Ghana - Kpong Hydroelectric Project

Report No. 12141 Early Experience with Involuntary Resettlement Impact Evaluation on Ghana Kpong Hydroelectric Project (Loan 1380-GH) June 30, 1993 Operation Evaluation Department FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MICROGRAPHICS Report No: 12141 GH Type: IER *SdPcument has aleWticted distribution and may be-used bymtciplents. yd~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ b4protacdii fdte.scnet ynthrwise S w*-I 1 -.ta ACRONYMS ADC - Agrloultural Dvlopment Corporation CDR - Committee for the Defenc of the Revolutlon CEB Communaute Eectique de Benin ECG - Electicity Corporation of Gh&,aa GHASEL - Ghana Sugar Estat Uld. GWSC Ghana Water Supply Company MoA Ministry of Agrculture MoH - Minisfty c Health OD Operatonal Dirc~ve OMS Operational Manual Statement OPN - OperatIons Policy Note TDC - Town Development Councl UST - Un~versity of Scienoe and Technology. Kumasi, Ghana VALCO Volta Aluminum Company VLRDP - Volta Lake Research and Development Programme VRA - Volta River Auority FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Wahington, D.C. 20433 USA Olo. of D4e~or.eea June 30, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND TE PRESIDENT SUBECT: Early Esperience with Involuntary Resettlement ImatEvauaio on GHANA -Kpong HdolcrcPoet( 18-H Attached is the pact Evaluation on GHANA - Kpong Hydroelectric Project (Loan 1380-OH) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department Atuk~men Ihi docummnt ha a red~d dIsIbuton and may be used by r only i the pedonnance o meir o~icial duk&m be ontenti may not othaenise be bo whout Wodd Bank authodzon. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH IVOLUNTARYM wE N IMPACT EVALUATION ON GHANA KPONG HYDROELEC'RIC PROJECT (LOAN 138.G) TABLE OF CONTENTS Pag No. Prefac. .................................................... Executive snunary .................. 81 L BadWound .. 1 A. htrhdZcton ........ ................. .................* 1 B. The Power Ser iO....... ... 3 C The.QpxagPrjet ......................................... 4 IL Compensation ................................................ 7 A. Compensation(Citeda ...................................... 7 I Ca ................................................... 8 C. Settles Reaction toompea .. .......................... 8 D. Conclusions .............................................. 11 1. R settlement ................................................. 12 A. Legislative Franwok ......................... 12 B. Resettlment Program ....................... 13 C ResettlementImpmaton ................................ 14 D. Settler Perception ofseumt ............................. 16 E. IesettlementCosts ......................................... 16 F. Conclusions .............................................. 17 IV. Agricte.................................................... 19 A. Agricultural Development Program ............................. 19 RL LandiTenue ............................................. 20 C. Cropping Patters and Agriultural Production .................... 22 D. Labor .................................................. 24 E. Settle rP epton.......................................... 24 I. Con dusion ............................................. 24 V. Socia l apac ................................................. 26 A. Populatiodentity ......................................... 26 B. Fa* mnity ............................................ 26 C. Social Inf structure ........................................ 26 D. Incomes ........................................... 27 B Women and Children ............................... 30 E. Conclusis ..................................... ...... ... 31 WIL Envi on nt ................................................ 32 A. Back ound .............................................. 32 B. Public HlthPoliaies ................................. .. 32 . Impaa .............n................. ......... 33 D. Projecttac.t ............................................ 33 EL Cocadlu .............................................. 35 This document has a testricted distribution and may be used by tecipients only in the performance of their oficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without WorMd Bank authoibiation.j VII. Institutional lapact ............................................ 36 A. Organizational Structure .................................... 36 B. ResettlementPlanning ...................................... 36 C. Resettl.ment Implementation .................... ... ....... 37 D. Relations with Hosts ........................................ 38 B. Involvement of Resettlers and Hosts ............................ 39 F. Bank Performance ......................................... 40 0. Ex Post Evaluation ......................................... 42 H. Conclusions .................. ........................... 42 Annexes L1 Ghana - Electricity Sources and Consumption, 1971-1988 .............. 45 12 Ghana - Total Domestic Energy Consumption, by Sources ............. 46 IL1 Number of Rooms Before and After Resettlement ......... 47 IV. Reasons for Not Visiting Extension Officer - Resettler ...... 48 V.1 Age, Household Size and Education of Household Member ........... 49 V.2 Total Activities by Household Members and Hired Labor .d........... 50 V3 Source of Household Cash Income, Before and After Resettlement ...... 51 V.4 Percentage of Resottlers and Immigrants Who owned Household Items Prior to Resettlement and Percentage Who Have Purchased These Items Since Reettlement .................... 52 V.5 Household and Hired Labor .................................... 53 V.6 Labor Use and Area CultOvated as Between Crops ................... 54 V.7 Distance to Water, Fuelwood, Agricultural Extension Officers and Health C.nics ......................... 55 VL1 Frequency of Diseases, Resettler and Immigrant, 1992 ................ 56 VII.1 Organization of Resettlement Program ............................ 57 Appendit Approach Used by the Socio-Economic Survey ............................ 59 Attchmen 1. Comments received from CIDA - OfTe of the Auditor General ........ 61 2. . Comments rceived from CIDA - Country Programme Director ......... 63 3. Comiments received from the Kuwait Fund. ........................ 65 Figune la Text II. Decline in Avege Farm Sizes: 1977,1981, 1992 .................. 9 Tables In Tet II.1 Decline in Average Farm Slze .................................. 8 111.1 Land Cearing, Planned and Accomplished ......................... 15 IV.1 Agriculture Land Tenure, Before and After Resettlement ............. 20 IV.2 Characteristics of Ethnic Groups ............. ..*. ............. 21 IV3 Major occupations, Before and After Resettlement ................... 22 IV.4 Crop Cultivation, Before and After Resettlement .................... 23 IV.5 Distribution of Production of Main Crops, 1992 ..................... 23 V.1 Distribution of Ethnic Groups .................................. 26 V.2 Monthly and Estimated Annual Expenditures ....................... 28 V3 Net Returns and Labor Use, 1992 Compared to SAR Estimates for VORADEP, 1980 ......................... 29 Map IBRD 24978 FARLY wRENoCE WITH INVOLUNTARY RSILMN IMPACT EVALUATION ON GHANA KPONG HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (LOAN 1380-GH) PREFACE This is one of four impact evaluations to assess the resettlement process of Bank-supported large scale infrastructure projects and to determine the impact on the involuntarily displaced population. Countries and prjects were selected on the basis of criteria which included three considerations. Fust, historical trends, which showed that the majority of people displaced were in projects financing agriculture and energy development (these trends are expected to continue in the future). Second, the ongoing lending program, which expects a concentration of projects with involuntary resettlement in the Asia and Africa regions. Third, some successful projects in order to draw lessons for the future. The impact evaluation for Ghana Kpong Hydroelectric Project (Loan 1380-OH) was selected to obtain a perspective on resettlement beyond the Asia Region and also to determine the extent and lessons learned in Kpong from the experience of a previous project (Volta River Authority Hydroelectric project, Loan 310-GH), which was one of the first hydropower projects in Africa and which displaced some 80,000 people. Extensive surveys and studies were carried out from 1974 to 1977 by the Volta River Authority (VRA), Lands Department, the University of Science and Technology, Ministry of Agriculture, Volta Lake Research and Development project and private consultants, in preparation for the resettlement program. They included social and economic surveys, agricultural & soil, fishery and epidemiological studies, and formulation of a housing policy. OED recruited Professor Martha Tamakloe of the Faculty of Environmental and Development Studies, University of Science and Technology, Kumast, to undertake a more limited follow-up siuvey of about 200 households. The survey was stratified by resettlers and immigrants, since the project area had attracted a considerable number of people into the area since the new settlements were formed. Traditional chiefs and community leaders were also interviewed separately. The survey was urw1ertaken between 1991-2. The survey was the responsibility of Professor Martha Tamakloe and her team included Professor EJLA. Tamakloo, Faculty of Environment and Development Studies and Mr. JM. Nani Nutakor, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Science and Technology (UST), Kumasi, Ghana. Loan 1380 in the sum of US$39 million was approved on March 22, 1977, was signed on March 24, 1977 and became effective on August 24, 1977. The project was closed on December 31, 1982. The report is based upon a review of the appraisal reportV, the project audit repor, a review of the project fies, other relevant documents, and the results of the survey undertaken by UST. An OED mission visited the field and interviewed a number of resettler families, community leaders as well as officials at the dam site and in Accra. The draft report was sent to Government and cofinanciers on May 5, 1993. Comments received have been incorporated into the final reports and are reproduced as attachments. The valuable assistance provided during the preparation of the report by the Government of Ghana, VRA and Professor Martha Tamakloe, Mr. J.L Nani Nutakor and Professor E.KA. Tamakloe all of UST are gratefully acknowledged. a. Repot No.1200. Mach, 1977. b. Report No.A781. JUne, 1985. EARLY W RIENCE WITH INVOLUNTARY IMETLE vN IMPAACT EVALUATION ON GHANA KPONG HYDROE C PROJECT (LOAN 1380-GH) E fCTE SUMMARY 1. The Kpong Hydroelectric project was the the credit of VRA, was particularly striking third Bank-supported pioject to the Volta River given the deteriorating economic situation and Authority (VRA) in the power sector. The first political turmoil of the time. The PAR also project, the Volta River Authority Hydroelectric found that project justification was weak. The project (La 310-GH) was also the first Bank economic situation would !ave warranted only group operation in Ghana. It was approved in very high priority programs receiving the invest- September 1961 and closed on April 25, 1971. ment funds which were allocated to Kpong. The project financed construction of a rockfill There was a lack of coordination between dam at Akosombo to provide hydroelect-ic country economic sector work and investment power to Accra and Tema and to the nearby lending. The audit concluded that where eco- Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO) The nomic growth prospects are uncertain, more project was one of the first hydropower projects emphasis should be given to ensuring full utiliza- in Arica, cost US$190 million and its dam tion of existing capacity. The audit also recom- created the largest man-made lake in the work mended that the resettlement experience should a reservoir 300 miles long and 10 miles wide, be studied further. Actual costs were US$250.6 which displaced some 80,000 people. Loan 618- million' compared to estimated costs of US$ GH provided funding for the expansion of 236.5 million. Actual ERR was 7.5 peent; the Akosombo through provision of two additional same as had been estimated at appraisal. generating stations and related infrastructure. 4. OED undertook an impact evaluation nine 2. The Kpong Hydroelectric project was sup- years after project closing. This included a ported by the Bank with a US$39 million loan specially commissi socioeconomic survey by (Loan 1380-OH) to VRA for constrtction of a local consultants of a sample of households headpond at Kpong, 24 kilometers downstream displaced by the headpond, in order to deter- from Akosombo, with four generating units and mine the impact of resettlement on the lives of related infrastructure. About 4,597 people living the displaced population and to obtain the views in 55 small villages situated along the east and of the affected families. west banks of the river and on the islands were affected, together with about 1,100 people living S. The impact evaluation found that the reset- in the township of Lower Kpong. tlement outcome was unsatisfactory. Incomes have not been restored to the levels which 3. The project was implemented between 1977 prevailed prior to moving. This was due to and 1982 and the project was audited in 1985. several factors which centered around land and The main findings of the audit report (PAR) agricultural development policy (para 11). were that technically the project was a success; implementation delays of one year were attrbut- 6. There was little change in the mix of income ed to new procurement procedures; and cost sources. Cash income from crops, fish and, to a overruns were slight This success, which was to lesser extent, employment, account for the bulk -IV. of income after resettlement as it did before contracting schistosomlasis. The majority of relocation. resettlers preferred the combined villages to smaller villages. 7. The social infrastructureprovided is general- ly superior to the situation prior to resettlement 11. Reasons for the unsatisfactory outcome al is greatly appreciated by households. But were several: the implementation of plans for the provision of transportation facilities and water supply fell a insufficien agricultural land was provided; and short of expectations. 1@ Iplementation of the agricultural policy did & Resettlement has not had any observable not match either the resettlement plan or the effect on the general structure of the communi- changes itrr - ieed during implementation. ties, which have shown little social change ten This became critical in explaining the dissatis- years after relocation. Age and ethnic composi- faction with incomes and employment oppor- tion are similar to pre-resettlement. There has tunities. been a steady influx of population, attracted by the superior houses and services available in the 12. Inadequate agricultural land resulted from five resettlement sites. Some 20 percent of the the complex process of estimating land needs, population in the five resettlement sites in 1992 identifying land and allocating it. Several fac- were immigrants. tors, some conflicting, were involved and revi- sions were made in the process. Original calcu- 9. Resettlers remain very dissatisfied with the lations were based on land under cultivation, but resettlement outec; v. Over 80 percent consider did not and land lying fallow, which was used they are worse off in Aspect of incomes, and the under the traditional shifting cultivation system majority in terms of employment opprtunities. of farming. Transportation and markets were also poorly rated. Almost half the households were not 13. Project experience raises the issue which has satisfied with the houses given, long been debated among practitioners of reset- tlement: whether resettlement should be used as 10. Over 60 percent, however, considered that a vehicle for change, more particularly in eco- they were better off in terms of the public nomic terms. If resettlement with development services, particularly health and education. The is proposed (as is recommended in the Bank health component was well prepared in terms of guidelines) what, how, and when to introduce the potential health effects and the approach development activities, e.g, agricultural intensiff- used was comprehensive and appropriate. The cation, crop diversification, training, off farm acidence fch declined during employment. Thus at Kpong the original agri- project implementation but increased after the cultural policy was to minimize change and to project closed, while onchocerciasis declined as preservethopredominantlyagriculturaleconomy expected, as did malaria. Guinea worm disease by providing sufficient land to permit resettle- (dracunculiasis) was recorded, largely due to the ment to continue with traditional methods of problems in water supply. Project experience cultivation. Concern of the planners was in part shows the trade offs involved in the optimal based upon the problems at Akosombo in intro- distance in moving people - care was taken not ducing large scale mechanization. to move the villages tou far from the headpond, since most were riverine populations, yet some 14. Shortly after project approval, this approach villages were not moved far enough away from was substantially revised and replaced with an the headpond to prevent household members intensifcation strategy. After review by the from gaining acess to the water, and thereby Bank, this focus continued, albeit in madified *V- fonrm, supported also by the difficulties then was largely developed and tested in Ghana's emerging in obtaining sufficient replacement major Volta river project - the Akosombo dam. agriculural land. Was this change appropriate? Resettlement planning at Kpong benefitted from The impact evaluation concludes that it was for the Akosombo experience. Many, but not all, of two reasos. First, the households themselves the problems faced at Akasombo were avoided saw resettlement as a unique opportunity for at Kpong due to resettlement guidelines de- change. For example, instead of requesting signed to deal with issues such as integrating the replicas of the old villages, settlers asked for new resettlement component with the power compo- towns. Second, agricultural intensification was nent, providing replacement houses and to a shortly to be underway in the project area, better standard, consolidating villages in keeping sponsored by the parallel Volta Region Agricul- with households' wishes and also to enable tural Developmeat Project and thus it would common services to be provided, and detailed have been inappropriate to leave out resettlers - attention to health. particularly when they themselves were seeking out the extension agents. 19. A sound institutional structure was in place, staffed by seasoned professionals and with clear 15. Timing of the agricultural development responsibilities to the respective line agencies. activities was, however, poor. The technical Moreover, VRA was concerned to learn from, package and supporting services were to be and incorporate, the lessons from Akosombo introduced after the project was closed. This into the resettlement plans for Kpong. was not done. 20. During implementation, strong government 16. As a result, the impact evaluation shows that commitment to a satisfactory settlement experi- there was no significant change in cropping ence was evidenced in that the housing and patterns, while the expected inensive farming village infrastructure was constructed as planned techniques which were to compensate for the and without delays. This was financed by coun- lack of available lands were not generally adopt- terpart funds despite the worsening economic ed by resettlers due to lack of credit, inputs and situation and political instability in Ghana at the systematic extension advice. This together with time. the shorter fallows greatly reduced farm output. Nor was the intended irrigation developed to 21. Despite all these factors, a potentially boost production. Households consider the lack satisfying outcome for the settlers was not of land and irrigation facilities to be a major realized. The Kpong resettlement team, not- factor explaining why their incomes are lower withstanding explicit attempts to the contrary, than before. faced nearly all the same problems at Akosombo of time pressures, planning which failed to 17. Kpong's resettlement process was deficient establish baseEne data on incomes and to antici- in some elements of execution rather than in pate the problems in acquiring agricultural lands, policies. There was strong government commit- satisfying land needs, avoiding conflicts, inade- ment while three of the six factors which account quate support from qualified agricultural staIX for successful resettlementd - a clear legal frame- failures of handing over responsibilities from work, strong implementing agency, and commu- VRA to assigned agencies, etc. Under stable nity involvement - were in evidence. Planni%g economic and political conditions, the known was not well focussed while the development problers might have been corrected without program was delayed. delay. 1& The legal framework relating to land and for 22. Financial management of resettlement also dealing with resettlement was comprehensive. It caused avoidable problems and conflicts despite .vi- established policies and guidelines. Overall encountered in the Philippines, where house- resettlement cost accounting was poor. Valua- holds refused to take up land opportunities tions and land compensation payments were during the relfcation period preferring to treated as matters to be dealt with after resettle- work on the construction site, until the time ment. Valuations for compensation were not came when such opportunities finished; it was done, which meant that compensation for land then too late to obtain new lands. In Ghana, taken for resettlement was not paid, causing if irrigation had been provided - and small opposition to resettlement. areas of irrigated rice were prevalent in the area before the project, this may have proved 23. Some lessons can be noted: sufficiently attractive to retain households on the land at the time when the dam was being * Land disputes are common in Ghana; more constructed. attention should have been given to the likelihood that such disputes would affect the a Experience in other settlement projects have resettlement program. shown the importance of deiging houses which take cultural traditions into account; * A clear lesson which emerges from the experi- planners rightly drew on the lessons from ence of this and the other hydropower project Akosombo in having VRA build the hous - in Thailand is the need for much earlier experience in India reinforces this lesson attention to the agricultural program (income where households encountered considerable generating component) in general and closer difficulties in trying to both rebuild their direct involvement of the MoA, in particular. houses as well as reestablish their livelihoods To some degree this would have been much simultaneously. easier in Ghana where there was another Bank-financed project running almost in a There is need to review carefully the optimal parallel and in part of the project area; unlike distance to site villages from the health point in Thailand where the area was much more of view. Ibis would have been the best pre- remote and public services much less. The ventive measure for bilharza given that the survey showed that farmers are receptive to water levels in the headpond cannot fluctuate new technology - a substantial number of significantly and thereby be used to control farmers seek out the extension officer, in the the breeding cycle of the snails. absence of visits. a The overriding lesson from Kpong's resettle- * Farmers understandably were dissatisfied with ment pron.n is that more attention must be the unfulfilled promises. There is an impor- paid to 1.ian implementation. There were tant lesson for planners from project experi- generally sound policies, strong government once. At the time that the dam was being commitment, a suitable organization, and a constructed, alternative employment opportu- seasoned staff with very relevant resettlement nities existed for many households. VRA experience. Yet the program faced avoidable meanwhile was concerned not to clear more problems which were not adequately solved. land than was necessary and felt that the demand was low. The same situation was c Distortions in the exchange rate resulted in the US dollar equivalent of local costs being greatly underalated. EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH INVOLUNTARY RESETLEMENT IMPACT EVALUATION ON GHANA KPONG HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (LOAN 1380-GH) CHAPTE I: BACKGROUND A. Introduction Cuinaxr BANK Poucr 1.1 Current guidelines for involuntary resettlement in Bank-supported projectsY provide for: (a) adequate compensation of lost assets; (b) assistance with relocation and support during the transition period; and (c) assistance in reestablishing former living standards. Prior to 1980, when the first Bank guidelines were published,? responsibility for resettlement lay solely with the Borrower. Bank's loan documentation tended to be concerned mainly with land acquisition, timely evacuation of people out of the proect area and payment of compensation, with less consideration given as to where they were to be resettled and how their livelihoods were to be reestablished. 1.2 The Bank was the first international organization to adopt guidelines on involuntary resettlement. This was largely due to flawed resettlement operations in past Bank-supported projects. Concerns for displaced persons gave rise to the following basic policy directives: * project design should avoid or minimize the need for involuntary resettlement; o projects should ensure that those who have to move receive benefits from the project that displaces them; and * projects should provide displaced people with the means to improve their former living standards, or at the least ensure that they are not worse off than before relocation. 13 The Bank specified procedures and institutional arrangements for dealing with resettlement issues in the several phases of the project cycle and for supporting Borrowers in their adherence to the Bank's resettlement policy. These procedures deal comprehensively with resettlement planning and implementation, with resettlement planning as an integral part of project design, and community relocation as a development program. 1.4 With the Bank's recognition that technical support might assist in the satisfactory outcome of resettlement, there came detailed technical guidelines,1 issued in 1988, for preparing and appraising involuntary resettlement components, including how to include resettlement in financial Y OD 4.30 - June 1990; Involuntary Resettlement. I Operational Manual Statement (OMS) 2.33- Febuary 1960; Social issues Associated with involuntary Resettlement In Bank-Financed Projeals. "Involuntary Resetlement in Development Projecft: Policy GuIdelines in World Bank-Pnanoed Projects Technical Paper No.80. World Bank. -2- and economic analysis, and what pro forma cost tables were required; the same period also saw the publication of two relevant technical papers 1.5 Treatmeat of the legal issues associated with involuntary resettlement was also taken up. The paper recommended: (i) a detailed review of the domestic legal framework, including statutes governing the power of eminent domain - the right of the government to expropriate private land for the public good; (ii) the notion of just compensation, Le., replacement value; (iii) review of rights of people displaced who do not have legal title to the land, even though they may have occupied it for generations; and (iv) an opinion on whether the judicial provisions for redress are adequate. 1.6 Bank guidelines made provision for the protection of indigenous populations. Initially it was expected that these people would be left undisturbed as far as possible given the special importance of land for these communitiesO "As a general policy, the World Bank will not assist development projects which knowingly involve encroachment on traditional territories being used or occupied by tribal people, unless adequate safeguards are provided." (para 5). 1.7 Subsequently there came a progressive broadening' in the range of the Bankls policy considerations for involuntary resettlement, including that special consideration should be given to protect those who may not have established or legal rights - minorities, the landless, women, indigenous and ethnic groups. Meanwhile, the approach to indigenous peoples also changed in 1991 to require consultation with the indigenous peoples to determine whether they wish to participate in the development process or whether they prefer to remain apart with protection for their cultural traditions. OamsenVES 1.8 The objectives are to: - examine how resettlement was implemented and determine the effects of resettlement on the lives of affected families; * "Dams and the Environment Considerations In World Bank projects. Technical Paper No.110, 199. world Bank Tnam Safety and the Environment" Technical Paper No.118. World Bank, 1990. 9I involuntay Resettlement in Bank Aselated Projects: An Introduction to Legal issues. Legal Department/World Bank. Apri 198. SOMS 234 - Febrmy 198 TrIbal People in Bank.Financed Projects. V Updaled guidellnes were Issued in 190 Poonotle 1) which superseded previous guIdelines, including OperaMons Policy Note (OPN) 10.06. The purpose was to broaden the treatment of resettlement Isues beyond hydropower and inigation prjects to all types of Invesment operaions. OD 4.20 - September 1991; Indigenous Peoples. -3- 0 compare the resettlement experience in different countries and wnder varying circumstances and relate this experience to the Bank's evolving resettlement policies and guidelines over the last ten years; and * draw lessons from the findings and conclusions for more effective resettlement policies and practices by the Bank. IL The Power Sector In Ghaws 1.9 Hydroelectric resources of the Volta river are Ohana's priacipal electric energy source. Oil exploration in the period 1978-86, mainly offshore on the continental shelf near Saltpond, produced an output of only 1,250 barrels per day during the early 1980's despite an estimated reserve of 7 million barrels. Offshore production was shut down. Onshore exploration in the Tano basin in the late 1980's was equally unsuccessful, and Ghana has no known coal deposits. Over 90 percent of electricity consumption is generated by hydroelectric power, the balance being supplied by diesel generators (see Annex-Tables L1 and I2). 1.10 The power sector consists of two statutory corporations owned by the Government of Ghana. The Volta River Authority (VRA) was created in 1961 to generate and transmit bulk hydropower. The other public agency, established in 1967, is the Electricity Corporation of Ghana (ECO). It retails some of the bulk supply received from VRA and also operates a small number of diesel generators for public electricity supply. 1.11 VRA's three major clients, consuming over 90 percent of supplied capacity, are the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO), BCG and Communaute Electrique de Benin (CEB), with over half the supply consumed by VALCO. 1.12 The Volta river's potential for hydropower production was identified in the mid 1950's. The first major development stage was the Akosombo dam and plant projecL This project hinged on the 1961 agreement between the Government of Ghana and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation. The commitment provided for the Government to construct Akosombo and for Kaiser to construct an aluminum smelter and purchase the bulk of the hydroplants output at concessional rates. The Bank and other lenders participated in financing the project that VRA was to construct. Bank loans for on lending to VRA comprised: 310-OH (US$47 million in 1962), 618-GH (US$6 million in 1969), and credits to Ghana for re-lending to ECG 118-GH (US$10 million in 1968) and 256-GH (US$7.1 million in 1971). The Akosombo hydropower development created one of the world's largest man-made reservoirs, a hydroplant equipped with six units with total rated output of ' OMS 2.33, Februaly 1980; Soc11 Issues Associated with Involuntary Pesem in BankFinanced Projecs. OM8 2.34, February 192; Tribal People in Bank-Financed Projects * OPN 10.08, October 108; Operations Issues In the Treatment of Involuntahy Resettlement In BankmFnanced Poects. * Would Bank Technical Paper No.80,1988; involuntary Resetlement in Dvlopment Projects; Policy GuidelInes in World Bank-Finced Projects. o Involuntary Resettlement in Bank Assisted Projecta; An Introduction to Iegal leaues, Calos R. Eacudero, Legal Depatment- World Bank lees. OD 4.30, June 1990; involuntaty Resettlemefti * 0D +, Indigenous Peoples. -4- 912 MW, and a grid of 162 kv transmission lines to Tema (VALCO), Accra, Togo and Benin. Akosombo's first stage was implemented in 1972 and completed in December, 1981. 1.13 Studies to determine additional generating capacity were carried out during 1969-1971 and concluded that the Kpong project, 24 km downstream from the Akosombo dam, seemed the most economic choice. Kpong, therefore, represents the third stage in the hydro development of the Volta River. C. The Kpong Project 1.14 The Kpong Hydroelectric project was supported by the Bank with a US$39 million loan (Loan 1380-GH for on-lending to VRA. This loan represented 20 percent of Kpong's foreign cost Other major cofinanciers were: Arab agencies 46 percent, CIDA 15 percent, and European agencies 11 percent. The Bank's loan was fully disbursed and closed by December 31, 198Z about one year behind the SAR schedule. 1.15 The Kpong project is located on the Volta River some 24 km from Akosombo, 80 km by road from Accra and 84 km by road from Tema, Ghana's deep-wate. seaport. 1.16 The Kpong project is based on the general expansion studies of 1974-75 which confirmed that additional generating capacity for Ghana should be speedily provided since the system depended almost entirely on Akosombo which might be vulnerable to system failures in the late 1970's. Four generating units, each with a design capacity rated at 40 MW provide an output capacity of 160 MW. Civil works started in November, 1977. All generating units were commissioned for service by December, 1981. 1.17 Project preparation was influenced by two concerns: power rates, and environmental and resettlement issues. Hydropower development in Ghana was determined by the establishment of the aluminum industry (para 1.11). The contractual electricity rate, established in 1962, was concessional and was to remain constant for 30 years with no provisions for adjustment That rate was no longer considered equitable after ten years due to worldwide inflation and the 1973 oil crisis. Negotiations for a rate revision, supported by the Bank and other potential lending agencies for the Kpong project, took three years (1973-1976) and were responsible for delaying project preparation. The environmental and resettlement issues were stressed in the preparation of the Kpong project because of great weaknesses in the implementation of the Akosombo resettlement program. 1.18 Despite these problems, responsibility for the Kpong project resettlement program was again vested in VRA. Compared to VRA's first major resettlement program of the Akosombo project, the resettlement planned for Kpong was small and seemed manageable. The creation of Lake Volta 'covering 800,000 ha) by the Akosombo dam called for the relocation of some 700 villages with 80,000 persons to 52 new sites. The Kpong reservoir (3,650 ha) displaced about 1,561 households in 55 villages who were resettled on 6 new sites as follows: W The Board approved the project on March 22, 1977; the an was siganed on March 24, 1977 and became effective on August 24, 1977. -5- Number of Households East Bank Old Akrade 184 Fodzoku 508 Torgorme 182 West Bank Natriku 90 West Kpong 253 South Senchi 364 Total 1,561 1.19 The reservoir created by the Kpong dam submerged the Senchi and Kpong rapids upstream and extends to the Akosombo dam. The reservoir affected small farming and fishing villages and the larger urban settlement of Kpong located along a 24 km stretch of the Volta River. Resettlement started at the end of 1978 and was completed in April 1981, just three months ahead of reservoir impounding. 1.20 The preparation of the Kpong project provided a rare opportunity to learn from the planning failures of the recent, larger, adjacent project and to avoid the resettlement problems of the upstream Akosombo project. Institutions (principally VRA but also responsible government departments) with seasoned personnel were in place to design and implement an improved resettlement process. 1.21 VRA's organizational structure (Annex-Figure VII.) to plan and implement resettlement, consisted of four subdivisions: ENGNmeGs headed by project engineer responsible for civil works. REsErnamcr headed by a settlement administrative officer responsible for land allocation, community development and valuation. IrAL:m headed by an epidemiologist responsible for all health aspects. AGrcuLTuam headed by an agricultural coordinator responsible for the agricultural settlement program. This organization essentially follows the structure used at Akosombo, with one difference. At Akosombo, agriculture was a separate organizational unit whereas at Kpong agricultural resettlement was part of the resettlement program, although the agricultural program was carried out under the direction of the extension staff of the Ministry of Agriculture. 1.22 At the time that the project was being implemented, Ghana was experiencing a period of great economic strain. Between 1973-83: GDP fell 13 percent per annum, industrial output by seven percent, exports by 6.4 percent, imports by eight percent, cocoa output by7.1 percent and food production by 2.7 percent. The annual rate of inflation rose from about six percent during the 1965- 73 period to 50 percent overall in the following decade. By 1982, when the project was completed, -6- per capita incomes had fallen by 30 percent, export earnings were halved and import volumes fell to one third the levels of 1970. The deterioration in the economy was such that in April 1983, government adopted an Economic Recovery Program, supported by the Bank and the IMP, which has been described as one of the severest adjustment programs ever accepted.1' That there were some shortcoming in what they were able to achieve in these conditions is not surprising. The achievements in relocation of the affected population are a tribute to the priority accorded to it by government. ORGAzATrON OF TMIs STUDY 1.23 This evaluation undertook a specially commissioned socio-economic survey in 1991-92 in part to obtain some insight into the perceptions of those affected by resettlement* regarding existing agricultural practices, social networks and residential communities, kinship groups and family systems, formal and Informal associations. The survey covered 196 households from five villages on both the east and west banks of the dam. A sixth resettlement village, Old Akrade, was excluded from the survey since, at the time of the fied mission, all but a handful of resettlers had fled following a land dispute (para 7.17 et seq). The views of host communities were obtained through separate interviews with community leaders. The survey was undertaken under the leadership and general direction of Professor Martha Tamakloe together with Professor E.K.A. Tamakloe both of the Faculty of Environment and Development Studies and Mr. JM. Nani Nutakor of the Faculty of Agriculture, University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana. The specific objectives of the study were: * What are the households' living standards and earning capacities now? o Are households' living conditions equal to, better or worse than before resettlement? * Are households satisfied with the compensations received for land, crops and buildings? o What are their view on the resettlement operation - preparation; their participation in developing plans for resettlement; the move to the new villages; the amount and quality of land provided ; and the assistance given by all responsible public agencies before, during and after resettlement? Further details on the approach employed for the survey are in the Appendix. y sam, Had. a. Wwmna Fund for Aguftua Development New York Univeral"y Pres. 1991. CHAPER Ih COMPENSATION A. Compensation Criteria 2.1 The basic policy adopted for the Kpong project which was based upon the experience derived from Akosombo, was: * Replacement of resettlers' houses and land, rather than payment of cash compensation. * Payment of cash by government for crops, temporary structures and incomplete structures. o Payment of cash by government for resettlement land used for housing, community facilities and farmland. 2.2 A precise house replacement policy was adopted. * VRA was to build all houses. o The standard of new houses was to be better the than existing mud and thatch house; e.g. good material, including non-traditional material, kitchen and bath area for all houses. * Replacement on room-for-room basis. * Design of houses to have regard to cultural traditions, Le., compound housing with central courtyard, cluster housing for extended family life. * Design for those entitled to only one or two rooms to allow for future house extensions. 2.3 The criteria for land compensation, Le., what would constitute 'replacement land', was only developed during implementation as agricultural development plans were prepared and reviewed (paras 4.2 et seq). Much of the resettlement land was not expected to involve payment by the project because several resettler groups remained on their tribal or stool land,F and some groups were moved to government owned land. 2.4 Two commercial farms affected by the reservoir - 263 ha of cotton and rice farmed by the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) on the East Bank, and 400 ha of sugarcane developed by the Ghana Sugar Estates Ltd. (GHASEL) on the West Bank - were not interested in receiving cash payments but opted for land replacement and provision of irrigation facilities lost. M Valuation was canied out by the Lands Department Cash compenealon was based on the valuatlon, inceased by a factor of ten to alow for replacement value. SOo00land ie land held, under cuelomaly law, asthe terriloy controlled bye paramount chief. People relding witin the stool are eqpsed to owe allegiance to the chief and to conform to local cueloms and les of behavior. B. Costs 2.5 Government was responsible for all compensation costs. No detailed or overall cash compensation costs were estimated prior to resettlement. Valuations for crops and structures entitled to cash compensation were made during and after completion of resettlement. An estimate of o2.5 million for crop compensation was made in 1982. A master list of structures entitled to cash compensation (645 structures) was valued at o1.1 million. Ten years after completion of resettlement it was not known how much, if any, of the estimated 3.6 million had been paid. The survey showed that only 20 percent of resettlers recalled receiving payment for crops and equipment. 2.6 Valuation of affected lands, both land inundated and land used for resettlement, was not carried out before or during resettlement. No payments for lands which were acquired for resettlement program have been made and land valuations have still to be made ten years after resettlement. 2.7 As to the relocation on stool lands or government lands, cash compensation was required for stool lands but not for fovernment lands. In this case, however, there are opportunity costs which should be accounted for. 2.8 Land owned by the two commercial farms was valued at o2.26 million. 2.9 Another compensation item of unknown quantity relates to assistance given to resettlers in the immediate relocation period, notably food distributions lasting from 3 weeks to 3 months. C. Rettlers Reaction to Compensation 2.10 VRA's decision to compensate resettlers mainly in kind for housing and land was based on the experience at Akosombo where cash compensation - with the expectation that resettlers would construct their homes - caused major problems. Families at Kpong were consulted and they agreed with VRA's policy of housing and land replacement (as did ADC and GIASEL for their affected land, para 2.4). 2.11 In 1992, there was widespread dissatisfaction among households heads with the compensation given primarily in terms of land, to a lesser extent with housing and the cash compensation. Among community leaders, most dissatisfaction was expressed with the cash compensation; half considered the compensation for lands and house to be quite adequate. 2.12 IAm. Replacement land was not equivalent to what was last. Resettlers' perception of their incomes being "worse off (para 5.14) is a direct result of less land being available since both the primary and secondary occupation for these households is agriculture. In addition, promises were not fulfilled (para 4.13) The survey shows the extent of the land loss. Table 11.1: Dedne In Average Farm Stze 1977 1981 1992 Number of Landholder 160 142 172 Total hectares 545 114 140 Average Farm Size 3.4 0.8 0.8 -9- 213 The impact at the village level is demonstrated in the following figure: Figure II.1: Decline In Average Farm Sizes - 1977, 1980/81, 1992 (farm size In ha) 4.5- 1977 IM 41980/81 £3 0.5' W.Kpong S.Sench Torgorm Fodzoku Narikw HuUShOlds: 253 364 182 508 90 Perewtag 16 11 12 33 6 2.14 The failure to obtain sufficient replacement lands was due in part to the lack of management attention to the agricultural component (para 43 et seq), to the lack of interest at that time among the resettlers themselves when other employment opportunities were available (para 4.16) and to land tenure difficulties. In Ghana, land is closely tied to religious values and beliefs; land disputes therefore are not uncommon. SouTH SENCRI LOD PROBLJM 2.15 The resettlement land for this village had been acquired earlier for the Akonombo project. But land tenure circumstances made it difficult to use the land for resettlers from Akosombo. The land in question, some 670 ha, belonged to two ethnic groups. To the north were Akwamu lands, where usufruct was held communally, to the south were Krobo lands, where farmers had individual rights. A number of these individuals resisted compulsory acquisition. Compensation may not have been paid to all owners and those who did receive compensation felt it was inadequate. The Kpong project, therefore, had first to resolve Akosombo's problem. It was resolved during implementation but caused delays; settlers reported that conflicts were still causing problems (Table IV.2). Towoonus Draue 2.16 The farmers of Torgorme were to be resettled on 40 ha of rainfed agricultural land and 25 ha of irrigation land. As a result of their opposition to the agricultural resettlement program, the cleared land reverted to bush. There were three reasons for -heir opposition: - 10- * One problem arose because some owners with land under wild palm cultivation refused to surrender the land for clearing. o The proposed irrigation farm development for Torgorme was resisted because the irrigation canals would run through their existing farms. * A long standing dispute by the chief and farmers of Torgorme with the government was ievived by resettlement. The ADC's leased government land was wanted by Torgorme famers for agricultural resettlement. 2.17 The resistance and delay caused in settling the dispute was made feasible because only half of Torgorme's farmland was flooded, so that much farming could continue on unaffected farmland. A compromise was reached later on the use of ADC lands. FoDzoxu 2.18 Two issues at Fodzoku illustrate (i) the lack of cooperation between planners and resettlers, and (ii) failure to ensure plan implementation: * Before agricultural resettlement started VRA attempted a program whereby farming activities could continue uninterrupted throughout the resettlement process. Seeds were to be replanted on new plots. Farmers asked VRA to provide a mechanical planter, which VRA refused to do; instead VRA took over the management of the new agricultural land. However, the farmers came later to reap the harvest. * Conflict arose between Fodzoku farmers and the adjacent village of Aforkpakope over cattle grazing. Under the agricultural program, Aforkpakope's farmers were to change from traditional open, large tract cattle grazing to controlled, fenced grazing. Fences were to be put up. Whether the fencing was properly done is not known but Aforkpakopes cattle farmers failed to control their animals and continue traditional grazing methods with resulting destruction of crops on resettled farmland. 2.19 Reduction in land holdings may appear relatively less important to the essentially urban dwellers of West Kpong and Natriku, yet the 1990 survey showed that there was a high incidence of unemployment in Natriku, which would indicate that households would look to agriculture to meet subsistence needs at the least. While in Kpong, subsequent investigation showed that there were more households relying on agriculture than had at first been thought. 2.20 HousiNG. All resettlers were given replacement houses, and the survey showed that over 85 percent were living in these houses, a few had rented them out. Almost half the resettlers considered that housing conditions were "better off" after relocation and almost half considered conditions to be worse of. This latter finding is surprising in view of the policy to replace an equal number of rooms at a higher standard. The survey provides a partial answer for the dissatisfaction. Resettled families were, according to the survey, given smaller houses (Annex-Table II.) in that the median number of resettlers rooms decreased from 3.4 to 2.& Before resettlement 72 percent of families surveyed lived in houses with more than two rooms but only 58 percent of the families were resettled in houses with three or more rooms. It seems likely however, that resettlers are using a different basis for ' The median caluAtadon is more appropilme than the average due to the wide varation In numbers of roome. - 11 - comparisonAW Dissatisfaction with the houses was also due to the inadequate quality of building materials used. Cracks in buildings as well as dampness were noted, particularly at West Kpong. 2.21 The dissatisfaction expressed by community leaders in the survey, especially of inadequate cash compensation payments for crops, appears to show concern for the results, rather than the principle established for compei.-ating resettlers. Whilst there are no official data on the amount of compensation monies paid, (para 2.5) this was also a period of great economic strain in Ghana when the annual inflation rate was 53 percent per annum for food prices and 47 percent for non food prices. This is likely to have affected perceptions of the adequacy of the amounts received. Among households, there was much less concern regarding the adequacy of cash payments; instead their attention was caught by the lack of agricultural lands from which to earn a living. D. Conclusions 2.22 The compensation policy of replacement in kind for both houses and land and cash compensation for structures and crops was sound. The housing policy was particularly well developed. Experience in other settlement projects have shown the importance of designing houses which take cultural traditions into account; planners rightly drew on the lessons from Akosombo in having VRA build the houses - experience in India reinforces this lesson where households encountered considerable difficulties in trying to both rebuild their houses as well as reestablish their livelihoods simultaneously. The fact that almost half the households was not satisfied with the houses given, raises the question as to whether the expectations were realistic (para 7.24). 2.23 Implementation, however, encountered several difficulties, the most important of which concerned replacement lands. Settlen and hosts (para 7.15) remain dissatisfied. The problems were: (i) assessing land compensation due to resettlers, (ii) providing adequate compensation in kind for lands, (iii) supplying the amount of land and irrigation equipment that was promised, and (iv) compensating the hosts. Valuation of land and settling claims were treated as matters to be dealt with later and not as part of the resettlement process. Implementation of the housing policy also suffered from inadequate quality of materials used. 2.24 Inadequate agricultural land resulted from the complex process of estimating land needs, identifying land and allocating it Several factors, some conflicting, were involved and revisions were made in the process. Original calculations were based on land under cultivation but did not add land lying fallow which was used under the traditional shifting cultivation system of farming. Land disputes are common in Ghana; more attention should have been given to the likelihood that such disputes would affect the resettlement program. ' The survey to etablish the sle of house was undertaken two years before seatlers moved. it is Ikely that resettlers took as the size of house before reseting as including any rooms which had been added on after the survey yet before moving. Asocio-economcO aurvey undertaken downstream at Tema where 12,000 members of the Ga tribe were moved between 1952-0 for construcion of the new port and harbor at Teme, found that households primarily complained that they did not receive as many rooms as they were entitled to, but loen in the hope of being given more rooms. See Tema Manhean: A study ofelement Amrtflo, G.W., Butcher, DAP. and Whitham, David. Ghana Univesitis Press Aoora, 1986. - 12- CHAPTE IIIl EEILMN A. Legislaton Framework 3.1 There are several laws which deal with the administration of stool (community) lands, land acquisition, compensation and the use of land for public purposes. In addition, legislation establishing the VRA gave the Authority powers to administer lands affected by hydropower development of the river Volta and to deal with cL aquent resettlement 3.2 Relevant laws relating to the acquisition and administration of land, compensation and resettlement are: * State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) and Amendment Decrees, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 307), 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 62). This act provides for the acquisition of land in the national interest * Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) and Amendment Decree 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 61), which consolidates the enactments relating to the administration of Stool and other lands. * Volta River Development Act, 1961 (Act 46) and Amendment Decree 1967 (N.LCD. 211). This provides for the establishment of the Volta River Authority and among other duties assigned to the Authority are: land acquisition; power to administer certain lands liable to be inundated and lands adjacent thereto; dealing with the resettlement of people living in the lands to be inundated; assigning to the Authority local government functions; dealing with compensation in relation to the State Lands Act, 1962. 3.3 Other laws affecting the municipal administration of resettlement lands: * Local Government Law, 1988 (P.N.D.C.L 207) which deals with local government administration. * Local Government (Asuogyama District Assembly) (Establishment) Instrument, 1988 (LL 1431). This instrument provides for the establishment of the District Assembly, and its functions, for the district which includes the Kpong settlements. 3.4 The actual principles followed for planning of resettlement in Kpong emerged from the Akosombo experience, VRAs first resettlement program. The large scale resettlement at Akosombo was mounted only after construction of the dam began, the resettlement program was experimental, and the population to be resettled was not prepared for moving. As a result, many problems emerged once the people were resettled leading, in extreme cases, to the abandonment of resettlement sites. 3.5 The general guidelines adopted by VRA for resettlement in the Kpong project were: * Resettlement to be treated as a component of the dam ard power project. * New villages should be located to minimize difficulty with respect to land tenure and host community. - 13- * The size of the new villages should be sufficient to support services and facilities but not too large to change significantly the village life-style. New housing must be equivalent to replace accommodation and designed to resrect traditional, social and cultural needs. * Efforts should be made to establish an economic base in the new villages. 0 Due regard must be given to public health requirements. 3.6 It was also expected that agricultural development would be a two stage process - a resettlement, followed by a development, phase. B. Resettlement Program 3.7 Extensive surveys and studies were carried out from 1974 to 1977 by VRA, Lands Department, the University of Science and Technology (USI), Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Volta Lake Research and Development project and private consultants, in preparation for the resettlement program. They included social and economic surveys, agricultural & soil, fishery and epidemiological studies, and formulation of a housing policy. 3.8 The resettlement program was published in 1977 and provided for* o resettlement of 1,089 households with some 7,000 persons, * preparation of about 1,140 ha of land for the resettlement areas, o preparation of 1,775 ha of non-irrigated agricultural land, * development of about 600 ha of gravity irrigated land as compensation for flooded commercial land, and * replacement of irrigation facilities, roads and utility services. 3.9 Relocation planning was mainly determined by two considerations - ethnic grouping and proimity to original villages. The social surveys had c tablished the different ethnic groupings, the largest of which affected by the project was Ewe (Table V.1, para 5.1) Six new sites (see map) were selected to provide for the resettlement, as near as possible, to the original 55 villages and built within small neighborhoods or precincts designed to preserve resettlement kinship and social patterns. New Settlement Populaton Distance from Exisng vilage (kms) Torgorme 854 > 1 Natriku 380 2 West Kpong 1,927 2 South Senchi 1,186 4-7 Old Akrade 377 5 Fodzcku 1,930 3 * 14- 3.10 Another resettlement guideline, based on the Akosombo experience, was dealing with exposure to waterborne and other diseases (Chapter VI). C. Resetnent mplementation 3.11 Resettlement of the first households who lived in the area of initial civil works started in December, 1978, and resettlement was completed on schedule in April, 1981. Agricultural land allocation was completed in July, 1981. The fact that the houses and villages infrastructure were completed without delays, financed by counterpart funds during a period of high inflation in particular and economic problems in general, indicates that government and VRA gave resettlement a high priority. As experience from other countries has shown, strong government commitment is an essential element in a successful resettlement effect. 3.12 Consultations were conducted with the leaders of groups to be resettled and agreements were reached about the resettlement sites. Where host communities were affected by the resettlement program, negotiations for land to be used for resettlement sites and agriculture did take place. But conflicts did arise later, especially in Old Akrade, leading to the complete abandonment of the resettlement site (para 7.17 et seq). 3.13 Two examples of implementation not following resettlement plans were the elimination of the construction of a dike at West Kpong resettlement site and the land clearing for the agricultural component. The recommended diking, which was preferred by the Kpong community, would have avoided the relocation of about 1,000 persons. It appears that time pressures in the construction schedule favored relocation of families over construction of the dike. Yet the essentially urban trader population involved should have remained in town near the main road instead of being relocated to an agricultural location. 3.14 As the following table shows, land clearing was not undertaken according to plan, either in terms of timing or the amount cleared. 3.15 Delays were often due to unavailability of equipment or broken down equipment waiting for spare parts. In addition, doubts about (i) the availability of farm labor during the construction of the hydro-project and (ii) the interest of resettlers in farming after completion of the project, led to the adoption of a policy of making farmland available in response to demand rather than clearing land in advance of demand. Plot demarcation was either not done at all or poorly done leading to disputes among resettled farmers. 3.16 ltere were other delays in implementation. In September, 1980, just six months before resettlement was to be completed, Bank staff insisted on: * aggressive mobilization of equipment; * Immediate resolution of land ownership problerms at Old Akrade & Fodzoku; * immediate survey of land requirements; 19 Fouh Project Review Repon (VRA), March, 1081. 〕袖馴細n工hl〞州C細晌唱劉細．馴細•dA偶濾•卹胎細細 騙 齣個鰍徇豳由圃個為•目山國•寫取．心，州h豳鵝k細，叮萬廈劍嗷 膩中囉你加畸州由h吋州．訕鬨豳細•試由喊戶d賽柚細．d徇戶曲”發．細嗎鳥訕由廈彌L A神•由仁 ．勵•開細臘臘編阿細闐． ..）•細馴織國略 爍計糾 -16- " need for the Electricity Company of Obana and the Ghana Water Supply Company (OWSC) to establish methods for selling power and water. (VRA to order 1,000 licusehold meters for ECO); " need to establish a firm plan for maintenance of village roads, garbage disposal, latrine maintenance with the District Council; " need to assist in setting up health & education services. 3.17 11ere is a limited amount of drawdown land suitable for agricultural use. 71c agricultural resettlement program did not consider the possible use of drawdown land. Such land is used by enterprising farmers who established their claims on a first come basts. D. Settler Perception of Resettlement 3.18 Surveys conducted before the start of the Kpong project did not find out affected faniffies! knowledge about the dam construction and their attitudes and expectations about resettlement. Communities in the general area were certainly aware of the consequences of dam construction from the recent Akosombo dam, but their mactions; to the decision to build the Kpong dam are not known. 3.19 Most heads of households describe their families as 'worse off" in respect of income (83 pe=nt), employment opportunities (65 percent), means of transport (43 percent) and markets (50 percent) However, they were "better off" in respect of public servicer. health facilities (63 pment), primary schools (74 percent), agricultural extension services (54 p=mt). 3.20 Ite three most important problem mentioned by resettlers in making a living after relocation were lack of agricultural equipment, lack of agricultural land and lack of capital. Resettlers had been accustomed to a pattern of shifting cultivation. As the survey showed, they are very receptive to new niethods/technology, and subsequent agncultural development plans expected there to be an intensffication strategy, in view of the shortage of unoccupied lands. Nmertheless, there has been no follow-on agricultural development strategy to ensure that the necessary inputs for such an stratea are in place. L Resettlement Costs 3.21 Cost data estimates for resettlement are available from the feasibility study and the Staff Appraisal Report but no reliable data wac available at either the completion or post-completion stage. Resettlement cost esfamates for the Kpong project generaffy exclude cash compensation for bud purchase and crop payments, although a nominal amount for the purchase of land was included in the feasibility study. No assessed value was established for resettlement land - housing sites and new agricultural land (para 2.6). 3.22 Fust estimates of resettlement costs were made for the feasibility study in 1976, Costs were based on the consultants' resettlement plan and included costs for housing, schook water and wwecage, land clearance, moving expenses, and some land purchase. Total resettlement costs amounted to &05 million cedis (US$7 million). - 17- 3.23 The Staff Appraisal ReportD confirmed the cost of o8.05 million (1975 prices). On a per capita cost basis the Kpong resettlement was expected to be el,400 compared to ol,000 for the Akosombo resettlement program. Of the total cost of resettlement (US$&2 million equivalent), the Bank was to provide US$1.2 million to cover the foreign exchange cost of equipment, vehicles and US$0.4 million for preliminary works of the first village to be resettled. The remainder of the costs was the responsibility of VRA. 3.24 Actual resettlement costs are difficult to trace and consistent records were apparently not kept. The minutes of the meeting of March 31, 1981 between VRA and the Bank mission state: "L The Mission strongly recommended that steps be taken to keep track of current expenditures on resettlement to enable a final resettlement cost to be established. This is necessary to make possible the calculation of the per capital (sic) cost of resettling the affected population." These recommendations were made near the end of the resettlement process, and there is no evidence that resettlement cost accounting improved. 3.25 The Project Completion Report records actual resettlement costs of 09.5 million plus US$1.6 million. Compared to appraisal estimates this indicates a 20 percent increase in local costs and a marginal increase of about one percent in foreign costs, in constant terms. 3.26 The ratio of resettlement costs to total project costs decreased from 4.0 percent at appraisal to 2.2 percent on completion. F. Conclusions 3.27 The legal framework relating to land and for dealing with resettlement is comprehensive. It was largely developed and tested in Ghana's major Volta river project - the Akosombo dam. Resettlement planning and implementation at Kpong benefitted from the Akosombo experience. Many, but not all, of the problems faced at Akosombo were avoided at Kpong due to resettlement guidelines designed to deal with issues such as integrating the resettlement component with the power component, providing replacement houses and to a better standard, consolidating villages in keeping with households' wishes and also to enable common services to be provided and detailed attention to health. 3.28 The provision of public services after relocation is generally considered superior by resettlers. The majority of resettlers preferred the combined villages to smaller villages. Discussions with community leaders revealed that many villages at the outset saw relocation as a unique opportunity for change. Instead of requesting replicas of the old villages, settlers asked for new towns. The traditional thatch was to be replaced with corrugated iron roofs. They had great expectations. Some envisaged a "small Accra" in the new sites. The modern layout, therefore, was in response to their requests prir to moving. l Repoit No.129b-GH dated March 1, 1977. 1W Report No.5781 dated June 25, 195. - 18- 3.29 Good intentions were not successfully pursued in other respects: * Insufficient agricultural land was provided to enable families to be as well off as before resettlement. * Resettlement cost information remained uncertain throughout the project. * While the resettlement plan in general observed policies, implementation of the agricultural policy did not match either the plan or the changes introduced during implementation. This became critical in explaining the dissatisfaction with incomes and employment opportunities. - 19 - CHAPTER IV: AGRICULTURE A. Agricultural Developmnt Progrm 4.1 The agricultural strategy adopted for the Kpong resettlement program was to maintain the predominantly agricultural economy and to provide sufficient land for the resettled communities to continue their traditional methods of cultivation. The rationale was that the resettlement program overall was to minimize social change. The experience of Akosombo, where the agriculture program which attempted to introduce intensification through large-scale mechanization, was one of the biggest failures, resulted in planners concluding that 'many resettlement programs have failed because they have been turned into development projects..." Nevertheless, tension between providing a strictly resettlement program (replacement lands)and a development program (provision of inputs, irrigation, extension advice) was apparent throughout implementation. Neither the resettlement nor the development objective was fully achieved. 4.2 Planning of the agricultural program began after project approval, in early 1977. VRA prepared a plan, with input from the Ministry of Agriculture, work was to commence in August 1977. The plan assumed a stabilized/Intensification strategy, including the provision of irrigation over 40 percent of the area, mechanization and subsidized inputs. This strategy, however, ran contrary to the assumption of retaining the traditional methods of agriculture. 43 7U first review of these proposals by the Bank in March 1978 questioned the departure from the stated policy - partiidarly in respect of providing irrigation. Although implementation was already delayed, it propose a redesign of the program. A detailed field review followed in April/May 1978 In keeping with the original objective, the consultant's TOR was to prepare a resettlement program rather than a development program - which was expected to be part of a post settlement/post project phase. 4.4 The report,V however, recommended a two stage process which combined elements of both: * a four year settlement phase, which, because of delays in the program, would concentrate on land clearing of an area equal to that cultivated by families in their original village in the previous year, this would be implemented by VRA; * a three year post settlement phase which would complete clearing of sufficlent lands to replace those currently under fallowP and provide agricultural supporting services, this phase implemented by MoA. The report also noted that no complete survey of farm holdings had yet been made, but that none of the spot surveys undertaken to date had included fallow lands. The average area addvate, JV Kpong Hydroelectric Projectsetement program, dated Mamh 30, 1978. SGhana - Kpong Hydroelectric project, Agrloultural Settement proposal, June 16, 1978. 1W The report recommended a replacement ratio of 2.6 for lot fetile rivebMnk alium lande and 1.6 Sor other land which would normally have poorer soils and been used in a culvallnfdow system. .20- therefore, was likely to be 2 ha with 58 percent of landholdings cultivated less than 2 ha and 42 percent over 2 ha. 4.5 More work was required on the report, although it did result in Government dropping the irrigation component, largely because of concerns over cost increases. Accordingly, the Bank sent a mission in February 1979. Since the agricultural component was now two years behind schedule, the principal emphasis became land clearing. Land replacement was now set to a factor of 1.5:1 for all settlers, regardless of class of holding, and based upon total as opposed to cultivated landholdings. There was to be provision of inputs (seeds, fertilizer) and extension services, with pilot irrigation in three of the six villages, partly to compensate for the less lands available and partly to lay the groundwork for future development. Increased agricultural output was expected to be derived almost entirely from increased supplies of rice and vegetables from the irrigated areas. B. Land Tenure 4.6 There were a variety of land tenure arrangements among the affected households before inundation, depending on ethnic background (Table IV.2). The majority of resettlers were from the Ewe tribe, among which lands are held in usufruct for all members of the tribe. Lands, therefore, are communally owned, rights to use the land are given by the paramount chieE Among certain subgroups, individual acquisition of lands had become possible although individual disposition of such lands was not Among the Adangme, ancestral lands were similarly owned by the clan but individuals had rights, including that of inheritance. Resettlement resulted in a change in the amount of agriculture land as held between different forms of ownership. There was a decline in the stool/communal lands, while the proportion of rented land increased, as did VRA's land ownership. The proportion of private farmland remained relatively unchanged as the following table shows: Table IV.1: Agriculture Land Tenure, Before and After Resettlement Land Tenure % of Total Farmland 1977 1981 1992 Famly & Prvate 52 67 49 Stoolcommunal 46 >1 1 Rented 2 16 25 VRA & other >1 17 25 100 100 100 Source: Socio4conomic Survey of Kpong Resetlement Vages, 1992. Thus villages such as Fodoku, where the survey showed that land, prior to resettlement had continued to be communally owned, were more affected than villages such as Torgorme where most farming was undertaken on an individual basis. -21 - Table IV Characterlstics of Ethno Groups Including land tenure arrangement; their placement In the new resettlement _WWvillages; tenure pol~cies, their lmplementation and Outcome thc Grop New Viage % of x ~ettled Relament Iads Changs During ImplementaUon~ Outoome Population Tongu Eve_________ _______ ______ ____ Eas Bank - T ~rgarme 12 Land fad indidually. 1. Insu0ient lands avalable, takdng Several land dispute To be given alternative fallow Into acount. (parm 216-2.17). ce s stoo landa. Iberefore, no 2. Nc shortage of lands pected, to landa secued just land tefnte problems taling a rephuinm factor of 1.5:1. prior to projecn Small, Indqpeaenn eted. Provision of 25 ha of plot igation compleion. Setter have political ~nita each with ms, not more land. No is own paramount irgation proded. ~hef PatriueaL Coumuna land Fodsoku 33 Land farmed mannal. 1. n~n~ident land avaable, taking Land conics (para ownenhip. Farmers. To be given alternative fall into acount. 2.1> Amcess to lands stoo landa plus landa 2. Not suicent land to rpect the secured just prior to cuently used by ADC 1.5:1 ha reie ent factor. prOect cOmpletioo . No land tenue problems Irigation on 100 ha to be provided. Setders have ug~nenntly "e~ed* les land than b~ere, no _ _rrigation suplid. Battor BEve - Old Akrade 23 Chief of Old Akrade (head 1. No land sses~ . Clash with host of Aloama) offered to 2. No shortag of land: 1.1 fat populatlnnhief, all Näa~ic fluhenaen who be rsd on Akuamu April 1989. settled o(s)landsof . l either the Aknamu or Manya Krbo, paping nt to the lspeeli chief. Returned to Lover Valts ama for thus South Senchi 11 Ibase living on Manya 1. Pouuhbe land shotags. Sntianual land tenue not cnudured local Krobo lands to be moved 2. Tight Et for rqdaomnht of landa probem (para 2.15). people. Patrnat to government land, according te formula, and anly Las lands than befor. Therefore, no land tenure acieved if the land teum problems Wh ai wer stil on going problems pr~e. realv~d. at the tIme of this ealan. Adame + Eve + Akan an~ ~ 0 No •West Epong 16 Few agiuld~ ad 1. No ad po~e for. Garden ~li soppfled. re dwq NO in ct e idnly 2. Smal garden plotstobe povided1 - ~ ~0" l 1~ . for the seml-urban populatla. Idva on Manu Krbo Natdku 6 Site dom= by Osudoku 1. Pomb damag to sall. Vay smal garden plts stoo landsalthough group ssampyarea wil 2. Only small garden plots te be 2supplied. No pi« dlm own land te=u.e, requlre ateive alte proded for the se~iurban kigation. sem- 1_ __ pre . papd . Sources: 1. Agricultural Sffikment Proposal, Junc 1978 2. Agiculturl Resetlemnunt Reew Miaa, Februay 1979. -22- C. Cropplag Paterms and Agricutura Pmoducton 4.7 Lands to be inundated were among the best in the project area. Soils were fertile, easy to manage and farmers had adapted a suitable cropping pattern. Prior to the project, major crops cultivated were cassava, maize, plantain, vegetables, oil palm and sugarcane. Cassava was the principal cash crop. Average amount of lands cuktated was no more than 2 ha; farmers practiced shifting cultivation Crop yields were modest, the advantages of good soils were offset by unreliable rainfall and use of traditional varieties. Livestock development was minimal, this being a twte area, fishing was similarly not well developed, there being better opportunities on the nearby Volta lake or downstream on the Volta river. 4.8 Te occupation of resettlers remained largely unchanged. Farming continues tq be the main occupation after resettlement despite the reduced scope of agricultural activity. Table IV.: Major Occupations, Before and After Resettlement Occupation Before After Fanner 53.5 54.8 Fiseiman 10.6 13.4 Artisan 10.6 6.4 Public Servant 9.9 7.6 Factory & Wage Empl. 9.3 10.8 Trader 4.0 4.5 Other 2.1 2.5 100 100 Source Soo- Suvey of Kpong Reseflernent Villages, 1992. 4.9 The smaller area available for agriculture following relocation (para 2.13-2.14) resulted in shorter fallows, farmers cultivate the same parcels of land, yet apply few inputs (para 4.12), while access to credit is very limited. At impact evaluation, cropping patterns on the reduced acreage were essentially the same as in 1978. Contrary to expectation, no irrigation facilities were provided to resettlers. About 70 percent of cultivated lands were used for maize and cassava, about 20 percent to cowpea and pepper and about 10 percent for such crops as plantain, yam, tomatoes, onions, sugarcane and oil palm. On the betler alluvial soils, land was cultivated for 8 years then left fallow for 3 years. On the lees fertile soils, cullvalowas reduced to 3 years followed by 5 years of fallow. ?&［아／w .24- prepared between 1977-80, with the objec&e of kcreasing smallhokler agricultural production in the region through provision of a basic technical package for the principal crops. This project was also, expected to provide pilot irrigation, while the Kpong area had been earmarked for imgation development as far back as the 1960s and more recently in 1976. D. IAbor U2 Members of the household sup* the majority (97 percent) of the agricultural labor needs because of the high cost of casual labor (between cedis 600-1500 per day) relative to returns. Only 13 percent of households hired laborers in 1992, these were mostly in Natriku, a semi urban area. In all odw villages, households relied on unpaid family labor. Ihe Annex-Table V.5 and Annex- Table V.6 present information on labor use as between the various agricultural activities, between members of the household and between households and hued labor The tables show that: 0 weeding a the most important actmty for the principal crops such as maize (38 percent of total labor respondents) and cassava (40 percent), as well as for secondary crops such as rice (36 percent); few fiumers use inputs such as fertiffm and pesticides; these typically absorb five percent of hibm EDr rice, four percent for maize and cassava; a little hired hdw is used for the staple crops - about 10 percent - but it provides almost half the labor of crops such as rice, with hired women contributing 23 percent and hired men 28 percent L Scow PWCOPdM 4.13 Settlers were very dissatisfied with what they described as promises unfulfilled: (t) for villages where it had been cpxted that lands would be replaced on a 1.5.-1 basis, less land was given due to difficulties in finding sufflcient unoccupied lands nearb, (ii) three villages: Torgorme, Fodmoku and Natriku, wre promised pilot unption when it was known that there was not sufficient land to respect the 1.5.-1 ratio, or that the softs of Imser quality, but none received any irrigation equipment; Qh) host communities that were to be ft the lands acquired for the resettlas, did not ]POW C CIve monies, thus difficulties broke out om cultivation of the, Mlacement lands, culminating in the dispute at Old Akrade (Table IV.2). F. CAMusim 4.14 The poliq of replacing lands to proem the traditional patterns of agriculture was not approp given that many resettlers viewed the pro= as an opportunity for change - the desire for the new, settlement to be like a 'little Accre, ftw exampI& Ooncem of the planners was givert the problem at Akosombo in introducing huge scale mechanization. An approach - based upon limited supply of inputs and extendon. advice as was being adopted for the Volta Region with Bank support, would have been appropriate and could haw gone some way to increase yields of traditional crops, particularly maize With the benefit of hindsight, it is also clear that the farmers are receptive to new technolog - a substantial number of farmers are seeking out the extension offi=r, in the absence of visits. -25- 4.15 Formulating the agricultural strategy began too late, received less management attention than it should have, given its central role in restoring incomes and living standards. This then assumed an increasing sense of urgency as impoundment of the dam drew closer and lands had to be cleared and planted before the onset of the rains. The changes and reevaluations delayed the program further and meant that the intensification strategy was largely ignored even though in the modified plan it was intended to form the basis for a post settlement development phase. As a result, in Fodsoku, where 100 ha of compensatory irrigated lands were to be provided because of the lack of sufficient replacement lands to respect the 1.5 ratio, no irrigation was provided. Nor were the pilot irrigation schemes in two other villages constructed. 4.16 Farmers understandably were dissatisfied with the unfulfilled promises. There is an important lesson for planners from project experience. At the time that the dam was being constructed, alternative employment opportunities existed for many households. VRA meanwhile was concerned not to clear more land than was necessary and felt that the demand was low. The same situation was encountered in the Philippines, where households refused to take up land opportunities during the relocation period preferring to work on the construction site, until the time came when such opportunities finished; it was then too late to obtain new lands. In Ghana, if irrigation had been provided - and small areas of irrigated rice were prevalent in the area before the project, this may have proved sufficiently attractive to retain households on the land at the time when the dam was being constructed. 4.17 Farming remained the main occupation after resettlement. There was no significant change in cropping patterns, while the expected intensive farming techniques which were to compensate for the lack of available lands were not generally adopted by resettlers due to lack of credit, inputs and systematic extension advice. This together with the shorter fallows greatly reduced farm output. Nor was the intended irrigation developed (para 4.9) to boost production. Households, however, consider lack of land and irrigation facilities to be a major factor explaining why their incomes are lower than before. 4.18 A clear lesson which emerges from the experience of this and the other hydropower project in "hailand is the need for much earlier attention to the agricultural program (income generating component) in general and closer direct involvement of the MoA, in particular. To some degree this would have been much easier in Ghana where there was another Bank-financed project running amost in parallel and in part of the project area; unlike in Thailand where the area was much more remote and public services much less. .26- CHAPTER V: SOCIAL IMPACT A. Populatio Identity 5.1 Resettlement has not changed the age profile of the resettlers; 50 percent were below 20 years of age before mnoving while in 1992, some 45 percent of resettlers were below 15 years of age (Annex-Table V.1). Ethnic composition of resettlers consists of four groups, the majority being Ewe. But the population surrounding the resettlement sites is predominantly non-Ewe. The 1992 survey recorded a decreased proportion of non-Ewe settlers. Table V.1: Disbibution of Ethnic Groups Etnic Group 1978 1992 Ewe: Tongu 42 6 setter .81 .22 6 78 Non-Ew&Osudoku 6 10 .28 J2 Adangm & Oth 35 100 100 Source: Socio-economic Survey of Kpong Resetllement Vilages 19f2. 5.2 Immigrants moved to the resettlement sites especially during the first four years (1980-1983). According to the survey, about 20 percent of the resettlement village population consisted of immigrants who were about evenly divided between Ewe and non-Ewe groups. Reasons for immigration were because of employment with the textile factories, with VRA or with other public sector agencies. B. Fandly Identity 53 Inirmation of household sizes before relocation was not available. In 1992, household sizes of resettlers were large to very large; 68 percent of resettlers' households had 8 or more members. This contrasts with immigrant households where only 27 percent of households comprised more than 7 members C. Social l 5.4 The provision of public services such as water supply, schools, roads and markets is more extensive than before relocation. Households and community leaders expressed general satisfaction with the supply of services. -27- 5.5 The progress achieved in education is probably due to the building of schools in the resettlement villages. Over 65 percent of household members included in the survey had attended 6 years of primary school, about 5 percent had a further 3 years of middle school educationA The rest had no school education (Annex-Table V.1). This proportion of school attendance Is good given that the literacy rate in Ghana for 1990 was 60 percent. School additions and provision of elementary school equipment such as tables were built with funds raised directly by the communities. Also, in some villages pupils bring their own chairs to school daily. The great appreciation of the primary schools in particular is reflected in the survey, where a large majority of resettlers and immigrants considered the service to be significantly better following resettlement. 5.6 Road access is available to all villages, largely by roads existing before inundation, but some roads are not well maintained. A particular problem after resettlement is transportation across the water. The road forming the top of the reservoir is not open to traffic and crossing the reservoir by boat is often dangerous. This hampers villagers on the east side in taking produce to the main markets on the opposite side. 5.7 A ferry run by the local district operated across the rapids before the creation of the reservoir. VRA is responsible for water transportation and it provides service on Lake Volta above the Akosombo dam, but it appears that VRA is restricted to north-south transportation, leaving cross transportation to other public jurisdictions. 5.8 Piped water to new sites was provided as part of the Kpong project, an improvement appreciated by resettlers. However, faulty design of the water system - plastic pipes not strong enough near the water intake, no boosters at critical locations, by-passing of high-level tanks - have resulted in interruption of service and no supply at all to Old Akrade. Villagers also complain about high water rates. D. Incomes 5.9 Although a socioeconomic survey was undertaken in 1974 information on incomes was not readily available, which meant that there was no reliable baseline data. The survey for the impact evaluation found that there was considerable under-reporting of incomes,1 particularly cash incomes, thus expenditures were considered to provide a more reliable guide to incomes (Table V.2). Expenditure data was available for the month immediately prior to the survey. Since these are expenditure figures only, and since they have been annualized on a per capita basis from one month's observation, they should be treated with caution. Without suitable baseline data several indicators were included in the survey to give an indication of trends over time. 5.10 The single most important source of household income in 1992 was agriculture (Annex-Table V.3). The decline in landholding, the lack of any agricultural development program, the continuation of the original cropping patterns, the poorer soils of the replacement land compared to what had been farmed before, the lack of Irrigation which had been expected to provide the bulk of tse incremental cash incomes, all would indicate that household incomes have not been restored to the levels prior to moving. W These nine years are free of charge and compulsory; although the dropout rate can be high. U This has been observed In other suveys of rural Incomes In Ghana See foonote 4 gR a. -28- ��.�.�� � � � �. �, � � $ � � � ° � � � � � � � � � � м � � � � $ о � . � � � � � g н й. �, �b'�, о, � � � и м $ � � � � � � � � � � S � � � � .. � � s . � � � м � � � Я � � � � � � а м � � � .. � � � � ''У о . � � � � � � � � �� � � � � �' � � � �� � � � � �� . � � � � �� � � � � � ё �. � � � �� G}� о � {4 � о • .29- 5.11 A farm budget was prepared from the 1992 survey for the principal cash crop - cassava (Table W). Since only weak data wow available* for comparison with the pre-project situatiok the . act evaluation has used the farm 'budgets prepared for the Volta Region Agricultural Development projectO the region in which the East Bank of the project is situated, and which was ongoing at the time of this project. Table V.3: Net Returns and Labor Use, 1992 Compared to SAR Estimates for VORADEP, 1980 (USPY Cason Not Return for a I he plot pis$) VORADEPV KpoN Without Prood With Project village* Ww Kpong (214) 472 844 South Senctd OW 472 844 Torgo" 472 844 Fodzcku 430 472 844 Natdku (108) 472 844 Labor Use for a 1 he plot (days) Wed Kpong so 55 115 South Senchl 126 * 55 115 Torgorms 83 55 115 Fodzoku 153 * 55 115 Nafrku 100 * 55 115 The high labor vcets are due to Varoporlation and markeft (which together fWM '/3 d tOW labor use) for these vftee which am skwM an the East Bank of the headpond vW which face d0loultles. j/ At an awhange We of OZ75 for the 1080 WA sodmates w4 at a rate of OM for 1992 eurM results. ?J Full developrnert was epxftd to be In ISM if Since VOROW data are for U developmert In IM of 1980 prlow the survey data have bow adkAted accordingly uft the ML)V Index Sources:. Volta Region Agricultural Development: pmleot, SAR Nc2U7- GH. dated March 20, 1080 SocboconomleSurveyof Kpong ResettlementVillages, June ism Form budgets were not prepared at appralsel but calculated In 1978 as pan of the In depth review of ft agriculturaloomponent, The review h~4 howwar, do since no detailed sump ofagdoultural praftes, Input% outputs, had been conducted, #0 OW could a* be regarded as Indicadw Report No2W-GH dated March 30, IM. -30- 5.12 Only South Senchi has moved slightly above the without-prqect situation, but has not reached the expected with-project achievements. This shows that no agricultural intensification has taken place which would have compensated for the loss of lands. 5.13 Finally expenditure patterns show constrained incomes in the decade following resettlement Annex-Table V.4 shows that only a small percentage of resettlers have increased expenditure on household items, while only 37 percent of households have invested in additions to the house; others who have not undertaken such house expansion cite lack of funds. 5.14 As mentioned above heads of households felt families were worse off in 1992 mainly because of low incomes resulting from the lack of agricultural lands available for cultivation. E. Women and Chdre 5.15 Women constitute about 16 percent of heads of household surveyed. AD women, and many children, work in agriculture. Annex-Table V.5 shows labor usage within the household and as between households and hired labor for three crops: cassava, maize and rice. The table shows that: o male members of the household are slightly more occupied with agricultural activities than are the women and girls; o within the household, children play a major role in the two principal crops of cassava and maize, while boys are the single most important contributor to the labor requirements for peppers, cowpea and tomatoes, which together form about 20 percent of area cultivated (Annex-Table V.6); * the most important tasks undertaken by women are weeding followed by harvesting/transportation; men are similarly engaged in weeding with planting, with land preparation lower on the list; In terms of crops, women are most heavily engaged in maize production, and almost all women have garden plots of vegetables, mainly tomatoes, but also other vegetables. 5.16 Women are seldom engaged in fishing but an important secondary activity for women in Torgorme is pottery. This activity is confined to women only, pots are sold in bulk to middlemen and provided an independent source of income for the women. Planners took care in moving the village 1.5 km downstream from the former Torgorme settlements, to select a site where there were abundant clay deposits for the women potters. Trading is an important occupation for women in Fodzoku, South Senchi, West Kpong. 5.17 Annex-Table V.7 shows that access to water, which is a woman's responsibility, has improved as a result of resettlement, while distances required to collect fuelwood - also a woman's task, have increased since moving; this most likely a result of the consolidation of small villages into larger units. The conclusion that 46 percent of households consider that means of transportation are worse off than before, only 34 percent consider it better than before directly affects women, since it is they who have primary responsibility for taking crops to markeL Access to market is also considered worse off than before by 50 percent of the households, another tactor which directly affects women. -31 - F. Conclustons 5.18 Resettlement has not had any observable effect on the general structure of the communities which have shown little social change ten years after relocation. Age and ethnic composition are similar to pre-resettlement. But there has been a steady influx of population especially in the first years after completion of resettlement. Some 20 percent of the population in the five resettlement sites in 1992 were immigrants. 5.19 The social infrastructure provided is generally superior compared to the situation prior to resettlement and is greatly appreciated by households. But the implementation of plans for the provision of public services was patchy. Design, construction or maintenance of transportation facilities and water supply were inadequate. 5.20 There was little change in the mix of income sources. Cash income from crops, fish and, to a lesser extent, employment account for the bulk of income after resettlement as it did before relocation. But incomes have not been restored to levels which prevailed prior to moving. 5.21 A notable finding is the extent to which children are engaged in agricultural activities. As expected, women are equally engaged in agriculture; as a result of resettlement their access to health services and clean water has improved, although they have further to travel to collect firewood, and to take crops to market, almost all of which is on foot. -32- CIHAPI'E VIs ENVIRONMENTE A. Bacgon 6.1 During project preparation and appraisal, CIDA took the lead in focussing attention on the potential envionmental effects of the project principally resettlement CIDA's involvement had in fact dated back to 1973; from which time it had increasingly focussed on both environmental/resettlement issues. In February 1976, there was a meeting between CIDA and the Bank when concern was expressed that Kpong not be a repetition of the experience in Akosombo. This was repeated in a meeting between the Canadian Executive Director and the Vice President for West Africa on February 19, 1976. At the end of that month the Bank hired a consultant to review the environmental aspects although his TOR were quite narrowly defined by the Environmental Adviser and essentially covered the health effects. 6.2 The report, completed by mid April, 1976,& concluded that schistosomiasis would be the principal health problem and certain preventive measures were proposed: (i) that villages should be sited as far as possible from the headpond; (ii) restricted access to the lake for fishing, transportation; (iii) legislative measures relating particularly to fishing and squatters - it was estimated that the population would double in size as a result of the dam; and (iv) establishment of a epidemiological unit for control of schistosomiasis. B. Public Health Policies 6.3 The policies formulated were wide reaching and comprehensive. Credit should be given to the planners in designing a program which was not merely seen as in terms of provision of medical services but preventive in approach. Thus while the overall policies were: * toprovide infrastructure for primary health care in the resettlement villages and to assist the Ministry of Health (MoH) and local authorities to maintain a reasonable level of health; and * to take all reasonable measures to control schistosomiasis in the headpond area; good health was also considered to depend upon provision of housing, clean water, clean surroundings, education, in addition to the provision of medical health services. 6.4 The Appraisal Report dealt with health aspects in some detail; outlining the potential problems with urinary and intestinal schistosomiasis; actual problems with onchocerciasisW and malaia, as well as remedial measures. This Chapter focusses on health which is considered the piodtly Iseue. Dated March 12, 197. Health Inrplicallons of the Kpong Hydroelectric project, Republic of Ghana, April 22, 1976. It was speoted that with th Inundaon of the Kpong and Senchi rapids, the breeding grounds for the fly which transmits onchocercis would be eliminated. - 33- C. Iumplmentation 6.5 Well recognized control measures for dealing particularly with schistosomiasis were put in place: the location of each village was set back more than 1 kilometer from the headpond; villages were supplied with piped potable water, although problems emerged after closing (para 5.8); landing piers were constructed to restrict entry to the lake to certain points; and the shoreline was cleared to prevent weed growth. In addition, although the relation between provision of simple latrines and bilharzia control is not so evident-V communal latrines were installed in all villages. All these measures were particularly important given that the water levels in the headpond fluctuate only slightly throughout the year. 6.6 CIDA representathes visited the project to review progress on the environmental/resettlement aspects early in 1977 and again in February 197& The effort focussed on the delays in the program as well as the agricultural development component (para 7.32); the decision not to build the dike in Kpong village and to move about 1,000 additional people after all, was not discussed. D. Project Impact 6.7 The incidence of urinary schistosomiasis, according to health officials, was prevalent in the project area prior to inundation. Studies in 1977 showed that, among one quarter of the children under 15 years of age living in the villages to be resettled, 31 percent suffered from this disease, ranging between 7-57 percent.2 Post-impoundment surveys, following mass treatment, showed the incidence as dropping to 24 percent in March 1982. The 1992 survey shows that the incidence of schistosomiasis reported among resettlers was as follows: Fodzoku 39 Natriku 25 South Senchi 44 Torgore 34 West Kpong 22 Average 40 Source: Socioeconomic Survey of Kpong Resettlement Villages, 1992. There has been an increase following dam construction, despite the measures taken. This is due to several factors (i) pro=imity to the headpond: the villages with the highest incidence, South Senchi and Fodzoku, are also those closest to the reservoir; (ii) the landing piers are not often used as they are constructed in concrete and damage the canoes of the fishermen and, therefore, are unpopular, while people who have subsequently moved into the area do not use the landing piers; and (iii) there is little seasonal fluctuation in the water level which can help to eliminate the snails carrying the disease. Bilharda Prevention and Hydroelectric reservoirs, Blue Nile Associates, 1992. Op CIL JW Health Impact of the KnoM Dam in Obana. LKA., Derban. Water Power and Dam Oonstructlon. October 1984. -34- 68 According to health officials, since 1988 there have also been reports of intestinal schistosomiasis. 6.9 There has been a decline in the incidence of onchocerciasis. Prior to the project, between 33-49 percent of the population suffered from onchocerdasis - with the higher prevalence reported on the north east bank of the river Volta. In 1992, the incidence reported by resettlers had declined to: Fodzoku 15 Naldku 0 South Senchi 13 Targom 30 West Kpong 13 Source: Soclo-eoomlo Survey of Kpong Resettlement Villages, 192. 6.10 The prevalence of malaria has declined somewhat Surveys undertaken in 15 villages on the East Bank in 1966 showed 59 percent of people infected with malaria. The 1992 survey illustrated that among resettlers, this varied from village to village as follows: TorgnmM 30 Fodzoku 37 South Sanchi 41 Naflku 0 West Kpong as Source: SSWvey of Kpong Resettlement wages, 19 6.11 One surprising findingW is the incidence of guinea worm disease (dracunculiasis) reported among resettlers in three of the villages; South Senchi and Natriku reported no incidence. Prevalence of this disease prior to the project is not known, but in 1992 this ranged from three percent West Kpong to nine percent in Fodzoku. Guinea worm disease is debilitating and is endemic in Ohana. In 1992, as part of a concerted plan by government, Ghana declined from the second to the third most highly endemic country for this problem, after Nigeria and Uganda.& Overall results from all the villages are given in Table VL1. 6.12 Responsibility for health services rests with both the VRA Health Officer and the Primary Health Care (PHC) officer. Follow-up was good particularly for the latter. With the exception of Natriku, community leaders claim that VRA Health Officers did not visit their villages at al last year; when they do so it is approdimately once a year. PHC officials visited often, in some case once a month, or at least every three months. The survey showed that among the households heads, the improved health services were ranked second after the schools. SSurpdsing In that this disease Is associated with unsafe drnking water. SMorbdlly Motality Weekly report February 12, 199. -35- 6.13 Downstream effects were not measured in the survey, but a Bank report ly noted that the combined effects of the Akosombo and the Kpong dam on the downstream areas was quite severe. The Volta estuary which had been a tourist attraction prior to construction of the Akosombo dam, had been affected in that as a result of the regulated flow of the river, salt water intrusion into the estuary had ceased, thereby permitting aquatic weeds to flourish, loss of the thriving clam industry, which had formerly employed about 2,000 women, as well as of the tourists. E. Concluslns 6.14 The component was well preparedw in terms of the potential health effects and the approach used was comprehensive and appropriate. During preparation and implementation, CIDA kept the Bank's attention focussed on environmental/resettlement issues. 6.15 Despite this, bilharzia has increased, onchocerciasis has declined as expected as has malaria. Guinea worm is apparent largely due to the problems in water supply (paras 5.8 and 7.12). Project experience shows the trade offs involved in the optimal distance in moving people - care was taken not to move the villages too far since most were riverine populations, yet some villages have not been moved far enough away from the headpond to prevent household members from gaining access to the water. The latter would have been the best preventive measure given that the water levels cannot fluctuate significantly and thereby be used to control the breeding cycle of the snails. Since cures for bilharzia are expensive and not readily available, the lessons must be the need to review carefully what is the optimal distance to site villages from the health point of view and to ensure continuous and systematic follow-up by the health authorities after the project is closed. I A Review of the Treatment Environmental Asmects of Bank Enerav rolects. Induaby and Energy Deprt Woddng Paper.No.24. March, 1990. W in th above review (footnote 8 g10g 5O hydropower projects approved between FYM8W8 were reviewed and health faco were not mentoned in 38 of the SARt. -36- CHPERVII INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT A. Organizational Struue 7.1 Legislatively, the Minister responsible for social welfare is required among other matters," to ensure ... that no person suffers undue hardship or is deprived of necessary public amenities, as a result of his resettlement." And "the Minister is charged with the duty ... to assist in the resettlement of the people inhabiting land liable to be inundated.m However, management of hydroelectric projects were handed to VRA and resettlement was delegated to the VRA Director for Special Duties. 7.2 The following government and public organizations had resettlement responsibilities during resettlement, and some of them continued to have duties handed over to them by VRA after project closing* Organization Responsibillty Land Valuation Board Usling of properties and payment of compensation (formerly Lands Department) Electricity Corporation of Ghana Operating and maintaining electricity services Ghana Water & Sewerage Corporation Operating and maintaining water syalem Town & Country Planning Department Controlling physical development Ministly of Education Operating schools Department of Community Development Dealing with post-resettement social adjustment Minliry of Health Studying and monitoring health problerns; controng health hazards and proviing health facltes Local Administration Unit Integrating and operating services transferred from VRA (ncluding newly formed District Assemblies) 7.3 VRA's organizational structure (Annex-Figure VII.) was primarily designed to implement the resettlement phase but it also provided for coordination and sharing of duties to facilitate the transfer of responsibilities on completion of resettlement. Involvement of government departments, public corporations and local administrative units in the resettlement phase was expected to ease the handing over of services in the resettlement villages from VRA to the respective agencies. 7.4 Despite the appropriate management structure the handing over of the operation and maintenance of services to the local authorities and utility corporations was not successful (paras 7.11 et seq). B. Resetlemient Planblg 7.5 Resettlement planning for Kpong was based on the experience gained from the Akosombo resettlement program (1965-1969). Decisions on policies as well as preparation of plans for Kpong V Volta River Levelopment Act, 1981. S.19(1). -37- were made by a team responsible for resettlement at Akosombo. Working five yew after completion of the Akosombo program the VRA team was well aware of the mistakes and consequences of the previous program, and was fatent on applying the lessons learned at Akosombo. 7.6 Extensive studies were carried out in the three years before the start of construction of the first resettlement village. Although the range of studies coered all relevant resettlement issues, nevertheless, many of the studies themselves did not generate the information needed to assist project implementation and to establish benchmark criteria by which outcome could be judged. For example, the issue of availability of land, including land tenure, was not explored in detail, while there was no baseline data on the socioeconomic status prior to resettlement. Stu* Prepared by Socio-economic Survey VRA (main survey, 1974; supplementary, 1978) Land Valuation Land Department Housing Policy VRAAJnverally of Science & Technology; consultants Agricultural & Soil IRAsT Epidemology VRANVLRDP Fisheries VRA/VLRDP Health Impact Consultant Resettlement Program VRA 7.7 The agricultural component of the resettlement plan was the most difficult one to resolve (para 4.2 et seq). C Resettlment Ipee to 7.8 A number of problems affected the resettlement process preventing Implementation accorfing to the plan. Most of the difficulties were about land: availability, access, allocation, conflicts of ownership and tenure, land preparation and agricultural use of land. Two other problems hindering plan implementation were () rivalries of authority between chiefs and group conflicts - including with host populations, and (ii) handing over of duties or failure to accept responsibilities. RrIVEm mD COaCS 7.9 Frictions between individuals and groups were numerous during and after resettlement. Some of the disputes were endemic and not necessarily brought on by resettlement, although resettlement may have aggravated them or revived dormant conflicts. Other disputes may have occurred because resettlement disturbed the traditional and well-established way of life. 7.10 Rivalry between chiefs about status in the new villages disrupted relationships between their respective followers and affected coopation in community development. -38- HANorm oF OPEAON AND MADwEmANCz oF SiaWce 7.11 The resettlement program called for the handing over of public services on completion of resettlement from VRA to the utility companies (water & electricity) and to the local authorities and town development committees (latrines, roads & paths, drainage, etc). This did not happen. 7.12 Although water and electricity services were formally transferred by VRA to the two utilities they failed to take on responsibility. Local authorities claim they cannot operate and maintain the new services because they receive insufficient funds from the government and their local revenues are inadequate. 7.13 In all the villages, a number of projects have been initiated using communal labor provision of school furniture, school construction and renovation, construction and renovation of health post/clinic and road construction. These are carried out as a joint effort with local leaders. For example, there are special projects such as community farms, adult education, the teaching of handicrafts, which are initiated and implemented by the 31st December Women's Movement. Peace keeping and arbitration are often carried on by both the chiefs and Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). In Fodzoku, the Town Development Council (TDC) provided electric bulbs for the village. 7.14 Development at the local level requires support from development officers at that level. In Ghana, not only are officials from line agencies but also district and regional political authorities expected to show interest and commitment to the development aspirations of local communities. All leaders were unanimous that the regional and district administrations have shown interest in their respective villages by providing health and political education, assisting farmer communities with road construction, visiting and advising the communities and, most important of all, contacting the VRA on their behalt D. Relations with Hosts 7.15 Leaders' assessment of host attitudes towards resettlement provided a three-way response; about a third each thought that hosts felt positive, negative or were indifferent Where relations were deemed good,as in Fodooku, leaders attributed this to hosts being able to participate in the amenities of the settlement. The main reason given for negative attitudes was that hosts were not compensated for the use of their land or were jeaous of the lot of the resettled villages. The new settlers were provided with better water supply and sanitary facilities than existed in the host village. The newcomers also were given agricultural support not available to the hosts. The hosts asked for similar treatment and called for establishment of a buffer zone between them and the resettlement village. 7.16 Ethnic group conflicts also erupted despite, in one case, seemingly compatible arrangements for resettlement. Hosts and resettler groups of the same ethnic background (Kaira) but including splinter groups which had previously defected, and developed different cultural practices, were brought together. Soon after resettlement violent clashes occurred; the minority splinter groups resenting the hosts' dominance. OU Akrd 7.17 The conflicts between hosts and resettlers, leading to the most extreme consequences in the Kpong project, happened at Old Akrade. Several factors contributed to the eventual departure of practically all of the resettles in April, 1989. -39- 7.18 The hosts were involved with the resettlement team in the selection of land for the resettles adjoining the township. The hosts belong to the Akwamu tribe while the resettlers, mainly from the inundated islands, are Battor Ewe. There was previous contact between hosts and settles; for example Old Akrade's chief owned lands on the islands. Some 1,500 resettlers came to join about 800 hosts, and initially they lived harmoiously alongside each other. When conflict started, VRA and the local administration tried to resolve issues. 7.19 There has been no investigation into the events leading to the hasty departure of the resettles. When the District Administration failed to mediate the dispute the Paramount Chief tried to arrange a meeting. Messengers of peace were attacked with bow and arrow, two persons were killed, and all resettlers left in one day. 7.20 The direct cause of the final Incident is unknown but several reasons for friction have been mentioned*. * VRA believes that chieftaincy dispute and ethnic conflict were responsible for the disaccord. * Hosts report two provocations, one by resettlers and the other by VRA/Government: (t) settlers trespassed beyond the area allocated to them; some farmed the land, others felled trees for the sale of lumber, (ii) the resettlement land had not been paid for. E. Involveamn of Resele and Hosts 7.21 Resettler families were not directly involved in resettlement planning and Implementation, although atensive consultation took place particularly regarding the location of the resettlement sites and the type of compensation preferred. VRA did, however, consult extensively with established leaders and local organizations during the course of studies, plan preparation and implementation * Village Chiefs or Headmen, and so-called opinion leaders. * Kpong Landlords Association o Committees for the Defence of the Revolution * Village Development Committees (when created during resettlement) * Newly formed District Assemblies. 7.22 DmwDENcv SYNDam. The failure either to compensate, or to compensate adequately, the hosts - which has resulted in conflict over lands (Table IV.2); the reduction in landholdings for these agricultural communities (para 2.12); the absence of any agricultural strategy, including provision of inputs and irrigation to permit intensification of these smaller landholdings (para 4.9); the difficulties in access to markets (para 5.6) all have combined to result in a dependency syndrome among many resettlers. It is hardly surprising that when respondents were asked to suggest possible solutions to some of the major problems such as lack of agricultural equipment, lack of agricultural lands, lack of capital, marketing facilities, invariably statements such as "Government should help' or "VRA should help or "the agency involved should provide tractor services or credit facilities' were made. -40- 7.23 Iocal participation is not an easy tasL VRA's efforts to involve the resettlers during implementation illustrate the dilemma that such agencies can face in trying to stimulate local participation. In Ohana, government has devolved important administrative powers and responsibilities to traditional chiefs, while their respective communities owe allegiance to such chiefs. During implementation, VRA made considerable efforts to get the chiefs involved in setting up organizational arrangements which would then be responsible for subsequent operation and maintenance of services at the village level. Lack of interest on the part of the chiefs then led VRA to try to set up independent Resettlement Management committees, charged with this responsibility. Chiefs, however, felt that these challenged their leadership and also felt threatened in their authority by newly formed organizations such as Youth Associations which achieved political power. This led to opposition by chiefs to the establishment of such bodies as Resettlement Management Committees. 7.24 Nevertheless, some of these expectations held by resettler leaders may be unrealistic. Expectations continue among many village leaders that VRA should still be responsible for all aspects of operation and maintenance in the village, without much contribution from the resettlers themselves. The fact that expectations are unrealistic can be seen in the differing response of the resettler and immigrant community leaders. While some resettler leaders consider various aspects of the compensation package to be inadequate, immigrant leaders on the other hand view the compensation package as being adequate. It is likely that these leaders are comparing what the resettlers have as against what other comparable communities have. 7.25 This dependency syndrome has developed as a result of the failure to implement the policies laid down at the outset. The experience at Old Akrade, where all the resettlers left in one day at the behest of the Chief, suggests that cultural traditions require that members of the community look to "leaders for decisions and for solutions. In this context, therefore, this experience highlights the extent of the responsibility on the part of the implementing agencies to ensure a satisfactory outcome through restoration of incomes, since the likelihood of individual initiative is small. F. Bank Parformance 7.26 Thought was given to minimizing the scale of resettlement from the early stages of the planning process. An early feasibility study prepared by consultants in 1974 included several alternatives to take this into account The TORY for one pre-appraisal mission required that cost estimates include not only that for the plant/equipment but all related costs of the resettlement (this since the Akosombo project had not treated costs in this fashion). In April 1975, the Resident Mission in Accra requested consultant assistance in planning and implementing the resettlement component. 727 The project was appraised in March 1976. The TORN made specific mention that attention should be given to the non power aspects such as resettlement, health. The appraisal review laid out Datd January 1, 1975. Dated February 12,1978. -41 - the arguments for and against the various policy choices,S then under discussion by VRA; responsibility for resettlement rested with government. 7.28 The Staff Appraisal Report was issued at the beginning of 1977, three years before publication of the Bank's first guidelines dealing with resettlement.S Nevertheless, the SAR fully described the resettlement program and the report recommended, as a condition of effectiveness of the Bank loan, that final resettlement plans be submitted to the Bank for approvaL Tis at a time when 43 percent of other Bank SARs for Hydropower projects had no mention of resettlement (see footnote 28). Plans were submitted and approved in June, 1977, three months after Board approval. 7.29 The first supervision missionv reported on progress, including the decision not to build the dike at Lower Kpong, which would result in more people having to move; other physical implementation issues were also addressed. Thereafter, supervision for the resettlement program ran in parallel with regular Bank supervision missions, prompted at the outset by CIDA. 7.30 Progress on the agricultural program also received attention. By November 1977, nine months after Board approval, CIDA representatives visiting the Bank raised this issue. This was followed up in a letter to the Bank's Vice President for West Africa on January 27, 1978, in which CIDA reiterated earlier concerns about the agricultural development component and also stressed that the health aspects must be dealt with effectively. Meanwhile a Bank mission in February, 1978 heard the same concerns from the Canadian High Commission in Accra. The Bank was informed that CIDA would be sending a separate mission to investigate. 731 The Bank joined this mission, which took place in March/April 1978, contributing a consultant sociologist and an agriculturalist from RMWA, Abidjan. The latter was particularly critical of the agricultural component program (pam 4.3), suggesting that the program needed to be redrawn. The sociologist also felt that the resettlement program was basically sound except for the agricultural component. CIDA agreed to provide an agricultural adviser for two years beginning in January 1979. 7.32 In addition, other aspects were reviewed during the course of other Bank missions to Ghana. For example, a liaison mission during the course of the appraisal of the Volta Region Agricultural Development project, reviewed the role of women in the development of the Volta region - including Kpong, and findings were discussed with government.9 7.33 The Project Completion Report mentions delays in resettlement, questions about agricultural development and other problems the program encountered. But in general the report is approving "Government, VRA, and the affected population and companies seem satisfied with the result" (page 41, para 3.13). - The policy choices reviewed included the location of the resetient vilages; the compensation polcy; agloultural policy; time schedule for construction and post resettlement responalbilities. - OMS 23, Februaiy, 1980. -W Repot dated Februury 15, 1978. BackOo report dated March 12 1979. .42- 7.34 The diligence of staff reviews and appropriateness of review recommendations notwithstanding, the supervision system was not effective in achieving timely actions or required changes in the program. G. Ex Post Evaluation 735 No ex post resettlement survey or evaluation of the Kpong Project has been carried out, but a comparative study of resettlement under the Akosombo and Kpong projects was prepared for VRA.-W The study, in part, concludes: * The Kpong project had more time for studies, surveys and plan preparation than Akosombo; consequently the range of problems affecting both projects was less severe at Kpong. * In both projects conflicts arose in status of leaders, cultural practices, jealousy among groups and political authority. * Problems with the agricultural program were identical in many respects: issues of access and development, equipment and spares, and inducing the settlers to cultivate the land. * Delays in land clearing and preparation. " In both projects the handover of services and infrastructure by the utilities and local authorities were not readily accomplished. * The lesson that escaped both the Akosombo and Kpong planners was to utilize the economic potential created by the main hydro project in making rehabilitation plans for the settlers (p. 26 op cit). H.Coacusoas 7.36 Kpong's resettlement process was deficient in some elements of execution rather than in policies. With a clear legal framework, policies were appropriate, with exception of the agricultural programme. A sound institutional structure was in place, staffed by seasoned professionals and with clear responsibilities to the respective line agencies. Moreover, VRA was concerned to learn from, and incorporate, the lessons from Akosombo into the resettlement plans for Kpong. 7.37 During implementation, strong commitment to a satisfactory settlement experience was evidenced in that the housing and village infrastructure was constructed as planned and without delays. This was financed by counterpart funds despite the worsening economic situation and political instability in Ghana at the time. 7.38 A potentially satisfying outcome for the settlers was not realized. The Kpong resettlement team, despite explicit attempts to the contrary, faced nearly all the same problems at Akosombo of time pressures, satisfying land needs, avoiding conflicts, inadequate support from qualified agricultural SComparative Study of Resettlement Projects in Ghana from Akosombo and Kpong. V.O. Adu-Ayee, May, 187. -43. staf failures of handing over responsibilities from VRA to assigned agencies etc. Under stable conditions the known problems might have been corrected without delay. 7.39 Another weakness in plan preparation, evident in most resettlement projects, caused settlers dissatisfaction at Kpong - under-assessment of needs. Surveys of population, housing and land affected by the proposed reservoir must necessarily be done well ahead of resettlement But in the time between surveys and resettlement, a matter of years, changes occur. Families grow, new families are formed, houses are completed or enlarged, and more land comes under cultivation. Yet resettlement provision is determined by out-of-date information. There is need for check-up surveys or monitoring arrangements to adjust to changing circumstances. 7.40 At times, the Bank's position concerning resettlement at Kpong appeared powerless. Staff identified weaknesse in the program and problems in implementation. Probably as a result of CIDA's involvement, separate supervision missions were mounted, staffed by a sociologist, since the regular six monthly missions were being staffed by power engineers. The sociologist also identified the agricultural component as being the principal issue needing attention. Reviews made recommendations which VRA accepted but "essentially nothing has been done on the ground".9 Had the Bank's advice been followed promptly the program would have had greater success. 7.41 Financial management of resettlement also caused avoidable problems and conflicts despite established policies and guidelines. Overall resettlement cost accounting was poor. Valuations and land compensation payments were treated as matters to be dealt with after resettlement Valuations for compensation were not done, which meant that compensation for land taken for resettlement was not paid, causing opposition to resettlement. 7.42 The overriding lesson from Kpong's resettlement program is that more attention must be paid top implementation. There were generally sound policies, government commitment, a suitable organization, and a seasoned staff with very relevant resettlement experience. Yet the program faced avoidable problems which were not adequately solved. 91 Ghana - Kpong Hydroebctric Project, Agroutural Reselement Review MissIon, Back*to-Office and FuH Repoot February 26, 1979. ・藁’---------------------;-(-―「―-,;-；。―-- ,46, 13 GHMA - T~ D~~ E=W ~~^ by S== 1975 im im ini Mtog tu M toc % 09 M4 eu 87.1 6n9 6LI E~ 973 112 103 W 324.1 313 TOW 867.7 tag - - tom of on equ~ Ma i i - c~ ~ and omuc~ 19~ conuv~ km 011 =d hydrod~ som= Wodd Emp &~m and B~= 1971-1M IBA SM~ EMW OEM, P^ 19X W0N E~ff &~ and ~= IM IM MA E~ OEM, Parkb ina ~ k~ ~ Oh= 8= P~ Ohmw h~ ud Opd= In the ~ Se~ R~ of the ~ UNDP/WaN ~ E~ Anm~ PM~ No~ber 19M - 47 - Pqgp 3 de 13 Table I.k NG~be of Ro==e mmor and Aner Rmset=omet by Tjyp of Respmd~n Number of B Afiff 6 . At Rmm Freq % Froq % Fr.q % Fmuq % 1 6 4 22 15 5 14 17 43 2 385 24 39 27 18 81 13 33 3 38 28 34 23 4 11 7 18 4 23 16 21 14 2 6 5 13 9 7 5 2 6 - 6 14 9 8 5 3 9 1 3 7-< 19 12 14 11 1 3 1 3 Tal 148 100 145 100 35 100 39 100 Sourne:8 Sod.cnmi uvyo Kpon gidm~n vle~, 19N. - 48, 4.f13 Tb IV.1: Reasons for Not Visiting E s Ofc Resettler Number % - No knowledge o th* exiOs 19 13 - Boausty omse to us 2 1 - I do not do any sedousfarmng 10 7 - I haw no problems 17 12 - They ar alwaysunooperatv 6 4 - Bau thy do ncomto m 13 9 -No edmnsionwokiscatedout 1 1 -The dilanes vry far from hr 68 46 -I haWe emt hOW to dmost f agr dension 2 1 -I do not hae to go 3 2 - millirat 5 3 - Fan~rs need credit mare than eden~on seo. 1 1 Total 147 100 Source: -Sury af Kpong Reseldement Villags, 1902. -49- 5 af 13 Table V.I: Age, Housuhold Size and Educafo of Household M br R~see and Imm ~pnt 199 Type af RØSPon~n AGE RME Røsettler fmmfgrnt % % 0-14 46 0 15-45 49 37 46-> 5 3 Total 100 100 EDUCAION LEVL Percentag Non 34 Primaly school only 8 Middle school only 43 seody tal trag 11 Univsi~y 2 Ohe,, 2 Todal 100 Resetter Immigrant Tol SRE OF HOUSEHOLD 1- 4 30 38 31 5.8 30 39 32 8-12 24 23 24 13-< 6 - 13 Total 100 100 100 Sou~e socio-conomo Stvy or Kpong Reæettlement Vhag^e, 1992. -f50 - Fg V.2 ta Ac~ by Household Members and HId Lb (%) CASSAVA (1(^ P(prEnew9 W~ei a Paz^ MAIZE 8Trn~ Spr~ of K dPparam(29ages, im - 51 - Pge 7 ef13 Table V.3: Source of Housebold Cash Income, Before mad A*e Rm "mt Source of income Befosr _ ifr Saeo Food Cops 40 40 Sale of Fsh 18 1 Empboyment 29 23 nemitanct ftrm Relatives 6 10 Rent 1 4 Other 6 a 100 100 SOurce: Socoeconombc Swvey of Kpong Reseiemet VBages, 1M -52 - Table VA: Pemntage of Resetlers and hm4ffau Who Owned Hobisstemd Prior to Retemt ad Peetge Who Have PrChasd These itemam aR tafflnt BB oe A____r Houeho _ _ _ iller lmman Resille hmnmat Tractor 5 7 8 Vehmile 26 15 17 13 Bicycle 37 3 25 Camo. 25 15 23 38 Radio 47 54 37 41 Telbvsion 5 33 3 15 Sewing Machne 7 10 7 5 Iron 34 33 22 28 Source: Socioosoonomi Swvey cf Kpong Rseioment Vsage, lm. •sз- �• в ���ae�i����`о � �Ф�1.,i �дА®С1 �t й�i �S�n'�i�vй�i� м� k+ .�.�i���ël��ме��� � � � �г �1�l�iF���г lVë9.�.. 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Scope of the Resettlement Some 66 villages or minor settlements were resettled in six new communities, three on the East Bank and three on the West Bank of the headpond. Ive of the six villages were included in the sample interview survey. The sixth village, Old Akrade, was not included because in 1989, as a result of a major dispute, all of the resettled families left Old Akrade. Although it was expected that some or all families would return, only 15 persons had done so at the time of the survey. The field visits in preparation for the survey also showed that there were a number of households living in the villages which had arrived after resettlemen. The survey was to include a prni sample of these households, to determine their extent and reasons why they were attracted to this resettlement villages. The population resettled was as follows: No. of Populadlon Reseled Households* Populaon 1881 - . EAST SIDE Old Akrade 184 377 315 Fodmoku 608 1,962 1,015 Torgom 182 654 679 WEST SIDE Narku 90 380 450 West Kpong 253 17 1,28 South Senchi 364 1,166 1,379 1,561 6,6 6,185 * Seventh Revioan, 1064. * July 1961 VRA Repost. -60- Interview Respondents Three groups of respondents in each village were selected for interviews: o head of resettled households; * head of immigrant households (familie& moved to resettlement villages from areas unaffected by headpond); * community leaders, e.g. chiet headman, assembly member, CDR and TDC members. Views of the host communities affected by the resettlement, their experience and opinions were obtained from the community leaders Methodology The sample unit was the head of household, defined as all members who eat from the same pot A sample size of 196 households were interviewed, divided proportionately between the resettlers and immigrants. The sampling was as follows: Nam of Households Resettlers immigrants Vage Resettled Fodzoku i08 10% s0 - Torgrm=e 182 12% 22 - Natriku 90 13% 12 8 West Kpong 253 11% 28 10 South Senchi 364 10% 36 15 Total 1,7 10.6% 148 33 Source: Socloeconomlo Survey of Kpong Resettlement Villages, 1992. For the household heads, selection was by a stratified random sampling of all household heads of affected and host families/new migrants. Then a ten percent sub-sample of the original sample was identified which asked additional questions or probed deeper into attitudes. Female household heads formed about 15 percent of all household neads. For the community leaders, interviews were held with chiefs, chairmen of Town Development Committees, members of Committee for the Defence of the Revolution, Volta River Authority offcials, women groups and leaders, Agricultural Extension, Public Health Care and Community Development officers. - 61 - OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL BUREAU DU VkRIFICATEUR GtNtRAL CANACA 240 Sparks Street Ottawa, Ontario K1A OG6 9 June 1993 Mr Graham Donaldson Chief, Agriculture & Human Development Division Operations Evaluation Division The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Dear Mr Donaldson: Re: Early Experience with involuntary Settlement - Impact Evaluation on GHANA - Kpong Hydroelectric Project (Loan 1380-GH) Thank you for sending me a copy of the abovementioned report and asking me to provide my comments. I have read it carefully and am pleased to inform you that I found the report to be comprehensive and the analysis very thorough. Of particular importance from my point of view was that the study's criteria were clearly defined, the target group understood the criteria, and use was made of local expertise in carrying out the study. I commend you and other OED staff involved on the quality of work and look forward to receMng the consolidated findings of all four reports. With best wishes. Yours sincerely. Rajesh Da Director Audit Operations -63- l a ence cnadlenne de Canadian International 1 lveloppement ntemational Development Agency 2go. du Portoo* 200 Promenade du Portage M ,unue.e Pa 1 of 2 CANADA KIAOG4 KIAOG4 V00 -WV vow ra *June 11, 1993 Graham Donaldson Chief, Agriculture and Human Development Division Operations Evaluation Division The World Bank 1818 H Street Washington, D. C. 20433 subject: Xmpact Evaluatin: Muna: Knong MNAroelectric Dear Mr. Donaldson: My colleague Richard Beatty, who is responsible for CIDA's Industrial Cooperation programming in Africa and the Middle East, has passed along your letter of May 5 and its enclosed draft evaluation report on the subject project. I regret that we have passed slightly your June 9 deadline for comments in passing the report within CIDA, the more so as the report is a thoughtful one which raises a number of issues which are deserving of aid donors' attention. I was interested by the role which the report indicates CIDA staff and the Canadian Executive Director played before and during implementation in pressing the Bank to ensure that the environmental dimension of the project was fully considered, as well as by the focus which the report gives to their doing so. From today's perspective, it is difficult to appreciate how that environmental dimension could have been so narrowly defined as to cover only the health impact of the project. My most immediate comment on the draft evaluation report, in fact, is that it continues that narrow environmental focus, assessing the project within its self-defined concentration on health effects rather than in terms of its actual impacts on the larger environment. While it would be inappropriate to note that the project did not achieve objectives which it never sought to achieve, it would seen a very valuable lesson for future programming that the environmental impact of not seeking them was significant. CIDA is no longer involved in the power sector in Ghana, and the Kpong project is not a part of the corporate Canada" -64- ATte 2 at 2 memory of our current West Africa programme staff. Others in CIDA, though, will be interested in the report's findings and I will be circulating it to them, for their interest, comments and the lessons it conveys. Should any of the comments bear materially on your on- going work, I will be pleased to forward them to you. As a separate formality, I should appreciate the opportunity to clarify.matters further with respect to the formality of our views on the publication of the report; I will write further on this, hopefully within the month. We would, of course, appreciate a copy of the report as finalized for Bank use. Archie Book Country Programme Director West Africa Programme Africa and the Middle East Branch c.c. Office of the Canadian Executive Director, The World Bank Canadian High Commission, Accra - 65 * ATTACHMENT 3 /~~~o I} Pae1Of 5 KUWAll RND FOR AB CONMIC DEVELOP nW: 4 -i.S6 FAXatANMISIO N Toopage:5 AW n..t moADsMMIoM&oenROWs cm: AAlt/US/PY2 FAX: (0"S) 241009. TELEPHONE TELEX: 22025 ALUNDUK (M05) 2dU800 (40 Une) 613 KFAED KT TO MR. GRAHAM DONALDSON, CHIEF WeRgPI&IMM11ONDEPARTMENT' THE WORLD BANK, WASHINGTON DC. U.S.A. FAX NO. : 0012024776391 THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF MAY 5, 1993 REGARDING THE KPONG HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT. WE HAVE PREPARED SOME COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT WHICH ARE ENCLOSED HEREWITH. WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE PLEASED TO HAVE A COPY OF THE OVER VIEW WHEN IT IS PREPARED. AS REGARD$ THE PUBLICATION OF THE REPORT ON THE KPONG HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT RESETTLEMENT, PLEASE. FEEL FREE IN QUOTING ANY OR ALL OUR COMMENTS. WE ALSO HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE REPORT BEING PUBLISHED. Yo8 SINCERELY, HIS & YAN DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS P.0amus ant ses,1g m stel Cable AtauNDUlt * IGMalT .aggl a..8:ghlIiip. Wt1.gs*V* p .o. g'tat Telehfow :400 * sS ALSUNOMA I agMt IWAGD IC* ar : Ihs1 I a61sto I s418ga I a483B I ASaIa ATTACHMT3 KNfAl FUND FORAMA ECONOMIC DEVELPENT W*gt /it-tu&6 FAXITELEXTRANSMISSION rTavaes: . aIa 8At.6.1993 -ouses808Mous OPsRAmOWs cF: AAR/US/PY1 ,FAX: Ps 21eie TELEPHONE TELEX: 22020 ALBUNDUK 04 leS) a24so (4o Unem) 22613 KFAED XT TO : MR. GRAHAM DONALDSON, CHIEF AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DIVISION OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT THE WORLD BANK WASHINGTON DC. U.S.A. FAX NO. : 001 202 4776391 RE: EARLY EXPERIENCE WITH INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT- IMPACT EVALUATION ON GHANA- KPONG HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (LOAN 180-GH) WE ROPER TO YOUR LETTER DATED MAY 5, 1993 AND ATTACHED REPORT REGARDING THE ABOVE SUBJECT. SINCE THE KUWAIT FUND, WAS ONE OF THE THREE ARAB DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE FINANCING OF THE GHANA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT. NAMELY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ALL CVL WORK FOR THE KPONG DAM. WE WERE NATURALLY INTERESTED IN GING THROUGH YOUR REPORT. AND THANK YOU FOR SENDING IT TO US. HOWEVER, AS WE WERE NOT ACTUALLY INVOLVED IN THE RESETTLEMENT COMPONENT OF THE PROJECT, WE CANNOT SAY THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS RELATING TO THIS IMPORTANT PART, OTHER THAN FoLLOW THE PHYSICAL PROGRESS OF THE CONSTRUCTION WORKS RELATING TO IT. WE ALSO PAY GREAT ATTENTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS WHERE THEY PFATURE IN PROJECTS IN WHICH THE KUWAIT FUND PARTICIPATES IN FINANCING. NEVERTHELESS WE HAD SOME PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH RESETTLEMENT PROBiM AS PART OF OTHER DAM PROJECTS. BE IT FOR HYDROELECTRIC POWER 611N1RATION, IRRIGATION, WATER SUPPLY OR ANY COMBINATION OF TWO OF THESE PURPOSES. P.Oaft a 8 gtftiggg faao Cobb: ALSUNDOt * 4NUW.45 &&a .elb":*Awj4st*yael,S I.Aa T4tMe : 80000 * 7kb : 250M A.UUK I 2Mst VPAJD Kr * PSL. ' SAIS00 I asage 1 9410M2 / Saga I aieg - 67 - AWAO SUND FOR AAAB ECONOMIC DEvaOPMENT RESETTLEMENT. HOWEVER SIMPLE IT MAY SEEM APPEARS ALWAYS TO INVOLVE UNEXPECTED OR UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES. BEING REFERRED TO AS INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT- THEN. BY DEFINITION. PEOPLE USUALLY RESENT BEING UPROOTED FROM THEIR OLD HOMES TO ANY NEW AREA. EVEN IF CONDITIONS OF LIFE PROVE TO 8E BETTER AFTER THEY FINALLY SETTLE IN THEIR NEW HOMES. IT SEEMS THAT IN THE CASE OF KPONG MATTERS WERE RATHER AGGRAVATED BY ETHNIC AND SPUNTER GROUP CONFLICTS AS WELL AS BY THE NEED OF THE HELP OF GHOSTS". IN OUR OPINION, THE PLANNING AND THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGES HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY STUDIED. WE ALSO CONSIDER THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOING THIS RESTS SQUARELY ON THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS TO ALLOCATE SUFFICIENT FUNDS (WHICH MAY BE PROVIDED IN STAGES) TO MEET THREE MAIN REQUISITES: (A) THE CONSTRUCTION OF ALL HOUSING, SCHOOLS, MEDICAL CENTRES. WATER AND POWER SUPPLY, AND OTHER AMENITIES WELL BEFORE MOVING THE SETTLERS. (a) PREPARE NEW LAND (PROBABLY LARGER AND MORE SUITABLE) FOR AGRICULTURE AND ENSURE ITS PROPER IRRIGATION, AND (C) MAKE CASH PAYMENTS TO SEE THE PEOPLE THROUGH THE PERIOD. AFTER THEIR MOVE AND BEFORE NEW CROPS ARE AVAILABLE. PLACING FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WELFARE OF THE SETTLERS ON THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT, OF COURSE. PRECLUDE RESORTING TO SPECIALIZED CONSULTANTS LIKE SOCIOLOGISTS OR OTHERS. IN SOME CASES FOREIGN CONTRACTORS MAY ALSO BE NEEDED FOR SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF BUILDINGS, ALTHOUGH LOCAL CONTRACTORS. WHERE AVAILABLE, WOULD PROBABLY BE CHEAPER AND MORE VERSED WITH LOCAL CONDITIONS. THE RESETTLEMENT PROCESS SHOULD NORMALLY INVOLVE THREE STAGES: (1) THE PLANNING STAGE (2) THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE, AND (3) THE TRANSPORTATION STAGE 2 * 68 - ATTACHMENT 3 KUWAI TUNW FOR LaAA CONOMIC DEVEiOPMENT THE PLANNING STAGE IS PROBARI V rss Parter* anone 4w *- *T*-** -A^* DESIGN OP HOUSES OF DIFFERENT SIZES AND ALL OTHER CONSTRUCTION WORKS. IT ALSO INCLUDES IDENTIFYING LAND SUITABLE FOR AGRICULTURE, SURVEYING SUCH LAND (AND POPULATION). SUFFICIENT TIME MUST BE ALLOWED FOR THIS STAGE (IN YEARS). A GOVERNMENT SPECIAL SUITABLE UNIT SHOULD 8E ENTRUSTED WITH THIS STAGE WHCPf SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVEIS OF THE SETTLERS THEMSELVES ACCORDING TO THEIR NUMBERS AND SIZE OF THE WHOLE OPERATION. THIS HELPS LATER IN AVOIDING DISPUTES. THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE ALSO NEEDS CAREFUL PLANNING AND TIMING. IT IS NOTED IN YOUR REPORT (PARA 7.41 PAGE 6e) THAT "KPONG RESETTLEMENT TEAM, DESPITE EXPLICIT ATTEMPTS TO THE CONTRARY, FACED THE SAME PROBLEMS AT AKO$OMBO OF TIME PRESSURES, SATISFYING LAND NEEDS, AVOIDING CONFUCTS, INADEQUATE SUPPORT FROM QUALIFIED AGRICULTURAL STAFF, FAILURES OF HANDING OVER RESPONSIBILITIES FROM VRA TO ASSIGNED AGENCIES.. ETC.* FURTHERMORE THE PROBLEMS MENTIONED IN PARA 7.42 SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROMPTLY ATTENDED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT OR VRA, SPECIAUY AS REGARDS THE AGRICULTURAL COMPONENT, BEING THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE NEEDING ATTENTION. AGAIN, IT IS REALLY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT REMARKS REGARDING FINANCIAL MATTERS (PARA 7.43). DELAYS OF IMPORTANT ISSUES UNTIL AFTER RESETTLEMENT IS CERTAINLY ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS TO BE AVOIDED. THE TRANSPORTATION STAGE WAS PROBABLY NOT AN ISSUE IN KPONG RESETTLEMENT CASE 5AS OF THE SHORT DISTANCES INVOLVED. BUT IN OTHER CASS. WHERE DISTANCES MAY BE VERY LONG, TRANSPORTATION BECOMES A PROBLEM THAT ALSO REQUIRES GOOD AND CAREFUL PLANNING WELL AHEAD. IN ADDITION IT COULD NEED THE CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS OR EVEN RAILWAY EXTENSIONS, IN SOME. ADMITTEDLY, RARE CASES. AS YOU ARE INTERESTED IN INVOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT IN ASIA AND AFRICA. WE SHOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE UNIQUE CASE OF THE RELOCATION 3 ATTACHMEN 3 Fap s or s a0g o D FOR Ana tNeMC OROMMR OF WADI NALFA POPULATION IN THE SUDAN, SOME TIME DURING THE 19508. THIS . OPERATION, BROUGHT ABOUT BECAUSE OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FAMOUS ASWAN HIGH DAM IN SOUTHERN EGYPT, INVOLVED THE RELOCATION OF ABOUT - 50.000 OR 00.000 SUDANESE (OF NUSA ORIGIN), FROM AN AREA WITH MEAGRE. OR SOMETIMES NO RAINFALL. TO A NEWLY DEVELOPED AGRICULTURAL AREA ABOUT NINE HUNDRED KILOMETRES AWAY (ALONG THE RAILWAY LINE HALFAATBARA 4HAYA-KASSALA- KHASHM EL GIRBA) ON THE RIVER ATBARA BANKS SOUTH EAST OF WADI HALFA. A NEW DAM HAD TO BE CONSTRUCTED ACROSS THIS RIVER TO IRRIGATE NEW VIRGIN LAND FOR THE RELOCATED INHABITANTS PROM WADI HALFA AND A NUMBER OF NEARBY VILLAGES. A RAILWAY BRANCH OF SOME 50 KILOMETRES AS WELL AS A ROAD WERE ALSO CONSTRUCTED TO THE NEW KHASHM EL GIRBA DAM SITE. FROM THE NEAREST POINT ON THE ABOVE MENTIONED RAILWAY LINE. UNFORTUNATELY WE COULD NOT TRACE ANY REFERENCES ON THIS MAJOR OPERATION AT OUR END BUT PRESUMABLY. YOU MAY FIND SOME IN THE ISRD. WE CAN HOWEVER. MENTION THAT IT TOOK YEARS OF PLANNING AND GREAT RESISTANCE FROM THE WADI HALFA PEOPLE. TO THE EXTENT THAT SOME OF THEM REFUSED TO MOVE AND PREFERRED TO REMAIN AT T 1 EDGES OF THE NEWLY FORMED LAKE IN THE NORTH. FINALLY WE CANNOT HELP BUT STRESS ONCE MORE, THE IMPORTANCE OF PLANING. AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. FOR SUCH RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS. AND THAT CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS MUST BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY AND NECESSARY EXPENSES WHETHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IF THE BENEFICIARIES FROM THE OPERATION HAPPEN TO BE A THIRD PARTY. H±*" - YAM DIRECTOR OF OPENaIlTONS 4 C闐！^1隊 一一 取6計乙O遞細I