Cameroon - Forestry Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MICROFICHE COPY Repirt No. 10476 Report No. 10476-CM Type: (PCR) SFEIR-YOUN/ X31752 / T9053/ OEDD1 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT CAMEROON FORESTRY PROJECT (LOAN 2092-CM) MARCH 31, 1992 Agriculture Operations Division Occidental and Central Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfonnance of their ofrcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT -CAMEROON FORESTRY PROJECT (LN.2092-CM) CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Units - FCFA Average Annual Exchange Rates 1980 226 FCFA = US$1.00 1981 287 FCFA = US$1.00 1982 336 FCFA = US$1.00 1983 417 FCFA = US$1.00 1984 480 FCFA = US$1.00 1985 378 FCFA = US$1.00 1986 323 FCFA = US$1.00 1987 267 FCFA = US$1.00 1988 303 FCFA = US$1.00 1989 289 FCFA = US$1.00 FISCAL YEARS Government of Cameroori: July 1- June 30 World Bank: July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CDC Commonwealth Development Cooperation CELLUCAM Societe Cellulose du Cameroun S.A. Cellulose Company of Cameroon DEFC Direction des Eaux et Forets et Chasses Department of Water, Forests and Wildlife DF Direction des Forgts Department of Forests ONADEF Office National de Developpement des Forets National Office of Forests Development ONAREF Office National de R6generation des Forets National Office of Forests Regeneration SEMRY Societ6 d'Expansion et Modernisation de la Riziculture de Yagoua Company for the Expansion and Mode-,iization of Rice Production at Yagoua  FOR OFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Wasnington, D.C 20433 U.S A. Office of DtffectOGeneral OpeWatmns Evaluatitn March 31, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on CAMEROON Forestry Proiect (Loan 2092-CM) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Cameroon - Forestry Project (Loan 2092-CM)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. This project has not been audited by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This doc'iment has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OMCL4 USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION-REPORT s CAMgRQXN FORESTRY PROJECT (LN.2092-CM) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ..... ........................................... EVALUATION SUMMARY . ......................................i PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE .... . ........... 1 1. Project Identity . ........................................ 1 2. Background . .......................................... 1 3. Project Objectives and Description .......................... 2 4. Project Design and Organization ............................ 2 5. Project Implementation .................................. 3 6. Project Results . ........................................ 5 7. Project Sustainability .......... .......................... 6 S. Bank's Performance . ...................................... 7 9. The Borrower's Performance .............................. 8 10. Project Relationship ...................... 9 11. Consulting Services ...................... 9 12. Project Documentation and Data ............... 9 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ........... 11 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION ........................... 13 MO: IBRD 15692 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT CAMEROON FORESTRY PROJECT (LOAN 2092-CM) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Forestry Project in Cameroon, for which Loan 2092-CM, in the amount equivalent to US$17 million, was approved in February 1982. US$10 million were cano,led when the Project was re- designed in 1985. The Loan Account was closed on Dec. 31, 1989, about three years behind schedule. In total, 39 percent of the loan had been disbursed and the balance of US$338,000 was canceled on June 5, 19X)O. The PCR was prepared by the Africa Regional Office (Parts I and III) with the assistance of an FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme mission which visited Cameroon in December 1990. The contribution of the Government (Part II) was requested, but has not been received. The PCR is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Loan and Project Agreements, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and Borrower, internal Bank memoranda, interviews with Bank staff, discussions with Government staff, and field visits to selected project sites.  iii PROJECT COMPI ETION REPORT CAMERON- FORESTRY PROJECT (LN.2092-CM) EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Qbiectives - The Project aimed to expand the contribution of the forestry subsector to the national economy through the establishment of about 1 1,000 ha of pine and eucalyptus plantations, and enhance the capabilities of the responsible Government agencies to improve reforestation and recover revenue from the forest users. 2. The total Project cost over the five-yea, irvestment period was estimated at US$ 35.5 million, which was to be financed by 2 Bank loan (USS 17.0 million), by a loan from the United Kingdom's Commonwealth r - velopment Corporation for the cofinancing of the Edea component (US$ 7.4 mil. ao and by the Government (US$ 11.1 million). The Bank Loan was made to the Gov- 4nment for a term of 20 years, including a five-year grace period, at the interest rate of 11.6 percent. 3. Implementation Exoerience - The Project was plagued with problems throughout, and particularl,i during the early stages of imp,ermentation. To start with, the l.oan did not become effective until 22 months after Board approval. Realizing these delays, the implementing Company - Cellulose Company of Cameroon (CELLUCAM) succeeded in planting 450 ha of pines and eucalyptus at Edea in 1981 and 1982 from its own resources to supply a pulp mill. But because a fire destroyed the bleaching chemical recycling plant in the pulpmill in 1982, and because external markets of pine and eucalyptus were poor, the company's financial situation deteriorated. The Bank dropped the pulpwood plantation component at Edea in October 1984 and US$ 10 million (and the CDC loan) were canceled. Also the other plantation components made little progress during the first two years of the Project, because of senior managerial changes in the re-organized forestry services, a weak technical assistance team, and a shortage of operating funds which were to be provided by the Government. In view of the Project's poor performance, by mid-1 985 the option of closing the loan and redefining with Government a new strategy for the forestry subsector was considered in the Bank. Instead it was decided, on recommendation of the Minister of Agriculture and the supervision mission, to re-design the Project. With Bank approval, the Government terminated the Tschnical Assistance contract in October 1985. 4. The Government proposed a re-designed Project, which was accepted by the Bank in December 1985.  iv 5. Results - In spite of the apparent will of the project management and of the Bank to make the Project work, the physical results of the Project since January 1986 are poor. Some 700 ha of woodlovs were planted at Maroua-Maga, but some of the woodlots either had to be planted twice or had disappeared bscause they had been planted on poor soils. About 1,500 ha of pines and eucalyptus were planted and maintained at Ngaounder4, but 900 ha of these plantations suffered severe damage from fire in 1989. This fire damage could have been avoided by proper management. 6. The Mbalmayo stockyard and seed conservation unit were established, - it the stockyard did not appear to be used for species which are rapid growing and economically viable such as Ayous. Again the stockyard was recently destroyed by fire as a result of vandalism. 7. Operations of the Department of Water, Forestry and Wildlife (DEFC) were strengthnned and improved through organization and training. The Government improved tax collection by setting up a special collection brigade and legislation aimed at enforcing payment of taxes and royalties. . Sustainabilitv - The economic and financial analysis confirms that the national economy cannot continue to sustain public sector parastatals involved in the types of activities supported by the Project. The only two components for which an economic rate of return can be calculated, the plantations near Ngaound6re and the village woodlots near Maroua, will be a continuing drain on public resources if managed by a Government parastatal, with an estimated minus 2 percent economic rate of return (ERR). However if ownership and responsibility for management is handed over to the local communities, greatly reducing maintenance and harvesting costs, a modest positive ERR of around 5 percent is likely. 9. Findings and Lessons Learned - In retrospect, it can be said that the project designers failed to grasp the importance of tree planting by the local populations, when it concentrated on Government plantations. Itis unfortunate that the opportunity of supporting or encouraging tree planting by the private people was missed in a country where this should be shouldered by the private sector if it is to be sustainable in the longer term. 10. Other lessons from the Project are: (a) the number of agencies involved in a Project needs to be kept to a minimum and progress should be monitored closely throughout;  v (b) '-hen the Edea component was dropped, the Project became unbalanced; and when also the other Project components made little progress during the first two years of implementatiun, this might perhaps have been an opportune time to re-appraise the Project (instead of only re-design it) or close it altogether; (c) a Project should not depend too strongly on technical assistance in order to be successful and the Government forestry officials need to be fully involved in Project design and execution; (d) the risks of fire ,n the arid zone planwations need to be adequately dealt with in implementation. The responsibility for planting and especially for maintenance must be defined at the beginning of a project.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT CAMEIOQN FORESTRY PROJECT (Ln.2092-CM) PART 1: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Ideotx Project Name Forestry Project Credit No. 2092-CM RVP Unit Africa Region Country Cameroon Sector : Agriculture Sub-sector Forestry 2. Dackground 2.1. Cameroon has a wide range of climatic conditions, from tropical rain forest in the South to Sahelian in the extreme north. This permits a well diversified agriculture and forestry sector. The country is dominated by forest. The forest area covers a total 33.1 million ha, which is equivalent to 70% of the total land area, of which 18.1 million ha are considered dense forests with 7.5 million ha now being exploited, and 15.0 million ha are savannah. However, forest exploitation has not been well planned and controlled. In the northern savannah and riverain areas, rapid population growth has created a considerable demand for building materials and for fuelwood, particularly in areas of rural population concentration where access to other energy sources is limited and costly. 2.2. The completed Project was conceived to establish plantations of exotic pines and eucalyptus to assure a cheap supply of wood for a local pulpmill (CELLUCAM). It was also intended to afforest areas in the savannah regions where wood is in short supply, both in block plantations and in village woodlots. The Project was the first Bank-assisted project devoted entirely to the forestry subsector in Cameroon. More recently, the Government has adopted a Tropical Forestry Action Plan and a strategy for the development of the subsector. A Forestry and Environment Project is proposed for FY 92.  2 3. ProlectlQbIectlves and Description 3.1. The project aimed to expand the contribution of the forescry subsector to the national economy through the establishment of about 11,000 ha of pine and eucalyptus plantations, and enhance the capabilities of the responsible Government agencies to improve reforestation and recover revenue from the forest users. 3.2. The original project - as appraised - was to: (a) plant and maintain about 8,800 ha of pines and eucalyptus at Edea to supply a pulp mill operated by CELLUCAM; (b) plant and maintain 1,000 ha of timber species, mainly eucalyptus, and 200 ha of village woodlots in the Saheli'n zone at Maga in the extreme north and 1,000 ha of pines and eucalyptus in the savannah area at Ngaounddr6; (c) establish four seed production sites for forestry plantations and a seed conservation unit; (d) strengthen the National Office of Forests Regeneration (ONAREF) and the DEFC to improve their technical capacities to execute reforestation and recover revenues from taxes. 3.3. The total project cost over the five-year investment period was estimated at US$ 35.5 million, and was to be financed by a Bsnk loan (US$ 17.0 million), by a loan from the United Kingdom's Commonwealth Development Corporation for the cofinancing of the Edea component (US$ 7.4 million>, and by the Government (US$ 11.1 million). The Bank loan was made to the Government for a term of 20 years, including a five-year grace period, at the interest rate of 11.6 percent. 4. Prolect Design and Organization 4.1. T' * esign and success of the Project basically hinged on the 11,000 ha plantation jpamme to supply a pulp mill, in particular the 8,800 ha CELLUCAM Edea compnr.- ;. This component accounted for 68% of project cost and was expected ti generate substantial benefits in the production of uniform-quality plantation-grown wood which would reduce harvesting costs, decrease the cost of pulping, and yield higher valued short and long fiber p'Jlp than would have been the case without the project. But CELLUCAM was in poor financial shape already at appraisal and, therefore, project design should have paid more attention to this problem. Technical project design was faulty, in that it was an error to entrust the major plantation component to a technical assistance team, whose performance turned out to be poor. Trials and promotion of new technology under the Project were poorly coordinated with on-going programs of the Centre of Forest Research.  3 5. PelJIm9hoinuld" 5.1. Loan Effectiveness and Proiect Start-up. The original project was plagued with problems Lhroughout, and particularly during the early stages of implementation. To start with, -he loan became effective only 22 months after Board approval (Part Ill, Table 2). Realizing these delays, CELLUCAM succeeded in planting 450 ha of pines and eucalyptus at Edea in 1981 and 1982 from its own resources. But because a fire destroyed the bleaching chemical recycling plant in the pulpmill in 1982, and because external markets of pine and eucalyptus were poor, the company's financial situation deteriorated. The Bank dropped the cdea component in October 1984 and US$ 10 million (and the CDC loan) were cancelad. 5.2. Also the other plantation com-s. its nade little progress during the first two years of the Project, because rf senior mer,dgerial changes in the re-organized forestry services, a weak technical assistance team, and a shrrtage of operating funds which were to be provided by the Government. 5.3. In view of the project's poor performance, by mid-1985 the option of closing the Loan and redefining with government a new strategy for the forestry subsector was considered in the Bank. Instead it was decided, on recommendation of the Minister of Agriculture and the supervision mission, to re-design the Project. With Bank approval, the Government terminated the Technical Assistance contract in October 1985. 5.4. Project Redesian. The Government proposed a re-designed project, which was accepted by the Bank in December 1985, with the following objectives: (a) planting of 900 ha of woodlots at Maroua-Maga and 220 ha of irrigated lot at Maga; (b) establishing 1,500 ha of tree plantations and maintaining 1,600 ha of forest reserve at Ngaound6r6; (L' developing a stockyard and building a seed conservation unit at Mbalmayo; (d) strengthening and improving DEFC operations. 5.5. In spite of the apparent will of the project management and of the Bank to make the project work, the physical results of the Proiect since January 1986 are poor. Some 700 ha of woodlots were plantad at Ma. ;a-Maga, but some of the woodlots either had to be planted twice or had disappeared because they had been planted on poor soils. It is not clear how much of the area was planted under the Bank- supported project or from ONAREF's own resources. The irrigated lot at Maga was not established, because SEMRY and the Ministry of Agriculture could not agree on a suitable site, and the component was subsequently dropped. About 1,500 ha of pines and eucalyptus were planted and maintained at Ngaounddr6, but 900 ha of these plantations suffered severe damage from fire in 1989. This fire damage could have been avoided by proper management. This incident was a shock both to the project  4 management and to the staff, and this badly affected their morale. The firebreak network was subsequently upgraded and the local ONAREF unit was provided with firefighting equipment. 5.6. The Mbalmayo stockyard and seed conservation unit were established. These included installation of a sophisticated irrigation system and developing and protecting the plant material collected to produce cuttings for the reforestation effort of ONAREF. The stockyard did not appear to be used for hardwood species which are relatively rapid growing and economically viable such as Avol, rather mostly slow growing species such as Bibolo were plsnted. Again the stockyard was recently destroyed by fire due to vandalism. 5.7. DEFC and ONAREF operations have been strength-ned and improved through organization and training. In February 1990, the forestry agencies were reorganized into the National Office of Forest Development (ONADEF) and the Department of Forests (DF), respectively. DF field services have been provided with infi astructure and vehicles to enhance their capacity to control forest exploitation. The project assisted DF in improving tax collection by setting up a special collection brigade aimed at enforcing payment of taxes and royalties. A systom of tax collection on felled trees (ae d'abattag) is now being extended nationwide by DF under a Canadian- supported project. 5.8. Disbursoments. Loan disbursements are shown in Part Ill, Table 3. The particularly low levels in the early years are due to the delays in starting. The strengthening of the US dollar with respect to appraisal estimates also permitted some savings. Total disbursement was about 39% of planned. The balance of $10,337,767.58 was cancelled, ($10 million in December 1985, and $337,767.58 in June 1990.). Data on project financing (Part ll, Table 5) highlights the serious shortfall in domestic funds. The capacity of DEFC and ONAREF to generate funds was significantly less than expected. 5.9. Project implementation coincided with the poor economic performance in the country, which led to shortage of counterpart funds. Especially in the last few years, funds approved by the Government were considerably less than what had been requested. The Bank showed flexibility aif,. reacted by increasing its share of funding, for some categories up to 100%. 5.10. A fundamental problem affecting operating funds was recognized to be the personnel. Large numbers of workers were recruited for the plantations, and turnover and absenteeism were high, and productivity was low. On the other hand, !he level of performance improved when the Cameroonians took up the challenge of carrying out the plantations without expatriate technical assistance. As a result ONAREF was able to plant some 500 ha annually. 5.11. Procurement. Equipment procurement was slow due to lengthy Government procedures and a lack of strong administrative support from the Ministry of Agriculture. Major purchases of firefighting equipment did not take place until 1989. Procurement of some equipment did not include essential spais parts which are not readily available locally. As a result some equipment, for instance some tractors, are already non-operational for the lack of spares, although they are practically new.  5 6. Prwtoct Results 6.1. The Project has not achieved its main objectives of expanding the contribution of the forestry subsector to the national economy and enhancing the capabilities of the responsible Government agencies to improve reforestation. The afforestation achievements at Maroua fell far short of appraisal targets in spite of the prolonged implementation period. Standing pines and eucalyptus planted in hum:d savannahs, which would be suitable for fuelwood, building poles, transmission and telephones poles, and utility saw logs, are not being cut for sale and replanting. 6.2. As the Loan Committee review observed in October 1981, the Project was not likely to be economically viable without the Edea pulpwood plantation component. Since the planted areas have been small and not systematically exploited, there has been little increase in employment opportunities and availability of fuelwood. Overalb, however, the Project has enabled the country to produce planting stock and conserve seeds, and to strengthen and improve DF operations to recover revenues from taxes. 6.3 On the basis of the limited data corcerning physical implementation of the Project ( Part Ill, Section 4) the benefits of the Project will be limited to some 500 ha of village woodlots near Maroua and 600 ha of remaining plantations near Ngaoundere. Estimated output of wood from these plantings are estimated at about 16,000 m3 of poles and firewood over a 20 year project life, worth about $3.5 million. Ironically, the delays in starting the Edea plantations and the decision not to proceed after the destruction of the mill have resulted in major cost savings for the Government, in what would have inevitably become a major long term drain on public funds. 6.4 Economic Analysis. At appraisal, the economic rate of return was calculated on thc. three productive components only: the Edea plantations, the Ngaoundere plantations and the northern woodlots. The returns on each of these components are discussed below: - Plantations at Edea. Since this component was abandoned before any investments had been made to establish plantations using project funds, a revised rate of return has therefore not been calculated. - Plantations at Naaoundere. At the beginning of 1990 the Government proposed the establishment of ONADEF, a parastatai to replace the two existing parastals: ONAREF, responsible for establishing the plantations at Ngaoundere; and CENADEFOR (National Forestry Centre), responsible for maintaining and harvesting them. If a Government parastatal continues to maintain the plantations, the discounted present values of the costs of plantation maintenance and harvesting would exceed the discounted present value of revenues from timber sales for poles and fire-wood. Using the figures available, the economic rate of return (ERR) has been estimated at -2%. However, assuming that parastatal reform continues under the Bank supported Structural Adjustment Program, the remaining 600 ha of plantations should be turned over to the local communities, who would provide maintenance at little economic cost,  6 since the opportunity cost of their labor would be negligible. Even so, the heavy costs of plantation establishment by ONAREF and the loss by fire of 900 ha from fire, out of the total 1,500 ha planted would result in a modest ERR calculAted to be 5 percent, compared with an appraisal estimate of 19 percent. Woodlots in Maroua region. A rather similar situation exists for the village woodlots as for the plantations. They were established at considetable cost by ONAREF. Assuming that they are handed over to the villagers, and that the labor required to carry out future maintenance and harvesting is provided by the villagers, an ERR of 4 percent has been estimated assuming that half of the wood output is used for poles and the other half for fuelwood. The appraisal estimate for this component was estimated at 19 percent. 6.5 Financial Analysis. Assuming that the plantations near Ngaoundere and the village woodlots near Maroua are handed over to the local village communities at little or no cost, they will be able to make a reasonable financial return, as well as generate suffi-ent cash income to be able to purchase seeds and inputs for replanting. If however t Government insists on maintaining an expensive parastatal to maintain the plantations, the costs of maintenance will result in continuing financial losses. 7. Prolect Sustainability 7.1. From a technical standpoint, the project management and staff showed that they could establish plantations under difficult conditions. The sustainability of production under the existing system, with ONADEF responsible for maintenance and harvesting, will hinge on the extent of political support, the availability of continued funds for operation, the maintenance and replacement of equipment, the retention of high quality staff, and careful protection of the resource from fire, disease and encroachment. At present the local forestry staff is continuing maintenance of some of the plantations at Ngaound6r6. However, the machine park which was established under the project suffers from poor maintenance and a shortage of spare parts due to the lack of funds and is rapidly falling into disuse. Suitable standing pines and eucalyptus are not being cut for sale and replanting. The question of plantation management, including selected cutting, has not been addressed. Several plantations have needed at least a light clearing for some time, which has not been done. This leads to a considerable loss of production and could even result in a loss through fire of the entire investment. The question needs to be resolved urgently by the responsible forestry authorities. 7.2 However, the economic and financial analysis confirms that the national economy can not continue to sustain public sector parastatals involved in the types of activities supported by the project. In retrospect, it can be said that the project designers failed to grasp the importance of tree planting by the local populations, when it concentrated on Government plantations. It is unfortunate that the opportunity of supporting or encouraging tree planting by the private people was missed in a country where this should be shoukdered by the private sector if it is to be sustainable in the longer term.  7 7.3 The Project has clearly demonstrated that Cameroon cannot afford to make further public sector investments in establishing plantations. The Bank should not be involved further in assisting any such efforts. Moreover, the considerable expenditures on training" staff of the forestry parastatals have resulted in few measurable benefits, and the justification for the continuation of ONADEF should be seriously questioned by the Bank within the context of the Structural Adjustment Program, irrespective of whether further project finqncing is considered for the forestry sector. 8. Bank's Performance 8.1 The Bank supervised the Project as the situation warranted. The supervision missions appeared to be helpful in identifying the main problems facing the project, in advising Project management on how to solve them, and in continuously signalling to the Government (and the Bank) the difficulties faced by the Project and the need to provide political and financial support. It is doubtful wheth3r the Project would have achieved even its modest present level of results if the supervision missions had not consistently attempted to identify and address the issues. The supervision mission's recommendation to extend the Project provided an opportunity to complete on-going components such as Mbalmayo and Ngaounddrd. 8.2 Spending much time and effort on the recruitment of consultants wrongly implied that this was the most irnportant element of the project. The early preparation of a plan for fire Protection would have been more appropriate given the high forest fire risks in the area. 8.3 In retrospect, the following lessons may be learned from experience with the Project: (a) Project management was the responsibility of numerous agencies involved in the subsector such as the Ministry of Agriculture, and its forestry agencies. These had partly overlapping work programs and were not appropriately supported to be able to deal with the added responsibilities created under the Project. The planned periodic external evaluation of progress, as part of the responsibilities of the strengthened headquarters staff, was never carried out. The number of agencies involved in a project needs to be kept to a minimum and progress should be monitored closely throughout. (b) The project design hinged strongly on the Edea plantation component. Already the Loan Committee review in October 1981 observed that the Project would not be economically viable should CELLUCAM eventually not purchase the trees planted under the proposed project. When the Edea component was dropped, the Project became unbalanced, this might perhaps have been - with the benefit of hindsight - an opportune time to re-appraise the Project (instead of only re-design it) or close it altogether.  8 (c) The Project depended too strongly on the performance of the technical assistance team which was responsible for plantation establishment. Therefore project staff did not identify fully with the objectives of the Project and its implementation. The Government forestry officials need to be fully involved in project design and execution. (d) Some of the technical assistance work was inappropriate, for instance, trials and promotion of new technology was poorly coordinated with programs of the Centre of Forest Research. Research should be part of a specific programme and responsibility for research should remain with the appropriate agency. In any case the work could not be expected to have any impact on this particular project because of the long time lag. (e) The risks of fire in the humid savannah plantations were not adequately dealt with in project design and implementation, although experience of protection of forest plantations was available already at that time on sites further north in Cameroon. Responsibility between the participating forestry agencies for forest management and protection was not clearly defined. Also the fire fighting equipment for the plantations was inadequate and some arrived on site only after the forests had already burned. The responsibility for planting and especially for maintenance must be defined at the beginning of the project. (f) In spite of the problems faced by the Project, the working relationships between the Borrower and the Bank were generally good. However, although supervision missions visited Cameroon twice a year, some senior forestry officials felt that more frequent opportunities for i dialogue with the Bank staff on subsectoral and project issues would have been useful. (g) The lessons learned from the Project are "expensive" in comparison with the project cost and the meager results obtained in the field. However, they might be even more expensive if they are not taken into account in the design of other future projects in the subsector. It might be useful to organize a workshop/seminar of forestry officials, in order to review the performance of this Project so that the lessons learned may be incorporated into DF's strategy. 9. The Bonrower's Performance 9.1. The Government has been favorable to the Project and the shortage of funds experienced during project implementation should possibly not be construed as a lack of Government support because of the general economic difficulties of the country. Nevertheless, although dictated by economic difficulties, the fact remains that the Government did not fulfill its commitment to provide adequate funds to complete implementation on time, nor did it review project targets and objectives in line with  available resources. The Borrower made what use it could out of the consultants, especially at Mbalmayo. DF operations have been strengthened. Full use is being made of the new tax collection system. 10. Prolect RelationshiD 10.1. In spite of the problems faced by the Project and despite the exchange of strong notes, particularly concerning the technical assistance staff and the weak management of the project in the early years, the working relationships between the Borrower and the Bank were generally good. There was initially friction between the Bank and the Government over the selection of the technical assistance firm. However, this did not spoil the good relationship because both the project management and the supervision missions recognized the need of making the project successful. 11. Consultna Services 11.1. Internationally recruited technical assistance in line positions were a heavy element of the plantation programme. The performance of the initial consultants was so poor that their contract had to be terminated in October 1985. Their impact was short-lived. The contribution of the different specialists in organizing the Mbalmayo stockyard and seed conservation unit is recognized, as is the contribution of the workshop manager at Garoua. However, the disorganized state of the vehicle park at Ngaounddr6 and the non-availability of spares (because they were not purchased) reflects a lack of planning and work discipline. 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.1. In the early years, there was a deficiency in accounting procedures, inaccuracies in withdrawal applications, and delays in reporting of project progress. Auditing of accounts was consistently delayed. The accounts for 1988/89 are only now being finalized and audited. 12.2. Supervision reports were the most valuable resource of information for the PCR. Several of the supervision missions also provided thorough reviews and guidelines for use by project management. However, there is no full set of annual reports available at Bank headquarters. At completion, the Borrower had not produced a draft PCR. While information on loan disbursements was readily available, this was not the case for data on total project costs. Part of the problem probably lies in the fact that since the Project was implemented by different Government agencies it is difficult to reconcile their individual accounts.  11 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE (Part 11 has not been received.)  13 PART Ill: STATISTICAL INFORMATION I. Related World Bank Credits and/or Loans Credit/Loan Title Purpose Year of Status Approval Credit 784-CM Includes forestry 1978 Completed (Western Highlands RD components with the Project) objectives of promoting small-scale reforestation and erosion control Credit 1075-CM, Loan Same 1980 Completed 1919-CM (Northern Province RD Project) Loan 2406-CM Same 1984 On-going (Second Western Province RD Project) 2. Proiect Timetable Planned Date Revised Date Actual Date Item Month/Year Month/Year Month/Year 1. Identification 2/79 2/79 2. Identification 11/79 11/79 Preparation 5/80 5/80 Appraisal Mission 10/80 1/81 1/81 Loan Negotiation 12/81 Board Approval 2/82 Loan Signature 1/83 Loan Effectiveness 12/83 Loan Completion 12/86 12/88 12/88 Loan Closing 12/87 12/89 12/89  14 3. Loan DisburseMents Cumulated Estimated and Actual Disbursements Bank FY 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 -------- US$ million ------------------------ Appraisal Estimate 1.5 4.6 8.2 11.5 13.9 15.9 17.0 Estimate at Re-Design 1/ 0.6 1.9 3.4 4.7 5.7 6.5 7.0 Actual and Latest Estimated 0.0 0.9 1.3 2.7 4.0 4.5 5.7 6.7 Actual and Latest Estimated 0.0 47.0 38.0 57.0 70.0 69.0 81.0 96.0 as % of Estimate at Re- Design 1/ Date of Final Disbursement: June 10, 1990 Amount Cancelled: US$ 10.3 million 1/December 1985 4. Prolect Imalementation On the basis of the available information the following limited results were achieved: Appraisal Redesign Estimated Estimates Estimates at full (12/85) development Area planted in ha a. Plantations 8,800 nil nil at Edea b. Plantations 1,000 1,500 600 at Ngaoundere c. Irrigated plant- - 220 nil ations at Maga d. Woodlots in 1,200 900 500 Maroua region 1,500 ha plantations less 900 ha destroyed by fire. 700 ha planted, of which estimated 500 ha survive.  15 5. Prolect Costs and Financing Appraisal Actual Bank Bank Estimate Estimated Financing Financing Costs 2/ 1/ (%) ... .........--- (US$ million) ---------- ---- Part A: Edea Plantation (cancelled) 24.3 0 0 0 Part B: SEMRY Plantations 3. Vehicles, Equipment, Civil Works 2.0 0.7 0.5 75 4. Plantation Works 1.0 0.5 50 Part C: 1.4 Ngaound6r6 Plantations 5. Vehicles, Equipment, Civil Works 0.4 0.3 90 6. Plantation Works 0.5 0.5 100 Part D: Strengthening of ONAREF 4.0 7. Vehicles, Equipment, Civil Works 0.2 0.2 90 8. Operating Costs 0 0 100 9. Consultants and Training Part B-D 2.7 2.7 100 10. Vehicles and Operating Costs 0.2 0.2 90 Part E: Strengthening of DEFC 3.8 1.3 1.3 90 Vehicles, Equipment, Civil Works 0.3 0.3 100 Incremental Operating Costs 0.3 0.3 100 Consultants Services Total 35.5 7.4 6.6 90 I/ At redesign in December 1985. 2/ No information available. PCR estimate base on share of Bank financing as at Closing Date.  16 6. Proiect Resuln On the basis of the limited data concerning physical implementation of the project (Section 4 above) the benefits of the project may be summarised as follows: Appraisal Redesign Estimated Estimates Estimates at full (12/85) development Wood Production (m3) a. Plantations 17%. '0 nil nil at Edea b. Plantations - 22,500 9,000 at Ngaoundere c. Plantations 5,500 nil nil at Maga d. Woodlots in 12,000 9,000 7,000 Maroua region Value of Production (000 CFAF) b. Plantations - 450,000 180,000 at Ngaoundere d. Woodlots in - 135,000 105,000 Maroua region Economic Rate of Return (Dercent) b. Plantations at Ngaoundere i. Ownership transferred - 5 to local communities ii. Ownership remains -19 -2 with Government d. Woodlots in -19 4 Maroua region  17 7. Covenants Not Fully Cgmolied Wit Seotlon/Convenant Status of Compliance 1. Loan Agreement 3.01 (a) Borrower to provide funds to carry Not complied with. Advance Accounts were out project. established but were never replenished. 3.02 (a) Borrower to open and maintain As above. All financial transactions were separate Advance Accounts centralised at ONAREF. 3.02 (b) Borrower to deposit specified initial As in 3.02 lb). amounts in the Advance Accounts. 3.02 (c) and (d) Borrower to replenish As above. Advance Accounts as required 3.03 Borrower to make available land Complied with, with the exception of required for plantations. SEMPRY plantation. 3.04 Borrower to employ consultants Complied with, but with delays. satisfactory to the Bank. 3.06 Borrower to provide annual work plans Not complied with troughout. and budgets for forestry services strengthening. 3.08 (b) Borrower to record and monitor Not complied with. No draft Project progress of DEFC component. Completion Report available. 3.09 (d) Borrower to prepare a Project Not complied with. Completion Report. 4.02 (a) Borrower to arrange for supervision Not complied with. of Project Accounts. 4.02 (b) Borrower to ensure that the records Not complied with. Accounts for 1988/89 account for Part E may be audited. and 1989/90 not yet audited. 4.04 Borrower to maintain project- Not complied with. Some project-financed financed equipment equipment idle due to lack of maintenance and spare parts. 2. ProJect Agreoment 2.05 See LA 3.04 2.09 (b) See LA 3.08 (b) 2.09 (d) See LA 3.08 (d) 3.01 (b) Borrower to protect and maintain Not fully complied with. Protection measures trees planted under project. and maintenance weak. 4.01 (a) See LA 4.02 (a) 4.02 (b) See LA 4.02 (b)  18 8. Use of Bank Resources A. Staff and Consultant Inputs Loan/Credit Project ID Number Project Name Fiscal Year Pre*ppraisal Appraisal Negotiation Supervision Other Total 3CAMPA043 L20920 FORESTRY 1977 .2 .2 1978 .1 .1 .1 1979 46.6 1.3 48.0 1980 29.3 .5 29.8 1981 21.3 42.8 4.5 68.6 1982 1.1 4.7 2.4 6.5 14.6 1983 9.5 9.5 1984 25.6 25.6 1985 15.7 15.7 1986 13.5 13.5 1987 9.5 C.S 1988 t 13.9 13.9 1989 7.2 7.2 1990 7.8 7.8 1991 11.4 11.4 == _==s f=a===== =====tc t Total for the Project Id 3CAMPA043 97.4 43.9 4,7 116.6 12.9 275.5 Crand Total for all Project Id& 97.4 43.9 4.7 116.6 12.9 275.5 a Excludes time spent by Young Professionals _ . _ _ _~~~~~~~~~~~~~  19 B. M.ssion Dates Stage of Sent by MonthY Number Period Specia- Overall Types of Project Cycle ear of In lisation Perfor- Prob- Persons Field Represented mance lems 3/ (weeks) 1/ Rating 2/ Sector Rsview FAO/CP 2/79 2 4 n/a Identificatn. IBRD 2/79 1 4 F Identificatn. FAO/CP 11/79 2 3 F,F Preparation FAO/CP 5/80 I 7 F, F, F, APR IBRD 1/81 4 3 E, E, F, FA APR CDC 1/81 2 p.t. n/a 1. Supervisn. IBPRr 3/82 1 1 F 2 F 2. Supervisn. 2/83 1 3 F 2 F,O 3. Supervisn. .8RD 10/83 3 1 F, F, FA 3 F,T 4. Supervisn. IBRD 3/84 3 3 F, F, FA 3 F,O 5. Supervisn. IBRD 10/84 1 1 FA 3 M 6. Supervisn. IBRD 4/85 2 3 F, FA 3 M,T 7. Supervisn. IBRD 9/85 1 4 TC 2 8. Supervisn. IBRD 12/85 2 1 FA, TC 2 9. Supervisn. IBRD 3/86 2 1 FA, TC 2 10. Supervisn IBRD 9/86 2 2 FA, TC 2 11. Supervisn IBRD 12/87 2 2 FA, TC 2 12. Supervisn IBRD 1/88 3 1 F, FA, TC 13. Supervisn IBRD 2/89 3 1 F, FA, TC 14. Supervisn IBRD 1/88 2 1 FA 1 / E = Economist; F = Forester; FA = Financial Analyst; TC = Tree Crops Specialist 2/ 1 = Problem-free or Minor Problems; 2 = Moderate Problems; 3 = Major Problems 3/ F = Financial; M = Managerial; T = Technical; P = Political; 0 = Other  4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ S i -eD- A CD t 'r r . yt _, =>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ...... . 5 / g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~g 1\}- /+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ > _ . \- 3 5 _ 5 ,~~~~~~~