India - Early experience with involuntary resettlement : impact evaluation on India Second Maharashtra Irrigation Project

Report No. 12133 Early Experience with Involuntary Resettlement Impact Evaluation on India Maharashtra Irrigation I Project (Credit 954-IN) June 29, 1993 Operatios Evaluation Department FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY MICROGRAPHICS Report No: 12133 IN Type: IER I h å ~_tE_ dn bocw nent .1 the Wo.r a bank Th s document hÉs a restricted distribution and maybeusdy Íc'pntr .,iyin thøperfomæ Ø their offical duties. its cbm -e di$ sWcwhb UWrd 1ankautho iZatIo0 CADA - Command Area Devlopmer~ : Authorty CWC - Central Water Commission DRO - Dstrct Reselement Oier EGS - Employment Guarante Scheme EIA - Environmental Impat Se nt GOM - Gvemment of Maharashtra ICOLD - Intemational ommission on Large Dams OSP - ector & Operallons PoIcy PAP - Project Affected Person FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washfngton, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. cfa.e of Danator.efnerst Opeall lon June 29, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBTECT: Early Experience with Involuntary Resettlement Impac valuation on INDIA - Maharashtra Trrigation II Project (Cr.954-IN) Attached is the Impact Evaluation on INDIA - Maharashtra Irrigation II Project (Credit 954-IN) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performnce of their official duties. Its contents may not othewise be disclosd without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH INVOLUNTARY RESEITLEMENT IMPACT EVALUATION ON INDIA MAHARASHTRA IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDIT 954 - IN) Table of Contents Page No. P .......................................................... i ExecutiveSum ary ................................................ iii L Backgnd ................................................... 1 A. Introducion ............................................... 1 B. Dams in MaharashtaState .................................... 3 C. The Maharashtra InigationllProject ............................ 3 L Com pemaoon ................................................. 6 A. compensation tiad ........................................ 6 B. inp ............................................. 7 C. Conclic ................................................ 9 IIL Resettat 1.................................................. 10 A. I gislative Franewrk........................................ 10 B. ResettlementIngdementadox .................................. 11 C. RelationswidhlHosts ......................................... 15 D. Settlers'Perceptions ofResetlement ............................ 16 E. ResettlementCosts .......................................... 16 F. Conci1s ................................................ 17 IV. Agri1re ................................................... 18 A. LandTanue ............................................... 18 B. Cropping Patterns andlItensites ............................... 20 C. Yiekd .................................................... 22 D. Conclusions................................................ 24 V. SocialIm ct.................................................. 25 A. PopulationQuracerstic ..................................... 25 B. Fami Id ntity ............................................. 25 C L*astructue ......................................... 25 D. Incomes andlEqpeditur ..................................... 26 E. Settlers' Perceptions of Employment ............................. 31 F. Con chsion ................................................ 32 VL Eninn aliA pect .......................................... 33 A. Policy and AdministrativeFamework ............................ B. EnvironmentalIngact ........................................ 34 C Con usions ................................................ 35 V I InstitudaaIlmpt ............................................. 36 A. Organization Stru3 e ....................................... 36 B. Resettleme tPlan ing ....................................... 37 C. ResettlementImpkeentadon ................................. 37 D. Agricultural DevelopmentSupport .............................. 38 E. Involvement ofR entlrs ..................................... 38 F. Bank Perfrmance........................................... 39 G. Con chns ................................................ 40 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Pag No. Annexes Li State-wise Distribution ofDams.................................... 43 111.1 Compensation and Assistance Given to Project Affected Families .......... 44 111.2 Household Characteristics ....................................... 45 11.3 Health ....................................................... 46 III.4 Education ......... .......................................... 47 IV.1 Village Averages and Identification of Ownership ...................... 48 IV.9 Wage and Employment Summary .................................. 49 V.1 Population and Household Characteristics ............................ V.4 Average Annual Income and Expenditure ............................ 51 Chart V.1 Annuallncome-1975,1987,1990Level ........................ 52 VI.1 ImpactAsssment3Procedure ................................ 53 VII Maharashtra Irrigation and CADA Department ................... 54 Appendix Approach Used by Socioeconomic Survey .................................. S Attachment 1. Comments received from Borrower - Ministry of Water Resources ............. 57 2. Comments received from the Government of Maharashtra ................... 58 Bo Ia Test ]II.1 Outmigration Among the Marathas ................................. 12 Chart In Text VII.1 Organizational Chart ............................................ 36 Figures In Text 11.1 Patterns of Migration Among Four Fully Affected Villages ............... 13 IV.1 Land Holdings and Area Irrigated, 1990 ............................. 19 V.1 Social Origins of Resettler and Host Families ...................... ... 25 V.2 Average AnnualIncome and diture ............................ 29 V3 Households' Perception of Employment Rates ......................... 31 Tables in Tet 11.1 Tracer Studyof Resettlement Records............................... 7 IV.1 Land Ownership Before Resettlement and in 1990 ..................... 18 IV.2 Agricultural Devepmnt ........................................ 20 IV-3 Net Return per Hectare of Main Irrigated Crops ....................... 22 IV.4 Y eds ....................................................... 23 IV.5 Agricultural Expenditures as a % of Total Household Expenditures ......... 23 IV.6 Use of Inputs per Hectare ........................................ 24 V.1 Distributionof Per Capita Income .................................. 27 V.2 Household Income, 1990 ......................................... 27 V.3 Per Capita Income and Land Owned ................................ 28 V.4 Sources of Household Income ..................................... 30 VIL1 Credit Outstanding ............................................ 38 Maps IBRD 1419RI, 14318R, 24328 -1. EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH INVOLUNTARY RESETLEMENT IMPACT EVALUATION ON INDIA MAHARASIITRA IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDIT 954 - IN) PREFACE This is one of four impact evaluations to assess the resettlement process of Bank-supported large scale infrastructure projects and to determine the impact on the involuntarily displaced population. Countries and projects were selected on the basis of criteria which included three considerations. First, historical taends, which showed that the majority of people displaced have been in projects financing agriculture and energy development (these trends are expected to continue in the future). Second, the ongoing lending programme, which expects a concentration of projects with involuntary resettlement in the Asia and Africa regions. Third, some successful projects in order to draw lessons for the future. In view of the importance of this subject for many Bank-supported projects in India, the Maharashtra Irrigation II project (Credit 954) together with the Karnataka Irrigation I project (Credit 788) were selected as they provide an interesting comparison of experience. Both are of similar age, involve dam construction with major irrigation components and are situated on the Krishna river. The projects. however, are located in different states and have markedly different outcomes in terms of resettlement. The Maharashtra Irrigation II project supported the construction of 11 dams in six subprojects scattered over a wide area of Maharashtra State. At project completion, only two of the seven dams expected to be completed under this time-slice operation were actually completed. Accordingly, for the purposes of this impact evaluation, the Krishna subproject was selected for in-depth analysis. There were two socioeconomic surveys undertaken in the project area in 1978 and in 1985 under the auspices of the Command Area Development Authority (CADA). OED commissioned a socioeconomic survey in which this information on incomes was updated so as to determine changes over time. Since the newly resettled villages were to be established in the a,mmand area, the survey was stratified to include some homt villages in order to obtain some insight into host/resettled village relations. Other households elected to remain close to the damsite in the catchment area; a sample of these villages was also included. There was also concern that this sample would not be representative in that the landless, who were not eligible for replacement land in the command area, would have migrated out of the project area. It was also known that a number of families had chosen to settle themselves. Thus the consultants also undertook a tracer study of eight impounded villages. Both the socioeconomic survey and the tracer study were the responsibility of Dr. Surappaswamy Parasuraman of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Bombay. The survey was undertaken between 1990-91. Credit 954 in the sum of US$ 210 million was approved on October 16, 1979, the credit was signed on April 14 1980 and became effective on June 6, 1980. The project was closed on December 31, 1985. This report is based upon a review of the staff appraisal report, the project completion' and project audit reports, a review of project files, other relevant documents and the results of the survey and tracer study undertaken by TISS. An OED mission visited the project area and interviewed a number of resettler families, local leaders, government officials in the project site, in Bombay and in New Delhi. The draft report was sent to Government on April 12, 1993. Comments received are reproduced as an Attachment. The valuable assistance provided during the preparation of the report by the Government of India, Dr. Surappaswairy Parasuraman and his team, and Mr. Ramesh C. Arora (facilitator and consultant) are gratefully acknowledged. a. Report No.2529-IN. September, 1978. b. Report No.7580. December, 1968. c. Report No.9718. June, 1991. EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT IMPACT EVALUATION ON INDIA MAHARASIflRA IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDIT 954 - IN) EXECUTI.E SUMMARY 1. Mahaimshtra Irrigation II was the first cluster in the autumn of 1990. The main find- project to tackle, on a state wide basis, major ings of the audit were that performance was technical and institutional bottlenecks to im- unsatisfactory* there were major delays in project proved irrigation and water management in implementation - only two of the 7 dams to be India. These had been identified in earlier completed were actually done so, the secondary sector work and were being piloted under the and tertiary irrigation infrastructure had received Karnataka Irrigation project (Cr 788-IN). much lower priority than expected, full comple- tion of project works was expected to take 2. Maharashtra Irrigation fL project was sup- another five years; cost overruns; and funding ported by the Bank with a US$ 210 million difficulties. The ERR was considered to be credit (Credit 954-IN) in order to assist in the speculative since the PCR estimates included continued construction, although not completion, returns to later investments. of six majord irrigation schemes. All had been started between 5 and 10 years previously but 4. OED undertook an impact evaluation of only 8,000 ha had been provided with irrigation one of the six major schemes, Krishna, which out of a total potential of 620,000 ha. At project was one of the most advanced at the time of closing in 1984, it was expected that some project closing in 1985. This included a specially 147,000 ha would be irrigated. The project also commissioned socioeconomic survey by local expected to assist the partial modernization of consultants of a sample of households displaced two existing schemes. Project components by the dam - in order to determine the impact of included (i) construction of 11 dams, of which 7 resettlement on the displaced population and to were to be completed under the project, and obtain the views of the affected families as well related irrigation infrastructure; (ii) road con- as a tracer study to determine how many families struction (iii) institutional strengthening, training were eligible for public assistance for resettle- and (iv) expansion of a pilot water management ment and how many had chosen to migrate of programme. Total project costs were estimated their own volition. to be US$ 452.9 million,' although overall costs of all eight schemes, from inception to comple- 5. The impact evaluation found that the reset- tion, was estimated to be US$ 1,269 million. tiement outcome which could be conclusively The appraisal ERR, which focussed on these established for abo.. half of the affected larger investments, but excluded Bhima, was population was satisfactory. Average incomes of estimated at 15%. families surveyed who settled in the command area were higher in 1990 than before 3. The project was implemented between 1980 resttlement and higher than those of the host and 1985; the project was audited as part of a population. Increased incomes is the central requirement of Bank guidelines regarding reset- 9. Although 90 percent of land in the resettled tlement. For the declining proportion of families villages was irrigated, there has been only slow who had chosen to stay in the catchment areas progress in reaching the revised PCR targets for -f the reservoir, incomes were lower than those agricultural cropped and irrigated area, as well living in the command area, but higher over as of cropping and irrigation intensities, due to time. technical problems ad water pricing policies which were considered unattractive by farmers.b 6. No information is available on the incomes The importance of private sources of irrigation of the remaining affected population who were was also underlined. There was little success at not eligible for compensatory lands in the the time of impact evaluation in encouraging command area. The tracer study showed that irrigation in the early rainy season. There was, about three quarters of these households were however, a change in cropping patterns - farmers joint families, and one quarter were landless. having switched to high yielding varieties as well Nevertheless, the situation of these families is as high value crops. As has been noted else- unlikely to be as bleak as those in Karnataka. where, farmers have taken precaution to diversi- The tracer study' showed that among the joint fy incomes; there was a wide range in sources of families, groups of related households bought income although in the irrigated area, incomes lands with compensation monies in less from agriculture were of primary importance. expensive areas and that individual families The typical response in all villages was to mi- moved to where they had relatives. As regards grate in search of off farm employment This the landless, the tracer study also showed that of was particularly noticeable in the catchment area all the households in the eight villages, only 5% villages in Mabarashtra. migrated to Bombay. The response among resettlers that the advent of irrigatiop has 10. Resettlers' perception of their situation generated increased wage employment would reflected these statistics: three quarters of reset- suggest that many landless families moved on tied households surveyed in Maharashtra rated their own initiative into the command area. their living conditions as better than before. 7. Among those who benefitted from the 11. Reasons for the satisfactory outcome were project, in 1990 there were fewer households several. There was a legal fr-mework with provi- living below the poverty line (between 7-33%) sion for lesson learning. Land is a state respon- than is commonly found in rural Maharashtra; sibility in India, thus implementation of the Land the project took the opportunity to reduce the Acquisition Act, 1894, rests with state Revenue number of landless families. Departments. The Government of Maharashtra took the initiative to build on this by introducing 8 There was widespread appreciation for the its own legislation for resettlement and rehabili- social infrastructure supplied by the projects: tation, and to refine it after ten years based on roads, markets, electricity, education, which was the experience acquired. As a result, state typically better than in the old villages. The policies have established clear responsibilities for housing plots were of adequate size, and the new resettlement, provision of replacement infra- villages were well laid out. Households spent structure, houseplots and arable land; they more money on the new house due to families delineate the powers and duties of the adminis- constructing larger houses than before. Families trators from the level of the state Government received loans to rebuild their houses. Malaria to the tahsil; they provide the processes and was a problem in the catchment area villages timetables for addressing the many issues which which were situated close to the dam site. arise in resettlement; and they establish mecha- .VW nisms for grievances not only regarding cash holds moved or began moving in the 1970s. No compensation but, equally Important, the admin- resettlement plan was prepared nor a socloeco- istrative decisions taken by officials responsible. nomic survey commissioned of the population to Thi has been important In putting into effect a be affected. At full development, however, resettlement program which has given a very fair Maharashtra has definitive data for those fami- deal to the eligible families. lies who were eligible for assistance. 12. An attractive development program. For 16. Second, program implementation was weak. resettlers who moved into the command area the This largely centered around delays in survey shows the potential for yields if irrigation implementation as well as inadequate sequencing is secure. While official yields statistics were in of the provision of social infrastructure. This general lower than expected, yields from the reflected rather poorly on the ability of the survey reflected that farmers irt the command program managers to phase properly the several area were willing to spend a greater portion of resettlement activities and to complete them in their income on inputs and also had relatively a timely manner. good access to supporting services. 17. The following lessons can be noted. 13. Households wer- flexible as to where they wanted to move. Given the strong desire on the a The largely satisfactory outcome is due to part of the Marathas o own land, people were government commitment underpinned by prepared to settle in a wide variety of places, (unplanned) beneficiary involvement. This usually where land was cheaper. This was partly was manifested by government's willingnev encouraged by Goverment so that farmers to: would move to existing villages where kinship 0 accord rights to affected persons; ties were strong thus making the assimilation * define government's responsibilities; and process easier. Many farmers did in fact take * learn from past experience. this option, but many also had to move on their own since they were either joint owners of the a Local leaders clearly saw resettlement as an property and under the 1976 legislation had no opportunity to be grasped to improve their recognized rights, or they were landless. economic and social situation. Resettlers used their initiative to participate in the 14. Caste in part explains the outcome. The existing political structures and to bargain predominantly Maratha caste used their bargain- for more and better services in their villages. ing power effectively and since many in the command area were of the same caste, local a the importance of allowing households the leaders campaigned to purchase lands to give to opportunity to settle where they wish - many the resettlers. To this must be added the innate did not want to move into the official sites ability of the people themselves. Young people but elected to live close to major roads, or have to a large degree stayed in the project area, with relatives elsewhere. organized village groups which in turn have taken up opportunities presented by various a The attraction of the command area was government programs for development assis- very compelling both to those families who tance. had originally opted to stay behind close to their former village in the catchment area - 15. Several weaknesses were noted. First there most families expressed a wish to move into was no detailed planning undertaken. House- the command area and to many former -v - absentee landlords, who returned from a The good relations with host populaions urban areas to reclaim their land rights, were due to two factors. First, the distance Such rural stabilization is a finding of other was not far: the new villages were still witHn impact evaluations in the irrigation sactor. the social catchment area of the former villages and second, that the affected people a Agriculture. The higher incomes and lower were of the same caste (Maratha). poverty levels in the Maharashtra command area were a reflection of the contribution which irrigated agriculture can make to rural incomes. This has been noted in many other irrigation impact evaluations. d. Schemes larger than 10,000 ha. e. Not including US$100 million for the Shima subproject, financed by IFAD. f. Together with INDIA - Kasnataka Irrigation I (Credit 788-IN), Gujarat Medium Irrigation (Credit 808-IN), Subernarekha Irrigation (Credit 1289.IN) and Andra Pradesh Irrigation and CAD Composite (Loan 1251). OED Report No.9716. June 28,1991. g. Which were undertidien for eight fully affected villages. h. The finding that delays in project implementation to the extent that project targets cannot be obtained within the expected time slice period is a finding of many Irrigativn projects In India. The most recent example Is INDIA - Second Gujarat Irrigation Project (Cr.1011-IN), Karnataka Tanks Project (Cr.1116-IN), Kallada Irrigation and Tree Crops Development Project (Cr.1269-IN/Ln.2186-IN) (OED report under preparation). EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH INVOLUNTARY RESETLEMENT IMPACT EVALUATION ON INDIA MAHARASHTRA IRRIGATION II PROJECT (CREDIT 954-IN) CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND A. Introduction CUaEr BANx PoucY 1.1 Current guidelines for involuntary resettlement in Bank-supported projectsy provide for: (a) adequate compensation of lost assets; (b) assistance with relocation and support during the transition period; and (c) assistance in reestablishing former living standards. Prior to 1980, when the first Bank guidelines were published,? responsibility for resettlement lay solely with the Borrower. Bnk's loan documentation tended to be concerned mainly with land acquisition, timely evacuation of people out of the project area and payment of compensation, with less consideration given as to where they were to be resettled and how their livelihoods were to be reestablished. 1.2 The Bank was the first international organization to adopt guidelines on involuntary resettlement Concerns for displaced persons gave rise to the following basic policy directives: * project design should avoid or minimize the need for involuntary resettlement; * projects should ensure that those who have to move eceive benefits from the project that displaces them; and o projects should provide displaced people with the means to improve their former living standards, or at the least ensure that they are not worse off than before relocation. 1.3 The Bank specified procedures and institutional arrangements for dealing with resettlement issues in the several phases of the project cycle and for supporting Borrowers in their adherence to the Bank's resettlement policy. These procedures deal comprehensively with resettlement planning and implementation, with resettlement planning as an integral part of project design, and community relocation as a development program. 1.4 With the Bank's recognition that technical support might assist in the satisfactory outcome of resettlement, there came detailed technical guidelines,1 issued in 1988, for preparing and Y OD 4.J0 - June 1990; Involuntay Resettlement & Operagonal Manual Statement (OMS) 2.33- FeWxuay 1980; Social Issues Associated with Involuntaty Resettlement in Bank.Financed Projecte. Y *Involuntary Resettement in Development Projects: Policy Guidelines in World Bank-Financed Projects. Technical paper No.80. World Bank. -2. appraising involuntary resettlement components, including how to include resettlement in financial and economic analysis, and what pro forma cost tables were required; the same period also saw the publication of two relevant technical papersO 1.5 Treatment ot the legal issues associated with involuntary resettlementY was also taken up. The paper recommended: (i) a detailed review of the domestic legal framework, including statutes governing the power of eminent domain - the right of the government to expropriate private land for the public good; (ii) the notion of just compensation, i.e., replacement value; (iii) review of rights of people displaced who do not have legal title to the land, even though they may have occupied it for generations; and (iv) an opinion on whether the judicial provisions for redress are adequate. 1.6 Bank guidelines made provision for the protection of indigenous populations. Initially it was expected that these people would be left undisturbed as far as possible given the special importance of land for these communities: "As a general policy, the World Bank will not assist development projects which knowingly involve encroachment on traditional territories being used or occupied by tribal people, unless adequate safeguards are provided." (para 5). 1.7 Subsequently there came a progressive broadening in the range of the Bank's policy considerations for involuntary resettlement, including that special consideration should be given to protect those who may not have established or legal rights - minorities, the landless, women, indigenous and ethnic groups. Meanwhile, the approach to indigenous peoples also changedw in 1991 to require consultation with the indigenous peoples to determine whether they wish to participate in the development process or whether they prefer to remain apart with protection for their cultural traditions. OaanVE 1.8 The objectives of this impact evaluation are to: examine how resettlement was implemented and determine the effects of resettlement on the lives of affected families; S"Dams and the Environment* Coidertis In World Bank projects.0 Technical Paper No.110, 1989. World Bank. "Dam Safety and the Environment" Technical Paper No.115. World Bank 1990. "nvoluntary Resettlement in Bank Aslted Project: An Introduction to Legal Issues." Legal Depatment/World Bank. April 198& I OMS 2.34 - February 1982; Tribal People in Bank-Financed Projects. V Updated guidelines were Issued In 1990 (footnote 1) which useded preious guidelines, including Operaions Polloy Note (OPN) 10.08. The purpose was to broaden the treatment of resettlement Issues beyond hydropower and Irrigation projects to an types of investment operation. I OD 4.28 - Sepember 1991; Indigenous Peoples. -3- * compare the resettlement experience in different countries and under varying circumstances and relate this experience to the Bank's evolving resettlement policies and guidelines over the last ten years; and " draw lessons from the findings and conclusions for more effective resettlement policies and practices by the Bank B. Dams a Malarashtra State 1.9 India ranks fourth in the world in terms of the number of large dams constructed. The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) defines large dams as those over 15 meters in height.O By 1988, China provided almost half the total stock of 36,226 large dams worldwide with I8,820, followed by the US (5,459), Japan (2,228) and India- 1,137. 1.10 Within India, the statewide distrbution was available for the years up to 1979. The definition also included some dams between 10-15 meters high. Annex Li shows that with this slightly broader definition, Maharashtra State had by far the largest number of dams either completed or under construction - comprising some 631 dams or slightly more than 40 percent of the total of 1,554 dams.'Y Such dam construction was primarily for the purposes of irrigation and hydropower: between 1951-85, the area under surface irrigation in India almost doubled from 83 million ha to 15.9 million ha.W Over 55 percent of agricultural output is from irrigated areas, which now constitute about one third of total gross cropped area. In Maharashtra State, net irrigated area in 1984 comprised 2.0 million ha, larger than, for example, the Philippines: 1.5 million ha, Morocco: 1.3 million ha and Korea: 1.1 million ha (all are 1986 figures). C. The Maharhtra Irrigation II Psoject 1.11 In the late seventies, India had over 22 million ha of cultivable command area within large scale irrigation projects. The S-year plan at the time projected the development of an additional 1.6 m ha annually in order to meet the objective of increasing the productivity of agriculture so that the standards of living of the poorest segments of the economy would be raised. In the State of Maharashtra, agriculture contributed one-third of the state income while employing about two-thirds of the labor force. 9' ' OM8 2.33, February 1980; Social leaues Associated with involuntary ReselIeet In Bank-Financed Projects. * OMS 2.34, February 1982 Tribal People in Bank*-Financed Projects * OPN 10.06, October 1986; Operations Iseues in the Treatment of Involuntay Resettlement In Bank-Financed Projects. * World Bank Technical Paper No.80, 1988: InvoluntaeyRel t in Development Projects; Polloy Gline in World Bank*Financed Projects. * Involuntary Resettlement in Bank Assisted Project; An Introduction to Legal lasues, Carlos R. Eacudero, Legal Deparment- World Bank 1888. * OD 4.30, June 1960; Involuntary Resettlement * OD 4.20, ladigenous Peoples. JA' World Register of Dams, 1988, ICOLD. ly Register of Large Dams in Indle, Central Board of Irgation and Power, Indian National Committee for ICOLD, 1979. 19' Toal not Irrigated area Increased over the same period from 20.9 million ha to 41.8 milion ha -4- 1.12 The Maharashtra Irrigation II Project fitted well within the national development context. The project, approved in October 1979, principally consisted of the construction of six gravity irrigation projects which had already started between 1968 and 1972. They were to be completed by 1994, bringing the net cultivable command area of 494,000 ha into full production. Credit 954-IN provided financing assistance (US $210 million) for five of the six subprojects during the period 1980 to 1984, leading to the irrigation of 147,000 ha for the 5-year period. 1.13 Of the five irrigation schemes, one (Krishna) was selected for the evaluation of associated involuntary resettlement experience since the distribution system was the most advanced, and thus would have the greatest potential for the achievement of irrigation benefits. By 1984, the Krishna scheme would, according to plans, have proceeded to the following state of completion: % completed Dams 100 Major Canals 6 Distibutlon System 64 Roads 53 The Krishna subproject involved the construction of an embankment dam (Dhom) on the Krishna River (as well as a second dam, Kanher on a tributary of the Krishna River, not included in the present review). The subproject is located in the Satata district, south-east of Bombay and South of Pune, near the headwaters of the Krishna River. The driving time from Bombay to Satara is about eight hours. 1.14 The Dhom storage dam was completed and the reservoir was first filled in 1976; the area submerged by the reservoir was about 2,500 ha. In total, 2,840 ha was acquired from 32 villages to accommodate the reservoir and tht dam construction site. The reservoir's storage capacity is 382 million cubic meters. By impact evaluation in 1990, the left bank canal of 113 km and the right bank canal of 59 km were also completed, giving a total potential area under irrigation command of about 32,925 ha. Of the 32 villages, 13 were fully submerged and 19 were partially affected. 1.15 A specially commissioned socioeconomic survey was undertaken in 1990 in order to obtain some insight into the perceptions of those affected by the resettlement: regarding existing agricultural production systems, social networks and residential communities, kinship groups and family systems, formal and informal associations. In addition to including newly resettled villages in the command area, the survey also sampled some villages which had elected to remain around the edge of the reservoir. Unlike in Thailand, where two baseline surveys were available on the status and living standards of the people affected by the Khao Laem dam, no such information was available for the families affecteJ by the Dhom dam. In order to have some proxy whereby changes in incomes could be measured, the survey included in the sample some host villages in the command area for which baseline data on incomes was available. This also enabled some information to be obtained on the state of relations between the newly resettled, and the existing, villages in the command area. Accordingly, the survey was stratified to include resettled villages, host villages and villages which elected to remain around the edge of the reservoir, and covered 328 household interviews in 13 villages. Survey work was carried out under the leadership and general direction of Dr. Surappaswamy Parasuraman of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Bombay. The specific objectives of the study were: .5- * to assess the socioeconomic conditions of the resettled and host populations, " to estimate the levels of income and expenditures of the survey populations, * to assess the perceptions of those resettled about their living conditions, and o to trace the resettlement process through official records. 1.16 There was considerable concern on the part of the OED mission as to how to trace the landless who would not, under the then legislation, be eligible for land compensation in the new resettlement villages. Thus in order to determine the movement and whereabouts of the population displaced by the reservoir, the consultants undertook a tracer study of eight of the fully submerged villages. Details of both the socioeconomic survey and the tracer study are given in the Appendix. CHAPER l COMPENSATION A. Compeasatlon Criteria 2.1 The land purchase from the Krishna (Dhom) reservoir population was carried out under the provision of the national Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The 1976 state legislation (para 3.1) was not yet in place at the time of some of the acquisitions but it was applied to the project. 2.2 The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended in 1984, deals with compulsory acquisition of private land for public purposes. Compensation is made at market value as determined by the Collector of the District where the land is acquired. The procedures set out by the Act include: * preliminary notification (Section 4), * hearing of objections (Section 5), * public notice to acquire (Section 6), * determination of compensation (Section 9) * making of award (Section 11), o possession (Section 16). These provisions applied to the acquisition of the Dhom reservoir land and Included the deficiencies in the Act and regulations, as subsequently recognized in the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. Some of the significant changes made by the Amendment Act include: * publication of notification in local newspapers and in regional language, * elucidation of public purpose, * time limit on making award, o payment of interest on amount of award from date of notification, and increase in solatium (ex gratia payment) to thirty percent of market value in recognition of compulsory nature of acquisition. The Land Acquisition Act as amended, therefore, confines itself to acquisition and compensation issues and is silent on the remaining elements of involuntary resettlement: relocation and rehabilitation. In this respect, the State of Maharashtra, as the first State in India, enacted specific legislation to cover these issues. 2.3 The compensation provisions that applied under the Maharasthra Resettlement of Displaced Persons Act, 1976, includedv: 1W Annex-Table IiL1 summarizes the compensation and resettlement provisions of the national and state legislallon. o villages that lost more than 75 percent of houses and/or cultivable lands due to submergence were considered 'fully affected'; o villages where less than 50 percent of houses were affected were considered partially affected; the landowners of these villages would be provided with alternate land but not houseplots; o landless agricultural laborers in fully affected villages were considered project affected. 2.4 Eligibility for receiving compensatory land included: * persons with land in their name in the original village; minors and those eligible for a share of the land were not considered for compensation; o compensation land provided on the basis of: . persons losing up to two acres eligible to receive two acres, . persons losing two to five acres eligible to receive up to three acres, . persons losing over five acres eligible to receive up to four acres; o household with more than five persons, for every additional three persons, one additional acre was provided; * makimum compensation land per household not to exceed seven acres; o GOM asked landowners in the original village to deposit 65 percent of the compensation amount paid for land, or the value of the new land, whichever was less, if they wished to receive land in the new village; o landless and service households could receive one acre of land, if land was left over for distribution after all landowning persons had been considered; o compensation land should not be more than eight km from the house, in either the original or the new village; o houseplots would be provided to those eligible, with plot size depending on family size; landowner plots would be twice the size of plots ft -affected landless persons. 2.5 HoUSE CONSaRUCrION. Those with land in previous village received Rs 2,000 towards construction of a new house; the landless received a construction loan of Rs 500. For those who received their houseplot after October 1980, these amounts were increased to Rs 5,000 and Rs 1,500 respectively. House construction materials, where available, could be obtained from the Government at subsidized rates. 2.6 Other assistance provided to the resettlers included: * transportation to the new village, " village infrastructure, * loans for livestock and to initiate self-employment venture, and o preference in suitable Government jobs. B. Implementaton 2.7 The tracer study provided information on the extent to which compensation has been received by the affected population. Table II shows the key findings. Row 1 refers to the total of (i) the number of persons who had land/house/tree in their name and (ii) the number of persons who were entitled to share the land/house/tree which was in someone else's name. Under the Maharashtra Resettlement Act, 1976, only registered landowners affected by a project were eligible for replacement land (para. 2.4). In this case, only those persons under (i) above were eligible to receive land compensation and houseplots (see row 1A). Thus only 51 percent of those with assets had sufficient documented rights to be eligible for compensatory land in the command area. Row 2 shows that the total number of households given houseplots is 49 percent of those in row 1. If houseplots were provided to all those eligible, then, contrasting the figures in rows 1 and 2, only about half those who had rights to land and ownership received a houseplot. - Tabl ILl: Tacer tudy o Rearwlemunt Records for gt Fully Aecled Vlags Mpoed VUbqp Miaa s Dhom B!!y Ysl lil Chaadwad Y oill I Total number of parsons who owned land/houseree or had the right to a share of the landhousetree 267 169 174 182 456 256 132 281 1917 1A ilgible to recelve land 46 NA 180 121 163 177 125 147 979 2 Number given houaeplos 139 86 72 63 223 131 76 147 937 3 Number applied for land (paid 75% of COmpensation amount) so 112 109 87 103 164 76 60 761 4 Number given alternate land 48 149 102 99 111 141 79 SO 779 S Number receing compensation 254 165 172 146 443 254 92 208 1734 2.8 ALTERNATE OR REPLAcEMENT LAND. Assuming that the 937 households given a houseplot had documented rights to land, 80 percent of those eligible for replacement land in these eight villages applied for compensation land (Row 3) by depositing 65 percent of compensation paid. This is somewhat higher than the 68 percent who deposited monies for land according to the official figures (para. 3.6). Figures in Row 4 show that more households received replacement land than those who deposited compensation monies. This is explained by land given to the formerly landless. 2.9 LAND ACQiSrnON IN THE COMMAND AREA. GOM was strongly committed to acquiring(purchasing land in the command area It applied the Land Ceiling Act to those who had land in excess of the ceiling and bought land from those willing to sell. In respect of the latter, several factors aided this process. First, in some villages in the command area, the principal source of income was employment outside of the village; land played a secondary role. People, therefore, were more willing to part with land. Second, Government was judicious in it choice of resettlement -9- sites. It avoided villages where there were large landowning populations with strong political connections. Third, the benefits oL belonging to the same ethnic and political system worked in favor of those who were deemed eligible by Government for replacement land. Government was able to acquire over 2,412 ha of land in the command area and was helped in no small measure by political leaders in the command areas itselE Many of these leaders campaigned for the release of land in the command areas to enable those displaced - who were of the same ethnic/political affiliation, to be able to obtain land. The consultants have noted that in other projects, people in command areas sometimes resisted acquisition of land for those who had been displaced, more particularly when those affected have been tribal groups and Harijans. The resettled persons who received land as compensation expressed the view that command area people sold inferior quality land, a claim that could not be assessed by the survey. Regardless of soil quality, the acquired land being in the command area was irrigable while the expropriated land was not This was considered a significant productive advantage. 2.10 GOM made a major effort in acquiring land for the displaced households considered eligible under the 1976 Act. In the eight villages examined, total land owned before was 1,493 ha and alternate land provided was 865 ha or 1.1 ha per household on average. Over 85 percent of those who applied for land, received land, usually the full quota. GOM fies indicated that additional alternate land was available outside Satara District, but that people were not interested in leaving the district. The tracer data also revealed that a good number of landless people received one acre of land. While the exact number could not be determined, about three percent of persons receiving land in resettlement villages were landless in their original village. C. Coneuslos 2.11 The tracer study shows that almost all those who had any rights to assets such as land, houses or trees in the affected zone, received compensation monies. The 1976 Act also, however, made provision for certain other families to be eligible for compensatory land in the command area. This was seen as a useful benefit in that a majority of eligible families opted to exercise this option. At the same time, Government of Maharashtra's original 1976 policy - and the one which was applied in this instance - had the effect of limiting the number of people eligible to receive compensatory land and houseplots. The result was that almost half the affected families - principally the joint owners and the landless - were not eligible for land and houseplots in the command area. Within the limitations of the 1976 Resettlement Act, GOM appears to have carried out a fair compensation program. This is further verified in Chapter III which describes the successful resettlement process and in Chapter V which establishes that per capita incomes have risen since resettlement. . 10- CHAPTER III; RESETLEMENT A. Legislative Framework 3.1 There are two acts that are relevant to resettlement in the State of Maharashtra: the Maharashtra Resettlement of Displaced Persons Act, 1976; and 0 the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1986. 32 This legislatio i: discussed briefly. The Maharashtra Resettlement of Displaced Persons Act, 1976, was enacted March 1977 and repealed January 1990. This act does not supersede the Land Acquisition Act as the actual land acquisition is still carried out under the national statute. The resettlement act, however, provides for the resettlement of those losing house, land or landless agricultural laborers displaced from lands acquired for public purpose. It defines the affected zone, displaced person and benefitted zone. Specifically, it decrees that the State Government shall resettle as many displaced persons as possible on land in the benefitted zone. Those affected are to deposit 65 percent of compensation monies received for lands in the affected zone, any difference between the amount deposited and the market value of land in the benefitted zone is to be repaid in six annual installments. Agricultural laborers are to receive one acre in the benefitted zone free. To this end, a Directorate of Resettlement is established to plan and implement resettlement programs. The Resettlement Officer may acquire land holdings in the benefitted zone and allocate such lands to displW-ed persons on the basis of compensation received. Those who choose to resettle independently are eligible for a rehabilitation grant of between 75-100 percent of the compensation monies received for their land - up to a ceiling of 10 acres - in the affected zone. 3.3 The Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1986, enacted October 1989. This act strengthened the definition of 'affected person' to include not only landholders and agricultural laborers but also other residents of the affected villages. The act sets out the amenities (infrastructure) that are to be provided by the resettlement auth irities in new villages. Important features of this act are: (a) It applies to all irrigation projects of which the area of the affected zone exceeds 50 hectares and the benefitted zone exceeds 200 hectares. (b) Every brother of a joint family who has a share in the agricultural land is treated as a separate family. (c) A person with a trade occupation or working for gain in the affected zone for five years prior to notification under the Land Acquisition Act is treated as a project affected person (PAP). (d) The provision for civic amenities which was previously made by administrative orders is now included in the statute. (e) The project authority is made statutorily responsible for carrying out the work of providing civic amenities. * 11 - (f) Provision for giving highest priority in project-related employment to at least one member of the PAP family has been made in the act. (g) Provisions which result in delays in acquisition and allocation of alternate agricultural land to the PAPs have been removed. (h) Provisions have been made for those who cause obstruction to the PAPs in cultivating the alternate agricultural land given to them. B. Resettlement Im-plemntation 3.4 The 32 affecad villages were situated in hilly areas of Satara District. The submerged lands were used for crops and livestocL Although not then defined by statute, Government considered that the basic resettlement premise was that those displaced by the reservoir should ideally be resettled within the downstream irrigated area and become beneficiaries under the project. 3.5 By the end of 1990, the following situation existed for the Krishna Subproject, according to the GOM Irrigation Department* Fuly Affected Landboldes 3,017 Parday Affected Ladholem ASected Famies with Land 4,346 Families without Land 150 Total Affected Families 4,496 Land Required for CompensatIon 5,463 ha Land Available in Satara Ditrict Comand Area 2,412 ha Land Aaiable in Solaper District Command Area 3,050 ha Familes Hectares FamWes who depolted 65 poccnt of their compensation towards replacement land 2,045 Families who received land in Satara District 2,029 2,184 Famles who received land outside Satar Distict 100 12 The resettlement of the 13 fully affected villages has been completed, with the Government providing land to all those that applied for it (by depositing 65 percent of compensation received). 3.7 The evaluation was keen to find out how many families availed themselves of the opportunities to move into the resettlement villages and for those who did not, where they chose to move. - 12 - 3.8 The tracer study showed that, if joint families and landless had been recognized, there would have been about 7,850 families, rather than 4,496 (para 3.16). The tracer study also demonstrated that, on the basis of this larger figure, about 40 percent settled in the new villages in the command area, 12 percent elected to remain in the catchment area aid about 45 percent settled in other areas. For the latter, there were several reasons by which individual resettlement was accomplished. Groups of related men bought land with compensation monies in less expensive areas. Individual families moved to villages where they had relatives. A number moved to Bombay - Satara has traditionally been an area of outmigration (see Box 111.1). It could have been expected that, with the disruption of resettlement - together with the. :t that many of the population were not eligible for replacement land and/or house, some would have taken the opportunity to migrate to Bombay. The tracer study shows, however, that this did not accelerate the ongoing outmigration to large cities; only five percent opted to do this. This suggests that even those who were not eligible for land or house have been able to obtain a livelihood in the rural areas, although their current standard of living is not known. Box IL1: Oulmigrallon among the Marsihas The original displaced villages were populated mostly by Marathas - a broad group occupying middle rank In Hindu caste hierarchy - and a few scheduled caste households. Marathas are primarily an agricultural community to whom land is the principal source of lvelihood. Their life centers around land. But land was scarce and after repeated sub-divisons this resource had become too small to sustain households primarily on its own contribution. Lack of irrigation had made the job more difficult This phenomenon has led to the migration of men to Bombay, Pune and Satara for employment purposes. Prior to resettlement, most households had at least one member in Bombay, (Satara to Bombay: 335 km.) and the income derived by the migrant accounted for a substantial proportion of the total household Income. Migration of Satara people to Bombay is characterized by the following aspects: It Is male dominated, and men normally receive better education, Le. at least up to higher secondary level. The extensive network of native people in Bombay and Pune help the migrant Initially to settle down and locate employment. The family remains back In the village; men visit the family regularly; women take turns to go to Bombay primarily to look after the food needs of men Ing together; much of the earnings In Bombay are remitted to the villages. Men normally return to village after retirement For the Marathas, increased volume of migration to Bombay was mostly due to the Incapacity of agriculture to support the growing family in the village. However, their dependence on land and the house in the village was fundamental to their existence in Bombay. The overall contribution of land to the IIvelihood of the family might be low but life without land was not a proposition acceptable to the Marathas. 3.9 A number of families elected to remain on the edge of the reservoir, close to their original village. These included both partially and fully affected villages. Not all of the lands of the latter were inundated, thus some of those who were left with more than one ha or 50 percent of their original lands, chose to stay. Those who had smaller pieces of land sold the land either privately or to Government, which were options open to them under the program. This particularly benefitted 013. those who were formerly landless, who were now either given land by Government or purchased it themselves. 3.10 For those who were considered eligible for land compensation, however, the findings confirm the official data above - that about two thirds opted for official assistance with the remaining cne third resettling themselves - and also provide insight into the wide range of options exercised by the affected families. 3.11 For those who opted for public assistance in resettling, Government provided a choice of sites for villages and households to resettle. Eligible families were entitled to a houseplot of 4,000-6,000 square feet and to a loan of Rs 3,000-5,000 for home construction. Government did not insist that households move to the designated villages - some families preferred, for example, to be closer to a main road or to the taluka headquarters; providing Government was able to purchase land in these villages they were able to exercise their choice. As a result, people went to a variety of villages; seldom were villages moved as an integral unit. 3.12 The driving force behind where people moved to was the desire to acquire land, families were less concerned about metdining village unity. The tracer study shows that families in one village relocated to nine different areas; in other villages, families settled in between 3-6 different locations. The Maratha people are an agricultural community to whom land has always been the primary source of income. For the socially conscious and upwardly mobile Maratha households, the contribution of land to the livelihood of the family was declining but its intrinsic social and psychological value remained strong (see Box Ii.l). Figure IILI: Paftems of Migralton Among Four Fully Alfected Villages as Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Village 4 SPopulanio to Offlial Population to Population to Resettlement Villages Non-iIal Remain In Resetlernmnt Villages Original Village Source: 1990 Socioeconomic Survey, Tata Institute of Social Sciences. *14 - 3.13 The outmigration has also to be seen in the context of immigration as a result of Irrigation development The construction of the dam prompted many men in the command area to return from Bombay. A number reported that once their land received irrigation, they returned to the village since a few acres of irrigated land could support their familyA Concurrently, Government's power to acquire land in the command areas under the Land Ceiling Act stimulated immigration as absentee landlords or those who could lose land returned to claim their rights. 3.14 All resettlers constructed their own new house, after making temporary huts and living there until the new house was completed. This typically took one year. As soon as part of the new house was habitable, the family moved in. House construction was generally more expensive than the amount of money obtained as compensation for the old house. The difference in cost was due to the larger size and changed design; houses tended to be constructed of the same materials as in the former house: walls of stone, bricks and mud, all roofs were of tile with floors of mud or cow dung. Only a few houses had cement floors. Annex 11.2 shows that only a handful of households added separate kitchens, toilets or bathrooms. Facilities tended to be about the same as in the host villages, thus about 25 percent of households had separate kitchens, between 18-22 percent had separate bathrooms, and 4 percent had indoor toilets. Among the newly resettled villages, only a very few households took opportunity to add facilities compared to what they had before. 3.15 Compensation was supplemented with loans so that larger houses could be constructed. Ninety percent of houses accommodated extended family, either parents or siblings, thus accounting for the large household size. 3.16 An interesting finding which emerges from the tracer study is the difference in the definition of affected families, depending on whether the 1976 or the 1986 Act applies. The difference concerns both the joint owners and the landless. According to Hindu inheritance custom, agricultural land is recorded in the village register in the name of one brother as manager of the Hindu joint family. The family includes all brothers, or sons of any deceased brother, with each having a share in the land, whether formally documented or not. The tracer study illustrates that in the fully affected villages there were an additional 2,500 brothers/sons, who would have been deemed affected under the 1986 Act. Regarding the landless, the 1976 Act, as well as the respective Government Resolutions which guided the resettlement and rehabilitation effort before the Act was effective, did not recognize all landless as PAPs. Only those who earned their living by manual labor in agriculture were considered eligible. Official figures show that only 150 landless families were considered project affected (para. 3.5), whereas the tracer study shows 1,000 landless families to have been living in the fully afferted villages. This is also somewhat of an underestimation since this does not include those who were living in the partially affected villages. The following chart suggests that under the 1986 Act, there would have been about 7,846 affected families and not the 4,496 families as defined by the 1976 legislation. This phenomenon has been observed in a number of OED impact evaluations on Irrigation projects: . World Bank Experience with Irrigation Development (Overview, Mexico and Morocco). OED Report No.7876. June 1989. . Wodd Bank Experience with Irrigation Development (Overview, Philippines and Thaliand). OED Report No.8494. March 1990. *. Fully Affected Villages: 13 Partially Affected Villages: 19 1976 Act I Act 3,017 landowners 3,017 8 Villages: Houses 11 Villages lost some 150 landless 1,000 * acquired from 273 land. 1,056 lardowners joint owners 2500 * families since all received compensation 2048 deposit 85 percent of lost over 50 percent but were consldered by I compensetion monies of their land. These Government to be 273 families settled secondary priority for 2029 given land compensation on their own, with replacement land, did landless given land cash compensation not deposit 65 percent received from their of compensation total received land former asselsi monies. 1,029 resettled on own Initiative 4,529 Total Families 3,167 6,517 1 1,329 Fully and Partially affected under 1976 Act: 4,496 families Fully and Partially affected under 1986 Act: 7,846 families * Derived from the tracer studies, which were based upon landholding and household data from the Revenue, Irigatlon and Resettlement Departments for the fully submerged villages. C. Relatlous with Hosts 3.17 Those surveyed in 1990 reported that they had good relations with the host villages, most located about a kilometer from the newly resettled villages. The host villages reported that, at the outset, there had been several instances of conflicts between resettled and host village households over land. Problems revolved around ownership of land and were usually mediated by Government. Another contentious issue was grazing land. Lands which had been used by host villages for grazing were now taken up by Government for land compensation; some families in resettled villages reported crop lose from animals grazing on their plots.' The problem with grazing persists. 3.18 An indication of the state of relations between the resettled and the host villages is the extent to which invitations to marriage and other social ceremonies are exchanged. Good relations were reported among both host and resettled villages. This was due to the fact that many did not move too far from the original village and thus remained within the area in which marriages were traditionally arranged. The importance of belonging to the same caste cannot be underestimated. Although families moved to many different locations, kinship ties remained strong. I' The Irrigation Sector Review noted that loss of common grazing areas was not addressed in any of the earlier projects where resettlement occurred In the early 80s. This had significant implications since it was usually the landless who earned significant income from livestock and thus depended on common grazing areas for their lIvelihood. Report No.9518-IN dated December 20, 1991. - 16 * D. Settlers' Perceptions of Resettlement 3.19 Of the families surveyed who resettled with Government assistance, about three out of four households in the resettled villages indicated that their economic condition had improved compared to their situation in the old village. Of the 25 percent who felt that their situation had deteriorated families were mostly of (i) landless households and (ii) houwholds that had been 'truncated', that is, the original household had split and separate units resettled in different locations. 3.20 In addition to the higher incomes of families after resettlement (para. 5.21), the perception of well-being was based on such factors as the availability of adequate drinking water, schools, health care, shops, roads and transport, electricity and canal Irrigation (Annexes 11.3 and IIL4). These families also had good access to supporting services. 3.21 The resettled and host villages, being adjacent to each other, showed similar patterns. Both had the same economic base in the command area and both had similar provision of infrastructure. It is therefore not surprising that their socioeconomic profiles matched closely. Both can be considered relatively well-off. 3.22 The status of families who chose to settle on their own initiative is known only for those who elected to remain close to the new reservoir site. In these catchment area villages, in terms of natural resources, economic opportunities and community infrastructure, these villages were decidedly worse off in comparison. The perception in these villages was that they were not better off than before. The catchment area households generally moved up on the hills because they had land there (not subject to acquisition) and therefore they decided to stay. Due to the reservoir, transportation has deteriorated especially during monsoon periods. Not being situated in the area administered by the Command Area Development Authority (CADA), the catchment area villages have lost out on Government attention and specific programs such as employment on Government projects. At the time of the survey, these villages were keen to take up opportunities in the command area. A number of families have sent their women folk and children to live in the command area villages to take advantage of the education facilities. When the consultants visited one village, Chandwadi, in preparation for the survey, they found that all the families had already moved away. 3.23 The situation of the approximately 45 percent of families who were not eligible for replacement land or houseplot, and who resettled out of the catchment area is unknown. F. Resettlement Costs 3.24 Information of total resettlement costs were obtained from District Resettlement Office in Satara and comprise expenditures up to December 1989. The Office considered these to be final costs; no further resettlement was planned. The costs are for land acquisition and rehabilitation for the Dhom dam: Rs (m) US$ (m) S-mnred Area * Land Acquisition 26,9 1,5 . Housing 3,1 0.2 . Trees, other assets n.d. Command Area . Land Acquisition 36,2 2,0 Housing 4.8 0.3 . Civic Amenities 31,1 1,7 TOTAL 102,1 5,7 - 17- Average costs of land acquired per ha in the submerged area was Rs 10,216 while that for the command area was Rs 17,832. Civic amenities included water supply, schools, temples, burial grounds, electricity, public latrines and approach roads. F. Conclusloas 3.25 The Government of Maharashtra has demonstrated strong commitment to this issue: it has taken the initiative to introduce legislation for resettlement and rehabilitation, to apply its provisions retroactively to those families affected by the Dhom dam and to refine it based upon project experience. This has been important in putting into effect a resettlement program which has given a very fair deal to the eligible families displaced by the dam. The satisfactory outcome was reported by the families themselves and has particularly benefitted those who opted to be resettled by Government in the command area; survey data shows that incomes are not only higher than before but are higher than those who have always lived in the command area. Project experience demonstrates, therefore, the potential for success if those affected are included as beneficiaries of the project - and, in this case, given land in the command area. Government's judicious use of the Land Ceiling Act also ensured that all of the fully affected landowners who wanted land in the command area were able to obtain land. 3.26 To this must be added the innate ability of the people themselves. Local leaders clearly saw resettlement as an opportunity to be grasped to improve their economic and social situation (para. 7.10). There is increased use of inputs and the higher yields and production which are typical of resettler families compared to host families. 3.27 The distance involved in moving was also important. The fact that the new villages were still within the social catchment area of the former villages and that the affected people were of the same caste meant that ihe social fabric was maintained with a minimum of disruption. Relations with host villages were generally good; the loss of grazing lands for livestock is still an issue, however. 3.28 The attraction of the command area is apparent even now to those families who had originally opted to stay close to their former village in the catchment area. One advantage of the delays in project works is that these families will now have an opportunity to move into the command area, since project works are not yet complete and not all lands have been acquired. The attraction of the command area also proved compelling to many former absentee landlords - who returned from urban areas to reclaim their land rights; this is a finding of other impact evaluations in the irrigation sector. 3.29 Government's policy did encourage dispersal of joint families not deemed eligible and given the strong desire on the part of the Marathas to own land. People were prepared to settle in a wide variety of places usually where land was cheaper, as long as they could possess some land. Nevertheless, this has not affected kinship ties. Although land was becoming less important in an economic sense its intrinsic social and psychological value remained strong and explains why people chose to settle in groups in so many villages. - 18 - CHAFER IV: AGRICULTURE A. Land Tenure 4.1 Farm size in Maharashtra closely follows local agro-climatic conditions, with farms in high rainfall areas being smaller than those in low rainfall areas. Average rainfall in Satara district ranges between 600-2,500 mm p.a. At appraisal, average landholding under rainfed conditions was 3.9 ha for Satara district, slightly less than the s-ate average of 4.3 ha. In the project area, at project closing, average farm sizes had declined significantly* the farm models were reestimated on the basis of a 1 ha plot compared to a 3 ha plot used at appraisal. At impact evaluation in 1990, average farm sizes were between 1.3-1.5 ha in the command area and 1.6 ha in rainfed conditions; this does not suggest an increase in farm size, however, since the basis for 'ie PCR revision is not clear. 4.2 The 1976 Act has clearly had an impact on land tenure arrangements. Before moving, 49 percent of households in the resettled villages had their land registered among various family members. Following resettlement, this proportion dropped to 16 percent while household heads constituted the largest group (51 percent). Meanwhile in the host villages, whereas 47 percent of families had registered land previously among several household members or, not at all, in 1990, 51 percent of household heads held land title. 4.3 Although there appeared to have been an increase in the number of landless (Table IV.1) in the resettlement villages - from 4 percent prior to construction of the dam, to 29 percent by 1990, nevertheless, many of these 'landless' people are likely to be those who previously lived in these extended families. Annex IV.1 shows that there has been an insignificant decline in the number of people sharing the land in the resettled villages and less than has occurred in the host villages. Table IV.1: Land Ownrship Belbre Rsellim and In 1990 (V) Resettled Host im* Before 1990 1990 Before 1990 Landless 4 29 18 62 19 >1 ha 13 31 47 5 36 1 ha*2ha 34 33 14 2 24 2 ha < 50 6 21 12 20 Mean (ha) 3.1 1.3 1.5 2.3 1.6 * Rim = catchment area vl1ages. Source* 1990 Socioeconomic Survey, Tata Institute of Social Sclences. W' About 8% of these families may still obtain land since they have deposited compensation monies, yet not received land, which would reduce the overall percent of landless to 21%. - 19- This would be logical given the improved social infrastructure available in these communities and, as reported by the farmers surveyed, opportunities for, and wages of, agricultural labor have increased in the command area with the advent of irrigation (para 4.14). Thus it is likely that the increase in 'landless' recorded following resettlement is a result of the more formal documentation of land rights, rather than in any change in family members' access to land. In this context, it is important to note that the 1986 Act has widened considerably the definition of those affected by the project and thus eligible for land compensation (para 3.3). 4.4 There was a decline in landlessness in the catchment area villages. Whereas prior to dam construction, over 60 percent owned no land, in 1990, there were less than 20 percent who were landless. How was this land acquired? Almost half of these new landowners received land from Government; 20 percent bought land from families who opted to leave while another 17 percent bought land in nearby villages. The high proportion of land obtained by Government was a direct result of the 1976 Act which permits Government to acquire land where 75 percent of land held by the owner was to be inundated. These lands acquired above the water line were then distributed free by Government to formerly landless people. 4.5 In terms of land size, average holdings were slightly smaller among the resettled population in the command area in 1990 when compared to either the hosts or those who stayed behind, although access to irrigation was slightly greater, as the following table shows: F%ix IV: Land Holdings and Area kgaled 190 Raw at B On Ht WageHnoWto Source: 1990 Socioeconomic Survey, Tata Institute of Social Sciences. There is also area irrigated in the catchment area villages. At project appraisal, almost half of the area irrigated in Maharashtra state was through wells; canal irrigation accounted for about 25 percent while the remainder was derived from small diversion weirs, tanks, etc. Thus private sources of irrigation have always been important. Nevertheless, families living close to the dam have made use of opportunities for lift irrigation in addition to the more traditional weirs and wells. -20- B. Cropping Patterns and Intensities 4.6 A principal project objective at appraisal was to permit the introduction of more intensive, year round, cropping patterns. At impact evaluation, a few years before full development, this objective is short of being realized. 4.7 Table IV.2 shows total cropped and irrigated area estimated at appraisal, at project completion in 1987 and actual data for each of the three years thereafter. The estimates are for production at full development. Table IV Agdcutural Development (ha) Estimated at Estimated at Actual Appraisal Completion % of without with without with POR Prolect aLec O olec rect 1E 1988-89 19W!- Estimates Net CCA Y 74,000 74,000 74,000 74,000 52,246 55,709 51,536 70 Rainfed Area 79,920 - - - 26,195 19,863 26,100 Irrigated Area (project) - 115,440 - 85,100 10,943 11,073 18,860 22 Irrigated Area (Private) - 7,794 7,189 12,050 14 Total Cropped Area 79,920 118,400 74,000 123,580 44,932 45,125 57,014 46 Cropping Intenaty (%) 160 187 86 81 108 65 Irrigation Intensity (%)(allsources) 156 21 115 36 42 58 50 CroWna latensity (%) IOar 80 82 36 36 40 49 Rabi 59 63 38 37 55 87 Hot Weather 7 10 4 5 8 80 Perennial 14 12 8 3 7 160 167 86 81 110 66 Irria nntio ni (%) (all sources) Khaif 76 50 11 8 13 26 Rabi 59 43 13 26 32 74 Hot Weather 9 10 4 5 8 80 Perennial 14 12 8 3 7 58 156 115 36 42 60 52 7 Cultivated Command Area. Source: Irrigation Department, CADA Government of Maharashtra and mission estimates. - 21. 4.8 The table shows that, in terms of the cropped area: (a) at project completion, the estimate for total cropped area at full development, in 1993- 98, was revised upwards while the likely irrigated area was revised downwards. At impact evaluation, three years before full development, the Table shows that actual cropped and irrigated areas for 1989-90 were considerably short of either the SAR or even the revised PCR estimates. (b) At project completion, the expected cropping intensity at full development was increased, while the irrigation intensity was revised downwards. At impact evaluation in 1990, the Table shows that cropping intensities were 108 percent, only slightly above the without project situation while the irrigation intensity was lower than estimated. (c) trends over time show that while total cropped area increased each year, for the past three years, an important part of this increase was the further development of private sources of irrigation. While the SAR had not included any irrigaLed area in the without project situation, the PCR assumed an irrigation intensity of 21 percent. Table IV.2 shows that if all sources of irrigation were taken into account, the total irrigated area rose to 36 percent of the PCR estimates. 4.9 According to official data, project objectives of a year round cropping pattern had similarly not yet been achieved. At appraisal, it was expected that the project would encourage irrigation in the kharif season by providing a pre-monsoon soak, since research trials had shown that early planting maximized yields. When irrigation intensities were analyzed by season, the rabi (winter) season continued to be the most important in terms of cropped area, the kharif (rainy season) has an irrigation intensity of only 26 percent of the revised (downwards) PCR estimates. Rainfed agriculture continued to be important in the command area; with over 2/ of cropped area rainfed for each of the years 1988-90 in the kharif season. Reasons for this were not entirely clear. Almost all households in the command area villages had irrigation facilities; agicultural officers reported that farmers were reluctant to pay irrigation fees, preferring to rely on the possibility that rain would be timely and sufficient. The PCR reported that the low kharif irrigation intensity was in line with findings of other irrigation schemes in Maharashtra and was due to difficult soil conditions, cultural traditions and other socioeconomic factors. The importance of rainfed cultivation was also confirmed by the survey for the new villages but, interestingly, host villages had a greater area irrigated than raided. Raided cropped areas for the rabi season were, respectively, 65, 28 and 43 percent for the years 1988-90. 4.10 At project completion, it was noted that there was more cropping of high value crops such as vegetables and wheat in the rabi season, groundnuts in hot weather and sugarcane as a perennial crop. There was also a shift from traditional sorghum varieties to hybrids. 4.11 The 1990 survey confirmed this change in cropping patterns. Cropping patterns varied as between the new resettlement villages and those of the host villages. In the former, the principal crops in terms of irrigated area were hybrid sorghum, 60 percent of which was sold; followed by traditional varieties of sorghum, most of which was retained for home consumption; and by sugarcane, one third of which was for household use. In the rainfed season, vegetables and pulses for the market took precedence. Only a few families in the host villages continued cultivating the traditional variety of sorghum, almost all had changed to hybrid. Other important crops in terms of area were sugarcane, which similarly about a third was kept for consumption, and pulses for market sale. Farmers find sugarcane attractive because of its guaranteed price, it is largely free from pest and disease and since irrigation water is often unreliable, it can withstand the stress better than other - 22 - crops. Government meanwhile has tended to discourage further planting to sugarcane. Although only 10 percent of Maharashtra's irrigated area is to sugarcane it consumes between 50-60 percent of total irrigation waterA3 In addition to its high water usage, the crop gives low net returns per unit of irrigation water. The importance of sugarcane in financial terms to farmers is demonstrated it the following table (Table IV.3) on net returns per irrigated ha. Table IV.8: Net Return per Helare of Main Inigaled Crope Pue Indian a.) Net Net Return Area Yield Total Value Value Inputs Return By Season fjl =031 Production g' Per He Per He MH gafHa .Groundnut 205 1.1 324.5 227 770 1,972 (1,202) .Paddy 350 2.1 735.0 2,57 7,351 1,506 5,845 .Sorghum 963 2.3 2214.9 4,430 4,600 1,400 3,140 .Turmeric 192 3.5 672.0 12006 63,000 1,000 S2,000 .Ginger 32 2.5 80.0 800 25,000 1,000 24,000 .other (Veg-frnch 303 2.5 757.5 30,300100,000 1,000 99,000 23,600 beans, onkon) rghum 5,754 0.8 4,603.2 18,111 2800 1,362 1,438 .Wheat 2270 1.8 4,086.0 15,527 6,840 1,212 5,628 .Gram 33,133 0.8 2506.4 22,553 7,200 1,320 5,880 .Other 968 2.5 2420.0 121,000125,000 600 124,400 14,450 Summer Weather .Groundnut 938 2.4 2,253.6 1,902 2028 2000 28 .Maize 1,010 2.2 2222.0 4,444 4,400 1,500 2900 3,260 Perennial .Sugarcane 2649 90 238,410.0 95,364 36,000 8,500 27,500 27,500 18,858 Source: CADA, Krishna Subproject, Government of Maharashtra C. Yields 4.12 The third project objective was to increase yields. Table IV.4 gives information on yields as expected at appraisal and at project completion, as well as actual yields for the past three years. The variations in yields from year to year in the kharif season probably reflect the extent to which this season is characterized by rainfed, rather than irrigated, agricultural production. Trends over the past three years show that yields of hybrid sorghum have yet to reach the revised (downwards) estimates at project completion, although that for vegetables has reached expectations. In the rabi season, yields of hybrid wheat, sorghum and gram have similarly not yet reached completion estimates, although vegetables continue to do weL In the hot weather season, groundnuts are between the appraisal and revised (upwards) PCR expectation, while that for sugarcane is also above both appraisal and completion estimates. 19' N. Rath, A. Mitra. Economics of Irrigation In Water - Scare Regions: A Study of Maharashtra. Joumal of the Gokhale Institute of Politics & Economics. Volume XXXI No.1. March 1989. -23. Table IV.4: YIld Estimated at Estimated at Appraisal Completion Actual 3-Year Average % of PCR 1EZ.l IMM9 1M Estimates ohum (ocal) 0.7 0.9 1.6 1.6 - 178 .Sorghum (HY) 3.5 3.0 2.4 1.8 2.3 72 .Groundnut 1.5 1.8 2.1 12 1.1 81 .Vegetable 20.0 - 21.0 21.0 - - Ral .Wheat(HYV) 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.9 1.8 72 .Sorghum (Local 1.8 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 67 .Sorghum (HYV) 3.0 2.5 1.1 1.7 - 56 .Gram 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.8 64 .Vegetable (HY) 20 - 21.0 21.0 - - HotWthf .Groundnut 2.0 3.0 2.4 2.6 2.4 82 .Maze - - 1.8 2.2 2.2 - .Sugarcane 75 85 90 90 90 106 Source: Irrigation Department, CADA, Govemment of Maharashtra. 4.13 Information obtained from the survey, and analyzed by villages in both the command area (hosts and new villages) and in the catchment area of the reservoir, showed variation when compared with the official statistics. Yields in the new villages were, in most cases, higher than their neighbon in the command area, for a number of important crops, with the exception of sugarcane. Families in new villages were willing to spend a greater pairt of total expenditures on agricultural inputs: Table IVA5 Agdcullual Expendlures asa p-latOI TOtal Household Experli.as Resettled Host Rim* Agricultural Inputs 6,789 3,836 A139 Total Expenditures 22,096 18,448 14,832 As% of Expendtures 31 21 14 * Rim = Catchment area villages. Source: 1990 Socioeconomic Survey, Tata Institute of Social Sciences. The higher use of inputs among the resettlers is in part due to their better access to services such as credit and extension. Government departments responsible for provision of loans and agricultural inputs favored the resettled villages, a situation which may, over time, cause resentment with the host villages. *24- Table IV. Use of Inpuls par ha rah) Resettled Host Rim* Per Cropped ha 4,575 2,916 1,153 Iuigated ha 5,088 4,054 1,740 * Rim a catchment area villages. Source: 1990 Socioeconomic Survey, Tate Institute of Social Sciences. 4.14 This, together with the higher incidence of outmigration among the resettled villages has created a greater demand for hired labor among the resettler families than among the hosts. D. Conclusions 4.15 Legislation concerning resettlement has resulted in land tenure becoming more formalized. The incidence of landless people declined in the catchment area villages. 4.16 Although 90 percent of land in the resettled villages was irrigated, in overall terms the Krishna subproject was only making slow progress in reaching the revised PCR targets for cropped and irrigated area, as well as of cropping and irrigation intensities due to technical problems and water pricing policies which were considered unattractive by farmersy The importance of private sources of irrigation was also underlined. Few changes had been effected in r, pect of encouraging irrigation in the early rainy season. There was success in changing cropping patterns - farmers having switched to high yielding varieties as well as high value crops. The survey shows the potential for yields if irrigation is secure. While official yields statistics are in general lower than expected, yields from the survey reflect that farmers in the command area were willing to spend a greater portion of their income on inputs and also had relatively good access to supporting services. W1 The finding that delays in project implementation to the extent that project targets cannot be obtained within the expected time slice period Is a finding of many Irrigation projects in India The most recent example Is INDIA - Second Gujarat Irrigation Project (Cr.1011-IN), Karnataka Tanks Project (Cr.1116-IN), Kallada irrigation and Tree Crops Development Project (Cr.1269-IN/Ln.2186-IN); OED Report under preparation. -25- CHAPTER V: SOCIAL IMPACT A. Population Characteristles 5.1 Satara district has long been an area of outmigration. Resettlement has not accelerated this process among those who were eligible for lands in the command area: 14 percent of the population in the resettled villages lived away (but was still considered as belonging to the family, especially for income purposes) compared to 11 percent of the host families. In the catchment area villages, however, the proportion was almost one fifth, which suggests that the relatively poorer agricultural opportunities have resulted in larger numbers seeking employment outside of the District Nevertheless, the fact that young people (0-14) made up about 30 percent of the population indicated that continuing pressure on land and continuing out-migration could be expected. 5.2 The resettlers were predominantly Marathas (a broad caste group occupying a middle rank in the Hindu caste hierarchy) but the prevalence of this group among the hosts was less. FiUre V.1: Saclesrii O r dHost and Calmc t Area Qm) Fanles Merethem Uaheduled Case mService C)ther e ost HIM Source: 190 Socioeconomic Survy, Tata Institute of Social Sciences. B. Family Identity 53 Resettlement appears to have had little impact on family structure; population statistics of the three types of villages (Annex V.1) showed that after resettlement, the extended family continued: household sizes were large (in excess of 8 persons). C. Social Inhlustructure 5.4 The resettled villages in the command area were situated about one kilometer from the existing villages. Layout of these villages is in contrast to that of the hosts: houses in these villages - 26- were laid out in rows on both sides of broad streets. Plots provided for the houses were ample. Infrastructure was provided, although not always as originally scheJuled. Over 50 percent of the host and resettled villages in the command area had electricity, compared with only 37 percent of households in the catchment villages. Resettled villages also had the advantage of street lights, well constructed sewerage and rainwater drainage systems, a community hall and other social amenities. In contrast, catchment area villages had few facilities. 5.5 The survey showed that school attendance rates for females were low (one out of two), compared to males (three out of four) with consequently lower literacy rates among females. Nevertheless, the literacy rates for all the villages were higher than the crude literacy rate for 1991 in Satara district (67 percent for males and 45 percent for females) with the exception of the females living in the catchment area villagesW D. Incomes and Expenditures * INCOMS 5.6 No data were available on incomes of the fully or partially affected villages prior to resettlement. To compensate for this, the OED socioeconomic 1990 survey was designed so that 4 of the host villages selected had already been included in household surveys carried out by the Command Area Development Authority, in 1975 and 1987. This afforded an opportunity to compare annual incomes over time. In order to make a meaningful comparison, the income results from the two previous surveys were adjusted to reflect 1990 prices using regional price indices. The results indicate that real income doubled between 1975 and 1987 for 3 of the host villages, increased fourfold for one of the host villages. Incomes have not further increased since 1987, except in one village where it doubled again. (See Annex-Chart VL1). 5.7 On a per capita basis, the resettled population was substantially better off than the host populations and thus it can be concluded that incomes for the resettled population were higher than before resettlement. In contrast, those families who chose to stay behind in the catchment area have lower per capita incomes than the host villages. Over time, however, incomes have increased: the 1990 incomes of the catchment area villages were higher in constant terms than the host village incomes for 1975, and about the same as those for 1987. Incomes of those who moved elsewhere are not known. 5.8 In terms of inc-me distribution and poverty levels, assuming a 1990 poverty level of Rs 1,500 per year (US$83) the survey results indicated only seven percent of the resettled population in this category, compared to one-fifth of the host population and fully one-third of the catchment area population (Table V.1). In rural Maharashtra, 42 percent of households were living below the poverty line in 1983-84. On the other side of the scale, those with per capita incomes in excess of Rs 7,500 (US$417) account for seven percent in the catchment area villages, 15 percent in the host villages and 23 percent in the resettled villages. By these measurements, the resettled households have adapted well to their new economic environment and can be said to be fully rehabilitated. W The crude teracy rate Is not stricty comparable since this includes chldren up to six years old who are treated as Illterates In the 1991 census. Lteracy rates for Maharashtra as a whole - which covers the population 7+ were 75% for males and 51% for females, ging an overall total of 63% -27- Tabl V.i: DIebulon o Per Capla Income (% of Households) Resettled Host Rim >Rs ,500 7 20 33 .-po-povery ne. 1,500 - 2,500 19 17 22 2,500 - 3,500 23 18 19 8,500- 4,500 13 15 10 4,500 - 5,500 11 10 7 5,500 - 6,800 4 5 2 8,500 - 7,500 7 4 3 7,500 - 12,000 8 7 2 <12000 8 4 2 Tol 100 100 100 Average 5,530 3,943 2,850 * Rim Catchment area villages Source: 1990 SocIoeconomic Survey, Tas InSitute Or SocIal ScIences. 5.9 Table V-2 shows that total 1990 household income from all sources was estimated to be: Table V2 Household Income, 1990 (Re) Resettled Host Rim Income 34,820 28,217 18,740 % 100% 82% 54% * RIm a Catchment area villages. Source 1990 Socioeconomic Suivey, Tat Institute at Social ScIences. The reasons for higher incomes in both relative and absolute terms were several. Resettled villages showed higher incomes due to a higher proportion of irrigated land and a greater proportion of non- agricultural wage labor outside village. 5.10 Among the resettled villages the range of income was from Rs 27,883 to Rs 46,668. Tae village with the highest income had the largest average landholding and the largest average irrigated landholding. Among the host villages, incomes ranged from Rs 19,769 to Rs 40,406. As could be expected, there was a strong relation between high irrigated land-holding and high incomes. The income range for catchment area villages was Rs 16,884 to Rs 20,486. These lower incomes are related to poorer quality of land and fewer irrigation facilities. The aggregate findings are presented in Table V.3. .28. Table V. Per Capila Income and Land Owned Resettled Host RIm* Landless 4405 2414 2322 (189) (104) (100) > than 1 ha e022 4334 2471 (259) (187) (157) 1 -2 ha $139 3081 3647 (221) (133) (157) 2ha. < 10772 5271 4159 (464) (227) (179) Index figures In brackets are based on the lowest per capita income which Is for the landless In catchment area villages (2322 = 100). * Rim = Calchment area villages. Source: 1990 Socioeconomic Survey, Tata Institute of Social Sciences. 5.11 The survey investigated all sources of household income. Seven were identified separately for each household and details given in Figure V.2 and Annex V.4: * Cultivation * Agricultural Wage Labor within the Village o Agricultural Wage Labor outside the Village o Non-Agricultural Wage Labor within the Village o Non-Agricultural Wage Labor outside the Village o Business Livestock and Animal Husbandry. - 29. Figur. V2 Avrg Annual incom. and Expondlan fRemtthdV~fgs Hast~kges RknWlgs le-INCOME Agria.tur AgrinOOt¥Wags Lab OrtVUage AgrihEge Labor iVlge Bushass I EXPENDITURES I i. I, ....... .... ........ FoodI Muddne Entertah Repaks Land Rev. Clothes Educatlan Transport krrig.Tx AgEgq4a Source: 1990 Socioeconomic Survey, Tata Institute of Social Sciences. .30- 5.12 Table V-4 shows that the sources of income for resettled and host villages were similar, with incomes from farming of primary importance. For the catchment area villages, on the other hand, non-agricultural wage labor outside the village was the most important source, contributing almost half of total income. Cultivation was a distant second source, contributing about one-quarter of total income. Table V.4: SOUes of Househald Income Resetlled (152) Host (116) Rim * (58) % Contribution to % Contribution to % Contribution to No. of Total Income of No. of TOtal Income of No. of Total Income of Obs a Houholds _9& AN Householdt s. All Households Cultivallon 138 42.2 84 47.4 44 25.9 Ag.wage whin 84 6.2 78 11.1 13 3.0 Ag.wages outide 39 1.6 12 0.6 44 14.5 Non-ag.wages 30 4.5 18 1.9 8 1.5 withn Nonag.wages 107 3.3 60 30.3 34 48.9 outemde Busie 34 10.2 27 8.6 8 6.0 I' Number of surivey respon per vilage. Note: Income from Livestock and Animal Husbandry was not lgnificant although many houeh have cows and buffaloes that produce milk for household consumpion. * RIm a Calchment area vMiages. Source: 1990 Socioeconomic Survey, Tata Institute of Social Sciences. 5.13 When the project was originally appraised, it was expected that incomes would be largely drawn from agriculture. The survey confirms findings of other household surveys which have shown that farmers typically rely on several sources of income and Table V.4 illustrates the extent to which these other sources of income contribute to family welfare. Thus 50 percent of the income of resettlers was derived from non-agricultural sources while tor the hosts it was also a not insubstantial 41 percent The reason for the satisfactory overall levels of income for resettlers and hosts is in part due to the presence of opportunities to earn wages outside the village in nb-agricultural endeavors. This in spite of the fact that with the introduction of the irrigation scheme, the opportunities for earning wages in agriculture increased considerably, resulting in more days of wage work per year. 5.14 Within the village, non-agricultural income derived from the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) which was a Government scheme designed to create employment through digging wells and construction activities in general. It was the smallest incore contributor for all households. Income earned outside the village by the migrant accounted for a substantial proportion of total income. In those households that had income from this source it accounted for about half of total income. 031 - 5.15 Typically, the men who were better educated were drawn to Bombay for employment (see Box). The host population was also subject to the same pressures. 5.16 Income from business and self-employment was highest for the resettled villages. This may be due to the fact that loans for starting such ventures were available to the resettlers, although the number of such loans taken was not large. Typical business activities included poultry, stores, restaurants, vegetable shops, bicycle repair and bicycle sales. * EXPENDFURES 5.17 The amount of money expended by each household exclusive of expenses on agricultural inputs, indicated that basic expenditure levels for the three types of villages were reasonably close. Combining this with the wider ranging income levels showed that discretionary income of resettled households was substantially higher than for hosts which in turn was substantially higher than for catchment area villages: Resetled Host Catchment Area . Total income 34,820 28,217 18,740 . Normal Expenditures 15,307 14,612 1Z802 . Discretionary Income/Savings 19,313 13,605 5,88 Resettlers, reflecting higher incomes, spend the smallest proportion of their income on food. E. Settlers' Perceptions of Employment 5.18 About 55 percent of the population considered itself to be in the labor force. However, of this group, one-third was unemployed and 40 percent was only partially employed (activity rates range from 10 to 90 percent). Only 27 percent considered itself fully employed, that is, working during all working days. This is the overall situation on a percentage basis: Figure V.3: Households' Perception of Employment Rates Fully Employd .. ...... ...... Underempleed Unemployed 20 S o u T I 10- Mae Ieawi M8k skd Pi.rovb =um I I Source: 1990 Socioeconomic -Survey, Tata Inistitute of Social Science&. -32- 5.19 As shown by these numbers, the situation for the female labor force is considerably lower than that for men, with only 12 to 15 percent fully employed and 34 to 47 percent considering themselves unemployed. The resettlers in this respect do not appear to be any better off than the host nor are there major differences in comparison with the catchment area population which suggests that in effect, the employment status of women who considered themselves to be in the labor force has not changed through resettlement. 5.20 The survey also asked resettlers for their perception of employment opportunities following the advent of irrigation. As would be expected, the farmers surveyed reported that the arrival of irrigation created increased opportunities for agricultural labor (Annex IV.9). F. Conclusions 5.21 Average incomes of families who settled in the command area were higher in 1990 than before resettlement. In part as a result of irrigation development, real incomes in the command area have at least doubled since 1975. For those families who chose to stay in the catchment areas of the reservoir, although incomes were lower than the host populations, they were higher over time. Thus when compared to the host villages, average incomes in 1990 were about the level of the host villages in the command area for 1987 (in 1990 prices, Annex-Chart V.I) and thus higher than the 1975 level. No information is available on the incomes of those who chose or, of necessity, had to resettle elsewhere. An interesting observation is that, at current poverty levels, all households, including those who opted to remain in the catchment area of the reservoir, have fewer numbers below the poverty line than is commonly found in rural Maharashtra. 5.22 There were no significant variations in income distribution in either the resettled, host or catchment area villages. The higher incomes and lower poverty levels in the command area were a reflection of the contribution which irrigated agriculture can make as a principal source of income. Nevertheless, the continuing incidence of underemployment and the lower than expected agricultural production illustrate the potential which has still to be realized in the command area. As has been noted elsewhere, farmers take precaution to secure other sources of income; there is a wide range of income opportunities. For those in the catchment area villages, the traditional source of income in Satara district: outmigration, has become the most important contributor to household earnings. In contrast, there has been immigration into the command area where irrigation has served to attract and stabilize the rural population. The better incomes were reflected in expenditure patterns; resettlers in the command area spent the smallest proportion of their income on food. 5.23 There is widespread appreciation for the social infrastructure: roads, marketing, electricity, education, which has also played an important role in raising standards of living. Somewhat of concern, however, was the low attendance of females at school, despite the facilities available. Although the legislation has formalized land rights, the extended family remains important; the size of the family continued to be large. -33- CHAPTER VIt ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS A. Policy and Administrative Framework 6.1 Responsibility for environmental protection is allocated between several ministries/ departments at both the state and central level. 6.2 Land is a state matter in India. Authority for implementation of the Land Acquisition Act is vested in the state Revenue Department in the position of the District Collector. Land records are maintained by the District Collector and, since taxes are based upon land holding, village records are updated at least every ten years. The Collector is the highest ranking officer of the Revenue Department at the district level and is the primary Government administrative officer. Collectors are drawn from the Indian Administrative Service, officials of which are selected on the basis of competitive examination and given rigorous training prior to admission and posting. Land acquisition, therefore, is undertaken according to defined policies and administrative procedures. 6.3 Under current policies, feasibility studies for irrigation projects are prepared by the State Water Resources Department. Details of numbers of people affected are to be obtained from the Revenue Department and plans for resettlement to be prepared by the Engineering Division of the Water Resources Department. The package is then to be sent to the Ministry of Water Resources of Government of India for review. The Central Water Commission (CWC) as the technical wing of the Ministry reviews the feasibility studies including the rehabilitation plans. The review has tended to concentrate on the technical aspects of the project since expertise to assess sociallinstitutional/economic aspects is not readily available in the CWC The Ministry also forwards the studies to up to 15 departments to obtain environmental, ecological and forest clearance. 6.4 The Central Ministry of Environment and Forests looks for compliance with the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, the Forest Conservation Act,1980 and the guidelines laid down for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of River Valley projects, 1985. The Environment Act is concerned primarily with pollutants and handling of toxic substances, while the Forest Conservation Act prohibits conversion of designated forest land to non-forest use. The guidelines for EIAs are intended to provide project authorities with an indication of what data should be collected on environmental aspects in order to permit environmental impa-t assessment* for example, health and, in particular, water borne diseases; plant genetic resources, aquatic resources; water logging and salinity; and deforestation and soil conservation. 6.5 These guidelines also specifically deal with the socio-cultural aspects of inhabitants in the affected area. "Since, relocation may strain/disrupt the social fabric of the affected population, efforts should be directed towards betterment of their quality of life and preserving, to the extent possible, the special characteristics of their lifestyle by adequate provisions of: * population relocation requirements in inundated as well as watershed areas. This aspect has special bearing on the relocation of Tribals and Adivasis, etc.; * identification of educational and vocational training programs to be imparted to the effected population so that they can cope better with the new lifestyle; * resettlement area planning for housing and other amenities of community life (water supply, sanitation, schools, health services, etc.) to be provided at resettlement sites." -34- 6.6 The guidelines also detail the institutional steps which have to be taken both for clearance and monitoring of the project from environmental angle (Annex-Chart VI.). 6.7 The Ministry of Welfare is concerned with problems of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. It is to review and give clearance from the point of view of the settlement and rehabilitation of persons belonging to these weaker sections of the society. It Is to ensure that the resettlers belonging to these castes are properly rehabilitated and compensated for the land they have to forego. Generally, it is expected that the tribal peoples would be settled close to the forest with which they have very close socioeconomic and cultural interest. B. Envirnmental Impact 6.8 A recent Irrigation Sector ReviewN has, however, noted deficiencies in the design and implementation of these current guidelines for irrigation projects: that the review process coming as it does downstream and not early in the project preparation cycle, is subject to political pressures, while implementation often falls short of the concerns and objectives laid down in the EIAs.I 6.9 This particular project was approved before these guidelines came into effect and, perhaps as a result, there is a dearth of data on the environmental impact of the project. Some findings were available from the survey. There were some mea urable health impacts. The advent of irrigation has clearly had a positive impact on the household diet, only 20 percent of families in the resettled villages and 30 percent of families on the catchment area villages had a per capita expenditure on food of less than Rs 125 per month. At the same time, the incidence of malaria was high in the catchment area villages, which are closest to the reservoirW During the six month period covered by the survey, at least one person in each household had had malaria. Health services were located quite distant while roads were often impassable. Families in the catchment area villages also used the reservoir for drinking water, supply of water was sometimes a problem in the dry season. In contrast, in the resettled villages, wells and watertaps were located in strategic positions, providing ready access by village households. Two of the resettled villages reported no problem with drinking water while three noted that the supply of drinking water was insufficient. 6.10 About 70 percent of those surveyed in tht host villages and 75 percent of those in the resettled villages reported that they paid irrigation water charges. This collection rate is in line with findings elsewhere in Maharashtra. The National Water Policy of 1987 requires that such rates should be adequate to cover actual operation and maintenance of the irrigation system as well as a portion of investment costs. Assessments were levied annually on a per ha-crop basis with different rates depending on crop and season. For example, in Maharashtra, irrigation charges for sugarcane were 740 Rs/ha, wheat: Rs 100/ha, hybrid jowar: Rs 77/ha. Rates levied, however, did not cover actual operation and maintenance costs. The Sector Review7J noted that revenues for collection of water charges have increased by 29 percent, largely a result of the expansion of canal irrigated Y India Irrigetion Sector Review. Report No.9818-IN. December 20,1991. is Op. cit, para 8.20. 1W No Information was available on the situaion before the project i Op. CIL., pare 5.4. SOP. CL *35- areas while operation and maintenance expenditures increased by 280 percent in real terms. In the Krishna subproject, families paid on average between Rs 81-552 in the resettled areas; while in the host villages the payments ranged between Rs. 190-255. The latter is particularly interesting since it is the host villages which cultivatc more sugarcane - yet do not appear to pay these full charges. 6.11 Maharashtra is the third largest state in the Union in terms of population size: 7&7 million in 1991, the population having increased by almost 16 million between 1981-91. Satara district had a total population of almost 2.5 million in 1991 with a population density of 233 persons per koe, slightly less than the state average of 256 persons per km2. According to the survey,the number of children constituted about 30 percent of population which was somewhat less than the average for India as a whole (40 percent).' In the resettled villages the nearest family planning service is between 3-8 kms. 6.12 Deforestation. The State Government acquired 19 ha of forest land but no data are available on the impact of this action or any changes in forest use following resettlement. 6.13 No data are available on the existence of water logging or salinity as a result of the introduction of irrigation. C. Conclusios 6.14 National Guidelines for Resettlement and Rehabilitation are currently under preparation by the Ministry of Water Resources and will be cleared by the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Environment and Forests. However, there is no clear idea which Ministry or Ministries of the Government of India would implement and monitor these resettlement programs including their environmental effects. It is obvious that two Ministries - Welfare and xinvironment and Forests - cannot have the overall view of the resettlement procedures because they are concerned with sectional view of the problem as stated above. The only Ministry of the Government of India which could be considered suitable for coordinating the work of resettlement of multipurpose irrigation projects is the Ministry of Water Resources. So, it is felt that once the guidelines are framed and approved by the concerned Ministries of the Government of India, the responsibility for implementing and monitoring of resettlement programs should devolve on the Ministry of Water Resources. 6.15 There is no possibility of the National Guidelines specifying responsibility of the Central Government for the implementation of the projects of resettlement for the project affected people. The Constitution of India lays down that "Land! is a state subject; therefore, all matters relating to land acquisition, payment of compensation, resettlement of families in the benefitted zone and acquisition of land for the land pool are matters within the jurisdiction of the State Government. The State Governments very zealously guard their powers and responsibilities. The Planning Commission of the Government of India, however, can make the strict compliance of the National Guidelines as a prerequisite for the sanction of the project included in the State Plan. Similarly the Ministry of Water Resources can ensure compliance of the National Guidelines before recommending releases of funds for the externally aided projects. In the Federal structure envisaged in the Indian Constitution, the responsibility for implementation of these project will continue to be with the State Government, but the Central government can take responsibility for State adherence to minimum standards. 1V A handbook of Educational and Ailed Stalistis, Minisby of Human Resource Development GO 1987. Note the data are based upon the 1981 Census. -36- CHAPTER VII: Institutional Impact A. Organizational Structure 7.1 Until 1965, there was no administrative machinery whereby resettlement and rehabilitation of affected people would take place. Under the auspices of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it was the Revenue Departments responsibility to acquire land and to pay compensation monies. In 1965, the Government of Maharashtra established a Directorate of Rehabilitation, made provision to provide alternate agricultural lands and residential plots to displaced people and, where necessary, to establish new villages with civic infrastructure. 7.2 The demand for better resettlement provisions, together with the increasing number of people affected by infrastructure projects, led to the 1976 Resettlement and Rehabilitation Act; Maharashtra was the first state in India to propose such legislation. The Act provided for a Directorate of Resettlement comprising a Director, Deputy Director(s), Resettlement Officers and made provision for Advisory Committees in certain circumstances. Chat VI: Resettlem Depatmmnt GOM organieltional chart Minister of Resettlement I I Deputy Secretary Under Secretay I Desk Officers Divisional Commissioner I I Assistant Commissioner Office SupitL I Desk Officers Collector of District and Deputy Chief Controlling Authority I I I DIasettlemnt Offier District Rev. Officers Office Supt. I I esettlemntOfficers Circle Officer Circle inspector Village Officer * 37. 73 Implementation experience highlighted a number of problems, some of which were apparent in this project, (para 7.19) particularly in respect of institutional issues, which led to Government in 1985 establishing a select committee known as the Thopte Committee. While the Committee recommended amendments to the 1976 Act, the Government went further and introduced a new Bill in 1986 which included a number of the recommendations of the Committee. 7.5 The 1986 legislation fitted responsibility for resettle-nent more firmly into the existing administrative structure of the Revenue Department under the auspices of a Commissioner for Resettlement, with rank of Secretary in Government of Maharashtra. The Act also made the project authority, rather than local district officials, responsible for construction and provision of civic infrastructure. Thus, the process involves both the Revenue and the Irrigation Departments at the state leveL Annex-Chart VII1 illustrates how the Minister in Bombay has a direct line down to the village level for the purposes of resettlement while the Commissioner is responsible for coordinating activities horizontally with other line agencies, including the Irrigation Department. B. Resettlement Planning 7.6 No detailed resettlement plan was prepared. The 1976 legislation required that resettlement schemes (plans) be drawn up to include information on the numbers of people to be displaced, the availability of land in the command area, and the nature and extent of civic amenities to be provided. The Maharashtra Irrigation II project was approved in 1979, after this legislation came into force, but the project was a time slice operation: in the Krishna subproject, for example, construction of the Dhom, but not the Kanher, dam, had already been c apleted by 1976. 7.7 The 1985 Thopte Committee sought to strengthen the planning process and recommended that there should be simultaneous preparation of the resettlement plan together with the project plan - and in fact that resettlement should constitute part of the project plan. Despite this, planning responsibility in the 1986 legislation is more concerned with establishing eligibility for resettlement than in determining the identity and socioeconomic status of those to be affected. Thus the focus of the planning effort - to be undertaken by the project authority - is on the extent of the affected and benefitted areas, in order to determine how much land and other facilities will be required to be provided. There is no mention in the Act of determining how many people are to be affected, what is their current socioeconomic status, including standards of living. One aspect that is covered in more detail is the requirement that the Commissioner prepare a budget for his own division in order to carry out resettlement responsibilities, while the project authority is also required to prepare a budget for the costs of the civic amenities to be provided by the project. C. Resettlement Implementation 7.8 Resettlers were asked what problems they had encountered when first moving and whether problems continued at the time of the survey. As was noted by the Bank in its final supervision mission (para 7.16) households in all villages encountered a lack of services when they first moved - availability of drinking water, electricity, wage labor, ration shops, health care services, educational facilities, transportation, ability to obtain inputs and animal health services. In almost all cases, services were either established within 1-3 years after moving or alternative services were provided, for example, Government helped families in getting their children admitted to the existing local schools. Overall, the resettled villages reported that in 1990 there were no problems with these services, and in fact many were described as a source of satisfaction. Minor problems persisted. For example, Triputi village reported that their nearest health center at Koregaon was not good, Velang- Kanherkhed and Kadegaon reported problems with drinking water, while other villages wanted better standards of roads or found that their etectricity bills were high. .38- D. Agricultural Development Support 7.9 All households appeared to have good access to loan facilities. Outstanding loans were held by 62 percent of resetlers, 55 percent of hosts and 63 percent of catchment area households. Most households expressed confidence that they could get loans from cooperative societies or other public institutions. Specific purposes for which loans were taken: * to buy seed, fertilizer and pesticide; * to hire tractor, bullocks, carts; * to buy buffaloes and cows; o to pay for marriage of children; o to buy household items. There were some small loans that were more in the nature of a subsidy as there was no expectation of repayment Average outstanding loans per household that required repayment were about the same order of magnitude for resettled and host villages but much lower for catchment area villages reflecting the higher incomes. Tatle VL1: Credit OutleWng Resettled Host RIm* Loans to Be Repaid 10,037 11,807 6,525 Dicretionary Income 19,313 13,605 5,938 Loans as% ot Discretionary Income * Rim = Catchment area villages. Source 1990 Socioeconomic Suvey, Tata Institute of Social Sciences. E. Involvement of Resettlers 7.10 Many resettlers have seen the construction of the Dhom dam as an opportunity to be grasped rather than an intrinsically negative development. Young people, instead of migrating to Bombay as might have been expected, to a large degree stayed in the area and have taken charge of administering their villages. Village organizations comprise the panchayat, which consists of elected representatives and responsible for development and thus for expenditures, and the tehsil, charged with collection of revenue. A number of panchayats are then grouped together to form, at the district level, the zilla parishad, which is similarly charged with development and comprises elected officials. Villages also have access to the Jawahar Rojhar Yogna, a Government-sponsored program, which is intended to create employment for the rural poor. Combining poverty alleviation and rural development it offers employment to those seeking work. In the resettled villages, young men of -39. between 25-35 years have assumed leadership in the panchayaL All opportunities open to the panchayat through Zilla Parishad, were systematically taken up. For example, funds available to the panchayat through Jawahar Rojhar Yogna in successive years were used to construct roads, and the tertiary irrigation and drainage networkl, and to maintain the tertiary irrigation system. 7.11 Youth from each of the resettled villages have formed associations of displaced people. Further, associations from 23 resettled villages have come together and formed an apex bodym to deal with the issues related to resettlement and development assistance. The apex body has become a strong bargaining mechanism with political Implications. Office bearers of the councils and the association form a core group of young people with wide support in the villages. This core group is actively involved in cooperative ventures, which incorporate most of the households in the village. 7.12 The political affiliation of the council, youth group, the apex body corresponds to the dominant political formation at the Zilla Parishad and state leveL This common political interest has significantly helped the resettled villages to benefit from the development assistance. F. Bank Peforme 7.13 During project preparation, which took place between 1977-79, and thus prior to the introduction of Bank guidelines on involuntary resettlement, there is no mention on project files of resettlement issues being reviewed. Project preparation, which was undertaken with assistance from FAO/CP, included the preparation of an irrigation sector review, as well as engineering and hydrological studies including the safety of dams, agronomy and institutional aspects. The two volume Staff Appraisal Report included one paragraph on land acquisition and resettlement and expected 20,000 families (including the Bhima subproject which was financed by IFAD but supervised by the Bank) to be affected. It noted that a particularly large area was to be submerged: 84,413 ha, due to flat topography and the extent of the distribution network. Through the Issues paper, the Loan Committee meeting and Board presentation, resettlement issues were not mentioned. 7.14 With the first supervision mission in April 1980, there was a detailed review of the status of resettlement in all the five subprojects with dam construction, records of compensation, villages to be moved or already moved and, in some projects, a review of when the resettled villages would obtain irrigation water. Thereafter, the physical progress of rmttling was monitored by supervision missions on a yearly basis. In July 1983, settlement issues moved more to the forefront, largely because in the case of Bhima, Warna and Kukadi subprojects, where delays in land acquisition and resettlement of villages were causing delays in construction activities. In the case of Warna, the gorge filling, which had been scheduled for November 1983, was delayed to 1985. By February 1984, the situation had still not been resolved and credit closing had to be extended to December 1985, instead of September 1984, largely because of the delays in land acquisition. 7.15 Until April 1985, Bank supervision missions saw resettlement as solely Government's responsibility. In the early years, the situation was monitored by the irrigation engineer, letters to I The lrdgution department takes no responslbillty to construct and maintain sub-oanals for taking water to the fild. If proper use of water Is to be made, then maintenance and repair of the sub-canals on a continuous basis Is required. Proper care of canals facilitated equitable distibution of water to all and prevent water logging. 9W There is a move to form a federation of assoolations of the displaced people at the Satara district leveL This has a political basis in that these young men feel that this federation can be used as a better bargaining tooL 040- Government reporting on supervision findings did not include mention of resettlement. In July 1983, the question of resettlement was couched to Government more in terms of Government's responsibility to expedite the process in the three subprojects. This position continued through 1984, with letters to Government repeating that resettlement should be expedited. 7.16 For the final Supervision Mission in 1985, which comprised four irrigation engineers, one agriculturalist and one roads engineer, the Terms of Reference included instructions to ensure that progress on rehabilitation and resettlement was being made. The Mission also took the opportunity to comment on whether GOM's policies adhered to Bank guidelines and also made four recommendations where the mission felt that Government policies fell short: provision of amenities at the new villages lagged considerably behind relocation of the resettlers; delays in acquiring land for the houses which resulted in delays in house construction and also dissipated these resources of the resettlkrs; provision of drinking water should be the highest priority in the new settlements - there were both delays and one settlement was located in an area with no groundwater potential; lack of any organization to monitor the status of the resettlers after moving. The mission also recommended that GOM create a monitoring unit including, In particular, a sociologist to monitor the facilities provided and the resettlers' economic and social status for a period after moving. 7.17 The PCR prepared by FAO/CP did not mention experience with resettlement; the Overview, which was prepared by the Asia Region staff commented that while resettlement was a concern of supervision missions, this was more often in terms of efforts to avoid delays in civil works rather than in terms of the adherence to Bank guidelines. G. Conclusions 7.18 The Government of Maharashtra has shown strong commitment towards a satisfactory resettlement outcome. It is one of the very few states in India which has enacted any legislation fashioning policies and setting up administrative procedures for resettlement. Furthermore, Government has taken a proactive and dynamic position, demonstrating a willingness to learn lessons and improve upon existing policies as and when needed.211 The institutional strategy adopted: by gradually strengthening the powers of the Revenue Department through the successive Acts, was appropriate, since the Revenue Department is already involved to the extent of determining how much land is affected and who is to be eligible for compensation under the national legislation. 7.19 As a result, state policies have established clear responsibilities for resettlement, provision of replacement infrastructure, houseplots and arable land; they delineate the powers and duties of the administrators from the level of the state Government to the tahsil; they provide the processes and timetables for addressing many issues which arise in resettlement; and they provide mechanisms for al' The situation in Krishna dam has not always been found to be representative, in that problems have been experienced in other resettlement operations pertaining particularly to: a Inadequate Identification of households affected by the dam and households eligible for resettlement. a DIfficulties In allocating replacement lands in the command area due to (0 the distance Involved between the reservoir and the command area; (i) households living below the poverty level have difficulties both In depositing 65% of compensation monies for new lands and in providing the balance of 35% and (111) when ethnic compensation Is not compatible. a Inadequate compensation awards. " Housing assistance loans are insulficient. Government is taking steps to Improve this record under the auspices of the MCIP Ill Restructuring project. That the experience under the Krishna project has been satisfactory, demonstrates that such an outcome can be accomplished. - 41* grievances not only regarding cash compensation but, equally important, the administrative decisions taken by officials responsible. The survey has shown that program implementation has exhibited certain weaknesses. These have largely centered around delays in implementation as wel as inadequate sequencing of the provision of social infrastructure. This reflects rather poorly on the ability of program managers to phase properly the several resettlement activities and to complete them in a timely manner. Greater efforts are still needed to monitor the socioeconomic impact, including the post resettlement phase. 7.20 Government has also actively encouraged farmers to move on their own initiative. As far back as 1980, there is record on project files of Government considering paying farmers more cash compensation to enable them to choose between alternatives, for example, moving to an existing village where kinship ties exist and thus making the assimilation process easier. The experience of this project showed that many farmers did in fact take this option - some moving on their own because they had to but many also opted to move elsewhere even though they were eligible for land compensation in the command area. Settlers have also used their initiative to participate in the existing political structures and to bargain for more and better services in their villages. 7.21 Bank performance demonstrates that the Bank has come a full circle. From the beginning when resettlement issues were considered to be solely Governments responsibility, the Bank gradually evolved towards taking a more active stance, largely prompted by fears that project implementation would be further delayed. Only towards project completion was consideration given to the extent to which Government policies complied with existing Bank guidelines including the restoration of incomes and living standards. .43- ANNEX Page 1 of 9 Table LIb State-wse Distribution of Dms, 1979 Number af Dams TOTAL Name 0f the Stats Prior to Under 1900 10011 1962-79 Contucton Mahhrashtra 23 41 341 226 631 Gujarat 4 38 100 74 276 Madhya Pradesh 1 27 70 33 131 Uttar Prades 1 22 49 12 84 Tam Nadu 2 7 60 8 77 Andhra Pradesh 16 32 25 74 Rajasthan 4 4 39 20 67 Kamala 4 8 24 27 63 Kerala NU 1 27 16 44 Orissa 2 NU 27 10 39 Barm NU NU 22 9 31 WestBengal NU NU 6 11 17 Jammu and Kashmr NU NU 2 5 7 Himachl Pradesh NU NU 3 NU 3 Punjab NU NU i 1 2 Meghalaya NU NU 6 NU 6 Go, Daman andDu NU NU NU 2 2 Total 42 164 88 479 1554 Dams included: AU dams ab~v 15 meters In heigh measured frm the kb st portion af the generalfaundaon arm to the arest, ar to be nclutd. Dame between 10 meters and 15 meters can be Inluded If desire, provded they camply wfth at east ane oa the faUowng condtions. (a) the length o crest i not les hthn 500 meters (b) the capaoly of the reservo r Irmed by the dame is not kems thm 1 milon cubo meters; (c) the mødmum flod disharge delt wih by the dam bs not less than 2,00 cubOa metes per smond; (d) If the dom had ape~l~My dl~iMult faundacrn prableme; ar (e) f It lsdam f unuual desgn. Dam. les th an 10 meers in heit ar not to be Included. Saurc: Register f Large Dames In India, Central Bcad of irrigaton mnd Power, Indan National Comm~ee for IOLD, 1979. Table HI: Compensation and Assistance Given to Project Affected Families in Mfälmastra State Caasification Cah Compenatlon y Aistance Provided 2 Land Houseplot Land Loan FUILLY AFFECTD * n hou with more than 5 persons, an additioal 0.4 ha per each 3 persons would be given up to a Landowm with ~ile mundmum of 2.8 ha > 0.8 ha Land, houses, trees at Eligible to receive up to 0.8 ha If remaning lands Family size >5 Ra 5,000 for hose market value not greater than this 8,000 sq ft plus onstruction 0.8 ha - 2 ha Elgble to receve up to 1.2 ha u and If ftmfy 1,000 sq ft for depouit 65% of each additonal 2 ha < Eligible to receve up to 1.6 ha c e t for 3 perms Minr and those eligible for a No compensation No direct snem under the 1976 Act; under the 1986 legislation, every brother is treated as a share In the land separate famy. Lan~.a Trees, house 0.4 ha land rovided if land Family size >5 Rs. 1,500 for available 4,000 sq ft plus hose construcion 1,000 sq ft for each additona 3 persons PARTIALLY AFFCTED** Landowners with title Land, trees Alternate land provided, but no No houe plot relocaton of village (since not Y Under the Land A~quisdon Act, 1894, as amended in 1984. 3 Under Maharas Resettlement of Prject Däsplaced Persons Act, 1976 and the Maharshtra Project Afected Pemons Rehabitation Act, 1986 * Villages which lose 75 percent of houses or kes than 75% of houses but more than 75 peuent of landa. *Vilgswhich Imc kwa ~ha 50 ~eun of bo^ss Table I.2: Household Characteristics In Resettled, Host and Catchment Area (RIM) Viges Number Separate Seprate Separate Old Source of l~ghting New Source of ighting of Obs # Kitchen k Bath y Toilet W (count) (count) Old New Old New Old New Noe Kerene Electric Other 0 Nome Kerosene Electrc Other Chandawadi 42 16 18 12 14 2 4 10 10 20 2 10 5 27 0 Bhvadi 34 6 5 7 10 0 0 16 15 0 3 16 0 17 1 VeangK 19 1 3 4 3 1 1 10 6 2 1 10 2 6 1 VelangSh. 19 6 5 5 2 0 0 7 10 1 1 6 6 6 1 VyahallK 38 7 7 3 5 0 1 12 19 4 3 11 2 23 2 Resettled Villages 152 36 38 31 34 3 6 55 60 27 10 53 15 79 5 K ~adegon 20 8 0 5 0 1 0 3 3 12 2 20 0 0 0 Kanherkhed 20 3 0 2 0 1 0 5 7 7 1 20 0 0 0 Khadhi 29 9 0 4 0 0 0 1 15 13 0 29 0 0 0 Shirambe 20 4 0 3 0 1 0 3 7 10 0 20 0 0 0 Triputi 26 6 0 7 0 1 0 1 7 17 1 26 0 0 0 Host Villages 115 30 0 21 0 4 0 13 39 59 4 115 0 0 0 Bhvadi 10 4 4 0 1 0 0 1 9 0 0 1 4 5 0 Velang 29 3 5 0 0 0 0 2 21 2 4 2 12 12 3 Vyahali 21 6 4 1 1 0 0 4 13 4 0 4 12 5 0 Rim VDages 60 13 13 1 2 0 0 7 43 6 4 7 28 22 3 All Vlages 327 79 51 53 36 7 6 75 142 92 18 175 43 101 8 Number of Survey responses per village. Number of affirmative answers. 91 Number of responses with the value V, which is undened in the codebook. "Other" incudes 'Lanterun', Petrmax, and Solar Eerg. 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V~ Av~ ad Ideaffladom of Owmnhip No. of Hm Mav Sh~ ta Wh= ~ was ~ Rogh~ How Magy 2~ b Wb= ~ 19 the L~ Rco=ed? obs L~ in Old ~ Land la New ~se M& ObL N~ SW Fa~ ~ 0~ Nom SIf M~ 0~ Cbaftd~ 42 16 20 1 23 14 2 2 17 9 11 22 6 2 1 8~ 34 16 17 2 20 7 2 3 23 18 10 ta 3 1 2 Vek% StL 19 3.7 12 2 a 7 1 1 23 6 6 11 2 8 0 vehns c 19 3.3 9 0 9 1 2 1 3.0 1 a 0 0 0 vyamn x 38 2.9 16 2 10 15 1 4 19 11 13 18 RamLed ~ 152 19 14 7 70 50 14 11 2.8 37 51 77 14 4 6 K~ 20 3.5 8 3 10 6 t 0 17 9 4 12 2 2 0 Kaftbe~ 20 3.7 10 7 4 6 2 1 17 6 7 5 3 4 1 Khftdw 29 3.0 15 6 9 8 5 1 11 a 1 15 3 3 1 Sh~bo 20 3.5 14 1 8 6 0 5 z9 10 l 11 4 2 2 T~ 26 33 14 7 6 6 3 4 2.5 6 7 16 1 2 8 Hoa ~ 115 3.4 61 24 37 32 11 11 17 39 26 59 13 13 4 Bt~ 10 14 0 10 0 0 0 0 2.8 6 2 4 1 2 1 ~ 9 29 3.0 2 26 1 2 0 0 19 14 8 11 10 3 1 4 vyman 21 0 20 0 0 0 1 $1 2.9 8 3 11 3 2 2 Rim VD~ 60 10 2 56 1 2 0 l 81 z7 22 16 25 1 5 7 AD ~ 327 3.1 137 87 108 84 25 23 23 ge 93 161 34 22 17 3' NMber et SM" MT~ per V%go- Y ~ b~ ~ C~ Re~ 0~~. M~ 5^ Fatba~. Fet SM= 1990 sodom~ &~, Tate ~ute of s~ SdMOCL - 49 - ANNEX Page 7 of 9 Table W.9 Wage and Employment Summay In Rusettled, Host and Catdbment Area Viages No. of Land No. of Man-Days Wages Pald Average V Obs I rdgnted Emplayed Wages/Man.Days) ga Avg. Obs, Avg. Obs. Avg. Obs. Chandawadi 40 1.1 124.5 24 1,160.7 22 302 19 Bhvadl 38 1.0 60.7 16 930.1 15 15.1 15 Velang K 19 1.6 390.9 9 678.4 10 36.3 9 Velang Sh. 19 1.1 79.3 14 1,400.7 14 27.7 14 Vyahall K 39 1.2 85.2 19 894.5 21 28.7 18 Resettld Vilages 155 1.2 124.5 82 1,0325 82 27.1 75 Kadegaon 20 1.4 56.6 9 685.6 9 30.9 8 Kanewkhed 18 1.3 28.8 5 1,216.0 5 44.7 5 Khadkl 30 0.7 51.8 11 738.4 12 21.7 10 Shlrambe 18 1.4 57.3 12 746.3 12 18.6 12 Triputi 26 1.2 385 10 531.5 10 23.8 10 Host Villages 112 1.1 48.9 47 737.1 48 25.5 45 Bhvadl 7 0.6 0 0 0 Velang 31 1.2 28.8 12 640.7 11 19.7 11 Vyahal 22 1.1 44.8 5 661.7 6 2.4 5 Rim V~ages 60 1.1 32.1 17 648.1 17 21.8 16 AJIVlIages 327 89.4 146 891.6 147 25.9 136 W Number of Suuy responses per villag. W For each village, the average is taken over al values of WagelMan.days. Sourme: Tata Instute of Socia Sciences, Socoeconomc Suiey 1990. -50. ANNEX Page 8 of 9 Table V.1: PopuStion and Household Characterks~es in Resetted, lst and Catchment Arm vlages Resettled Host Rim Number of Householdsn Survey 152 116 58 Total Populaon 1241 978 465 Average Household Size 8.2 8.4 8.0 Number of Persons .iving Away 178 111 94 (14%) (11%) (20%) Household Size In Residence 7.0 7.5 6.4 Age Group (%) 0-14 28 32 33 15-65 64 60 58 . W+ 8 8 9 Mate/~emals Ra~o 5w/48 51/49 51149 Marita) Status (%) mad 51 48 51 unmar~d 45 48 46 School Attendance (%) mates 69 73 75 ~emales 59 51 55 Lteracy 5+ (%) m~ats as as 88 female. 5y 86 44 Source: 1990 Socfoeconomic Svey, Tas. Institute of Social Sences. '��s ret�s � е�и� е�1 `�влтs �nuo� аввь �e�s �� оь � Zou e�s �е � а�и! Р�в � вле � р�ез е��в �уо Риии и�елрl�'J +► •Ре�+ыеР �1 � вщ �► �а в1�ц�1 виnюдеы Г► � ооо'г tas) овь'г tsьь) sw�►`г tгsь) ве,пиаиед�ов � �t � Zt9'iгЬ (9ыi 1�ь �l) 8 о1. егв'� tв� bгь'в (sьь) гег's �зь) •��вw'� ' srs'в Ges) вее'ьь t�ы ) вао'оь tгsь) аоо� ' 098'Z i8� 6`�6'6 (8ь ь) 0£�'S (г�3►) еи�1 � а&i OrL�Bt � ttг�Z tetь) аг9"b6 баsь) � �`в tв ) sьа'в {tг ) ®os'sь (vг ) вsаи� wац еи,�,� • 0£6'3ь i1►� 8Ьг'4ь %9 ) 4Zl'LЬ i1Qь) е�11l�► е�гю �i е�►1�г+�1��N ' sг1'г ts ) овЬ's !яь ) гее'l t+� ) е�им ич�м юреl еВ�ам ра�гиlг�U�N ' �'� t�) �'ь tгь ) �г'•г (� ) � ев�► �в �� wv"7`•1 �м 1о'•'Ч"�{'� • �'г G►ь) г�ro'ti tsг )�ов'Е ctie ) е��► иц�м �1 в�м 1�пип�вv • �s'э t�) вsв'�ь ttie ) �гс'sь {вЕь) е�гит�ивv • �S е 1 -...._. '�10 '8ЧО � ''�О � aN � 'oN 1Q •aN una �вон ав�иевва t� �тя �ы а� � �н w ��а��� �л� б�б�д Х;Э1цЛ� _TS. .52- ANNEX-CHART Pap I of 3 Wt Annual Income - 19759 19879. 1"0 Level in Raettled, Host and Catchment Area Villages M im pdces tft) 45-, 40-, ...... ......... . ...................... ............................................. ..................... 35-1 .... ... "" .... * ... ..... ............... ... ............................................. ................ ............................................. ............... 20-1 ....... ................. ........... ..... ................. ............... . . ....................... ................. ................. ................. ................ ............. ............. .............. . ................ ............ ............. ... ......... ............... 0. F -- A .- -- - =e THput Shirmbe Khadid Kadegaon 1976 M 1987 EM I OW Source: 1990 Sodoeconotnic Survey, Tata Institute of &wW Sdence& -53- ANNEX-CHART Page 2 of 3 VI.1s Impact Assessment Procedure Hydroaectri aNd k%iglOn Polstlearnice fro the Enim enial Angle A schematic diagram gMng the stepwise procedure for impact assessment Is shown below: PROJECT AUTHORITIES DPRS Check-list details through; Forest Department; WiIdilfe & Fisheries Department 81 & ZSI, etc. DPRe CWO PLANNING COMMISSION CEA ASSESSMENT Technical & Financial Clearance NOTIFICATION: MONITORING CHECK4-IST Monitoring FEED BACK DETAILS DOEn. Environmental Assessment and Clearance . Collection & Composition of Check-lst Information; . Feld visit If required, by an Expert Team constituted by DOEn; . Project Summary & Environmental Aspects for EAC; . EAC Assessment and Its Recommendations; . Consideration & Approval of EAC Recommendations by Secretary, DOEn; . Formal Clearance Issued to Concerned Authorities; . Follow-up & Monitoring through Monitoring Groups -54- ANNEX-CHART Page 3 of 3 VIL: Maamastra Irrigation & CADA Department Minister of Iirgation & CADA Secretlsy of Irgaon & CADA Chief Engineer Dy scay Under Secy (Projea) & Joint Sbrelay Chief Engineer (Specied and Chief Admir of CADA SpEnor SupttEngr. Engr. Spt.Engr. & Admin~srao & Adnistato CADA CADA EX.ExEngr. Ex.ngr. Exngr. Dy Engineer Junor Engineer ������������l��д� ���iд����E�q� � �Sd�fg�g��'� � ����е д аа �� �д � ���84ggiet3��� :9$��;�ё€ � гг�gт$,АёJгУ i � ���g'� �� � ВЕ�ь;g9 °�В� �г�� �� z}д� �# ���в {�&;��а���§�$gri��рΡ{° ��;З�8IрΡQ6$� я� 8�g�� яёа� � �g9$�5�� 9���t�6� �д38�°��� �� �У���8 ��Р( 9г��&г��ь�,ач�ч�Э $�9's��ieй � г@ г � �$(Э а ь =•а ав s� � .......� 3 [� �� � �������� ���g�& �������$� ���° Ё��г�€ �i �уΡ�R�� ���} �i � 4�}�дg���ьд�� `�9�a���J��a� й,... У! ёг��°S§ �а+��!- I �ai����gg���� � g �а�$ �;i� °��g�€ � д ���I�Э ��;$� °а �гь �� � � s е.ь�� : j 3�i� �даз �@��r�9��i�г� ��� 9rf� II� � = а' ! д г g�г�( а � ����iгgiвв��I � �г�й а� �tь1 iаЭ� � .56- - quardy actually coniumed for a day, week 80 month. living In four inundated Villages In WdW to determine - quantity taken from own source, whom all the people. landed and landless. actually . qua" purchast. moved. In order to trace these families, a desk study - mom Value of the %witily consumed was undertaken of the Was maintained by (Q the office of the Executive Engineer of the Dhom; Projecl: Authority In Non4ood experofture relates to clothing, education Son Palgation, depwIment) - which had Intorma1lon on health owe, entertainment and transport expenses for a lands and houses acquired and QQ the office of the period of one year. Expenditure for each n*mmber of the Maharashtra Resettlement Department, District household on each of the noo4ood Items was collected Resettlement Office In Satara. Most landless families and the total expenditure on each Rom for the household would have owned a house, except In the case of the as a whole was derived. For example, In,estimallng bonded laborers. For the letter, the consultants also expenditure on clothing, clothes bought and the reviewed the household list of each displaced household corresponding expenditure for each member of the In the four villages from the Wall. This list Included all household was obtained and the cumulative expenditure households Irrespective of land ownership stmA. for all members constituted the household total, The consultants were asked to undertake this tracer study Tracer Sh* for four villages While the work was underway, the affected households complained that the four villages As the time the survey was commissioned, there was under study had had good experiences with resettlement concern that the sample would not be representative In while there were other villages which had been poorly that it was likely that the landless, who were not eligible resettled. Thus the consulterft In consultation with the for replacement land (under the provisions of the 1976 affected families, selected anodw four villages covering Act) would have migrated cut d the project area. It was eight in all. The results showed that In fact there was no also kno" #0 a number of families had Oman to settle dIfference among the alghl: villages In terms of themselves. The consultants, therefore, were asked to resettlement expedence. undertake atracer study of all households who had bow .-57 - ATTACHMENT 1 0.0. NO. 3(13)/90-FA.If N. SURYANARAYANAN gW qqTwq #VRW COMMISSIONER (PP) GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TEL. NO. 371 1946 MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES Rfwtee* NEW DELHI 1st June 1993 Dear My. DOAIScO) Please refer to your letter dated 12.04.93 -regarding the 'Early experience with involuntary Resettlement - Impact Eva- luation Report on India - Karnataka Irrigation Project (Cr.788-IN) and Maharashtra Irrigation II Project (Cr.954-IN)I. The report of the Operation Evaluation Department of the World Bank has been gone through. Our views are that while the experience of the two projects per s are useful both in terms of corrective measures to be adoptedfas also for evolving a National Policy on the R&R, it is felt that a comparison between the two States of Karnataka and Maharashtra with regard to the policies, imple- mentation, people's attitude, etc., would not be desirable, since conditions and policies followed by each state are different. In addition, there are aulte a few constraints also peculiar to the States. A comparison Is possible and could be appreciated only if there Is a common base which is not so in respect of these two projects. In view of this, while we have no objection to the Bank bringing out projectwise independent review reports, a com- parative study may be avoided. A copy of your final report, incorporating our suggestions/ comments may please be sent to us for our Information. With y yours XA*VJ- t0. SURYAMARAVANAN) Mr. Craham Donaldson Chief Agriculture and liman Development Division Operations Evaluation Department The World Bank , - 1818 I. Street, N.W. Washlagton. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. ATTACMENT 2 Telex trom Mr. S.Y. Shokla, Deputy Secretary to the GOM, Irrigtion Deparment, Mantralaya, Bombay "Refer your letter dated 26th April 93, I am directed to inform you that this Government has no comments to offer on the report. Early experience with Involuntay Resettlement-Impact Evaluation on India-Maharashtra Irrigation II Project (Credit 954-IN) of April 12, 1993. I am also directed to request you to send similar study reports for Bank-supported Hydro-power Project in Thailand and another Bank-supported Hydroelectric Project in Ghana, if ready.w ! . .1� � _ _ _ -" -/ ' / �, �.1" 1 >r� --� \`�� �i .,-�._.\\ и=---� : � / r---^'�� �-.ч,Уеоtтоl �` 16R� 14798R1 >'r ,.v„y. и� �r �. -� � i" � М А 0 F1 У А Р R А D Е 5 Н i" г� �л �r-��-'t ,., ю� а � С '�..`-n.. w в Fд..° юма+м ..у✓• _1. 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МцОR GItY0aD3 N Т о� О МЧОR тOWNS АИО СП1Е5 � � соа R �:� Q" ----. D1STe1Cт eOUNDARIES nu ы, ь..п р"го�д j/ Р - 5rnre ок ииlои твгкпоаr воииила�s �''"��"°*1 В°�*• "°" [/`•.•1' L� .�. д ra�vdra т�д 6 tvY.e юwпд и д 7Ие Wa1d Вмk �д� и � 1Ао Ьo-пдтiа П'емг � l/ 1F6 ме➢ де пеь irn�Ь'. м 1М �. �S wndл.w«гаыг w. i ��пм'"�'ыммr« �, 1(1tOMETEpS 0 20 р 60 ВО 100 120 1�Оу 7�М! ��па�и�гв д Т� .' ' - �. �у. MILK 0 10 !0 ЕО 80 100 �р. � NOVEMBER 199'1 콥 NOV日＾SER 1992 m IBRD 2439 ;>i INDIA KHATAV MAHARASHTRA IRPGATION Il PROJECr V~ KRISHNA SUB-PROJECr KOREGAON FKAJNIM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 FULLY AFFECTED VILLAGES AND RESETTLED VILLAGES RELATED TO DHOM DAM ~ON Yæ WAI ex. 0E0A0N 4ý I " a. i:. - 1 1,113111 ---------- -- T A KOLABA mw SWAIE VAM 104E: SM/W' IMI DAM KUSH 9 PHA Mb~ V-YAH SAY~ p w~ N« GÅRDE NH Vff"i C~ i B~ VALSE* 1VICY~ADI ~Aw W~T" KKKKK KNUW K~ I.I KUOMI MA» BX P~ l JAOLI KMHER DAM SATARA "C~ VM ,aWAT ~TE PZM ý11A1I I D. KARAB . W~ A T A R A PAU SANM SI, AREA DErAILEV K0~ C4ATAV ------ 5 A N (MYSORE ~AY R~v~ PAM= 0 KOLABA-il AM F£~ JAOU " _ýs T A R A D~ Im