Colombia - Popayan Region Earthquake Reconstruction Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 10704 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA POPAYAN REGION EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (LOAN 2379-CO) JUNE 1, 1992 Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division Country Department III Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  Currency Equivalents Official Parallel Rate Rate YEAR ($b/US$) ($b/US$) 1977 20 N/A 1979 25 N/A 1982 196 N/A 1983 500 N/A 1984 9,000 25,000 1 985 (May) 45,000 150,000 (Sept) 100,000 1,500,000 MEASURES AND EQUIVALENTS mm - millimaeter (0.03937 inches) cm - centimeter (0.3937 inches) 1 meter (m) - 3.28 feet 1 kilometer (km) - 0.62 mile cm? - square centimeter (0.1550 square inches) m2 - square meter (0.764 square feet) ha - hetare (2.471 acres) km2? - square kilometer (0.386 square miles) 1 - liter (0.264 US galions) 1/cd - liters per capita per day 1/sec - liters per sec. (15,833 US gallon per min) m3/sec - cubic meters per sec. (86,400 m/day) m3/day - cubic meters per day (264 US gallons per day) ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AC D Accion Communal, The Community Development Department of the La Paz Municipality BANVI a Banco de la Vivienda - The National Housing Bank BC - Banco Central - The Central Bank BISA - Banco Industrial, S.A. - The Industrial Bank BPC - Bolivian Power Company CONAVI - Consejo Nacional de Vivienda - The National Housing Council CONES - Ministry of Education's Department of Education Construction FOMO - The National Manpower Development Agency HAM - Honorable Alcaldia M.inicipal - The Municipality of La Paz JV - Juntas Vecinales - Neighborhood Committees MH - The Ministry of Health MPC a The Ministry of Planning and Coodination KUV - The Ministry of Urbanization and Housing SAMAPA - The Autonomous Water Supply and Sewerage Agency of La Paz SSE - Small-Scale Enterprises FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31  FOR OFCML USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of D,recto-Genefal Opetation Evaluateoin June 1, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Colombia PoRavan Region Earthquake Reconstruction Proiect (Loan 2379-CO) Attsched, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Colombia - Popayan Region Earthquake Reconstruction Project (Loan 2379-CO)" prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance | of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA POPAYAN REGION EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (LOAN 2379-CO. 1558-CO PART F AND 1726-CO PART L) TABLE OF CONTENTS Pare ND. Pre face ............................................... i Evaluation Summary .. ... .............. * ............... ii PART I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE A. Project Identity . .............. . 1 B. Bac':.round ........ ................. 1 C. Project Objectives and Description. 2 D. Project Design and Organization . ... 3 E. Project Implementation . . .............................. 4 F. Project Results ........................ . 7 G. Impact and Sustainability of Project Benefits.. 8 H. Borrower Performance ...... .. .. ....... ... .. 9 I. Bank Performance . . .....................10 J. Project Relationship a t i o n sp...... .......... 10 K. Consulting Services '0.......... '.0 L. Project Documentation and Data .10 M. Lessons Learneda r n ed.................. 11 PART II PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .. 13 PART III STATISTICAL DATAATA.................... 14 Table 1: Related Bank Loans. .. 14 Table 2: Project Timetable ............... 15 Table 3: Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements.. 16 Teble 4: Project Implementation. ................O.. 17 Table 5A thru 5F: Project Costs and Financing .22 Table 6: Project Results.... ... . . . ... 28 Table 7: Status of Covenants ..31 TAble 8: Use of Bank Resources. ................. 37 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official dut;es. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA POPAYAN PF'GION EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (LOAN 2379-CO, 1558-CO PART F AND 1726-CO PART L) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Popayan Region Earthquake Reconstruction Project in Colombia, for which Loan 2379-CO in the amount of US$40.0 million was approved on February 2, 1984. Additional financing for the Project was obtained by the reallocation of US$6.4 million from Loan 1558-CO (First Urban Development Project) through an amendment approved on February 27, 1984, and of US$1.3 million from Loan 1726-CO (Third Medium and Small-Size Cities Water Supply and Sewerage Project) through an amendment approved on November 8, 1983. These funds were fully disbursed when the loans were closed in December 1988 (Loan 2379), July 1986 (Loan 1558) and June 1986 (Loan 1726). The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure and Energy Operations Division of the Latin America and the Caribbean Country Department III (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III). The Borrower contributed extensive financial statistical information, which has been incorporated in the report. On June 6, 1991, the Bank sent the Borrower Parts I and III with the request to prepare Part II, but .o reply was received. Preparation of this report is based on, among other things, the President's Report, the loan agreements and amendments, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower contained in the Project Files, on a field visit to the project area, and on interviews with relevant project executing agencies and representatives of the Borrower.  ii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA POPAYAN REGION EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (LOAN 2379-CO, 1558-CO PART F AND 1726-CO PART L) EVALUATION SUMMARY Obiectives 1. The objective of this project was to assist the Government of Colombia, through the Department of Cauca Reconstruction and Development Corporation (CRC), in the reconstruction and assoziated planning and management arising from the earthquake of March 31, 1983, which destroyed a significant part of the economic and social infrastructure of t:'e city of Popayan and the surrounding areas in the Department of Cauca. Specifically, project investments were to: (i) contribute to the physical and economic rehabilitation of the areas damaged by the earthquake by restoring essential facilities and services and re-establishing a basic level of economic activity; (ii) support a streamlined institutional arrangement appropriate for efficient coordination, while strengthening the new and existing institutions; and (iii) help develop measures to minimize the potential damage from natural disasters that could be applied to this and other vulnerable areas of the country (para. 4). The Multi-sectoral Proiect Package 2. The Project was appraised three months after '-he earthquake. While the appraisal documentation argued for a quick response, it took nearly 11 months from the date of the earthquake to get the Project (Loan 2379-CO) to the Board. At the same time, the First Urban Project (Loan 1558-CO) and the Third Medium and Small-Size Cities Water Supply and Sewerage Project (Loan 1726-CO) were nearing completion. The devaluation of the Colombian peso had led to less than the expected dollar amounts being disbursed. To enlarge the Bank's response to the earthquake, it was decided to take advantage of these savings by reallocating them to eligible expenditures in the Popayan region. Disbursements under amended Loan 1726 (water supply) began 13 months after the eartnquake and under Loan 2379 (the main loan) 17 months after it. Delays in finalizing the subsidiary project agreements under amended Loan 1558 (shelter in squatter areas) held up disbursements until nearly three years after the earthquake (paras. 13-14). Implementation Experience 3. The coordinating agency for this project, CRC, efficiently managed the execution of twelve subsidiary agreements under Loan 2379-CO and nine subsidiary agreements under Loan 1558, in addition to executing parts of the project directly. Investments under Loan 1726 were supervised by the national water supply agency (INSFOPAL) and executed by the municipal water and sewerage company, Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Popayan.  iii 4. Although the emergency nature of the project precluded extonsive preparation of some components, execution closely followed the original plan. Flexibility was maintained during implemantation by choosing subprojects according to set criteria rather than specifying all components in advance, when information was insufficient. Major variances occurred only with respect to on-lending ternns for shelter and productive sub-loans when, in 1986, Congress lowered the 18% p.a. interest rates --at a time when market rates were 28-36%-- to 6% p.a. for shelter sub-loans and 102 p.a. for productive sub-loans. These changes prompted the Bank to cease disbursements against the shelter component (paras. 16-17). 5. Resettlement of the homeless in 17 new or reconstructed neighborhoods under Loan 1558 was completed with delays caused by political unrest in squatter settlements during the mid-1980s and by less-than-efficient performance of some of the agencies involved. While the physical objectives of this part of the project were satisfactorily achieved, these implementation problems resulted in costs exceeding original estimates by approximately 129 percent in local currency (paras 21, 28). 6. Water supply and sewerage works under Loan !726 were completed in three-and-a-half years. Technical defects in the design of the water treatment plant sab-project financed under this loan caused delays and cost overruns, which required additional financing from the CRC (para. 21). All other sub-components were satisfactorily completed on schedule. The loan amounts were fully disbursed when the loans were closed in Deaember 1988 (Loan 2379), July 1986 (Loan 1558) and June 1986 (Loan 1726). Project Results 7. The Popayan Region Earthquake Reconstruction Project achieved its rehabilitation and reconstruction objectives, even though there were some delays, as well as substantial strengthening of national institutions to plan and manage reconstruction projects. Additional benefits were obtained from the strengthening of local planning and implementation capacity and from the massive training of local manpower. Unfortunately it fell short in the area of disaster preparedness at the national level. Direct cost recovery also fell short of expected levels, so that the project's financial objectives were only parLly achieved (paras. 23-33). 8. Project design met clearly identified priority needs. Sufficient institutional and financial resources were mobilized. Physical and institutional results matched or exceeded appraisal targets. The one-and-a- half year delay in project completion in comparison with the original schedule was mostly due to the delayed start-up and is rather small given the multi- sector complexity of the reconstruction program. That most project components were executed according to plan is an unusual outcome in emergency circumstances. 9. At the same time, the project bears out some of the conclusions reached by the Bank-wide task force on emergency lending whose report was issued in mid-1989. In particular, the delays in start-up epitomized some of  iv the difficulties the Bank has in responding as quickly as it would wish when a disaster strikes. The institutional mechanisms for a successful line-of- credit operation take time to establish in the best of circumstances. The complicated procedures requ:'red by Colombia's legal and financial systems and the comDlexity of :elations between its central and local governments are not the best of circumstances. They contributed to the two-year delay becween aDp-oval and effectiveness for the amended Loan 1558 (the squatter areas compor.ent). Differences of view between the Bank's Projects and Programs Departments slowed down processing within the Bank. Overall, this was not a quick response to the disaster. (It may ba noted that the Jamaica Emergency Reconstruction Import Loan in 1983 became effective only four months after the ' rricane. It benefited from not having to deal with two levels of government --national and local. It also benefited from the Bank's 1987 reorganization, which abolished the Projects/Programs dichotomy in favor of a single line of authority and put all infrastructure sectors under a single division.) 10. While its start-up was slow, the Popayaii Project's final outcome was genera'lly satisfactory. This can be attributed to the Covernment's strong commitment, whi-h enabled the Bank's assistance to be used effectively to restore assets and productivity and ninimize the longer-term impacts of the disaster. Restoration standards met historical specifications and the best part of Popayan's unique historical patrimony was salvaged. Displaced population and activities were relocated at minimum social cost. 11. Although cost-benefit calculations were not practicable, either at appraisal or at completion, project results suggest that the economic benefits accruing from the investments made have been substantial and will be sustained over time (paras. 34-35). 12. Implementation arrangements were efficiently designed ._nd carried out, based on the central coordinating role of the CRC. However, during preparation, more attention could have been given to the transfer of responsibilities to the CRC regarding the complementary amended loans. This transition was difficult under Loan 1558 and did not occur at all under Loan 1726. INSFOPAL, the national water agency, was weak at the outset of this project and was abolished in 1987. Bank supervision of the water and sewerage component, which came under a different division, was inadequate (paras. 13-14, 39). 13. The most negative result was that the Borrower's early commitment to cost recovery was not sustained. Although participating agencies contributed about 40 percent of project costs, many of those funds came from central government transfers. Direct cost recovery from beneficiaries has been disappointing. The project's less-than-satisfactory financial performance partly reflects the lack of political will to support market-rate lending terms for sub-loans soon after such an extensive disaster. It is important to note, in addition, that reinstating the finaiicial soundness of the CRC remains a priority which requires the Borrower's attention to collections of inter-agency loans by CRC, of utility tariffs by local agencies, and of shelter and productive sub-loans by the financial intermediaries involved in the project (paras. 17, 33, 37).  v Lessons Learned 14. For the Bank, the project experience suggests the following lessons (para. 43): (a) The type of assistance which the Bank is good at takes time to deliver; it is unrealistic for it to aspire to deliver assistance in the short intervals (up to six months) which disaster relief agencies aim for. (b) The timing of the first mission is an important matter of judgment. Sf it gces too soon, it may misjudge the scope and nature of the assistance neede< the physical needs are then very apparent but the institutional .blems may be hard to recogr.ize. But if it waits too long, the Government may have embarked on a relief program that we find ill-conceived; we may lose our opportunity to take part in its design. (c) The multisector project design may be worth replicating, provided that the institutional set-up is strong enough and not too complicated. (d) Amending existing loans may be an effective way to mobilize additional resources quickly for an emergency project. (e' Emergency opArations justify retroactive financing on a larger scale than a.lowed in normal operationas. (f) Continuity in Bank staffing for a piroject from appraisal to completion has a substantial pay-off in the quality of the dialogue with the borrower, ease in modifying project scope when necessary and, in general, cost-effective supervision with relatively few missions.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA POPAYAN REGION EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (LOAN 2379-CO. 1558-CO PART F AND i726-CO PART L) PART I. BANK REVIEW OF THE PROJECT A. Proiect Identity Project Name: Popayan Region Earthquake Reccastruction Project Loan No.: 2379-CO 1558-CO Part F (First Urban Development Project) 1726-CO Part 2-L (Third Medium and Small-Size Cities Water Supply and Sewerage Project) RVP Unit: Latin America and the Caribbean Region Country Department III Country: Colombia Sector: Urban Subsector: Reconstruction B. Background 1. Earthquake Damage and Immediate Relief Effort: On March 31, 1983. an earthquake with an intensity measured at 5.4 on the Richter scale hit Popayan and 11 other municipalities in the Department of Cauca. About 250 people were killed and 1,500 injured. Damage affected all aspects of Popayan's urban systems: shelter, production, utility networks, public services and public administration. The immediate relief effort was efficiently handled. Some essential services were restored within days of the earthquake; medicines, tents, clothing and food were made available. Relief actions by the Government, voluntary agencies, the affected communities, the private sector and international relief organizations were prompt and well coordinated. 2. Transition Between Relief and Reconstruction: Once the relief efforts were underway, the Government proceeded to take the necessary measures to prepare for the reconstruction. Key actions at that stage included: (i) creation os' the Cauca Rehabilitation and Development Corporation (CRC) as a regional :-cunstruction authority and strengthening of the municipal and regional governments; (ii) establishment of a national reconstruction fund and special budgetary allocations; (iii) negotiation of external loans; (iv) development of a reconstruction plan; (v) enactment of various emergency decrees to facilitate the reconstruction process; (vi) introduction of seismic-resistant building guidelines; and (vii) negotiations for the acquisition of land invaded after the earthquake. The reconstruction strategy consisted in a 15 year comprehensive plan with an initial phase of 3 years focused on priority investments.  - 2 - 3. Bank Response co the Emergencv: Two weeks after the earthquake a Bank identification mission was able to assist the Borrower in preparing a comprehensive reconstruction program, which provided the basis for financing a multisectoral time-slice reconstruction operation. This timely Bank assistance also helped coordinate the participation of other donors and led to a coherent reconstruction process. Project appraisal followed in early July, three months after the earthquaka. C. Proiect Objectives and Description 4. Proiect Objectives: The project objectives were to (i) contribute to the physical rehabilitation and economic reactivation of the area affeczed by the earthquake; (ii) help build an institutional base capable of managing a coherent renonstruction effort and further urban development; and (iii) assist in the estauiishment of a framework for dealing with similar emergencies in the Popayan region and in other gec gically-unstable areas of the country. 5. Project Components: The project consisted of the following compcnents: (a) shelter (32% of actual project cost) through individual credits for home repair, reconstruction, and/or relocation benefiting approximately 8,250 families whose houses were damaged by the earthquake; (b) restoration of basic infrastructure (14% of actual project cost) including repairs, replacement, and/or extension of: (i) water and sewerage networks, treatment plants and pumping stations in Popayan and neighboring municipalities; (ii) reconstruction and repaving of streets; (iii) re-provision of power transmission, transformers and distribution; and (iv) renewal and extension of telephone cables and construction of a new telephone exchange building; (c) reconstruction of commercial, industrial and tourism assets (16% of actual project cost) through productive credits for repair and reconstruction of industries, offices, hotels, micro-enterprises and cooperatives, benefiting approximately 300 firms; (d) reconstruction of community facilities and public buildings (18% of actual project cost) including regional and municipal headquarters, workshops, health posts, primary schools, a bus terminal, three public retail/wholesale markets, a home for the elderly, a cemetery, a public library, and othe- community facilities; (e) provision of vehicles and equipment (17% of actual project cost) for rubble removal and maintenance of public services; and (f) institutional support (3% of actual project cost) including design and supervision, technical assistance, and specific studies.  - 3 - 6. The project was expr,cted to be completed in three years. Its cost was estimated at US$164.8 million equivalent, 71 percent to be financed by the Government and 29 percent by the Bank, including US$40.0 million from Loan 2379-CO and US$7.7 million from on-going loans: US$6.4 million from Loan 1558-CO Part F (First Urban DeveloDment Project) ond US$1.3 million from Loan 1726-CO Part 2-L (Third Medium and Small-Size Cities Water Supply and Sewerage Project). The most severely affected municipality of Popayan would absorb about 90 percent of the project's investments. The balance was allocated to other damaged areas in the Department of Cauca including the municipalities of Cajibio, Caldono, El Bordo, El Tambc, Guapi, Mercaderes, Morales, Piendamo, Purace, Silvia, Sotara, Timbio, Timbiqui and Tororo. D. Proiect Design and Organization 7. The Popayan Earthquake Reconstruction Prcject was one of the few projects of this kind to have been approved in the context of the Bank's emergency lending operations.- Its innovative feature was to finance a multisectoral time-slice operation covering the most urgent initial phase of a longer-term reconstruction program. Since speed was deemed essential to the operation's success, its preparation phase was shortened, basically consisting of identification of sector priorities and definition of criteria for selection ot sub-projects eligible for Bank financing. 8. Sub-projects were to have prior approval by CRC and meet the following criteria: (i) reconstruction of assets of critical necessity in the initial reconstruction period; (ii) immediate restoration of key social and economic activities; (iii) likelihood of efficient implementation and timely disbursements; (iv) insufficient or no other financing committed; and (v) confirmation of high priority by the Government and other authorities. In practice, the majority of the sub-projects were identified during preparation, and it was possible for the participating agencies to proceed with detailed design and execution at a relatively rapid pace. 9. The original scale of the operation was appropriate to the objectives of the project and its multisector scope well suited to the nature of the emergency. Adjustments to project scope were expected and handled in an orderly manner through correspondence between the Borrower and the Bank, periodic Bank supervision missions, quarterly reports, and annual action programs. The accelerated three-year schedule was ambitious but not altogether unrealistic except in so far as it underestimated start-up delays. 1/ At the time of appraisal of the Popayan Region Reconstruction Project, the Bank had approved 43 emergency operations totaling US$1.5 billion, starting in FY47 with a series of post war reconstruction projects. Previous earthquake reconstruction projects included a Road Reconstruction Project in Peru (FY71), multisector earthquake reconstruction projects in Nicaragua (FY73), Guatemala (FY77) and Romania (FY78), and three transport earthquake reconstruction operations in Yugoslavia (FY80).  - 4 - 10. Prvject organization contributed to the success of the project by establishing clcar roles for channeling financial resources through the Central Bank (Banco de la Republica-BR), for the general management of the operation through the CRC, and for the financial intermediation for sub-loans primarily through the Central Mortgage Bank (BCH). Responsibility for the execution of sub-projects was allocated to public and private agencies experienced in their respective sectors. This organization was supported by appropriate legislation and by effective technical assistaace to the CRC, the Cauca regional administration and the Municipality of Popayan. Also important was the support provided by the National Planning Department (DNP) throughout the implementation of the project, ensuring coordination between the reconstruction program and the national investment plan. On the other hand, the transfer of responsibility for the execution of the sub-projects under Loan 1558-CO from the Secretariat for National Integration of the President's office (SIP) to CRC was iess well handled, causing serious start-up delays. 11. Issues raised during appraisal: The appraisal raised issues about how large the Bank's loan should be, which financial intermediary the Bank should disburse to, and whether the loan should be to the financial intermediary or to the Government. First estimates of the damage inflicted by the earthquake put the cost at some US$400 million, wo the Bank proposed to lend 10% of this amount. The Government subsequently raised its estimate of its financing needs to US$764 million and requested a Bank loan of US$80 million. The Bank, however, was reluctant to raise its loan above US$40 million. It considered its lending envelope for FY85 essentially fixed and did not want to take away funds from other projects. Doubts were also expressed about the riskiness of committing larger sums in the face of uncertainty about the institutional capacity of CRC, a newly created agency, and the Government's commitment to cost recovery. Instead, the issues/ decision memo proposed a possible second loan at a later date, if justified by the needs and CRC's capacity. It also proposed that disbursements under the first loan be front-loaded. (Under the formula finally adopted, disbursements started out at 65% and were reduced gradually in three steps to 10%.) In parallel, the Bank began processing the amendments for Loans 1558 and 1726, to provide modest additional amounts from savings. Subsequent developments made the idea of a second loan moot (para. 17). 12. The issues/decision memo also considered lending directly to BCH as a single-tier operation, rather than the two-tier financial intermediation through the central bank that was subsequently adopted. The latter was preferred because of the substantial fiscal contribution implied by the below- market interest rates to be charged. The rediscounting mechanism under the latter worked satisfactorily; the outcome gives no reason to fault the decision reached. Finally, the issues/decision memo considered the alternative of lending to the central bank (BR) with the guarantee of the Republic, rather than lending to the Republic itself. It was held to offer no significant advantage; hindsight, again, finds no quarrel with this decision. E. Project Implementation 13. Loan approval and effectiveness: The amendment to Loan 1726 was approved in November 1983. The main project was negotiated in December 1983  - 5 - and approved in early February 1984, 11 months after the earthquake. The amendment of Loan 1558 was approved later in Februaty 1984. Disbursements under Loan 1726-CO Part 2-L began first, in April 1984, primarily because only one subsidiary agreement was required for effectiveness. At the time of the first supervision mission in May 1984, the Borrower had made an initial US$3.85 million deposit of counterpart funds to the Project Account, put into effect a new seismic-resistant building code for the Popayan Region, finalized a procurement manual for the CRC and entered into subsidiary project agreements with 12 project entities, thus meeting all the conditions of effectiveness for Loan 2379. Disbursements from that loan began in August 1984. 14. In the case of the amendment to Loan 1558-CO, however, difficulties in managing the transition between SIP and the CRC and in signing the subsidiary project agreements between CRC and nine executing agencies delayed effectiveness until December 1985, nearly three years after the earthquake. This start-up delay might have been avoided if transition arrangements had been more clearly defined during negotiations. 15. Implementation schedule: Project investments had alreadv begun in mid-1983 with clearance of debris and installation of provisional fi.ilities for critical public services. The Bank disbursed approximately US$5.2 million in retroactive financing under Loan 2379 during the first year after Board approval. There were some delays in preparing withdrawal applica.tons and issuing import licenses during FY84 and FY85, while the CRC was still in the process of strengthening its financial management. In general, however, project implementation progressed satisfactorily from mid-1985 through completion, albeit necessitating an 18-month extension of the closing date of Loan 2379. 16. Critical variances in proiect design: The physical results of the project closely matched its original design (see Table 4). Nevertheless, three intervening factors had important impacts on project outcomes, namely: (i) changes in on-lending terms for sub-loans disrupted the project's cost recovery plan, (ii) one specific study on national disaster-preparedness was not carried out, and (iii) sharp exchange rate adjustments led to unexpected loan surpluses mid-way through project implementation. Each of these variances is analyzed separately in the following paragraphs. 17. Cost recovery variances: The original on-lending terms agreed by the Borrower and the Bank ensured an adequate level of cost recovery conducive to the restoration of normal economic practice as quickly as possible after the earthquake. These terms, mandated by Resolution 32 of the Monetary Board in 1983, established interest rates at 18% p.a. for all sub-loans --at a time when market rates were 28-36%-- with terms varying from 2 years for productive loans with one year grace period, to 15 years for shelter sub-loans with 3 years grace period. Political pressures for continued relief led Congress to approve Law 132 in December 1985 reducing interest rates and extending loan terms for both types of reconstruction sub-loans. The new law remained ineffective for several months but had the immediate impact of causing disruption in the Popayan credit market, sharply depressing demand for shelter credit due to uncertainties as to lending terms, and effectively hampering the  - 6 - operations of BCH and other financial intermediaries in the project area. From April 1986 through December 1987, complementary legislation, decrees and regulations were enacted. The legislation was made retroactive to April 1983 through February 1987 and affected 53 percent of the estimated project cost. By mid-1986, when regulations were finally enacted, the Bark had already disbursed approximately US$12.2 million equivalent for shelter and approximately US$3.6 million equivalent for productive sub-loans. The Bank then decided to halt further disbursements on shelter sub-loans but continue disbursing against productive sub.-lo.as. 18. Variances in disaster-preparedness measures: Changes made to the scope of the study addressing the development of a national strategy for dealing with future disasters reduced the intended goal of this component of the project with respect to development of guidelines to avoid or reduce the impact of future disasters. The original study was replaced by a detailed analysis of the Popayan earthquake which, albeit highly skillfully completed by a team of experts, was no substitute for the intended disaster-preparedness strategy. One should note, however, that Bank experience of disaster-preparedness at the time was limited and the change did not raise objections on the part of the Bank. Other studies were modified but their changes ht.d no negative impact on project results. 19. Financing Adjustments: In April 1985 the loan disbursement percentage was reduced from 65% to 50% consistent with the front-loading formula (para.11). However, by mid-1985 it became clear that macro-economic adjustments affecting the peso exchange rate would substantially reduce total project cost in US$ equivalent. Devaluation between the time expenditures were made and reimbursement made from the Bank loan also reduced the amounts disbursed. These two factors left some implementing agencies unable to cover all their counterpart obligations. The loan was therefore amended in late 1985 to raise the disbursement percentage such that the average Bank contribution to the components financed went up from 27% to 46%. The amendment also incorporated additional investments in productive sub-loans, maintenance equipment, and reconstruction of public buildings, while reducing the allocation to shelter sub-loans. -. - Project Costs: Project costs at completion are estimated at US$94.7 equivalent or 42.5 percent lower than estimated at appraisal (see Tables 5A,B,C,D Part III). For the most part, the observed difference can be attributed to the devaluation of the Colombian Peso. In Colombian Pesos the project cost at completion is estimated at Col$ 17.6 billion or only 4 percent below the Col$18.3 billion appraisal estimate. Records of direct foreign exchange costs amount to approximately US$5.5 million equivalent, but the available dEta are insufficient for estimating indirect foreign exchange cost. The Bank loans-ftilanoed 50.4 percent of estimated total project cost or significantly more than the 29 percent contribution originally envisaged. Due to the above adjustments to project design during implementation, the actual costs by component (with the exception of infrastructure) differ significantly from the appraisal estimates (see Table 5F). 21. For sub-pro4ects under Loan 1558-CO Part F, estimated costs at completion are much higher than expected and, in this case, actually reflect  -7- cost overruns associated with implementation difficulties, rather than charges in project design. Shortcomings in the original design for the water treatment plant, under Loan 1726-CO Part 2-L, led to additional costs which were financed by CRC to permit the completion of the plant. 22. Disbursements: Table 3 and the accompanying chart compare the actual and estimated disbursement schedules for the project. During the first six months following effectiveness (FY85), practically no disbursements occurred. In FY$6 the pace of disbursements picked up and they were virtually completed in FY88. Thus, once the initial obstacles were overcome, the disbursement curve approached the appraisal forecast. Actual disbursements compare very favorably with the average Bank urban project and with profiles for all loans in Colombia and the Latin American Region during the FY76-FY85 period. F. Proiect Results 23. Proiect Objectives: The project achieved its physical reconstruction objectives, reactivated the local economy and significantly strengthened regional and municipal institutions. It fell short of expected levels in terms of cost recovery and in improving national preparedness to handle future calamities (see Table 6). 24. Physical Results: Overall, the physical objectives of the project were achieved. Performance of local contractors was satisfactory and local artisans were successfully involved in the process of reconstruction of historical buildings. A decision to phase the reconstruction of the municipal headquarters in five tranches was appropriate and contributed to the success of the project. 25. Operationally, infrastructure networks, social services and other public buildings began functioning immediately following completion of the civil works. Provisional facilities were orderly demolished once their respective functions could be relocated. An exception to this norm occurred in the new Las Palmas public market (representing about 1.4% of project investments), which remained unoccupied for over a year due to difficulties in re-locating merchants to what they saw as a commercially less attractive site. 26. With regard to residential and commercial real estate assets, very few affected structures are still visibly damaged. The majority were rebuilt with sub-loans financed by the project. Many new settlements built to accommodate lower-income Popayan families made homeless by the earthquake, actually now house additional families who came from neighboring municipalities, attracted by the new construction jobs in the city. 27. A solid waste treatment plant and municipal and department workshops for equipment maintenance were added to the original set of sub-projects. As planned, several reconstruction activities continue in progress, such as further expansion of networks and water treatment facilities, but at a considerably slower pace than during project execution.  - 8 - 28. The settlement component financed through the Loan 1558-CO and executed by SIP suffered from poor community participation and its excessively physical planning approach to civil works. The component did not benefit from the community organization experience of SIP as intended, and for this reason its efficiency was reduced. 29. Institutional Results: The project was also largely successful in meeting its institutional objectives. The technical assistance resulted in strengthening the CRC as well as the governments of the Department of Cauca and the Municipality of Popayan. 30. Special studies expanded the technical capacity of the Popayan water supply company and of Cedelca, the regional power company. Local maintenance capacity was improved at the departmental and municipal levels, through the development of programs for routine and periodic maintenance of roads, equipment and utility systemus. The base for further urban development in Popayan was established through a long-term comprehensive urban development plan complemented by useful land tse, traffic and zoning plans. 31. Appropriate seismic-resistant building standards were incorporated into the local building code and applied to all reconstructed and new buildings. The high-level technical study of the earthquake impact (para. 18) not only scientifically documented the event, but clearly identified the geologically vulnerable areas and recommended measures to mitigate the impact of potential future earthquake damage to the region. 32. In terms of preservation of the historical patrimony, a building-by-building historical research exercise assisted in the appropriate reconstruction of the historic center of Popayan, thus enhancing the capacity of both the public and the private sector in this area. 33. Financial Results: Overdll project cost recovery was estimated at appraisal to be between 40% and 50% of project investments assuming partial direct cost recovery from sub-loans and indirect recovery through utility tariffs. These targets are not being met for several reasons: (i) the majority of the shelter and productive sub-loans were re-financed at highly negative real interest rates; (ii) both BCH and ICT face substantial arrears on their shelter portfolios; (iii) approximately 60 percent of the Col$ 6.1 billion transferred by CRC to project entities (in the form of loans or equity participation) is unlikely to be recovered; and (iv) tariff collections by local utility companies continue to fall short of desirable levels. In sum, although the project anticipated unusually high levels of central government subsidies on account of the emergency, actual subsidies are likely to be even higher than expected. G. Impact and Sustainability of Proiect Benefits 34. Cost-benefit calculations were not practicable, either at appraisal or at completion. However, the physical results of the project suggest that economic benefits accruing from project investments are substantial and will be sustained over time. Levels of economic activity and employment in the region have declined in comparison to the most intensive  reconstruction years (when almost full employment was achieved), but compare favorably to pre-earthquake conditions. Although national preparedness to handle disasters has not improved as a result of the project, the risks of future earthquake damage to the city of Popayan are now lower on account of the adoption of the seismic-resistant building code. 35. Long-term maintenance of the project assets has been ensured through the technical assistance and acquisition of the necessary equipment. The PCR mission was satisfied with the maintenance standards observed in the project area two years after project completion. As to the substainability of institutional benefits, further attention is required to reduce the current operating deficit of the CRC through reactivation of collections and other appropriate financial remedies. H. Borrower's Performance 36. The Government's commitment and strong support for the reconstruction effort contributed significantly to the success of the project. It assigned high priority to the emergency and took immediate and efficient measures which maximized the mobilization of public, private and ir.ternational resources in aid of the reconstruction effort. Specifically, the Government: (a) established CRC immediately after the earthquake, as a regional reconstruction authority responsible for coordinating the relief effort, for developing a reconstruction plan, and for managing its execution; (b) created a national reconstruction fund to rebuild assets and support operating budgets of local institutions; (c) enacted various emergency decrees to facilitate the reconstruction process; (d) negotiated external loans; (e) promptly acquired land to accommodate population and activities displaced by the earthquake; and (f) recruited competent professional staff for the CRC and engaged experienced local and r.ational agencies in the reconstruction effort, thus minimizing the risks associated with insufficient preparation of some project components. 37. With one exception, Loan Agreement covenants were fully complied with, albeit at times with some delay (see Table 7). On the management side, the deployment of qualified staff and introduction of new management and control methods was accomplished by virtue of concerted efforts on the part of the CRC Board of Directors, the Governor of the Cauca Department, and the Mayor of Popayan. Strong community participation and the active involvement of the private sector were also key elements in achieving the overall objectives of the project. In retrospect, the policy change regarding cost  - 10 - recovery was the Borrower's only weakness of lasting impact on the project outcome. I. Bank Performance 38. The Bank maintained continuity of staff involvement throughout the project cycle, which proved an important factor to the success of the operation. Staff time in the field was predominantly used during project preparation (76%), providing the Borrower with strong support at the time of greatest need (see Table 8). Supervision averaged only one mission per year but benefitted from the quarterly monitoring and annual program revision systems set up at the CRC with Bank assistance. The Bank's decision to halt disbursements against shelter sub-loans in 1986 was justified, in view of the disruption to the project's cost recovery plan imposed by the legislative change of the on-lending terms. The Bank was also justified in not allowing exceptions to the agreed procurement guidelines for technical control and supervision of project works. The Bank's performance was less effective in advising the Borrower in the area of disaster-preparedness, and in supervising the water supply components under Loan 1726-CO (which came under a different division). J. Project Relationship 39. Working relationships between the Bank and the Borrower's staff were supportive and helped streamline project execution and quality control. Weaknesses were apparent only in relationships with third parties, specifically with regard to the transfer of responsibilities over parts of the on-going Loans 1558 and 1726 from SIP and INSFOPAL to CRC. (INSFOPAL was a weak agency at the outset of this project and was abolished in 1987.) These difficulties might have been avoided if clearer transfer arrangements had been agreed upon during negotiations. K. Consulting Services 40. Local consulting services were used in the project for design and supervision and for the preparation of the specific studies. Three of the six studies were changed during implementation but within the modified scope the consultants' performance was generally satisfactory. The quality of the consultants in the case of the geological analysis of the earthquake impact and in the detailed restoration of historic buildings was outstanding. Also worth noting was the photo-study of fractures caused by the earthquake to the water supply network, financed under Loan 1726, which greatly helped in repairing the system. L. Proiect Documentation and Data 41. The abbreviated loan processing documentation was helpful to the emergency nature of the operation and covered all key aspects of the project, and was well understood by the parties involved. The Loan Agreement exhibited the same level of satisfactory coverage and clarity of content as the President's Report, although the complementary amendments to the on-going loans were less clearly and/or comprehensively drafted.  - 11 - 42. Availability of Relevant Data to the PCR Mission: The CRC provided extensive financial reports on the execution of the project covering Loans 2379 and 1558 Part F, which proved invaluable to the preparation of this PCR. Much less comprehensive information was available to the mission on the sub-projects executed under Loan 1726 Part 2-L but, upon request, the essential data was later supplied by the executing agency. Finally, although experts from the Controller General's office and the Central Bank published useful analytical articles on the outcomes of the project,2/ the final audit of the project accounts was not submitted to the Bank, possibly because a small number of subsidiary agreements had still not been finalized in late 1990. M. Lessons Learned 43. For the Bank, the project experience suggests the following lessons: (a) The type of assistance which the Bank is good at, takes time to deliver; it is unrealistic for it to aspire to deliver assistance in the short intervals (up to six months) which disaster relief agencies aim for. Even though the Bank's first mission was in the field only two weeks after the earthquake and appraisal documentation was streamlined (no SAR was prepared, only a President's Memorandum), the first disbursements were not made until 17 months later. (b) The timing of the first mission is an important matter of judgment. If it gpes too soon, it may misjudge the scope and nature of the assistance needed: the physical needs are then very apparent but the institutional problems may be hard to recognize. But it it waits too long, the Government may have embarked on a relief program that we find ill-conceived; we may lose our opportunity to take part in its design. (c) The multisector project design may be worth replicating, provided that the institutional set-up is strong enough and not too comflicated. By ensuring that no sector was ignored, it increased the Bank's influence and effectiveness and facilitated coordination of the entire reconstruction effort. On the other hand, the multiplicity of implementing agencies delayed 2/ See Revista del Banco de la Republica, "El Sistema Financiero en la Reconstruccion de Popayan 1983-1988", by Dario Delgado, Jorge Trujillo Figueroa and Gonzalo Alberto Valencia Barrera, in two parts published respectively in March and April, 1989. See also, Banco de la Republica, Informe Especial, "La Corporaci6n Regional del Cauca y la Reconstruccion de Popayan", 1990.  - 12 - implementation, because of the time it took them to agree on subsidiary project agreements. (d) Amending existing loans may be an effective way to mobilize additional resources quickly for an emergency project. (e) Emergency operations justify retroactive financing on a larger scale than allowed in normal operations. (In this case up to 18 percent retroactive financing was permitted under Loan 2379-CO). (f) Continuity in Bank staffing for a project from appraisal to completion has a substantial pay-off in the quality of the dialogue with the borrower, ease in modifying project scope when necessary and, in general, cost-effective supervision with relatively few missions. The grouping together of all infrastructure sectors into one division since the Reorganization should make it easier to achieve the cross-sectoral co-ordination that was lacking under this project.  - 13 - PROJEC'i COMPLETION REPORT COLOMBIA POPAYAN REGION EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (LOAN 2379-CO. 1558-CO PART F AND 1726-CO PART L) PART II. PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S FERSPECTIVE The Borrower contributed extensive financial statistical information for the preparation of the PCR, which has been incorporated in the report. On June 6, 1991, the Bank sent the Borrower Parts I ard III with the request to prepare Part II, but no reply was received.  - 14- PART III: SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL DATA Related Bank Information Table 1: Related Bank Loans 1/ Year of Original Title Loan No. Approval Amount Disbursed Comments Urban Development 1558-CO 1978 2'i.8 24.5 Closed 6/15/88 2/ Canceled $0.3 INSFOPAL III 1726-CO 1979 31.0 30.5 Closed 6/30/86 3/ Canceled $0.5 Water & Waste 2961-CO 1988 150.0 15.0 4/ 1/ Source: IBRD Statement of Loans, Vol II (EMENA & LAC Regions), November 30, 1990. 2/ In February 27, 1984, Loan 1558-CO was ameinded re-allocating US$6.4 million (25.8% of the loan amount) to the Popayan Region Earthquake Reconstruction Project for the upgrading of squatter settlements which developed in Popayan as a consequence of the earthquake, including streets, storm drainage, water, sewerage, electricity, public telephones, credit for shelter improvements, community services and facilities, credit for artisan enterprises and technicail assistance. Actually US$6.44 million was disbursed for the p.ject. A balance of $345,645.37 was canceled at loan closing on 6/15/88. 3/ In November 8, 1984, Loan 1726-CO was amended to provide US$1.3 million for rehabilitation and repair of the water treatment plant; installation of about 34 km of water mains and networks; constructi.n of a pumping station, storage tank and a water main extension of about 3 km; rehabilitation and repair of about 3,000 house connections, including replacement of water meters; rehabilitation and construction of sewer collectors (18 km); acquisition and utilization of maintenance and operation equipment; and consulting services to carry out a census of water supply and sewerage customers, a leak detection and repair program, and an assessment of damages in the sewer system. 4/ One of the sub-projects financed by Loan 2961-CO (executed through the Fondo Financiero de Desarrollo Urbano) is a new water treatment plant for Popayan that expands considerably the capacity of the old treatment plan rebuilt under Loan 2379-CO.  - 15 - Table 2: Proiect Time Table Appraisal Forecast Actual Initial Request for Bank Financing 4/04/83 Reconnaissance Mission 4/19/83 Appraisal 7/13/83 Negotiations 8/29/83 12/15/83 Board Approval 2/02/84 Loan Signature 2/27/84 Loan Effectiveness 2/00/84 6/26/84 Loan Amendment 4/15/85 (*) Loan Closing 6/30/87 12/23/88 Loan Completion 12/31/86 06/30/88 (*) Reducing disbursement percentage from 65 to 50 against local expenditures.  - 16 - Table 3: Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (Loans 2379-CO, 1558-CO Part F and 1726-CO Part 2-L) USS million IBRD FY 1984 1985 19&6 1987 1988 1989 Estimated (2379) 24.0 '6.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 Act.al (2379) 0.0 15.4 25.8 31.5 37.1 40.0 Actual as Z of Estimated (2379) 0.0 42.8 64.5 78.8 92.7 100.0 Estimated (1558F) 2.6 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 Actual (1558F) 0.0 2.4 3.6 6.4 6.4 6.4 Actual as Z of Estimated (1558F) 0.0 37.4 55.5 100.5 100.5 100.5 Estimated (1726L) 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 Actual 1726L) 0.0 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 Actual as Z of Estimated (1726L) 3.3 57.2 85.4 97.7 97.7 97.7 Estimated (Total) 27.2 43.7 47.7 47.7 47.7 47.7 Actual (Total) 0.0 18.5 30.5 39.2 44.8 47.7 Actual as Z of Estimated (Total) 0.1 42.4 63.8 82.2 93.9 100.0 Date of Final Disbursement: Loan 2379-CO: 12-DEC-88 Loan 1558-CO Part F: 17-JUL-86 Loan 1726-CO Part L: 21-JAN-87 Source: IBRD LDSLOA1060 Reports.  Table 4: Project Imltementation (Page 1 of 5) Planned Actual Comnents A. Shelter Credit Loan 2379-CO: 1. (BCH) Low and median income housing (about 3,800 credits) 3,245 credits Shelter credit expenditures not reiibursed by IORD 2. (CCH) Housing in historic center (about 1,000 credits) 789 credits after 1986 due to change in credit terms umndated by Colombian law No.18/87. This determination applies to credits under loan 1558-CO as well. Loan 1558-CO: 1. (ICT)Low income housing (squatter settlements) 4,413 credits Of which, 1,286 for new housing and 3,127 for repairs About 3,450 credits for reconstruction and repair and improvements. All property titles were issued. including tenure legalization lmplementation began in 1984. Loan disbursements began a year later due to delays in signing the Loan -; Amendhent. Political unrest slowed implementation in 1985. Large post-earthquake in-migration vastly increased the number of squatters needing housing. Approximately 600 qualified applicants remained unserved at project completion. Cost were significantly higher than originally estimated. S. Business Credit Loan 2379-CO: 1. (BCH) Credit for repair and reconstruction of 140 business 263 credits The m dber of credits and average credit amount premises, 50 offices and 3 hotels in the project area was i.-reased in response to demand. Loan 1558-CO: 1. (CFP) small business credit (including cooperatives) 608 credits Of Which, 101 by CFP and about 500 by Corpocauca. Corpocauca also provided training and technical assistance to micro-enterprises. CFP withdrew from the project in May 1986 due to lack of comparative advantage vis-a-vis CORPOCAUCA in the micro -enterprise credit market. CORPOCAUCA continues the program with CRC financing.  Table 4: Prolect Imtlementation (Page 2 of 5) Planned Actual Comments C. Infrastructure Loan 2379-CO: 1. Water distribution and sewerage lines (155 km) in Popayan 140 km Plus an additional 80 km extension to El 8o-do. 2. Water treatment plants & pumping stations in nearby municipalities 7 systems Water & sewer systems build in the municipalities of Cajibio, Caldono, El 7ambo, Morales, Piendamo, Timbio and El Bordo. Municipalities shared approximately 25% of the cost. 4. Offices and workshops in nearby municipalities 2 Offices Municipal offices (Alcaldias) in Piendano y Cajibio. 5. Extension of water lines (4 km) to squatter settlements Completed 6. Reconstruction & repaving of streets in Popayan Completed 7. Re-provision of power transmission, transformers and 1 plant & Main power plant (Florida 1); 4 sub-stations: distribution lines 4 sub-stations Principal, North, Tulcan, and Central. oo 135 km lines Approximately 70 km low-tension and 65 km high- tension distribution lines in rural & urban areas. 8. Renewal and extension of telephone cables 5,000 lines Construction of new central exchange (AXE-10) building completed. Existing lines could not be repaired and were replaced by new lines instead. Loan 1726-CO: 1. Repair of El Tablazo Water Treatment Plant in Popayan Completed Design errors and defects in filtration technique resulted in need for additional funds (USSO.5m) from CRC to complete the plant. A larger treatment plant (not included in the project) is currently being built, partly financed by IBRD Loan 2961-CO. 2. Installation of 34 km water mains & networks Completed Northern neighborhoods. 3. Construction pumping station (115 t capacity) Completed El Tablazo pumping station. 4. Construction storage tank (3,000 m3) Completed El Tablazo storage tank. 5. Extension water main (3 km) 3 km Water main extension. 6. Rehabilitatien 3,000 house connections/meters Completed In Popayan urban area approximately 40% connections are now metered; the meter repair shop is operating. 7. Rehabilitation & construction sewer collectors (18 km) 18 km Sewerage collectors.  Table 4: Prolect Imrlementation (Page 3 of 5) Plnnied Actual Comments C. Infrostructure (cont.) Loan 1558- CO: Urbanization of 17 neighborhoods (squatter settlements) 690,000 m2 Land acquired and urbanized for approximately 1,900 residential lots and for community facilities. 1. Vater suply and sewerage (mains, distribution lines and house corrections) Completed 2. Pubtlic lighting and house electricity connections Completed transformers & switch gear 3. Publie telephones Completed 4. Streets and pedestrian ways, curbs, gutters & storm drainage Completed D. Commnity Facilities and Public Buildings Loan 2379-Co:. 1. Reconstruction Departmental Headquarters Completed Old facade restored, new offices (4,800 m2) built. 2. Reconstruction Municipal Headquarters (CAN) Completed Restoration in 5 phases after extensive historical research, using local artisans and materials. Provisionat installations build and used during the CAN reconstruction. 3. Repair 10 health posts Deleted Repairs completed under Loan 1558-CO. 4. Repair hone for the elderly Changed Construction of new building for 162 elderly instead of repairs to old building. 5. Repair other community facilities 5 facilities Accounting Office (Contraloria), Case Caldas", Toribio Naya school, and the Legislative building were restored. A new vehicle maintenance workshop facility was build. 6. Reconstruction bus terminal Completed Reconstruction and expansion of the urban transport terminal, meeting seismic-resistant standards. 7. Reconstruction 3 public markets Changed 2 markets (S & U) were restored and are in operation. The third market (Las Palms), a new building, remained unoccupied for over a year due to location problems and weak demand, in early 1991, 80X of the stalls were occupied.  Table 4: Proiect Imwlementation (Page 4 of 5) Planned Actual Comments D. Community Facilities (cont.) 8. Reconstruction slaughter house Changed Replaced by construction of municipal workshops. 9. Reconstruction cemetery Completed 10. Reconstruction public library Deleted Public library restoration deleted. Loan 1558-CO: 1. Construction of primary school classrooms and ancillary facilities in squatter settlements Completed The schools and health posts were repaired, 2. Construction of health center in squatter settlements Completed expanded and equipped. All were fully operational at project completion. E. Provision of Vehicles and Ecuijment Loan 2379-CO: 1. Road construction/maintenance equipment including: 113 acquired Of the heavy equipment acquired for the Dept of (100) tipping trucks and miscellaneous vehicles, Cauca, 13 were transferred to the Municipality 3 mechanical shovels, asphalt tanker, 2 water tankers, for street maintenance. 2 graders, 1 conpressor, 2 bulLdozers 2. Water/sewerage pipes, valves, Fximps and fittings Acquired 3. Solid waste processing equipment Acquired A solid waste treatment plant was built. 4. Fire fighting equipment Acquired 5. Passenger vehicles (station wagons) Acquired Vehicles for CRC and Dept of Cauca. 6. Computer equipment & software for CRC & Municipality Acquired In operation at CRC and the Municipality. 7. Electric transformers, cables, switch gear & accessories Acquired 8. Telephone cables, equipment & maintenance spares Acquired Loan 1558-Ca: 1. Equipment for primary school and health center Acquired In new settlements. 2. Equipment, vehicles, materials and tools for training in self-help housing construction Acquired By SENA. 3. Equipment and materials for electricity distribution and public telephones Acquired By CERELCA and ENTEL.  Table 4: Proiect lmplementation (Page 5 of 5) Ptarmed Actual Conments E. Goods (cont.) Loan 1726-CO: 1. Water & sewer pipes, fittings, pumps & spares Acquired 2. Computer data processing equipment for Acueducto Acquired 3. Water meters, registers & hydrants Acquired 4. Leakage detection equipment for wate, & sewer lines Acquired 5. Sewerage cleaning equipment Acquired F. Studies Loan 2379-CO: 1. Building code with seismic-resistant standards Completed Published as "Reconstruccion de Popayan: Plan de Accion, Cartilla Guia de Construccion" Popayan, 1983, 46 pp. Applied to new buildings and restorations. 2. National strategy for dealing with future calamities Changed Replaced by detailed analysis of the earthquake under the coordination of INGEONINAS, published as "El Sismo de Popayan del 31 de Marzo de 1983" Bogota, 1986, 320 pp. 3. Long term coaprehensive development of Dept of Cauca Changed Replaced by "Popayan Urban Development Plan - Year 2003"1, deemed unrealistic and lacking in analytical depth. 4. Maintenance of vehicles and other mobile equipment Completed By Dept. Cauca. 5. Improving of local planning and financial management Completed Land use and zoning plans completed by Municipality; Financial & Administrative Technical Assistance provided to the Municipality. 6. Long-term reconstruction of the historic center of Popayan Changed Each historic building was object of detailed study prior to restoration works. 7. Reduction of power losses caused by clpndestine connections Completed By Cedelca. Loan 1726-CO: 1. Photo-study of network fractures caused by earthquake Completed By Acueducto. Loan 1558-Co: 1. Census of the population of 23 squatter settlements Completed By OCA assisted by ICT. ICT updates this census.  - 22 - POPAYAN REGION EARTHQUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT TABLE 5A - COMPARISON BETWEEN APPRAISAL ESTIMATES AND ACTUAL COST (Loan 2379-CO) Total Cost in USS millions /1 Total Cost in COLS millions ........... . .........