Zambia - Fifth Education Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 10677 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ZAMBIA FIFTH EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1251-ZA) MAY 28, 1992 '4. ~ A' Population and Human Resources Division Southern Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AfDF - African Development Fund JGAP - Japanese Grant Aid Program JSS - Junior Secondary Schools MGEC - Ministry of Education and Culture MWS - Ministry of Works and Supply NORAD - Norwegian Agency for Intemational Development PIU - Project Implementation Unit SIDA - Swedish Intemational Development Authority TNDP - Third National Development Plan UNZA - University of Zambia  THE WORLD BANK FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of DirectarCer.i.- Opsiathm Evaluaw m May 28, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on ZAMBIA Fifth Education Project (Credit 1251-ZA) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on ZAMBIA - Fifth Education Project (Credit 1251-ZA)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their omcial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without WVorld Bank authorization.  FOR OMCAL4 USE ONLY PROJECr CC)MPLMRPR ZAMBIA FIFTH EDUCA4TION PROJECI (CREDIT 1251-ZA) TABLE OF COS Page No. PREFACE .................................................. i EVALUATION SUMMARY .................................... iii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM IDA'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity.... . .1 B. Project Background.... 1 1. Economic Situation . ....................... 1 2. PolicyContext .......... 1 3. Bank Involvement ............................ . 2 C Project Objectives and Dscription .... .................... 2 4. Project Objectives ............................... . 2 5. Project Cmponents .............................. . 2 D. Project Design and organization .... ...................... 3 6. Identiica ion and -Peparation .......an................. 3 7. Appraisal ...................... 3 10. Negotiations .. ................................... 4 F. Project Implementation .......... ...................... 4 11. Start-up and Project Duation ....... ................. 4 12 ConstructionGroup 1 .............................. 4 13. Construction Group 2 . . . . . ...... ................... 5 14. Furniture and Equipment ........................... 5 15. Senitary System ................................... 5 16. Maintenance Program ............................... 5 17. Reform Implementation Study . ...................... 5 18. Project Risks and Unforeseen Factors Affecting mplementao .......................... 6 19. Decisions Affecting Implementadon .................. . 6 F. ProjectResults ...... 6 20. Junior Secondary Schools .... ........................ 6 21. Maintenance Program ......... ..................... 6 22. Reform lmplementa ion Study . ...................... 7 G. Project Impact and Sustainabifity .................... ..... 7 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwie be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  -2- Table of Contents (cont.) H. Performance of Participants ............................. 8 26. DA Performance ................................. 8 30. BorrowerPerformance ............................ 8 31. Project Relationships ......... ..................... 9 32. ConsultingServices ............... ................ 9 33. Project Docwmentation and Data. 9 L Conclusions and Lessons learned .. 9 35. LeonssLLearned. 10 PART IL PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE.. 13 PART IE STATISTICAL INFORMATION A. Related Bank Loans ................................... 15 B. Project Tumetable ..................................... 16 36. Comments on Project Tumetable ...................... 17 C CreditDisbursements ................. ................. 18 D. Project Implementation ............... ................. 19 37. Comments on Project Implementation ..... ............ 19 E. Project Costs and Fmancing ... : .......... ............... 20 38 Comment on Project Fnancing ....................... 20 F. Project Results ....................................... 22 39. Comment on Student Enrollments ...... .............. 22 40. Comment on Project Studies ......................... 22 G. Status of Credit Covenants ......... ..................... 23 H. Use of Bank Resources ............... ................. 25 TABLES Table 1 IBRD Loans Relevant to the Project ....................... 15 Table 2 Planned, Revised and Actual Dates of Project Timetable .... .... 16 Table 3 Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements ..... ......... 18 Table 4 Planned and Actual Completion Dates of Components ..... ..... 19 Table 5 P:.-ject Costs and Fnancing .............................. 20 Table 6 Allocation of Credit Proceeds ............................. 20 Table 7 Cost Analysis of Schoos ................................. 21 Table 8 Comparison of Appraisal Estimates and Actual Student Enrollments (1991) for Tbree Junior Secondary Schools ..... .............. 22 Table 9 Project Studies ............... 22 Table 10 Compliance with Credit Covenants .......... .. ............. 23 Table 11 Staff Inputs by Stage of Project Cycle in Staff Weeks .... ..... 25 Table 12 Mission Data by Stages of Project .......... .. ............ 26 ANNEX Annexc I Exchange Rate Fluctuations .......................................... 27  PROJECr COMPLETION REPORT ZAMBIA 2-'FJ7H EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT j1-A), PREFACE This is the Pro)c-t Completion Report (PCR) for the Fifth Education Project in Zambia, for which Credit 1251-ZA in the sum of US$25.0 million (SDR 22.2 million) was approved by the Executive Directors on May 20, 1982. The Government of Norway, through the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), provided 25 man years of technical assistance. The Credit came under suspension on May 1 1987 as part of the genertl suspension of disbursements to Zambia. The last payment was made in August 1987 under the limited list of exemptions to the suspension of disbursements. The Credit Account was closed on March 31, 1988, and an undisbursed balance of SDR 13,292,331.59 was canceled. The PCR was prepared by the Population and Human Resources Division of the Southern Africa Department (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and m). The Borrower assisted in con cributing cost and enrollment data, but since the project has been closed for more than four years and the original team involved in implementation is no longer attached to the Project Implementation Unit (PIU), Part II could not be completed. Preparation of the report was, inter alia based on the Staff Appraisal Report and related Working Papers, the President's Report, the Development Credit Agreement, supervision reports, correspondence between the Borrower and the Association, the Project Implementation Monitoring System and PIU progress reports. Comments were also obtained from IDA project staff, who identified, prepared, appraised and supervised the project.  PROJECF COMPLETION REPORT ZAMBIA FIfTH EDUCATION PROJECI (CREDIT 1251-ZA) EVALUATION SUMMARY Project Objectives and Content: (i) The project objectives were to assist the Government in carrying out high-priority items of the Education Reform as contained in the Third National Deve!opment Plan. Specifically, the project would address the equW'y of the basic education system by expanding education access in the rural areas wnd assist in improving the efficiency of the education system by introducing, within the firSt phase of the Education Reform, junior secondary schools, which would become an integral part of basic education. The project would also continue to develop and improve the maintenance of schools begun under earlier projects and complement ongoing efforts of other donor agencies. The African Development Bank would finance the construction and equipping of three Junior Secondary Schools during the same period. (ii) The project included the following components: (a) construction, furnishing and equipping of eight junior secondary schools; (b) renovation of facilities and the establishment of maintenance programs for existing secondary schools; (c) provision of technical assistance to the Project Implementation Unit through parallel financing by NORAD; (d) a study on implications and costs of the transition from the existing education structure to a new system. Implementation Experience: (iii) Project preparation from identification to Board presentation took five years (1977-1982) due to a lengthy approval process within the Government of the Education Reform and its integration into the Third National Development Plan. The project became effective in September 1982 and came to a sudden stop in May 1987 with the general suspension of Bank/IDA disbursements to Zambia (para vii). Implementation of the schools started well but construction was soon slowed down by the lack of foreign exchange available to the Government and delays in providing counterpart funds. Despite sereral measures and amendments to the Credit Agreement to alleviate the situation, construction schedules suffered directly from the difficult financial situation. At the time of suspension, three junior secondary schools had been built, furnished and partly equipped, while a second group consisting of five schools had only reached about 15% completion. The Maintenance Program achieved rehabilitation of 47 out of 69 schools and provided a full complement of training, while the Reform Implementation Study was carried out and completed. About 40% of the Credit was disbursed (paras 11-17).  -iv- Project Results: (iv) Tbree junior secondary schools with a planned enrollment of 1,200 students and 840 boarding places were fully financed under the credit. Actual numbers have exceeded these by about 40% because incre3sed social demand for secondary educatiou coupled with demographic pressure has outsoipped the limited supply of classroom space. Out of 17 Junior Secondary Schools requested by Government &. Negotiations, 10 were eventually constructed using resources from vario .s agencies as follows. Three were constructed using IDA funds, one school was completed using Government funds, three schools were constructed with the support of AfDF and another three were funded by JGAP. Due to NORAD's financial and technical assistance, the maintenance component was completed in 1989 and a continued plan of action for maintenance of all education bu&'2Ings developed between the Government and NORAD. The Reform Implenmentation Study, successfully carried out by the University of Zambia, analyzed the implications of atta..ng universal basic education by the year 2000 and underlined the importance of giving priority, in resource allocation, to primary education (paras 20-23). Project Sustainability: (v) The project focused rather narrowly on a single aspect of the Education Reform, admittedly of high prierity to the Government. The financing of a very limited number of junior secondary schools with boarding facilities has proved unsustainable in the light of the deteriorating economic and social conditions in the country. The impact of the Maintenance Program, on the other hand, has proved to be an extremely worthwhile investment (paras 24 & 25). Conclusions and .essons Ljarned: (vi) The project came at a time of profound change in the Zambian economy - per capita incomes fell by about 50 per cent in the ten years between project identification and its closure in 1988 The economic downturn made it impossible to attain the 3oal of nine years of universal basic education and put into question the feasibility of expanding junior secondary schools, while resources remained inadequate to finance the first seven years of primary education. To date many of the Education Reform recommendations remain unimplemented, with the result that the education system remains in the same transitional state it was in during the appraisal of this project. (vii) Towards the end of the project ycle implementation was greatly slowed down by the suspension in disbursements and by the 1987 World Bank reorganization, which brought about a hiatus in supervision at a critical time in the life of the project. The impact of the Educational Reform with respect to the new junior secondary structure will require a separate evaluation which would look into the qualitative aspects of the system including relevance, replicability and financial sustainability. The Maintenance Program was successful due, in great part, to NORAD's technical and financial assistance, while the Education Reform Study constitutes an important framework for future policy and planning in education (para 34). (viii) Notwithstanding the unique set of circumstances that bedevilled this project, there are some lessons leamed from this project that may be of value in future projects. These are: (a) the painful experiences of this project indicate that when a country is undergoing major economic or political upheaval, the project identification process needs to be very  vv - circumspect in order to reconcile priorities of the moment with the anticipated needs of the emerging scenario; (b) if a project is going to ta'ke five years to prepare, as this one did, it is necessary to allow for sufficient flexibility to make design changes in the project. Even before the project became effective, concerns were raised within the Bank about issues it had failed to address (parn 9). It is these issues which later tuumed out to be critical during implementation and which undermined the overall impact of the project; (c) planned and sustained maintenance of physical plant and equipment fR a major form of investment. A costed maintenance schedule should be an intet * t of project design in projects comprising construction of physical facillties (ps 21); (d) bmreaucratic decisions carried out to the letter without consideration for mitigating circumstances generate unnecessary burdens (para 28). Even within the rules governing suspension of disbursements, there were several actions that could have been taken to make the suspension and final closure of this project less abrupt and less costly to the Government; (e) supervision mission teams should contain a skills mix that ensures a technically sound review of the project (para 26). A technically sound mid-term review of this project would have indicated the need to recast the project in light of the dramatic changes in the economy and the consequent revisi"-i of priorities; (f) where more than one Government ministry is involved in project implementation, communication delays are likely to slow down implementation unless Bank supervision missions focused more closely on ministerial coordination (paras 19 & 27); (g) gaps in the continuity of supervision can have serious consequences in project outcome (para 29); (h) firm financing commitments on the part of bilateral agencies should be included in credit agreements (para 17); (i) implementation progress reports prepared by Borrowers should be designed to yield information that is operationally useful including explanations for actions taken and general implementation difficulties (para 33).  PROJECr COMXPLETION REPORT ZAMBIA FIPTH EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDRIT 1251-ZA) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM IDA'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity Project name : Fifth Education Project Credit No. : 1251-ZA RVP Unit : Africa Region, Country Department VI County : Zambia Sector : Population and Human Resources Subsector : Education B. Project Backgrund 1. Economic Situation. An assessment of the project must take into account the difficult economic period during which the project cycle took place, from the initial identification in May 1977, up to the sudden and premature arrest of the project in May 1987, due to the suspension of all Bank disbursements to Zambia, which particularly affected the later stages of implementation. Economic difficulties were triggered by a 40% fall in the price of copper in 1975, setting off a balance of payments and public finance crisis, and throwing the economy into a deep recession from which it has yet to recover. These problems were compounded by a decline in copper production and ore grade and by agricultural stagnation from several years of drought. During the 10-year span of the project, per capita incomes fell by about 50 per cent. The Government tried several times to restructure the economy, but none of these efforts was sufficiently comprehensive to bring about the structural changes required. Of these, the most ambitious was the Bank/Fund supported program in 1985-1987, which the Government abandoned in May 1987 on the groun.,,, that it generated excessive economic and political instability. 2. Policy Context At Independence in 1964, very few Zambians had completed secondary or higher education or received skills training, with the result that development programs had to rely almost entirely on expatriates for their implementation. National development could, therefore, be pursued only through a rigorous emphasis on education and training in the various development plans from Independence up to 1976. A general feeling that education was not producing the skills conducive to self-reliance and national development precipitated a government review of the sector and the publishing, in 1978, of a draft Education Reform to be implemented in phases, starting with the Third National Development Plan (1979-83). The Plan aimed at modifying the  2- existing education structure into 3 stages: (i) a basic education cycle covering the first n;ne yeas of school; (ii) the three-year senior secondary cycle and; (iii) the higher education cycle. Pwvisions we.e also to be made for continuing education in' Uding adult literacy and other aspects of non-formal education. However, implementation of the Plan was delayed, due in largo part to the inability -if the Government to provide adequate recurrent and capital funds to carry out the program. 3. Balkl Invkhwment. The Bank Group has had a lor.g and extensive involvement with the education sector in Zambia. Since 196Q, a total of USS69.0 million has been disbursed under four education loan agre3ments. The First and Second Education Projects placed particular emphasis on the expapsion and improvement of secondary, technical, higher education, and teacher training, in line with the need to alleviate the acute shortage of trained high. and middle-level manpower in the years following independence. With the Third and Fourth Projects, a shift in ervIhasis gave increased attention to farmer and health training, adult education and improvement of suppcrdtve educational services such as curriculum development and school broadcasting. The Bank also financea an education component in an urban project and project-related training as part of various infrastructure projects. C Project Objctives and Description 4. ect The project assisted the Government in carrying out high priority items of the Educhtion Reform as contained in the Third National Development Plan (TNDP). Specifically, it addressed the equity of the Basic Education System by expanding education opportunity in the rural areas and assisted in improving the efficiency of the existing education system by introducing, within the firt phase of the Education Reform, junior secondary schools, which would become an integral part of Basic Education. The project also fostered further efforts to develop and improve the maintenance of schools instituted under earlier Bank education projects and complemented ongoing quality improvement efforts of other donors. 5. Prject Omponen. The project included the following components: a) Junor S a Schools Construction, furnishing and equipping of 8 new junior secondary schools to be located in rural areas, p,oviding 3,120 additional student places Construction of staff houses for all the schools and hostel facilities to accommodate 1,920 boarders at 7 of the schools. b) ntenace Pm: Renovation of facilities and provision of repair mate rials, spare parts, equipment and vehicles for maintenance of existing secondary schcx is; ) mTech Asce: Provision of about 35 man-years of technical services to the P. oject Implementation Unit, financed by the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), for the implementation of the project; and  -3- d) Refom Implmoct So*. A comprehensive study to produce a detailed plan for the structural transition of the education system according to the recommendations of the government Education Reform. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) would assist in the financing of the study and provide the necessary specialists to the Ministry of Education. D. Poject Desiei and Oanization 6. Identiaition ad Prenar1M!n Preparation covered a period of 5 years, from the initial identification of the project in May 1977 up to Board presentation it May 1982. The first project brief of September 1977, based on a draft of the Education Reform, recommended broad sectoral support rather than project-specific lending. Possibilities of assistance were identified in the areas of upper primary education (academic facilities, currirulum development, teacher trAning, radio services); continuing education and quality improvement (production-orientee; training, distance learning); and higher education (agricultural university). At the time, this approach was considered particularly suitable; the reform document articulated the government's overall educational strategy and priorities and provided an appropriate framework for broad sectoral support. Release of the final Education Reform document in June, 1978 coLncided with the early stages of preparation of the Third Nationa! Development r; n (INDP). The launch of the plan was delayed by nearly two years, during which period questions were raised regarding the reform proposals and its cost implications. Based on the findiags of a re- identification mission in November 1980, a second project brief was drafted in February 1981, by which time it was felt that reverting to a project-specific lending policy would be more appropriate. 7. L The project appraisal, carried out in March 1981, retained the government's highest priority component described in the project ',riefE namely the expansion of basic education facilities at the junior secondary levei The report included the continuation of the secondary school maintenance program with the technical assistance of NORAD, which was initiated under the Third Education Project. It provided for a study on the implementation of the Education Reform to determine the most economic and efficient method to implement the Govemment's future education plan (the Government requested that the study be financed out of the Technical Assistance credit 873-ZA). The provision of additional places in the junior secondary schools was in line with the general impetus of the Reform, which proposed the, establishment of a nine-year basic education cycle in v,hich junior secondary schools would constitute the final two grades. & Following appraisal, processing of the project met with another delay because the Government had omitted to include the project in the three-year investment program for 1981-83, which replaced the TNDP and which had been reviewed by the Bank and agreed on with the IMF in February 1981. Confirmation from the Ministry of Fnance that the project had been included in the 1982 budget finally came in December 1981. Once past this hurdle, processing of the project through negotiations and Board approval went smoothly.  -4- 9. Durng the period that the project was held up awaiting inclusion in the budget, considerable debate continued within the Bank on several issues: (i) whether it would not be prudent to delay the project and await the findings of the proposed studv in order 'o develop a plan for implementing the Government's ambitious Educational Reform Program; (ii) due to the severely constrained Government finances, whether there was not a considerable risk in assuming counterpart funds for the combined IDA/AfDF project; (iii) the justification of expanding junior secondary education while leaving the senior secondary level unchanged (the issue being that the situation would cause further constriction of the bottleneck between junior and senior levels and of adding significantly to the nuwater of 16-year-olds who may be unemployable in a skills-oriented market); and (iv) whether the project addressed adequately the failure of the education system to provide properly trained technical and professional cadres (the appraisal report which raised the problem did not propose any direct intervention in this respect). 10. Nepfliatiow Negotiations which were held in March 1982 centered on the number of school- to be included in the project Initially, 17 schools were included in the second project brief, but a combination of escalating construction costs and deteriorating country economic conditions made it necessary to reduce this number to 11, since the IDA crndit was fixed at US$25.0 million. Once the African Development Fund confirmed its intention of financing three of the schools in a separate project, it was agreed that IDA would finance the remaining eight schools. As the Government had obtained financing from SIDA for the Educatiun Reform study, IDA Technical Assistance Credit (873-ZA) funds would no longer be used to finance the study. As it turned out, however, SIDA financing for the study did not materialize, and after a delay of about one year, IDA resources were used to finance it E. Project Implementation 11. t-n and eDtion. The early stages of implementation were relatively problem free. Following signature of the Credit in June 1982, the project was made effective three months laer, the Government having fulfilled the main condition of opening a special account According to the appraisal report, implementation was scheduled over six years, with project completion set for September 30, 1987 and closing on March 30, 1988. Actual implementation covered only 56 months because the project came under suspension with the general freezing of disbursements to Zambia in May 1987. 12. Construction Group 1: Cbibombo. Lubwe and Mwen. At appraisal, tendering and construction of the eight schools was planned in two stages staggered by a six- month intervaL The first group of three schools was tendered essentially as anticipated in April/May 1983, with the corresponding sites selected and designs based on Public Works and Supply (PWS) standards. Following contract awards, construction started quite well, but progress soon slowed down, reflecting the deteriorating economic situation. With repeated and drastic devaluation of the Kwacha starting from 1983, combined with a lack of foreign exchange, construction time planned for 15 months almost doubled to an actual 29 months. Despite several measures proposed to alleviate the situation, such as an increase in the reimbursement percentage of the civil works category from 60 percent to 75 percent (approved in June 1985) and an increase of funds deposited  -5- by IDA in the special account (approved in November 1986), the Government was unable to keep up the replenishment of counterpart funds in the account. Construction of Group 1 was finally completed in January 1986. 13. Construction Group 2: Chiwa Lumezi Mooye Sioma and Sohvw The second group of schools originally scheduled for tendering in September/October 1983 suffered directly from the consequences of currency devaluation and foreign exchange constraints described above. The tendering process for this group began in 1986, three years behind schedule, the delay having been caused by a lack of resolution on the foreign exchange issue. After an agreement was reached between the Borrower and IDA on a procedure to provide required foreign currencies to contractors, tenders were finally received in August/September 1986 and contracts awarded in Januaty 1987. With only a few months to go prior to suspension, construction reached about 15% completion in the case of four schools, while work never commenced on the fifth school (Miooye). 14. Furniture and Equipment Tendering for both furniture and equipment took place early in 1986, with awards made in March of the same year. Procurement was also affected by the recurrent problem of foreign exchange availability and by local difficulties in the supply of materials. Security-related problems also affected the distribution of supplies to schools with thefts occurring at warehouses and school sites. The three completed schools were adequately furnished and provided with some equipment. The premature closing of the project prevented the PIU from completing the equipment procurement process. As a result, laboratory equipment is lackdng, and the schools do not have functional laboratories. 15. n0i= SRstenm A system of waste disposal referred to as "soakaway", which was selected for the three completed IDA schools, proved almost immediately after occupation, to be inadequate for the capacities of the schools and, in addition, presented a health hazard for the school population. New plans were developed to convert or ease the pressure on the system by excavating coidation ponds. Before these revisions could be implemented, the Credit was stopped, and this serious problem remains unresolved to date through lack of funds. 16. Maintenance Program This was a continuation of a program started under the Third Education Project (Loan 900-ZA) and was designed to rehabilitate 69 secondary schools through renovation of facilities and procurement of needed repair materials, spare parts, equipment and essential transport. The program also included the trmining of technical teachers in self-reliance by providing them with special maintenance and repair courses. In turn, the teachers would be able to organize maintenance in the schools using existing workshop tools and machinery and utilizing the students for the worlk At the time of credit suspension, 47 schools had been rehabilitated, with the remaining 22 schools in the Copperbelt region scheduled to start in 198& Headmasters and teachers/caretakers from all 69 secondary schools had completed their training in school maintenance. 17. Reform Implementation Study. In order to determine the most economic and efficient method to implement the Government's Education Reform, this comprehensive study was designed to produce a detailed plan for she fuil transition from the exdsting education structure into the new structure. At negotiations, the Zambian representatives stated that the Swedish International Development Agency would finance  - 6 - the study. This assistance did not materialize, however, and more than one year was lost in starting the study. The Government then requested that a team from the University of Zambia's School of Education be given the assignment, with fees and expenses paid out of IDAMs Technical Assistance Credit (873-ZA). A four member team of the University started work in July 1984 and largely completed its task by January 1986. They issued an interim report for Government approvaL The contract was extended in December 1985 for the team to carry out a tracer study of graduates of two secondary technical schools. Partly because of the suspension of disbursements, the tracer study was not completed, nor was the implementation report formally approved by Government. 18. fProect Risks and Unforeseen Factors Affecnlg JInnIementation. The appraisal mission did not foresee major risks affecting the project. It would have been difficult at the time to prediLt an economic downturn of such proportions as actually occurred, although at appraisal, there were evidently apprehensions of adequate counterpart financing. The critical foreign exchange issue, which affected the project so dramatically, did not emerge in full force until the end of 1983 and, consequently, could not have been anticipated by the appraisal mission in March 1981. 19. Decidsions Affectny Imnlementation. The foreign exchange issue and the request to the Association for an increase in the reimbursement percentage of civil works took a considerable time to be resolved. The tendering of the second group of schools, initially scheduled for November 1983, went through several abortive exercises and was not completed until the end of 1986. Better inter-Ministerial coordination between Public Works (which had to rewrite the bidding documents), Fnance (which had to give its approval) and the Association would have allowed construction to begin at a much earlier date. Not until IDA's March 1985 supervision mission were these problems fully brought ouL The Association responded favorably to the increase in reimbursement in June 1985, yet it took another year to have this reflected adequately in the tender forms. These schools would have been near completion in May 1987 had these problems been resolved in a timely fashion. F. jectg Rm:uls 20. Junmor Seondad Schools The proceeds of the Credit directly financed the three schools in the first group, providing physical infrastructure and additional student places for a planned enrollment of 1,200 day-student and 840 boarding places. Actual numbers in both classroom and boarding facilities have greatly exceeded these numbers (Table 8) due to the heavy demand generated by a rapidly increasing population growth (3.4%o in 1985) and by a strong social demand for secondary education. Within the group of schools financed by the project, Mwenzo is a girls' boarding school in line with the Government's policy of providing equal educational opportunities for boys and girls. Of the schools left uncompleted as a result of the disbursements suspension, the Government completed Solwezi JSS with its own funds in May 1990. Meanwhile, the African Development Fund completed three JSS as planned (Kasempa, Maamba and Mpongwe) by 1988, and the Japanese Grant Aid Program completed three more schools (Chilubi Jumbe and Kaputa) in 1991. The number of Junior Secondary Schools built stands presently at 10.  -7- 21. Maintenance Profr'm' This is one of the most positive outcomes of the project. Due in great part to NORAD's sustained assistance, financial as well as technical, the objectives established at appraisal were well on the way to being achieved by mid- 1987. The continued assistance on the part of NORAD during all the difficulties experienced by the country up to the present speaks highly for this Agency's commitment. By the end of 1989, all 69 schools had been rehabilitated and the preventive maintenance training completed. A bilateral agreement was made between the Government and NORAD for a continued plan of action to establish preventive maintenance through committees at the national, provincial and school levels, with the objective of including all secondary schools in Zambia in the maintenance program. The development of a comprehensive approach to maintenance deserves high praise and could serve as a model for other education systems where enormous resources have been wasted through negligence of physical facilities and a lack of adequate financial provision for maintenance of physical facilities. 22. Reform Imiementation Study. The study subtitled 'Towards the Implementation of Zambia's Educational Reforms under Demographic and Economic Constraints 1986-2000" was never formally adopted by Government mainly because of the national economic crisis that had gripped the country by 1986. It nevertheless still remains the most comprehensive analysis of the Education Reform and its implications. The financial implications of achieving both the qualitative and quantitative targets of the reform and many of the options the report proposes are as pertinent today as they were then. Now that the country is on its way to recovery, the report will no doubt become an important guide in future policy development and investment policies. The central finding of the report is that priority in the allocation of resources should be given to the implementation of the first phase of the Educational Reform, namely to the development of the primary sector and of the necessary support areas, so that every child of primary school age can be assured of seven years of quality education. 23. Key proposals of the report include: (a) improvements in educational quality and relevance for the majority, who will not proceed beyond the first seven years in schooL This entails improvements in (i) teacher education, (ii) teaching materials, and (iii) science and mathematics education; (iv) increased emphasis on practical, production and service activities, with more community involvement in all aspects of school activities; and (v) reforms in the examination systems. (b) resource mobilization measures including the need to (i) allocate a larger share of the education budget to the primary sector, (ii) phase out spending on student allowances and bursaries; and (iii) share education costs across central government, local governments and consumers. (c) the need for improved management and supervision within the system; for a greater and more structured involvement of the non-government sector; and for better coordination and clearer setting of priorities of foreign aid. G. Project Iupact and Stbilit 24. With respect to the Junior Secondary Schools, project impact would be related to an assessment of the impact of the Educational Reform on basic and secondary education, including results related to the quality of education and graduates produced by the new structure. Such an evaluation has not yet been done but should be undertaken in  -8- order to evaluate the financial sustainability and replicability of this project in the dramatically changed economic and demographic scenario. In quantitative terms, the IDA credit achieved only three-eighths of its target, and the increased enrollment figures for the three schools must be seen as a diminution in quality output. In total, the 10 JSS completed to date fall short by a wide margin of the 17 requested by the Government at negotiations in 1982. 25. Impact and sustainability of the Maintenance component, on the other hand, have left tangible results. Having reached not only a very satisfactory level of physical maintenance in many schools but also having secured the Government's commitment and cost sharing of preventive maintenance at the national level, continuation and inclusion of such a component in future projects would be highly desirable. IL Performance of Participants 26. IDA Performance. In general, IDA staff contribution to the -project was professional as well as supportive. The delays in project preparation and appraisal were clearly beyond staff controL As soon as circumstances permitted, the various steps of document preparation leading to credit effectiveness were handled efficiently. Reservations described earlier (para 9) notwithstanding, project design was simple, with few components, which, under the circumstances, was particularly appropriate. Supervision missions were fielded at regular intervals and became more frequent as the problems of implementation developed. Since the uppermost issue of implementation was the lack of foreign exchange and its effect on tendering and construction, the sustained assistance by IDA technical missions was the appropriate approach. However, it is puzzling that during the whole period of implementation and 11 supervision missions, specialists in general education never reviewed the project from a pedagogical standpoint. It is clear that the team responsible for the preparation of the Reform Implementation Study would have benefitted from interaction, particularly at the early stages of the study, with such specialists. It is also clear that such a review would have indicated a need to recast the project to reflect the fast changing situation. 27. IDA showed great flexibility in approving measures proposed to alleviate the financial difficulties of the project, through increasing the reimbursement percentage for civil works, increasing deposits in the special account (para 12) and revising tender procedures to provide foreign currencies to contractors (para 13). These measures, unfortunately, came too late to have a significant impact on implementation but the delay seems to have been due to the lack of coordination between the Ministries of Education and Public Works, which caused communications delays with IDA. 28 In retrospect, the one area where performance of the Association could be faulted is in the way the suspension of disbursement was handled. Too little time was allowed for the settlement of contracts after May 1, 1987, the date of suspension of disbursements. A deadline for the receipt of commitments and eligible withdrawal applications in Washington was set at June 30, 1987. Before the message filtered down from Finance to Education and the PIU, to be passed on to contractors and suppliers, the deadline had passed, leaving many of those involved in the lurch. No flexibility was shown in this case. In imposing sanctions on the Government, many suppliers were punished in  -9- the process through broken contracts, and the consequences created by this strict bureaucratic decision have yet to be fully assessed. 29. There were no supervision missions between October 1986 and the final visit from a Bank architect in November 1987, due most probably to staff constraints related to the reorganization of the Bank. This was particularly unfortunate in the period just prior to and following suspension, since many financial difficulties described above could have been resolved through active IDA field participation. 30. BorowPerformance. The Project Implementation Unit established in the Ministry of Works and Supply (MWS) for the Third and Fourth Education Projects continued its responsibility under this project. At the time of effectiveness, the Director of MWS Buildings Branch was also PIU Director. The Unit was staffed through NORAD's technical assistance program with an assistant director, financial controller, procurement specialist and maintenance specialists. In October 1984, the PIU was transferred from MWS to MGEC and the assistant PS of MGEC was named Project Director, to replace the former Director, who returned to the Buildings Branch. Government was prompted to make this personnel change by irregularities in the 1983 audit report, which were later resolved. Efforts to localize PIU technical posts as they fell vacant when the NORAD experts completed their contracts were not always successful, and the procurement section, in particular, suffered considerably. These problems were at their peak in 1987 and did not, therefore, directly affect this project except in the general sense of constraining the capacity of the PIU. This capacity was further reduced by the loss, through theft or accidents, of a sizeable number of vehcles, which were eventually replaced but which left the PIU with severely diminished supervision capacity over a period of nearly two years. All in all, the performance of the PIU could be qualified as satisfactory. 31. Proiect RelationshipsL The qualified success achieved by the project was the result of the amiable working relationships between IDA, the Borrower, NORAD and the various participating groups themselves. An additional contributing factor was the level of professionalism, which was more than satisfactory among all concerned. Dialogue between the Government and IDA was sustained, amiable and direct at all times, even in consideration of the slow rate at which the Borrower responded to some specific issues. 32. Consulting Seices. The technical assistance provided by NORAD was of a consistently high level and has been commented on in this report for the Maintenance Program as well as for the PIU. The MWS input was also satisfactory, with the exception of delays in reflecting modifications to tender documents and procedures and the initial decision of adopting a sewage processing system that failed almost immediately. The consultant team from the University of Zambia who were responsible for the Reform Implementation Study produced an excellent report. 33. Project Documentation and Data. AU IDA project documents referred to in this report were well prepared. Of particular help were the supervision reports and the working papers, which provided factual information. PIU quarterly progress reports on the other hand were not very useful outside broad cost and completion data. In these reports, a subjective approach to complement costs and other data would have been more valuable for evaluating the circumstances surrounding key decisions and general problems of implementation.  - 10 - L Conclusions and Lessons Leaned 34. The Fifth Education Project came at a time of profound change in Zambia when there was a dramatic downturn in its economy. The long preparation period was indicative of the difficulties encountered in fitting the Reform into the country's national development plans and of hesitations in committing the Government to new financial obligations. The project focused rather narrowly on a single aspect of the Education Refurm, admittedly of high priority to the Government. Preparation having taken several years, it would have been preferable to wait for the results of the study on cost implications of the Reform before deciding on the highest priorities, which the report clearly identified as different from those earlier identified for the project. In retrospect, the financing of a very limited number of junior secondary schools with boarding facilities is questionable in terms of sustainability and replicability. Although the schools clearly met a very strong demand, their qualitative aspects have yet to be evaluated. The Maintenance component was successful due, in great part, to NORAD's technical and financial assistance, while the study on cost implications of the Education Reform will constitute an important document in future education investment dialogue between Zambia and the Association. 35. IbAn& Notwithstanding the unique set of circumstances that bedeviled this project, there are some lessons learned from this project that may be of value in future projects. These are: (a) the painful experiences of this project indicate that when a country is undergoing major economic or political upheaval, the project identification process needs to be very circumspect in order to reconcie the priorities of the moment with the anticipated needs of the emerging scenario; (b) if a project is going to take five years to prepare, as this one did, it is necessary to allow for sufficient flexibility to make design changes in the project. Even before the project became effective, concerns were raised within the Bank about issues it had failed to address (para 9). It is these issues which later turned out to be critical during implementation and which undermined the overall impact of the project; (c) planned and sustained maintenance of physical plant and equipment is a major form of investment. A costed maintenance schedule should be an integral part of project design in projects comprising construction of physical facilities (para 21); (d) bureaucratic decisions carried out to the letter without onsideration for mitigating circumstances generate unnecessary burdens (para 28). Even within the rules governing suspension of disbursements, there were several actions that could have been taken to make the suspension and final closure of this project less abrupt and less costly to the Government; (e) supervision mission teams should contain a skills mix that ensures a technically sound review of the project (para 26). A technically sound mid-term review of this project would have indicated the need to recast the project in light of the dramatic changes in the economy and the consequent revision of priorities;  - 11 - (f) where more than one Government ministry is involved in project implementation, communication delays are likely to slow down implementation unless Bank supervision missions focused more closely on ministerial coordination (paras 19 & 27); (g) gaps in the continuity of supervision can have serious consequences in project outcome (para 29); (h) firm financing commitments on the part of bilateral agencies should be included in credit agreements (para 17); (i) implementation progress reports prepared by Borrowers should be designed to yield information that is operationally useful including explanations for actions taken and general implementation difficulties (para 33).  - 13 - PROJECT COMPLEIION REPORT ZAMBIA FIiX1 EDUCATION PROJEC1 (CRDIT 1251-Z) PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE Part II was rLot completed.  - 15 - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT ZAMBIA FIFTH EDUCATION PRGJ A CT (CREDIT 1251-ZA) PART HI STATISTHCAL INFbORMA1ON A. Related Bank Loans* Table 1: IBRD Loans Relevant to the Project Loan Number Year of Purpose of Project Title Approval Project Status Comments Ln. 592-ZA April To provide quantitative expansion Completed Education objectives Education I 1969 and qualitative improvement in the 03/79 basically achieved. education system to meet urgent Project considered too manpower needs. Funded 9 new large and ambitious secondary schools, improvement of for a first operation. 56 existing secondary schools, 2 primary and 2 TTCs and 1 technical school Ln. 645-ZA Nov. To increase the supply of high level Completed Facilties provided are Education II 1969 manpower in selected fields by 12/75 effectively utilized. providing the extensions to the Improvements could UNZA Schools of Engineering and be made through Education. strengthening of UNZA planning capacity. Ln. 900-ZA May Expanding output of medical Completed Project amended in Education HI 1973 assistants; in-service training for 03/80 1980 to include 12 agricultural staff and farmer primary schools and training; curriculum development maintenance program services and additional facilities for for secondary schools. secondary schools and teacher Implementation training colleges. complicated by coordination of X All the Projects preceding the one under discussion here were I1RD Loan  - 16- unrelated subcomponents. Farmer training program ineffective due to policy changes during implementation. Loan Number Year of Purpose of Project Title Approval Project Status Comments Ln. 1356-ZA Dec. Improve education administration, Completed Successful completion Education IV 1976 business education and training of 03/83 of physical facilities. agricultural staff and farmers Farmer training affected by policychange as for Education m. Effectiveness of education admin- istration weakened through failure to use technical assistance and fellowships. B. Project Timetable abe 2: Planned, Revised and Actual Dates of Project Timetable Planned Date Revised Date Actual Date Identification Mission 05n7 - 08/77 Preparation Mission 01/79 11-12/80 11-12/80 Appraisal Mission 03/81 - 03/81 Credit Negotiations 02/82 03/82 03/82 Board Approval - - 05/20/82 Credit Signature 0)5/82 - 06/14/82 Credit Effectiveness 09/82 - 09/14/82 Project Completion 09/87 Credit Closing 03/31/88 - 03/31/88  - 17 - 36. Comments on Project Timetable. Project preparation took five years partly because after the release of the Education Reform document, project design was changed from broad sectoral support to project-specific lending. A further delay of one year occurred after appraisal because the project had been inadvertently left out of the Govermment's 1981-83 investment program. The project went into suspension, with the general suspension of disbursements to Zambia in May 1987. The Credit Account was closed in March 1988, although the last payment was made in August 1987.  - 18 - C. Crdit isbursemens Table 3: Cumuladve Esimated and Actual Disbursemen (in US$'000) Bank FY 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Apprais3l Esdlate 1.20 5.70 11.70 19.45 24.10 2S.00 Actual 1.20 3.86 6.98 7.50 9.28 9.S1 Actual as % of Esdlmate 100% 68% 60% 39% 38% 38% Date of Final Disbursement 08t21/87 lime I3ne of Plamed and Actual Disbursenent Schedules Cumulative Disbursements Estimated and Actual (in US$ millions) 30 25 - 20 .. 15 10-r 0' 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Appraisal Eitimate