Guinea - Third Highway Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OMCLAL USE ONLY ReNC N 12080 PROJECT C0MPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GUINEA THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (.REDIT 1457-GUI) JUNE 30, 1993 MICROGRAPHICS EReport No: 12080 Type: PCR Infrastructure Operations Division Occidental and Central Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by reipients only in the performaace of their official duties. Its contents may not othenrise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency: Syli (GSY) 1984 . 23.0 1985 . 62.0 1986 . 352.0 1987 . 398.0 1988 . 520.0 1989 . 590.0 1990 . 647.0 1991 . 781.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS item English-French ADT Average Daily Traffic/Trafic Journalier Moyen AfDB African Development Bank/Banque Africaine de Developpement BADEA Arab Bank for Economic development in Africa/Banque Arabe pour le Developpement Economique en Afrique CGPR Managemetit Council of the Road Project/Conseil de Gestion du Projet Routier CNR National Road Council/Conseil National des Routes EEC European Economic Community/Communaute Economique Europ6enne ERR Economic Rate of Return/Taux de Rentabilite Economique ICB International Competitive Bidding/Appel d'Offres International IDA International Development Association/Association Internationale pour le Developpement IMF International Monetary Fund/Fonds Monetaire International MATHU Ministry of Land Development, Housing and Urbanism/Ministbre de I'Amenagement du Territoire, de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme MIGAT Ministry of Infrastructure and Land Development/Minist4re de l'Infrastructure et des Grands Amenagements du Territoire OPR Road Project Office/Office du Projet Routier PCR Project Completion Report/Rapport d'Achbvement de Projet SOGUITRO Guinean Road Works Company/Societe Guin6enne de Travaux Routiers USAID United States Agency for International Development/Agence des Etats Unis pour le D6veloppement International SAR Staff Appraisal Report/Rapport d'Evaluation  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.SA Office of Director-General Operations lvaluation June 30, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECTs Project Completion Report on Guinea Third HighMa- Project (Credit 1457-GUI) Attached is the "Project Completion Report on Guinea - Third HiSghay Project (Credit 1457-GUI)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No Part It was prepared by the Borrower. The Credit (SDR26.5 million of May 1984) vas to support rehabilitation and maintenance of the road network, institution-building within the Ministry of Works, staff training, and medium-term planning. The Credit was closed two years behind schedule and has been fully disbursed. Bank assistance to Guinea has always emphasized strengthening of maintenance capacity and efficiency. The First Highway Project of 1976 created an autonomous road maintenance operation; the Second Highway Project of 1980 transformed this autonomous body into a departmental operation; the Third Highway Project transformed the departmental operation back into a unit that was theoretically autonomous but, in fact, had no independence. Little of the training program was implemented. Physical targets were met, but with long delays, with cost overruns of more than 60S, and with substantial quality shortcomings. The economic rates of return are acceptable but disappointing when compared to expectations. Institutional development objectives which zere preeminent in this repeater project were only partially met. Overall, the project is rated as marginally satisfactory and sustainability as uncertain. The PCR is of satisfactory quality. The project may be audited along with the first two highway projects and the port project. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipfents only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise h- ---closed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF GUINEA THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT CREDIT 14S7-GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT CONTENTS Preface Evaluation Summaqy PART I. PROJEliCT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity .......... .................... 1 B. Background ....................1 C. Experience under the First and Second Projects .... ....... 2 D. Project Objectives . ............................. 3 E. Project Description and Costs ........ .............. 4 F. Project Organization . ............................ 5 G. Project Implementation ........... ............... 6 H. Project Results and Sustainability ....... ............. 9 I. Bank Performance . ........................... 17 J. Borrower Performance ............. ............. 18 K. Project Relationship ............................ 18 L. Consulting Services . ........................... 19 M. Project Documentation and Data ....... ............. 20 N. Findings and Lessons Leaned ....... .............. 20 PART II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE PART HI. STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits ...... ............ 23 2. Project Timetable ............................. 24 3. Credit Disbursements ........... ............... 24 4. Project Implementation ............ ............. 25 5. Project Costs and Financing ......... ............. 25 6. Project Results ............................... 26 7. Compliance with Legal Covenants ....... ............ 27 8. Use of Bank Resources ............ ............. 28 Annex Economic Evaluation .............................. 30 Map - IBRD No. 17479 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their offlcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  REPUBLIC OF GUINEA THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT CREDIT 1457-GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report for the Third Highway Project in the Republic of r iinea, for which Credit 1457-GUI in the amount of SDR 26.5 M was approved on May 1, 1984. The Credit was closed on September 30, 1991, two years behind schedule. The Credit was fully disbursed as of March 3, 1992. ITe PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division of the Occidental and Central Afri X 'Department on the basis of the Staff .1ppraisal Report, the Credit Agreement and Amending Agreements, the Project Agreement and !DA correspondence files. The Borrower has not yet submitted its own assessment of the Project for Part II of this report.  - ii - REPUBLIC OF GUINEA THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT CREDfT 1457-GUI PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY Background i. Heavy rainfall and steep terrain make Guinea's roads hard to maintain. For many years, the country's economic isolation and low level of agricultural production contributed to the neglect of road infrastructure, except for roads linking bauxite mining areas to Conakry's port. Beginning in 1976, a road maintenance office was created under the Ministry of Public Works and received $US27 million in IDA funds to support its operations under the First and Second Highway Projects (1976-1984). Initially, an autonomous force account operation, this office carried out rehabilitation and maintenance of 2,100 km of paved and gravel roads under the First Project and 3,575 km of rehabilitation and maintenance of earth and paved roads under the Second Highway Project. ITese were impressive achievements, but fell short of appraisal targets in physical terms. The Third Highway Project was built on the experience of the first two projects as part of a program now being supported by two ongoing projects: a Transport Sector Project and a Fourth Highwdy Project, and one just appraised, the Transport and Urban Infrastructure Project (paras. 1-9). Objectives and Description ii. The objectives of the Third Highway Project were to assist Government with: (a) rehabilitation and maintenance of the priority road network; (b) institution building for road maintenance and rehabilitation; (c) staff training; and (d) defnition of medium-term priorities for the transport sector. The maintenance office was to be made autonomous, as it had been under the First Highway Project, and more emphasis was placed on the training of local staff. The role of consultants was also increased, compared to the Second Highway Project, to manage the operation itself and introduce private sector style record keeping, cost monitoring, and work programming in order to prepare the organization for future privatization. This was necessary because force account was not intended to be a long-term solution to road maintenance. The ultimate objective was not self-sufficient force account operations, but Government-managed private contracting (para. 10,15). iii. The US$73.7 million Project approved by the Board for US$28 million IDA financing was to be cofinanced by BADEA (US$9 million for equipment, spares and transport studies) and AfDB US$14.6 million for civil works) with Government providing US$22.1 million (equivalent) in loczl cost financing. Civil works components making up 53% of Project costs involved the reconstruction or rehabilitation of half the primary paved road network, including its "backbone," the Conakry-Mamou Road, and two "ribs," (Mamou-Labe and Mamou-Kissidougou, about 600 km) through ICB (see Map. IBRD-17479). The Road Project's Office force account brigades were also to carry out the regravelling and rehabilitation of 1,100 km of gravel and earth roads, 3,000 km of equipment-xi.based routine maintenance (grading and patching). Labor based maintenance of shoulders and drains over 2,500 km would also be carried out with project support through cantonnage (paras. 11-14).  - iii - Implementation Experience iv. Tle Project was to start in July ,984 and take four years. It was negotiated in Ma ,u 1983 and became effective only in December 1984. This delay was due to difficulties in identifying cofinancing and rot related to the advent of a new regime following the death of Sekou Toure in 1984. Consultants were slow to set up new procedures for maintenance operations. and the procurement of equipment and spares was also delayed. Relations between the contractor-consultants and their supervisors (engineering consultants in the Ministry) were strained. The contractor-consultants failed to adequately supervise brigade work and train staff, and the hoped-for partnership among consultants and local staff never materialized. Unexpectedly rapid political and economic change wider the new regime gave new impetus to the privatization of the road maintenance office. Internal record keeping and work planrAing procedures were gradually and successfully introduced; however, the maintenance office, from a financial point of view, never became fully autonomous. The closing of the special project accounts in 1986-87 during bank reform, de.ays in the Government's disbursement of salaries and bonuses and processing of local purchases during the 18-month closure of the special accounts, and internal reorganizations of the maintenance office and its parent Ministry (beginning in 1986), all furither handicapped equipment-based maintenance operations. Nonethe.ess, the number of brigades was expanded to seven from the three which were foreseen at appraisal, and maintenance brigade operations averaged 200 km per year of regravelling, and 900 km per year of regrading during the 1985-88 seasons (paras. 21, 24-29). V. Civil works for reconstruction and repaving also started late and took longer than anticipated, because the works required were substantially greater than anticipated, the contractor performed poorly, and payment by the Government of local cost invoices to contractors was delayed. The Closing Date for the Project was extended twice, primarily because of the lateness of these works. The Project was closed two years late, in September 1991. The implementation took nearly seven years, from effectiveness to closing, and covered six rather than the four m aintenance seasons anticipated at appraisal (paras. 22-23). Results vi. Reconstruction and repaving targets were largely achieved (about 580 of 615 km, or 94%). However, they took much longer and cost 65% more than estimated at appraisal, because of greater than anticipated increases in drainage works and surface deterioration. Part of the increase was due to unforeseen implementation delays and to the failure to plan for culverts and other drainage works needed in Guinea's climate and terrain. Maintenance works were impressive - 3,048 km of grading (114% of appraisal target), 830 km of regravelling (186%), and 410 kn of earth road rehabilitation (63%) during the first four seasons - the quality, however, is uncertain. The Bank's insistence upon initial standards, even when the roads necessitated rehabilitation rather than maintenance, also contributed to the poor end result. A contract for 19 bridges and culverts on a single paved section was added to the Project works as a first step toward the correction of drainage inadequacies. This accounts for much of the increase in cost (paras. 31-35). vii. Institutionally, the Project represented an important transitional period between the traditional, centralized force account operations and a future setup involving fully competitive private contracting. The results can be seen as having exceeded expectations in that the mnmber  - iv - of maintenance brigades was larger and force account operations were privatized, all within the Project's lifetime. However, the Govemment's preference for contracting works to the privatized maintenance office, SOGUlTRO, over capable, small local contractors has resulted in a local construction market which has not grown to its full potential. Moreover, labor-based routine maintenance was only implemented under the Fourth Highway Project. Little of the training program foreseen at appraisal was implemented, due to the neglect of on-the-job training by consultants, and tardiness in the preparation of a training plan. The transport plan study led to the establishment of an effective local planning unit within the Ministry (computer training of this staff is one of the Project's few successful training activities), and, under the Transport Sector Project, to the establishment of the Road Fund, a domestic financing mechanism for road maintenance (paras. 36-44). viii. The Project cost US