Uganda - Third Highway Project

Documnt of The World Bank FOR OmCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 12035 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT UGANDA THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1445-UG) JUNE 30, 1993 FILE COPY Report No: 12035 Type: PCR Infrastructure Operations Division Eastern Africa Department Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Uganda Shilling US$ 1.00 = U Sh 1198 U Sh 1.00 US$ 0.00008 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 meter (m) = 3.28 feet (ft) i kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile (mi) 1 sq. kilometer (km) = 0.386 square miles (sq mi) 1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres (ac) 1 metric ton (m ton) 2,204 pounds (lbs) ABBREVIATIONS CWS = Central Workshop HMOS Highway Maintenance and Organization Study MOT = Ministry of Transport mow Ministry of Works MOWTC = Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications RTC = Road Training Center FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK WashiNgton, D.C. 20433 U.SA Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation June 30, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Uganda Third fighway Project (Credit 1445-UG) Attached is the "Project Completion Report on Uganda -- Third Highway Project (Credit 1445-UG)" prepared by the Eastern Africa Department in the Africa Regional Office. Part II is based on Borrower comments. The US$58.0 million Credit (SDR 56.1 million) was approved in March 1984 to support a project planned to be completed by end-1987. Considering Uganda's condition in the aftermath of the 1979 civil war, project objectives were ambitious: maintain classified roads, re-establish Ministry of Works capability for road maintenance, develop the local construction industry, improve transport sector management, and help enforce vehicle weight and traffic safety regulations. Project implementation was difficult. Widespread lawlessness, slow contracting, poor site management, procurement difficulties, problems with technical assistance, shortage of local funds and staffing shortages combined to account for a four year delay in Credit closing and funds amounting to SDR 6.5 million were canceled. Institution-building for good road maintenance was the fundamental objective and the PCR concedes that the project did not succeed in establishing a sustainable organization. The PCR also concedes that project-financed equipment was diverted from road maintenance to road rehabilitation/ reconstruction, that Borrower performance was "less than satisfactory", that staff productivity was "generally low", and that the Government showed "a clear lack of commitment to road maintenance". Overall, the Project is rated as unsatisfactory, its sustainability as unlikely, and its institutional impact as negligible. No audit is planned. This docunent has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfork...... of thefir offitciat duties. its contents may not otherwise be disciosed without WorLd Bantk authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1445-UG) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface ................................................ i Evaluation Summary ........................................ ii PART I - PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Project Identity ........................................... 1 Background .............................................. 1 Project Objectives and Description ................................ 2 Project Design and Organization ................................. 2 Project Implementation....................................... 3 Project Results ............................................ 7 Project Sustainability ......................................... 7 Bank Performance ............................................7 Borrower Performance ....................................... 7 Project Relationship ......................................... 8 Consulting Services ......................................... 8 Project Documentation and Data.................................. 9 Findings and Lessons Learned .................................. 9 PAR] 1 - PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Borrower's Assessment of Project Definition ......................... 10 Assessment of Borrower's Performance...............................10 Asessment of Bank's Performance ................................ .11 PART II - STATISTICAL INFORMATION Related Bank Loans and/or Credits ............................... . 12 Projects Timetable............................................13 Credit Disbursements ......................................... 14 Project Implementation Indicators.................................. 15 Project Costs and Financing A. Project Costs ..................................... 16 B. Project Financing .................................... 17 Project Results, Economic Reevaluation.............................. 18 Status of Legal Covenants ..................................... 19 Use of Bank Resources A. Staff Inputs......................................22 B. M issions........................................ 23 Uganda, Highway Network (IBRD 17320) At the time of Project appraisal the Department Director was Mr. H. Wyss, the Assistant Director was Mr. P.C. Loh. and the Division Chief was Mr. P. Gyamfi. The Project was appraised by Messrs. S. Kathuria (Sr. Highway Engineer) and M. Le Blano (Economist). During the supervision phase, the Director was Mr. Wyss followed by Mr. C. Madavo and the Division Chief was Mr. J. Brown followed by Mr. S. Weissman. Supervision missions were undertaken by Messrs. S. Demissic (Highway Engineer). B. Bostrom (Economist), P. Sooh (Highway Engineer), and S. Kathuria (Deputy Division ChiegConsultant). The PCR was prepared by S. Kathuria and cleared by Mr. S. Weissman, Division Chief, and Mr. F. Lethem, Projects Advisor. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. - i - UGANDA THIRD IIIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1445-UG) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Third Highway Project in Uganda, for which Credit 1445-UG in the amount of US$58 million (SDR 56.1 million) was approved on March 13, 1984. The Credit was closed on January 31, 1992, about three and a half years behind schedule, and an amount of SDR 6,520,979.18 c.icelled. The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division of the Eastern Africa Department in the Africa Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III), and the Borrower (Part II). Preparation of this PCR was started in August 1992 and is based, inter alia, on the Staff A12praisal Report, the Development Credit Agreement, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda. - ii - EVALUATION SUMMARY obiective The objectives of the project were to (i) improve the maintenance of the country's rapidly deteriorating classified road network; (ii) help train Ministry of Works' (MOW) road maintenance personnel and to reestablish MOW's capability for road maintenance; (iii) help develop the local construction industry; (iv) improve the country's transport sector management; and (v) help enforce vehicle weight and traffic safety regulations (Para. 3.01). Proiect Implementation Experience The project aimed at improving routine maintenance of the classified road network (7,540 kin), resealing of about 600 km of bitumen-surfaced road and regravelling of about 1,000 km of gravel road. The project was scheduled to begin in mid-1984 and be completed by end-1987. Due to Government/consultants delay in finalizing bidding documents, in prequalifying contractors for civil works and in awarding contracts for road maintenance and workshop equipment, an initial delay of about 2 years was caused in project implementation. The implementation of the road resealing/regravelling component of the project was delayed due to poor site management, lack of proper organization and unfamiliarity of the contractor with the working conditions in Uganda. Besides, the contractor faced difficulties in securing access to work sites and in relocating amps because of rebel activity in the country at the time. The contractor completed the works at end- August 1990, about 19 months behind the contract completion date. Road maintenance and workshop equipment, and tools included in the Project to help improve MOW's capability for routine road maintenance were delivered mid-1987 to mid-1988. Spare parts for rehabilitation of the existing equipment were delivered in part (70%) in May 1991 and the supplier declared his inability to supply the balance due to their having become obsolete. A major 'Second Tranche' of equipment procurement (not included in the Project) planned by MOW in mid- 1990 was disapproved of by the Association, since the Ministry did not have the resources of funds, trained personnel and facilities to operate and maintain even the existing equipment. The implementation of improvement to the Road Training Center (RTC), Central Workshop (CWS) and upcountry workshops component of the project was badly delayed. After a series of calls for bids, Government awarded the work of itrprovement to RTC, CWS and 7 upcountry workshops (divided into 4 lots) to local contractors and the works were completed in end-January 1992 (over 7 years after Credit effectiveness). Nine domestic contractors received classroom and on-the-job training under the Pilot Program for Development of the Local Construction Industry. The Program was completed with some success at the end of December 1989 (Paras. 4.01; 5.02 - 5.06). The technical assistance services provided by a consulting firm did not prove to be fully effective. Not only did the firm take long, almost 2 years after contract signature, to mobilize its staff, the consultants first acting team leader lacked management experience and none of the team members including the instructors had serious experience in staff training. An assessment of the effectiveness of the TA team carried out by a joint Government/Bank team in October/November 1989 showed that the TA team had not been fully effective due to various reasons such as, late arrival and frequent changes of TA staff, - Iii * difficult operating conditions in 1986/87, understaffing in MOW and lack of counterpart staff, unsatisfactory supervision of TA staff by MOW and consultants head office, insufficient funding of road maintenance, etc. It was not until the consultants' new team leader/senior highway engineer arrived in September 1989 (over 3 years after contract signature) that things changed for the better. The expiry date of July 31, 1989 of the technical assistance contract was extended first to end-January 1990 and then to end-January 1991. Later, Government extended the services of 3 TA staff for MOW and 2 TA staff for MOT within the limit of the existing contract funds; wost of the staff left the country by May/June 1991, except for 2 staff (team leader/senior highway engineer and senior transport planner) who continued till September 30, 1991 (Paras. 5.07 - 5.08). Rather than using equipment purchased under the project to help reestablish MOW's road maintenance capacity, it was diverted from its normal road maintenance use to road rehabilitation/reconstruction. Consequently, roads which should have been maintained were neglected and allowed to deteriorate to the point where major rehabilitation became necessary. The funds allocated/released by Government for road maintenance were inadequate. Due to the insufficient local funding and/or bureaucratic delays, MOW was unable to procure fuel, lubricants, spare parts and/or tires for day to day operation of equipment. Nevertheless, it did not utilize Credit funds for the purchase of fuel and bitumen, except for the procurement of a small quantity of bitumen in FY88 (Para. 5.09). The final total cost of the project is within the appraisal estimate (Part Ill, Table 5); however, large excesses occurred over the cost of civil works and consultant services which were offset by savings on other items. The disbursements under the Credit (Part III, Table 3) remained slow, partly due to the initial delay caused in project start up and partly due to the delay in the implementation of the civil work components. The Credit finally closed on January 31, 1992, about three and a half years behind schedule but within the standard disbursement profile for Uganda (Paras. 5.12 - 5.13). Results The project was partially successful in meeting its targeted maintenance objectives for the country's rapidly deteriorating road network, but did not succeed in establishing a sustainable road maintenance organization; however, the project helped in setting up a maintenance management system in MOWTC1/. Some 366 km of paved road was resealed and 723 km of gravel road regravelled; MOWTC's road training school, central workshop and 7 upcountry workshops were rehabilitated/improved. The recalculated ERR for road resealing and road regravelling based on two representative sets of roads is 54% and 27%, compared to an overall ERR of 59% and 45 '; respectively, estimated at appraisal (Paras. 6.01 - 6.02). 1/ MOW and MOT were merged into a single Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications (MOWTC) in mid-1991. - iv - Proect Sustainability The maintenance management system developed under the project sets the stage for future improvement in road maintenance planning and operations. The training of domestic contractors should over time help in developing the local construction industry, provided contractors are assured of work continuity and prompt payments by Government. The National Transport Data Base set up under the project would help in drawing up comprehensive transport programs and in improving transport sector management in the country (Para. 7.01). Borrower Performance The overall performance of the Borrower was less than satisfactory, despite heavy reliance on foreign consultants. Due to the poor remunerations and working conditions, staff productivity was generally low. And, there was a clear lack of commitment on the part of Government to road maintenance; the project equipment was diverted from its normal road maintenance use and deployed extensively to rehabilitate/reconstruct roads (Para. 9.01). Lessons Learned In a country whose civil service has been undermined by years of insecurity and civil strife and poor remunerations and working conditions, the principal lessons learned include the need to (a) allocate Credit funds to project incentive schemes to help attract and retain staff of the right calibre or better yet to civil service reform or autonomy for Road Department; and (b) execute road maintenance by contract rather than force account. Also, it is necessary to establish a funding mechanism, based on user charges, that would assure the availability of sufficient funds for iad maintenance in a timely manner. In addition, as now generally practiced, the terms of rei.rence for technical assistance services should include a detailed work program with verifHole inputs and outputs for each TA staff. A mid-term review of project implementation should also be provided (Paras. 13.01 - 13.05). -1- U-GANDA THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1445-UG) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART I - PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECIE 1. ProedIdntity Name Third Highway Project Credit Number 1445-UG RVP Unit Africa Region Country Uganda Sector Transport Subsector Highways 2. Backgrnd 2.01 At independence in 1962, Uganda inherited a very good transport system. The system was further improved during the decade 1962 - 1972 to become one of the best in sub- saharan Africa. However, after a decade of neglect and ultimate destruction during the liberation war in 1979, the transport system was left in complete disarray. The Government reacted quickly to the situation and with the assistance of a Commonwealth team of experts, prepared a recovery program which concentrated on the rehabilitation of the economy and identified priorities for the various sectors. In the transport sector, the highest priority areas identified were the rehabilitation of Uganda railways and rehabilitation and maintenance of the national road network. 2.02 Due to the lack of proper maintenance for more than a decade, the country's road network had fallen into a state of disrepair; paved roads had developed deep potholes and surface cracks; most gravel roads had completely lost their gravel and had reverted to earth roads, and in the worst cases they required major rehabilitation. MOW's workshops suffered extensive damage during the war; the damages ranged from minor to major repairs, and in some cases complete reconstruction of the structure was needed; the workshops did not have facilities to adequately repair and maintain equipment. 2.03 In 1982, the Association financed an updating of the 1972 highway investment, maintenance and organization study carried out under the Second Highway Project (Cr. 164-UG); the updated study, highway maintenance and organization study (HMOS), formed the basis for the road maintenance program included in the project. -2- 2.04 Also, the Association carried out, in 1982 - 83, a transport sector review which identified the following needs in the transport sector. (i) the need for an extensive transport sector manpower development; (ii) the need to improve the data base in the transport sector to permit policy formulation and decision making; (iii) the need to improve transport administration and policy making; and (iv) the need to improve transport sector cooperation between Uganda and Kenya, particularly as it applied to rail movements. 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.01 Pric Obiectives: The objectives of the project were to: (i) improve the maintenance of the country's rapidly deteriorating classified road network; (ii) help train Ministry of Works' (MOW) road maintenance personnel and to re-establish MOW's capability for road maintenance; (iii) help develop the local construction industry; (iv) improve the country's transport sector management; and (v) help enforce vehicle weight and traffic safety regulations. 3.02 Roie Descripion: The project provided for: (i) a program to improve maintenance of the country's classified road network; (ii) technical assistance to MOW and Ministry of Transport (MOT) (iii) a pilot program for the development of the local construction industry; and (iv) preparation of a future road maintenance program. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.01 In 1983, the country's classified road network consisted of 1,940 km of bitumen- surfaced road and 5,600 km of gravl road. The 4-year (1984 - 87) road maintenance program Included in the project was to help improve routine maintenance of the classified road network (7,540 km), as well as periodic maintenance of about 600 km of bitumen-surfaced road and about 1,000 km of gravel road that were in urgent need of resealing/regravelling; the roads were selected on the basis of the results of the HMOS. Since MOW's ability to maintain roads was -3- severely constrained by lack of equipment, trained manpower and funds, the project provided for the engagement of contractors for road resealing/regravelling, leaving routine road maintenance to be done by force account with the assistance of technical assistance staff. 4.02 To help re-establish MOW's capability for road maintenance, the project provided for the procurement of road maintenance and workshop equipment, and tools, spare parts for existing equipment and training equipment, supply of fuel and bitumen, and improvement to Road Training Center (RTC), MOW's Central Workshop (CWS) and up-country workshops. 4.03 The technical assistance (7 staff for MOW and 2 staff for MOT) included in the project was intended: (i) to help alleviate staffing shortage, to improve MOW's road maintenance planning, organization and operations, ard to draw up and implement a staff training program; and (ii) to assist MOT in establishing its transport data base. 4.04 The Pilot Program for Development of the Local Construction Industry was intended to improve the efficiency and capability of domestic contractors in order to reduce the country's reliance on foreign contractors, and the road maintenance study was intended to draw up a road maintenance program which could form the basis for future assistance to the country. 4.05 Given the rapidly deteriorating state of the country's road network, the lack of adequate staff and physical resources in MOW and the urgent need to improve the data base in the transport sector, the project concept and design were appropriate and timely. In retrospect, the scope of routine road maintenance included in the project was rather too large for MOW to implement, in view of the staffing shortage arX inaccessibility of certain areas due to poor security situation in the country at the time. 4.06 Project implementation was the responsibility of MOW and MOT. The road resealing/regravelling works were carried out by contract under the supervision of consultants. Consultants were engaged for preparation of bidding documents for civil works and goods. A road construction firm assisted Government in implementing the Pilot Program for Development of the Local Construction Industry. 5. Project Implementation 5.01 Credit Effectiveness and ProJect Start-up: The Credit became effective on December 27, 1984, about 5 months behind the original effectiveness date. The Credit effectiveness was delayed because of Government delay in employing consultants for the preparation of bidding documents for road resealing/regravelling, and road maintenance and workshop equipment which was a condition of Credit effectiveness. At the start, the project experienced country-wide civil strife and the resulting changes in Government in 1985/86 which delayed project commencement. 5.02 Implementation Schedule: The project was scheduled to begih in mid-1984 and be completed by end-1987. Due to Government/consultants delay in finalizing bidding documents, -4- in prequalifying contractors for civil works ano in awarding contracts for road maintenance and workshop equipment, an initiAl delay of about 2 years was caused in project implementation. 5.03 Government awarded the road resealing/regravelling works, divided into 4 contracts, to the lowest evaluated responsive bidder, a Chinese contractor; a contract between Government and the contractor was signed in April 1987 with completion scheduled by early February 1989, after a contract period of 640 days. The mobilization work of the contractor proceeded slowly; actual works on the roads started at end-August 1987. Due to poor site management, lack of proper organization and unfamiliarity with the working conditions in Uganda, the contractor accumulated excessive delays in the execution of the works. The same were further compounded by difficulties faced by him in securing access to work sites and in relocating camps, because of rebel activity in the country at the time - for security reasons, the contractor had to withdraw from certain sites and move his camp elsewhere. The contractor finally completed the works at end-August 1990, about 19 months behind the contract completion date. Meanwhile, Government rehabilitated some of the roads included in the project from its own resources or with assistance from other donors. 5.04 Government invited bids for the supply of road maintenance and workshop equipment, and tools (divided into 5 lots) in January 1986, and awarded contracts for the same in February 1987; the goods were delivered mid-1987 through mid-1988. After long persuasion by the Association, MOW with the assistance of technical assistance staff drew up an order for spare parts for rehabilitation of the existing equipment in February 1988, and awarded a contract for the same to a UK firm in January 1989 (4 years after Credit effectiveness). Only one consignment consisting of 70% of the spare parts was delivered in May 1991 and the supplier declared that he was unable to supply the balance due to their having become obsolete. No training equipment was procured under the project. A major 'Second Tranche' of equipment procurement (not included in the project) planned by MOW in mid-1990 was disapproved of by the Association, since the Ministry did not have the funds, trained personnel and facilities to operate and maintain even the existiL,; equipment. In July 1991, the Association authorized MOWTCI/ to purchase certain critically needed items of equipment, but the same could not be procured before the Credit closing date of September 30, 1991. The Association granted further extension of the Credit closing date by 4 months to January 31, 1992 only in respect of improvement to RTC, CWS and upcountry workshops. 5.05 The implementation of improvement to RTC, CWS and upcountry workshops component of the project was badly delayed. Designs and bidding documents for improvement to RTC and CWS were prepared by local consultants in 1985 and 1987 respectively; the corresponding tasks for improvement to upcountry workshops was undertaken in-house in 1987. Bids for RTC and CWS were invited from local contractors in November 1987 (almost 3 years after Credit effectiveness) and the sole bid received was allowed to lapse; the subsequent bids received in August 1989 were found to be higher than the appraisal estimate. Similarly, the bids for improvement to upcountry workshops received in December 1988 were found to be high. In November 1990, Government submitted a proposal to award the work of improvement to the upcountry workshops to the same contractor who was engaged on road resealing/regravelling contracts (Para. 5.03). The Association disagreed with the Government proposal and called on MOW to invite bids on the basis of local competitive bidding. Following receipt and evaluation 1/ MOW and MOT were merged into a single Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications (MOWTC) in mid-1991. -5- of bids, Government awarded, with the Association's approval, the work of improvement to RTC, CWS and 7 upcountry workshops (divided into 4 lots) to local contractors in end-June 1991 and the works were completed in end-January 1992 (over 7 years after Credit effectiveness). 5.06 A Danish road construction firm assisted Government in implementing the Pilot Program for Jevelopment of the Local Construction Industry. A contract between Government and the firm was signed in July 1986. Nine domestic contractors received classroom and on-the- job training under the Program. Some of the trainees selected lacked adequate resources of funds/equipment which coupled with Government delay in the release of advance payments to contractors retarded their progress. The Program was completed with some success at the end of December 1989. 5.07 Government engaged a US firm of consultants to provide technical assistance to MOW and MOT; a contract between Government and the firm was signed in July 1986 with contract completion by July 31, 1989. Of the 9 TA staff that were to be provided by the firm, 2 (a training instructor (civil)/acting team leader and an equipment maintenance engineer) mobilized in October/November 1986. The team leader/senior highway engineer and 4 other staff (a road maintenance engineer, a training instructor (mech), a mechanical superintendent and a senior transport planner) arrived between July 1987 and September 1987; a transport statistician arrived in March 1988. The vital post of road maintenance superintendent was not filled until May 1988, almost 2 years after contract signature. Over the first 3 years, the technical assistance team had shown very little progress in improving road maintenance planning and/or training of MOW staff. While the training instructor (mech) conducted some training of mechanics between April 1988 and January 1990, very little training had been conducted for the civil staff. In fact, the position of training instructor (civil) was never properly filled, with 3 separate candidates occupying the post for short periods of time. On Association's insistence, the consultants prepared and submitted a formal training program for MOW staff in December 1988, but the same was never implemented. The TA team apparently had not integrated into the Ministry and there had been lack of communication between the consultants and MOW staff. 5.08 An assessment of the effectiveness of the TA team carried out by a joint Government/Bank team in October/November 1989 showed that the TA team had not been fully effective due to various reasons such as, late arrival and frequent changes of TA staff, difficult operating conditions in 1986/87, understaffing in MOW and lack of counterpart staff, unsatisfactory supervision of TA staff by MOW and consultants head office, insufficient funding of road maintenance, etc. The same also showed that the first acting team leader (October 1986 to September 1987) did not have the level of management experience required for the post and that none of the team members including the instructors had any serious experience in staff training. Further, the team was not given any clear lead and it operated independently from the MOW. It was not until the new team leader/senior highway engineer arrived in September 1989 (over 3 years after contract signature) that the team was adequately led or managed; the TA team embarked on activities such as, road inventory and condition survey, traffic counts, equipment inventory and condition survey, etc., and helped develop a maintenance management system in MOWTC. A contract amendment in October 1989 extended the TA contract by six months to January 31, 1990 and a subsequent amendment in April 1990, following assessment of the effectiveness of the TA team, extended the MOW and MOT technical assistance to July 31, 1990 and to January 31, 1991 respectively. The April 1990 amendment to the contract included, inter alia, a detailed work program and verifiable inputs and outputs for each TA staff. Of the 7 technical assistance staff for MOW, 4 (road maintenance superintendent, mechanical superintendent, training instructor (civil) and training instructor (mech)) left the -6- country between January 1990 and July 1990. Later, Government extended the services of 3 TA staff (senior highway engineer/team leader, road maintenance engineer and equipment maintenance engineer) for MOW and 2 TA staff (senior transport planner and transport statistician) for MOT within the limit of the existing contract funds; most of the staff left the country by May/June 1991, except for 2 staff (team leader/senior highway engineer and senior transport planner) who continued till September 30, 1991. 5.09 MOW carried out very little routine road maintenance, and diverted project equipment from its normal road maintenance use to road rehabilitation/reconstruction. During FY89, FY90 and FY91 the total road maintained, including heavy grading and regravelling, was 12%, 25.3% and 26.3% of the classified road network respectively; for FY91 only 4% of the paved network received patchwork. Manual road maintenance barely existed, with the near total withdrawal of labor due to dissatisfaction with Government pay scales and the lack of hand tools. Consequently, roads which should have been maintained were neglected and allowed to deteriorate to the point where major rehabilitation became necessary. This included the roads that had been newly upgraded/rehabilitated, while priority was afforded to rehabilitation of other roads. On Association's insistence, MOW with the assistance of TA staff made an attempt to prepare an annual road maintenance program and the first such program drawn was for the second half of FY91. MOW's focus on road rehabilitation/reconstruction rather than routine road maintenance caused disproportionate demand on the scarce resources of funds, equipment and trained manpower. A large number of equipment units remained idle for want of consumables or fast moving parts and/or tires; the availability rate of equipment was very low (30%), as a result. The funds allocated/released by Government for road maintenance during the project were inadequate, US$2.16 million equivalent in FY87 rising to US$6.51 million equivalent in FY89, and then dropping to US$2.99 million equivalent in FY90 and US$3.63 million equivalent in FY91. The Development Credit Agreement for the project required the Borrower to provide annually a minimum of USh. 1.5 billion (US$6.0 million equivalentI/), in 1983 prices, for routine maintenance of the classified road network. Due to the insufficient local funding and/or bureaucratic delays, MOW was unable to procure fuel, lubricants, spare parts and/or tires for day to day operation of equipment. Nevertheless, it did not utilize Credit funds for the purchase of fuel and bitumen, except for the procurement of a small quantity (1500 ton) of bitumen in FY88. 5.10 The road maintenance study component of the project was not implemented. A road maintenance study is, however, being carried out as part of the project preparation work for a follow-on project. 5.11 Procurement: The procurement action followed the Bank guidelines, except for the improvement to the upcountry workshops where MOW invited quotations from individual contractor(s), instead of calling competitive bids. A period of about 2 years was lost by the time contracts were awarded on the basis of local competitive bidding specified in the DCA. The procurement action was generally slow; Government/consultants spent a great deal of time in finalizing bidding documents for civil works and goods. 5.12 Project Costs: The final total cost of the project is within the appraisal estimate (Part III, Table 5); however, large excesses occurred over the cost of civil works and consultant services which were offset by savings on other items such as, road maintenance and workshop equipment, fuel and bitumen, etc. I1 US$1.0 = USh. 250 -7- 5.13 Disbursements: The disbursements under the Credit (Part III, Table 3) remained slow, partly due to the initial delay caused in project start up and partly due to the delay in the implementation of the civil work components. The Credit finally closed on January 31, 1992, about three and a half years behind schedule but within the standard disbursement profile for Uganda. 6. Project Results 6.01 Project Qbjecives: The project was partially successful in meeting its targeted maintenance objectives for the country's rapidly deteriorating road network but, did not succeed in establishing a sustainable road maintenance organization; however, the project helped in setting up a maintenance management system in MOWTC. The project also assisted in establishing a National Transport Data Base for transport sector management. Besides, new regulations governing vehicle size, weight, dimensions and road safety were established under the project. The Pilot Program for Development of the Local Construction Industry included in the project was completed with some success. 6.02 Physical Results: Some 366 km of paved road was resealed and 723 km of gravel road regravelled; MOWTC's road training school, central workshop and 7 up-country workshops were rehabilitated/improved. The implementation results are shown in Table 4 in Part III. The recalculated ERR for road resealing and road regravelling based on two representative sets of roads is 54% and 27%, compared to an overall ERR of 59% and 45% respectively, estimated at appraisal. ERR for routine maintenance could not be recalculated due to the paucity of data on the roads maintained and/or costs incurred. 7. Project Sustainability 7.01 The maintenance management system developed under the project sets the stage for future improvement in road maintenance planning and operations; however, for achieving any meaningful results in this regard, it is imperative that Government establish a suitable mechanism for prompt funding of road maintenance. The training of domestic contractors should over time help in developing the local construction industry, provided contractors are assured of work continuity and prompt payments by Government. The National Transport Data Base set up under the project would help in drawing up comprehensive transport programs and in improving transport sector management in the country. 8. Bank Performance 8.01 The Bank's performance during the project cycle was generally satisfactory. The project was prepared and appraised at a time when the country was recovering from the aftermath of the liberation war in 1979. The Bank's supervision effort was more than adequate, with fifteen missions fielded over 7 years; however, there was lack of continuity in project supervision due to changes in task management responsibility during implementation. In FY90, the supervision input was unusually heavy in terms of staff time (46.3 staff/weeks). The Bank made sporadic attempts to push Government to provide adequate funds and organization for routine road maintenance. Because of Government focus on road rehabilitation/reconstruction rather than routine road maintenance, the Bank granted further extension of the Credit closing date beyond September 30, -8- 1991 only in respect of improvement to RTC, CWS and upcountry workshops. The Bank made a positive conwribution to the cause of the project in mounting a joint Bank/Government team in October 1989 to assess effectiveness of the consultants technical assistance services which helped improve consultant performance over the remaining project life. A Bank supervision mission encouraged MOW into procurement planning of a 'Second Tranche' equipment (not included in the project) when the Ministry did not have the resources of funds, trained personnel and facilities to maintain even the existing equipment; up until September 1990, overall status of the project was inaccurately rated 2 (moderate problems) despite serious management, financial and technical problems. 9. Borrower Performance 9.01 The overall performance of the Borrower was less than satisfactory, despite heavy reliance on foreign consultants. Project coordination in MOW was weak until a new Deputy Engineer-in-Chief (Development), currently Engineer-in-Chief/Secretary for Works, took charge in November 1990. Besides general staffing shortage in MOW, there were many staff changes including 4 Permanent Secretaries. Due to the poor remunerations and working conditions, staff productivity was generally low. And, there was a clear lack of commitment on the part of Government to road maintenance; the project equipment was diverted from its normal road maintenance use and deployed extensively to rehabilitate/reconstruct roads. The funds allocated/released for road maintenance were far below the requirement specified in the Development Credit Agreement. While MOW was unable to procure fuel, lubricants, etc. for day to day operation of equipment, it did not utilize Credit funds for the procurement of fuel and bitumen. 10. Proiect Relationship 10.01 The Bank's relationship with the Borrower and the various participating agencies was good throughout the project period. 11. Consulting Services 11.01 Consultants' performance under the project was less than satisfactory. The consultants engaged on construction supervision of periodic road maintenance works did not perform well. A Bank supervision mission found serious defects in the completed works which had to be rectified later; the consultants took as long as 17 months to complete bidding documents for the works. The same is true of the consultants engaged for preparing bidding documents for road maintenance and workshop equipment. The TA team did not prove to be fully effective. Not only did the consulting firm take very long to mobilize its staff, the first acting team leader lacked management experience required for the post and none of the team members including the instructors had serious experience in staff training. And, it was not until the consultants' new team leader arrived in September 1989 that things changed for the better. .9- 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.01 The documentation for the project was adequate, providing a useful framework for the Association and the Borrower for review of project implementation. The staff appraisal report provided full details of the project components, implementation schedule and procurement procedures. 13. Findings and Lessons Learned 13.01 Project coordination remained weak over most of the project life and there were many staff changes in MOW. Due to the undermining of civil service by years of insecurity and civil strife and poor remunerations and working conditions, staff productivity was generally low. This underlines the need for allocating Credit funds to project incentive schemes to help attract and retain staff of the right calibre, or better yet to civil service reform or autonomy for Road Department. 13.02 MOW diverted project equipment from its normal road maintenance use to road rehabilitation/reconstruction. This could be avoided by executing road maintenance by contract rather than force account. 13.03 The funds allocated/released by Government for road maintenance were far below the requirement specified in the DCA. Experiences such as this indicate the importance of establishing a funding mechanism, based on user charges, that would assure the availability of sufficient funds for road maintenance in a timely manner, an essential basis for the success of such a scheme, however, is the solution to the problem of adequate staffing, so that a strong and efficient road department is established. 13.04 The technical assistance staff did not prove to be fully effective. To overcome this, the terms of reference for technical assistance services should include a detailed work program with verifiable inputs and outputs for each TA staff. 13.05 Long delays were caused in implementing certain components of the project. A mid-term review of project implementation would bring to light any inaction on the part of Government/consultants for taking necessary corrective action. - 10 - UGANDA THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1445-UG) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART II - PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE (Extracts from Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications' letter No. GC/H/27 dated September 24, 1992) 1. Borrower's Assessment of Project Definition 1.01 The project conceived as a Road Maintenance project, was quite comprehensive containing the major road maintenance aspects as clearly evidenced in project break-down by categories. 1.02 However, for the sake of further improvement, it is Government's view that projects of such a nature should have the need for "Project Termination" in focus, at the time of identification or appraisal. 1.03 It is quite essential that termination provisions should be made for some projects such as this one to be terminated to enable it get re-lodged in the National Recurrent Programme. This would ensure the "project's" continued sustainability and further realisation of the initial project objectives. Abrupt termination should be avoided as this often undermines the already achieved objectives of this class of projects. 2. Assessment of Borrower's Performance 2.01 The first two years of the project experienced civil turmoil country wide resulting in two government changes in mid 1985 and early 1986. From early 1987 to 1990 the Northern and North Eastern parts of the country were under civil strive which caused an insecure environment for the project. As a result the project commencement [was] delayed. 2.02 Despite the above, the project was executed as designed with 3 years (equivalent to one effective year) of extension and below budget. Approximately SDR 5.0 million remained unutilised on Credit. 2.03 The project had a requirement of Government's undertaking in respect of allocation of sufficient funds from the government's annual recurrent budget for routine road maintenance in order to support the equipment units that had been procured for road maintenance. However, on account of the fact that by beginning of 1986 only 5% of the road net-work was maintainable (i.e 95% of the net-work required prior rehabilitation), government deemed it necessary that its primary efforts be centred on the reopening of roads in order to stimulate economic activity. Therefore most of the road maintenance equipment and road maintenance funds from government budget were allocated for road rehabilitation reopening other than for routine road maintenance. - 11 - 2.04 In the final analysis however, expenditure incurred for road maintenance and rehabilitation was higher than what had been recommended. 2.05 Funds under Category 3 for road maintenance inputs were not sufficiently utilised on account of the strategy that had been established soon after signing the road resealing and regravelling contracts. At that moment it had been noted that there would be an over expenditure of over US $ 10 million on account of the fact that whereas US $ 20 million had been estimated in the project Staff Appraisal Report (Cat la) for the resealing and regravelling contracts, the contracts were awarded at the cost of US $ 32 million. Therefore, as a management strategy, it was decided by the government to go slow on Category 3 funds such that it could probably act as buffer to avoid credit over commitment. At that time 1.0 SDR was equivalent to US $ 1.10. However, as time past by the dollar fell as against SDR and it was only noticed in November, 1989 that if the credit would not be in any danger of over commitment the Category 3 funds were utilised. At that time 1.0 SDR was equivalent to about US $ 1.35. However all the efforts to effect additional procurement failed up to closure in September, 1991. 3. Assessment of Bank Performance 3.01 All in all there was very good coordination with Bank staff right from appraisal to completion. There was however misguided procurement information during the period May 1989 to September 1990 due to change of Bank's task Manager. This contributed to delays in procurement under categories lb and 3. - 12 - UGANDA THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1445-UIG) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART III - STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits Loan/Credit Title urposA Credit 108-UG Construction to paved standards of 1967 Completed First Highway the Mbarara - Katunguru Road Project (113 km); and construction of small agricultural and feeder roads, and detailed engineering of 740 km of main and feeder roads Credit 164-UG Construction/Reconstruction of 665 1969 Completed Second Highway km of primary, secondary, and Project feeder roads; a highway investment maintenance and organization study; feasibility and detailed engineering studies of about 400 km of roads; and technical assistance. Credit 1803-UG Rehabilitation/Strengthening of the 1987 Nearing Fourth Highway Kampala - Jinja (km 0 - 24) and Completion Project Mbarara - Ishaka Road (60 km); Pilot Rural Road Maintenance Program; technical assistance; and studies - 13 - 2. Project Timetble J= Date Planned Date Revised Date Actual Identification NA NA 03.08.80 Preparation 03.08.81 07.22.81 07.22.81 Appraisal Mission 10.82 03.30.83 03.30.83 Credit Negotiations 11.83 01.31.84 01.31.84 Board Approval 11.08.83 03.13.84 03.13.84 Credit Signature 04.19.84 - 04.19.84 Credit Effectiveness 07.18.84 12.27.84 12.27.84 Credit Closing 09.30.88 01.31.92 01.31.92 - 14 - 3. Credil Disbursem Cumulative Esdmated and Actual Disbursments (US$ million) IDA Fiscal YW Angaisal Asmal Actual as Ouabter EpdinD of Estimated EY1285 December31, 1984 0.25 7 Marb 31, 1985 1.50 0.10 2 June 30, 1985 5.00 0.10 E Y1986 September30, 1985 8.50 2.61 31 December31, 1985 12.00 2.75 23 March 31, 1986 17.00 2.75 16 Jine 30, 1986 22.00 2.75 13 FY1987 September 30, 1986 27.00 3.35 12 December 31, 1986 32.00 3.96 12 March 31, 1987 37.00 4.10 11 June 30, 1987 42.00 9.32 22 FY1988 September 30, 1987 47.00 10.88 23 December 31, 1987 50.50 17.46 35 March 31, 1988 54.00 19.10 35 June 30, 1988 58.00 20.99 36 FY1989 September 30, 1988 22.89 39 December31, 1988 25.10 43 March31, 1989 28.53 49 June 30, 1989 35.36 61 PY1990 September 30, 1989 37.82 65 December 31. 1989 39.26 68 March 31, 1990 41.20 71 June 30, 1990 48.13 83 FY1291 September 30, 1990 49.99 86 December31, 1990 53.59 92 March 31, 1991 57.54 99 June30, 1991 59.42 102 FY19912 September 30, 1991 62.87 108 December31. 1991 63.69 110 March 31, 1992 65.25 112 June 30, 1992 66.34 114 FY1993 September 30, 1992 66.34 114 December31, 1992 66.34 114 March31, 1993 64.681/ 112 .L/ Cumulative disbursement reduced due to refund from the Special Account. - 15 - 4. Project Implementation Indicators Appraisal Estimate A=1ual Resealing of Paved Roads (km) 600 366 Regravelling of Gravel Roads (km) 1,000 723 Procurement of Road Maintenance and Workshop Equipment, and tools (% completion) 100 100 Improvement to Road Training Center (% completion) 100 100 Improvement to Workshops (no.) (i) Central workshop 1 1 (ii) Area workshops 3 2 (iii) District workshops 11 5 Pilot Programs for Development of Local Construction Industry (% completion) 100 100 Technical Assistance (man-months) 234 341 - 16 - 5. Project Costs and Financing A. Projec Cost AppraisalEstimates Actual..1 Itm Local Eareign l1ta Lgcal EQreia Inte - US$ Million- - US$ Million- (a) Resealing of Paved Roads 5.79 12.15 17.94) (b) Regravelling of Gravel Roads 4.16 8.75 12.91) 4.64 41.07 45.71 (c) Procurement of Road Maintenance & Workshop Equipment, Spare Parts, Tools and Training Equipment: (i) New Equipment including Spare Parts 0.99 8.89 9.88) (ii) Spare parts for Existing Equipment 0.07 0.60 0.67) (iii) Workshop Equipment and tools 0.16 1.42 1.58) 0.22 10.86 11.08 (iv) Training Equipment 0.02 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 (d) Improvement to Road Maintenance Training Center 0.20 0.07 0.27} (e) Improvement to MOW Workshops 0.89 0.31 1.20) 1.53 2.05 3.58 (f) Supply of Fuel and Bitumen 3.88 8.12 12.00 0.04 1.96 2.00 (g) Consultant Services: (i) Preparation of Bidding Documents for Road Resealing/Regravelling 0.04 0.16 0.20 0.02 0.27 0.29 (ii) Supervision of Road Resealing/Regravelling 0.24 0.96 1.20 0.27 3.90 4.17 (iii) Preparation of Bidding Documents for Road Maintenance & Workshop Equipment 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.08 (iv) Technical Assistance 0.42 1.68 2.10 0.46 3.68 4.14 (v) Preparation of Future Road Maintenance Program 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 (h) Pilot Program for Development of Local Construction Industry 0.40 1.60 2.00 0.14 1.09 1.23 Sub-Total 17.29 45.02 62.31 7.33 64.95 72.28 (i) Contingencies (i) Physical 1.69 4.34 6.03 (ii) Price 4.01 8.52 12.53 Total Project Cost 22.99 57.88 80.87 7.33 64.95 72.28 1/ Estimated Costs at Completion - 17 - B. Project Financine Planned (Crdit Revised Final as a So1rc Agreement) (Sept 1991) Einal % of Planned ----- - ------------SDR'000---------------- IDA Expenditure Categories (1) Civil Works (a) under Part A.2 of the Project 20,000 30,650 31,075 155.4 (b) under Parts B and C of Project 410 1,340 1,720 419.5 (2) Road Maintenance, workshop and training equipment, spare parts and tools 11,810 9,890 8,700 73.7 (3) Fuel, bitumen, materials and supplies 8,700 2,290 621 7.1 (4) Consultants' services 2,850 6,170 6,209 217.9 (5) Pilot programs for development of local construction industry 1,550 840 581 37.5 (6) Initial deposit into Special Account 2,500 2,500 673 11 (7) Unallocated 8,280 2,420 NA Total 56,100 56,100 49,579 1/ Special Account exchange rate variations - 18 - 6. Ejct Results Economic Reevaluation J/ A. Road-Resealln Ier Capital Cost 2/ Benefits Net Benefits --------------------------US$ Million------------ 1987 3.40 -3.40 1988 6.06 -6.06 1989 4.06 -4.06 1990 1.23 14.39 13.16 1991 13.62 13.62 1992 12.89 12.89 1993 12.20 12.20 1994 11.54 11.54 ERR = 54% B. Road Regravelling m Capital Cs fnefits NetLBnefits ------- US$ Million- 1987 1.48 -1.48 1988 2.64 -2.64 1989 1.76 -1.76 1990 0.53 3.35 2.82 1991 3.17 3.17 1992 3.00 3.00 1993 2.84 2.84 1994 2.69 2.69 ERR = 27% .1/ Calculation of ERR done in 1987 prices 2/ Economic costs include cost of civil works an construction supervision - 19 - 7. Status of Legal Covenants Development Credit Agreement Deadline for S.ctin Description of Covenant Comletio 3.01 (b) The Borrower shall not later The funds than four months before the allocated/released for road start of each of its respective maintenance had been fiscal years beginning 1985 inadequate, US$2.16 and ending with 1987, review million equivalent in FY87 with the Association the rising to US$6.51 million proposed budgetary allocations equivalent in FY89, and for road maintenance and then dropping to US$2.99 provide annually in each such million equivalent in FY90 fiscal year a minimum of one and US$3.63 million billion five hundred million equivalent in FY91. Uganda Shillingsl/ (USh. 1,500,000,000) in 1983 prices for routine maintenance of its classified road network. 3.01 (c) The Borrower shall, by not 12.31.84 The position of Deputy later than December 31, 1984, Engineer-in-Chief fill the position of Deputy (Development) was filled Engineer-in-Chief within by regular staff in March MOW with a qualified and 1987 and a qualified experienced person and keep individual appointed in an such position and the position acting capacity to the of Chief Training Engineer position of Chief Training within MOW filled at all times Engineer. with suitably qualified and experienced persons. 3.02 The Borrower shall employ Complied with. consultants whose qualifications, experience and terms and conditions of employment shall be satisfactory to the Association. 1/ US$6.0 million equivalent (US$1.0 = USh. 250) - 20 - Deadling-for Section Description of Covenant Completion Sg= 3.04 (b) The Borrower shall submit to 08.31.84 Plans and construction the Association for its review details for the road training and comments not later than center and mechanical August 31, 1984 the plans and workshops were prepared other construction details and and submitted to the designs for the additional Association. facilities to be provided at the road maintenance training center and for repair and reconstruction of damaged workshops. 3.06 The Borrower shall not later 03.31.85 A training program for than March 31, 1985, submit MOW staff was prepared to the Association for its and submitted to the review and approval a suitable Association in December training program for MOW 1988. staff and thereafter implement the training program approved by the Association. 4.01 (a) The Borrower shall maintain or Audit reports were and (b) cause to be maintained separate generally received very accounts in respect of the late. project, have the accounts for each fiscal year audited by independent auditors acceptable to the Association and furnish to the Association not later than six months after the end of each such year, a certified copy of the report of such audit. 4.02 The Borrower shall employ not 12.31.84 A principal accountant was later than December 31, 1984, appointed in MOW in an accountant with appropriate September 1984. qualifications and experience as principal accountant in MOW. - 21 - Deadline for Section Description of Covenant Completion 4.03 The Borrower shall take all 12.31.84 The study was dropped necessary measures to ensure from the project. that the accounting study for parastatal organizations in the transport sector shall begin not later than December 31, 1984. 4.05 The Borrower shall take all 12.31.84 The new regulations were measures necessary to ensure approved by the Cabinet in that the proposed regulations June 1986 and a statutory governing vehicle size, weight, instrument for enforcing dimensions and road safety be the regulations was in effect not later than published in the December 31, 1984. Government Gazette on December 11, 1987; however, very little progress had been made in enforcing new regulations. 4.06 The Borrower shall resume its 1.01.85 Partially complied with. annual traffic counts not later than January 1, 1985. 4.07 The Borrower shall take all 9.01.84 A memorandum of measures necessary on its part understanding was signed by September 1, 1984 to between officials of formalize appropriate Uganda Railway arrangements with the Republic Corporation and Kenya of Kenya concerning the Railways on June 6, 1983, interchange of rolling stock. followed by a formal agreement between Ministers of the Ugandan and Kenyan Governments. - 22 - 7. Use of Bank Resources A. Staff inputs Stage of Project Cycle Planned eEinal ------------Staff Weeks -- Through Appraisal NA NA 77.6 Appraisal through Board Approval NA NA 3.9 Supervision NA NA 149.9 Total 81.5 NA 231.4 - 23 - B. Missions Staee of Project Month/Year Number of Davs in Specialization Performance Typs o Date of CYCle Persons Fiek Rpresented ating Status* Problems' ý First Mention in 02.72 Files Identification 03.80 2 8 ENG, EC Preparation i 07.81 1 15 ENG Preparation i 02.82 2 3 ENG, EC Preparation III 05.82 1 NA EC Preparation IV 10.82 2 6 ENG, EC Preappraisal 01.83 1 7 EC Appraisal 04.83 2 25 ENG, EC Supervision I 06.84 1 8 ENG 2 M, T 08.15.84 Supervision II 12.84 1 12 ENG i M 02.01.85 Supervision III 03.85 2 10 ENG, EC i p 04.29.85 Supervision IV 06.86 3 19 ENG, ENG, EC 2 M 08.25.86 Supervision V 10.86 1 12 .ENG 2 M 12.17.86 Supervision VI 07.87 1 17 ENG 2 M « 08.25.87 Supervision VII 10.87 1 13 ENG 2 M 12.21.87 Supervision VIII 03.88 1 8 ENG 2 M 04.22.88 Supervision IX 06.88 1 10 ENG 2 M 08.11.88 Supervision X 11.88 2 8 ENG, ENG 2 M 01.27.89 Supervision XI 05.89 1 10 ENG 2 M, T 08.09.89 Supervision XH 10.89 4 22 ENG, CON (3) 2 M, F, T 02.28.90 Supervision XIII 04.90 4 21 ENG, CON (3) 2 M, F, T 09.13.90 Supervision XIV 09.90 1 21 ENG 3 M, F, T 12.18.90 Supervision XV 07.91 1 7 ENG 3 M, F, T 08.23.91 a) Combined with supervision/preparation missions for other highway projects. b) Engineer (ENG), Economist (EC), Consultant (CON). c) I - Problem-free or minor problems; 2 - Moderate problems; 3 - Major problems. d) F - Financial; M - Managerial; T - Technical. f) 1 /kKITGUM IBRD 17320R UGANDA THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT S U D A N HIGHWAY NETWORK ) Roods .amtoined by M. W.: Promory bituno . -- NP-ay OCve Md, 0". Secondory bit~oen Koob>ng scondory eovoel - Terhary btme KTGU -T~~7er 9-1 a\, 1e1Y_r K E N Y A - -Ot heo r r o ds 1, t . \ , E Y - Riverr Rhi A Nonol apitol 1 T 1 Ptk . KOTD JINJA District copitols o.d nmes - Distrct bo-ndonis k vo MO. district boundarics L * . ' . Aroa boudors MASAKA Dstnt wrkshops \'. Areawokshop. N Nk -. - it oonl bvcndwanes ., M Z A l R E M - k-. HOM KU0AOW t9 Ki' ole ? /14 i~ 1 Nornoogol' /s\NBdkdooitoo -o LUWEROKAU N SG är"9 TORORO MUBENDE e IrRPsGANGAk t k- ~k- ~n b K~ CmS i <~t f å - - BUSHENY) RAoL UDAN RUKUNGIRL - T A N Z A N l A Ki~ o RWA N DA ..lz . . ' ~ AG 1993