Oman - Third Highway Maintenance Project

Docunent of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 12626 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SULTANATE OF OMAN THIRD HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE PROJECT (LOAN 2631-OM) DECEMBER 23, 1993 Infrastructure Operations Division Country Department II Middle East and North Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their ofricial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS (As of June 22 , 1993) Currency Unit=Rial Omani (RO) RO 1 = 1,000 Baizas=US$2.89519 (1985) US$2.60 (1993) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric SystemBritish/US System 1 meter (m)=3.28 feet (ft) 1 kilometer (km)=0.62 miles (mi) 1 sq. kilometer (km2)=0.386 sq miles (mi2) 1 metric ton (m ton) =0.984 long ton (Ig ton) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AC-Asphalt Concrete BMS-Bridge Management System CAS-Cost Accounting System DBST-Double Bituminous Surface Treatment DGR-Directorate General of Roads EMS-Equipment Management System ERR-Economic Rate of Return GIS-Graphical Information System HMMS-Highway Maintenance Management System HMP-Highway Maintenance Project HRID-Human Resources and Institutional Development MENA-Middle East and North Africa Region MFE-Ministry of Finance and Economy MOC-Ministry of Communications NDBMS-National Database Management System PMS-Pavement Management System POS-Purchase Order System PCR-Project Completion Report SAR-Staff Appraisal Report SCTP-Supreme Committee for Town Planning TA-Technical Assistance TMS-Traffic Management System VOC-Vehicle Operating Cost SULTANATE OF OMAN (FISCAL YEAR) January 1 - December 31  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A Office of Director-General December 23, 1993 Operationas Evaluation MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Oman Third Hithway Maintenance Prolect (Loan 2631-OM) Attached is the "Project Completion Report on Oman - Third Highway Maintenance Project (Loan 2631-OM)", prepared by the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office. The report includes a borrower contribution (Part II). The overriding lending objective was to support development of a sustainable highway maintenance system. The project aimed specifically at: strengthening procedures for works preparation, planning and implementation; providing physical support infrastructure for maintenance; training local personnel; and studying ways to control highway accidents. The project included civil works, workshops and technical assistance. Implementation was delayed by about two and one-half years due to the oil crisis, which constrained public sector financing in the mid-1980s, bureau- cratic inertia and institutional inexperience. The delays led to a redefinition of civil works financed under the project. The revised project achieved its objectives and made a significant contribution towards establishing a sound maintenance management system and creating strong maintenance capacities. The overall economic rate of return on investments, estimated ex-post, is at least 25.. Thus, the project had a satisfactory outcome, and institutional development was substantial. Sustainability is likely because of strong government commitment to maintenance and momentum in the roads sector. The PCR is succinct and gives a good account of the project history. No performance audit is planned. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their officiaL duties. Its contents may not otherwise be discLosed without WorLd Bank authorization.   FOR OFFICLIL USE ONLY Sultanate of Oman Third Highway Maintenance Project, Loan 2631-OM Project Completion Report CONTENTS Preface .................................................... Evaluation Summary ...........................................ii PART ONE: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Basic Information ........................................ 1 Background ............................................ 1 Project Objectives and Description .............................. 2 Project Design and Organization ............................... 4 Project Implementation ..................................... 5 Project Results .......................................... 6 Reevaluation of ERR, Impact and Sustainability ..................... 7 Bank-Borrower Performance and Relationship ....................... 11 Consulting Services ...................................... 11 Project Documentation and Data .............................. 12 Status of Covenants ...................................... 12 Lessons Learned ........................... ....... . 12 PART TWO: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Cooperation with the Bank ................................... 13 Project Identification, Appraisal and Objectives ...................... 13 Implementation .......................................... 14 Technical Assistance Services ................................. 15 Development of the Highway Maintenance Management System .... ....... 16 Training DGR Personnel .................................... 20 Summary and Conclusions ................................... 22 PART THREE: STATISTICAL INFORMATION Tables 1. Related Bank Loans ....................................... 32 2. Project Timetable ........................................ 33 3. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements ..................... 33 4. Project Appraisal, Loan Categories, Allocated Amounts and Actual Cost ... ... 34 5. Project Results ......................................... 35 6. Example of Threshold Calculations ............................. 36 7. Status of Covenants ...................................... 37 8. Use of Bank Resources .................................... 37 9. Project Description ...................................... 38 10. Road Network and Vehicle Fleet .......................... .. 39 MAP - IBRD 18682 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.   - i - Sultanate of Oman Third Highway Maintenance Project, Loan 2631-OM Project Completion Report PREFACE This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for Oman Third Highway Maintenance Project for which Loan 2631-OM, in the amount of US$30.0 million, was approved on October 29, 1985. The loan was closed on December 31, 1992, two and a half years behind schedule after a cancellation of US$7.985 million. The reduced loan was fully disbursed on April 30, 1993. The Borrower has graduated from Bank borrowing. The PCR was jointly prepared by the Infrastructure Division of Country Department II, Middle East and North Africa Region, and the Borrower (Part IT).* The preparation of this PCR was started during a Bank mission to Oman in June 1992 and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan Agreement, supervision reports, corresponden- between the Bank and the Borrower and internal Bank documents. * Teje Wolden, Task Mfanager, Alastair J. NMcKechnie, Division Chief, Ram Chopra, Director Reviewers were: Messrs. NMiguel Quintos (LOAEL), Hladi Abushakra (LEGMIN) and Brian S. Smith (MN2TC).   - ii - Sultanate of Oman Third Highway Maintenance Project, Loan 2631-OM Project Completion Report EVALUATION SUMMARY OBJECTIVES The project was designed as a follow-up to the previous two projects in the Sultanate, which in turn stemmed from the Oman Technical Assistance Project, Loan 985-OM. The first project was Oman First Highway Maintenance Project, Loan 1441-OM, on which a Project Completion Report was prepared in August 1985. The overall objective was to ensure the adequate maintenance of the Borrower's highway network, which at the time amounted to about 3,250 km of paved and 1,600 km of gravel roads and 8,000 km of earth tracks. This was to be achieved through the financing of priority road maintenance projects and technical assistance and training. The second project was the Second Highway Maintenance Project, Loan 2084-OM with primary objective of improving the maintenance of Oman's road system through institutional strengthening, improved maintenance planning, training and both force account and contract maintenance. The Bank loan of US$15 million was to finance about half of the foreign exchange content and was to be used to support an asphalt overlay program, the procurement of road equipment, the construction of two maintenance centers and technical assistance and training. The Third Highway Maintenance Project, Loan 2631-OM had, as the overall objective, the furtherance of highway maintenance in Oman through the strengthening of planning, including the introduction of a pavement management system, improvements to force account capabilities, training, the establishment of a highway accidents prevention program and selected support of periodic and routine maintenance and pavement strengthening. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES The project, which was appraised in December, 1984, due to bureaucratic delays in Oman did not become effective until July, 1986. Loan closing was planned for June 30, 1990 but was postponed three times until final closing on December 31, 1992. Final disbursements, after US$8 million cancellation by the Government in 1991, took place in May, 1993. These delays were primarily due to: (i) the delayed effectiveness; (ii) severe budget constraints imposed by the Government following the mid-1980s collapse of oil prices which also led to loan restructuring; (iii) the slow progress of the Second Highway Maintenance Project (Loan 2084-OM) which the Government wished to complete before embarking on disbursement from Loan 2631-OM; (iv) slow  - iii - recruitment of consultants; and (v) insufficient liaising in some cases among the Directorate General of Roads (Ministry of Communications), Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Development Council which caused procurement delays and led to some eligible contracts not being financed under the loan. RESULTS Despite the implementation delays, reductions in emphasis on institution building and the US$8 million cancellation, the project largely achieved its objectives. Priority road maintenance activity was undertaken. A direct labor force and Omani contractor capability to perform good quality surface dressing were built up. Through the technical assistance component: (i) a highway maintenance management system was developed and implemented, eventually with Omani engineering counterparts; (ii) a highway sector cost accounting system was introduced; (iii) a highway safety study was undertaken and a safety program prepare(l; and (iv) road and bridge design standards were updated. The ERR was satisfactory at an overall level of >22 percent compared with 37 percent estimated at appraisal; however, due to radical project restructuring that included new components no true comparison can be made. SUSTAINABILITY Since O&M funding is adequate and maintenance works are carried out at a reasonable standard, the only factor posing a threat to sustainability of project achievements is the shortage of Omani professional staff (engineers, accountants etc.) in line positions in DGR. Continuation of the consulting services for another 2-3 years will be important in providing operational support for planning maintenance activities, while the training of newly recruited Omani engineers in the use of the highway maintenance planning and budgeting system is continuing. This policy is supported by the Government and the consultants emplo)ed under the project have already been extended by DGR beyond the loan closing date. Should the Government supported policy of omanization go slower than expected, the DGR will have to continue using the private sector as has been the case in the past. FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED There are three main lessons to be learned from this project: (i) without close professional involvement of the borrower's personnel, especially at a high level, the borrower's commitment to project objectives and implementation, is constrained; (ii) greater attention needs to be paid during preparation to establishing an authoritative unit with a clear understanding of procurement and disbursement procedures within the executing agency and with ready access to the highest levels of concerned ministries; and (iii) the time required to address institutional issues satisfactorily, especially in traditional societies, is easily underestimated.  Sultanate of Oman Third Highway Mlaintenance Project, Loan 2631-OM Project Completion Report PART ONE PROJECT REVIEW FRONI BANK'S PERSPECTIVE Basic Information Title Third Highway Maintenance Project Loan No 263 1-OM RVP Unit MENA Country : Sultanate of Oman Sector Transport and Tourism Subsector: Highways Background 2.1 The national highway network is under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Roads (DGR) within the Ministry of Communications (MOC). During the 15-year period between 1975 and 1990 the road network was expanding rapidly, and the length of paved roads increased from about 700 to 4,500 km. This represents an annual increase of about 13.2 percent of paved roads per year. During the same period, the unpaved network also expanded from 3,300 to more than 12,000 km, an annual increase of 9.3 percent. The Government has adopted a policy that emphasizes the importance of effective and timely maintenance. By developing the institutional capacity to carry out the needed maintenance, the Government is helping to preserve its already considerable investment in infrastructure and the World Bank has played an important part in this. 2.2 The Bank has been associated with the road sector in Ornan since 1977 through four highway-related operations: (i) The first was a technical assistance (TA) project, Loan 985-OM, focussing upon national economic planning and the transport and agriculture sectors, granted to the Government of Oman. Under this, consultants were employed to prepare a development program to form the institutions needed to protect past investments. (ii) The second was the First Highway Maintenance Project (HMP), Loan 1441-OM, which was satisfactorily completed in May 1985. Institution building and resource development were provided in the form of assistance for starting up a training program and support for a three-year tranche (1979-81) of the multi-year road maintenance program. However, much remained to be done at the time of project completion.  - 2 - (iii) The third operation was the Second Highway Maintenance Project Loan 2084- OM, which closed on December 31, 1988 and had as a priority continued resource transfer in road maintenance by providing maintenance facilities, financing important maintenance and building up skills in the road sector. The project was designed as a follow-up of the first HMP. (iv) The last of these highway-related operations was the Third Highway Maintenance Project, Loan 2631-OM, which was designed to be a follow-up to the previous projects. It was approved on October 29, 1985 and closed on December 31, 1992. 2.3 The Second HMP was extended for three years. By the time the PCR for that project was issued in October 1989, the Third HMP was three years old and had recently been restructured. The original loan closing date of June 30, 1990 was postponed to June 30, 1992. Many of the findings in the PCR of the second project are also applicable for this project. Project Objectives and Description 3.1 Sector Development Objectives. Until 1970 there was no modern transport system in Oman. The highway network consisted of only 10 km of paved highway and an unknown length of earth tracks. Today the network consists of an extensive, and still growing, highway network of 4,700 km of paved roads and more than 13,000 km of gravel roads and tracks. The land transport services currently constitute about 4 percent of the non-oil gross domestic product. During the last 20 years, the objective has been to establish an economically efficient transport system that also meets social needs; this has largely been achieved. In the urban regions, in particular the Muscat capital area, the growth of traffic has been such that, despite a large highway development program, there is still need for major investments in highway facilities. In the rural areas, more and more communities are being connected to the main highway network by roads with bituminous surfacing with consequent reductions in operating and maintenance costs. The Government's objective in the last completed five-year plan (1986-90) was to continue to improve the highway system and to develop the Omani human resources needed to operate the system without the assistance of expatriates. At the same time, the Government has given priority to protecting existing investments by establishing a road pavement management system. In the future, more and more attention will have to be given to the preservation of road system assets at the expense of a further expansion of the network. 3.2 Project Objectives. The overall objective is the support of a sustainable system of highway maintenance in Oman by: (a) Strengthening project preparation, planning and implementation procedures, including the development of guidelines for project and program economic evaluation, the introduction of a pavement management system and the design and implementation of a highway maintenance cost accounting system. (b) Promoting and sustaining effective routine and periodic highway maintenance through the development of support infrastructure (highway workshops, work centers, pavement and  traffic data equipment) and economically viable work programs initially aided by Bank participation in the selection of priority works. (c) Training local personnel in skills to undertake planning, implementation and monitoring tasks to achieve Oman's highway maintenance, investment and highway safety programs. (d) Developing an effective program for the control and limitation of highway accidents. 3.3 Project Description. The project was designed to assist in the implementation of the first three years of the Government's five-year highway program (1986-90). Specifically, the project was designed to assist in the following activities to promote institution building and manpower development: (a) The construction of workshops, highway maintenance centers and training center extensions. (b) Equipment and spare parts for highway maintenance, workshops, pavement data collection and processing, and highway safety. (c) Technical assistance to MOC and DGR, including the training of staff. (d) The paving of unpaved roads (bituminous surface treatment). 3.4 The support for paving of unpaved roads was included after negotiation upon request by the Borrower to assist them in introducing bituminous surface treatment, which was not being used at the time. The project was restructured in 1989 to: (i) allow for more Bank support to works, in particular asphalt pavement strengthening, which was also a part of previous highway maintenance projects; and (ii) to delete the financing of training center extensions, as future training was to be carried out by existing vocational training establishments. The loan, therefore, financed all, or part, of the foreign exchange content of: (a) Equipment, spare parts and materials for highway data collection and processing and highway safety. (b) Construction for workshops and highway maintenance work centers, including necessary equipment. (c) Bituminous surface treatment for unpaved roads and asphalt overlays for pavements in need of strengthening. (d) Consulting services and individual specialists for highway maintenance, pavement management, cost accounting, training, highway safety and general technical assistance.  -4- Project Design and Organization 4.1 The project was designed within the framework of the Government's Five-Year Highway Program, which was developed by DGR with assistance from the technical assistance consultants employed under the previous project (Loan 2084-OM). The project was also prepared with the assistance of the same consultants and was appraised by the Bank, in December 1984. 4.2 The project was originally designed and appraised as a US$15 million project supporting the strengthening of existing asphalt concrete surfaced roads and for human resources and institutional development (HRID)(see Table 4). The design was almost identical to that of the Second HMP. The loan amount was increased to US$20 million before negotiations upon request by the Government during appraisal. To be consistent with the Bank's strategy for Oman, as spelled out in the Oman Graduation Paper, the Bank financing for civil works was shifted from the financing of pavements, as had been the case on previous projects, to the financing of work centers, workshops and training center extensions to facilitate and develop institutional capacity to carry out maintenance operations. The focus was on supporting critical aspects of manpower development, institution building and technical assistance consistent with the strategy. Between negotiations and Board Presentation, the project design was modified. Road works to upgrade unpaved roads to paved standards were included and the loan amount was increased to US$30 million. 4.3 In 1989, the project was restructured, and the loan agreement was amended to accommodate more road strengthening and upgrading and technical assistance was reduced. It was also agreed to remove the training center extensions from the project and for training to be undertaken in vocational training schools; and Bank financing of improvements to work centers was reduced. More emphasis was put on training DGR counterparts, especially as civil engineering graduates would become available in the early 1990s, reflecting the need to focus on manpower development. These changes were partly occasioned by the impact of large falls in oil revenues on the Government budget leading to reduction in road maintenance resource availability and resulting in a backlog of maintenance related activity, especially surface dressing highly trafficked gravel roads and tracks. 4.4 The technical assistance component of the project included: (i) providing policy support to set up new policies, guidelines and procedures for the implementation of the Borrower's Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Highway Programs; (ii) proposing a highway safety program; and (iii) establishing a pavement management system, including a cost accounting system. A comprehensive, multi-year organizational and manpower development plan for DGR, based on the rolling plan concept, could have been a useful tool in better defining the role of technical assistance and the need for training in DGR. The organizational unit within DGR responsible for all activities related to the management of externally financed projects did not liaise sufticiently, especially at the working level, with counterparts in the MFE and Development Council. This was to some extent corrected towards the end of implementation but was still hindered by the strong, traditional hierarchical system of administration. 4.5 Limited Omani involvement in project preparation may have been efficient but did not foster the ownership needed to facilitate implementation. The absence of potential Omani counterparts at  - 5 - this stage made greater participation impossible and the technical assistance personnel had to function to a great extent as line management. This is no longer the case (see para. 5.5). 4.6 Approximately 93 percent of the original project (excluding routine maintenance) consisted of civil works and supporting activity whilst about 80 percent of the loan was originally allocated to these categories. In the event about 96 percent of the restructured project was earmarked for these purposes and, allowing for the US$8 million cancellation about 85 percent of the loan was disbursed on these activities (Table 4). Project Implementation. 5.1 There were no special effectiveness conditions, but it took almost nine months before the loan could be declared effective mainly due to bureaucratic delays in Omani processing of the agreement. The delay had no practical consequence for the Borrower since the Second HMP had funds left and could disburse for basically the same project components. The loan became effective on July 3, 1986. 5.2 The original loan closing date was June 30, 1990; the actual loan closing took place on December 31, 1992. Nearly US$8 million were cancelled by the Government in 1992. Causes of slow project implementation were: (a) the sharp drop in Government revenues following the 1980s fall in oil prices led to a retrenchment in expenditure across the board and this also impacted upon disbursements under the Second HMP (Loan 2084-OM): consequently, a decision was taken to complete disbursements under Loan 2084-OM before drawing on Loan 2631-OM, the start of disbursements was postponed until the beginning of 1988; (b) despite frequent Bank supervision mission efforts, communications between DGR (MOC) and the MFE and Development Council were not always satisfactory, thus, certain expenditures appropriate for financing from the loan were either not financed from loan proceeds or financed at a very late stage; (c) procurement procedures were sometimes not adhered to, or, if they were, documentation provided to the Bank was incomplete; this led to significant processing delays; and (d) the Government decision to "re-tender" the technical assistance component of the project led to a delay of over one year - not just in the technical assistance component pr _ but in the many projected related line management jobs that the consultant was required to perform. 5.3 Disbursements against surface treatment (Category IA) and asphalt overlay (Category IB) were largely completed and comprised 53% of the original loan amount. Similarly, Category 3 (Consultants' Services) were fully disbursed. The areas where disbursements were well below project estimates were categories l(C) (workshops), I(D) (work centers) and 2(A) (equipment for workshops). Thus, project physical objectives were largely achieved and the technical assistance  - 6 - targets were met. However, some institutional objectives in the sense of traditional strengthening of the highway maintenance infrastructure, manpower training and putting in place an effective Omani operated highway planning system, including road safety, were only partially met. Efforts are, however, continuing. 5.4 In the PCR of the Second HMP, the establishment of a project management unit (MOF, DGR, Development Council) fully versed in administrating Bank-financed projects was suggested to facilitate project implementation. Such a unit was established towards the end of the Third HMP but did not have much impact on implementation progress. Again, one of the main reasons for this is the strong hierarchial decision-taking process: in this, although discussions can take place at working level, decision-taking involving several ministries can only take place at ministerial level. This is a characteristic of the administration system that would need to be tackled at the country level. 5.5 The implementation problems demonstrate the difficulties in managing projects with dual objectives: institution building/manpower development and the constructing/upgrading of roads. Road construction and upgrading by contractors are normally faster disbursing activities, with less Bank staff input, and tend to get more attention than components that involve building lasting organizations. Lower salaries in the public sector and a lack of qualified engineers has also made it difficult to find Omani counterpart personnel with technical backgrounds, which has adversely affected implementation. However, with the first engineering graduates coming out of Sultan Qaboos University in 1992, and the Government embarking on an Omanization program, the situation had begun to improve at the time of loan closing. Several local counterpart staff were appointed and underwent training by consultants during the last six months of the project in order to take over the day-to-day operation of the highway maintenance management system and other supporting systems. The DGR would need to follow up on this. 5.6 Despite supervision mission efforts, DGR frequently carried out tendering, awarded contracts and started construction work without following agreed procedures for prior review of tender documents required under Bank loan financing. Many contracts were, therefore, approved ex-post for financing by the Bank -- after careful review that the process actually followed Bank procurement guidelines (except for the prior review and no objection by the Bank before award of contract). Project Results 6.1 Surface Treatment. Because of delays and restructuring, the projects that were financed were not the ones that were appraised. The projects are listed in Table S. In all, 106 km of gravel roads or earth tracks were upgraded with a 30 cm combined sub-base/base layer and a double bituminous surface treatment (DBST) on top as wearing course. The roads were nearly all built in 1989 and 1990, and were generally in good condition when last inspected with no visible signs of distress. This is encouraging considering that DGR and local contractors had previously little experience with low cost surface treatment. 6.2 Asphalt Concrete (AC). The works are located within or adjacent to the towns of Ibra, Al Qabil and Bidya in the interior of the northeastern region of Sharqiyah. Included are:  (a) The rehabilitation of 9 km of National Highway No. 15 at major intersection. (b) The construction of 55.9 km of roads, of which 16.3 km are in Ibra, 16.7 km in Al Qabil, and 22.9 km in Bidya. (c) The construction of Irish crossings, flood protection works and culverts associated with the above. The total value of the works is approximately 4 million Omani rials for about 65 km of AC surfaced roads, most of which received new pavement construction. The general standard of construction is considered acceptable, although the AC mix design in places appears to have resulted in a bitumen-rich surfacing that could be prone to rutting under heavy loads and could give low skid resistance during rains. 6.3 Other Maintenance Related Civil Works. The loan also financed bridge repairs on the Bidbid-Sur Road, the repair of drainage structures on the Seeb-Malahah Road and bridge and road repairs on the Sohar-Buraimi Road and minor repair works on some other roads. In addition, the loan financed civil engineering works on the Ibra Maintenance Center, mainly an office block and a workshop building with equipment. Recent visual inspection of the civil works that were completed in 1989 showed only minor defects, and these works appeared to be in good condition. 6.4 Through technical assistance, the project has been successful in achieving the following results related to institutional development objectives: (a) Developing a pavement management system that places maintenance programming and budgeting on a sound technical basis. (b) Introducing a road maintenance cost accounting system, which provides important input for cost estimates, budgeting and control. (c) Establishing road traffic data collection systems. (d) Training Omani nationals in the use of the above systems. (e) Preparing of Highway Safety Program. (f) Developing an information recording and retrieval system. (g) Revising road and bridge standards. Reevaluation of the ERR, Impact and Sustainability 7.1 The beneficiaries of the project fall into three main categories: (i) government agencies responsible for building, maintaining and financing the road system; (ii) road users; and (iii) social  - 8 - and economic centers served by improved road transport. 7.2 The original project cost was anticipated to cover the 1986-88 period of the 1986-90 Highway Maintenance Program. The project cost was estimated at US$192.54 million (including contingencies) comprising US$137.02 million for capital cost and technical assistance and US$55.52 million for routine maintenance. Of this, the Bank loan was to finance US$30 million (22 percent) of the capital cost and technical assistance. The overall ERR, including routine maintenance with an assumed ERR of 100 percent, was estimated at 47 percent. For the overlay program the ERR was calculated at 31 percent, and for the surface treatment program it was estimated at a minimum of 12 percent. In the event, as described in the preceding paragraphs, due to delays in implementation and changes in project content, the basic highway maintenance program straddled the 1986-90 and 1991-95 programs and approximately US$8 million of the loan was cancelled. Consequently, it is not possible to undertake an exact reevaluation of the appraisal report's ERR. Furthermore, the borrower has not provided the Bank with either the finished Highway Maintenance Plans or the results and thus, the assessment of the overall achievement of objectives is not strictly possible. However, an attempt has been made to evaluate the economic results of these components financed from the Bank loan and to indicate the likelihood of the appraisal evaluation being achieved. 7.3 Total Project Assessment. During supervision missions the opportunity has been taken to review standards of maintenance in the field. These are good, and with the generally strict budgetary control it is probable that these standards are being achieved in a cost effective way: this applies to both contract and force account operation. Nonetheless, it is expected that if the Highway Maintenance Management System (HMMS) developed under the technical assistance component is properly applied savings, especially in periodic maintenance, will he possible without sacrificing standards. The extent to which the HMMS will be applied will depend on continued use of consulting services and a growing participation by trained Omani staff. 7.4 Surface Dressing Program. Selection of unpaved roads for surface dressing, either by contract or force account, was made using a traffic threshold as the criterion. This, in turn, had been established by consultants, taking into account vehicle operating cost (voc) and maintenance savings, during the preparation phase. The three critical factors were cost per kilometer, level of traffic and savings: in some cases maintenance savings, especially in distant areas were also important. (i) Cost per Kilometer. At appraisal, the contract cost per kilometer of upgrading from unpaved to surface dressed standard, was estimated at US$75,000. Actual contracts financed under the loan have ranged between US$60-85,000 km. Thus, we are confident that the cost side has remained reasonably constant. (ii) Level of Traffic. Although under the Project the technical assistance team has restarted a comprehensive traffic census program, sufficient results are not yet available to establish trends. However, vehicle statistics (the reliability of which has been significantly improved) indicate a growth rate of between 8 percent and 9 percent compared with a 10 percent estimate at appraisal. All contracts financed from the loan were preceded by feasibility studies agreed by the Bank: the studies stated that the traffic thresholds had been reached and these were:  -9- Flat terrain > 400 vpd Hilly terrain > 350 vpd Mountainous > 425 vpd Consequently, if the threshold figures are accepted and with a growth rate of between 8 percent and 9 percent applied, the traffic component of the evaluation would still be valid. The threshold for "Hilly" terrain is lower due to the voc savings being greater than in "Flat" terrain while construction costs do not counter balance the difference. In the case of "Mountainous" terrain increased construction costs more than counter balance the higher voc savings and the threshold, therefore, increases. (iii) Vehicle Operating Costs (voc). Since the beginning of the project, the consultants have carried out intensive work to establish voc under different road conditions. Use has also been made of several cost estimating models including those of the World Bank and the Transport and Road Research Laboratory. At the time of appraisal voc estimates under different sorts of operating conditions (typified by road surface roughness in mm/km) were estimated, and these are compared with the 1992 researched figures in the following table in US cents per kilometer. Vehicle Operating Costs (US cents/km) Vehicle Type Operating Conditions Surface Asphalt Tracks Gravel Dressed Concrete Appraisal Estimate Cars 19.0 15.5 12.1 11.1 4-wheel drive 46.5 40.6 33.8 32.5 Trucks (medium) 74.0 61.1 45.6 43.0 Researched Figures Cars 44.8 32.2 24.4 20.9 4-wheel drive 74.1 51.4 37.5 32.0 Truck *) 109.0 86.8 79.1 70.3 *) average of medium and heavy trucks It can be seen that the recently researched operating costs are appreciably higher than those estimated at the time of appraisal and, with the exception of trucks, the cost differential affected by operating conditions is also greater. Consequently, taking into account the three reassessments of road cost, traffic levels and voc, the return will be higher than estimated at appraisal. Analyzed over a 10-year period, the minimum case of  - 10 - 400 vpd gravel road upgraded to surface dressed standard, and an "average vehicle" voc saving of 10 cents/km yields an ERR of 16.5 percent. Thus, this component will have an ERR in excess of the 12 percent threshold established at appraisal. Furthermore, this does not take into account savings in the very high maintenance cost of a gravel road carrying levels of traffic in excess of 400 vpd. Table 6 is setting out the basis for the calculations. 7.5 Overlay Program. The program set out in the SAR was not undertaken. Overlay work, apart from some Irish crossing, was limited to 57 km of roads in the relatively heavily populated Ibra, Al Qabil and Bidiya areas with 1992 surveyed traffic flows of 3000 vpd. The contract cost averaged US$199,000 km. Using the above data on vocs - moving from surface dressed to asphalt concrete roads - the "average vehicle" generated a saving of 6 US cents/km. Assuming a 9 percent traffic growth rate the component yields an ERR of 39 percent over a 10-year period. 7.6 No ERR was calculated for the technical assistance component. However, the total components financed under the loan are estimated to have yielded a minimum ERR of 27 percent. Of course, should routine maintenance be included the ERR for the project as a whole would be very much higher. 7.7 Impact. It is probably too early to assess the impact of this project Mr se but, looking at it as an extension of the First and Second Highway Maintenance Projects, there is no doubt that the maintenance authorities are much better equipped to protect the highway system. This applies to planning and supervision capability as well as work execution. Particular points to highlight are: (i) the development of the pavement management system and cost accounting in the DGR which should lead to greater cost effectiveness; (ii) the preparation of a highway safety program; (iii) development of Omani road and bridge standards; and (iv) establishment of effective surface dressing units within the DGR. Progress has yet to be made, however, on the full acceptance of economic evaluation for road improvement and construction programs. The projects have also assisted in major improvements to communications with rural centers permitting improved economic activity and the effective delivery of social services. 7.8 Sustainability. The Second and Third HMPs were instrumental in building up of a capability within the DGR and among local contractors to carry out periodic maintenance and upgrading of gravel roads by the use of double bituminous surface treatment (DBST), a durable and inexpensive surface treatment for low trafficked roads. This has been successful, and DGR's balanced approach to road maintenance by the use of private sector contractors and consultants while maintaining force account capability, documents an institutional strength that is a good basis for sustainable operations, in contrast to many developing countries, where the private sector is only used in road maintenance if there is no alternative. 7.9 The only factor posing a threat to continuity and thus sustainability of project achievements is the shortage of Omani engineers in line positions in DGR. Presently the consultants employed to introduce the new Highway Maintenance Management System is assisting in carrying out work in line positions in the Directorate. Continuation of the consulting services for another 2-3 years will be important in providing operational support for planning maintenance activities, while the training of  - 11 - newly recruited Omani professionals (engineers, accountants etc.) in the use of the highway maintenance planning, accounting and budgeting system is continuing. This policy is supported by the Government and the consultants employed under the project have already been extended by DGR beyond the loan closing date. Should the omanization go slower than expected, the DGR will have to continue using the private sector as has been the case in the past. Bank-Borrower Performance and Relationship 8.1 The project entity (DGR) performed well and carried out routine and periodic maintenance and road improvement projects within its budget. However, considering that this was the third Bank- financed project, it was disappointing that due to poor communications with the MOC procurement unit, on occasion, the Bank's procurement guidelines as agreed during negotiations and required by the loan agreement were not followed. 8.2 The Borrower and the Bank should have identified and agreed on specific maintenance projects for financing when the project was restructured. In this way, more appropriate projects could have been identified (in relation to the objectives) and the Bank's procurement guidelines could have been applied early in the process. It was inadequate, at Oman's level of technical development, to adopt what was basically a sector approach. The delays and the budget reductions after the project was restructured made the subsequent identification of suitable projects for financing more difficult. Consulting Services 9.1 The technical assistance component of the project comprised 20 percent of the loan at appraisal, which was in line with the Bank's country strategy. This amount, however, was reduced to US$3 million (10 percent) after restructuring in 1989. The reduction can partly be explained by the fact that the consultant recruited in 1987 for the Third HMP was partly charged to the undisbursed funds in the Second HMP. 9.2 This consultant: (i) provided day-to-day assistance to DGR for the review of documents, the completion of design work and the preparation and review of tender documents; (ii) conducted special studies, such as of highway design manuals, highway inventory reports, annual road maintenance reports, five-year highway programs, vehicle operating costs updates, the cost accounting system, the pavement management system, the highway safety program, traffic data reports and quarterly progress reports; and (iii) trained of DGR counterpart staff. The design and supervision of road contracts by international consulting firms were also charged to this category. 9.3 The new consulting firm that was recruited under the project came in at a very late stage due to bureaucratic delays, but the general performance of the firm was good. Reports were produced as programmed in the initial action plan, and systems have been put in place in the DGR offices as scheduled. However, due to the lack of local engineers, the systems and reports could not have been developed with counterpart staff, and the late arrival of newly graduated Omani engineers as counterpart staff raises a question of the sustainability of the systems introduced.  - 12 - Project Documentation and Data 10.1 The Staff Appraisal Report and Legal Documents generally provided a satisfactory framework for project implementation. The Bank's procurement guidelines may possibly have contributed to the Borrower's choosing to finance some civil works contracts from its own budgets rather than waiting for the Bank's review process and approval of contract awards. Price variation on civil works contracts is not common in Oman. The Government prefers fixed price contracts. This has been a difficult issue, and the loan has mostly financed small contracts of relative short duration to avoid the use of price adjustment clauses in the contracts. Late preparation of withdrawal applications has slowed down disbursements. In particular, the Borrower believes that payments made in local currency should be accepted for reimbursement of the foreign currency component, at the appropriate percentage given in the Loan Agreement, and not be considered as local expenditures. 10.2 The availability of data for the preparation of the PCR has been acceptable. One back-to- office report was missing in the information center files, and it would simplify the review of the project if all Bank supervision reports were filed in a separate folder, not together with other documents and general correspondence. Status of Covenants 11.1 The Borrower complied with all of the covenants although there were delays in implementation. The status of compliance with covenants is shown in Table 7, Part III. Lessons Learned 12.1 The project was the fourth Bank-assisted project in the transport sector. The project design continued building on the achievements of the earlier projects, namely: focusing on a continuation of financing civil works (road improvements), manpower development and institution development. The project provided a number of useful lessons. (a) Counterpart Organization. All the maintenance projects could have benefited from a higher degree of Omani involvement in project preparation, in particular from the highway agency to facilitate ownership and commitment during implementation. By integrating the project better in the organization of the main beneficiary, it is likely that also the processing of with- drawal applications and accounting and auditing of the project account would have improved. (b) Slow Disbursement was largely a function of: (i) the over-reaction of the Government to the decline in oil revenues, which led to a hiatus of over a year in most sectors; and (ii) the lack of timeliness in processing payment certificates and reimbursement applications: this is partly a function of hierarchical administration and should have been addressed during preparation. (c) Underestimating Difficulties. The difficulty and time required in building lasting institutions is easily underestimated, in particular when the human resources and institutional development component is an add-on to a larger civil works project that is not disbursing and requires a lot of attention from both Borrower and the Bank.  - 13 - Sultanate of Oman Third Highway Maintenance Project, Loan 2631-OM Project Completion Report PART TWO PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Cooperation with the World Bank 1. 1 This project falls within the context of active cooperation between the Government of the Sultanate of Oman and the World Bank aiming at assisting institution building efforts in the MOC and DGR on highway maintenance, training of DGR staff, highway safety, pavement management and cost accounting. Project Identification, Appraisal and Objectives 2.1 Project Identification. The need for, and the objectives and components of this Third Highway Maintenance Project were identified by both the Ministry of Communications (MOC), and the World Bank as being a necessary continuation of the Second highway Maintenance Project. 2.2 This Project is related to the road network in the Sultanate of Oman under the responsibility of the MOC for which a short description follows: 2.3 Road transport in Oman is the major mode of transport linking the capital Muscat and the other major cities and areas in the country with each other and linking the Sultanate with the neighboring countries. 2.4 The road network and vehicle fleet have grown quite extensively since 1970. By the end of 1992, the road network comprised 5,200 kms of paved roads, out of which 4,984 kms were constructed by the MOC (4,286 kms are now under the responsibility of the MOC), and 21,000 kms of unpaved roads (gravel and track roads), out of which 4,984 kms were constructed by the MOC (4,286 kms are now under the responsibility of the MOC), and 21,000 kms of unpaved roads (gravel and track roads), out of which 14,873 kms were built and are maintained by the MOC. Agencies other than the MOC responsible for their own roads are Muscat Municipality, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Regional Municipalities and Petroleum Development Oman (P.D.O.).  - 14 - 2.5 Table 10 presents comparison between the growth of the network and vehicle fleet for selected years between 1970 and 1992. 2.6 Project Appraisal. The Project was appraised by the World Bank following its mission visit to Oman in December 1984. A Staff Appraisal Report of a Third Highway Maintenance Project (Loan 2631-OM) dated February 20, 1985 was issued as a World Bank document under Report No. 5493-OM. Following the World Bank appraisal and negotiations between the Government of the Sultanate of Oman and the World Bank, the Third Highway Maintenance Project (Loan 2631-OM), Agreement was signed on February 12, 1986. 2.7 Project Objectives. As for the previous World Bank Loan Highway Maintenance Projects, the overall objectives of this Project were to protect the large investment in recent highway improvements and sustain an efficient highway transport network to serve present and future demand, including institution building within the MOC while providing necessary assistance in expertise manpower resources and training of Omani personnel. In particular, the objectives of the Project were: (a) strengthening of project preparation, planning and implementation of procedures including the development of guidelines for project and program economic evaluation and the introduction of a pavement management system; (b) promoting and sustaining effective routine and periodic highway maintenance through the development of support infrastructure (highway workshops, work centers, pavement and traffic data equipment) and sound work programs aided by Bank participation in selection of priority works; (c) training local personnel in necessary skills to undertake planning, implementation and monitoring tasks to achieve Oman's highway maintenance, investment and highway safety programs; and (d) the development of an effective program for the control and limitation of highway accidents. Implementation 2.8 Project Implementation. The Project was implemented through the MOC - the Executing Agency - with cooperation of the World Bank. The implementation of the Project was slower than anticipated and had overrun its original closing date by 2.5 years (from June 30, 1990 to December 31, 1992). Compared to the original project period of 4.0 years - from the effectiveness date (July 1, 1986) to the original plan closing date (June 30, 1990) - the overrun period is 62.5%. 2.9 The main reasons for this delay were the continued economic stringency which followed the drop in oil prices at the beginning of 1986, and which in turn affected the government financial resources and, consequently, available funds to some project components and the schedule of  - 15 - disbursements. In some cases, it has been found out that the time envisaged for a project from inception, design, tendering to letting was shorter than what it actually took. 2.10 It was found that an amount equivalent to US$7,985,000 could not be disbursed by December 1992 and was, consequently, cancelled from the Loan. This is mainly due to the dropping of the rehabilitation of Ibri-Dank Project from the list of projects eligible for reimbursement from the Loan, as it could not have been completed by the Loan closing date. 2.11 Table 4 presents a comparison of actual disbursements with original estimated allocations by loan category. Table 4 presents summary of estimated and actual disbursements from the loan by year. 2.12 The project was supervised by the World Bank through its several mission visits to Oman, averaging about two visits per year. Table 8B presents a summary of the World Bank mission visits since July 1985. 2.13 Implementation Details. Table 5 presents a list of projects reimbursable from the World Bank Loan 2631-OM. 2.14 Category l(a), Project No. 12/90, Ibra, Al Qabil, Bidiya Internal Roads. This project is virtually completed with variation orders for some additional works. 2.15 Category l(e), Project 1/88, Ibra Workshop is virtually completed. 2.16 Category l(d), Construction of new DGR workcenters: tenders for administration block and basic facilities for five workcenters have been opened and evaluated. But tenders had been withheld by the MOC until the picture of entrusting track and other light maintenance works to contractors in each area in lieu of direct DGR forces had become clear. 2.17 Category 2(b), Project 1/89, equipment for workshops: tendering was stopped by MOC due to non-availability of funds. 2.18 Category 3(a), Project No. 3/89, Technical Assistance: for budget allocation shortage, the fees for the technical assistance consultants were paid only up to November 1992. Thus, although this item is eligible for reimbursement up to December 1992, reimbursement was only possible till November 1992. The MOC had already taken steps with the Development Council to resolve this matter. Otherwise, all other projects eligible for reimbursement from the World Bank Loan 263 1-OM were completed. Technical Assistance Services 2.19 General. During the period of the Third Highway Maintenance project (July 1986- December 1992), the consultant's agreements and staffing passed through the following stages:  - 16 - July 1986-December 1988: Agreement with Dar Al Handash consultants with only four (4) permanent staff due to budget constraints. January 1988-June 1990: Agreement with SICO, comprising same four permanent safe. July 1990-June 1992: Agreement with Misr Consulting Engineers and CTL, comprising full staff including the four permanent staff as required to fulfill the agreement tasks. July 1992-June 1993: One year extension of previous agreement with Misr Consulting Engineers and CTL comprising relatively reduced staff. 2.20 Major Tasks Achieved. The Consultant has fully fulfilled his tasks including, inter alia, the following: (a) One of the major tasks accomplished was the development of a computerized Highway Maintenance Management System (HMMS), custom made to the local conditions, general procedures and requirements of the MOC/DGR, and incorporating recent development in technology. A description of the developed (HMMS) and its subsystems is presented in para. 2.21 below. (b) Highway Safety Study (see para. 2.33 below). (c) Updated Highway User Costs (see para. 2.34 below). (d) Cost Accounting computerized system. (e) The 1991-95 Road Maintenance Plan. (f) A Feasibility Study of Road Projects candidate for the Fourth 5-Year Plan (1991-95) was carried out separately by Gibb Petermuller & Partners consultants based on Terms of Reference prepared by the Technical Assistance Consultant, who also monitored the study. (g) Training of DGR personnel (see para. 2.40 below). Development of the Highway Maintenance Management System (HMMS) 2.21 Development of the HMMS was done through the Technical Assistance Consultant and took about two years beside other activities of the project. The foundation on which the HMMS was developed started with previous Technical Assistance services and continued throughout.  - 17 - 2.22 The Maintenance Management System (MMS) Report 1990 describing the maintenance management evolution in Oman, was considered vital in providing supporting information and data on the current practice utilized by the DGR/MOC on various activities including: traffic and accident data, specification, monitoring, training, cost accounting and implementation of maintenance works as well as suggestions for future development. The MMS Report was used as an essential reference and was the base for current HNIMS development and its relevant subsystems. 2.23 The developed HMMS is modular in design and installed in a micro computer environment equipped with user friendly menus and networking facility. The HMMS includes five main subsystem. There are Pavement Management System (PMS), Bridge and Structures Management System (BMS), Equipment Management System (EMS), Traffic Management System (TMS) and Cost Accounting System (CAS). 2.24 In addition to the development of the HMMS and its related subsystems, and as part of the DGR automation, the consultant developed customized purchasing and stores systems, which are under implementation. 2.25 Efforts are continuing to fine tune and fully implement the HMMS developed. Currently, the MOC is engaged in building a Geographic Information System (GIS) that will be supported by the HMMS database. It is expected that the implementation phase and GIS interface will continue for another three years, during which all new technological development suitable for incorporation into the HMMS/GIS models will be made, and the Omani engineers and technical staff will be trained to operate the system. A brief description of each subsystem is given below. 2.26 The HIMMS subsystems. Figure 6 presents the developed HMMS and its related subsystems. The whole system resides in a large 486 IBM compatible microcomputer dedicated as a server for a Local Area Network (LAN). The system use FoxPro 2.0 as the database management system and Novell 3.11 on a thin Ethernet network. All subsystems are incorporated in a main menu designed to account for the user "choice to access". 2.27 The Pavement Management System (PMS) is designed to account for paved roads under the jurisdiction of MOC/DGR, as well as accessing a track and gravel road database. The basic PMS program includes six interrelated components, namely: (i) comprehensive inventory of all pavement network, (ii) condition assessment, (iii) maintenance and rehabilitation (M&R) assignment, (iv) prioritization of M&R needs, (v) cost of M&R strategies, and (vi) long range programming and budgeting for each year in a planning horizon up to 10 years. A customized program was developed to analyze the data collected from the field and produce multiple reports to suit the MOC/DGR needs. Similarly, to the other subsystems, the program is menu driven, user friendly, and ample of on-screen documentation. A User Manual and a Pavement Condition Distress Identification manual have been exclusively written for the customized system in Oman. 2.28 The Bridge and Structures Management System (BMS) includes five interrelated components, namely: (i) comprehensive inventory of bridges and structures network, (ii) detailed condition evaluation of each element, (iii) Maintenance and Rehabilitation (M&R) assignment,  - 18 - (iv) priority and/or urgency of needed repairs, and (v) reporting capabilities. The BMS program is customized to suit the local conditions and other administrative needs of the MOC/DGR. This program is menu driven, user friendly, and supported by on-screen documentation. In addition, a condition survey manual with pictures of typical field problems was made and each distress/problem was coded to match the computer program identification codes. 2.29 The Traffic Management System (TMS) feeds the PMS and BMS with current and historical traffic data and traffic summary indices such as Average Daily Traffic (ADT), percentage trucks, etc. This information is needed for maintenance and rehabilitation (M&R) design as well as in the priority setting for funds allocation. 2.30 The Equipment Management System (EMS) accounts for three elements, namely: (i) inventory of all equipments, (ii) maintenance service records, and (iii) operation service records. The program produce several reports to suit the users needs such as the maintenance service cycle with predicted time schedule, depreciation and operation/production cycle of equipment and predicted service life, i.e., whether or not to repair or discard the equipment, etc. 2.31 The Cost Accounting System (CAS) is supplied with achievement data from activities of the MOC/DGR workcenters and workshops, and other inventory data such as labor and material costs. It then processes this information to produce unit costs of Maintenance and Rehabilitation (M&R) strategies among other production/budget control reports. 2.32 Geographic Information System (GIS). The MOC/DGR have solicited tenders for the installation of a GIS hardware and software. The installation is scheduled to end in June 1993, and the implementation is to start thereafter. MOC/DGR goal of these GIS activities are: (1) To support inter-ministry applications. The GIS will be linked to the National Database Management System (NDBMS) main computer resident at the Supreme Committee for Town Planning (SCTP) to enable sharing and accessing information provided by all other ministries through a Wide Area Network (WAN). (2) To provide MOC/DGR with more effective, automated method of representing and managing maps and drawings and their related information as well as analyzing HMMS data. 2.33 Highway Safety. The Consultant carried out a highway safety study for Oman and presented his findings in his Highway Safety Final Report dated May 1992. The study included, inter alia, the following: One of the findings of the analysis of traffic accidents carried out by the Consultant was that the number of traffic accident deaths in Oman per 100,000 vehicles on the road is very high as compared to other countries worldwide. The study gives death rates and vehicle population for selected countries. A table is presenting registered vehicles versus number of traffic  - 19 - accidents, shows that the ratio of traffic accidents to registered vehicles is about 5%. The major cause of traffic accidents is the driver. He is accountable for about 0.5%. The vehicle is accountable for about 1%, while the road is accountable for about 0.5%. A table int the same Report gives number of traffic accidents by factor for the years 1986-90. Black spots along the road network were studied and remedial actions recommended in said report as well as in a special report on black spots. The Consultant has designed a proposed Accident Investigation Form that combines the merits of the Form designed by TRRL and that currently used by the ROP. It has been put under their disposal for consideration. - The Consultant has submitted detailed recommendations and program of work for Traffic Safety Education including education for children, various age groups, adults and traffic violators. 2.34 Highway User Costs. The Consultant submitted the Highway User Cost Update - 1992. The software utilized in the preparation thereof is based on the original RTlM2 program, which the consultant obtained under license from TRRL. 2.35 Cost Accounting. Earlier studies and reports prepared by the Technical Assistance for the Maintenance Management System, showed the need to establish a Cost Accounting System for DGR to assist in budgeting and control of financial affairs of various road maintenance activities. In January 1985, a manual Cost Accounting System, developed by the Consultant, was put into implementation. In 1986, and due to budget constraints, the Cost Accounting Section was closed, and the implementation of said system stopped. 2.36 During this latest technical assistance consultancy agreement, a computerized Cost Accounting System was developed with emphasis to improve upon the previous manual Highway Maintenance Cost Accounting System. 2.37 In particular, the objectives of the Cost Accounting System were to obtain on a continuous basis, up-to-date unit costs of each of the DGR activities. 2.38 Forms suitable for the function of the workcenters and workshops along with user manuals have been prepared and distributed. These forms cover detailed monthly records of labor, materials and equipment used for each activity, as well as the productivity during the month. 2.39 The implementation of the Cost Accounting System has been slower than the other subsystems of the Highway Maintenance management System, basically because of the unavailability of staff dedicated for the system. One Omani clerk has been appointed to organize and follow-up on  - 20 - the input forms to be collected. The implementation of the system is expected to accelerate upon hiring more accounting staff toward the second half of this year (1993). Training DGR Personnel 2.40 Omani Engineers. The MOC/DGR have recently employed five (5) Omani new graduate engineers mainly during 1992 and are in the process of employing more. Each of the five engineers have been assigned as a counterpart to one of the Technical Assistance experts in order to get on-the-job training and guidance, so as to take over such responsibilities in the future. 2.41 The posts that the new DGR engineers were assigned to, and areas of training received so far, are as follows: - Highway Design Engineer: He is being trained by the Technical Assistance Highway Design Engineer on aspects and principles of highway design. He participates in the review of road designs and tender documents prepared by other consultants as a member of the Technical Review Committee. Since his joining the DGR, he has already attended two training seminars in Jordan on highway design. - Highway Pavement Engineer: He is being trained by the Technical Assistance Highway Pavement Engineer on aspects of the Pavement Management System. He participates in the follow-up of other consultants' current studies for the rehabilitation of Nizwa-Thumrait and Batinah (Old Carriageway) roads, including participation with the Technical Review Committee in reviewing related designs and tender documents. Since his joining the DRG, he attended a training seminar in Jordan on highway safety. * Bridge Engineer: He is being trained by the Technical Assistance Bridge engineer on aspects and principles of bridge design. He participates in the review of bridge designs and tender documents prepared by other consultants, such as those for the two bridges in Sur-Al Ayjah Road project. He is also being trained on and already participated in the implementation of Bridge Management System, including the preparation of bridge inventory, bridge condition inspection, and inputting of data. Since his joining the DRG, he attended a training seminar in Jordan on bridge design. - Mechanical Engineer: He is being trained by the Technical Assistance Mechanical Engineer on aspects of mechanical engineering related to the DGR equipment and workshops. In particular, the Equipment Management System where he has participated in collecting the technical data needed for the equipment inventory as well as in inputting the data.  - 21 - Computer Engineer: He is being trained by the Technical Assistance computer experts, as detailed in "Omani Computer Staff" below. 2.42 In general, the MOC gives training utmost importance in order to properly equip the Omani personnel and facilitate their taking over responsibilities of running the work in the future. To achieve this goal, the MOC envisages great stress on on-the-job training, organizing in-house training seminars, participation in in-country relevant seminars, and sending DGR staff to attend different training programs abroad. 2.43 Omani Computer Staff. The computer/GIS Section of DGR currently comprises five Omani personnel, under the supervision of one full time Technical Assistance member and one part time Technical Assistance member. The Omani staff include one Computer Engineer, two graduates with computer programming diplomas, one person with commercial secondary school diploma specializing in computers, and one computer technician. All the Omani staff joined DGR during 1992 with little or no previous experience. 2.44 The computer staff is considered as the driving support staff for the Highway Maintenance Management System data management and implementation. The staff is also considered as the support staff to other DGR Departments for desk top application software, word processing, spreadsheet applications and computer graphics. 2.45 Training of the computer staff is a major ongoing task undertaken by the consultant. Current training areas are: - A comprehensive orientation to computer hardware and software and day-to- day training in the use of specific and desk top publishing software applications. - A presentation of the computer as a tool in DGR operations. - A detailed actual implementation and data input of the HMMS and its subsystems. - Attending seminars provided by local vendors. - Computer tenders evaluation. - GIS activities. 2.46 The training program consists of lectures and workshops sessions, lectures serve as the framework of the training subject, whereas workshops deal with the exercises, project assignments, queries and specific subject discussions. 2.47 Examples of elemental topics covered are: Foxpro DBMS, HMMS, Networking, DOS, Windows, Formtool, Harvard Graphics, Quatro Pro and Lotus 123, Wordperfect, Arabword,  - 22 - and Omnipage software applications using the scanners. 2.48 Example of advanced topics covered are: Sun Operating System (UNIX), Oracle database, Arclnfo, Autocad, Roadcalc, Map Scanning and Vectorization (raster to vector conversion), and HMMS < - > GIS interface. 2.49 As a result of this training to date, the DGR Omani staff in the Purchasing and Stores Sections, who have received training are now fully operating them, and the previous manual procedures are being phased out. Summary and Conclusions 2.50 General Performance. In general, the project was being implemented quite satisfactorily, although budget constraints caused a slower performance and an overrun in the closing date of 2.5 years (62.5%). 2.51 A complete customized and computerized Highway Maintenance Management System, as well as Purchasing and Stores Systems, were developed and are under implementation. 2.52 A Follow-up Committee - comprising representatives from the Development Council, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Ministry of Communications and the Directorate General of Roads - was formed to follow-up matters related to the Third Highway Maintenance Project (Loan 2631-OM) Agreement. 2.53 Towards the end of the project, US$7,985,000 had to be cancelled from the original loan amount of US$30,000,000 mainly due to the fact that rehabilitation of Ibri-Dank Road could not have been finished by the loan closing date (December 31, 1993). 2.54 The World Bank Role. As for previous loans, the World Bank has, in providing this loan and its disbursements, provided financial assistance. The main and more effective role, however, was the World Bank's guidance and supervision - through its mission visits to Oman or its headquarters contacts - towards developing and implementing the objectives of this project, especially in the technical aspects. 2.55 Special thanks and appreciation go to the World Bank mission members, who have been constantly visiting the Sultanate of Oman for many years to supervise this project as well as the previous World Bank loan financed projects. Their guidance, especially in enhancing the technical and institutional development was most valuable. 2.56 Future Needs. As the DGR has recently employed Omani graduate engineers and will be employing more on the near future, and as implementation of the developed Highway Maintenance Management System is starting, the following needs are envisaged as vital to prevent any retreat in the steps already achieved. These needs, inter alia, are:  - 23 - 1. Continue implementation of the developed systems. Pavement Management System (PMS), Bridge Management System (BMS), Cost Accounting System (CAS), Equipment Management System (EMS), Traffic Management System (TMS), and Purchase Order System (POS). 2. Arabize systems where needed. 3. Link and automate other DGR Departments such as Technical Affairs, Achieves, ongoing project management and scheduling, etc. 4. Implement the GIS system installed. Develop an interface with the Highway Maintenance Management System (HMMS); coordinate efforts/interface with Supreme Committee for Town Planning (SCTP) and other Ministries; and develop databases needed for the National Database Management System (NDBMS). 5. Link MOC and Southern Region Road Department with the computer and GIS network at DGR. 6. Continue in-house training for all departments as more Omani engineers and staff become available. 7. Continue conducting Sultanate-wide conferences (twice a year) for workcenters, other ministries and public awareness of the MCO achievements and new development. 8. Training abroad should be encouraged at all times for reasons of polishing the engineers' experience and incentive to efficient implementation. Also, inviting experts from abroad as lecturers for conducting workshops on specific topics (not contradicting local experience) should be encouraged. Alternatively, a technology transfer program could be established as a way to achieve training and technology transfer. 9. Build the MOC/DGR engineering library with frequent updates to facilitate easy references and obtaining technical data. Organize all reports previously submitted to DGR (Technical Development Reports) in one section in the library.  - 24 - FIGURE 1. THE MAIN ROAD NETWORK .NS OR 01 EDITION 4 SULTANATE OF OMAN FEB5 1993 1 51 54-\, _> f~5 56' \ W 0 SU 4tQ4--rJ5Vri