Haiti - Forestry Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 9399 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT HAITI FORESTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1257-HA) MARCH 7, 1991 Agriculture Operations Division Country Department III Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENT Gourde (G) 1 = US$0.2 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AFVP - French Association of Volunteers for Progress BD - Cadaster Bureau BME - Mines and Energy Bureau CRDI - International Development Research Center CTFT - Technical Center of Tropical Forest DCA - Development Credit Agreement EMAF - Agricultural and Forestry School ENGREF - National School or Rural, Water and Forestry Engineers FAH - Haitian Armed Forces FAMV - Faculty of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine FB - Forestry Bureau IDA - International Development Association MARNDR - Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development PFN - National Forestry Project SAC's - Agricultural Credit Societies GOVERNMENT OF HAITI FISCAL YEAR October 1 - September 30  FOR OmFCL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. YJico d oDecwe.cAew#al Opmatiam EvauAlIOM March 7, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Haiti Forestry Prolect (Credit 1257-HA) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled 'Project Completion Report on Haiti - Forestry Project (Credit 1257-HA)' prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT HAITI FOPESTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1257-BA,) Table of Contents Page No. Preface .. ........................ i Evaluation Summary .......................................... l iii Part I - PROJECT REVIEW PROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ............. 1 Project Identity .................................................. 1 Project Background ......................................... 1 Project Objectives and Description ......................... 1 Project Design and Organization ............................ 2 Project Implementation ........ ............................. 2 Project Results ..... ...................... ....................... 3 Project Sustainability ................................ #..... 7 IDA Performance ............. ...... ........... . ........... 8 Borrower Performance . ................................... 8 IDA/Project Relationship ...... .. ................. . 9 Consulting Services ................................................. 9 Project Documentation and Data ............................. 9 Part II - PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .......*, 11 Part III - STATISTICAL INFORMATION ............................ 31 Table 1 - Related IDA Credits ............................ 31 Table 2- Project Timetable ............................. 32 Table 3 - Credit Disbursements ........... ...........oe 35 Table 4- Project Costs ...........................,,,.36 Table 5- Direct Benefits ...........................,.,, 38 Table 6 - Status of Covenants ... 40 Table 7- Staff Inputs ..................... 42 MAP - IBRD 15925R IThis document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. ItS contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Wor:d Bank authorization.I  1i- PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BAITI FORESTRY PROJECT (CMDIT 1257-SA) Preface 1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Forestry Project in Haiti, for which Credit 1257-HA in the amount of US$4.0 million was approved on June 3, 1982. The final closing date was December 30, 1989, two and a half years behind schedule. US$4.2 million was disbursed and the last disbursement was on February 13, 1990 (para. 6.10 and Table 3). 2. The PCR was jointly prepared by the Agriculture Operations III Division of the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III) and the Borrower (Part II). 3. Preparation of this PCR was started during the Bank's final supervision mission of the project in April 1989, and is based, inter alia, on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Development Credit Agreement; supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and internal Bank memoranda.  - iii - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT HAITI FORESTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1257-MA) Evaluation Summary Obiectives 1. The project was a pilot phase for a long-term program of forestry development. The project was to define and begin institution building for a systematic approach to reforestation and included the following componentss (i) strengthening and restructuring of the Forestry Bureau; (ii) forestry training in Haiti and abroad; (iii) pilot fuelvood plantings and fuelwood species trials; (iv) management and improvement of about 20,000 ha of existing pine forests; (v) testing and promotion of cheap and fuel efficient stoves; and (vi) preparation of a follow-up forestry project (para. 3.01). Implementation Experience 2. The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) became effective on December 14, 1982, almost six months after the DCA was signed (para. 5.01). The final closing date for the project was December 30, 1989, two and a half years after the appraisal estimate (para. 5.02). Past IDA experience in the agriculture sector in Haiti has shown slow IDA disbursement and project implementation, primarily due to lack of technical staff, institutional weaknesses, budgetary constraints and slow authorization of expenditures by the Government. Coupled with these risks was the lack of awareness of the rural population concerning preservation of wood resources. The appraisal mission recognized these risks. The risk of financial constraints was minimized, to some extent, by the use of the Special Account. However, flexibility in implementation and close supervision were not enough to minimize all the risks so that the project could fully meet its objectives (para. 5.03). A negative influencing factor for project implementation was the political turmoil during the last four years of implementation (para. 5.04). Results 3. Total proiect cost was US$5.2 million (102Z of appraisal estimate of US$5.0 million) (Table 4, page 1 of 2). Disbu:sement of credit funds was particularly slow during the 1985-86 period (due to the political uncertainty in the country), but thereafter increased to be more in line with appraisal estimates (Table 3). The slow process of strengthening the  - iv - Forestry Bureau has begun. In spite of the fact that technical assistance was slow to come into place, expatriate advisers were hired and took charge of overall project supervision, management of the Foret des Pins, and local training (paras. 6.02 and 6.03). The forestry training component was satisfactorily implemented with most of the 60 mid-level forestry technicians graduating from the program subsequently being enrolled in the Projet Forestier National (PFN). Less satisfactory was the training abroad for higher level forestry technicians, in part because of the high costs involved (paras. 6.03 and 6.04). After a slow start, the pilot fuelwood plantings program took off in 1985. In the beginning, results were disappointing, in part due to lack of expertise among the staff. However, in 1987 and 1988, plantings had reached 80% of the original target of 500 ha. For the trials of fuelwood species, useful information has been collected. However, viable technology and practical approaches for large-scale reforestation programs have not been developed. Land tenure conflicts with the local population, as well as an erratic rainfall pattern, have hampered the effective implementation of this component (para. 6.05). The management plan for the Foret des Pins has not been completed primarily because of continuous political disturbances which made operations in the Foret des Pins both difficult and datgerous. An inventory has been completed for about 45Z of the Foret des Pins and the forest limits have been demarcated. Without the project's continuous presence in the Foret des Pins, this only remaining natural forest in Haiti would have been subject not only to substantial encroachments from the neighboring population, but also to wide scale illegal logging (para. 6.07). The results from the testing and promotion of cheap and fuel efficient sto-es have been disappointing. A market survey was initiated, however, with inconclusive results (para. 6.08). Preparation of a follow-up proiect was undertaken during the last two years of project implementation. Both IDA and FAO-CP staff worked closely with the Haitians. A draft of future forestry legislation was prepared in 1985 but its review was delayed due to political events starting in 1986 (para. 6.09). 4. Since the project was a pilot operation, it has had no impact on the overall wood and forestry situation in Haiti. However, the project has enabled the Government to initiate the strengthening of the Forestry Bureau in the MARNDR, and to initiate discussions with IDA and other institutions on a follow-up project of a much larger scope. The project has had a reasonable impact on development of human resources and has had a limited contribution to improvement of the physical environment by developing some fuelwood plantings and slowing down destruction of the natural pine forests (para. 6.12). 5. A financial and economic analysis was made at appraisal for the Pine Forest management. At completion, this analysis has not been made because: (i) the project was a pilot operation; (ii) the field trials did not provide practical approaches for large-scale reforestation programs; (iii) the component for Pine Forest management did not produce direct and immediate cash income as anticipated at appraisal; and (iv) the financial and economic analyses made at appraisal were based on general assumptions in lieu of reliable actual data in the country, which at this time is tno early to be ccnfirmed (para. 6.13).  Sustainability 6. The project is not likely to sustain its activities throughout its economic life unless a new external source of concessionary financing becomes available. After disbursement under the project ceases, permanent staff salaries may still be funded, but no budget would be available for operational expenses and investments (para. 7.01). Lessons Learned 7. Given the circumstances in Haiti, particularly over the last four years, the following lessons are apparent from the experience under the project: (i) Because of the human resource constraints, amplified by persistent budgetary shortages, project objectives need to be modest, even though the magnitude of problems to be addressed is large (para. 8.02). (ii) The sustainability of projects cannot be assumed to follow, even after a relatively successful project, because of the larger institutional weaknesses across Government and the highly constrained budgetary situation. Ways must be found to continue to provide support since it is only through sustained eifort that progress is achieved. The pilot project in this instance succeeded in initiating a number of actions but their utility will be lost if additional external support does not follow. (For example, a forestry training capacity was established. Likewise, a forestry departmer.t was established to implement programs and provide employment for forestry graduates. Methodology was also developed for working with farmers living within the pine forest to replant denuded areas) (para. 7.01). (iii) The cooperation and understanding of local communities must be obtained before embarking on projects in these areas, even in the absence of land tenure issues, in order that they appreciate the purpose of the work and do not interpret things incorrectly. (For example, the trials to measure the impact of restricting grazing on regrowth was interpreted by localoi as part of a Government effort to restrict their access to grazing land. Hence they broke down the fences on the trial plot) (para. 9.03). (iv) For forestry, or tree planting or even management of native stands, some mechanism of enforcement must be institutionalized because population pressures on the land are such that wood of any form is at a premium. Protection must therefore be a critical part of any forestry or environmental solution effort (para. 9.03).  - vi - (v) The project has confirmed again the importance of doing pilot work when the technology or methodology is not known or, as was the case on this project, neither the institutional mechanisms for implementation nor oupply of trained manpower exist. The issue of institutional strengthening is being addressed during the preparation of a follow-up IDA project (para. 8.02,. (vi) When it is clear that expatriate staff hired for a project are not performing adequately, IDA should act promptly to replace such staff. (In this project IDA decided not to renew the contract of the expatriate forestry adviser who was perceived as not committed to project objectives. His replacement proved to be more active and dedicated to the project) (paras. 5.05 and 6.03). (vii) The project highlights the importance of ensuring mutual objectives within international cooperating agencies for project implementation. In this case, CRDI, on whom there was an initial financial dependency, did not have the same objectives as IDA, the major project financing agency (para. 6.06).  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT HAITI FORESTRY PROJECT (CREDIT 1257-BA) Part I 1. Prolect Identity Project Name: Forestry Projet. Credit No.: 1257-HA RVP Unit: Latin America and the Caribbean Country: Haiti Sector: Agriculture Subsector: Forestry _. Prolect Background 2.01 In 1980, it was estimated that 72% of the energy used by Haiti was derived from wood. Today, wood covers over 83% of energy requirements for the country. At the same time, agricultural production has been declining because of erosion on cultivated lands in the hills and the absence of soil conservation methods. A rapidly increasing rural population puts an additional pressure on the land. This pressure, combined with weak public services, absence of alternative land resources, and severe land tenure constraints, has contributed to make Haiti a country completely devastated by erosion. In 1978, natural pine or hardwood forests were estimated to have covered no more than 8% of Haiti's total land area. The current estimate is 4% (FAO/CP). 2.02 The project was one of three interventions of IDA in the agriculture sector (Table 1) and addressed a group of problems which had not previously been focused on by other major donors. The project was consistent with Government efforts to revive erosion control and forestry programs in an effort to halt the rapid disappearance of Haiti's forests and the resulting soil erosion. 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.01 The project was a pilot phase for a long-term program of forestry development. Experience gained during this first phase was to be used to determine long-term objectives. The objectives of the project were to  -2- pro-'de technical assistance and help to prepate a large scale program aiming at reversal of the trend towards depletion of Haiti's forest resources. The project was to define and begin institution building for a systematic approach to reforestation and included the following componentas (i) strengthening and restructuring of the Forestry Bureau; (ii) forestry training in Haiti and abroad; (iii) pilot fuelwood plantings and fuelwood species trials; (iv) management and improvement of about 20,000 ha of existing pine forests; (v) testing and promotion of cheap and fuel efficient stoves; and (vi) preparation of a follow-up forestry project, which required the improvement of policy aspects such as the enactment and application of new forestry legislation, and definition of a national forestry policy. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.01 The project was simple, carefully defined in scope, and understood by all relevant parties. It corresponded to a priority recognized by the Government of Haiti and by all mrjor donors to Haiti. The project was well prepared and the staff appraisal report provided a good guide for project implementation. In retrospect, however, the expectations for the Foret des Pins management plan were too optimistic (para. 6.12). 5. Project Implementation 5.01 Effectiveness. The DCA became effective on December 14, 1982, almost six months after its signing, after a 3-month extension was granted on September 13, 1982. 5.02 Implementation Period. According to appraisal projections, the original closing date was June 30, 1987. Several postponements brought the final closing date to December 30, 1989, two and a half years later, due to: (i) initial delays in technical assistance recruiting; (ii) political disturbances since early 1986 which caused delays in carrying out training, technical assistance, and the forestry programs; and (iii) the recurrent shortage of counterpart funds. Despite these factors, staff continuity was good and no major administrative difficulties were encountered. 5.03 Proiect Risks. Past IDA experience in the agricultural sector in Haiti has shown slow IDA disbursement and project implementation, primarily due to lack of technical staff, institational weaknesses, budgetary constraints and slow authorization of expenditures by the Government. The appraisal mission recognized these same risks for this project. However, the risk of financial constraints was minimized, to some extent, by use of the Special Account and the availability to the Proiet Forestier National (PFN) of some taxes collected from sales of wood products (charcoal, lumber). The lack of awareness of the rural population concerning preservation of wood resources was recognized at appraisal. It remained evident throughout implementation and could only be overcome through coercive measures (which were not always effective), to prevent illegal logging in the forests and farmers invading fuelwood trials. Flexibility in implementation and close supervision were not enough to minimize these risks so that the project could fully meet its objectives.  - 3 - 5.04 Factors that Affected Prolect Implementation. The factors that most affected project implementation weres (i) the political disturbances during the last four years of project implementation which affected not only security of the operations, arnd the ability to protect State lands against farmers' invasions and brushfires in the Foret des Pins, but also illegal logging ordered by powerful officials; (ii) the help that the project was expected to receive from the Association Francaise du Volontaires du Progres (AFVP) that did not fully materialize due mainly to the country political problems; (iii) the difficulties experienced by the staff because of local work conditions caused by the continuous shortage of Government counterpart funds, lack of vehicle maintenance, adverse road conditions, administrative delays and shortfalls in salary payments; and (iv) the logistical problems caused by the March 1988 fire which destroyed the Forestry Bureau (FB) offices as well as most of the office building for the Ministere de L'Agriculture des Ressoiirces Naturalles et du Developpement Rural (MARNDR). 5.05 Decision Taken that Most Affected Project Implementation. In October 1987 IDA decided not to renew the contract of the expatriate senior forestry adviser to the project, who was perceived as not being committed to the objectives of the project. He was replaced by an adviser who proved to be more active and dedicated and has provided the leadership necessary to implement the project's objectives in the Foret des Pins (para. 6.03). This decision was instrumental in permitting the PFN to reach most of its targets, such as for the fuelwood planting program and the Foret des Pins management plan. 6. Project Results 6.01 This chapter compares actual performance with the targets established at appraisal. It includes an analysis of implementation of project components, assessment of project cost, disbursement, procurement, reporting, auditing and compliance with the Development Credit covenants. In addition, the project impact is evaluated. Because of its small size and relative continuity of management, project monitoring has been satisfactory in spite of the destruction of all records and archives in the fire of March 1988. 6.02 Strengthening of the Forestry Bureau (FB). The slow process of strengthening the FB has begun. Although still a fledgling unit, the FB is today one of the best departments in the MARNDR. However, institutional strengthening of the FB was hampered by the shortage of Governinent funds and the problems caused by the March 1988 fire. The component included financing of three expatriate advisers, respectively in charge of overall project supervision, management of the Foret des Pins, and local training. In addition, the graduates benefitting from external and local training were to be integrated into the PFN structure and necessary vehicles and equipment for the FB were to be financed.  - 4 - 6.03 Technical assistance was slow to come into place. The senior forestry adviser lacked adaptability and commitment to the project (para. 5.05) and the specialist for the management of the Foret des Pins was the victim of a nearly fatal aggression motivated by some imprudent decisions he made in the performance of his work. Both technicians were replaced in 1987 by one adviser who managed to cope successfully with both responsibilities. It was not until the fourth year of project implementation (1987) that a qualified training specialist joined the project. Most of the graduating mid-level forestry technicians were subsequently enrolled in the PFN. In addition, an expatriate technician worked on a program of applied forestry research linked with the pilot plantings and trials of fuelwood species. While this work was initially funded by the Centre de Recherche pour le Developpement International (CRDI) from Canada, costs for this technician were subsequently financed under the Development Credit when the Canadian agency discontinued its assistance in late 1987. (The CRDI expert and the AFVP field volunteers left the country after the shooting of the senior forestry adviser). Purchase of the necessary vehicles and equipment for FB took place as planned. 6.04 Forestry Training. When the project was initiated, Haiti did not have a locally trained forestry technician. To overcome this situation, in 1983 a Forestry School (Ecole Moyenne Agricole et Forestiere, EMAF) was created to train mid level technicians. Altogether three groups of trainees or a total of sixty individuals (SAR's target was only fifty technicians) completed their training during the last three years of the project. Overall, the component was satisfactorily implemented. In addition, eight higher level technicians were trained abroad, two of whom went to France to complement their education at the Ecole Nationale du Genie Rural et des Eaux et Forets (ENGREF). However, this training was not entirely satisfactory because it was more costly and not well adapted to the specific requirements of the forestry situation in Haiti: it could have been improved in terms of curriculum, course schedules, and selection of candidates. The overall training program was suspended when project resources came to an end because the MARNDR did not have the financial resources to sustain the EMAF program. Contrary to the original intention, which was to build a Forestry School at the Foret des Pins, it was decided to install the Forestry School at Damien, close to the MARNDR offices where, with Canadian assistance, a large educational complex had just been completed for the Faculte d'Agronomie et de Medecine Veterinaire (FAMV). This decision contributed substantially to the reduction of training costs for t1-. local technicians. The primary school training of first grade teachers in forestry education was cancelled to avoid duplication of a USAID-supported project. 6.05 Pilot Fuelwood Plantings and Trials of Fuelwood Species. Pilot plantings of species with a suitable fuelwood potential were to be made on 250 ha of State lands. Species elimination trials, through planting and seeding exotic and local species, were to be carried out over an additional 250 ha in different locations in the country. After a slow start, mostly  - 5 - due to lack of staff, the program took off in 1985 when pilot plantings were initiated in four locations (Cabaret, Jn-Rabel, Collora and Colladere). In the beginning, results wAre disappointing for lack of technical expertise among the staff. This problem was further compounded by the political disturbances which led farmers to invade and damage reforested lands with their cattle (para. 9.03). Subsequently, in 1987 and 1988, plantings were accelerated to reach 400 ha, or 80% of the original target of 500 ha. In most cases, the subsequent development of the plantings improved. Although viable technology and practical approaches for large-scale reforestation programs have not been developed, this component stimulated the: (i) production of seeds and forestry seedlings for distribution to NGOs and local farmers; and (ii) creation of local employment. However, useful information has been collected on the growth and survival rates of a number of exotic and local species, as well as on plantation techniques. Although this information requires further confirmation, it should prove valuable for the selection of fuelwood species in large scale plantations. Other serious difficulties, such as land tenure conflicts with the local population and an erratic rainfall pattern, have hampered the effective implementation of this component. 6.06. A lesson to be learned from implementation of this component is the importance of ensuring mutual objectives within international cooperating agencies for project implementation. In this case, CRDI, on whom there was an initial financial dependency, did not have the same objectives as IDA, the major project financing agency. CRDI tended to examine and make decisions on financing of the research component without taking into account the overall project, including the components financed by the Bank. 6.07 Management of the Foret des Pins. The development of a long-term forestry management plan of the Foret des Pins was not started until after 1987, when the first forestry technicians became available and could be sent to the field. It was not completed because of continuous political disturbances since 1986 which made operations in the Foret des Pins a difficult and sometimes dangerous exercise. However, all replanting was done in 1987 and 1988, covering 300 ha, exceeding the original target of 200 ha. A detailed inventory was completed for 11,500 ha, representing 45% of the total area of the Foret des Pins, and the limits of the forest have been physically demarcated with the support of the Bureau du Domaine (Direction Generale des Impots, Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances). Control of all activities, particularly by the 2,000 squatter families in the forest and by illegal loggers, has been progressively tightened with the assistance of the Forces Armees d'Haiti (FAH), which has maintained some soldiers in the Foret des Pins. In the meantime, a significant number of local workers have been employed by the project and received in-field training. Without the project's continuous presence in the Foret des Pins, this only remaining natural forest in Haiti would have been subject not only to substantial encroachments from the neighboring population, but also to wide scale illegal logging. Extension activities did not materialize and were limited only to a partial census due to lack of local funds.  - 6 - 6.08 Testing and Promotion of Cheap and Fuel Efficient Stoves. Results have been disappointing for the testing and promotion of existing designs of charcoal and wood burning cooking stoves, which was to be implemented by the Bureau des Mines et de l'Energie (BME). The market survey was initiated in Cayes, however, with inconclusive results. This component has not achieved its expected impact because there was no coordination between the BME and the PFN, the improved fuelwood stoves (at between US$8 and US$20 per unit) could present an affordability problem, and the population still need to be convinced that these stoves are, in fact, efficient. 6,0O' Preparation of a Follow-up Project. The follow-up project was Fz. in detail, in close contact with IDA and FAO-CP staff, during the _ 40o years of project implementation using the experience gained under the ervject, and with the participation of the senior forestry adviser attac,-*d to the project. 6.10 Credit Administration. The total project cost was US$5.2 million or 102% of the appraisal estimate of US$5.0 million (Table 4, page 1 of 2). Disbursement of credit funds (about US$4.2 million) was particularly slow during the 1985-86 period (due to the political uncertainty in the country), but thereafter increased to be more in line with appraisal estimates (Table 3). Since the Credit was in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for a total of SDR 3.6 million, the fluctuations between the SDRs and the US dollar increased, by about 20%, the resources in US dollars available to the project. Local procurement was used for the equipment and vehicles because there were no major items to be purchased for the project: this procurement was done satisfactorily. Reporting also was satisfactory, although some delays were experienced. Auditing was fulfilled by private local auditors with some delays. Audit reports contained numerous qualifications and the auditors have identified many deficiencies in the accounting system; however, their recommendations generally have not been followed. 6.11 The Borrower did not fully comply with the following sections of the Development Credit: (i) Section 3.01(a), concerning the provision of counterpart funding; (ii) Section 3.05, concerning the obligation for the Government to recruit the eight staff trained under the fellowship program; (iii) Section 3.06 concerning the provision of support services to the farmers in the Foret des Pins; (iv) Section 3.07, concerning the revision of the forestry legislation; (v) Section 4.01 concerning Audit Reports; and (vi) Section 4.03 concerning the collection of an appropriate charge for sawtimber (Table 6, pages 1 and 2). The above country-specific issues are being addressed within the context of the follow-up IDA project now under preparation. 6.12 Project Impact. Since the project was a pilot operation, it has had no impact on the overall wood and forestry situation in Haiti. However, the project has enabled the Government to initiate the strengthening of the Forestry Bureau in the MARNDR, and to initiate discussions with IDA and other institutions on a follow-up project of a  - 7 - much larger scope. The project has had a reasonable impact on the development of human resources, through formal and in-field training of staff at all levels. The project has had a limited contribution to improvement of the physical environment by developing some fuelwood plantings and by using the armed forces to slow down destruction of the natural pine forests. However, the project has not been able to improve soil and water conservation and production targets in the Foret des Pins have not materialized because widespread illegal logging has forced the Government to prohibit any commercial exploitation of forestry resources. In retrospect, most of the appraisal estimates, in particular for forested areas, growth rates, and potential for regeneration, were overly optimistic. This is particularly so given the population pressure on the land and the difficulties in controlling illegal logging brought about by the political disturbances in the country. 6.13 Financial Analysis of Pine Forest Management. At appraisal, financial and economic analyses were made for the Pine Forest management, the one component which would have direct cash income. At completion, no financial and economic analyses have been made because: (i) the project was a pilot operation; (ii) although the component for planting and trials of fuelwood species identified some suitable species, it is still early to assess the performance of them in terms of yields, production costs, and annual sawtimber output (the field trials did not provide practical approaches for large-scale reforestation programs); (iii) the component for Pine Forest management did not fully produce direct and immediate cash income as anticipated due to delays in developing the forestry management plant and the country's political problems as already stated in para. 6.07; and (iv) the financial and economic analyses made at appraisal were based on general assumptions in lieu of reliable actual data in the country, which at this time is too early to be confirmed (at least ten years is required for full development). 7. Proiect Sustainability 7.01 The project is not likely to sustain its activities throughout its economic life unless a new external source of concessionary financing becomes available. The Government of Haiti does not have the resources to maintain project activities, even at the minimum level necessary to ensure maintenance and protection of its physical achievements. After disbursement under the project ceases, permanent staff salaries may still be funded, although irregularly, but no budget would be available for operational expenses and investments. Consequently, any extended interruption in financing the most essential activities will jeopardize past project achievements, and in particular endanger the survival of the Foret des Pins. Ways must be found to continue to provide support, since it is only through sustained efforts that progress is achieved. Issues, such as adoption of a sound forestry policy and legislation, and institutional strengthening, are being addressed during the preparation of a follow-utp IDA project.  -8- 8. IDA Performance 8.01 IDA performance was satisfactory in the preparation stage and during most of project implementation. It must be emphasized that a large percentage of project activities took place between 1986 and 1989, a period of constant political disturbances. IDA acted flexibly in responding to Government requests for DCA amendments, in particular, closing date extensions on three occasions, increase in Special Account deposit, and change in location of one trial area. IDA also agreed to cover the costs of applied research after CRDI's pull-out. Clearly, the political situation in the last four years of implementation made it difficult to effectively supervise this project. 8.02 The main lessons of experience that may be relevant to other IDA-financed projects in Haiti are: (i) because of the human resource constraints, amplified by persistent budgetary shortages, project objectives need to be modest, even though the magnitude of problems to be addressed is large; and (ii) the project has confirmed again the importance of doing pilot work when the technology or methodology is not known or, as was the case on this project, neither the institutional mechanisms for implementation nor supply of trained manpower exist. 9. Borrower Performance 9.01 MARNDR's performance was not satisfactory due to its weak managerial capacity. The project staff could expect little support from MARNDR because of lack of continuity among higher level staff, poor coordination with other Government agencies, absence of budgetary resources for operations and investments, and unclear hierarchical relationships. Overall, the project lacked sufficient and timely counterpart funds. However, it must be pointed out that the Government, by recruiting most of the forestry trainees, bore a financial charge greater than anticipated in the determination of project costs. 9.02 Performance of the PFN, which acted as the project coordination and management unit within the FB, became satisfactory after initial indecisiveness. Project management has fluctuated and its performance has been mixed. The problems which contributed to the indecisive performance of the project during the first years were the following: (i) the Foret des Pins was not originally under MARNDR's jurisdiction; (ii) MARNDR's administrative procedures were very slow; (iii) frequent changes occurred among expatriate staff; and (iv) there were delays in recruiting qualified local professors for the forestry training program. Worthy of mention is the fact that the project did provide better conditions for staff working on the project than for other people in the MARNDR. This, at times, led to some jealousies that may have contributed to the slow approval process within the MARNDR. 9.03 The main lessons for the Borrower that may be relevant for follow-up forestry projects are: (i) the cooperation and understanding of local communities must be obtained before embarking on projects in these  -9- areas, even in the absence of land tenure issues, in order that they appreciate the purpose of the work and do not interpret things incorrectly. (This is also a lesson for IDA). (For example, the trials to measure the impact of restricting grazing on regrowth was interpreted by locals as part of a Government effort to restrict their access to grazing land. Hence they broke down the fences on the trial plot); and (ii) for forestry, or tree planting or even management of native stands, some mechanisms of enforcement must be institutionalized because population pressures on the land are such that wood of any form is at a premium. Protection must therefore be a critical part of any forestry or environmental solution effort. 10. IDA/Project Relationship 10.01 Overall relationship between IDA and the Borrower remained cordial throughout project implementation despite frequen': changes at the ministerial level in Haiti. However, the lack of coordination between the local institutions and their inability to influencc project performance limited, to a large extent, the possibility of a more useful dialogue. Promises by the Government to allocate sufficient counterpart funding were not fulfilled, largely because the Government's financial situation dia not allow it to channel the promised resources. 11. Consulting Services 11.01 Technical assistance provided by expatriate consultants played an important role in project implementation, reflecting the lack of local expertise in forestry. The PFN hired several consultants at different times, either directly or through private firms or public institutions (Centre Technique des Forets Tropicales (CTFT), France). Their performance, with one exception, was generally satisfactory (paras. 5.05 and 6.03). However, political instability and lack of security were factors in shortening their tenure with the project. In one instance, a consultant was savagely attacked and almost lost his life. Clearly, forestry consultants in Haiti need a great deal of dedication to their work and to the country when considering the adverse conditions mentioned above. 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.01 The legal documents for this project were adequate and the Development Credit Agreement was amended on four occasions (para. 8.01). The Staff Appraisal Report provided a useful framework for IDA and the Borrower during project implementation. Progress reports were informative, as well as some special reports on applied research, soil surveys in the Foret des Pins, the forestry training program, and the thematic maps for the Foret des Pins (produced by Aerophoto, a Canadian firm).  - 11 - Part II - Evaluation from the Borrowers Point of View The Borrower has completed a Full Project Completion Report (PCR). Attached is the unedited text of the Borrower's PCR from which we have deleted the descriptive portions of the report. The full PCR and Annexes are available in this Division.   -14- The second of the experts completed his contract, and did so to our total satisfaction. His work on EMAF's curriculum has been forwarded to IDA. A third manager was selected in October 1984. He was initially assigned to the Fuelwood Component, but from February 1985 was required to deal exclusively with the Research Component. (c) The integration of fellowship holders trained abroad and forestry technicians trained in EMAF. (1) Eight young agronomists were trained abroad, six of them financed by the project and two receiving fellowships from the French Cooperation Agency. ENGREF (the National School for Rural Engineering, Water Resources and Forestry) was selected for these advanced studies, but the training it provided was not entirely satisfactory, for the following reasons: * - The period of forestry training was too short. - lThe students received no training for the preparation of their dissertations. - The training was too expensive in relation to the amount of knowledge imparted. Nevertheless, the experience enabled the students to become much more sure of themselves and to develop their sense of responsibility. This had a positive impact on the project over the last three years. (2) Sixty technicians were trained in EMAF, and 18 of them (the final intake) will enter the Service in October 1989. The integration of these young trainees was an additional factor enhancing project performance, particularly with regard to inventory and planting activities in the pine forest, and it also increased the Service's efficiency, especially in the gathering of data for forest statistics. However, there have been setbacks, since some of the technicians have chosen to leave the Service, and others have simply been dismissed. The reasons are as follows: - Some of those accepted by EMAF had no clear idea of the hardships encountered in forestry work. - Others were seeking the sort of high salaries that the country is not yet ready to pay. - Others regard EMAF as a springboard to much higher qualifications. - Recruitment: Candidates were recruited in the various agricultural areas, and assumed that, after completing their studies, they would simply return to those places to work, even though there was no local forestry activity.  -15- The following solutions must be adopted: * As regards recruitment: (1) screen candidates to ensure that they can adapt to forestry work; (2) avoid selecting candidates who already possess the baccalaureat, and who might therefore seek higher qualifications; - provide "blind alley" training at EMAF, so that technicians will not aspire to higher qualifications; provide some sort of allowance within the Service and/or project for positions involving hardships and/or isolation, and call for volunteers for these positions. (d) Cost: US$1,777,500. This excludes the cost of training technicians and forestry engineers. 2. The Training Component 2.5 Constraints one of the first problems with regard to EMAF was that the training program had not been prepared in advance, and this shortcoming became immediately evident when the School opened. It was discussed on a number of occasions by the participating agencies (i.e. the World Bank, FAMV and the NFP). The result was that the School went through an initial period of experimentation, hesitating between training agroforestry technicians (who would be better adapted to the socioeconomic conditions found in rural areas) and forestry technicians (as required by the Agreement between the Government of Haiti and the World Bank, and by the priorities of the NFP and the Forest Resources Service). Meanwhile, there w.s a delay in the arrival of the forestry training expert responsible for cooperating with the School's Directorate on the preparation of the curriculum. He arrived only in May 1987, i.e. about three years after EMAF had opened. By this time, the School had finally opted to train forestry technicians. Moreover, training-was initially hindered by other constraints resulting from the project itself or from institutional factors. Certain essential items were not supplied in time. For example, the bus (for which there was a budget allocation) was acquired two years after the School had begun to function, and this delay hindered the field trips provided for in the  -16- training program. The procurement of camping equipment, audiovisual items, etc. was delayed as a result of institutional and/or administrative constraints. A notable constraint was the lack of any autonomy in the management of the budget for training forestry technicians. Although it did not have a major impact on the training process, some difficulties did arise at the conclusion of operations because of the distribution of allocations among the various line items, some of which had completely exhausted their shares and overspent, whereas others had been overbudgeted and still had funds to spare. 2.6 ImDAct After being in operation for five years, EMAF has produced 60 forestry technicians. Initially, they are being used to strengthen the Forest Resource Service, and are currently engaged in the various project components (planting, research, etc.). The EMAF training they received is reflected in the quality of their work in the field. At national level, this initial period of EMAF's operations can be regarded ar a pilot phase, giving it experience in the training of intermediate-level forestry technicians, who act as the necessary link between the planning stage and field work. In addition to producing technicians, this experience resulted in the preparation of a training program illustrated by field instruction sites that are used as references in a meticulously prepared document. EMAF now possesses the necessary course documentation for training forestry technicians who can be deployed immediately upon graduation, after a .training mainly based on forestry knowledge and expertise. The various courses studied are listed in the Annexes. It should be noted that there is a fact sheet for each of these courses, and there are individual documents detailing the content of most of them. These represent real gains for the NFP and for the Forest Resources Service, which has been strengthened by this trained intermediate- level personnel, and has thus increased its chances of successfully implementing the forestry program over the coming years. Insofar as: a training program for intermediate-level forestry personnel has been established and brought up to date; a team of instructors has acquired experience in teaching the various subjects relating to forestry; r - _  -17- - fact sheets and detailed documents have been prepared for most courses; - teaching materials have been prepared; - particular national sites have been identified and made available for practical training; the country can be proud that the NFP has provided it with the complete organizational structure necessary for operating an intermediate-level forestry school that can train not only forestry technicians, but also *- in the future, and as the need arises -- lower-level forestry agents. 3. The Pine Forest Max.a&ement Component IMPACT The most positive result is the gradual integration of the community into forestry work. The most important effect from the viewpoint of individual farmers is the continuing presence of the Forest Resources Service. We have traine" ;he temporary personnel necessary for producing the forest inventory (20 laborers). Farmers have been trained in reforestation, and about 61 EMAF students (three intakes) have been trained in the field, together with FAMV students (through short and long courses). 169 ha were planted in 1987, 124 ha in 1988, and 9 ha in 1989. Tourism was encouraged by the provision of seven chalets, rented by the tourism service. Illegal cutting was gradually reduced as a result of the surveillance provided by three military personnel from the Haitian Armed Forces. Enforcement of forest regulations must be intensifi3d and reorganized, to provide maximum protection for the remaining cover. LESSONS LEARNED Some technicians cannot endure the cold in the pi. forest, and others cannot stand the isolation, because it is admittedly a very demanding assignment. Technicians will be selected who can adapt to it, and efforts must be made to increase the salaries of personnel serving in the pine forest.  -18- Standard motorcycles are not suitable for difficult terrain, and makes must be selected that have been tested in hilly country. As regards the other vehicles (i.e. the pickup trucks), the make currently used is suitable for the purpose, provided that the pine forest operation is provided wlth lts own mechanLc (who can be penallzed for delays or careless repairs) and possibly with an inventory consisting of the most easily broken spare parts (e.g. windows, ball bearings, oil seals, etc.). Moreover, lt ls obvlous that the vehicles used in a tropical developing country should be somewhat more comfortable than the standard types, so as to provlde better working conditions for the users. Until December 1987, the advisors dld not accomplish -- or were unable to accomplish -- very much in the plne forest. If any reforestation work did take place, no maps were made avallable before 1987. The work performed is summarized in a map of the various stands dating from before the beginnlng of the project, and in a study of the diameter/age ratio prepared at the beginning of the project (now available). We did not reach the pine forest until the end of December 1986. A French expert arrived there in January 1987. Changes began to be made, but the expert was repatriated for health reasons in July 1987, and we cannot make any assessment of the work he performed. The present advisor took up the post in November 1987, and his work is outstanding for its practicality, the transfer of appropriate technology, the rapid personnel training provided (i.e. of laborers, technicians and agronomists), the preparation of the forest inventory, and the soon-to-be-completed management plan. 4. The Pilot Fuelwood Plantation Component 4.3 Project Execution A. Pilot Plantations As already emphasized in the Introduction, the activities relating to this component began only in December 1984, although the process had been officially initiated by the signing of the Agreement in 1982. It was only in 1983 that the project as a whole could be launched. The first pilot planting was initiated in three areas -- Cabaret, Jean-Rabel and the Central Plateau (Colladere/Colora) -- during the 1985/86 crop year. The results were thoroughly catastrophic, particularly in Cabaret, the basic reason being a lack of professional experience at various levels. The results in the three areas were even more disappointing after the events of February 7, 1986, when the plantations were overrun by the neighboring communities, who then used the land for grazing and illegal cutting.  -19- In the 1986/87 crop year, conditions for planting were more or less normal because of the introduction of new improved planting techniques and an increase in the number of field personnel. Conditions for planting in the 1987/88 crop year were the same as for the previous year, and the following table shows the areas planted during the project period. TABLE I FUELWOOD COMPONENT: AREAS PLANTED Location Planned (ha} Actual Area (hal Difference (ha) Cabharet 200 125 85 Jean-Rabel 60 60 0 Colora 120 115 15 Colladere 120 90 _5 500 390 105 As can be seen, the performance rate for these objectives was 78X, the reason being that activities were intensified from FY85/86. B. Seed and Seedling Production In addition to operating pilot plantations on state-owned land, the component also included the production of forest seedlings and the preparation of locally gathered forest seed, particularly in the Colora, Collad&re and Jean-Rabel centers. During the project period, about 750 kg of both exotic and local species were gathered and stored as part of this component. Seed was distributed in accordance with needs. Distributions were made to various NGOs and other institutions, but distribution to farmers was very limited. This material was also given priority for use in project activities. In addition, about 200,000 seedlings of forest species were distributed to farmers on land bordering the project areas. In this case also, it can be considered that the objectives were achieved. C. SainLng This component also helped train project and nonproject personnel, by providing assistance in the following forms:  -20- intermediate-level practical courses during school vacations; the opening of fields of activity to the new graduates, who were assigned to the component so that they could receive practical experience. The following persons were trained: 60 agroforestry technicians; 5 agronomists; 20 FAMV students; - 200 farmers. In addition, the component was concerned with the dissemination of the forestry expertise thus acquired, particularly through the organization of "information days" in the field, with the participation of several other institutions specializing in similar activities. 4.4 Social Impact In addition to the direct benefits resulting from the component, the following positive effects should be noted: = Job creation: Labor accounts for over 65X of the component's budget, representing a considerable number of jobs (about 40,000 man-davs over the entire project period). This employment therefore makes a considerable contribution to the economy in those areas where the component was implemented. - Training "or farmers: The paid labor force is lOOX rural. All these wor-irs received instruction in seed collection, seedling production and forestry planting methods. The 200 farmers referred to above received direct and continuous training throughout ttw- project, because they were its permanent labor force. Honevar, casual workers were also affected because training sessions were organized to prepare them for each of the various operations. - In each of the areas, certain groups in the community showed considerable curiosity regarding the plantations, and these were the object of a number of recreational and educational visits. - Some of the farmers in the areas had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with a new system of land use.  -21- 4.6 Constraints From the beginning of the project, the Fuelwood Planting Component encountered a number of constraints or major problems which severely affected its results and perfoN-mance. Some of these were as follows: - The Problem of Land Tenure MARNDR (the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development) has problems in maintaining control over the land it supervises. Sometimes, the supervisors of the various centers seem powerless to oppose the open hostility shown by the former occupants of the land. In the particular case of Cabaret, the acquisition of 250 ha by the Forest Resources Service for use as pilot fuelwood plantations caused discontent among the neighboring population. The Forestry Service had to adopt strict measures in order to carry out reforestation and protect the areas. Nevertheless, there was unrelenting pressure, and this showed itself in acts of sabotage of all kinds. Over the last year, these problems have been solved with the help of the local civil and military authorities. - SocioDolitical Conditions in Haiti These have never been favorable to our activities, especially since February 7, 1986. - Climatic Factors A series of events caused real problems for the satisfactory execution of the project. The most significant of these were the long droughts that followed planting, and the unfavorable distribution of precipitation. G razitng The plantations were affected to a great extent by the grazing of livestock, mostly belonging to the farmers who formerly occupied the various project areas. This problem even affected the use of certain species that had been regarded as promising because of their adaptability to those areas. - The Lack of Local Partici2ation There was absolutely no local participation. All activities received 100l financing, and were regarded by the local population with a certain scorn. - Administrative Constraints There were many such constraints, particularly -uring the first three years. Administrative delays affected the disbursement of funds allocated to the component. Project management was definitely too centralized to provide for efficient planting. The usual delays in the payment of workers  -22- also slowed down planting operations, so that the project lost its credibility. 44.7 Lessons Learned Through this pilot phase of the NFP, the component gained useful experience in planting for the production of fuelwood. Several lessons can be learned from this project: - It is not easy to manage the public domain in the current state of relations between the forestry sector and the farmers in the various project areas. So far, the only solution has been the use of force, and enormous efforts must still be devoted to community awareness and consciousness-raising. It is quite obvious that there is no point in attempting to solve this problem unless the farmers (who are the former occupants of the land) can be offered some alternative to merely abandoning that land. Experience in Cabaret clearly shows that plantations can be properly established, maintained and supervised only if a system of forest trails and roads is provided, and such a system is made even more necessary by the country's difficult topography. These trails and roads enable the various species to be clearly separated, with a clear demarcation among the various units for the purposes of work and supervision. - Haintenance is of vital importance for the first three years following planting, particularly where the herbaceous vegetation is especially invasive. All planting projects must be granted a certain degree of financial and administrative independence or autonomy. - A period for promoting awareness and for consciousness-raising is a prerequisite for any reforestation program. - Five years is an insufficient period for the pilot phase of a forestry project. Large-scale planting cannot be thoroughly tested in this pdriod. 4.8 Recommendations In light of the above, the following recommendations are made: - As far as possible, the local community should play an integral part in reforestation projects. - Reforestation activities should be diversified, and contacts with other sectors should be increased.  -23- All reforestation projects should include an extension unit, which must be properly supplied with the necessary equipment and resources. The expansion phase following pilot programs must not be delayed, so that the enthusiasm of the trained personnel can be maintained. Periodic evaluation is essential for reforestation projects. The administration and financial management of this component must enjoy a certain degree of autonomy and independence. Reforested areas must be protected, and access to them restricted. 5. Research on Fuelwood Species The research component was financed and evaluated by IDRC from June 1983 to December 1987, and financed by the World Bank from January 1988 until the end of the project. The main objective of the research component was to select promising fast-growing forest species for the production of fuelwood, charcoal, forage and construction wood, while undertaking trials on the direct seeding of forest species and various planting methods. Of the 10 locations proposed at the beginning of the project, only five were selected, representing three types of ecological area that are very widespread in Haiti. Currently, only three sites are in operation, since the others were seriously affected by political events. The trials were initiated in Cabaret in October 1983 and May 1984, in Jean-Rabel in June 1984, and in MiragoAne in October 1985 (see Annexes 2, 3 and 4). In addition, an evaluation was made in 1985 of the species trials conducted by FAO on eight different sites between 1975 and 1977 (see Annex 1). This evaluation provided the information necessary for planning and establishing trials of Eucalyptus microtheca and Eucalyptus tereticornis in Cabaret in September 1987 (see Annex 5). A further trial (of material from Gllricldla seplum) was also conducted in Cabaret (see Annex 6). The research component also produced fact sheets on the most promising species (see Annex 7). Observation parcels were established in Cabaret in 1985 for research on planting methods and various antierosion techniques. In 1987, farmers' demonstration units were established on three sites: Cazale, Trou-Chouchou/Petit-GoAve, and Meilleur (Bainet). Here, research is being conducted on various planting methods and the adaptation and acceptability to farmers of this species (document in preparation).  -24- In addition, several other silviculture activities have been undertaken. To this end, permanent parcels have been established, in both plantations and natural pine stands (work in. progress). Research on direct seeding has not produced encouraging results because the climatic and soil conditions at the site of this informal trial caused considerable problems. The component was provided with the services of a consultant on two different occasions, the purpose being to review the reports of experiments and the codification system for trials. As part of the research component, a computerized data base was also established, using the information generated by the various trials, a codification system, and reports on experiments relating to each of the trials performed. LESSONS LEARNED - The individual activities and forms of participation of the cooperating institutions must be predetermined, otherwise they will tend to act in isolation, thereby hindering progress. In spite of the agreements made at the outset, AFVP withdrew its participation as a result of the political troubles. Eight months of work still remained to be done when the volunteer assigned to the project (and specifically to the research component) was repatriated. On each of their visits, representatives of IDRC -- the donor financing the research component -- examined this component alone, without any reference to the NFP as a whole, and took decisions on methodology, the main aspects of research, etc. without taking into account the components financed by the World Bank. Although applications were repeatedly made to IDRC for a continuation of the financing, a favorable response was not forthcoming. IDRC's evaluation schedule did not coincide with that of the World Bank. * At the beginning of the project, the head of research activities was insufficiently experienced to undertake trials using a scientific method. Care must therefore be exercised when selecting personnel to supervise research. - The initial trials in Cabaret (1983/84) and Jean-Rabel (1984) did not comply with even the minimum requirements for scientific research. Periodic evaluation and carefully planned monitoring was performed only -after the departure of the expatriate specialists who initiated the trials. These were abendoned, and some of the material used was destroyed by livestock. The trials established after 1985 were conducted according to scientific methods and ranged from seed breeding, through nursery  -25- cultivation, to the planting stage, followed by periodic evaluations. - It is essential that expatriate consultants be scientists with the necessary professional experience and intellectual capacity to transmit their knowledge to the project personnel. - It is essential to motivate those members of the personnel who have performed well. At the beginning of the project, IDRC granted six fellowships enabling recipients to study for one month at CATIE (the Tropical Agriculture Research and Education Center) in Turrialba, Costa Rica. Currently, only three of the agroforestry technicians who received fellowships are still working on the project. The four (sic) others have left to work with USAID-sponsored NGOs. It is recommended that fellowships be granted as a form of incentive to the longer-serving members of the personnel who have shown their worth in the Forestry Service. IDRC had allocated a total of US$99,680 for the research component, but changes were made to cover the costs of agroforestry technicians at the end of 1987. The total granted was US$132,184, and expenditures totaled US$131,149. From May 1980 to September 1989, the World Bank allocated US$24,598.25. 6. Fuel Conservation and Legislation - Results According to BME's final report, these activities were successful. Under laboratory conditions, the,improved charcoal stoves proved between 201 and 30X more efficient than conventional stoves. Field tests in Port-au- Prince showed an average reduction of 24.81 in charcoal consumption for cooking, while similar tests in the Northwest showed a 15.2X reduction. The details of these studies and the results of research into the acceptability and production costs of these improved stoves have been taken from BME's report and are presented in the Annexes to this report. The current cost of these stoves (between US$4 and US$5) makes them competitive. The final success of these activities is likely to depend on the public; i.e. whether it can be convinced that these stoves are efficient. Research on fuelwood stoves produced similar results. Laboratory tests showed cooking time to be an average of 401 shorter, with heat retention increasing by an average of 25X. Field tests in the Northwest showed an average reduction in wood consumption of 38.71. Details of acceptability and costs have also been taken from the BME report and included in the Annexes. The cost of these improved stoves (between US$8 and US$20 per unit) would probably make it difficult for them to compete with the traditional three-stone fire as long as wood remains practically freely available to rural communities. However, fuelwood is already becoming scarce in certain regions, and before long it will probably cease to be a "free good." In short, we can say that this subcomponent seems  -26- to have been more than successful, because BME and other organizations continue to promote the use of these stoves, even without financial support. - Constraint The main problem with this component stems from a lack of planned coordination with MARNDR and other agencies. There is, of course, a coordinating committee, but its composition is entirely different from that initially proposed. Although this has had no effect on BME's performance, MARNDR has been somewhat disappointed at the failure to keep it informed of the findings of the monitoring process. This sets a bad precedent for future cooperation among the various agencies. If such cooperation is proposed in future, perhaps it would be better at the outset to determine which agency is to be responsible for execution (in this case BME), unless there are statutory reasons for including others. The other members of the committee would be selected as the project progresses. If the list of participants is specified in the plan, changes should be made only for important reasons and with the agreement of all agencies concerned. Moreover, a further problem affecting all components was that the semiannual reports and audits required by IDA were submitted late. (b) Legislation - Obiectives and Results Action was taken on this subcomponent at the beginning of the project, when the existing legislation, decrees, etc. relating to forest land, transportation and forest product regulations were reviewed and summarized by a consultant. In his report, he also referred to certain aspects of legislation that could be reoriented or improved, making the Forestry Bureau and the supervision of cutting more effective. The report was submitted to the Government at the end of 1985, but received no official response, probably because of the constant political upheavals and the instability affecting the Government at that time. The consultant's report draws attention to the complexity and breadth of the existing legislation. The conclusion could be drawn that the next stage for producing progressive legislative reforms must consist of the consolidation and modernization necessary for establishing an efficient Forestry Bureau (as planned), and a more thorough application of existing forest legislation. 7. Preparation of the Second Phase of the NFP  -27- Results When the project was completed (at the end of June 1989), this proposal was reviewed by the project officer, at the request of IDA and the FAO/CP representative. A project summary was prepared by IDA on the basis of the revised project. Constraint Nevertheless, certain problems arose with regard to the Forestry Advisor. Because he was the third to be hired (as late as 1987), he was to some extent bound by the proposals previously made, even though account should have been taken of developments in the project and of the new administrative situation arising toward the end of the project. Fortunately, these changes were acknowledged and rectifications were made after the initial revisions of the first proposal, so that the necessary corrections could be made before the end of the project. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that greater efficiency can be achieved only through continuity in the post of Forestry Advisor. Undoubtedly, the greatest problem was that the project was not thoroughly rewritten and evaluated, and that the next phase had not been approved, before the end of the preceding phase. This is the reason why many project activities -- such as tle maintenance of pilot fuelwood trials and proper management of the pine forest -- were delayed. Some members of the personnel undertook other projects after the conclusion of the NFP, probably because of the wage reductions. It is true that IDA and the Government endeavored to minimize the potential problems during the interim period before the beginning of the second phase. Possible solutions included IDA financing for completing preparation of the second phase, and World Bank support in the form of a grant for improving the environment. IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE Project performance was not very satisfactory until the end of 1985, for several reasons. From that date, the performance improved considerably and continuously. By the conclusion of the project, all the problems had been corrected or identified, and plans had been made for eliminating them during project execution. Performance was weak for the following main reasons: (a) At the beginning of the project, the NFP.did not control the pine forest. (b) At the beginning, the Special Fund providing immediate financing for procurement and disbursements was not sufficiently large, and thus it was impossible to make payments exceeding the amount it contained. The lack of financing delayed the procurement of  -28- equipment and services and payments to personnel, thus preventing execution from proceeding on schedule. (c) In addition, purchases and payments were often delayed by the lack of any agreed operating procedures between the NFP project officer and those responsible for individual components. (d) Other serious time overruns were caused by the frequent changes of ministers and other high government officials responsible for giving approval to expendi:ures, contracts, etc. (e) In the initial years, contusion arose with regard to the roles of coordinator and project manager. This problem was solved when the manager was assigned the main responsibility for control. (f) Certain components did not go according to plan because of frequent changes of expatriate personnel (i.e. the Forestry Advisor and the Forestry Management Advisor). (g) The training program was not implemented as planned because two full-time FAMV forestry specialists were not incorporated into the training program for NFP technicians. However, this did not prevent the program's implementation, because they were replaced by several short-term temporary instructors. Two potential FAMV members with advanced qualifications in silviculture, and who were acceptable to IDA, were identified for project follow-up. Most of these institutional problems were subsequently solved. V. THE BANK'S ROLE The part played by the World Bank throughout the project was more than satisfactory. The IDA project officers, other World Bank staff visiting the country on supervision missions or for consultation, and the IDA headquarters staff in Washington, D.C. were at all times helpful, cooperative and constructive in their project-related activities. VI. IMPACT ON FOREST RESOURCES As proposed, each component was to play its part in achieving the overall project objectives, consisting of the establishment of a suitable administrative and technical base for reversing the process of forest deterioration. A Forestry Bureau has been established with an almost full complement of staff, as a result of the hiring and training provided under the NFP. As a result of research and pilot fuelwood trials, many species have been selected for use in future plantations supplying energy needs. Management methods are beginning to be applied to the pine forest. Objectives (such as determination of the numbers of technicians to be trained locally and abroad and the areas of land to be used for pilot fuelwood trials and new  -29- plantations in the pine forest) were achieved as planned, although behind schedule. As regards the probable future impact of the first phase on the production of construction wood and fuelwood in the pine forest and other stands, the NFP Forestry Advisor's recent estimates of the benefit stream (clrculaClon mondtaLre nette), costs, the internal rate of return and future fuelwood output show that these are very close to the original estimates. However, these estimates have taken account only of the years after 2011, assuming that only an eight-year second phase would be implemented, and that 2011 would mark the end of the third cutting rotation on the new NFP fuelwood plantations. Some output estimates were made for 1988, when the second phase was likely to conclude. Most of the differences apparent in the output estimates for two different periods result from the figures prepared by the Forestry Advisor for the forest production areas, including the output from a proposed government-controlled permanent forestry area. The following are estimates of forest areas in the year 2011: Stand 1982 Estimate (ha) Forestry Advisor's Estimate (in 1989; ha) Government plantations for energy use 81,000 8,400 Mangrove 20,000 16,000 Dense deciduous forest 150,000 2,000 Degraded deciduous 691,000 21,000 Pine forest 69,000 20,020 The 1982 estimates were overoptimistic with regard to the regeneration rate for the dense pine forest. As regards the pine forest, the benefit stream for the year 2011 was estimated at US$5.7 million, costs at US$165,500, and the internal rate of return for the 29-year period from the beginning of the first phase was very positive. If differences of area are disregarded, the Advisor's estimates are very close to those initially made. The benefit stream totaled US$3.6 million (taking into account only cutting in dense forests), costs were US$200,000, and the rate of return was over 300X. The Forestry Advisor's estimates of fuelwood output are almost identical to those prepared at the beginning of the project, if we disregard. differences in the area and productivity of plantations for energy use. The two sets of estimates are identical with regard to rotation and the growth rate of natural forests.  -30- The annexed tables show these estimates in detail. Those for the beginning of the project are taken from the 1982 staff appraisal report, and those of the Forestry Advisor are his projections (1989) for calculating the cost-benefit ratio and the project's rate of return.  -31- Part III Table 1 PART III STATISTICAL INFORMATION Related IDA Credits / First Rural Development Rural 1977 Closed The project faced Implementation problems from Project In the North Development the outset and was classiflid as a problen project (Credit 676-HA) nearly half of the Implementation period. The project oncountered serious problems of social, og' cultural, and technical naturo by the weaknesses of the regional services. Agricultural targets were not met, irrigation underwent substantial reformulation during impl mentation, Infrastructure components were carriod out as torgeted. ODN failed to provide an analysis and a management overview of imploeentation and issues. Excess turnover of dir-ctore and technical staff. Post-Hurricane Agricultural Agriculture 1981 Closed Project appralsed under *bbroviated procedures, Rehabilitation Project experienced major delays during the various (Credit 1106-HA) Implementation stages. Limited capacity of the implementation agency DARNDR to absorb financial assistance, but no reasonable alternatives available to the urgent need to rehabilitato agriculture in the affected areas. Executed with a delay of more than one year, the oporation was not successful and confronted with limitation of counterpart funds, serious Institutional constraints of DARNOR to manage the project and SCA for delivering and control credit operations. 1/ Approved before the Forestry Project.  Part III -32- Table 2 Page 1 of 3 HAITI FORESTRY PROJECT CREDIT 1257-HA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Proiect Timetable Item Date Planned Date Revised Date Actual Identtiicatlon by Bank - Early 1978 Identification (FAO/CP and Bank) - March 1979 Identification/Preparation (FAO/CP) - - August 1980 Preparation (FAO/CP) 1/81 _ January 1981 Preparation (Bank) 1/81 - January 1981 Preparation Follow-up (Bank) 4/81 - April 1981 Appraisal 6/81 - June 1981 Post Appraisal 9/81 - September 1981 Credit Negotiations 4/82 - April 1a-16, 1982 Board Approval 6/82 - June 8, 1982 Credit Signature 6/82 - June 16, 1982 Credit Effectiveness 12/16/82 - December 14, 1982 Credit Closing 6/80/87 6/80/88 8/80/89 December 81, 1989 Project Completion Report 12/31/89 8/30/90 1/ The Executive Project Summary was issued in October 1980. The issues raised at each stage of project cycle were: Identification/Preparation - land for plantations and degraded forest in the North-West for management need to be actually identified, including clear information on cwnership; - recent decision by Government to remove existing contractors from the pine forest will have to be actually enforced; and - policy decision by Government is required on project organization.  Part III Table 2 -33- Page 2 of 3 Preparation - the area identified near Ganthier for fuelwood plantation is partly occupied by a military training group; and - the location of the field training station is to be decided upon. Preparation Follow-up - the participation of the population; - the organization and management; - the project impact in public finances; and - the land tenure. Appraisal - the need to clarify and detail the project design with Government; - the inclusion of field trails in the North-West; - the promotion of fuel efficient cooking stove; and - the amount of credit to be financed by IDA. Credit Negotiation - the appointments of Chief of Forestry Bureau, senior forestry consultant and the employment of consultants; - the sawtimber charge; and - the ava!lability of land for trial planting. Board Approval through Credit Effectiveness - 250 ha of land has to be made available to the forest service; - the Bureau has to appoint a field manager for each of the three project areas; - the Ministry has to designate a senior procurement officer; - the opening of the Project Special Account; and - the participation of both Ministries responsible for National Education and Energy.  Part III Table 2 -34- Page 3 of 3 Credit Closing - the project activities are still affected by the political climate prevailing since 1986; - the illegal activities in the Foret des Pins (logging, cultivation and cattle grazing) still contribute to the forest degradation in many places; - the counterpart funding is still inadequate; - the destruction by fire of the Ministry of Agriculture building in early 1988 has left the project without archives and accounting documents. Auditing of the accounts is proved to be difficult; - the pressure from surrounding farmers on the land still under forest cover, in the Foret des Pins, is continuing; - there is an inappropriate institutional framework with two Governmental institutions who administer all the forest in Haiti and they do not coordinate their actions; - the forestry legislation is inapplicable; - the absence of policy on national forestry; and - the complex landowner system (land tenure conflicts are hindering implementation of the forest management program).  -35- Part III Table 3 HAITI FORESTRY PROJECT CREDIT 1257-HA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Credit Disbursements (US$'000) -FISCA________-----------F I S C A L Y E A R (FY) 9 ------------------------- 1983 1984 1986 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Appraisal Estimate 70.0 87.0 2.20 8,700 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 Actual 64.5 61.4 802 1,899 2,169 3,188 8,877 4,249 2 Actual as X of Appraisal Estimate 79 69 86 88 54 80 97 106 Date of Final Disbursement: February 13, 1990 Cancelled Amount at Closing: US$ equivalent 107,000 (SDR 81,300) 1/ Bank FY (July 1st to June 30). 2/ IDA credit was granted in Special Drawing Rights (SDR). The actual final disbursement figure is higher than the original amount estimated at appraisal because during project implementation disbursements were made in US dollar equivalents of the then SDRs amounts of the IDA credit which reflected the exchange rates existing at the time of each disbursement.  Part III Table 4 -36- Page 1 of 2 HAITI FORESTRY PROJECT CREDIT 1257-HA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT A. Project Costs (US$'000) Actual as Z Components/Categories At Appraisal Actual 1/ of Appraisal 1. Reinforcement of Forestry Bureau 722.0 1,543.9 214 2. Forestry Training 2,112.8 1,346.1 64 3. Fuelwood Plantations 685.0 921.7 135 4. Pine Forest Management 1,194.6 1,336.4 112 5. Development of Cooking Stoves 149.4 36.5 24 6. Preparation of the Second Phase 213.0 3.7 2 Total 5,076.8 5,188.3 102 ========== =Feb y ========== 1/ Up to February 15, 1990.  Part III Table 4 -37- Page 2 of 2 B. Prolect Financing (US8'000) Components/Categories Government IDRC 1/ AFVP i IDA Total At ApDraisal 1. Reinforcement of Forestry Bureau 28.8 0.0 0.0 698.2 722.0 2. Forestry Training 44.7 0.0 116.7 1,952.4 2,112.8 8. Fuelwood Plantations 79.4 160.6 212.0 248.0 686.0 4. Pine Forest Management 89.9 0.0 231.3 898.4 1,194.6 5. Development of Cooking Stoves 0.0 149.4 0.0 0.0 149.4 6. Preparation of the Second Phase 0.0 0.0 0.0 218.0 21a.0 Total 217.8 800.0 669.0 4,000.0 5,076.8 Actual 1. Reinforcement of Forestry Bureau 200.6 58.1 - 1,285.2 1,648.9 2. Forestry Training 47.9 4.7 - 1,298.6 1,846.1 8. Fu-lwood Plantations 410.2 86.1 - 426.4 921.7 4. Pine Forest Management 94.6 1.0 - 1,240.8 1,886.4 5. Development of Cooking Stoves - 88.6 - - 86.5 6, Preparation of the Second Phase - - _8 7 8.7 Total 758.6 186.4 - 4,249.4 6,188.8 3) IDREC - Canadian International Development Agency. V/ AFVP - French Assoclation of Volunteers.  Part III Table 5 Page 1 of 2 HAITI FORESTRY PROJECT CREDIT 1527-HA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT A. Direct Benefits Component and Appraisal Targets Actual Results 1. Strengthenina of the Forestry Service (1) recruitment of external consultants Done (ii) Integration of forest technicians trained by the project Done (iM) purchase of vehicles and equipment Done 2. Forestry Training and Education (1) graduate training 8 8 (ii) technical training 60 61 (il) primary school training (toachers) 138 per None year S. Fuelwood Species Trials (No.) 4 8 4. Pilot Fuelwood Plantinps (ha) 500 400 5. Pine Forest Management (1) delimitation Done (ii) Inventory (ha) 26,600 11,600 (Ii1) management plan Incomplete (lv) replanting (ha) 200 S00 S. Development and Promotion of Fuel-Efficient Stove (I) study and manufacture of model Study Done (li) market test Initiated in Cayes Inconclusive results 7. Preparation of Follow-up Prolect Project identified POLICY ASPECTS (I) Improve operations of forest Due to lack of funds operations not service sustainable after project (ii) carry out extension activities None (111) enact and apply forest legislation Review carried out; no legislative action taken (iv) develop viable reforestation Incomplete; additional approaches technology involving people need to be tested  Part III -39- Table 5 Page 2 of 2 B. Economic Impact 1/ Appraisal Estimate Actual Economic Rate of Return (Z) Extremely Positive N/A C. Financial Impact 1/ Appraisal Estimates Actual With stumpage at US$.21m3 Highly Negative N/A With stumpage at US$.5/m3 Highly Negative With stumpage at US$10/m3 1.4 With stumpage at US$12/m3 9.88 1, The actual economic and financial rates of return have not been estimated mainly because this was a pilot operation and it is too early to assess the performance of field trials of fuelvood species (para. 6.13). D. Studies The following studies have been completed during project implementation: - the Management Plan of the Foret des Pins; - the drafting of a detailed curriculum for the training of forestry technicians; - a report on the results of the Forestry Applied Research Program; - proposals for establishing a Corps of Forestry Guards and improving forestry legislation; and - the Preparation R -ort for the follow-up Forestry Program.  -40- Part III Table 6 Page 1 of 2 HAITI FORESTRY PROJECT CREDIT 1257-HA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT Status of Covenants DEADLINE FOR COVENANT SUBJECT COMPLIANCE STATUS 3.01 (a) The Borrower shall carry out the During project Direct counterpart funding was project and shall provide the implementation. very inadequate. However, the funds, facilities and services, Government is currently promptly as needed, required for financing the cost of the the purpose. project local staff salaries (about US$300,000 equivalent per year). 3.05 Candidates for fellowships shall be During project Some of the forestry satisfactory to IDA and after implementation. technicians were not trained shall be recruited under contracted by the Government the project-financed training in the early years due to lack program. of sufficient local funds. 3.06 Government shall intensify Resources were unavailable. agricultural support services to farmers in the project area of La Selle, in particular by provision of credit and appointment of additional extension agents. 3.07 Government shall review, for future December 31, Draft future legislation was forestry projects preparation, the 1984. prepared in August 1985. Its existing legislation and review was delayed due to regulations, exchange views thereon political events after with IDA prior to the end of 1984, February 1986. and thereafter introduce modifications, as necessary.  Part III -41- Table 6 Page 2 of 2 DEADLINE FOR COVENANT SUBJECT COMPLIANCE STATUS 4.01 (c) Audit reports of project accounts Before April 30 Audit reports were generally to be received by IDA within four of each year late and with many months of the end of the Government during project qualifications. fiscal year. implementation. 4.03 Government shall cause the Bureau During project Illegal commercial logging to collect an appropriate charge implementation. took place during project for sawtimber commercially execution. In 1987, the harvested in La Selle managed Government stopped all forest. Charge to be increased authorized commercial logging periodically. in order to control illegal operations.  Part III -42- Table 7 Page 1 of 2 HAITI FORESTRY PROJECT CREDIT 1257-HA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT A. Staff Inputs (Staffweeks) FY Preparation Appraisal Negotiations Supervision Total 1978 0.15 0.15 1979 1980 1981 32.18 14.40 9.89 56.47 1982 26.18 26.18 1983 9.59 9.59 1984 19.00 19.00 1985 23.55 23.55 1986 11.95 11.95 1987 11.46 11.46 1988 8.11 8.11 1989 11.49 11.49 1990 4.41 1/ 4.42 Total 32.33 40.58 9.89 99.57 182.37 1/ Includes 4.09 staffweeks for PCR.  Part III -43- Table 7 Page 2 of 2 B. Missions Stage of Month No. of Days In Specialization Performance Type of i Prolect Cycle /Year Person Fleld ReDresented 1, Retina Status 2, Problems THROUGH APPRAISAL Identification (FAO/CP) 03/79 2 7 b,d Identification/Preparation (FAO/CP) 08/80 1 7 *,d Preparation FAO/CP 01/81 4 21 *,d,d,d Preparation Bank 01/81 2 11 *,b Preparation Follow-up (Bank) 04/81 2 7 O,f APPRAISAL THROUGH BOARD PRESENTATION Appraisal 06/81 8 17 a,d,d Appraisal Follow-up 09/81 2 6 b.e SUPERVISION Supervision 1 02/83 1 4 * 2 M,F Supervision 2 08/88 2 s *,g 8 U Supervision 8 10/88 1 2 * - - Supervision 4 01/84 8 10 b,c.- 2 U Supervision 5 07/84 1 s e 2 U Supervision 6 01/85 8 7 b,-,e U,T Supervision 7 08/86 2 12 b,e 8 U Supervision 8 10/86 1 10 * 2 U Supervision 9 08/86 1 8 o 2 - Supervision 10 11/87 2 8 c,. - - Supervision 11 10/87 2 4 coo 2 U Supervision 12 04/88 2 9 e,f 2 U Supervision 18 09/88 1 6 * - _ Supervision 14 12/88 1 6 * 2 U Supervision 16 04/89 1 4 * 2 U a/ a = mission leader; b = forestry specialist; c e economist or agricultural economist; d = consultant; e = agriculturalist; f = civil engineer; g = financial analyst. 3/ 1 = problem-free or minor problems; 2 = moderate problems; 8 = maJor problems. 3/ F = financial; U = managerial; T = technical.  MAP SECTION S.  . ' e , A : , o . , : . ,A / A N /N Cp e t - - O C E A N 7 i - 4k< . . Por, de P3ix | . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A R6 F.W., | CUBA' -\L. 6 w H BUEC IN T I 0% A-_ FAMAICA RICO RT>it' -' Pinre forest eomooruent G w 0 g9, W~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AI f C~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~6 Humi SC rdeo. - N' HAITI C' FORESTRY PROJECT : I IPine forest component fl Pine forest management hseadcotoarters FvPel.ooad species trials and demronstrations cc Ecological nones: Humnid '--Anneal oerage rainfall in millimeters Ssd Risers Gon&ve nrLLA Onrtlt nAn. 1O -Main higheays Scondapry roads . - - -- Tertiary roads - - International boundarp S3 K ILO M ET E R S 0 1 9 20 30 40 5 0 _6Lp MILES 6 6o io So <J4 C > 400 >Jerdrnie~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 R.....,t-Au-P,o.e R Z A ... D 'H ir. 1, 0 0~~00 , onn dn a,n . S.ats VACHe I C a r / 6 b e a n 5 e a Pv roaocnno rrhnOn,nooa,adsnb.ndoo 606600 Su 660 cne. Qn.gn.f, n. OOOu P00 uonoOor,. Cno, a IrS 06566 06M .060d. en vInnrno uunou06m00 Oufl=r o