Liberia - Second Lofa County Agricultural Development Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Repwt No. 9573 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT II (CREDIT 1242-LBR) MAY 17, 1991 Agriculture Operations Division Country Department IV Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PHASE II Currency Equivalent Currency Unit = US $ Weights and Measures 1 metric ton e 0.98 long ton 1 long ton = 2,240 lb 1 hectare (ha) 2.47 acres 1 acre 0.405 hectare 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile 1 mile = 1.609 kilometer Abbreviations ADF - African Development Fund GOL - Government of Liberia IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA - International Development Association IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development LPMC - Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation MOA - Ministry of Agriculture PCR - Project Completion Report Fiscal Year July 1 - June 30  THE WORLD BANK FOR OFFIIAL US ONL Washington. D.C. 20433 U.S.A. olce a# Otcitrncwwal Op,aeiam IwlAMIism May 17, 1991 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Liberia Lofa County Agricultural Development Proiect II (Credit 1242-LBR) Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project Completion Report on Liberia Lofa County Agricultural Development Project II (Credit 1242-LBR)" prepared by the Africa ^ gional Office. No audit of this project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICWALTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PHASE II CREDIT 1242-LBR Table of Contents Page No. Preface .................. - .... .... i Evaluation Summary iii.. .......................... Part I: Project Review from Bank's Perspective Project Identity ..................................... A. Background ............................. 0........0............ B. Project Objectives and Components ............................... 2 i. Objectives .............. .. ................... 2 ii. Components ...... ........ . ........ ....*.. * ............. * .2 C. Project Design and Organization ................................. 3 D. Project Implementation ...................................... . 4 E. Project Results ... ............................... S F. Project Sustainability ............................................. 6 G. IDA Performance . .................. ............... 6 H. Borrower Performance . ......................... 7 I. Consulting Services ... ...... ............. ..........8 J. Project Documentation and Data .................................. 8 Part III: Statistical Information 1. Related Bank Loans/Credits .................................... .9 2. Project Timetable .......................... 10 3. Disbursements .................................................. 10 Follow-on Project ........................... ......... 11 4. Project Implementation .............................. 12 5. Project Costs and Financing ...................... . ........ ...13 6. Project Results ............. o......... ...... o........ 14 7. Status of Covenants .......................... 15 8. Use of IDA Resources . .. . ... ... ... ..... .. . .18 May: IBRD No. 15550R This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  - i - PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT II CREDIT 1242-LBR PREFACE 1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Lofa County Agricultural Development Project II in Liberia, for which Credit 1242- LBR in the amount of SDR 13.3 million (US$15.5 million equivalent) was approved on May 4, 1982. The Project was co-financed by the African Development Fund (ADF) which provided a loan equivalent to about US$9.6 million. The Closing Date for the IDA Credit was June 30, 1987. Earlier a review by IDA and the Government officials in May 1987 had concluded that the Project (along with a few other on-going projects in Liberia) was not expected to achieve the desired development impact under the circumstances then prevailing in the country and that the Credit should be closed on schedule and the undisbursed balance be cancelled. However, in order to honor withdrawal applications the Credit was closed on September 29, 1988, over a year behind schedule. An amount of SDR 3.8 million (US$4.9 million equivalent) remained undisbursed and was cancelled with effect from the above date. 2. The PCR (Preface, Evaluation Summary and Parts I and III) was prepared by the Agricultural Operations Division (AF4AG) of the Western Africa Department in the Africa Regional office. The Borrower was not sent Parts I and III nor could they provide Part II because the Government collapsed as a result of the ongoing civil war. Preparation of this PCR is based on the Staff Appraisal Report; the Credit Agreement; supervision reports, correspondence between the IDA and the Borrower; and internal IDA memoranda.  - iii - PROJECT COMPLETiON REPORT LIBERIA LOFA COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT II CREDIT 1242-LBR EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Backaround: Agriculture a:c-.nted for about 35 percent of Liberia's GDP and about 60 percent of employment. Land was not a constraint for agricultural development. Rice is the main staple and is largely grown ir uplands areas. The growth in agriculture was estimated at 4.1 percent per annum for the period 1976-1980. With the collapse of the Government, the continuing civil war situation is likely to have serious impact on the agriculture sector. 2. Obiectives: The project was intended to consolidate the experiences and achievements of the first Lofa project and extend agricultural services to that part of the upper Lofa county not covered by the first project. The project aimed at increasing production of rice (upland and swamp) and cassava by improved farm management, new planting of coffee and cocoa and rehabilitation of smallholder coffee farms and thereby increasing farmers' income. The project was to reorganize cooperatives to enable them to take over input distribution, credit, and primary produce marketing functions. It was to start integration of project staff with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and to seek immprovements in the operations of the Liberia Produce Marketing Corporatior. (LPMC). 3. ImRlementation Experience: The IDA supervision missions found the project management to be good and the staff well motivated. However, the Borrower's commitment to the Project was not adequate. Its implementation-was far from satisfactory for a variety of reasons, some external to the Project such as suspension of disbursement by donors. Extension activities and agricultural services were carried out indifferently. While IDA missions detected the need to modify the technical solutions offered to farmers in light of the implementation experience and recommended specific changes, the adoption of these changes was below expectation. Efforts to develop cooperatives as a viable alternative to LPMC and/or licensed agent activities, particularly for marketing of crops, were unsuccessful. LPMC was not effective in fulfilling its market functions due to financial Ss well as organizational problems and the Government failed to take determined action to reform LPMC. The Project Unit staff grew disproportionately  - iv - to its development activities. The Borrower and its agencies remained poorly coordinated, thus reducing the possibility of taking effective action to achieve desired results. There were major shortfalls in the Government's contributions to project funding, particularly in the later years. The provalence of unethical practices at all levels contributed to a sense of demoralization, which was not conducive to innovative and vigorous actions towards achievement of project goals. 4. Resultss The Project's primary goal of increasing agricultural output and farmers' incomes was only partially attained. Concerning crop area and yield, coffee rehabilitation and upland rice did well in terms of appraisal targets, but swamp rice, new coffee and cocoa were well below SAR estimates. The Pi ject's performance with respect to institutional development (cooperatives and LPMC) was most unsatisfactory. The Project expenditures were unbalanced with administrative expenses taking a lion's share. The Ministry of Agriculture's extension service was weak and witheut links to research. The aim of integrating project staff with MOA could not be achieved. Loan recovery from the farmers was poor. The overall result of this project is unlikely to meet its main objectives because of implementation problems exacerbated by macroeconomic and institutional problems. Data for formal economic and financial analysis are not available since a PCR mission has not visited the country following completion of the project on June 30, 1987 because of the deteriorating country situation resulting from the ongoing civil war. 5. Sustainabilitvt The project organization as it emerged at the end of the project implementation period was not cost-effective and could not be sustained beyond the period of external donor ft,nd availability. The institutional set-up for extension, input delivery and outpul marketing required substantial improvements and its sustenanc, would otherwise have been pointless. The technological package offered to the farmers needed more testing and adaptation for further application in the County. The integration of all agricultural staff in the Ministry of Agriculture, a project objective which was essential to maintaining coordinated development activities in the County, was not attained. 6. Findings and Lessons Learned: (a) Follow-up projects can have pitfalls due to ready replication of earlier projects. Prudence would demand a more critical evaluation of the results of preceding projects and designing later projects in light of the lessons learned (para 7); (b) It is often preferable to pause in project development in order to settle the emerging institutional issues and test the technological solutions. Outcome in such cases are slower but surer in the long run (para 9); (c) In designing a project, consideration should be given to Borrower's views to elicit their participation. The  - v - Borrower's comnitment to the project is critical to its success (para 19); (d) Subsistence farmers with their traditional practices and cultural barriers are most difficult to change without adequate incentives--particularly higher output prices. Attempts to assist them directly and rapidly may encounter difficulties. It may ofter. be more expedient to strengthen the cooperatives and assist the non-subsistence farmers. This would lead to the gradual development of subsistence farming through institutional assistance. Demonstration effect of and provision of ready services by enterprising larger farmers can also be very cost-effective and beneficial (para 19); (e) In the early stages of development, productivity increases in subsist ace farming could be more easily obtained by improved husbandry than cash inputs (e.g. fertilizer); introduction of cash inputs can follow as the farmers get ready for adaptation (para 13); and (f) The farmer could easily lose incentive if he is unable to readily market his crops at a fair price; all his production efforts would otherwise be an exercise in futility (para 11) .  Part I PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK PERSPECTIVE Proiect Identity Project Name: Lofa County Agricultural Development Project II Loan No.: 1242-LBR WVP Unit: Africa Country: Liberia Sector: Agriculture Subsector: Food and Tree Crops - Subsistence Agriculture A. Background 1. The main thrust of the Liberian Government economic policy during the 1970s and 1980s was to expand the country's productive capacity, especially in agriculture, and to ensure that benefits from economic growth were enjoyed by an increasing number of Liberians. Agriculture was the largest productive sector in Liberia's economy, accounting for 35 percent of GDP. The rate of growth of agriculture was estimated at 4.1 percent per annum for the period 1976 to 1980. About 60 percent of the total population earned a livelihood from agriculture. With low average population density, land was not a constraint to agricultural development. However, there were still constraints on agricultural development, e.g. lack of ongoing analysis of economic and institutional aspects, shortage of qualified and experienced agricultural staff and agricultural support services (e.g. marketing) and poorly developed farmer's organizations. 2. The Government gave high priority to agricultural and rural development, particularly for the benefit of smallholders. The Government's objective was to improve traditional farming by increasing on-farm productivity and supporting marketing and processing, as well as related social and other infrastructure. The land-use policy was to encourage cultivation of rice in the swamps and to grow tree crops on the uplands. This was because swamp rice carried much higher yield potential compared to upland rice and tree crops offered a far superior monetary return compared with upland rice. 3. The Lofa Agricultural Development Project II (Lofa II) was the Bank Group's seventh lending operation for agriculture in Liberia. Six other projects for a total of US$45.6 million consisted of a pilot rubber development study and technical assistance, two county agricultural development projects including the first phase Lofa Project, and Rubber, Forestry and Oil Palm Development projects. Bank Group lending for agriculture supported the Government's objectives of diversifying production and increasing smallholder participation in development. 4. The Lofa II project aimed at increasing food production and farm incomes by extending assistance to smallholder farmers initiated under the first project (Credit 577-LBR). About 8,000 additional farm  families were expected to earn significantly higher incomes; improvement in agricultural services, roads and wells were to bencfit a majority of the rural families in the region. The project was, therefore, in line with the Government's sector and macro policy objectives. The crop components reflected the Government's land use preferences. B. Proiect Obiectives and Components (i) Obiectives 5. The project was intended to consolidate the experiences and achievements of the first Lofa project and extend agricultural services to that part of the upper Lofa county not covered by the first project. The project aimed at increasing production of rice (upland and swamp) and cassava by improved farm management, new planting of coffoe and cocoa and rehabilitation of smallholder coffee farms and thereby increasing farmers' income. The project was to reorganize cooperatives to enable them to take over input distribution, credit, and primary produce marketing functions. It was to start integration of project staff with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and to seek improvements in the operations of the Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation (LPMC). (ii) Components 6. The Project comprised of the following components: (a) the supply on credit of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, to improve production of upland and swamp rice, cassava, coffee and cocoa; (b) expansion and improvement of extension services us.ng the Training and Visit (T & V) system with female extension workers to reach women-farmers: (c) staff training to improve the extension program and cooperatives; (d) production of improved cocoa and coffee seedlings and cassava setts, and adaptive research into upland cropping systems; (e) improvement -f cooperatives to enable them to take over responsibility for input supply, credit an. marketing; (f) improvement in the marketing operations of the LPMC; (g) schistosomiasis monitoring and control in swamp rice areas; (h) construction, upgrading and maintenance of feeder roads and farm trecks, village wells and latrines; and  (i) the establishment of a central monitoring and evaluation section of the Ministry of Agriculture and funding for evaluation studies. C. Proiect Design and Organization 7. The Lofa County Agricultural Development Project II was a follow-up to Credit 577-LBR (Agricultural Development-LOFA). Preparation and appraisal staff replicated the design and organization of the earlier project. The assessment of the results of the first project also seemed somewhat more favorable than might be justified. Consequently, the second project did not fully benefit from all the lessons of the earlier project. The experience of projects in Liberia, as in some other developing countries, had already indicated that traditional agriculture of subsistence farmers (the target group of the project) was difficult to change. It was more advisable in the beginning to promote better husbandry through demonstration plots and extension work, than to introduce new ways of farming involving significant cash investments. The project, however, attempted to provide better seeds, credit, fertilizer, etc. without too mucl. success in improving productivity. Also certain cultural barriers and attitudinal factors were ignored in emphasizing swamp rice component in the project. Swamp rice cultivation was regarded as inferior work reserved for women and was to be practiced where land was scarce and production for domestic consumption was necessary (not as a cash crop). it was not surprising, therefore, to find that both in terms of area and yield, the swamp rice development was a failure. The project included a technological package which was not sufficiently attractive to the farmers and in some cases still under experimentation. Naturally, conflicting advice was sometimes given to the farmers (e.g. the utility or otherwise of shade trees in coffca farms). 8. In matters of organization, the project started with a potential problem. MOA's agricultural staff (located, but not working in the project area) received different pay and benefits than Project staff working in the same county. The marketing issue was identified early but the Project was launched with Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation (LPMC) suffering chronically from cash availability, and problems with procurement, price level and the timing of payments. The weak cooperatives were to be strengthened by supervision and training, and a specialist was provided to reorganize the operations of these societies. Interesting, however, organizational provisions included the use of village level cooperative units, group meetings undez the T&V system and other group activities for raising comnitment and responsibility of the farmers. Also, provision of extension services was specifically made for independent female farmers and for farmers' wives who had been somewhat constrained socially from direct contact with male extension workers. 9. It would not be correct to say that the appraisal and supervision staff were unaware of the design and organizational problems  - 4 - mentiot.ed above. However, a certain amount of undue optimism about remedying the deficiencies in design and organiization of the project could be detected. Quite early in the credit processing stage, the Bank's senior management had pointed out the need for working out the LPMC's restructuring and a more critical reappraisal of the experience of the first Lofa project before proceeding quickly with a follow-up credit. However, on the ground that continuity was needed in the operations and staffing of the ongoing development program, the credit was pushed through and declared effective. It was natural, therefore, that the project execution period was marked throughout by problems associated with the identified but unresolved issues. On hindsight, it appears that it would have been preferable for IDA to delay project development to permit settlement of identified institutional problems and technological issues. D. Proiect Implementation 10. In the face of the traditional antipathy of farmers to work in swamps and the labor requirements of such cultivation, the swamp rice development program faltered. About fifty percent of the extension effort was devoted to it. For upland rice, seeds distributed by the Project had only ten percent more yield capacity than seeds obtained by exchange from Gther farmers. The proj.ct seeds w.ere also not readily available in adequate quantities. In fact, labor availability (for swamp rice) was a constraint in the project area and the upland rice development had more scope Eor expioitation than the project envisaged. Also, more adaptive research and evaluation of the results were necessary before offering particular technical solutions to the farmers. For example, farmers were encouraged by the project to cut shade trees in coffee farms in the early years. Substantial project funds were spent on equipment and staff in this effort. Later, it wAs found not to be beneficial without benefit of fertilizers, and the shade trees had to be gradually restored. IDA missions also found the necessity for coordinating advice by various donor agency officials in such technical matters. The need for integration in the !.ofa County of MOA staff and project unit staff was recognized early, but with the exception of the Chief Agricultural Officer of the Lofa County doubling as the Project Manager, nothing much happened in this respect during the entire project implementation period. The project staff members enjoyed greater benefits than the regular MOA staff, but lack of assurance of eventual absorption in MOA meant considerable uncertainty as to their future job security. 11. At the time of credit closing, costs for the project reached 75Z (about US$21.0 million) of appraisal estimate (about TJZ$28.0 million). However, the performance was not balanced. Admin..strative costs were about 1772 of appraisal estimates while productive activities were being underfulfilled. Expenditure on agricultural extension and training were 73? and 582 respectively of the appraisal estimates. 12. The unsatisfactory marketing arrangements for inputs and outputs was a major problem of the project. This was also the main reason why the credit Closing Date was not extended by IDA and a large  -5 amount of credit funds was cancelled. It was envisaged that the cooperatives would be developed under the project; this was expected to alleviate a lot of the input and credit distribution, as well as crop marketing problems. However, in spite of the appointment of some key senior staff and increasing the number of the cooperatives, these organizations never achieved sufficient strength and efficiency. IDh missions were frustrated with this situation and in 1987 concluded that even the Cooperative Union Manager in Voinjama, the principal city in the County, lacked interest, leadership and strong managerial force to guide and strengthen the cooperatives. The failure of LPMC to fulfill its marketing functions compounded the difficulties of the farmers and the objective of increasing their output and income through incentives could not be achieved. A study on LPMC's marketing was carried out with a view to preparing a plan of action for implementation but until IDA's last supervision in January, 1987, nothing was done by the Government. Significant efforts, however, were made under the project to reach female farmers and farmers' wives and encourage them to improve home gardening and diversify crops for greater variety in diet. Craft courses were also provided and the female participation rate for all the above matters was satisfactory. E. Proiect Results 13. The project was expected to be completed by June 30, 1986, but since IDA funds were still available, project activities continued until June 30, 1987, when the Credit was closed. According to the estimates of the last supervision mission in January 1987, actual new area cultivated and yields obtained were below appraisal estimates. The revised appraisal targets were oaily exceeded for coffee rehabilitation area and nearly achieved in respect of the area for upland rice - seed exchange. Achievement of crop area targets for swamp rice, new coffee and new cocoa was only between 40 to 50 percent of the appraisal estimates. Actual crop yields for upland rice and coffee rehabilitation were comparable to appraisal estimates, but that of swamp rice, new coffee and cocoa were below appraisal estimates. 14. The unsatisfactory results appear to be mainly due to the inappropriate development strategy, ineffective extension service and absence of a viable marketing system. Towards the end of the project, IDA missions had recognized that given the small size of the family farms (seldom above 2 ha) and their low technological levels, increases ir productivity could be obtained in the early stages from better husbandry methods, and without the use of cash inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides or machinery. The MOA was weak and its extension service lacked clearly defined purpose. Supervision was loose and there was no systematic monitoring. The extension eervice had no links with research activities. 15. The project had devoted a large part of the available financing to administrative expenses and vehicle operating costs, to the detriment of other productive activities. The project's performance in cooperative development, input supply and credit administration was less than satisfactory. Recovery of seasonal loans in the years 1983-85  averaged only 51 percent. LPMC had perennial lack of funds which hindered its ability to buy crops from farmers, disrupting marketing and credit recovery. IDA's suspension of disbursement of Liberian Loans and Credits on two occasions during the project implementation period (on country debt service grounds) compounded the financial problems. The incentives amongst the farmers that the project was able to develop were stifled by the problem of inadequate and erratic marketing (through LPMC). This, however, could not be solved in the context of the project, particularly since its origins resided in the difficult state of Government finances. F. Proiect Sustainability 16. The sustainability issue relates to whether the organization, financing and the activities of the project were such that these could be absorbed within the regular functioning and financial abilities of the country. Insofar as the Second Lofa Project (along with the first phase) was covering the entire Lofa county, and it was consistent with the Government's decentralization decision to organize development and administrative efforts on a county basis, project activities were to be continued into the future. The deficiencies in the project's strategy and institutional arrangements have been raised in other sections of the PCR. Here we would raise only the two major issues of integration with Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and cost- effectiveness, which are somewhat inter-related. With a semi-autonomous management unit, the project hired its own staff at salary levels higher than those of MOA, which also had its agricultural staff in the project area. The project also provided its own training facilities and physical infrastructure which further added to costs. The MOA remained weak and outside the sphere of the major development efforts under the project (and similar other projects) which rendered duplication of the project approach on a national level unlikely, considering the financial constraints of the Government. 17. The Project unit remained over-staffed, in spite of some reductions made with IDA's encouragement. Even in mid-1987, at the time of credit closing, there was serious imbalance in staffing and operating costs between administrative and productive divisions. In terms of expenditures, in the first four years of the project with 75Z of the project funds utilized, administrative expenditure was about 1762 of the appraisal estimates, while expenditures on Agricultural extension and training were 732 and 58Z respectively. The project was not sustainable at this level of administrative expenses beyond the period of external donor financing of bulk of such expenditures. G. IDA Performance 18. As has been mentioned in the section dealing with project design, IDA performance in the early stages of the project cycle was marked by an approach which, though cognizant of the fundamental difficulties (e.g. technology, cooperatives, LPHC and marketing) facing the project, was unduly optimistic about their timely and successful resolution. The technological (e.g. seeds, swamp preparation) issues  -7- were not fully assessed until well into project execution. The causes of inadequacies in the cooperatives and LPMC in respect of input distribution and marketing were expected to be diagnosed after the project began and expected to be cured early during the project implementation. The supervision missions laboriously grappled with these matters and met with project officials and ministers, introduced consultants and studies, and attempted to promote action plans. These efforts, however, were not very successful due to the financial situation prevailing in the country and the inherent lack of coordination at the highest levels of the government and its parastatals. 19. The cultural traditions in the country, whether in respect of rice cultivation or use of public funds and resources, were perhaps not fully comprehended by IDA staff (e.g. public bodies as sources of patronage). Also, the assessment by successive IDA missions of the Liberian project management as consistently good and highly motivated seemed at odds with the project's uneven and unsatisfactory performance. A sad example of the Project Management's priorities was the increase in administrative costs while productive activities were being underfulfilled. During 1986 when staff was reduced by about 100, reductions in expenditures for Plant Production, Civil Works, Health and Commercial Services were between 24 and 45 percent. At the same time, administrative staff increased by 29 percent. The Project Management could have benefitted by closer attention and guidance from the IDA missions. This might have allowed significant mid-term changes to project strategy and action plans. H. Borrower Performance 20. Towards the end of the first phase of tha Lofa project and before the preparation of the Second Project, the Liberian Government had changed as a result of an army coup in April 1980. It was interesting to note that this change did not materially affect the commitment of the Liberians to the two Lofa projects. The ministers in the new government took interest in the projects and were regularly accessible to IDA missions. Perhaps more use could have been Liade by the missions of this level of involvement on the part of the policy makers in reforming the project and resolving the implementation problems. Even at the project design stage, the Minister of Agriculture had suggested that the IDA could concentrate on development of the cooperatives and assistance to non-subsistence farmers, while the MOA would deal with the subsistence farmers. It appears that IDA staff did not sufficiently consider this suggestion and proceeded to replicate the first phase in designing the second project. In retrospect, it may have been more prudent for IDA to first concentrate on strengthening the vital input delivery, credit and marketiag functions through cooperatives which would later have permitted more efficient assistance to the subsistence farmers. Weakness of the cooperative system was a serious handicap of the project. Also, IDA staff could avoid the obsession of directly reaching the subsistence farmers. Often the development of the non-subsistence sector is a surer way to assist the subsistence farmers because of the considerable demonstration effect.  Also, cost-effective and timely services and inputs can often be provided by the non-subsistence sector. 21. On the other hand, lack of financial support by the Government was a major problem for the project, particularly during the later years. The shortfall in Government's actual funding of the project from appropriations during the years 1983-84 and 1984-85 (first two quarters) was 50 percent and 99 percent respectively. The project activities were then grinding to a halt due to inadequate counterpart funds. The Government also dragged its feet in preparing LPHC reform plans, and perhaps against the best judgement of IDA management, the study and restructuring of LPMC was agreed to be done during the project period instead of preceding it. Again, the LPMC's marketing performance or the lack of it was the most serious constraint faced by the Project. In June, 1985, an IDA mission observed that the marketing problem was due to the physical shortage of cash and to LPMC's weak financial situation and that the farmer producers and cooperatives were having to bear the heaviest burden. In order to market farmers' produce, many cooperatives had to borrow heavily at high interest rates from commercial banks; the only way they could break even or make a profit was by rapid turnover of sales. Since LPMC was unable to pay when crops were delivered, most cooperatives incurred heavy losses. Farmers had to sell to whoever would buy at about half the regulated price; this affected the farmer's ability to repay loans, and was a disincentive to production. There was, however, no determined effort on the part of the Government to streamline LPMC's operations and speed up payments. Revocation of licenses of licensed buying agents who were found to be paying less than minimum prices was also not made. The Government was advised by IDA to encourage the private sector to play a wider role in marketing, in parallel with LPMC. Not much attention was paid to this suggestion by the Government possibly because LPMC was a major source of patronage of the senior officials who had drained off LPMC's surplus of funds (or equity) years ago. I. Consultina Services 22. Project consultants provided valuable assistance to the Project management in project implementation including training of local staff. A good relationship existed between the consultants and the Project management and the Borrower. J. Proiect Documentation and Data 23. The documentation for the project was adequate. The Credit Agreement was quite adequate for achieving project objectives. The appraisal report provided a useful framework for review of project implmentation.  -9- PART III STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1. RELATED SAW( LOANS/OR CREDITS Loan/Credit Titl- _Purpose Yoar of Approval Status A. Cr. 677-LBR Agricultural Devolopment (Lofa) Project: To incroose production August 1, 1975 Completod 6/02. of emailholder rice, cocoa, coffee in Upper Loft. B. Cr. 700-L8R Agricultural Development (Bong) Project: To increase production Docember 29, 1977 Completed 12/68. of smaliholdor rico, coffee and cocoa in Upper Song.  - 10 - 2. PROJECT TIMETABLE Date Planned Date Actual Identification 1/ -- -- Preparation 12180 12/80 Appraisal 05/81 05/81 Credit Negotiation 01/82 01/82 Board Approval 05/82 05/82 Credit Signature 06/82 06/82 Credit Effectiveness 12/82 12/82 Completion 06/86 06/87 Credit Closing 06/87 09/88 1/ As a follow-up to the First Lofa County Project, the project was prepared by the Bank's Regional Mission for West Africa in collaboration with the management of the First Lofa County Project. The Project incorporated lessons learned from the first phase Lofa County Agricultural Development Project financed by IDA Credit 577- LBR. 3. DISBURSEMENTS, Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements ----------------(uS$ million)------------- FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 Appraisal Estimate 1.30 4.80 9.70 14.20 15.50 Actual 1.15 4.84 6.95 9.12 10.10 Actual as 2 of Estimate 88 100 72 64 65 Date of Final Disbursement: September 29, 1988 Comments: No follow-on project.  LIBERIA-LOFAI 1 Actual and Estimated Disbursements 16 - ____ __ ____ 15 14 13 - 12 - c o 1 1 10 9 0:: ~7 o 6 5 4 3 2 83 84 85 86 87 PERIODS (FY) El Actual Disbursement + Appraisi Estimrate  - 12 - 4. ,,OJECT !L1 TT0 PYl PY2 PY8 PY4 TOTAL X INDICATORS SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR/Actual Crop Developent -----------------------