduction of investment of the components is costs related to the Borrower's in progress. road network. improvement of road safety; and tramfer of the provision of passenger transport serviccr to theprivate sector. 2. Proiect Timetable 11 Reparation Mission 1 November 1983 November 1983 Appraisal Mission January 16,1984 January 16,1984 I1 Loan Negotiations April 23, 1984 April 23,1984 Board Approval 1 May 31,1984 May 31,1983 II(1 Loan Signature I June14,1984 1 1 June 14,1984 r --- i n Efictivems 1 Gtember 13.1984 I October 31.1984 November 30.198411 Rojecf Completion June 30,1988 December 31,1992 I December 31,1989 11 Loan Agreement. 3. Loan Disbursements C u m u l a t i v t /US$millionsJ 1Actual 0.4~ 0.6 2.0 4.2 4.7 5.8 7.90 7.9 I ') Ihe &e offtnoldisbursementwas May 6,1992.Ihe deadlinefor disbursementswasrrrended tos t months @er the atended Loan Closing Date, December 31, 1991.  4. ~ r oect Implementation i - Recotutruction -Colas Bulk Tanker (1600gal) -Chip Spreader flowed) -Drop Side Truck (5 Ton) -Land Rover Vehicles -Tiraring Robr (3.5 Ton) Rubber-Wheeled Robr (6 Ton) -Front-End Loader (1.5m3) -Bitumen Mobil Sprayer -Birranen Hand Sprayer -Mobile Compressor (2S&j%nin) -Unimog wlBacWloe & Shovel -Skid SteerM e r -Pump(rainwater) -Lawn Mower -Aspha&Batch Miring Plant -Truck w/jack & emuL sprayer B. Road Safetv Propram i) Improv. trtenections & sidewak: - Development and operation of the following systems: Commcnlr: " Highway 2A was eliminatedfiom the Project (12.4 bn) due to mirprocurement. Five safety subprojects, which becamepart ofthe Bridgetown Trafi Management Study, were eliminatedfiom the Safety component of the Project and replaced with three new high priority subprojectr, with Bank's approvaL tr) Thesystems were designed andpersonnel training initiated. Full implementationisbeing complctcd underthefollow on Second Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project, approved by the Bank in mid-1992. In addition, an equipment to mearure road roughness (Mays Ride Meter) wpr purchased under the Project in 1991, and MTW's staf trained in its operation.  5. Proiect Costs and Financing dlh?ka%M I%USSmillion) I a A. ~ o l r u&. Reh. Pr01mJu: 9.9 &$ L 4 I - a n 1 w o r k 7.4 8.9 16.2 85.1 -WPmmr 0.1 1.0 1.2 6.3 B. Road Safeq f m m l e . o a , a 2 J I - a d 1 w o r k 0.4 0.5 0.9 4.7 -Eqdpmmr @I @I 0.1 0.5 lI F m Fee 0) fbl 0.2 O-O FNANCINi T o i bus: FI~IVCS not add up to rhc r o d k c a w e 01row may Car& &u&de h d c d and prlce contingencies. *' Denour m n o ~lrzrs JLOn ~ USSl00,000or .nilm. RepCcn eliminotm o/Highwcsy 2Ah m &e Pmjcct (Rank loan reduced by USS2.5million) and changes in the Road Sqfety Program. B. Project Financing loam WLU reduced by USS2.5 m 8.600.0 6,100.0 6,292.1 h m USS11.Om to USSB.5 m. 2.Equipmat and Vehicles 1,200.0 1,200.0 1,016.3 3. Consubnu Fees and Trninng 350.0 350.0 589.0  6. Pro1act 'Reeults A. Direct Benefits schululing and Ju moniwn'ng of road the program and moniwring EquipmrmManagonou JLstmc; and FinuncialJnformcrdon *stem; complev~under J ufollowon project. conrukanr, conducvd Ju economic d u o d o n of all mad invesnrnu includeaunder thefollow-on project. A mllrng Five-Year Invesanmt Plun is an inuxtd pan of* (4) Estublishing a Mar~riakand Soik (4)Thr Materials and SoiLr Lubo~oy~estublishead qualie conmlprogram, romUIInetytcsdng Ju qualie of all mateAoL being suppliedfor road wont.. 0)Estubkhing a Troc Unitw carry our (5) Trcrgicanalyses hclped Ju Govenvnmt WPW periodic mflc cocmu and an+ses of n f l c Icgislotion rr&danng a l e lo&, and IOimprwr d ~ a n d a c c i d m r d o t r r . invesiment and engineering. B . Economic Impact Ihmethdology wedfor Ju economicNoluoa'onof Jupmject orappraisalwasbasedonusrrcartsm'ngscalculorrdasJudwemrcebetween vehicle opcdng costs wirh and w'thou Ju road impmveinent. Ih noacre of mad investment did nor warrant Ju usc of a sophfsdcated model. Avemgedaily m c w h w swere&tcmnruned November1983-lanuy 1984and a growth rateof 5percent was assumed. Ihposr evahdon in was carried OW usingthcsenr d l . Costsand mflc assumpti4Nwerereplacedw1.1a c dcaru and mfic damdeunnined a h r cornpledon of thcproject (1MS1991). WhileJu &cal cast ovepnm of thcprojccr was withinphysical andprice condngencies, he n f l c data showed h g m r d higher h& of w.Ihro v e d economic rates of rrnrrnfor the Road Maintenance and Rehabflicorlon component crdmotcd or apprrdcal and a&r thc cumpledonof& project are giwn be&: Owratl Propnwn Evalum'on {SO bn) O v c r o U ~ Rate ofRmcrn c  7. Statue of Loan Covenants rrlcvmrt quulificcm'oruand apcritncc to asis; rlu borrower in canying orrt Main&na?uc ojadequotr accomts ond rrcordc.  8. Dee of Bank Reeourcee B. Missions 2Ek,IEn, IFa, n.a. 1TrS Phnwgh ~ecdveness Supe&on - - SPC~&&: & = . c M ;En = engineer; Fa Jnancial &sf; Trs = transpotradon spcciaIlst;n.a =not applcabk. "'W ~ If := NOrlflcaiu ptvblmu; 2 = Modrrate ptvblmu; 3 = Majorproblem; 4 = Majorpmblmu not being addressed. DP cl/pmbbmr: F Finadd; M = Mana8crid;P = Aocumnent