Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 12632 PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPPINES SECTOR PROGRAM FOR ELEMENTARY EDUCATION (LOAN 2030-PH) DECEM!BER 29, 1993 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Philippine Peso (P) US$1.00 = P 7.5 (At appraisal, February 1981) US$1.00 = P 22.50 (At final disbursement, August 1989) GLOSSARY DECS/MECS Department/Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports EDPITAF Educational Development Projects Implementation Task Force EMIS Education Management Information System IMC Instructional Materials Corporation IMDC Instructional Materials Development Center MIS Management Information System NESC New Elementary School Curriculum OPS Office of the Planning Service PRODED Program for Decentralized Educational Development STR Student/Teacher Ratio TBS Textbooks Board Secretariat GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 SCHOOL YEAR June - March FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation December 29, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Performance Audit Report on Philippines Sector Program for Elementary Education (Loan 2030-PH) Attached is the Performance Audit Report on Philippines - Sector Program for Elementary Education (Loan 2030-PH) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department. The Bank's support for the Government's 10-year educational development plan included financing of school building programs in each of the country's regions, as well as nationwide subprojects such as the provision of textbooks and teacher training. The Program was implemented during a period of prolonged economic and political difficulties. Nevertheless, the outcome is rated as satisfactory, most Program targets having been exceeded albeit with substantial implementation delays. Similarly, the institutional impact is rated as substantial even though educational performance indicators have lagged behind the ambitious appraisal forecasts. In view of the Government's strong support for elementary education, sustainability of Program achievements is considered likely. The Bank continues to assist the subsector through the Second Elementary Education Project (Loan 3244-PH). Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPPINES SECTOR PROGRAM FOR ELEMENTARY EDUCATION (LOAN 2030-PH) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE ............................................................ i BASIC DATA SHEET .................................................. iii EVALUATION SUMMARY .............................................. vii I. PROGRAM BACKGROUND ................................... 1 1. Introduction ............................................. 1 2. Program Objectives and Activities ............................. 2 3. Program Organization ...................................... 3 H. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ................................ 3 III. OUTCOMES ................................................ 5 1. The Implementation Record .................................. 5 2. Extent of System Improvements ............................... 7 IV. FINDINGS, A POTENTIAL ISSUE AND LESSONS .................. 21 APPENDIX A ............................................... 25 TABLES 3.1 Volume of Project Activities (Appraised and Actual) .............. 6 3.2 Elementary Education - Performance Indicators, Baseline, Appraised and Actual Figures ............................. 8 3.3 Annual Growth Rates in Elementary Enrollments, 1981-1992, by Type of School ...................................... 9 3.4 Mean Scores in Achievement Tests for Grade 4 and 6 Students, by Subject Matter, 1975/76 and 1986/87 .............. 11 3.5 Regional Distribution of Elementary Education Enrollments and Expenditure (1979/80 and 1985/86) ...................... 14 3.6 Regional Variations in Selected Education System Indicators, 1982 and 1990 ................................. 15 3.7 Average Unit Costs for Textbooks, by Component, 1991-92 .............................................. 19 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. -1- PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPPINES SECTOR PROGRAM FOR ELEMENTARY EDUCATION (LOAN 2030-PH) PREFACE This is a Performance Audit Report (PAR) on the Sector Program for Elementary Education in the Philippines. This Program was supported by a Bank Loan (Ln. 2030-PH) in the amount of US$100 million, approved in July 1981. At the request of the Government, US$19.5 million were cancelled in December 1986. The Loan was closed with two years' delay on December 28, 1988, and a remaining balance of nearly US$0.5 million was cancelled at the time of the final disbursement (August 28, 1989). The PAR is based on the Project Completion Report (PCR) (OED Report No. 9923 dated September 25, 1991); the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR No. 3423a-PH dated May 29, 1981); the President's Report (No. P-3085-PH); the Loan Agreement dated August 25, 1981; project files, and government documents including the Project Completion Report--Program for Decentralized Educational Development (PRODED). Additional information was gained through discussions with Bank staff and government officials involved in the project, the latter being contacted during a mission to the Philippines in November/December 1992 which also included field visits to local educational offices, individual schools and other institutions. The PAR is in broad agreement with the findings of the PCR which could be confirmed (and emerging trends be verified) with the help of more recent data which were not available at the time of PCR preparation. The PCR also discusses in some detail questions of educational inequalities, aspects of institution building including management information systems, and the provision of textbooks. The OED staff wishes to express his appreciation to the government officials and his colleagues in the Bank who freely gave of their time to discuss the project with him. Following standard OED procedures, copies of the draft PAR were sent to the Borrower on November 12, 1993 for comments. The comments received from one borrower agency are reproduced as Appendix A. w - Ill - PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPPINES SECTOR PROGRAM FOR ELEMENTARY EDUCATION (LOAN 2030-PH) BASIC DATA SHEET KEY PROJECT DATA Item Original Plan Actual Total project cost (US$ million) 448.1 378.8 (Underrun) (in percent) - (15.5) Loan amount (US$ million) 100.0 100.0 Disbursed 100.0 80.0 Cancelled - 20.0 Date physical components completed 12/85 12/88 Proportion completed by above date 100.0 32.0 Proportion of time overrun (in percent) - 60.0 Institutional performance Good Satisfactory CUMUIATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (US$ million) FY 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 Appraisal Estimate 1.5 11.0 25.0 45.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Actual 2.7 aJ 3.5 5.7 13.5 30.5 49.4 65.9 76.5 80.0 Actual as percent of Appraisal Estimate 179 32 23 30 34 49 66 77 80 a/ Includes US$2.6 million deposit into Special Account. - Iv - MISSION DATA Month/ No. of Estimated Specializations Performance Year Persons No. of Days Represented /8 Ratings /b Identification/ Reconnaissance 12/78 1 2 EP 03/79 1 2 EP Preparation 0979 1 5 EP Preappraisal I 11/79- 5 82 EC,GE,EV,MA,EP 12n9 II 03/80 1 3 AR Appraisal I 07/80 2 15 AR,EV II 09/80 4 71 EC,GE,PD,PU 10/80 Post-appraisal I 02/81 2 20 EC,PU II 03/81 1 10 EV Subtotal 210 Supervision I 10/81- 3 6 AR,GE,AD 1 11/81 II 06/82- 4 20 GE,PD,AR,EC 1 07/82 111 10/82 2 6 AR,EC 1 IV 02/83 1 2 GE n.a. V 09/83- 2 16 GE,EV 2 10/83 VI 06/84 3 17 TE,EC,LO 2 VII 09/84 1 4 LO n.a. VIII 10/84 2 8 GE,TE 2 IX 02/85 2 4 GE,TE 2 X 06/85 1 4 GE 2 XI 10/85 1 5 AR 2 XII 01/86 1 3 GE 2 XIII 06/86 1 5 EC 2 XIV 10/86 3 15 GE,AR,TE 2 XV 03/87 4 20 TE,AR,GE,EC 2 XVI 10/87 2 10 GE,EC 2 XVII 04/88 2 4 GE,EP 2 XVIII 09/88 1 3 PD 2 Subtotal 154 Completion (PCR) 03/89 1 2 PD 05/89 1 2 PD TOTAL 368 /a AD = Administrative Assistant, AR = Architect, EC - Economist, EP = Education Planner, EV- Evaluation Specialist, GE - General Educator, LO = Loan Officer, MA - Management Specialist, PD = Procurement/Disbursement Specialist, PU - Education Publisher, TE - Technical Educator. /b 1 - problem-free or minor problems; 2 - moderate problems; 3 - major problems. STAFF INPUTS (in staff weeks) Stage of Project FY Cycle 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Totals Identification to Appraisal 3.9 5.5 3.6 58.0 44.9 115.9 Appraisal to negotiations 2.3 27.9 30.2 Negotiations to Board Approval 11.3 11.3 Supervision 1.3 7.7 7.3 12.3 9.7 11.8 16.6 12.9 8.8 88.4 Other a/ 0.1 2.4 2.9 2.7 10.5 0.1 2.0 1.2 2.4 0.6 1.4 0.1 1.0 4.0 12.0 43.4 Totals 4.0 7.9 6.5 63.0 95.9 7.8 9.3 13.5 12.1 12.4 1&0 13.0 9.8 4.0 12.0 289.2 a! Includes Project Implementation Review, Project Completion Report and miscellaneous administrative work. ALLOCATIONS OF LOAN PROCEEDS (in US$ million) Appraisal Estimates Actual Final (May 1981) (Aug. 1989) Civil works 0.0 8.3 Equipment, materials and paper 35.0 30.4 Furniture 15.0 6.1 Instructional materials 15.0 12.5 Staff development 13.0 13.7 Consultants' Services/Fellowships 9.0 7.4 Special Account 3.0 1.6 Unallocated /(cancelled) 10.0 (20.0) Totals 100.0 100.0 - vi - OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Plan Actual First mention in files - 09/78 Appraisal 06/80 7/80;9/80 Negotiations 08/80 05/81 Board Presentation 11/80 06/81 Loan Agreement signing 12/80 08/81 Effectiveness 03/81 11/81 Closing Date 12/86 12/88 Borrower Republic of the Philippines Executing Agency Dept. of Education, Culture and Sports a Follow-on Project: Name Second Elementary Education Project Loan Number Ln. 3244-PH Amount US$200 million Loan Effectiveness Date August 30, 1990 Fiscal Year of Borrower Jan. 1 - Dec. 31 aj During implementation, the name of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports was changed to Department of Education, Culture and Sports. The terms Ministry/Depart- ment and Ministry/Secretary have been used interchangeably in this Report. - Vii - PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPPINES SECTOR PROGRAM FOR ELEMENTARY EDUCATION (LOAN 2030-PH) EVALUATION SUMMARY Introduction administration and an increased allocation of funds for specific inputs, notably facilities, 1. In the late 1970s the Government of furniture and equipment; textbooks and other the Philippines started to reassess its materials; and staff development. development concepts and strategies. Faced with growth limits in export agriculture, public resource constraints and growing unemploy- Program Objectives and Content ment, the Government began to put a stronger emphasis on self-sufficiency in food production 5. The Bank decided to support the and energy, agricultural diversification and Government's 10-year program through a small- and medium-scale industrial enterprises, Loan (Ln. 2030-PH) in the amount of US$100 all with a view to create employment and million. This lending operation was to finance alleviate poverty. 60 subprojects planned for the period 1982-85. Most of them (52) were one-year school 2. In the field of human resources, building programs in each of the country's 13 parallel developments emphasized elementary regions. They were complemented by a few education which was seen as essential for nationwide subprojects in areas such as pursuing the new macroeconomic orientation. textbook provision and teacher training. The organization of the program involved a 3. Elementary education, which had number of government agencies below the reached a relatively high enrollment level (84 central level as well as outside the Ministry of percent) by 1978, suffered from three major Education (e.g., the Ministry of Public Works); shortcomings, viz.: a certain degree of complexity was thus inevitable. - geographic inequalities in access to education; Implementation Experience - an inefficient schooling process with high 6. Program implementation experienced dropout and repeater rates; and delays early on. The above-mentioned administrative complexities were compounded - low student achievement, by cumbersome procedures for procurement and funds release, and by an extended period 4. In 1979 the Government developed a of budgetary stringency and of econorc and 10-year education development plan to address political instability which culminated in the these shortcomings, which included changes in 1986 Revolution and the emergence of a financing policies and educational democratic Government. -viI - 7. Following two Program restructuring Elementary Education Project of 1990 is efforts (in 1985 and 1986) which included a contributing to the necessary physical invest- cancellation of US$19.5 million of Loan funds ments (particularly in classrooms, school and changes in both the scope of disbursement furniture and textbooks) through a Loan of and relevant disbursement percentages, the US$200 million. These two factors bode well Loan was closed, after two one-year exten- for the sustainability of the achievements made sions, at the end of 1988 and another US$0.5 under the Program. million cancelled, at the time of final disburse- ment (August 1989). Findings Results 11. The project experience provides four lessons: 8. The program surpassed in nearly all categories the investment targets set at (a) In projects aiming at improvements of the appraisal. However, the hoped-for improve- educ;ation process, it would be preferable for ments in the education process (reflected in Bank staff to use ranges of expected outcomes such indicators as dropout rates or student/ rather than point estimates. This would avoid teacher ratios) were slow to materialize; only suggesting a degree of precision which the in the post-completion period did some of the present knowledge of the education process is relevant indicators show noticeable improve- unable to ensure. ments. This discrepancy between appraisal estimates and actual outcomes, however, is (b) In addressing inequalities in the education largely due to unrealistic expectations. system, input and performance inequalities should be clearly distinguished. Generally, the 9. Overall, the program outcome can be latter would be more difficult and time- considered as satisfactory. A significant consuming to overcome, hence the importance amount of institution building took place of adequate levels of recurrent funding in the during the implementation period, both at the post-completion period to maintain the local level and with regard to major entities, momentum of the previous investments. such as the Ministry's Planning Service and its management information system and the (c) When planning the spatial allocation of Instructional Materials Corporation (IMC), the investment funds, general formulae measuring country's textbook agency which had already various aspects of inequality fail to give been successfully assisted by a previous Bank adequate guidance. They cannot substitute for project (Third Education - Textbooks - Project a detailed exercise in school mapping and of 1976, supported by Loan 1224T-PH). physical resources inventory. Sustainability (d) The Philippines appear to have become largely self-sufficient in technical expertise in 10. The Government is facing an immense the field of education. However, it is not clear task: to meet, in a situation of severely to what extent this pool of in-country know- constrained resources, the dual challenge of ledge is being tapped. Future project and accommodating a steadily increasing student sector work should promote the effective population and of further improving elemen- utilization of relevant skills and monitor tary education. However, it is the declared remaining specific shortfalls and emerging new policy of the Government to give elementary capabilities. education top priority. This government commitment is supported by continued assistance from the World Bank: the Second PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT PHILIPPINES SECTOR PROGRAM FOR ELEMENTARY EDUCATION (LOAN 2030-PH) I. PROGRAM BACKGROUND 1. Introduction 1.1 Towards the end of the 1970s, development concepts and strategies in the Philippines started to undergo some basic changes. In the face of obvious limits to further agricultural export production, of public resource constraints and of a worsening unemployment problem, a shift in emphasis took place, away from selective output growth in agriculture, traditional exports and large- scale industry, towards greater self-sufficiency in food production and energy, supported by agricultural diversification and the forming of small- and medium-size industries, all with a view to create employment and alleviate poverty. 1.2 In the field of human resources development, this strategy was paralleled by a growing concern with grass-root services, particularly elementary education. Effective education was seen as essential for attaining the new development objectives. 1.3 Elementary schooling, despite having reached a relatively high enrollment rate (84 percent in 1978) for the relevant age group of 7 to 12 years, was seen as suffering from three major shortcomings: (a) regional and local disparities in access to education; (b) inefficiencies in the schooling process, reflected in high dropout and repetition rates; and (c) low student achievement showing up in performance tests. 1.4 The reasons for these shortcomings were seen in financial policies and administrative processes that reinforced rather than countermanded regional inequalities, in a lack of appropriate support services in general and educational planning in particular, and in an uneven and on balance insufficient endowment of the regions with teachers, classrooms and instructional materials. 1.5 In 1979 the Government developed a 10-year education development program covering the decade 1981-1990 which was meant to reduce disparities and improve quality and effi- ciency in elementary education. It included revised policies for finance and management, improvements in administration and planning, and more development funds for specific inputs, viz.: curriculum development; textbooks and other materials; facilities and equipment; staff development; and sector evaluation. 1.6 Through the 1960s and 1970s, the Bank had supported educational development in the Philippines through six operations with a total amount of US$108.7 million. Four of these -2- projects focussed on the development of professional, managerial and technical manpower for agricul- ture, fisheries and industry, and the other two on the strengthening of elementary education through the provision of textbooks, educational radio and in-service teacher training. 1.7 The new educational policy of the Government was in congruence with the Bank's new Basic Needs approach, hence the latter's decision to undertake a project that would assist a four- year time-slice of the Government's 10-year program. The proposed Loan of US$100 million repre- sented a sharp increase in the Bank's support to the Philippines education sector, almost equalling the cumulative sectoral lending undertaken so far. 2. Program Objectives and Activities 1.8 The Bank's lending operation shared the objectives of the larger government program to improve student access to, and achievement in elementary education, particularly in disadvantaged and under-performing regions. 1.9 It had the following specific aims: (a) in the area of educational policies, to - change the allocation of development expenditures in favor of disadvantaged t2gions; - reach a better balance between personnel and non-personnel items in recurrent budgets; - reduce the teacher/class (and thereby increase the teacher/student)./ ratio to achieve a more effective use of teachers; and - modify student admissions and progression policies to enhance participation (enrollment) and promotion rates; (b) in the area of system management, to - modify the respective responsibilities and functions of central and regional offices in charge of elementary education towards greater decentralization; - enhance the role of the Ministry's Planning Office and to create regional planning units; and - give the Textbooks Board Secretariat (TBS) a permanent institutional basis with a mandate to provide textbooks to students in public schools; (c) in the area of system performance, to - introduce a revised curriculum, improve teaching methods and instructional materials; 1/ Mainly through a diminished use of subject matter teachers in the last two grades (5 and 6). -3- - work towards a more equitable regional distribution of teachers and facilities; - offer staff development programs for central and regional staff responsible for elementary education, and for school principals and teachers; and - introduce systematic monitoring and evaluation. 1.10 The Bank Loan was to contribute to the financing of about 60 specific subprojects scheduled for the years 1982-85. The bulk of these projects (both in numbers and the amount of Loan funds committed to them) concerned physical investments: 52 subprojects (one for each of the- -then--13 regions of the country and for each of the four years of implementation) to provide facil- ities, furniture and equipment; one staff development subproject for each of the four years; and one single subproject each in the areas of curriculum development; provision of instructional materials; teacher supply; and sector evaluation. 3. Program Organization 1.11 The organizational structure for program implementation consisted of several layers. The Minister of Education had the final say in approving subprojects. He was assisted by the Program Executive Authority (headed by the Deputy Minister and including the heads of the relevant branches of the Ministry) concerned with general management and subproject review. They were in turn supported by the work of the technical staff responsible for the preparation of the national (centrally managed) subprojects; appraisal and supervision of the regional (decentralized) facilities subprojects; and program evaluation. The regional subprojects were prepared, implemented and monitored by Regional Management Groups under the Ministry's Regional Offices. At the proper stages in the implementation process, the Ministries of Public Works (through its Regional Offices) and of Budget and the Audit Commission provided assistance in the areas of financial control and procurement. 1.12 The Bank had already in the course of its preparation work, reviewed in depth several of the centralized subprojects. For the remainder, appraisal was to follow procedures and criteria agreed between the Government and the Bank, with provision for periodic reviews by Bank missions. 1.13 The Bank's role in implementation and supervision was to be an indirect one: it would participate in annual discussions on relevant sector policies, review progress of the entire program and, on a sample basis, of three or four regional and two national subprojects, with a total of about one quarter of all subprojects undergoing such a review over the four-year implementation period. In addition, Bank missions were to scrutinize, with decreasing frequency, subproject appraisal reports to monitor adherence to agreed standards. II. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 2.1 Program implementation ran into delays early on because of factors which were mostly recognized at appraisal but whose weight seems to have been underestimated. The first was an organizational structure which the SAR had considered effective (SAR, para. 4.05) but which was nonetheless of great complexity, perhaps inevitably so, given the wide coverage of the various program components, the geographic dispersion of the physical investments, and the necessary involvement of different government levels. In most of the previous education projects, implementation had been in the hands of the Educational Development Projects Implementation -4- Task Force (EDPITAF), a specialized semi-autonomous agency set up in 1972. Over the years, EDPITAF had acquired a considerable depth and width of expertise both in project planning and implementation. By contrast, the Sector Program involved numerous Ministry of Education offices at central and regional levels whose common characteristic was a lack of implementation expe- rience.2/ 2.2 The second delaying factor was a constrained budget. The two projects that had been completed by the time of appraising the Sector Program had both experienced difficulties with the timely availability of local finance (SAR, para. 1.06). A similar funding problem was to affect the implementation of the Sector Program. 2.3 Thirdly, and related to the second problem, was the slowness of the procurement process. The experience from previous projects had shown the importance of a sufficient lead time for project preparation (SAR, para. 1.06). Consequently, at the time of Board presentation (June 1981), the Government had already made ready for implementation half of the facilities subprojects (i.e., seven) scheduled for 1982; proposed and appraised prototype courses for the four training subprojects and drafted standard contracts covering the fellowship program specialized services; appraised about ten proposals for specific studies (seven of which were scheduled for 1982); and completed the design of the performance monitoring system (SAR, para. 4.19). In addition, standard designs and contract documents for facilities and equipment/furniture purchases had been developed. The appraisal of all physical investments and other activities scheduled for 1982 was to be completed by September 1981 to permit an early start. Similarly, the revised curriculum (on whose availability depended the timely start of the textbooks and teacher development components) was to be ready in draft form to permit a one-year experimentation prior to its introduction in 1983 (SAR, para. 4.19). 2.4 However, in spite of these preparations, delays in project implementation occurred almost from the beginning. They were caused to a large extent by the complexity and resulting slow- ness of relevant government procedures. For most of the implementation period, contracts exceeding R 2 million had to be approved by a Cabinet Committee on Contracts and by the President's Office, with major delays ensuing. It was only after the abolition of this Committee and the raising of the R 2 million ceiling to R 10 million in 1986 that the flow of project activities accelerated noticeably (PCR, para. 1. 11).-3] 2.5 The above-mentioned budget constraints during most of the implementation period compounded the deleterious effects of existing fund release and payment procedures. Even the establishment of a Special Account, usually an effective instrument for expediting disbursements, added yet another impediment to implementation as payments out of the Account were subject to a set of time-consuming government procedures. Eventually direct payment by the Bank to suppliers and contractors, being the most straightforward payment procedure, became the preferred vehicle for the transfer of project funds (PCR, para. 1.12). 2/ It should be added that, during the ear.y upstream work, the Projects Division had emphasized the scarcity of implementation capabilities and advocated a pilot program approach in one or two regions, whereas the Programs Division preferred a comprehensive and country-wide effort. The files do not reveal the reasons why eventually the second approach prevailed. Bank staff involved in the early phases of the Program explained this change of mind by the combined push of a large lending program and the pull of government requests for a comprehensive operation in the subsector, regardless of administrative bottlenecks 2/ The processing time for paper and printing contracts, for example, fell from a wide range of between six and fourteen months (which in itself was an indication of the unpredictability of the approval process) to about four weeks. -5- 2.6 The early realization that the volume of physical investments and other activities planned under the Program was not possible within the time span foreseen at appraisal led to its restructuring first in 1985 and then again in 1986. In essence these modifications entailed a curtail- ment of the program size (reflected in a cancellation of US$19.5 million of loan funds), a widening of both the extent (disbursement percentages) and scope (inclusion of civil works as an eligible disbursement category and, eventually, two one-year extensions of the Closing Date. At the time of closing the project accounts (August 28, 1989), another US$0.5 million was cancelled. 2.7 As a result of these changes, total project costs fell from the appraisal estimate of US$448 million to US$380.4 million with the Loan financing a share of 21 percent instead of the 22 percent foreseen at appraisal. III. OUTCOMES 1. The Implementation Record 3.1 Even within the more modest financial framework agreed in the 1985/86 restructuring, the Program succeeded in meeting or exceeding most of its physical objectives. This is a worthwhile achievement, given the economic adversity the country found itself in during most of the implementation period, and the political upheaval which culminated in the 1986 Revolution and the emergence of a democratic government. The strong backing of education and human resources developmert in general from the new Government, reflected in increased budget allocations for the sector, contributed to the satisfactory conclusion of the Loan. 3.2 Table 3.1 summarizes the appraisal estimates and actual extent of Program activities, based on pp. 33-35 of the PCR. The observed surpassing of most physical targets came about through a combination of factors: a steady strengthening of the US$ vis-A-vis the national currency over the implementation period; a reduction of specifications (e.g., in the size of classrooms by almost 25 percent), and a conservative costing at the preparation/appraisal stage. Table 3.1 does not contain comparative figures in the areas of curriculum development and research and studies undertaken, since these activities do not lend themselves to meaningful quantitative comparison. Part II of the PCR (prepared by the Borrower) gives a good assessment of these components (paras. 2.16 ff.). They were seen as valuable program elements, a view with which the evaluator agrees. -6- Table 3.1: Volume of Project Activities (Appraised and Actual) Civil Works Appraisal Actual Classrooms New 44,000 a/ 48,532 b/ Repair/Rehabilitation (not specified) 9,751 Multi-purpose workshops 2,608 toilets - 863 Regional Training Centers 13 14 c/ Textbook Warehouses 26 26 4/ Equipment/Furniture (not specified) 110,000 chairs 20,000 tables 600,000 desks e/ Textbook Provision Textbooks 11,000,000 54,000,000 Workbooks - 29,000,000 Teacher guides 6,000,000 2,600,000 Supplementary materials 500,000 758,000 Charts - 186,000 Training Activities (Numbers and types of participants) 14,000 principals 18,410 principals 125,000 teachers 272,303 teachers 20,000 special training 2,580 prof. staff 4,530 prof. staff 125 specialized staff 384 specialized staff Fellowships 280 staff/1,959 months 1,214 staff/1,792 months a/ 11,000 p.a. over 4 years. b/ Ca. 7,000 p.a. over 7 years. Plus conversion of one existing facility into a National Educational Learning Center. d/ Plus annex to the central warehouse. e] Produced in 1986-87 under local employment generation project. -7- 2. Extent of System Improvements 3.3 Through the Program the Government and the Bank hoped to improve the performance parameters of the elementary education system. The main indicators used to gauge the system's performance were: - enrollments; - participation rates;4/ - cohort survival rates; / - student achievement on standardized tests; - student teacher ratios; - budget shares for salary/non-salary expenditures; and - regional inequalities manifest in regional variations in specific performance indicators. 3.4 Table 3.2 compares the changes in various performance indicators as estimated at appraisal with actual outcomes: I/ The 7-12 years old enrolled in grades I to 6 as a percentage of the entire age group (also referred to as the net enrollment rate). 51 Present enrollments in grade 6 as a percentage of enrollments in grade 1 rive years ago. -8- Table 3.2: E'nentary Education - Performance Indicators, Baseline, Appraised and Actual Figures (in percent unless otherwise defined) Baseline Appraised Actual W Post Completion Indicator 1979 1985 1990 1988 1990 Enrollments (million) 7.8 9.3 10.1 9.5 10.4 Participation rates for 7-12 years age group 84.0 n.a. 90.0 92.0 95.0 Cohort survival rates (grades 1 through 6) 65.0 n.a. 78.0 66.0 68.0 Student/teacher ratios 31.0 n.a. 36.0 33.0 35.0 Share of teacher salaries in recurrent budget 98.0 n.a. 93.0 89.0 84.0 bl Achievement tests: mean scores (inax. = 100) 48.0 55.0 63.0 47.3 c/ n.a. a/ Year of Loan Closing b/ 1992 c/ Grade 6 Sources: SAR, PCR, and DECS data. 3.5 In most of the performance categories, improvements have taken place, although not to the extent anticipated at appraisal. It should be emphasized that the "targets" established at that time were not goals in the sense of postulated outcomes of processes whose mechanics were fully understood. As in other contemporary Bank education projects which tried to chart paths to educational improvements, these "targets" were rather simple series of year-to-year extrapolations towards desired levels of performance. However, such development processes are invariably much more complicated; once certain performance levels are reached, further improvements occur at diminishing rates (and at ever increasing marginal costs). To mention one example: to enroll the last 10 percent of youngsters in primary school is considerably more difficult and costly (in terms of unit costs) than the other 90 percent. Thus, any specific claims as to what improved outcomes (rather than inputs) a project can be expected to provide, should be received with this reservation in mind. The next seven sections deal with the individual performance indicators listed in para. 3.3. -9- 3.6 Enrollments. Between 1981 and 1992, 65 total elementary enrollments increased from 8.5 million to 10.7 million students, or by 2.1 percent per year. With a growth from 0.45 to 0.79 million, private schools (which were not included in the Sector Program) expanded much faster, at 5.3 percent per year,2/ than those run by the Government which increased their enrollments from 8.1 million to 9.9 million students, or by 1.9 percent per year. Thus, over the entire period, total enrollment growth appears to have slightly lagged behind the growth of the relevant age group (the 7-12 years old group, which can be assumed to have experienced a growth rate not much different from the total population growth of about 2.4 percent per year observed during the 1980s). 3.7 However, a disaggregation of these data shows three distinct periods: in the beginning, four years of very slow growth, then, following the 1986 Revolution, four years of more rapid enrollment increases which brought distinct improvements in enrollment levels and finally, in the three years 1989-92, again a slowdown, although not to the level of the initial period. It is worth- while mentioning that without the vigorous growth of private enrollments throughout these eleven years, progress would have been even more modest. Table 3-3: Annual Growth Rates in Elementary Enrollments, 1981-1992, by Type of School (in percent) Type of School 1981-1985 1985-1989 1989-1992 (1981-1992) Government 0.97 3.43 1.05 (1.88) Private 3.20 7.75 4.88 (5.30) All Schools 1.09 4.45 1.31 (2.09) Source: Calculated from MECS enrollment data. These national averages conceal considerable regional variations in annual enrollment growth rates, ranging from about 2.8 percent for the National Capital Region and Mindanao to 1.2 percent for the Visayas. 3.8 Participation rates. The participation rates between 1982 and 1990 (data for more recent years are unavailable) have remained essentially static (94.2 and 95.3 percent, respectively). However, these rates (and even more so the disaggregated regional figures) appear to have an 6/ The school year in the Philippines runs from June to March. In this Report, usually only the starting year is being mentioned, i.e., "1992" refers to the school year that began in June 1992 and ended in March 1993. 2/ The fact that over 80 percent of the increase in private enrollments during the years 1981 to 1992 occurred in the National Capital Region and the two adjoining regions (III and IV) suggests that private schools filled a gap brought about by large-scale migration to the Manila metropolitan area and which the Government could not close on short notice. - 10 - upward bias. / The national average for 1990 of 95.26 percent (which refers to Government schools only) increases to 102.2 percent when private school enrollments are added--a result which violates the definition of the participation rate (FN 3). With about 10,000 rural neighborhoods (barangays) without an elementary school within walking distance,2/ any participation rate close to 100 percent would thus invite doubts. A more realistic estimate by the Department's Planning Service puts the participation rate in the 85 to 90 percent range--still a respectable enrollment level considering the country's topography and its level of GNP per capita. 3.9 The anomalies observed in the participation rate could stem from inaccuracies in either the underlying population data or in the enrollment statistics, or both. Since the population data are anchored in the census figures obtained at 10-year intervals, it is likely that inaccuracies will grow the more one moves away from the baseline data, because of unforeseen changes in school entrance cohorts towards the end of the decade (children not yet born at the time of the last census) or, for regional data, because of migration. Thus, even if the baseline figures were reasonably precise, subsequent extrapolations would be increasingly unreliable, and so would be any indicators based on them. 3.10 The second major source of errors could be in the enrollment data themselves. Apart from a pervasive over-reporting of enrollments the possibility of biased age recording must be considered: a sizeable number of 6-year olds may be enrolled and reported as 7-year olds, a group which could subsequently be subject to higher dropouts (which would partially correct the distortion). In this case some degree of overestimation of the 7-12 years group of students and hence, an upward bias in participation rates, could become a permanent characteristic of enrollment statistics. 3.11 Although the age-cohort data (both national and regional) may not permit a precise assessment of how access to elementary education has developed over the last decade, the figures in Table 3.3 suggest that the net enrollment rates may have fallen below the initial 1981 level (see para. 3.7 above).10I 3.12 Cohort survival rates. The cohort survival rate, indicating the percentage of grade 1 entrants who proceeded to grade 6 j1J in the required five years, remained roughly at the same level through the 1980s (moving from 65.4 percent in 1979 to 65.7 percent in 1988, with a low of 63.7 in 1986). It has risen to 68.2 percent in 1990. Similarly, the graduation rate (see FN 7) rose from 91.7 percent to 96.8 percent during the period 1979-1990. Average repetition and dropout rates declined from 2.2 and 3.8 percent, respectively (1979) to 2.0 and 1.8 percent in 1988, and stood at 2.05 and 1.69 percent, respectively, in 1990. &I The PCR (Part III, Table 3.7, p. 38) expresses similar doubts, adding that "DECS has continually had problems reconciling their enrollment statistics with official population figures." 2/ "Policies for Basic Education" (Speech by Secretary of Education), Manila 1992, p. 2. This source gives an estimate of one million unenrolled school-age children. 10J/ Unless this period saw a large-scale reduction in enrollments of under- and over-age students (for which there is no evidence). l/ The Department of Education treats student flows from grade 1 to grade 6 separately from the flows through grade 6. The relevant indicators are called the cohort survival rate and the graduation rate, respectively, in the DECS statistics. The combination of the two rates is referred to as the completion rate (something of a misnomer since it ignores repeaters who complete the course belatedly). - 11 - 3.13 These advances may seem small, but their impact on the budget should not be underestimated: at a recurrent cost per student year of about US$50 equivalent in elementary educa- tion in 1992, a drop in repetitions of one percentage point would translate into avoided costs in the amount of US$5 million per year. Similarly, a reduction by one percentage point in the dropout rate would yield an avoided cost total of US$2.8 million equivalent.12 3.14 Student achievement. It was hoped that the introduction of the 1982 New Elementary School Curriculum (NESC) would not only make the content of education more relevant to the realities of the country but also, by concentrating on the traditional 3 R's, lead to better learning outcomes. The SAR estimated that the mean achievement would rise from a baseline level of 45 in 1978 to 55 in 1985 and 63 in 1990. While this would have constituted a sizeable increase, it still should have fallen short of the Designated Learning Norm of 75. However, the figures that follow show that the process of improving learning achievements is far more arduous than had been assumed. Table 3.4: Mean Scores in Achievement Tests for Grade 4 and 6 Students, by Subject Matter, 1975/76 and 1986/87 Grade 4 Grade 6 Subject Matter 1975 1986 1975 1986 English: Reading 33.2 42.0 39.5 42.6 Language 42.7 53.0 39.2 40.9 Filipino: Reading 45.1 46.7 44.7 52.8 Language 47.7 58.6 48.1 58.2 Mathematics 34.3 50.5 35.7 44.2 Note: A score of 75 is defined as "Designated Learning Norm"; single asterisks and double asterisks denote statistically significant differences at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Source: University of the Philippines, Philippine Education: Promise and Performance, Manila 1990, pp. 95-96. 3.15 Apart from the data given above, the Government's Project Completion Report J3 contains some additional test results (overall means and standard deviations for grade 6 in 1976, 1983 and 1988, as follows: 2/ The grade distribution for dropouts during the period 1982-87 was applied to the 1990 overall dropout rate of 1.69 percent. This calculation is based on the aroitrary assumption that elementary education ending short of literacy (say, before the completion of grade 4) is lost. 13/ The Project Completion Report--Program for Decentralized Educational Development (PRODED), Manila 1990, p. 82 (henceforth quoted as "PRODED Report'). - 12 - 1976 1983 1988 Overall Mean 42.6 37.8 47.3 Standard Deviation 5.6 11.0 16.4 Since these data derive from different test instruments, their comparability appears limited. The 1986 and 1988 figures seem to point to some improvements in students' achievement, following the introduction of the 1982 new curriculum. However, the simultaneous strong increase in standard deviations between 1983 and 1988 suggests a widening gap in performance across test subjects and regions, without providing a clue as to the reason for this divergence. Hence, before deciding on any corrective policy measures, it would be necessary to know whether this slow and uneven improvement is simply a longer than anticipated transition period from one curriculum to another, whether it reflects a qualitative or quantitative insufficiency of teacher or material inputs (particularly of textbooks), or whether there are extra-school factors, such as, say, a deprived home environment or long commuting distances (which many Philippine observers consider as equally serious problems which would be much more difficult to address). 3.16 Student/teacher ratios. The SAR saw the student/teacher ratio as an important policy parameter to contain elementary education costs so as to free funds for enrollment increases and quality improvements. The latter, through their hoped-for effects on dropout and repetition rates, would in turn provide additional resources for further development. 3.17 At the outset o' the project, the average student/teacher ratio (STR) stood at 31. By international comparison, this was by no means a low level (given that the average included many small schools in remote rural areas). However, the wide-spread practice of employing special subject teachers in grades 5 and 6 was a factor which raised costs unnecessarily,4/ the teacher/class ratio in the last two grades being 2:1. It was thought that the more compact new curriculum and improved training would permit gradually to do away with special subject teachers in elementary schools. A teacher-class ratio of 1.2:1 in grades 5 and 6 was envisaged for 1986 and an overall STR of 36. 3.18 By 1988 the STR had moved to 33, and the grades 5-6 teacher/class ratio was 1.5 to 1. Two years later, the STR had increased further to 35, close to the original target. This is a notable achievement, particularly in view of the fact that prior to 1986, progress had been slow and uneven. From 1979 to 1985, the national STR remained constant at 31. However, this average concealed wide regional variations. Whereas the Mindanao regions showed averages that went as high as 38, two politically favored regions (Region I, Ilocos, and VIII, Eastern Visayas, being the home regions of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos, respectively) were permitted to retain STRs well below the national average (26 and 27, respectively). Only in recent years has this special treatment ceased, with the two relevant STRs increasing to 30 and 31, respectively, in 1990 (although they were still well behind the upward moving national average).if 14/ Studies had shown that the employment of special subject teachers did not result in any significant changes in student achievement. 15/ Some doubts about the validity of specific regional data remain. From 1987 to 1990, for example, Region XII reported STRs of 33, 38, 32 and 43. This would have implied year-to-year variations in teacher stocks of -9, + 28 and -21 percent, respectively, a very unlikely sequence. - 13 - 3.19 Balance between expenditure items. Another perceived weakness of the elementary education system was the fact that salaries absorbed practically the entire recurrent budget (98 percent), thus leaving little scope for reading and writing materials and for maintenance and repair of facilities. The SAR envisaged that, by the end of program implementation, the share of non- personnel expenditure would stand at 7 percent. More specifically, the Ministry was aiming at an eventual allocation of about 3 percent for instructional materials and supplies, a similar share for project development/supervision and in-service training and of 1 percent for maintenance of facilities.i6 3.20 In actual fact, relative allocations for non-salary expenditure increased beyond that target. After dropping from 5 percent in 1982 to 3.5 in 1985, the non-salary share increased to 8 percent in 1986, 14 in 1987 and 16 in 1989. In the latter year, maintenance accounted for almost 25 percent of non-salary expenditure, pointing both to the change in attitudes and to the extent of accumulated repair and maintenance needs.L7/ 3.21 While future intermittent salary increases are bound to reduce the share of non-salary expenditures below the record level of 1989, it seems entirely feasible to maintain in the longer run a level of material expenditures around the benchmark of 7 percent set at appraisal. 3.22 The question of the balance between salary and non-salary items in the recurrent budget is a specific aspect of the wider question of resource sufficiency. When viewed in a longer historical perspective, there can be little doubt that education has lost the preeminent position it enjoyed in the years 1955 to 1972 when an average of almost 28 percent of the total budget went to the Ministry of Education. After a precipitous fall from 26.2 to 16.3 percent between 1972 and 1973, and from 17.2 to 11.3 between 1974 and 1975, the share of education in the total budget averaged under 10 percent in the years 1973 to 1985. These reduced allocations, however, had to serve a much larger system. Between 1959 and 1985, public elementary enrollments more than doubled, from 4 to 8.4 million students, secondary enrollments grew from 0.2 million to almost 2 million, and in public higher education from less than 40,000 to over 200,000. It was only in the years following the change in Government that the share of the Department of Education in the total budget has gone up again, averaging 10.5 percent for the period 1986-92.Ll/ 3.23 The inevitable consequence of this was a perpetual underfunding of the school system and, as a result (although this is difficult to document), a drop in schooling standards. It is possible that the high level set for the Designated Learning Norm (paras 3.14-3.15) is a reflection of past performance levels rather than of short-term realistic aspirations. 19J 3.24 Recurrent expenditure per student declined during most of the implementation period, from the baseline average (1980) of US$42 equivalent (SAR, para. 2.03) to US$28 in 1985. Table 16/ PRODED Report, para. 2.6.19. 17/ It should be kept in mind, though, that the allocation of additional budget allocations does not necessarily equate with their timely receipt by the end user. The recurrent difficulties of transporting textbooks from the regional/divisional warehouses to the individual schools may illustrate this problem. L8/ DECS, Facts and Figures on Philippine Education, Manila 1992, Table VI. (The percentages given in the source table do not correspond to the relevant DECS and National Budget totals.) 19/ The means and standard deviations in para. 3.15 indicate that even in 1988 the great majority of students (well over 90 percent) who passed had fallen short of achieving the Designated Norm (assuming a normal distribution of scores). - 14 - 3.5 shows the erosion of available resources (last column), as well as the width of remaining inter- regional differences in resource allocation. Table 3.5: Regional Distribution of Elementary Education Enrollments and Expenditure (1979 and 1985) 1979 1985 Exp./SL Region Enrollments Expenditure Expend.J EnrolL Expend. Expend.J In 1979 (in 1,000) (8 millon) Studt. (8) (in 1,000) (8 milL) Stud. (8) Prices NCR 681.3 204.6 300 709.1 400.7 565 206 I 592.3 218.3 369 604.8 390.6 646 236 II 380.2 104.1 244 406.3 219.0 537 196 III 792.5 225.4 284 833.9 408.0 489 178 IV 994.6 298.2 300 1,117.4 573.7 513 187 V 659.4 189.4 287 680.5 354.9 522 190 VI 776.3 253.3 326 818.2 478.4 585 213 VII 586.1 186.5 318 614.8 340.0 553 201 VIII 481.5 164.8 342 502.4 295.7 589 214 lX 440.1 118.4 289 470.6 238.5 507 185 X 465.1 123.7 266 519.0 249.3 480 175 XI 569.1 137.3 241 633.0 290.9 460 167 XII 428.8 115.3 269 482.2 243.1 504 183 Totals 7,817.5 2,339.2 299 8,392.1 4,482.8 534 195 Source: University of the Philippines. Philippine Education: Promise and Performance, Manila 1990 (calculated from data in Tables 6 and 11 and using IFM price series to obtain last column). 3.25 When the new Government assumed office in 1986, its first task was to regain pre- project spending levels, before being able to pursue the objective of increasing recurrent budget allocations beyond the initial benchmark. By 1992, some progress had been achieved, with the share of the education sector in the budget standing around 11 percent, and the unit cost figure at& 1,175 29 or US$46 equivalent. 3.26 Regional inequalities. There are six education system indicators for which regional data are available over an extended period. Table 3.6 gives the relevant means and ranges for 1982 and 1990 for the following ratios: - Expenditures per student (XPS); - Student-teacher ratio (STR); - Cohort survival rate (CSR); LO/ "Are we investing enough in education?" (Speech by Secretary of Education), Manila 1992, p. 4. - 15 - - Dropout rate (DOR); and - Repetition rate (RR) Table 3.6: Regional Variations in Selected Education System Indicators, 1982 and 1990 1982 1990 M R R/M M R R/M XPS 299.0 128.0 0.43 195.0 69.0 0.35 STR 31.0 12.0 0.39 35.0 11.0 0.31 CSR 65.1 35.1 0.54 68.2 40.0 0.59 DOR 2.78 3.92 1.41 1.69 2.81 1.66 RR 2.32 2.33 1.00 2.05 2.93 1.43 NOTE M = Mean, R = Range (difference between maximum and minimum regional averages); XPS values refer to 1979 ctpenditures and to 1990 cpenditures in constant 1979 prices. Source: calculated from data in "Philippine Education, Promise and Performance", and from EDCS statistics. 3.27 The figures in Table 3.6 fail to convey a clear picture. While keeping in mind the uncertainties pertaining to some of the underlying statistics, a few tentative observations are possible: the spread in regional average expenditures per student and in student/teacher ratios has narrowed both absolutely and relatively; - regional differences in average cohort survival and repetition rates have widened in absolute and relative terms; - the range of average regional dropout rates has narrowed in absolute terms but widened in relation to the mean. 3.28 The tentative conclusion to be drawn from these data is that it appears easier to overcome what might be termed input inequalities than to reduce outcome inequalities. This appears plausible in view of the many other variables which enter the educational production function and because of likely time lags. 3.29 Some comments on the assessment and attempted correction of regional inequalities under the project are in order. The SAR (Appendix 4) included "Guidelines for the Allocation of Development Funds and Criteria for Subproject Approval" which contained a highly complex formula with weighted school age population shares, school age enrollment rates, cohort survival rates and achievement scores in grade 6 by region. Apart from doubts about the availability and reliability of the respective regional data, this formula did not provide any concrete guidance for identifying investment needs within the regions and to assess the merits, on equality grounds, of specific proposed investments. Apparently this formula proved too cumbersome for operational purposes. The Government developed later on three additional formulae but their applicability for concrete investment decisions was likewise limited, with the PRODED Report concluding that "whichever - 16 - version was used, inequities or imbalances still remained."21flhe obvious lesson from this experience is that in distributing investments over a large and unevenly endowed area, such condensed formulae fail to give concrete guidance for investment decisions; they cannot be a substitute for a detailed exercise of school mapping and physical resources inventory. 3.30 Institution building. Institutional development in education is often perceived narrowly in terms of creating or strengthening specific agencies or academic institutions rather than the slow and uneven accumulation of experience and know-how throughout the education system, in particular below the central government level. The project history provides examples of both types of institutional development (although the former, being more focussed and visible, is easier to trace and document than the latter). 3.31 During hi. field visits the OED staff could not fail to notice a number of positive changes 22 that have occurred in rural schools in the Philippines over the last two decades.2/ 3.32 The first difference was in the density of the school network: on the whole, elementary schools are now clearly more accessible than twenty years ago.24/ Secondly, the class- room utilization appears high, with most places filled and classrooms often used in more than one shift. Thirdly, facilities, including those of older vintage, generally show an adequate upkeep, the long period of insufficient allocations notwithstanding. Fourthly, and most visibly, was the general availability of textbooks, in contrast to their extreme scarcity in the early 1970s. Books were treated with care, and the wear and tear was generally less than what could have been expected after two or three years of use.2/ 3.33 Other positive changes related to the functioning of the school and the classes: a commendable degree of improvisation and resourcefulness was in evidence, e.g., school gardens for vegetables to supplement meals, or didactic aids made by teachers from local materials. 3.34 Among administrative practices proper, efforts to have school, teacher and student data readily available deserve mention. In every school visited, large information charts offered an immediate overview over the composition of the student body and of school resources. That these charfs were actually used as administrative instruments rather than to impress visitors could be seen from corrections made over the course of the school year. Similarly, in some schools the headmistress knew already the numbers and names of first grade entrants to be accommodated during the following school year (which was then still over six months away), i.e., the schools were moving towards medium-term planning. 21/ PRODED Report, p. 12. 22/ The following three paragraphs have been written in full awareness of the dangers of drawing general conclusions from a minuscule sample of schools. However, education officials emphasized that most of the positive features observed could be found throughout the country. 23/ The only other occasion for the OED staff to visit rural schools was in 1971--a sufficiently long interval for very small but consistent changes to become noticeable. 24/ This is also born out by the official statistics: the number of government elementary schools increased from 21,900 in 1%9/70 to 32,600 in 1992/93. 25/ The useful life of textbooks, according to several teachers interviewed, tended to exceed the benchmark of three years applied for planning and budgeting purposes. - 17 - 3.35 It is not possible to say to what extent these improvements are directly attributable to the program. The link is most obvious for textbooks and new classrooms, and reasonably strong in the cases of facilities upkeep and school-level administrative improvements (although most of these changes appear to be of rather recent origin). By contrast, multi-shift classroom use and improvisation suggest continuing resource deficits. On balance, though, there can be no doubt that the program has fostered school-level improvements. 3.36 Alongside these instances of grassroots institution building are two examples of free- standing, hence more visible, institutional achievements. The first concerns the factual basis for education system management, the second the provision of textbooks. 3.37 Educational management information system.26 Since 1975, the Ministry's Office of the Planning Service (OPS) has been charged with all aspects of educational statistics, from data compilation through analysis. The initial information system was based on a series of forms to be completed by each school at the beginning and end of each school year. The (manual) compilation of the primary data proved time-consuming and prone to errors as the process of data consolidation proceeded through several administrative levels. 3.38 The increasing problems of keeping pace with expanding data demands moved OPS to develop a new management information system. It consisted of eight sub-systems dealing with the following areas: students; staff; curriculum matters; relevant legislation and control; physical facilities; finances; community services; and educational planning, research and evaluation. 3.39 An important feature of this system was that it encouraged and enabled education offices below the central government level to use the data created or compiled for their own pur- poses. This did away with the "post office image" 27/ of the subsidiary education agencies that had so far played a largely passive role in collecting and conveying data. The new information system was thus a logical step in the Government's efforts to decentralize educational administration.28 3.40 However, the limitations of this new system soon became apparent, the most serious one being its continued reliance on manual processing which proved inadequate in view of the volume of data created, and its rigidity, which did not permit an easy change to computerized use. However, as micro-computers (and the staff's familiarity with them) spread throughout the Ministry, a transition to a computerized management information system became possible. 3.41 The new Education Management Information System (EMIS) was introduced in 1987. Its main advantages over previous forms of data collection are - a greater ease of collection (once instead of twice yearly, using eleven instead of over fifty forms to cover both government and private elementary and secondary schools; 26/ This section draws heavily on a UNESCO publication (EMIS in the Philippines, by Dr. Charles C. Villanueva, UNESCO Principal Regional Office, Bangkok 1990; henceforth quoted as "EMIS - Report"). L/ EMIS - Report, p. 4. P/ "(E)ach office was treated as an MIS unit capable of satisfying the information needs of managers and data users at its respective levels" (ibid.). - 18 - - a much wider scope for computing system performance indicators--a total of about 75 2L9 relating to efficiency, effectiveness, equity and quality of education; manpower needs of the economy; staff characteristics and remuneration; and extra-educational aspects (promotion of science and technology, of culture and sports); - greatly reduced lead times, hence an earlier input into educational policy deliberations; and - standardized data bulletins at the subsidiary levels (district, division, region) to serve information needs for a variety of users. 3.42 With the further spread of computers and technical competence below the central government level 3.0 data collection, processing and analysis will be continuously streamlined and expedited which should contribute greatly to making educational policy decisions more responsive to emerging needs. 3.43 Provision of textbooks. In the early 1970s, efforts to improve the quality of elementary education were severely hampered by an almost complete lack of textbooks. On average, for each of the required texts, only one book was available for every ten students, and many rural schools fared even worse. The Third Education (Textbooks) Project of 1976 (suppert by Loan 1224T-PH in the amount of US$25 million) was to address this problem by develop. ig national capabilities for producing and distributing, educational materials for elementary and secorn- iry schools. The project included buildings for the Textbooks Board Secretariat (TBS),31] for a central warehouse and a network of 55 provincial warehouses, furniture and equipment, pl' - funds for textbooks development, production and distribution and an extensive program of r-;aied teacher training (a novum in textbook development projects). 3.44 The project was considered "an outstanding success," L2 hence th- decision to consolidate and build on this achievement through the Sector Program for Element"' EdWucation. This second phase of the textbook development effort complemented the network of wa,ehouses--26 additional units were built--and strengthened the institutional framework. In 1986, the Textbook Board Secretariat, which had been the implementing agency for textbook dCvelopnent and distribution since 1976, was converted into the Instructional Materials Corporatifil, a semi- autonomous government agency under the tutelage of the Department of Education. In Yovember 1991, it was reorganized and became the Instructional Materials Development Center (.DC), a regular government agency attached to the Department of Education. L9 The effective number is somewhat lower (about 50 indicators) as some data are being used in more than one category (e.g., the student/teacher ratio to gauge efficiency, equity and quality of education). (EMIS - Report, pp. 12-15.) & By 1990, the educational administration used 325 computer units at the Central Office but only 14 in the Regional Offices (EMIS - Report, p. 18). L11 The predecessor of the Instructional Materials Corporation (IMC) which was the name of the government textbooks agency during the implementation of the project under review and which became the Instructional Materials Development Center, a regular DECS agency, by Executive Order No. 492 of November 29, 1991. & OED Report No. ,279 (Project Performance Audit Report for Loan 1224T-PH), 1986, p. v. - 19 - 3.45 In the seventeen years of its existence, the IMDC has grown into a highly efficient agency which is being studied and emulated by other countries.3 Between 1976 and 1985, some 120 million textbooks, workbooks and teacher guides were produced and distributed, and 137 titles for elementary education developed and tested. Most of the staff of about 150 have been with the agency since its inception and are thus highly experienced. 3.46 Because of the volume of textbook orders and rigorous adherence to cost-efficient procurement, the agency has managed to achieve cost levels which are extraordinarily low by any stan- dard, as is apparent from Table 3.7. The overall average cost comes to R 15.30 for one book L. (or about US$0.55-0.60 equivalent, using the range of the P/US$ exchange rate observed over the two-year period). Book length ranges from about 120 pages in early elementary education to 320 in secondary school.3/ Table 3.7: Average Unit Costs for Textbooks, by Component, 1991-92 (in F)af Grade Paper Printing Distribution Overhead bj Totals 1 9.33 3.09 1.50 1.06 14.98 2 9.62 3.20 1.50 1.06 15.38 3 9.95 3.32 1.50 1.06 15.83 4 10.34 3.48 1.50 1.06 16.38 5 7.47 3.40 1.50 1.54 13.91 6 8.33 3.84 1.50 1.54 15.21 Averages c/ 9.25 3.36 1.50 1.19 15.30 A/ The figures in this Table are derived from budget estimates. Actual costs were considerably lower, the average total costs being R 11.20 instead of F. 15.30 (see also Appendix A). t/ Includes development costs. c/ Weighted by 1990 grade enrollment figures. Soure: Instructional Materials Development Center (IMDC) 3.47 The bulk of the cost (92 percent) refers to contracts with the private sector following competitive bidding. The application of international competitive bidding for printing contracts has, in the view of IMDC, contributed greatly both to cost containment and higher quality products.36/ 33/ Trainees for several Asian and African countries have gone through an internship program at the IMC/IMDC. In addition, the agency hosted a number of seminars and workshops (Agency Profile: The Institutional Materials Development Center - IMDC, Quezon City 1992, p. 2). 34/ By contrast, the OED staff found bookstore prices for comparable private sector textbooks in Metro Manila (the country's most competitive marker with the lowest distribution costs) to be in the range of R 65 - 100, and on occasion even higher. 35/ C.A. Miranda et al., The Philippine Textbook Project A Case Study, Quezon City, 1990, pp. 31-32 (henceforth quoted as "Case Study"). 36/ Case Study, p. 33. In the process, the few Philippine companies which could handle very large contracts (running up to 1.3 million copies per title) proved to be not only fully competitive with, but actually at an advantage over, foreign bidders. - 20 - 3.48 Manuscript development was originally entrusted to a number of government centers. In 1983, this function was turned over to private publishers. This proved detrimental as the new manuscripts, having been prepared by diverse companies, were of uneven quality, lacked grade-to- grade cohesion, and often arrived late. The government centers were readmitted in 1984, with open competition between the two groups; in 1987, only nine of twenty-six new titles originated in the public sector; in 1988, twelve out of twenty-six.37/ 3.49 Distribution of textbooks to the school proved to be the most difficult stage of the process, given the nature of the country and its scant infrastructure. While the transport from the central warehouse in Metro Manila to the regional and divisional warehouses (which are usually located in easily accessible urban centers) was a straightforward matter, final distribution to the schools turned out to be a source of frequent frustrations and delays.3/ Lack of communications meant that the schools were seldom aware of the arrival of their books at the warehouse. Thus, even though the upstream phases (writing, testing, production) may have been on schedule, by the time the textbooks arrived at their final destination, often half of the school year had already passed. The only way to deal with this structural problem would seem to allow more time for the entire sequence of textbook provision L9/ and to start the final stage of distribution from the warehouses to the schools with the most difficult outlying areas. 3.50 Sustainability. The commitment of the Government to human resource development has been forcefully stated: "the highest priority area is public elementary education, especially on the matter of accessibility."40/ Yet the financing requirements remain enormous: for 1993/94, the DECS expected an influx of about 240,000 additional elementary students and of an equal number of secondary students. This required additional capital outlays of -F 3.25 billion for classrooms and of more than P 200 million for school furniture and textbooks, plus an increment in the annual teacher salary bill of F 750 million, in total -P 4.1 billion, or US$160 million equivalent. Making up for accumulated shortages over a three-year period would more than double this amount.4/ It seems that any improvement in the quality of education is constrained by the sheer weight of numbers, and that internal efficiency measures (such as increasing the Student/Teacher Ratio or accelerating student flows while minimizing dropouts) are approaching a ceiling. 3.51 However, one possibility of enhancing quality and efficiency of elementary education which the Government is exploring centers on classroom contact time. The 1982 curriculum included a reduction in daily teaching time from over 350 minutes to 300 minutes. Returning to the former school day, and combining this change with a recommendation of 1991 Congressional Commission 37/ Case Study, p. 29. 38/ The story of a headmaster who claimed that he had to cross 23 rivers on foot to get his school's textbooks from the district office may serve to illustrate the extremes of the problem (Case Study, p. 34). 39/ At present the cycle of creating and providing a new textbook lasts just under 1,000 days; it consists of four partially overlapping stages: manuscript planning and writing (300 days); editorial work and field testing (470), production (150) and distnhution (180). Crash programs can be carried out in roughly two thirds of this time, about 640 days (Source: IMDC). 40/ "Poliies for Private Education." (Speech by Secretary of Education), Manila 1992, p. 2. 41/ hid., pp. 10-11. - 21 - to lengthen the school year from 185 to 220 days would result in a gain of effective teaching time of nearly 40 percent.4/ 3.52 However, it is unlikely that the country's teachers would accept such a steep increase in their teaching load without some compensation. The Department is considering to cut back on the many demands on teachers for work outside the classroom which has for some time been a source of discontent.L3/ The Government hopes that relieving the teachers of such extraneous obligations would increase their willingness to devote more time to their profession proper. 3.53 Regardless of such potential gains in cost efficiency, a search for additional sources of finance remains imperative. Among the possibilities considered by the Government are (a) an exit tax on college graduates who emigrated; (b) a similar tax on workers already overseas; and (c) a Debt for Education Swap.44 However, no feasibility study of those measures has yet been undertaken, nor has their revenue potential been assessed. For the foreseeable future, the quest for sustainability will be a continuous effort to secure an adequate financial basis for meeting the educational needs of a rapidly increasing school-age population, while maintaining acceptable levels of quality and internal efficiency. IV. FINDINGS, A POTENTIAL ISSUE AND LESSONS 4.1 Findings. Although project implementation coincided with a period of economic and political instability, the physical investment targets for the project were in most instances surpassed, albeit after an implementation delay of two years. 4.2 The system performance targets were more difficult to achieve. This is, however, less a reflection of a faulty project performance than of an unrealistic level of expectations on the part of the Bank staff who designed the project which in turn reflects a limited knowledge of the educa- tion production process. However, it should be noted that in the post-completion period further improvements in the major performance parameters have taken place, and that in some cases the original targets are now within reach. 4.3 Overall, the achievements are satisfactory and form a suitable basis for the continued development of elementary education in the Philippines. This process is being supported by a follow- up Bank project (Second Elementary Education Project of 1990, assisted by a loan of US$200 million), which supports urgently needed investments in classrooms, school furniture and textbooks. 4.4 The project led to a significant amount of institution building, both at the grassroots level (decentralization of educational administration being one of the main emphases of the 10-year program in which the project was assisting) and in some major undertakings, notably the setting up of a comprehensive management information system and the development of IMDC, the textbook agency, into a highly effective and efficient institution. 42/ "Policies for Private Education," p. 2. L/ Ibid,. p. 3. g/ Ibid., p. 13. - 22 - 4.5 While the resource demands of a rapidly growing student population and of further necessary improvements in the system are huge, the high priority given by the Government to elementary schooling and the continued commitment of the Bank to educational development, make sustainability of project achievements likely. 4.6 A potential issue. One recent development gives cause for concern. At the time of the field visit (November-December 1992), a legislative initiative (Senate bill No. 252), then in its early stages, threatened to negate some of the gains made over the last 15 years. In an effort to assist the country's publishing industry, the bill calls for the "government (to) undertake a gradual and systematic phaseout of its elementary and secondary school textbook publication and distribution functions and make every effort to support the phasing in of private publishers to assure these functions" (Section 7.4). 4.7 It is inconceivable that the private sector, not enjoying the economies of scale that IMDC can count on, will ever approach the low unit cost levels achieved by the textbook agency (see paras 3.45-3.46). The outcome of the envisaged switch to the private sector would be, in the worst case, a deterioration in textbook supplies towards the situation of scarcity existing twenty years ago (and with adverse consequences for the equality of educational opportunities). In the best case, it would mean a diversion of funds that could have gone into further educational development, into support for an ailing industry. 4.8 Educational development in the Philippines depends critically on adequate textbook supplies to be provided under conditions of severe budget constraints; hence the need to avoid any divergence from cost-efficient resource use which the proposed legislation implies. Since the work of IMDC was (and is being) assisted by IBRD loan funds, this potential issue cannot be a matter of indifference to the Bank. 4.9 Lessons. The project experience provides four lessons, three of a general nature and related to one another, the fourth one specific to the Philippines: (a) Firstly, in preparing further projects designed to improve the education process, it would be preferable for sector staff to use ranges instead of point estimates in targeting specific outcomes, given that the mechanics of the improvement process are still poorly understood. (b) Secondly, when dealing with inequalities in education, one should distinguish input and performance inequalities. The former can be addressed through properly designed projects; improvements in the latter may follow, but possibly to a lesser extent and with a time lag. This means that adequate levels of financing in the post-completion stage are of utmost importance, in order to maintain the momentum of the previous investments. (c) Thirdly, in planning the spatial allocation of investment funds over a large and unevenly endorsed area, general formulae derived from highly aggregated statistics fail to give adequate guidance. Whatever their degree of refinement, they cannot substitute for a detailed exercise in school mapping and physical resources inventory. (d) Fourthly, the PAR endorses and expands on the views of the PCR (paras 1.31-1.32) regarding consulting services: -23- in many subject areas, competent national specialists who combine cost-efficient services with a superior knowledge of local conditions, are readily available. However, some Bank staff feel that the utilization of existing know-how lags behind actual capabilities, and that the country would benefit from involving a wider range of institutions and individuals in consultancy services to the sector; for highly specialized expertise which is not yet developed in the country, twinning arrangements with proven overseas institutions which would combine consulting and staff training (though not necessarily by the same specialists) ought to be considered; and visiting sector staff should treat the identification and assessment of emerging national capabilities in areas not yet adequately covered as an ongoing task. - 25 - INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS CORPORATION EC. f DA TE.- Co'PP0PATWA December 8, 1993 APPENDIX A Page 1 of 2 Mr. Graham Donaldson Chief, Agriculture and Human Development Division Operations Evaluation Department The World Bank OEDDI Fax (202) 676-0555 Dear Mr. Donaldson: Thank you for sending us the draft Performance Audit Report of Ln. 2030-PH. My apology for the delayed response. I had been out of the country for an international technical consultation on basic learning materials at UNESCO, Paris. We wish to commentdn the instructional materials component as follows: 1) We highly appreciate the favorable assessment of the perfor- mance of the government textbook agency. 2) Re table 3.7, p.29, while the source is IMDC, we wish to point out that the average total unit cost of P1 5.30 is higher than the actual average unit cost of P11.20 only. The data given (P1 5.30) was based on budget estimates and planning figures used for determining issue price of textbooks. Ideally, we should prepare a substitute chart but we are not certain if OED's policy will permit it. At any rate, if at all possible, please add this information in the footnote. a/ 3) Concerning distribution or textbook delivery problems (p. 30), there are recent efforts to correct uneven distribution to effect timely arrival of books to the schools. For example, we prepared a systematic and simple reporting system to monitor the status of textbook deliveries that is school-based for better reliability. There was a recent DECS order which provides for a complete identification of such problems in delivery areas and for IMDC to directly handle the delivery of textbooks to the schools through the appropriate delivery modes as may be deter- mined. 4) Once more, we highly appreciate your concern in your discussion of a potential issue para. 4.6, pp. 33-34. To date, Senate Bill 252 has not been passed as a law. a] The actual total unit cost has been added to Table 3.7 (see Table 3.7 note a/). A. Ma. Regidor Street, Area X1, University of the Philippines Campus P.O. Box 211. Diliman, Quezon City 1101, Metro Manila, Telephones 922-99 -81 to 84 - 26 - APPENDIX A Page 2 of 2 For additional information, the following is an excerpt from our position paper: a) We believe that the government textbook production program implemented by the IMC should be retained. It has proven its effectiveness in providing adequate supply of textbooks at the desired textbook-pupil ratio (1:1) and achieved at less cost to the government because of the absence of profit. Because of this, government can provide government edition textbooks at lower prices than the private sector: P11 .20 per copy (government) equal to total production cost as against P1 9.24 per copy (private) corre- sponding to production cost plus profit. Based on a yearly average print run of 20 M copies, government will spend P224.11 M against P384.8 M if the private sector would have assumed this function, or an additional cost of P160.69 M a year, an increase of 71.7%. b) The private sector already benefits greatly from the government textbook program with around 90% of government expenditures for this purpose channeled to the former. During the years 1988 to 1991, out of a total expenditure of P821 M, the government textbook production program channeled almost P740 M or an annual average of P185 M to the private sector, broken down into (a) Printing - P44.7 M (24.1 %), (b) Purchase of paper - P122.2 M (66.1 %), (c) Freight forwarding - P17.1 M (9.2%), and (d) Preparation of (purchase of publishing rights) - P1 .0 M (0.6%). Moreover, a complete takeover by private publishers of textbook production could unduly expose adequate availability of textbook supply to possible uncertainties. c) In most developing countries, the government directly under- takes textbook publishing and production. In fact, foreign mis- sions have been continuously coming to study the Philippine experi- ence in textbook publishing which has been acclaimed international- ly as a success story. To break the government's role in textbook publishing for the public schools is not a valid proposal since this undertaking is not a profit-oriented business activity. Thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to comment. We wish you more success in your endeavors. Very truly yours, CARIDAD A. MIRANDA General Manager
Группа Всемирного банка · Project Performance Assessment Report
Philippines - Sector Program For Elementary Education Project
Открыть оригинал документа
Полный текст размещён на сайте публикующей организации. lawenc.com индексирует метаданные и ведёт на официальный источник.
Полный текст
Основные сведения
Организация
Группа Всемирного банка
Тип документа
Project Performance Assessment Report
Страна
Филиппины
Источник
Всемирный банк