India - Irrigation Projects

Document of The World Bank FOR oMCIAL USE ONLY Report No. 12212 PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA SECOND GUJARAT IRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1011-IN) KARNATAKA TANKS PROJECT (CREDIT 1116-IN) KALLADA IRRIGATION AND TREE CROPS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1269-IN AND LOAN 2186-IN) JULY 28, 1993 MICROGRAPHICS Report No: 12212 Type: PPAR Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipiets only Ia the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withaout World Bank autherization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Name of Currenc. Rupee (Rs) Rate of exchange 1979 US$1 = Rs 8.4 1980 US$1 = rs 8.4 1981 US$1 = Rs 9.1 1982 US$1 = Rs 9.7 1983 US$1 = Rs 10.5 1984 US$1 = Rs 12.5 1985 US$1 = Rs 12.2 1986 US$1 = Rs 12.8 1987 US$1 = Rs 13.0 1988 US$1 = Rs 14.9 1989 US$1 = Rs 16.0 1990 US$1 = Rs 18.0 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND STATES FISCAL YEAR April 1 - March 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CCA Cultivable Command Area CPS Central Projects Staff CWC Central Water Commission DSRP Dam Safety Review Panel ERR Economic Rate of Return GOI Government of India GO Government of Gujarat GOKa Government of Karnataka GOKe Government of Kerala ID Irrigation Department MCS Micro Conveyance System O&M Operation and Maintenance OED Operations Evaluation Department PAR Performance Audit Report PCR Project Completion Report RWS Rotational Water Supply WALMI Water and Land Management Institute FOR OFFICIAL USE ONIY THE WORLD 8MAK Washington, D.C. 2433 USBA 01* of aholWor.eal opos Evoluedon July 28, 1993 MMORAN TO TH FM5UIVIECaMS Ah THU REMEN5 SUBJEC: Performance Audit Report on India Second Gujarat Irrigation Project (Cr.1011-IN) Karnataka Tanks Project (Cr.1116-IN) Kallada Irrigation and Tree Crops Development Proaect (Cr1269/La.2186 Attached is the Performance Audit Report on India - Second Gujarat Irrigation Project (Cr.1011-IN); Karnataka Tanks Project (Cr.1116-IN); Kallada Irrigation and Tree Crops Development Project (Cr.1269/Ln.2186-IN) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. All three projects had unsatisfactory outcomes, with unacceptably low economic rates of return resulting mainly from delays in implementation and shortfals in project attainments compared with appraisal expectations. The principal audit finding is that the ambitious physical construction, operational improvement and institutional strengthening objectives of the projects were far beyond the capacities of the implementing agencies. The projects did not conform to Bank operational norms regarding the state of field investigation and detailed design for engineering works at the time of negotiations. Since the projects were completed Bank assistance for Indian irrigation has shifted, away from the earlier concentration on constructing new irrigation systems. Future projects are likely to give emphasis to restructuring irrigation institutions, improve their professionalism enhance their management and technical capabilities, and progressively devolve responsibility to farmers and other non-government agencies. Robert Picciotto by H. Eberhard Kpp Attachment This documen has a MeMrcted disrbUlOn and May be Used by iv.4fAleni only In the perfOrnce of theirollaMdugof. Its o Mi may not otherwise be disclosed wOuW World Bank auRthrallon. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SECOND GUJARAT IRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1011-IN) KARNATAKA TANKS PROJECT (CREDIT 1116-IN) KALLADA IRRIGATION AND TREE CROPS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CtDT 1269-IN AND LOAN 2186-IN) TABE CONTENTS Page No. Preface ...................................... i Basic Data Sheet .................................. iii Evaluation Summary ......................................... ..... ix L Background .................. ..... 1 I. Implementation Experience ........................................ 3 A. Gujarat Irrigation H ........................................ 3 B. Karnataka Tanks .......................................... 6 C. Kallada Irrigation and Tree Crops.............................. 8 III. Project Outcomes.. ................... ........ 10 IV Findings and Issues ...... ................................... ..... 13 A. Over-ambitious Appraisal Expectations ............. .... . 13 B. Premature Lending ................ 15 ATTACHMENT I: Comments from the Government of Gujarat ........... ...... 17 ATTACHMENT II Comments from the Government of Karnataka ............... 25 MAPS: IBRD 24496 Gujarat Irrigation 1 Project Component Locations IBRD 14608R Gujarat Irrigation It Project Ukai-Kakrapar Irrigation Scheme IBRD 14610R Gujarat Irrigation I Project Damanganga Component IBRD 14611R Gujarat Irrigation H Project Karjan Component IBRD 15343R Karnataka Tank Irrigation Project Locations IBRD 16023R1 Kallada Irrigation and Tree Copes Development Project Locations This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorisation. .- PEREORMANC AUDIT RPR SECOND GUJARAT IRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1011-IN) KARNATAKA TANKS PROJECT (CREDIT 1116-IN) KALLADA IRRIGATION AND TREE CROPS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CDIT 1269-IN AND LOAN 2186-IN) This is a Performance Audit Report (PAR) on three IDA/Bank assisted Irrigation sub- sector projects in India. The credits# to a total value of US$289.0 million equivalent (M) and one loan for US$20.3 M equivalent were approved by the Board in May 1980, March 1981, and July 1982, respectively. The Gujarat project was closed in April 1989, and the other two in March 1989. A total of US$15.7 M equivalent in undisbursed balances was cancelled from Credit 1011. The other credits and loan were fully disbursed. Dates of final disbursement were November 10, April 10 and October 17,1989, respectively. This PAR is based upon a review of the Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs),1 the corresponding President's Reports,l the Development Credit Agreements and Project Agreements,1 the Project Completion Reports (PCRs),y and the transcripts of the Executive Directors' meetinp at which the projects were considered. Bank files and other relevant documents were also studied, and discussions were held with Bank staff associated with the projects. The PCRs provide good accounts of the projects' experiences. They are generally critical of preparation weaknesses which led to over-optimistic expectations of the time required to complete the project investments. This PAR elaborates on important aspects of the preparation and appraisal process, including the strong influence of the bank on project objectives and content which resulted in impossibly ambitious targets being set for the relatively short implementation timespans, and the inadequate state of advancement of field investigation and design at time of Board presentation which inhibited timely tendering and commencement of construction. An OED mission visited India in October - November 1992. The mission held discussions with officials in the ministries and other agencies responsible for the projects at both Central Government and State levels. Their kind cooperation and valuable assistance in the Ctdit 1011 . US$175.0 mllion equivalent; Cedit 1116. USS54.0 million eqiWvaleft; Criat 1269- USS60.0 millin equlaent and Loan 2186 US$20.3 million equlvalent. Report Number 2843a.IN dated April 9, 190; 3239-IN dated Febmuary 26, 1981; and 36SIN dated May 24, 1082 Repors Numben P-2765-IN; P-2968-IN; and P-3347-I. Dated May 12, 1980, March 26, 1981, and Jty 6. 1962. Repots No.9S0 dated May 17,1991; 6668 dated May 29, 1990; and 9369 dated Februazy 21, 1991. preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged. Field trips to a representative selection of project sites were also undertaken for the purpose of familiarization, and to interview staff responsible for implementation and project beneficiaries. Following standard OED procedures, copies of the draft PAR were sent to the Government of India and the State Governments. Comments received from the State Governments of Gujarat and Karnataka are reproduced as Attachments I and II to the PAR. ·”·！’··―·―-l&---―·룝―!--I·。―-- ．떼 iv - Måffi 28 NOc( speda~ Pctf«m~ pa~ prqw~ gin 3 PM44~ so~ i EcEn 2 1 MTP supw~ 11 2 Ecm 2 3 KT ~~ ni 4M 2 Ecm 3 2 KT upm~ iv 11182 2 Beleft 3 1 KT ~~ v 50 2 ECIEn 2 1 m squ~ vi 90 3 3 en 2 3 m sqm~ VD 4M 4 4E4 2 3 m ~~ vm 1m4 4 3 F^ F 2 2 KT supa~ DC 3M 4 4ED 2 1 T sqn~ x Izo 10 4 W^&T 3 2 2 3V Flo &Ta~ m 406 10 4 El4F^R+R 4 2 3 4 FIT s%*~ m 9186 7 5 EnP.A 4 3 3 4 FTO sqx~ xlu 4W 11 7BMJ~ +R 1 2 2 3 TIM sqm~ xw 5 4 ~+R i 2 2 3 TIM sqm~ xv- 408 2 3 En 1 3 a 2 TS sqm~ XVI 100 3 3 En i - 3 3 3 T~ supa~ Xvil Z49 4 2 PAAT 4 4 a 4 T~ Odw~Data BanmW omww~ of ad sum of 0~ N~ G*w me~ U~= 11 Cr«* Kumber 1496-M Am= (Uss 8~ Ino AppmM Da* Jue 12,1984 Bo - Ecm~ Da - Bu~ P - Pmcure~ $pm~ F - Pk~ A~ A A&Muft~ T T~ Sp~ R+R - Rem*le~ and RcMbW~ 8 - Sod~ pro~ 2 - mo~ pm~ 3 - maýw pm~ 1 194~ 2 m SIR~ 3 m Eknerl~ M Mo~ T - Ta~ F - Fi~ 0 - Odwr. Wcm Mque~ of fou no~ me 9~ (ftm junc ^ die r~ mw to aw&mty at ~ p~ w~er~ öwd~ k~ ud 0~ d~ rupo~ m ~ of 1 to 4. .v. PERFQRMANE AUDIT R KARNATAKA TANKS PROJECT (CREDIT 1116-IN) BASIC DATA SEET Kev P~ec Data Appra~sal Acuaalor Atual% f SExpectation Cu~ E~ A Total Projc Cots (USS million equivalent) 77.4 57.2 74 Crdit Amout (US silio equivalent) 54.0 50.9 94 Dat ~ Physca cmponent Comple~e asS 3394M Eoaomic ate of Retum (%) 20 Relow SA 19 Inestitiona Prfomac- Poor B 1092 Stat, Goverment Estimate Cumulative æatimate and Actual Dimbursements AppraislEsthate 4.0 14.0 28.0 44.0 54.0 - - - (US lilion equiv.) Cdit Am~out - 0.3 5.4 12.4 22.5 34.9 40.5 50.9 (US$ million equiv.) Actualas%QtAppra~sal(%) - 2.1 19.3 28.2 41.7 64.6 75.0 943 Date~of Final Dbburm et: April 10, 1989 PU=ec Date orinal Fiat Mention in FRes 12/19 Neodatons 2/81 Board Approval -31911 Signig (edit Agreement Date) 3~2Q81 Effecdves Q24181 /581 Clng Date 3/316 3f3187 3f3189 Staff Inauts Preapp aa 69.1 14 70.5 Appaisal 59.6 59.6 Ne~gadon 2.7 2.7 Sup~nduåon 4.2 1M.6 14.7 31.9 14.6 25.2 19.2 18.1 1 5.2 157.5 Ot*er .8 . . .. iOTAL 143.4 18.0 14.7 31.9 14.6 25.2 19.2 18.1 7.8 5.2 298.1 st ttlltii ll§W 9 ca ei N ti I~iit jt PEPRMåNE A-UD-IT -REP INDIA KALLADA IRRIGATION AND TREE CROP DEVELOPMENT (CREDIT 1269-INLOAN 2186.IT) BASIC DATA SHET Appraisal Actualor A «tualaa%t Tota Project Cost (US$ million equivalet) 1604 139.0 Loam Amont (US$ million equivalent) 203 20.3 100 Cedit Amount (US$ million equvalent) 40.0 60.0 100 Date Plcl Components Completed 33' Bconomic Rate of Return (%) 20 below 9.7 49 I 10~92 State Government Badmate Cumulatfi e Esdmate and Actual Disbumements Apprasa liadmate 11.1 27.4 47.4 63.5 80 3 - - - (JSS million equiv.) Credit Amont 13.9 24.1 31.1 433 55.7 651 85 803 (USSm mion aqliv.) Actuatas ofAppraisat(%) 125 es 66 68 69 82 98 100 Date f Fin' ibursement: Octobr 17,1989 Prorec Datesn Original 14t Menden I il ue - 12n78 Negodad~ 3•-$8 DerenAppro~ -- e2 Signing (C~et Agmelemt Iate) 7/@S2 Effeativeness 10/5/82 91/82 Cong Date »Ius? 341M9 ~Staff -nut EWI F%amEMM M FM FM EYW N3ml reppafaf 35.5 03 351 AppraI 51.4 24.9 763 Néodadn 24 24 SupeUon 0.7 0.2 234 28.1 253 358 43.4 238 17.7 4.9 2Ms other .g .m . _ . - - - - - _au TOTAL 98,2 39.6 23.4 2.1 25.3 352 43.4 23M 17.7 4.9 340.2 •viff - (modr.) RS9g Rpeetd ggW EB EIgL ndentinapa tioffigmon 12/8-12~79 3 - Apprisa~ 980 6 . - - PosApprisa (Refornuation) 5i1 2 - - - Supervisio i 12v82 3 2ac,En 1 • T,M,F Suprision 11 9/83 2 Ec,En 2 1 T,MIL Suprvison I 2/84 4 2 EnAg,Ec 2 1 M,L,A,RR Supevwon IV 12/84 3 3E 3 2 M,RR,P,DS SupvonV 585 5 3 EAg,Pr 2 1 T,DSMiOPIP Supav~o VI 11/85 6 3 E,Pr,F 1 2 2 2V DS,RR,F SupervisionVII 6 8 4 EnAgPr 1 2 2 2 DS,RR,F Supmviion VlI 186 2 EaS 1 2 2 2 T,P Supev~sionX 11/87 4 3 EN,E 1 2 2 2 DS,P,RR,F Supe~vision X f87 4 2 EA,Pr 1 2 2 2 DS,P,T,OP Supeavis XI 1/88 4 2 EA,Pr 3 1 2 2 F.P,T Supeavs Xu 8g8 2 2BO 1 1 2 2 TPRR,OPM Supervision XIII 289 3 2 2 2 M,RRF,L,OP,P Completio 4/89 1 En Com~ptdn 1009 1 En Other Prolect Data Boroer. Government of India and State of Kea HE~oUng Ar~ riion Depatment Ec - Econs~t En - Hngine, Pr - Procurement Specat; PA F , Financial Analys A. - Agrcult~mal; and 5- Somdglogist. W 1 - mninor prebluas;2- moderate prnbleme- 3- major problefis. 1=Imprvia~ 2- Stoary;3- Deterfraion. M -, Manag~al; T - Technical; F - Pnancial; RR Reselement and RebabaLon LA - Land AaIltion; L - Legal; P = Procuument; DS - Dam Safty; and OP - Systems Op~on Where ~equencsof tfour Afga am s~sa, the rati~gs rfer to ava~ab ity of funds, proect manageaent, dselopment impect and oweml statu repecdh~dy, on cac ef 1 to 4. SECOND GUJARAT IRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1011.IN) KARNATAKA TANKS PROJECT (CREDIT 1116.IN) KALLADA IRRIGATION AND TREE CROPS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1269-IN AND LO9N 2186-IN) EUATIO SUMMARY Introduction Results 1. The three irrigation projects covered by 4. The experience and outcomes of all this PAR were the thirty-fourth, thirty-sixth and three projects have been unsatisfactory, with fortieth irrigation sub-sector projects in India unacceptably low economic rates of return re- supported by the Bank/IDA. Despite local diff- sulting mainly from delays in implementation and erences, their audits have been combined in this shortfalls in project attainments compared with one report for convenience and ease of compar- appraisal expectations (paras. 3.1,3.9, and 3.10. ison (paras. 1.1-13). 3.11). This finding is consistent with the findings in the PCRs for the Gujarat and Karnataka pro- Objectives jects, but contradicts the PCR for Kallada, which rated the project as satisfactory. 2. All three projects aimed to expand the area under reliable irrigation through substantial 5. Despite the overall poor performance investments on large and small dams and asso- during the years of active Bank support, the dated distributory systems. Improvements over audit was encouraged to note that the state past practices and operational performance were governments are continuing to finance, albeit at to be realized through extension of the irrigation lower levels than previously, ongoing activities networks down to the farm gate, and the intro- on the part of the irrigation agencies to either duction of rotational water supply principles in complete or extend the construction targets, order to guarantee a more equitable irrigation mainly for the minor distribution systems, in the supply to individual land holders. (para. 1.4). post-project completion periods. In particular, in Gujarat the principle of rotational water Implementation Experience supply is gaining widespread acceptance and being progressively introduced in the project 3. All of the projects experienced slow areas and beyond (paras. 3.2 - 3.3). start-ups, and progress and final achievements remained well behind appraisal expectations, in Swstababiity spite of two annual extensions to the closing date in the case of Kallada and three for the 6. Sustainability, defined as the extent to others. Impediments to satisfactory progress which the projects are likely to maintain accept- were many and various, and included local bud- able levels of net benefits throughout their econ- get shortfalls, institutional and managerial weak- omic lives, is uncertain in the case of Karnataka nesses, staff and material shortages, inadequate and Kallada and depends on a large number of training Inputs, poor quality construction stand- variables. In Gujarat sustainability is mast likely ards and contractor performance, and interrup- in those areas where rotational water supply has tions due to drought, flood, or strikes and, in the won favor with the farmers to the extent that all case of Gujarat, civil strife (paras. 2.1 - 2.38). farmers now have strong vested Interests in *1* ensuring the maintenance of the irrigation struc- 1 The cive involvement in projects pre- tures (para. 3.2). paration of several Bank staff who also partc- pated in the appraisals appears to have been a 7. In Karnataka the outlook for sustainabi- further factor in explaining the ove-ambitious lity varies widely from tank to tank; it is likely in nature of the projects as finally presented to the the case of those tanks were all farmers in the Board. It i difficult for appW-A missions to cultivable command areas are receiving equitable retin the correct degree of obje,vtywhen eval- water supplies on a regular basis (para. 3.6), but uating a project from the viewpoint of the lender is unlikely in the case of tanks were the micro- when the same staff have previously made conveyance system has fallen into disrepair, substantial contuibutionstopreparing theproject unless major efforts are introduced to carry out on behalf of the borrower (pm. 4.10). repairs and ensure correctly scheduled operation (para. 3.7). 11. The projects did not conform to Bank operational norms regarding the itate of & In the Kallada project in Kerala un- of field investigation and detailed certainty arises regarding the extent to which the design for engineering works at the time of state can continue to mainta;n the innovative appraisallegotiation. Delays in commencing pipeconveyancesystemwithoutchargingsubstan- construction works, particularly of the distribu- tial user fees, which also might cover at least a toxy systems, is directly attributable to this cause portion of the very high capital cost of its in- (paras. 4.11 - 4.13). stallation (paras. 3.10 - 3.11). 12 Partly as a result of the unsatisfctory Fhdings and iessons experiences of these and other gravity Irrigation projects supported by the Bank in idia in the 9. The ambitious physical construction, oper- late nineteen seventies through nineteen eight- ational improvement and institutional ies, the Bank carried out an Irrigation sector strengthening targets and objectives of the review in 1990. The review has contributed to projects as presented to the Board for approval anappropriatechangeindirectionofBankassist- were far beyond the capabilities and capacities of ance for Ian Irrigation, away from the earlier the Implementing agencies to complete satis- concentration on constructing new Irrigation factorily in the agreed time spans. The heavy systems as exemplified by the three audited pro- (100%) emphasis on canal lining and the exten- jects and toward improvedstems sion of the public conveyance system down to operations and and dam safety in outlets serving areas as small as 8 ha is, in existing Irrigated areas. Future projects support- retrospect, seen to have been inappropriat ed by the Bank e likely to give much more (para. 4.6). The rapid expansion which was emphasis to restructuring Irrigation institutions taking place in the irrigation sub-sector lending in order to improve their professionalism, en- program to India in the years when these pro- hance their management and technical capabill- jects were processed lends credence to the tes, and progressively devolve reoit to assertion of many Bank (and borrower) staff that farmers and other ent agencies pressure to lend (and to borrow) was unusually (paras. 4.14 4.1) strong at that time, and could explain, in part, the over-ambitious expectations of the appraisal reports (pars. 4.9). -1- -I SECOND OUJARAT IRRIGATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1011-IN) KARNATAKA TANKS PROJECT (CREDIT 1116-IN) KALLADA IRRIGATION AND TREE CROPS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDT 1269-IN) AM LOAN 2186-IN) L ACKOROUND 1.1 Irrigation development has been a major determinant of agricultural growth in India during the past several decades. Up to the end of 1992 the Bank/IDA has supported 60 irrigation projects (19 lift and 41 gravity) through 66 loans or credits with a total commitment of approimately US$5.0 billion. The lift projects financed mainly small, privately owned tubewells, pumps and dugwells through conventional credit programs, while the gravity projects were concerned with variable sized, but often large, publicly owned and operated storage reservoim and canal reticulation systems. To date, project completion reports (PCRs) have been produced for 36 of these projects, of which 29 have been audited (15 lift and 14 gravity). 1.2 Performance Audit Reports (PARs) for eight of the initial set of 10 gravity projects, implemented in the 1970s through early 1980s and audited prior to the end of 1985, pointed to their having been relatively successful with favorable reestimated economic rates of =eturn (ERRs), only one of which was clouded with any marked uncertainty. A further set of six gravity projects implemented during the latter part of the 1970s through the mid to late 1980s and audited in 1990 show a marked decline in performance, with five achieving reestimated ERRs that are substantially less than the appraisal estimates. The performances and outcomes of four of these projects were rated unsatisfactoy. 13 This audit deals with a further three gravity projects, started in the early 1980s, all of which were completed in 1989. Qeies 1.4 All three projects, despite their considerable differences in design, had roughly similar objectives of expanding the area under reliable irrigation in order to increase productivity and farm incomes within their cultivable command areas (CCAs) through substantial investments in large and small dams and irrigation water distribution systems. In the process the major causes of underutilization of irrigation investments, described as inadequate planning, design and management of engineering works in the past, were to be addressed. This was to involve improvements over past practices and operational performance, principally through more rigorous dam safety standards; reduction in water losses in the conveyance systems through more extensive canal Uning and extension of the water supply networks through water courses and field channels down to the farm gate, in order to guarantee an equitable irrigation supply to individual land holders in accordance with -2- rotational water supply (RWS# principles whereby a fixed quantity of irrigation water would be delivered at predetermined times proportionately to the area of each beneficary farmer's irrigated holding. Pect Costs and Financing 1.5 Project costs were as follows: EMiW AMMraia kinl - US$ million equivalent - Gujarat 360.0 2561 Karnataka 77.4 57.2 Kallada 10. 139.0 TOTAL 598.0 452.3 1.6 The lower actual expenditures in US dollar terms as compared with appraisal expectations were due to progressive devaluation of the Indian rupee during implementation, and to lower target attainments than estimated at appraisal. 1.7 The appraisal financing plans and actual financial contributions to the projects were as follows: gEjWG Anorisa AcuaW ankIA Government t Govenment I US$ million equivalent Gujarat 175.0 185.0 360.0 159.3w 96.8 256.1 Karnataka 54.0 23.4 77.4 50.9 6.3 57.2 Kallada 80.3 §, 10. 3 50.7 TOTAL 3093 288.7 598.0 298.5 153.8 452.3 1.8 Bank/IDA funds were disbursed mainly for civil works, equipment and vebicles, with smaller amounts for technical assistance and training, monitoring and evaluation. Asucessful variant of RWS, known loca8yasambandi, has been commonly practced In Punjab and Hayana States for many decades. Warabandi Is a rotational system which was designed to distribute water equitay over fixed, unaltrMe, intetals of time in the typical Indian contest of water scarcty and mau farm sla- I See alo Goernment of OGarat suggestion for an alternate actual fnancing pan which, if Introduced, could heer the IDA dhbusmeant to the estimated figue at appraleal (Attacument I, pp. 20-22). -3- II IMPLEMENTATION EXPERNCE 2.1 This chapter gives brief outlines of each project, including its design, preparation and appraisal, Board discussion, and implementation experience. A. Ggarat Irrigation II 2.2 ig The project was designed as a five-year investment in the State's irrigation program and was initially prepared in 1978 by a government team. Later, Bank staff and consultants became involved, particularly in the matter of improving design standards and redefining criteria for civil works. As finally prepared, the project comprised five large engineering components and the establishment of a Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI). The engineering components as proposed included (a) completion of dams and partial completion of irrigation service blocks on three new major irrigation schemes, at Damanganga with a CCA of 56,000 ha, Heran, 32,000 ha and Karjan, 56,200 ha; (b) modernization of irrigation facilities over 33,000 ha of a 52,000 ha existing scheme at Ukai-Kakrapar along with drainage improvements over about 34,000 ha, as well as a sizeable roads component; and (c) construction of storage and distribution facilities to irrigate about 25,000 ha of coastal lands affected by salt water intrusion in Saurashtra which had resulted from overdraft of the aquifer in recent decades. (see Map No. IBRD 24496) 2.3 The project investments in the three new schemes, dam design and in some cases construction works for which were already underway before appraisal, were described as time-slices, meaning that financing provided through the credit would be used to construct certain percentages of the engineering works within the specified time period. The expectation was that the dams, main canals and roads would be completed and that 50, 30 and 33 percent respectively of the irrigation blocks within the new schemes would be commissioned before the end of the five-year time-slice. A high proportion of the conveyance systems were to be lined to reduce conveyance losses and maintenance cost, and the minor distribution systems, which would be designed to permit RWS, defined as allocating the water according to a fixed schedule and on a volumetric basis proportional to the irrigable area of a farm holding, would be extended to gated turn-outs serving 8 ha irrigation service areas (sub-chaks). The move to RWS represented a radical change from the existing state- wide irrigation system, known as shejpaliY 2.4 Similar irrigation standards as in para. 2.3. above were to be introduced under the Ukai-Kakrapar modernization component. The Saurashtra coastal development component involved a comprehensive scheme for water conservation, direct irrigation and artificial recharge based on gated or ungated tidal regulators, check dams, gully plugs and afforestation in the upper catchments. 2.5 An oraiaal mission visited Gujarat in mid 1979, at which time principles and design criteria were discussed on such matters as canal lining, and RWS conveyance technologies and operational procedures, which were to be introduced over a 60,000 ha aggregate area of the several components. A US$10.0 million preparation fund was also included in the Bank credit to assist GOI Under the shpaH system, which is rgulated tough te 1897 Bombay Ingation Act and Canal Rules, ach faumer is sanctioned to receive, and the irrigation agency is obligated to provide, enough water to irigate an areed area cspeOled aop or crop. t quantity recelved is not related to theuosla ofaermers Irrigated holding, as is the cm i RWS or Waband. in practce, the shjpall system is relatively imelent In water.uSe terms; lends ielf to rent-seeking behavior an the part o operadag stal and has proven diffScult to operate in an equitab w hatrlg manner under ts high ented, amAD-plt land.Owneabip pateras prevaflng oer th Irrigated areas ofojaa -4- with the preparation of future irrigation projects, including the Narmada River development, for Bank/IDA financing in Gujarat and other states. 2.6 Bank files for the period between appraisal and credit negotiation in March 1980 show that the Bank requested detailed resettlement plans from 000 for the approximately 5,700 families which would be displaced from the reservoirs to be created upstream of the new dam sites. 2.7 A failure of an earth dam, Machhu II at Morvi in the Saurashtra area of western Gujarat (not financed by the Bank) shortly after the appraisal mission returned to Headquarters led to concern on the part of the Bank in regard to dam design, construction and operating standards not only in Gujarat but also in India as a whole, and to the strengthening of covenants referring to dam safety in the credit agreement. The issues paper prepared by Bank staff after the return of the appraisal mission, and subsequent memoranda in Bank files, revealed a general concern at possible difficulties which 000 staff might experience in performing to the new standards for planning, design and operation. As a consequence a post anraisal mission was fielded in September 1979 partly to strengthen the organizational and training aspects of the project. This led to an agreement between GOG and the Bank to the establishment of a separate Command Area Development (CAD) unit to be responsible for water management in the irrigated blocks to be modernized through the project. It was also recognized that, given the difficulties likely to be experienced by GOG in moving to an improved level of operational efficiency, the Bank should accept a higher level of supervision inputs to reinforce GO's effortU. 2.8 The &AW approved the project in April 1980. When presenting the project to the Board, Bank staff argued that the introduction of high yielding varieties and new cropping patterns through the 1970s required changes to irrigation design standards, including more sophisticated conveyance systems and distribution technology capable of ensuring equitable shares of available water to all beneficiary farmers. Several Board members spoke in favor of the project, and particularly of the project preparation facility. One member expressed concern about the conditions for resettlement He was assured that OG had a good social program which gave emphasis to resettlement on alternative cultivable lands as much as to the payment of monetary compensation. 2.9 Implementaion. The project was declared effective in June 1980, but the first supervision mission, from the Resident Mission in Delhi, did not take place until January 1981, more than eight months after the agreed commencement date of the five-year time-slice (April 1, 1980). The mission reported that progress had been slow in sanctioning construction works and that procurement problems explained part of the delay. Work on the Heran dam was held up by a legal dispute. The mission expressed concern at the inability of GOG to establish WALMI or to organize training programs for irrigation staff who would be responsible for the design and operation of the modernized system to be constructed under the Ukai-Kakrapar component. Serious Implementation and quality control problems were noted, especially in regard to the construction of small channels and the quality of lining works, which were attributed to a lack of experience in their planning and to poor supervision of contractors responsible for their construction. 2.10 The second supervision did not take place until almost a year after the first, in December 1981 and eighteen months after effectiveness, by which time the Heran component had been dropped from the project because of opposition from villagers living within the site of the proposed reservoir. Progress was disappointingly slow for all the other components. The Damanganga dam construction attainments were only 60% of SAR expectations and canal construction was 1igging by one year, while field channels and drainage works had made virtually no progress. The Karian dam was about one year behind schedule because of a need to retender in -S- order to conform with Bank procurement guidelines, and had encountered unexpected foundation problems, while canals, branches and distribution network construction had hardly started. The Ukat- Kakrapar component was similarly well behind schedule, and progress was slow at Saurashtra. WAIMIL inaugurated in October 1981 was operating from temporary accommodation and experiencing great difficulty in attracting good staft largely because terms of service offered to potential appointees were unattractive. 2.11 Shortfalls in civil works progress and sub-standard quality of completed works were repeatedly noted by supervision missions through to the end of 1985. During these years it became increasingly apparent that a limited understanding of RWS design and operating principles on the part of many engineering staft combined with some reluctance by others to accept such approaches, were preventing the attainment of project objectives. Increasing emphasis was therefore given to in-service training, to which Bank and FAO/CP staff and consultants financed under a separate UNDP program administrated by the Bank subsequently made important contributions. 2.12 Only 53% of the physical construction targets were estimated to have been attained by the end of 1985 (eight months later than the SAR estimated project completion date of April 30), but prospects for improvement were judged promising. Also, after five years of indecision and delay, GOG had selected a site and approved plans for the construction of permanent facilities for WAII at Anand, about 100 kilometers to the south of Gandhinagar, the State Capital, and had appointed an enterprising director who was giving strong emphasis to training. For these reasons the Bank agreed to extend the credit for two years to April 30, 1988. At the same time, the Board approved financing for the reconstruction of Machhu II dam (para. 2.7) and strengthening of Machhu I dam in substitution for the cancelled Heran componentL 2.13 The first 10 supervision missions through to the end of 1985 had been carried out by Resident Mission staff in the New Delhi office, but commencing in January 1986 the responsibility for project supervision was assumed by Bank Headquarters. The main focus of the April 1986 supervision mission was to undertake a review of the '"... constraints in GOGs financial capabilities and impact of such constraints on ability to complete project as scheduled, after requesting GOG to prepare a realistic reassessment of work plans and budgets prior to the mission's arlival. This concern over local financing was a consequence of political unrest within the state and a public employee's strike, and of massive diversion of state funds (agreed to by the Bank) from the fiscal 1985-86 project budget to social welfare programs following a weak monsoon and persistent drought in northerm and western Gujarat in 1985. 2.14 The Bank's supervision letter to GOG emphasized that if the present levels of funding were to continue it would be unlikely that the project could be completed by the extended credit closing date, and OO was urged to make every effort to increase its financial support to better ensure that benefts could be realized as quickly as possible from the considerable investments already made. An aide-memoire prepared by the mission and attached to the letter noted that the overall status of the project was rated as having major problems not being addressed adequately, in marked contrast to the moderate problems performance rating for the previous three years. Attention of GOG was drawn to the need for an increased emphasis on extending the distribution system, field channels and drainage at Damanganga, Karjan and Ukai-Kakrapar, and on the introduction of detailed operating plans for the dams, spillways and storage facilities associated with all te irrigation & 'ie Gowmumaent ofOjea preent an afteaate oview onw watt ildeas a the state cosalank about RWSIne ma whih eadited la the eadyy'am of hect, but was meoted in apaquct as afer the oempt atRWSwaedm r dena (Atlatmnt I, W 22.24 -6- components. Emphasis was also attached to the need for an authoritative dam safety panel certification for the recently approved Machhu II dam reconstruction component 2.15 The twelfth supervision, carried out in September 1986 noted a continuing deterioration in progress due to fiscal 1986-87 budget limitations imposed because of a continuing drought emergency. It was observed that many project engineers had little understanding of RWS systems, which could explain much of the difficulty 000 was experiencing in attaining the improved water management objectives of the project. The revised two-year implementation schedule agreed to a few years earlier was already proving to be unrealistic, and an additional 18 months was considered necessary to meet the SAR targets. 2.16 By early 1987 the financial situation had improved and construction was more or less keeping pace with a further revised implementation schedule. However, the quality of construction works remained a source of considerable concern to the Bank, particularly at Damanganga were extensive and costly remedial works were considered necessary. The aide-memoire addressed to 000 by the mission includes 29 recommendations for improvement. 2.17 Subsequent Bank supervision missions reported continuing disappointing progress with most project activities, but in early 1988 evidence of a stronger commitment to Warabandi-type RWS, and an end to what was described as a long standing state of confusion about the principles and practice of RWS, was sufficient to persuade the Bank to agree to extend the closing date of the project by an additional year, to April 30, 1989, during which time progress in accordarce with a further revised implementation schedule was to be closely monitored by the Bank 2.18 Except for the Karjan dam, which was completed on time and within cost estimates, disappointing overall progress continued through the final year. During this period the Bank expressed serious concern over the delay in the initiation and implementation of dam safety modifcations and strengthening of Machhu I dam; leakage at the Karjan dam; and repeated shortfalls from construction schedules and quality of civil works, all factors which led the Bank to close the credit in April 1989 despite a 001 request for a further one year extension.L B. Karnat Tanks 2.19 Egg. As originally proposed by GOKa the project was to include construction of 161 new tanksw, widely distributed through the state, to irrigate an aggregate area of 88,000 ha in a five-year period. But at appraisal the proposed area to be irrigated was reduced to 25,000 ha for an assumed 120 to 160 tanks, with individual CCA's varying in size from small (below 400 ha) through medium (400-1,000 ha) to large (above 1,000 ha). Only new tanks were included in order to maximize the impact of new planning and design criteria, the introduction of which were an integral part of the objectives. As in the case of the Gujarat project, Bank staff introduced design criteria which specified layout of canals and field channels down to individual holdings, with lining down to irrigation turnouts serving about 8 ha subunits. Operation according to RWS principles was to be inherent in the design. Mno Government of Gujarat emphas that t conecuti droughts in M85, '86 and '87 wee te def faces amondag for ddat 1n %pkmtdon (AttaUhment I, pag 24). Tba are smag zeoals behlad ear an which hav been the traditional source of Iigadon water in areas of low and enatic rainfall In seral states of southern India for many centuries. .7- 2.20 The project was Intended to be completed in a four-year period. The GOKa's capability for implementing what was described in the SAR as a relatively modest program of construction of 120-160 tanks was not questioned (SAR page 44, para. 7.14). In addition to the civil works construction the project included the setting up of a rainfall and stream gauging network to improved the hydrological database for future planning of minor irrigation projects; development of an improved model for catchment runoff estimation; and a study of possible approaches to the formation of water users' organizations. 2.21 An appreciation of the linovative nature of the project In terms of planning requirements, design, and operating procedures, and the difculties which the Irrigation Department might face in meeting the higher performance level called for in the project objectives, led the mission to recommend a doubling of Bank staff supervision inputs through the project implementation phase. 2.22 At the appraisal report yellow cover review stage several Central Projects Staff (CPS) expressed reservations as to the scale and timeliness of the project, bearing in mind the limited numbers of qualified engineers available to plan, design and supervise construction to the higher performance standards called for in the project description, and the recognized constraints in the form of limited local budgets and slow land acquisition procedures being experienced in the on-going Karnataka Irrigation Project (Cr. 788). A smaller scale approach to test out the innovative design and operation concepts, followed by a larger project only after the new concepts were fully proven and understood, was recommended. A closer scrutiny by the Bank of individual tank appraisals to be undertaken by ID staff during implementation was also suggested. The scope, size and time frame for the project remained essentially unchanged in the final appraisal report, in spite of the above reservations. 2.23 The project was well received by the Ba which approved the project on March 19, 1981. In response to a question from an executive director as to why the project was supporting construction of new tanks rather than rehabilitation of existing tanks when the 41,000 existing tanks in Karnataka were currently irrigating only 350,000 ha out of an estirnated CCA of 850,000 ha, staff answered that the new projects were chosen to better meet poverty alleviation objectives, and to more easily introduce the new criteria for design and operation leading to more equitable distribution of water. It was explained that rehabilitation of existing tanks, which for the most part are heavily silted, could be extremely costly. Two other executive directors enquired about disbursement delays, given the poor disbursement performance of several on-going agricultural credits in India in the recent past Staff replied that the disbursement situation had recently improved substantially, and could at that time be described as extremely good. 2.24 tato.The project was declared effective in early March, three weeks ahead of the date stipulated in the credit agreement. A first supervision in April urged that priority be given to the training of ID staff in planning and design in accordance with the agreed criteria and the basic techniques for hydrologic reservoir sizing and distribution system layout It was noted that considerable time would be needed to bring the first sub-projects to a stage where they could comply with agreed planning and design criteria, and it was though unlikely that construction of the first tanks could commence before March 1982. 2.25 The second supervision, which took place in March 1982 and nine months after effectiveness, observed that a shortage of design staff was seriously hindering progress, and that the need for appropriate training in design standards was urgent. So far only six projects had been sanctioned in respect to their dams and spillways, but the water distribution systems had still to be -8- designed. The Bank arranged for FAOICP technical support to speed up the development of design standards for canal systems. Even by the time of the third supervision in September 1982 the only construction to have been undertaken was approach roads to four tank sites, and the project was judged to be 16 months behind SAR schedule. Disbursements were negligible and the list of project tanks was reduced to 77 as compared with the SAR estimated 120 to 160 (See Map No. IRD 15343R). Much of the delay in implementation was attributable to a shortage of qualified technical staft It was estimated that at the current rate of progress it would take nine years to complete the project rather than the SAR estimated four years. 2.26 Construction activities finally accelerated towards the end of 1983 when work was proceeding on the dams at 19 tank sites, but a shortage of competent design staff was still holding up the construction of the distribution networks, work on which only got underway in earnest early in 1985, after which progress was repeatedly interrupted by delays in acquisition of land. 2.27 Yearly extensions to the credit closing date were agreed to by the Bank on three occasions through to March 31, 1989, which affectively doubled the covenanted project completion time from four to eight years. Performance standards showed a slow but steady improvement in the closing years in spite of low technical staffing levels, suboptimal local funding, materials shortages and land acquisition problems. 228 The credit was closed on March 31, 1989 and funds were fully disbursed by April 10, by which time engineering works had been satisfactorily completed on only 33 tanks and an irrigation potential was said to have been created over an estimated 14,800 ha. The GOKa undertook to complete the construction work on the remaining tanks, using state budget financing, in the years following credit closing. C. Kallada Irrigation and Tree CrQps 2.29 mig. The project as originally designed by a GOKe team in 1978 was essentially to complete the construction of a conventional on-going gravity irrigation scheme aimed at year round irrigation of an existing raifed paddy area. But Bank staf& concluding that there would be insufficent benefits from paddy alone, favored including irrigation of tree crops (mainly coconut and rubber) in the upland areas through which the main left and right bank supply canals were routed between the Ottakal weir, situated some 50 kilometers inland in the valley of the Kallada River, and the low lying paddy areas on the coastal plain (See Map No. IRD 16023R1). Bank staff from the New Delhi Office and staff from FAOICP then became involved in the preparation, with the result that the project as prepared prior to appraisal included the original coastal paddy area together with a larger area of sloping land under tree crops, referred to locally as gardealands, designed for irrigation from a highly innovative micro-conveyance system of buried low pressure poly-vWinyl chloride (PVC) pipes and flexible hoses for an aggregate cultivable command area of 61,600 ha. Outlets were designed on average to serve about 10 ha command areas in the gardenlands. 2.30 An anail mission in late 1980 concluded that the project was only marginally viable, given the high unit costs per ha for water delivery and the rather optimistic and difficult to substantiate assumptions for yield increases expected for coconut, rubber, pepper and cashew under irrigation in view of the high annual precipitation of 3,000 mm aperienced under the prevaiing bimodal, two monsoon rain pattern. CPS expressed strong reservations about the project as appraised, and indicated that they would withhold support for the project until more convincing evidence of incremental yield expectations in support of a minimal ERR of 10 percent could be presented. This led to a post-appraisal in February 1981, but, as convincing evidence was still not .9- forthcong, CPS again expressed strong doubts about the project's economic viability. One CPS analyst, commenting on the yellow cover draft appraisal report, stated that the returns appeared "dangerously low", with an ERR of only 2 percent on a 20-year basis under one set of yield and adoption rate assumptions, in contradiction to the appraisal estimated ERR of 16 percent. Other CPS commentator, including the irrigation advisor, stated that with its high costs and marginal returns, the project appeared much too large for an initial undertaking, and that a smaller "pilot! project of say 10,000 ha within the right bank canal CCA would be a less dsky operation. The Region subsequently decided to downsize and restructure the project in the direction of a four-year PrograM 2.31 A re-appraisal took place in April 1981, which led to a redefinition of the project as a time-slice investment, with a reduction in scope to 34,300 ha concentrating on, but not confined to, the right bank CCA. A reassessment of yield assumptions and adoption rates led to a raising of the project ERR to 20 percent without sunk costs and 14 percent when sunk costs were included. Once again CPS noted that the adoption rates looked over-optimistic and expressed doubts that sufficient hybrid coconuts would be available to support the higher production expectations underpinning the benefits stream, but did not withhold support for the project at the loan Committee stage. 2.32 At Motiations held in March 198Z the project CCA was raised to 37,600 ha, at the urging of the GOIVOOKe negotiating team. Minor conveyance systems were scheduled to be installed and operating over 27,600 ha of gardenlands by the end of 1986. 2.33 The project was presented to the ]gad as an attractive investment in high value cash crops, based on its innovative pipe delivery system for irrigation, the first of its kind in India, with good prospects for future replication in other parts of the country. The project was viewed favorably by the Board and approved after a short discussion in the course of which staff assured the Board that cost recovery from beneficiaries was likely to commence in 1984 after a study of water charges had been completed in the project area. 234 Imon. The project was declared effective on September 21, 1982, two weeks ahead of the stipulated date in the loan and credit agreements. A first supervision mission in December 1982 reported that construction progress was satisfactory, despite minor technical difficulties and a delay in setting up the Planning, Monitoring and Coordination Crll which should have been established by September 30 as covenanted under the Project Agreement. The mission concluded that the project was likely to finish on schedule. 2.35 But a report from an FAO/CP engineer who visited the project in July 1983 was more critical of progress, pointing out that the ID capacity for survey, design and construction of the micro conveyance system (MCS) was inadequate due to staff shortages and was a major hinderance to progress. A second supervision towards the end of 1983 confirmed that MCS construction was significantly behind schedule, partly due to survey and design staff shortages and partly to delays experienced in acquisition of land for engineering infrastructure, which was a time consuming and complicated process involving about 20,000 privately owned plots for every 10,000 ha of irrigated land. The task was being made more diffcult by opposition from some farmers who considered the approach of providing irrigation for tree crops, particular rubber, to be uneconomic considering the high average rainfall distribution, and who therefore didn't want to participate. By the fourth supervision in December 1982 the project was rated as a problem project for the above reasons. 2.36 By the end of 1985, only three months before the covenanted loan/credit agreement completion date, progress compared extremely poorly with appraisal expectations. The Kallada dam, -10- completion of which was scheduled for early 1984 was still under construction, and the Dam Review Panel, constituted at the request of the Bank, had reservations about its safety; progress on the left bank canal was impeded by a tunneling problem; and although the right bank canal was nearing completion the distribution system was seriously lagging, to the extent that construction of MCS on the first 1,000 ha had only commenced as recently as mid 1985, while attainment of the 27,000 ha MCS appraisal target was viewed as a distant prospect only attainable through progressive extensions to the loan/credit closing date. 2.37 Progress over the remaining four year through to loan/credit closing in March 1989, at which time loan/credit funds were fully disbursed, could best be described as slow but steady. A final supervision one month before formal closing noted that the dam was 'virtually complete'. The right main and branch canals were complete while the distribution system was described as well advanced although the MCS construction rate remained very slow and had only been completed on 8,900 ha, out of which little more than 2500 ha had been commissioned and could therefore be assumed to be benefitting from irrigation. Construction of the left bank canal was much less advanced, having been seriously interrupted by a tunnel collapse in mid 198& 238 Acute GOKe financial problems in the final implementation year resulted in steep budget cuts which adversely affected construction progress following the final drawdown of Bank funds. Substantial increases in actual construction costs as compared with SAR estimates were attributed to underestimation of unit costs and quantities at appraisaL Much of the poor project performance was attributable to repeated changes in senior management during implementationw. Other matters of concern to Bank supervision missions in the closing years included a long delay in providing an adequate electricity and water supply to the 405 families resettled from the reservoir site, and an inability on the part of GOKe to institute water charges to CCA beneficiaries following the completion of a cost recovery study completed in 1986. IlL PROJECT OUTCOMES 3.1 The pessimism expressed in the PCR, in which the ERR was reestimated at 3.2%, with sunk costs excluded, is shared by the audit. In fact, short visits made to the sites of the five engineering components in late 1992, two and a half years after credit closing, confirm that benefits remain slow to materialize due to continuing slippage in construction schedules, especially at the distributory levels in the lower reaches of the CCAs as compared with those assumed in the PCR for the years following completion. 3.2 On the brighter side, however, acceptance of RWS principles as defined in the SAR is now evident on the part of the irrigation establishment, and since 1988 its introduction in practice has been taking place over parts of several irrigation schemes around the State following an amendment to the 1897 Bombay Irrigation Act and the issuance of firm instructions and guidelines to all engineers. The pace of introduction is constrained by many factors, not least of which at the S smW prja aanes emeuly in chaiUs te project during toscn.car alae-lout perid butweenefboeSh and loancredit calosng -11 - present time is farmer acceptance, given the strong adherence of many farmers, and particularly those at the head end of an Irrigation system, to the very different shejpali system of water allocation to which they are accustomed (para. 2.3). Despite these difficulties, the audit was particularly impressed with a 400 ha area within the Karjan right bank main canal OCA, where ten approdmately 40 lia chaks have been operating according to strict RWS rules since 1990. The water courses and some parts of the field channels in this area are lined and water is equitably distributed on a 10 or 12 day delivery schedule through carefully calibrated, tamper-proof water dividers and box openings. All farmers, including those at the tail end of the chaks acknowledged that they receive a fair share of the available water. Demonstrations such as the above provide excellent ncel from which RWS practices can be expected to spread in the future; unfortunately, however, the time frame for this adoption will be much longer than postulated in the SAR. 3.? A striking development in the post-project implementation period has been the rapid growth of WALMI as a center for training and research in irrigated agriculture. Construction of the partly Bank-financed campus was seriously delayed and only commenced in 1987, several years later than scheduled in the SAR. The institute finally started functioning in the new buildings in May 1990, ten years after the project became effective and one year after credit closing. Since then, the staf with strong support from the US Agency for International Development, have rapidly established a good reputation for irrigation training at all levels, and the institute is now an important source of expertise in RWS technology. WALMI is an important asset for ensuring the eventual attainment of the modernization objectives of the project. Karnataka Tanks 3.4 The unsatisfactory reestimated ERR of 4 percent presented in the PCR was based on an assumption that at credit closing in March 1989 34 of the 78 tanks serving a CCA of 16,800 ha had been completed in all respects, and a further supposition that the remaining 44 tanks would be completed by June 1991, by which time the irrigated area should have reached 24,100 ha. 3.5 Unfortunately, as observed by the audit in October 1992, the PCR assumptions for the post-project period have not been realized. An updated ID summary of progress up to August 1992 presented to the audit reveals that only 21,126 ha was considered to have been provided with an irrigation potential at that time; while physical completion of engineering works was claimed for only 68 of the 78 project tanks In fact, micro-conveyance systems still need to be installed on many of the tanks categorized as physically completed, and an estimated 1,318 Lakh rupees (approximately US$4.7 million) will be required to conclude the balance of works on all tanks by the end of GoI fiscal 1993/94.-W 3.6 An audit field visit to a representative selection of three project tanksa proved to be a further disappointment. All three tanks are categorized by the ID as physically completed, except for part of the micro-conveyance system on the Kuduregundihalla Tank, but only the small Bindenahalli Tank appeared to be operating satisfactorily under RWS principles, with tal enders receiving an equitable supply of irrigation water on a one in seven-day frequency during periods of low rainfall. W A more tmcat (May 1993) summary of propeas in completing the project is provided by the Govermet of Kamatab (Attachment IL pp. 27-28). &5 Bindenabal Tank in Maudys District, CCA 25 ha; DandiganahaU Tank In Kolar District, CCA 213 ba; and d u Tank In Mysore District, 816 ha. -12- 3.7 The medium sized Dandiganahalli Tank on the other had, while ostensibly operating on a seven-day RWS cycle, was defective, with many turnouts and field channels in the lower reaches of the CCA in a state of disrepair. Farmers in the head reaches were continuing to grow heavy water consumption crops (paddy and sugar cane) while tail enders were receiving little or no water through the RWS system, and remained dependent on direct rainfal or their own lift supplies. 3.8 Finally, the large Kuduregundihalla Tank proved to be a further disappointment. Construction was begun in 1984 and it was recorded as due for completion in December 1989 in the PCR, but a combination of foundation problems at the bund site, which called for a redesign of the bund after construction had commenced, and lengthy delays in land acquisition which held up canal construction, has prevented operation of the system through to late 1992. The fir irrigation is scheduled for the 1993 Kharif crop season, to coincide with the completion of the micro-conveyance system, construction of which had only recently commenced at the time of audit inspection. 3.9 The slow implementation progress in the years following the final disbursement of Bank funds and closing of the credit can be attributed largely to GOKa budget stringencies. R%.ultant delays in commencing irrigation over the project tank's aggregate CCA (e.g. para. 3.8) as compared with PCR expectations, and prevailing operating ineficiencies (e.g. para. 3.7) are clearly reducing the benefit stream to an extent that the likely ERR could be much less than the 4 percent reestimated at completion.9 Kallada Irriation and Tree CroW Development 3.10 The PCR reestimation of an ERR of 9.7% for the SAR project area of 37,600 ha, based on an assumption that irrigation would be taking place over an area of 50,000 ha, well in excess of the SAR target, by September 1992 (PCR page 29, table 6B (i)) is contradicted by evidence collected during the audit field review in November 1992. ID records indicate that as little as 21,000 ha had been commissioned and were being irrigated at that time, of which 13,675 ha was conventional gravity irrigation in the lowland paddy area while only 7,325 ha of gardenland was being saved through MCS. The audit was surprised to find that the proportionately small number of farmers benefiting from the, very high capital cost, completed MCS service do not pay water charges. 3.11 Since the credit was closed in early 1989, financial stringency on the part of GOKe has resulted in much reduced annual construction budgets for meeting the cost of outstanding engineering works, mainly MCS, but also large sections of distributory and minor canals, particularly those leading off the left bank canal and in the lower reaches of the right bank canal. At present rates of construction it will be at least another year or two before the original SAR 1986 target will be achieved It is now apparent that the likely ERR of the project as appraised, when finally completed, will be much less than the 9.7% reestim ted at completion. The absence of reliable data on changes in cropping patterns, crop areas and incremental yields resulting from Irrigation makes any ERR calculation at this time particularly speculative. A survey is essential to give a reliable measure of agricultural benefits, and should be done before consideration can be given to replicating the MCS approach in similar, probably somewhat limited, areas beyond the present project limits. IUs Region adds hat a relevant topic for tescamch would be e bhistoric suffideny of d water supply for each at to wiey dispessed tank scheomes fo which te hydrologic analyes were mostly baed on corselated data - ts would Ip a long way in determnlagwhether or not anya abfar future hnvetsshoutt be made by ts Bosoner in aseanylarge'raauaPsos of the Ghats. - 13 - IV. FINDINGS AND ISSUES 4.1 'Te principal finding for all three projects is that the rates of implementation were well below appraisal expectations, to an extent that most major project targets could not be attained within the expected time-slice periods, and, as determined by this audit, many targets had still not been met even several years after the extended closing dates (Chapter II). 4.2 In consequence, with heavy front-end expenditures on dams and other costly engineering works having been incurred far in advance of the much curtailed benefits streams, ERRs are turning out to be considerably below appraisal forecasts and the outcomes for all projects are clearly unsatisfactory in economic terms. (Chapter III). At the present time sizeable financial and social benefits are undoubtedly accruing to limited numbers of project farmers who have to date received regular, and in most cases highly subsidized, irrigation services; but the combined investment, operating and maintenance costs to the GOI and state governments are disproportionately large compared to the value of the benefits. 4.3 Partial strengthening of the institutions took place under all three projects, but was less than anticipated at appraisal. Project sustainability is considered likely only in the case of Gujarat, where considerable improvements have taken place in the post-project completion periodM Project sustainability is uncertain in the cases of Karnataka and Kallada, and is only likely if reasonable standards of operation and maintenance are forthcoming in the post-project completion period over those portions of the projects which are operating efficiently at the present time. 4.4 Two important issues for the Bank arose from these project experiences: A. Over-ambitious Apaai Epeat 4.5 Initially, all three projects were prepared by staff of the respective state governments in accordance with prevailing GOI norms. But in each case Bank staff became involved in refining the borrower's proposals, either in the later stages of preparation or through the appraisal process. The changes introduced by the Bank were aimed at upgrading the standards of design, construction and operations with a view to increasing the efficiency of water use. The guiding principle was equitable RWS which in practice meant constructing more intensive CCA reticulation layouts than was customazy, with full lining except in the case of the most impervious soils, and with assured water delivery to each farm gate through outlets serving 8 to 10 ha. sub-chaks (paras. 2.3, 2.19 and 2.29). 4.6 Unfortunately, the limited capabilities and capacities of the implementing agencies for carrying out the projects in the short time spans of between three and a half and five yearsW according to the more exacting even innovative, design, construction and operating standards introduced on the recommendations of the Bank appears to have been inadequately appreciated either by the Bank or the borrowers throughout the preparation, appraisal and negotiation phases of all three projects. Furthermore, many senior and experienced technical staff in the irrigation agencies were not convinced that all the Bank-imposed standards were appropriate under the local conditions. Their resistance, which acted as a brake on implementation was proven justified in at H sM Govenmemt t G4arm pvod suppot for "s smmmet in is conMeaty (AUnauent L pp 24-26). Intevabetectivne and project completio asspelved in s crdit agemen foryeas eigh& soallt ahee yc ee asones and tiee years fiee sn for die Gq|aat. Karnataka and Kailada p-jet eepeathety. - 14 - least two instances. It led to an appropriate relaxation of the 100% lining specification for the entire conveyance down to approximately 8 ha sub-chaks in Gujarat, and thereby prevented needless expenditures in areas of relatively impermeable soil. And it prompted a progressive move upward from the SAR specified 20 ha chak and 8 ha sub-chak blocks to the currently accepted, more operationally practical 40 to 70 ha service areas supplied from a single outletW Bank-inspired proposals for training and organizational change included in the SARs, and a proposed doubling of Bank supervision coefficients, which in the event were exceeded in the case of Gujarat and Kallada but not Karnataka, were insufficient to ensure smooth start-ups of the projects or guarantee the rapid strengthening of the institutions in conformity with the tight SAR implementation schedules. 4.7 Interestingly, as the Bank's files show, the ambitious nature of the project objectives in relation to the capability and capacity of the agencies responsible for implementation was appreciated by several Bank staff at least in the case of the Karnataka and Kallada projects. Concern was expressed as to the practicality of the draft SAR intentions and alternate, more modest, approaches to project scopes or design were offered. These suggestions came from CPS staff at or before the yellow cover review stages, but had little influence on the projects as finally presented in the SARs. 4.8 Notable CPS suggestions, which proved to be prophetic and which, if accepted, might have led to more satisfactory outcomes, emphasized reductions in size of the physical targets given the innovative quality of many of the technical improvements proposed and the scarcity of qualified engineering staff Other constraints considered by CPS as likely to adversely affect progress or eventual outcomes included complex and time-consuming land acquisition procedures, which frequently take between two and three years to conclude before development becomes possible; the likely persistence of under-budgeting by state governments which was already common place on many previously approved and on-going Bank-assisted projects; high cost and marginal return expectations; and limited evidence to support incremental yield estimates, which raised concerns regarding economic viability (paras. 2.22 and 2.30). A further serious oversight in the preparation/appraisal process noted by the audit stemmed from a lack of appreciation of the importance of having more accurate topographic maps than were available, to provide a reliable base for minor systems alignment and design. The additional time required to conduct the surveys contributed further to the delay in the start-up stages of all projects. Finally, the need for changes to the 1897 Bombay Irrigation Act to provide a legal basis for introduction of RWS was apparently overlooked in the case of the Gujarat project. 4.9 In retrospect, it may seem surprising that CPS reservations regarding project design were not taken more seriously and appropriate adjustments made prior to negotiations. Lending pressure was suggested by several Bank staff during audit interviews as a possible reason for proceeding with what can now be seen as impossibly ambitious targets for relatively short time spans. And a corresponding pressure to borrow syndrome was also alluded to by many of the borrower's . L)as Region adds that the SAR - dictated 20 ha chak sim was later thought to be in error (too small) because a Warabandi - RWS system based on anything less than about 40 ha chaks (rotational unit) would result in a design Irrigation stream too small to physically service farm and field plot szs" N The Region comments that a lot of effort was spent by GG In the 80s trying to get its State Assembly to adopt legislation to replace or update the old Bombay Act, but the so called RWS legislation has never been passed - it remains in committee in drat form. oldlinesand/or Government Ordei ssued tJanuay 1988 and agreed supervision Action Plans concerning RWS implementation criteria as per Bank Agreements were believed sufficient to achieve project RWS objectives and were in fact the basis for such implementation. Once RWS designs were Implemented in the field, Le., to achieve equitable rationing of short water supplies the old Shejpali operations wore no longer possible. - 15- technical staff, who reported to the audit that the resources of their agencies were spread too thin and were being expected to do too much, too quickly. Figures for Bank-assisted financing to the Indian irrigation sector during the first five years of the 1980s, which included the years when the three projects were approved by the Board, compared with the preceding and succeeding five year periods, can be advanced to support staff assertions of strong pressures to lend-approvals rose substantially from ten projects with a total commitment of US$816 M in FYs 1975-79 to twenty projects with a commitment of US$2,016 M in 1980-84 and then declined to eight projects with a commitment of US$1,486 M in FYs 1985-89. 4.10 Possible lending pressures aside, the audit advances a further likely reason for the unduly ambitious appraisal expectations to the fact that several Bank staff involved in assisting the borrowers with preparing the projects were also members of the appraisal teams. Particularly significant, in the view of the audit, is the fact that the appraisal mission leaders for all three projects also contributed to their preparation. Bank staff strongly influenced the final design of all projects, not only in terms of scope and size , but also particularly in setting desirable, but difficult to attain, higher performance objectives in respect of water use efficiency, equitable distribution and dam safety. Under such circumstances it is difficult for appraisal missions to maintain the necessary degree of objectivity called for when evaluating from the viewpoint of the lender the appropriateness of what is deemed to be the borrowers' proposals. A review by the Bank of the extent to which a possible conflict of interests might arise from the dual role of staff who assist actively in the process of project preparation and subsequently assume leading responsibilities for appraisal, and how this affects the content and outcome of projects in general, could be revealing. It could lead to a clarification of Bank guidelines on this issue, and an improvement in the quality of future Bank-assisted projectsM B. Premature Leading 4.11 Bank operational manual statement No. 2.28 issued in October 1978 stresses the importance of having engineering works (defined as field investigation and detailed design) sufficiently advanced at the time of appraisal/negotiation so that bidding documents can be available about the time of Board approval, thus permitting tendering, or force account construction actmties, to begin immediately, or shortly thereafter. All three projects failed to conform with Bank norms in this respect, which explains much of the start-up delay following effectiveness (paras. 2.9, 224-2.25, and 2.35). This particularly applied to the distributozy systems in the CCAs of all the engineering components, and the WALMI facilities in the case of Gujarat, were architectural design could not begin for several years because of delay in securing a suitable site. (para. 2.12); the entire tank and associated CCA conveyance construction program in Karnataka (para. 2.24-2.25); and the MCS installation program in Kallada (para. 2.35). 4.12 Under these circumstances, the one page estimated implementation schedules included in the respective SARs were rendered obsolete within the first few months of implementation, and the time-slice targets, which eventually degenerated into construction-slice targets as the completion and closing dates were progressively extended, were quickly shown to be unrealistic. 4.13 Stronger adherence to both the spirit as well as the explicit requirements of manual statement No. 2.28 at appraisal would undoubtedly have improved the timeliness of implementation in the case of all three projects. M1w Region maes the polnt tat tis is had to coela4 gico d time honore appeac to poecJt peparad which has always been to ue he same people (to he catent pos0ible) durfg pepatin actis and appasaL -16 - Sectoral Outlook and the Future Role of the Bank 4.14 Concern in recent years on the part of the Bank and GOI at the uneven, and far below potential, performance of the Indian irrigation sub-sector led to a Bank.sponsored review in 1990191. A report published in December 1991V highlighted a decline in sector management, deteriorating infrastructure, and disappointing yields. It recommended a strategy focussed on forging a coherent, river basin-based, water resources policy, prioritizing government expenditures toward higher performance of existing irrigation, upgrading of technical performance particularly in the areas of adequate maintenance, improved water management, better quality construction, and fuller rehabilitation of displaced communities affected by irrigation development. At the heart of these reforms is the need to restructure irrigation institutions, enhance their management and technical capabilities and progressively devolve responsibility to farmers and other non-omnet agencies. 4.15 The above report has already contributed to a change in direction of Bank assistance for Indian irrigation. Bank financing has declined in the 1990s from the high levels of the previous decade, with only one project being approved for each of the y%ars FY 1990 and 1991, and no projects in FYs 92 or 93. The latest projects, and others currently being prepared, are aimed at improving water use efficiency and agricultural productivity from existing irrigated areas, with emphasis on rehabilitation, systems operations and maintenance, dam safety, and upgrading professionalism in irrigation agencies rather than construction of new irrigation systems in rainfed areas, as formerly. Tis change in direction of Bank support appears entirely appropriate, to judge from the disappointing outcomes of the three projects covered by this audit. ly dia: Inwpb eo r Re, Rapan No. s18-m (* vomes), Deambe, 1esI. -17- ATITACHMM I Page 1 of 8 -*rTelephone: -Telegram: NWRSA. NARMADA AND WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT No. WB/3192/=80/C6 t OR 4 t aoVBRNha r OuARAT 9. SARDAR BRAVAN SwctIalayau GundhfearS 010. . aftWW, trge(we. rat'e a 17-5-93 Mr. Graham Donalsons Chief Agricultute and* Hunan Development Dn, .Operations Wraluation Department The WORLD BAN 1818 H Street N.W WASHINGTON D.C. 20133 Sub s 3IDIA- Second Gujarat Irrigation Project (Cr. 1011-IN)- . Draft Performance Audit Report(PAR) Sir,. . . Wth reference to your letter of April 1, 1993, I- -am directed to enclose herevith,, the *ievs and paravise comments of Got. of Gujarat on Draft.- Performance Audit Report for further consideration. vLth best regards, YoureSierely, Under Secretary (PPM) Enal s As above - 18-. AT ACEMW I Page 2 of 8 COlMINTS OF GOMUM NT OF GUJAAT ON P.AOR. r SCO1QD ERIGM'ION PROJMCT, CREDIT 1011-IN Performance Addit Reports (PA) for three irrigation projects namel3, 1) Second Gujarat Irri.Project (Cr.1011-I3) 11) Karnataka AIxri.Project (Cr.1116-N) iii) xaada Irri. and Tree Crops Development Project (or. 1269-IN). have been furnished together in one PAR, stating that they "had rougb4 similar xobjectives n. Though an. gravity dam/irrigation projects. have more or less same objectives their implementation and accomplish- ment indices videlytdiffer.- Th6ethree projects do' wt ha*e azy common ground to compare or eveauate. All three projects are situated in different regions of India having entirely different geography, different agro-climatic zones, different socio-economic back-gound and also different situations in which they have been Implemented and different implementing agencies. -Therefore, -the statement made under pare-1 of Introduction of Evaluation- Summarr that "..Their audits have been combined in this report for convenience . - and case of comparision" needs some suitable modification:- Par_ 1.Y. 6. 1,.. The appraisal finincing plans and actual financial contribution given under para 17, need- further-clarification. in this regard reference also invited to TABLE-5 A and - TAble -5 B of PCR, Parta'III. ased on this, the follovng Table is evolved for more clarity. ...2 -19- ATTACMENT I Page 3 of 8 stbtus. Totl Estimated .... rgS - t6al Hh- o. Cost elgble ~~ tra * Of.' ~ot O M..expendtture dlsburse- disbuose rate cred t -------- et for ment 1ge.ut - . .. wa oatc- sat itn -·gories- k.L8*s $341 S..2.... 3 4. . 6 7 89 1)At azree- 3024 1921 63 76.50 '1470 48.6 8.4i0 175 2)At closurm 4067 -24wo 60 gl.70 1778 44 11.16' 159. ' (10/89) .(average) 3)Aitertative 407 24W0 60 80 1984 48.6 11.16 175 assumption at- losure (10/89) .rom the - above Table, it vill be seen that three -factcrs affecte1 the. -ov. disbrsement. ) The percentage shar«.of tbe Bamk at the time at Agrment vas 48.6% tch has subsequently been reduced to 44%. :u) Arer~ge exhange rate has been increased by 33%. iii) Eigible percentage expenditure envisaged at ..the time of Agreement vas 63% whicbehak béei icdue to 60X subsequently. To. lxprov upon the digburéement, tbe Bankbhould have i) rasd/aintained i a.ahare to at'-least 48.6% 11) Increaseg the rate of disbursement at-least to 80 to 8%. ••.3 -20 - ATrACHMENT I Page 4of 8 This Is shown in status-Alternative assvmption in the above TabU. This aspect was given a pre-thoiight in case of presei* credit 196-IN-to-revise the ,ate of disborsement while 'the implementation progressed -as can be seen 'below:- P Period Pbsition of % Disbursement Cr.,1011-IN * 'hr.1496-IN 7n a - e ------- - - * t./s.-.4/86, 70% 50% .5/86 - 6/88 70% 80% . 7/88 - 10/89 70% 90% * bth the projects were progressing-in the same State, with comparable situations and in the same time slice, tberefore similar review-of enhancing-the % disbursment in case of Cr. 1011-IN would bave-improved the-situation of disbursement whicl would have -helped - GOG. put more input on the project for speedy progress. Ja=:23, 3 2*11. 2&-293s1 In this regards GOG-has fully furnished- its comment in draft.PCR vide Part-II, Para 1. to 10. . . specifically, .Para .5 of Part II of PCR needs a special attention id emphasis. The presenX PAR .seems to have softened the impact of CO0s comments =oder Para 5 Part-I of PM Lthout givIng proper weightage to the OGis reastions in PCR, it is injustice-to sy that H a limited uOdersta iding of RWS design and operating principles on the 2a engineering staff, combined with some reluetance by other.to acept-such approaches, were pteventing the attaiment.of.project objectives" (vidd pa 2.11 of R).. Also the statement made under Para 2.15 of PAR that 1 may project engineers had little understanding of RWS system" is highly objected. In view of GOG*s comments .21- ATEACHMENT I Page 5 of 8 in para - of. PCR Part II which have been commented by the W.3. ander para 12 of PCR Part II under the "Svaluation of .B.'s Performance". As per-this. it will be seen that the project agreement and agreed minutes of or. 101-2N provided -the guidelines for developing the command -for the introduction of R-14. These g#delines were followed in sub-projects. Subsequently, project orr A1496-1Nwa- signed and Implemented from June 184, wherein the concept ofr RWS was clearl defined. This concept of RW was . altogether different from the concept in Cr. 10113-IN. GOG then issued RWS guidelines in January '88 on the basis of the concept of RWS in Cr. 1496-IN. Subsequent Missions after 1985, were also insisting for adopting- RWS-as per Cr. no.1496-IN, in sub-projects of Cr.1011-IN. As - per these guidelines the design of distribution systems in Project 1011- IN had to be reviewed and modified which -has -resulted in a state of conftslon aboit RWS imple- - mentation; in- Cr.- 1011-IL This forced GOG to switch- over to the new concept of EVW in Damanganga & tka-iakrapar (Moderzsation). This had resulted in huge cost whicb 0OG Was called upon to incur from its State Pundi- because these two projqcts were not included in the present credit 1496-I3L -In such -circumstances the Bank shotld have advocated some Improvements .In Gjarat ig existing - Shejpalt System to Improve upon with suitable modi ft- fications in accoidance with- the local conditions(which was also indicated in SA) rather than forcing rigid- - RWS on to the project. GOG had no alternative but to-accept - the recommendation *as "the same was made U condition for . extension of the credit. T6erefore, teluctance,of GOG in- acceptance. of RWg shbul2 it be viewed as an obstacle to the progress on the project, .-. It would not be out of place to mention'here that the subsequent Gujarat Medium.Irri- Project,Cr. 196-z1 id 'an example on the part of COG where RWS has been- successfully introduced ATt the Bnk's view was clear' -22. ATTACHMENT I Page 6 of 8 In October 1987. Presently an area of 1,82,000 ha. has been made suitable to RW out of 3,81,000 ba. The remaining area Is planned to be brought under RM by March '94. This proves that GOG has gained sufficient expertise as far as -RWS concept is -concerned. (This has also been acknowledged by the Audit in Para 3.2 of PAR). This para relate td inordiziate 'delay in project* implementation. In this regard GOGfs views have been given with full justification under para 3 & 4 of PCR Part-I1. It may be added that uncertainty about the issue of RWS, consecutive three drought years of 1985, 86. and 87, were the chief factors for delay in implementation. The ad was requested to extend the -credit after April *86 Vhich*was granted with a condition to introduce RS, and to amend the Guarat Irrigation Act. 'During this period Guarat was passing .through severe financial crisis- as all the resources were diverted to the needs of scaicity- stricken area. It was not rational on the part of the Bank to force GOG to agree to the condition forthwith -obich was not contemplated in the original agreeiant. -GOG however, accepted the condition in good spirit in consi- deratian that .the new RWS will lead to better watir- management compared to. present Shejpalli system.- The afceptance, of this c4ndition increased the. cost of the project imposing a further burden on .004..0 The credit. 1011-IN was ' abruptly closed in'April '89 by the Morld ank without considering the reasons of GOG's. repeated .- requests for extension. It may however be. stated that a siib-projects of Cr. no.1011-IN were. allowed to be included tint in Cr. 1496-33. This justifies the requests of GOG for the previous credit extension. Therefore, PAR neieds to be modified, in view of this point. The statement made about "Project sustainability.118/ .being uncertain is highly objectionable in vei of the following points which may be taken in cognition:- This statement has been revised on the basis of evidence provided .6 by 000 and by staff of the Bank's South Asia Regional Office. (para 4.3 refers) -23- ATTACHMEfT I Page 7 of 8 1) The remainin -5 sub-pio j.As (except Damanganga and Ukai-Kakrapar sub-projects) are included by the World Bank in the present credit 1496-IN; after the closing - of tbe credit 1011-IN. The progress is quite satisfactory as reviewed .by the subsequent Missions. ii) RWS principle- as suggested in Cr, 14-96.IN is- well established and implemented, in all sub-projects of or. no.1496-IN& Cr. no.1011-IN. iii) All Dam Safety measures as recommended by- DSRP have been identified and are vell in advanced stage of implementation. iv) WAIMI Institute has been very effectively- working v) Progressive- check in salinity -has-- been observed- in SaUrasbtra Coastal area which is found to be within the acceptable criteria giving succes to measures taken. .--vi) Most of the works are planned to be completed by Sept. fi 94. ..Vii). The budget provision for operation & maintenance is being increased year by year. The vrks requiring such maintenance as prioritised by the highest level. plojeot autborities, are attebded immediately. viii) No ission has feared the sustainabi3lty so far. In fact it is -too - early- to make. sueb a statemqnt when Project is still not completed. ix) In fact GOG is proted to state that-last year- one of the - sub-proje6ts of Cr. 1496-IN, namely 'UN project, in which the concept of RuS vas introduce4 is ** .24, ATTACHMENT I queed a Page 8 of 8 the receipent of the first prize of V-National Productivity Council Award". In this project, the entire command ( 100%) Is put to 'utilisation following water deliveries as p DWIS, wbere- highest possible productivity was achieved. The experience gained in one sub-project can also-be attained in other sub- projects. GOG is therefore putting all out efforts to implement all sub-projects to achieve similar objectives. x) The remaining tvo sub-projects viz. Damanganga and Dkai-Kakrapar are also in advance stage of imple- mentation with State funds. GOG feels that the project under-Cr. 1011-IN was very well handled in spite of several obstacles and hindrances. The Design, engineering and inalementation parts were well looked after with the best possible standards and expertise available. The project is technically and economically viable arA sustainable. The conclusions drawn in PAR- are by an expert in audit and accounting system on techical aspects of design and construction of.projects are not proper. *****0 -25-. ATTACHMENT U Page lof 2 VIaANA SOUDHA. ANGAL.AL60 001 INDIA DAI3.. 18-05-1993*** o rae............ . ...................* CHIEF SECRETARY To Mr. Graham Donaldson, Chief Agriculture and Human Development Division, Operations & Evaluation Department, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington D.C. 20433, U.S.A. Sir, Sub:- INDIA - Karnataka Tanks Project (Cr 1116 - IN); Draft Performance Audit Report. Ref:- Your letter dated April 1, 1993, addressed to Mr. J.C.Lynn, Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka, Vidhana Soudha, Bangalore - 560 001. Our comments to the Draft Performance Audit Report dated March 31, 1993 of the World Bank pertaining to Karnataka Tank Project (Cr 1116 - IN) are furnished as under: As on 31-3-1993, out of 78 projects taken up for Implementation, 60 projects are completed, 16 projects are in advanced stage of Implementation and micro net work system are in progress, one project namely Hadalagi T.I.P. Gulbarga District is held up due to land acquisition and the other project namely Y.G. Gudda T.I.P. in Bangalore District is in progress. The total irrigation potential created from the completed projects and those in advanced stage of construction as on 31-3-93 is 21,403 Ha. The cost of the work to be done as on to date is about Rs.166.70 Million. During 1993-94, it is programmed to complete the following 17 T.I.Ps to create an additional potential of 2207 Ha. 1. Kudregundihalla T.I.P Mysore District 2. Ravathanahalls T.I.P Bangalore District 3. Doddathanda T.I.P Bangalore District 4. Mosarahallababy T.I.P Mandya District 5. Biggerehalla T.I.P Chikkauagalur District -26- AI'ITACHMN II Page 2 of 2 6. Aregundibal1a T.I.P Chikkamagalur District 7. Aaundinala T.I.P Dharwad District 8. Mundavad T.I.P Dharwad District 9. Durgadaballa T.I.P Uttara Kannada District 10. Attiveri T.I.P Uttara Kannada District 11. Madhubbavi T.I.P Belgaum District 12. Aheri Jambagi T.I.P Bijapur District 13. Arasanal T.I.P. Bijapur District 14. Alur - B T.I.P Gulbarge District 15. Hadalagi T.I.P Gulbarga District 16. Huvin Hippargi T.I.P Bijapur District 17. Indargi T.LP Raichur District The remaining one project viz., Y.G. Gudda T.I.P in Bangalore District is programmed for completion during 1994-95 to create the balance potential of 525 Ha. Our comments on the field observations made are as under: i) Bindenahalli T.I.P in Mandya District having contemplated command of 25 Ha. is performing satisfactorily. ii) Dandiganahalli project in Kolar District has a contemplated command of 213 Ha. The damaged structures have now been repaired. To the extent of land developoment and storage available in the tank, water has been supplied to about 90 Ra. As per the local conditions prevailing, the farmers are resorting to grow heavy duty crops in some areas. However efforts are being made to gradually enforce the designed cropping pattern and rotational water supply system. iii) Kudregundihalla T.I.P in Mysore District with a contemplated command of 816 Ha. is completed except for J' micro net system. It is targetted to complete the micro net system of this T.I.P by 1-7-1993 to supply water for irrigation during Kharif 1993. Yours faithfully, (J.C. LYNN) Chief Secretary Government of Karnataka 18魄D糾496 ＿化 &＇讓 BHARUCH DISTRICT INDIA 73"30- IBRI) 146084 GWARAT IRRIGATION 11 PROJECT i 15 Kola-ha r.~ ä LIKAJ-KAKRAPAR IRRIGATION SCHEME IRCIEV IRRIGATION 11OCKI: CANAIALIG.ElfFS KARANJBLOCK EXISTING COMMAND AREA HAJIRA BLOCK SASTING WEIR Kimo UMRATH BLOCK R[VERS - - - MAJOR DISTRICT ROADS May m 0 PROJECT DRAINAGE BLOCK STATE HIGHWAYS NATIONAL HIGHWAY RAILROADS 0 MAIN CITIES AND TOWNS ---- DISTRICT BOUNDARJES H A J R A *vai Tana KAKRAPAR WEIR 5 R A 1ý bi Vyara G u of roli volod Khombhof U R A T 0 0 KflOWERS lp 1,5 9,00 1,021'00'- VALSAD MILES L<ea= xtå- 25V te= ,5 DISTRICT 73*W 73'30' FEIllvu~ 1993 不 d■『り■■■■月■■■で■1曲り■ 一－ IBRD15343R kl 8HOPMGAMEl Ni ANOAkKUNrA THia ØLAL)A INDIA KARNATAKA TANK MAHARASHTRA u PUR IRRIGATION PROJECT PANGARGA *vAlz 1, 1 PROJECT SITES "HADALG1 GLA INAVNIHAI 401NAHt ffKAL CHA MAW 6 TANK MMATM PWJWT 5m5 OMA k10~ IN MILUMETERS "NK4WCHl *HER1 ~ØAGI Ifillilt~ CAI~ MM, 0~, AND WEIRS DISTRIa HE^A~ ARA sme >WADGUmm RÅ f ULAGUDDA D~ S~DÅRIES STATIE ~~ INITRNATIONAL BOUNDAM IN *Upp"ER L4 G 1h10AtGi 6 JEL RElø %1lary ,,KKALAHALU UND1~ ANOHRA PRADESH WALA M HAUA A~NA NOt" OADtPAL EDO1PÅ HALL QAPAHALU ,BALAmA 1ELIL E THUtOIRE YG *8 HA ,MEDAMIA NAHALV LLA 60øl APASIAN TAMIL NADU KU~ 40 80 KERALA FEM~ I M IBRD 16023R1 INDIA KALLADA IRRIGATION AND TREECROP DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PROJECT AREAS -DAM -WEIR 2 ILOME RS JANUARY 1993